Strategy & Tactics - Number 208

Update Afghanistan • Pearl Harbor • British-Afghan Wars

NUMBER 208

Also:

• For Your Information

• Toolkit for Holy War:Afghanistan

«joi p

OUTGOING BY JOSEPH MIRANDA

Editor-in-Chief: Joseph Miranda

fYl IdftoirTimothyl KultaDesign • Graphics • Layout: Wlie'Cüirimins

'Copy Editors: Cory'Andersort, tob DeanySaiyRomano, and Dav Vandenbroucke. >Map Graphics: L Hoffman & Meridian MappingCounter Graphics:,L Hoffman ,,. • , . . . „ . . • - , ,

, ADVERTISING: Rates and specifications available on re-quest. WrileP.OJox21598,Bûkersfleltltt93|90.uSUBSCRIPTION RATES are: Six issues per year—tin

"United Slates is $99/1 year; Caiula surface miifl raWs dn!i-SIM/l-year and Overseas surface moil rates ore $129/1year. International rotes aresubjectto change as postalrotes

,,,. , , , ,. agoa'neonlyMlie^nitd'State is $36/1 year. CanodosAi moil['ratei W$4î ''"'year and Overseas'surfece mail rotes ère $48/1 yeo.All payments must be inU.SJundsdrtwnonaU.S. bank and.mode payable IB Strategy & Toctlcs,{r1eflse no Canadian<lieefe}. ttecb and immey orders or |ISA/Mfls|0rC0nl «•

'tejJted (with à minifnumchorje of$40JlA( ordertsrwutd Hsent to Decision tóames, M. lok 21598;BalërsfieM t*93390 or ct*661/58?-9633 îhest hours Ja crf'qre 9orfr12am POT, M-H or.use our 24rhow|ox,e6U58775031 wor ^.mail us from our website www.decisloi ames.com.NON U.S. SUBSCRIBERS PLEASE NOTE: Surface mail

,toP.O.§ox2l598,,BakersfteJdCà,9» , ,.,„ ,„, ,„,STRATEGY & TACTlß® "'»a registered trademark forDecision Gwies" mtiary fcishiry magazine. ' Strategy& Tartks {©2001} reserves all rights ortlhe cBntents bithis .puUtarttan. Nothing may be, reproàtedi from ,» to..«/hob orjn part wBhotrf prtor pennlssion, (raffte pie-stehïr. AB rights reserved. All csrrespondence acnld besent to Decision Games, P.O. Box 2ï598,'Bakersfiëld CA1

9339IU • ...... •'. - , - " > • > • ! > ''-il'-, » ;ï ., . vSTRATEGY & TACTICS (ISSN 1040-886X) is pub-lished bHiwnthlyhy.pecfeion Somes, 1j549S|lzw«lh'A, . ;ii, ^ ( i - ^ ._

Periodiwl Oass postop poirf at Bakersfleid^danlLJJïAï-Ü^I '' •** ' ' ff- <"* "':> '*'$ •'"• ' * *? "- '•'•''•

POSTMASTiR:Please send addresschanges toStrategy & • '"-To«fic*,,PQïox„, «2l598,BakersfieldCA93390.

BULK RATE

U.S. POSTAGE

PAID

MOJAVE CA

PERMIT NO 92

This is a special issue of Strategy & Tactics. After considerable discussion, we decided thatgiven the current situation in Middle East to run articles and a wargame that deals with not onlythe current conflict, but also the historical background as well as a future "what if' war againstIraq. Veteran game designer Ty Bomba takes the lead with his Back to Iraq feature. AndrewPreziosi and Gary Romano look at once and future wars in Afghanistan. Tim Kutta over in theFYI section provides an update on the continuing crisis, with some background on the Talibanand Osama bin Laden. And we close with my "lessons learned" analysis of the last war inAfghanistan, the Soviets versus the Mujahideen. With the next issue of S&Tv/e resume ournormal schedule with First Indochina War, the French vs. the Viet Minh, 1946-54.

Back to AfghanistanI did a quick check of ScSTback issues. In the last decade or so we've covered quite a few

topics related to the current conflict in the Middle East (it's the middle of October 2001 as I writethis). S&T 139 included Arabian Nightmare, a complete simulation of the Gulf War, designedwhile the conflict was in progress. Issue 144 had Chad: the Toyota Wars which wargamedthe intricacies inherent in low intensity conflict in acountry fractured by civil war. Number 147was Holy War: Afghanistan, a simulation of the then recently concluded Sovietcounterinsurgency against the mujahideen. Number 158 had a retrospective on the Gulf War.Issue 166 included an analysis of modern terrorism, and what counterterrorist forces did rightand wrong (admittedly, back in the 1960s and 1970s, but still there are lessons to be learnedfor today). Issues 170and 171 presented extensive coverage of the UN intervention in Somaliain the early 1990s, this being one of Osama bin Laden's stomping grounds. 174 was oursimulation of the Indo-Pakistani Wars, and 197 looked at both nations' nuclear capabilities ingreater detail. First Afghan War was published in issue 179, wargaming the ill-fated Britishexpedition of 1839-42. Issue 180 had articles on two different air wars against Iraq (the firstbeing the little known campaign of 1941, the second the well publicized Desert Storm). Andfor more on this topic, issue 180 included a piece on simulating airpower in low intensityconflict. Issue 202 was Invasion: Taipei which, while set in a different part of Asia did includesystems for modeling modern electronic and cybernetic-based operations. Number 204covered the Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s, a conflict which has had considerable repercussionsfor today. Finally, issue 206 provided an analysis of US strategic deployment capabilities inAsia.

Simulating Modern WarfareWhen designing wargames of modern era conflicts, say from 1946 to the near future, there

are several dilemmas that have to be faced. These include:

Asymmetry in tactics. How do you account for the differences between, say, US AirLand Battledoctrine and Soviet-style echelon tactics? Do you use special rules to give each nation'sforces special capabilities in combat? Or do you just give each force different combatresults tables, with the outcomes reflecting the differences that occur on a lower level?

Reconstitution versus unit burnout. Some nations try to keep their combat units as cohesiveformations by providing them with replacements and enhanced logistical support. Otherssimply keep their units in the line until ineffective, pull them out, and replace them withfresh formations. Do you give units operating under the former system the ability to replacecombat losses (say, by providing "replacement points" or enhanced disruption recovery),while the latter receives additional whole unit reinforcements instead?

Helicopters. How do you portray helicopters and assorted airmobile/air assault formations?Are they a special form of airpower or a modified form of land power? They use flight toquickly concentrate and break off combat. But these units also can operate in a mode similarto armor, that is, as maneuver units capable of taking and holding terrain.

Technology and other stuff. Electronic warfare has considerable impact on the modernbattlefield, yet it is not a combat maneuver force. The related fields of command-controland cyberwar also are becoming increasingly critical. One solution (used in S&T 202Invasion: Taipei), is to model them similar to airpower, as theater level assets effectingunits on the operational and tactical levels. continued on page 26

Next IssueNext issue: Indochina. The First Indochina War, French versus the Communists,1946-54, your chance to win in Vietnam before the United States got involved (JoeMiranda, designer; Brian Train, developer).

#208

CONTENTS

NOVIDEC200I Number 208

FEATURES

4 Back to Iraq: A StrategicAnalysis & Update for 2002by Ty Bomba

16 Update Afghanistanby Gary Romano

22 The British Warsin Afghanistanby Andrew Preziosi

40 "A day that will live in infamy."by Gary Romano

47 The Soviet War in Afghanistanby Joseph Miranda

DEPARTMENTS

2 OUTGOING MAIL

26 WORKS IN PROGRESS

27 FYhFORYOURINFORMATION

33 TOOLKIT FORHOLYWAR:AFGHANISTAN

63 FEEDBACKQUESTIONS

RULES

RI BACKTO IRAQ, 3RD ED.

On the cover: Photos from aroundthe Middle East

STRATEGY & TACTICS 3

ack To Ira ci

Strategic /4n a lysiby Ty Bomba

The Ai

>li< - î ' < • - - ! ' ' ï >=. ': -n air power, as given expression by the US and other First World air forces, cannpi>:/" »s '•' ' '• v | ; , : : . ; ' ' : . . in the 1991 Gulf War, the month-long aerial offensive conducted preliminary

toïi« •/,": : : : ; ; > : ? < ; . : JJjjj f - - i : ; -i : ••... ; ; •• ; | ! : , :• ; fi percent of all Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery° o . , ' K - ? - ' . - . p H-, "i: ;-! ï ; : : ' ! îg ,conducted primarily by I3-52s, also worked to undermine the moraleof the

j i '; ' ' • ; ' : • : ! ' : ; :; . : , , ; i : ; nahe 140-iTiile-long "Saddam Line" along the northeast border of Saudi Arabia.1 ' • ' < • • • '•.'• : • ; : : : ! , : • • • ; • ? • • • • : . , , . : , , ; • ; i . s o hard that their formations effectively ceased t o operate.

• - • . - . - - - . _ ... . S^S^^pJ i|AIÏ| ^^?AtîAAâ ! \' ! . : ' • ':' ' . - ï i p §| . M : : : p s , ! - ||| j : ; : i r ! M ! , i : , , , : ') i :, 'i î ; ;âck Jong enough to allow for Iraqi mobile forces,

i ; ^ : ' ::.u< | • ; , : : i ; = . : ; u > ; . • ; ; : , ;; ,;..\ , ; iietratioiis. In stead, by the time the Coalition ground attacki's'iu!.*' • ; . ' • • , - • - } ' • , : , i-: : ; i :^ ' . ' > : : i : . ; : ; v » : : ' ;* -.'uced by casualties and desertion to the point they hardly

/ ; : . K . , r ; i T: , i \ . - :> ' . ; , i ;mi;\ 'vri'":^ [ 'o . ; . , ; : - . ; : i : . r . ' i j ' ' 1 ,5 \ h : - = . i , : ' , i :::s\a.

-\." ' . . - a i / i - ' i- •-. .•• ' ^ ; . - i i . : ;•'••• • > . . •: ;!;;:::'! | • ;- ; : - , : ; ; Jjj ; : ' : : : i . M vehicles the Iraqis had in the Kuwaiti theater of•-.- • - : • : • . -> ; ' ; : ;'i ' ' :; .ï, r ••: ; . • : ;.

:- : : . 1 ' . L i v . ' "\ i : : : - < i i ; r, though, because most Iraqi truck drivers,'• ' : • > ' ' • v ' : : s : : ' i : - : : : , - , . • • ' . . • • , : . < , - • • ' . : • • • - I , ; . . ; - • , i :• . . :• ' , : , r , - • = ; ! . . ;v,, ' • ' : • ' • • lier increasing their army's supply

: - , i i ' c H , , : : : M u:";:::' : ' : ; ; : . " : r - t . ; ; ; .•• • . .>; i , : - , - j r ; : ' i.Sdam's ill-fated. Kliafji counter-offensive wereU U n O l , - :V.:^ M l l J ' O.:" , ' : ' : : , . ' ; ' "0 | fiA

All that was accomplished by air power in the 1991Gulf War. And it was accomplished even though lessthan nine percent of the munitions used were of the so-called "smart bomb" type. Elsewhere in September1995 during a three week NATO aerial campaign con-ducted using about 70 percent Precision Guided Muni-tions (PGMs), the Bosnian Serbs were undeniablybombed to the peace table. Executed just four and a halfyears after Desert Storm, and under the much worsevisibility of Balkan skies, that effort showed how muchPGMs had been improved since the earlier war. The USAir Force and Navy claim the PGMs hit their targets 97percent of the time in Bosnia, heavily damaging orcompletely destroying 80 percent of those so struck.

More indicative of the ongoing limitations of the airpower only approach, though, the late-1998 "OperationDesert Fox" air offensive over Iraq, aimed at gettingSaddam to readmit UN weapons inspectors to thatcountry, failed miserably. Despite the creation of anominal (and actually stillborn) replacement weaponsinspection regime, the man from Tikrit proved tougherthan the administration then in the White House. Bydemonstrating he was willing to go on exposing his bestremaining mobile units—the then newly organizingSpecial Republican Guard—to ongoing aerial attrition,Saddam simply outlasted President Clinton. In so do-

ing, he regained the freedom necessary to carry on hisvarious chemical, biological and nuclear weapons re-search programs, a development that will undoubtedlyhave repercussions in any new war in the region.

Finally, from 26 March to 10 June 1999, again in theBalkans, but this time under the less colorful sobriquet"Operation Allied Force," some 1,200 US and Alliedmilitary aircraft were used to fly 34,000 sorties againstthe rump state of Yugoslavia. That operation's intentionwas to force the Milosevic regime to halt ethnic cleans-ing in the rebellious province of Kosovo, though no onewould have complained if the Serb dictator had alsobeen killed in the process. The mission was an eventualsuccess, though it now seems it was more the Serbdictator's belated realization that Russia would not riskwar with NATO to save him, rather than the unevenbombing effort itself, that finally brought peace.

It is now 2002, which means the flyers and scientistshave had another three years to further refine andimprove the computerized high explosives. Still, thecritical truth revealed by those recent Western aerialoffensives, at least in terms of judging what modern airpower can and cannot do in war, came from what didn'thappen. In both the Gulf War and the Balkans, not asingle important member of either dictatorships' rulingcliques was so much as scratched by a piece of aerially


delivered shrapnel. And despite all proclamations com-ing from Washington before and since as to who andwhat constitute legal targets under US law, they werecertainly trying to kill the two dictators.

In 1991 the complete disruption of the Iraqi armedforces' communications by aerial attacks failed to over-turn Baghdad's strategy for the conduct of the war. Thatwas because Iraqi ground war strategy was simple. Atfirst it could be summarized as simply: "Hold and die,"while later the paradigm was changed to "Run away!"Iraqi strategy didn't require their engaged units be inregular communication with higher headquarters inorder to execute it.

Air power failed as well to alter the various lower-level headquarters' tactics for conducting the groundbattle. As one captive Iraqi major explained to his USMarine Corps interrogators shortly after the cease fire,when asked to evaluate how Coalition air power hadaffected Iraqi tactics, he answered: "Not at all. You see,in the Iraqi army we don't really have anything liketactics."

What he meant was that the Iraqi army, like mostThird World forces, never sharpened tactical skills ondefense, in training or in action, beyond just trying tohold static, linear positions. As for conducting offensiveoperations against opponent Western armies, the abilityeven to attempt to do so, let alone to carry such effortsthrough to completion, can be taken as the operativecharacteristic distinguishing "elite" Third World unitsfrom the run of the mill.

Once all is considered, then, analysis of recentexperience indicates air power alone still cannot bedepended on to win and maintain a desirable peacewithout at least the clear threat of strong ground forceattack. After a decade of on-again, off-again bombing,today Saddam Hussein remains in the saddle while alsohaving revitalized his weapons of mass destructionresearch and acquisition programs. The rest of thisarticle therefore deals with the strategies available to theWest in 2002 to bring about the downfall ofthat regimein such a way as to create a relatively lasting settlementacross the region.

VABs caught in a sand storm.

Iraq Forces TodayWhenever the possibility of a new ground war

against Iraq is discussed in the media, it is not longbefore it is pointed out the US Army is no longer largeenough to field a force of the size used in 1991. What isgenerally not mentioned, however, is the fact Iraq is alsounable to deploy a force anything like the one Saddamhad at his command in 1990-91.

The end of Desert Storm, and the further wastagesuffered due to the revolts inside Iraq immediatelyafterward, left Saddam's ground force reduced to about35 percent of its prewar size when measured in terms ofmanpower and equipment levels. It's harder to get a surefeel for his troops' present level of proficiency, moraleand unit cohesion (the ability to keep fighting oncecasualties begin to be suffered). We do know, however,all Iraqi divisions, including those of the RepublicanGuard, are currently listing about 15 percent of theirpersonnel as absent without leave, which is not a figuretypical of high-morale armies.

Likewise, we can safely guess that the approxi-mately 800 officers purged as a result of the four failedcoups staged against Saddam since 1995 have beenreplaced by men selected on the basis of their personalloyalty to the dictator rather than for their tacticalacumen, operational competence, or strategic brilliance.We also know that since 1990 no field training exercisehas been conducted within Iraq by any formation largerthan a single division. Thus we can see the Iraqi army isincreasingly led by political appointees and increas-ingly lacks even training in maneuver and combat of thescope that would be carried on in any new war with theWest.

The Iraqi ground force—which was never close tomatching Western standards of morale, proficiency andcohesion even when at its peak in 1990—has only gonedownhill since. As a guess, then, if we were to quantifythose factors on the day the Iraqi army entered Kuwaitin 1990 as having been 100, we could safely estimatetoday ' s rating in those same categories would be some-where around 50. Looked at another way, a recentlydeclassified Defense Intelligence Agency report esti-mates the overall combat power of Saddam's armedforces is fading away at the rate of about three percentper year. (Unfortunately, the report doesn't give anyindexing start date for when that attrition rate came intoeffect.)

In terms of general organization, both the regulararmy and the Republican Guards responded to their1991 defeat and the embargo f olio wing it by consolidat-ing units and cannibalizing equipment. But such pro-cesses can only be carried so far, and the general senseamong analysts is the Iraquis have reached their limits.

Iraq also manufactures under license most of theconventional equipment needed by its army, includingtanks and armored personnel carriers. The embargo,

#208

however, has worked to ensure new equipment hasarrived in numbers much lower than needed to achieveanything likefull-replacementstatus. Forinstance, since1991 the T-72 factory near Baghdad has failed toproduce more vehicles than would be needed to fleshout one division. Nor can much improvement be ex-pected in the efficiency of the military portion of theIraqi economy. One of the tactical successes of theDesert Fox bombings was to further reduce Iraq'soverall arms production capabilities, all state owned,which are now estimated to be about a tenth of what theywere in 1990.

A new element in Saddam's force structure wasintroduced because one of the coup attempts came fromwithin the Republican Guards. That coup's failure re-sulted in those units losing their status as the regime'spraetorian guard to a new headquarters set up andpersonally headed by Saddam, the Office of the Presi-dential Palace (OPP). It contains some 25,000 to 40,000personnel, all organized into new, super-elite, super-loyal formations.

The Presidential Guard (Heavy) Armored Divisionwas for a time the single largest division inside Iraq,with an estimated manpower of 14,000 and a fulldivisional complement of tanks and armored personnelcarriers, including almost all of the several hundredIraq-manufactured "Lion of Babylon" T-72 variant, thebest tank in Saddam ' s arsenal. This unit also came underheavy attack during Desert Fox; so much so, in fact, itappears to have been demoted on the organizationalcharts to a brigade-size formation now referred to assimply the Armor Command.

Saddam '$ Fedayeen (men of sacrifice) is a motor-ized infantry force made up of teenage recruits takensolely from his own Tikrit clan. This is another unitwhich was disrupted by Desert Fox. It remains slated,however, to eventually expand to full division size.

Special Forces Unit 999 consists of four battalionseach of which contain men given special training in aspecific foreign language and culture, including SaudiArabian, Persian (Iranian), Palestinian and Turkish.There's also a fifth battalion of marines, reportedlytrained to specialize in deploying frogmen and smallboats to lay mines and conduct demolitions in coastalwaters.

The General Security Service Rapid InterventionBrigade, the Military Intelligence Rapid InterventionBattalion, the Security Battalion of the Military Intelli-gence Service and the Rapid Intervention Brigade of theSpecial Republican Guard (apparently renamed simplythe 4th Motorized Brigade) are all well equipped—interms of weaponry, vehicles and communications gear—motorized infantry outfits. In effect Baghdad-basedflying columns, their efforts that have been responsiblefor keeping Saddam in power during the last few years.They have so far proven able to detect, move to engageand annihilate every coup attempt.

British armor in the desert.

The last unit above al so forms the vanguard of a new14 battalion strong force of heavily armed motorizedinfantry organized under the command of Saddam'syounger son and heir apparent, Qusay. Called the Spe-cial Republican Guard Corps or SRG, it was set up bydrawing on the most loyal members of the originalRepublican Guard force and has since been given thepick of recruits. Since the Desert Fox bombings, theSRG has also inherited the remnant of the erstwhilePresidential Guard Heavy Armor Division, the AirDefense Command (two regiments and three indepen-dent batteries, in and around Baghdad, armed primarilywith SA-6 and SA-7 missiles), the Intelligence Bureau,the Communications Command, the Chemical Detec-tion Platoon, and the Field Artillery Command, theHowitzer Command, the Transport Platoon, as well asa reserve infantry and self-propelled artillery regiment.

Those changes have left the original RepublicanGuard units to serve as little more than the mechanizedcore of an increasingly less mechanized (thanks to theembargo and Desert Fox) Iraqi ground force. Thesedays only OPP and SRG units are stationed in andimmediately around Baghdad. Even when in transit, noregular army or Republican Guard armored unit isallowed to remain in the capital city overnight.

Also in response to Desert Fox, in 1999 Saddamdeclared the return of the Popular Army, a defenseconcept earlier abandoned during the Iran-Iraq War. Intheory at least, this resulted in the militarization of alladult Iraqi men into 19 new infantry divisions. The ideawas those units would provide the margin of manpowerneeded to defeat the ground invasion Saddam declaredwas sure to follow the Desert Fox aerial offensive. Inreality, it seems the Popular Army exists only on paper,a public relations stunt at most. There simply aren't the

continued on page 10


D D GIS l D H .uil 1-

1 1 1 d .é f b ï i»irv:' CollectionBeyond the Urals:

An Alternative History Campaignin Russia, 1942

•••. •» Herns«*! the Urals is a two-player strategic-Ie vel simulation of, a cari!;;:-!-;;! lhat might-have-been in Russia during World War II.Beyond fe 3 Vals postulates that the Germans had defeated theRed Army in their 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, but failed toforce the capitulation of the Soviet Union itself. In early 1941,Soviet leaders had decided to deploy their armed forces "up front"on the border with the Third Reich, as chief of the Red Armyarmored forces, General D.G. Pavlov, had proposed. As a result ofthis alternative deployment, the Germans destroy the Red Army onthe frontiers, sweep eastwards, and take Moscow, Leningrad andStal itigrad in late 1941.

However, in this alternative time-line, the Soviets keep fightingeven after the Germans reached their planned Archangel-Astra-khan stop line. Being given no alternatives other than to suffer theconsequences of German exploitation and terror in the East, or tocontinue a desperate resistance, the Russians and other Sovietpeoples go on fighting. The remnants of the Red Army make theirstand to protect the great industrial complexes east of the Urals,hoping to draw in the Germans for the final decisive battle. As 1942opens, Hitler orders the Wehrmacht to head into the East for thefinal battle of annihilation in Eurasia, beyond the Urals.

Components: 1 34 x 22 inch mapsheet, rules booklets, player aidcards, 176 die cut counters, storage bags and 1 die; ziplock.

99$24

NAME

ADDRESS.

CITY, STATE.

PHONE

ZIP

EMAIL.

VISA/MC (ONLY)#.

EXPIRATION DATE

SIGNATURE

Operation Kremlin:An Alternative HistoryCampaign for Moscow, 1942

What if Hitler decided to try again for Moscow during thesummer of 1942 rather than plunging the Wehrmacht deep into theCaucasus and Stalingrad as he did historically? Operation Krem-lin uses the corps-army level units that were historically availablefor this campaign. The German player is on the offensive, seekingto win by controlling Moscow and other key cities. The Sovietplayer, though mostly defending, must watch for opportunities todeliver counterattacks against the Germans in order to inflict adecisive defeat upon them or upset the Axis alliance.

Operation Kremlin's orders of battle are extrapolated fromboth sides' historic organizational charts of mid to late 1942. TheGermans have the units which composed Army Group Center on 28June 1942, along with all the panzer corps that were deployedelsewhere on the Russian Front. Manstein's llth Army enters asreinforcement once Sevastopol falls. The Germans also have theAxis satellite armies, on the assumption that their own governmentswould have wanted to be able to claim participation in this "finaland decisive" campaign in Russia.

The Soviet order of battle is based on their front line deploy-ment of 28 June, along with all their operational and strategicreserves, plus just about everything they generated in the way ofreplacements and reinforcements during the time period of thehistoric Stalingrad campaign.

Each hex represents approximately 10 miles ( 16.2 kilometers )from side to side. Airpower is represented abstractly, representingthe effects of one side or the other having local air superiority. Eachfull game turn represents one week.

Operation Kremlin gives wargamers the opportunity to dis-cover what would have happened had the Germans struck forMoscow in 1942. Was this the last great chance for the Third Reichto win in the East? Or would it have led to an even greater"Stalingrad?"

Components: 1 34 x 22 inch mapsheet, rules booklets, player aidcards, 176 die cut counters, storage bags and 1 die; boxed.

$34."ecision - = = •>• :

CrawesPOBox21598

Bakersfield CA 93390661/587-9633 »fax 661/587-5031 »ww,; *«,,»»« com

Shipping Charges1st item

$612

14(10)17(25)20(25)

Adt'l items$1

22(7)

7(10)9(10)

Type of ServiceUPS Ground/US Mail Domestic PriorityUPS 2nd Day AirCanada, Mexico (Express)Europe (Express)Asia, Africa. Australia (Express)

Iraqi Regular Army

V'olindependènt Brigades

»t>> Man'nes>>

eg : Total manpower: =402,000I66 (including Republican Guard)

speciai'Forêes 800-1000 operable tanks

| II [HQ:,Diyala . n , fnUHQ: Nasseria

\3

|IV|HQ:AIAmara

llO

->. imsa.-:-..

|Northern|Hä!'Tikrit "; ":|

11 ;"Adnan"

xxx: ÀI Hafreia

'Nebuchadnezzar"

"Anshki""Makhuul""Independent"

IndependentBatteries

SBM = Security Battalion of the Military Intelligence ServiceMK = Mujahideen-e Khalq: =15,000 Iranian defectors fighting for Saddam

GSS = General Security Service Rapid Intervention BrigadeSdF = Saddam's Fedayeen

SaddamHussein

weapons to arm them, nor the skilled noncommissionedofficers (NCOs) needed to train them.

Last here, another new, interesting, but still largelyuntested unit in the Iraqi order of battle is the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MeK). This formation, said to consist of fourmixed armored/mechanized infantry brigades, a com-mando battalion, and a helicopter squadron, along withartillery, air defense and engineer support units, is madeup of some 20,000 Iranian defectors and ex-prisoners ofwar. The MeK is presently scattered throughout 17bases in Iraq but would undoubtedly be brought to-gether if a new ground war seemed imminent.

All the army restructuring described above, whichreally amounts to little more than cutting and recuttingthe same pie into different pieces, has been conductedprimarily to help assure Saddam remains in power. It isdifficult for anti-Saddam officers to find out if theirpeers are of the same mind, and hence begin to formsome kind of action cell, if they continually find them-selves and their units reshuffled into new commandstructures.

Of course, the near constant restructuring is double-edged in that officers who hardly know—let alonetrust—each other cannot be expected to maneuver andfight their units well together. At the same time, theattrition suffered during the various Coalition aerialoffensives since 1991 have, it is estimated, reduced thenumber of operative Iraqi tanks and armored personalcarriers from 2,000 to about 800 of each category.

Thus the Iraqi ground force has been on a more orless steady down-slide since the move into Kuwait overa decade ago. It may well be, though, that Saddam is notcounting on fighting and winning his next round withthe Coalition in a war featuring his army as any kind ofcenterpiece.

Saddam's Health & WMDsIt has been reliably reported Saddam suffered a mild

stroke in January 2001. It has been further reported hehas also recently undergone intensive chemotherapy foran early diagnosed case of lymph-node cancer. At theage of 65, then, his prospects for continued long termsurvival seem somewhat dim even if any possible futureCoalition efforts against him are discounted. It begins to

seem, in fact, that advancing age, coupledwith repeated frustration on the conventionalbattlefield, first against Iran, then in Kuwait,then beneath falling bombs within Iraq itself,have given the dictator, if not wisdom, at leasta wicked canniness.

In particular, it seemed at first that his1998 eviction of the UN weapons inspectionteams, and his willingness to see importantparts of his army fed into the fiery furnace ofDesert Fox bombing shortly thereafter, werelittle more than another tantrum from anincreasingly desperate man feeling the walls

•!fc

of time and fate closing in around him. It now appearsthere was true method to the seeming madness. On theone hand, the 1998 dust-up took advantage of whatmight be called the "crisis fatigue" then already affect-ing the Coalition to effectively peel away from it all butits hard core of the US, UK and Kuwait.

And even as it was ground down under the rain ofCoalition bombs, the Iraqi army retained enough com-bat power to deal several decisive blows against theinternal Kurdish opposition. Whereas in 1997 theremay have been as many as 60,000 armed Kurds oppos-ing the Baghdad government in the mountains of north-ern Iraq, today they have almost all been killed, drivenout of the country, co-opted back into the regime, orsimply bribed into quiescence. Thus, despite the factthat the Desert Fox campaign brought even greaterdegradation of his conventional forces, it also resultedin Saddam's finally regaining a free hand against hisinternal opposition, along with the ability to againpursue WMD research and acquisition programs.

And pursue them he has. Current estimates placeSaddam, as of this date, at no more than two to sixmonths from completing his first atomic bomb. Further,at the time of their final departure from the country, theUN inspectors had drawn up a list of WMD agents andweapons known to already exist in Iraq that had neverbeen located. That list includes 17 tons of biologicalweapon growth media, 4,000 tons of chemical agentprecursors, 750 tons of precursors for the deadly VXnerve agent, some 31,000 chemical warfare munitionsof various types, 50 to 100 Al Husseini missiles (rangeout to 400 miles), and 20 Scud-B (185 miles) missiles.

It doesn't take much imagination to see the newstrategy Saddam seems to be bringing into play for hispersonal end game. His next move is not likely to becentered on any effort by conventional forces. Indeed,in broad measure and compared to his salad days, hehardly has any of those left. But he does seem to have,or will almost certainly soon have, the ability to deliverchemical, biological or atomic attacks. Such a movewould at once fulfill his self-proclaimed role as cham-pion of the Palestinians, while almost certainly alsoembroiling the Middle East in the larger war he believeswill result in the final overthrow of his many enemies.

A likely target for Saddam, once he has gotten hisWMD delivery systems on line, would be the Israelinuclear weapons depot at Zachariah, just a few milessoutheast of Tel Aviv. That facility, centered on anetwork of naturally occurring limestone caves, con-tains virtually all of Israel's nuclear warheads—asmany as 400 by some estimates—mobile ground launch-ers and Jericho-two intermediate range ballistic mis-siles. That single-point concentration of Israeli atomicweaponry was undertaken as a cost saving measure, andfor the simple fact that nation's small size does not allowit the deployment options available to continent-sizepowers. The idea behind an Iraqi missile strike on

10 #208

Zachariah would be to render those weapons at leasttemporarily inaccessible to their owners, thereby alsoheralding the start of a new, all-out Muslim holy waragainst the Jewish "crusader state."

It is hard to imagine any Israeli government wouldsit passively while an avowed enemy finished his prepa-ration to make such a deadly move. But given thedistraction of the deteriorating Palestinian situation,plus the fact that Israel was once before caught com-pletely by surprise in 1973, it's not impossible Saddamwill get at least one shot at fulfilling his dream.

US Ground Forces TodayThe organizational and doctrinal changes forced on

the American military by the downsizing conductedsince the end of the first Gulf War have been large andprofound. For the purposes of this analysis, though, it isenough to say US ground forces could still form theoffensive core of any new Coalition army put togetherto invade Iraq.

One revisionist historian of the US ground forceeffort in the Gulf War has concluded the 1991 Coalitionarmy wasn't good, "It was merely better than its oppo-nent." That may have been true, but it is also unfair andbeside the point. No army has ever been great in theabsolute sense. War is far too complex an undertakingfor any real army to measure up to its full, theoreticalpotential. Doctrinal and personal disputes among com-manders, personnel turnover, along with the myriadother factors that go to make up the "friction" inherentin all wars, conspire to make sure the better—never thebest possible—army wins.

That having been stated, two simple truths remainabout the 1991 US ground force and that of today. First,the earlier force was more than good enough; it got thejob done and done well. The less than satisfactoryending to that conflict was the result of failed nerves andpoor foresight in Washington, not defeat in the field.Second, all who are well read in military history knowthat academic field is replete with both well and poorlyreasoned revisionist studies that seek to debunk thewinning armies of all ages, from Pharaoh's chariots toHitler's panzers. Such efforts are valuable in that itnever hurts to investigate weakness as a way to betterunderstand what constitutes real strength.

But the practical perspective should not be lost. Thefact remains: there is still nowhere in the world today,nor is there likely to be in the near future, either amongthe enemies or friends of the US, a ground force that canovermatch America's when fully committed. One canconfidently expect every US maneuver brigade willhave the combat power of four, five or six Iraqi units ofthe same size. In that spirit, then, confident the USarmed forces can certainly deliver the terminal blow toSaddam should they ever be tasked to do so, the follow-ing criticisms are offered of current doctrine, organiza-tion and technique.

In terms of organization, there are today not enoughtransport vehicles in the brigades and divisions to allowfor smooth logistical and support functions duringprolonged combat. That is particularly ironic given thefact the US Army of World War II was the first toachieve total motorization. It is nevertheless true, be-cause current transport vehicle allotments—set in placein the face of budgetary constraints—are based on unitneeds in peacetime maneuvers. Those requirementsneed to be multiplied by least a factor of two, or betterthree, when figuring actual combat requirements.

The US air and sea transport commands provedsuperb at rapidly moving mountains of supplies to theGulf region in 1990-91. Once the fighting began thatmateriel's disbursement from the supply dumps to themaneuver battalions was far slower and less certain. Forinstance, by the end of the four day ground offensive,there was already a shortage of replacement parts amongforward US units.

Another tactical weakness has developed becausethe artillery arm has been allowed to evolve a doctrinethat effectively keeps it from providing anything aWorld War II-era practitioner of mobile warfare wouldrecognize as "fire support" for the maneuver battalions.That is, all requests for fire support are now fed into theartillery's TACFIRE computer system. Though there isnothing wrong with those computers as such, theirprogramming may be termed faulty in that has beendesigned to give priority to large targets containing adozen enemy vehicles or guns rather than to unexpectedones. In effect, the artillerists have come to view themost effective use of their weapons as deep interdictionfires against approaching enemy reinforcements, ratherthan minute by minute fires against targets of opportu-nity as called for by engaged infantry and tank com-manders.

A drive in the desert.


Armed Forces Around Afghanistan, 2001

IranDivisionsArmored x 4Infantry x 6Commando/Special Forces x 2Revolutionary Guard x 16-20 (equiv.)Non-divisional unitsAirborne brigade x 1Marine brigades x 2Artillery groups x 5SAM battalions x 21Air Force units

Fighter-bomber squadrons x 9, „.,,, - Fighter squadrons x 7&(. ' Equipment

;'A> Main battle tanks: ca. 1100ti - „ .?>«~ Armored personnel carriers: ca. 1000

Surface to surface missiles: 40+£.<:Attack helicopters: 130

- -Combat aircraft'</F-4x66f-,'- F-5x60

~* ,"-; F-7 x 24

fe^Hf •;:, ,4

&».,,:/MiG-29 x 30

:" ' Su-24x24,' Su-25x7

. .Warships; Frigates x 3

Patrol, coastal, and missile boat x 63Submarines x 5

Paramilitary: 40-240,000

m fm

IraqDivisionsRepublican Guard :x 6Armored x 3Mechanized infantry x 3Infantry x 11Non-divisional unitsRepublican Guard brigades x 4Special Forces brigades x 2Commando brigades x 7Air Force units

Not knownEquipmentMain battle tanks: ca. 2200Armored personnel carriers: ca. 3400Surface to surface missiles: 25+Attack helicopters: 120Combat aircraft

Bombers: ca. 6, various typesFighter-bombers: ca 130, various typesFighters: ca. 180, various types

WarshipsPatrol, coastal, and missile boat x 6

Paramilitary: cà. 50,000

Below f Special engineer vehicles with themine clearing rake mounted to clear the

path for tanks.

Pakistan

Divisions

Armored x 2 -,, ,.

Infantry x 19

Non-divisional units

Armored brigades x 7

Infantry brigades x 9

Armored recon regiments x 3

Artillery brigades x 9 '

Air defense brigades x 8 : : ;

Special forces group x 1

Marine commando group x 1

Air Force units

Fighter-bomber squadrons x 6

Fighter squadrons x 12

Recon squadrons x 1 * ;•

Army equipment f

Main battle tanks: ca. 3000

Armored personnel carriers: ca. 1000

Surface to surface missiles: 110+Attack helicopters: 20

Combat aircraft

F-6x40 ;

F-7x77 , , .

F-16x32

Mirage III x 59

Mirage 5 x 52

Q-5 x 42

Warships >

Frigates x 8 * ,:.

Patrol, coastal, and missile boat x 9 :

Submarines x 10

Paramilitary: 290,000

Note: Pakistan has also an atomic weapons capability.Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence (ISI) provided much ofthe support and training for the Afghan resistance during the1980s.

Tajikistan


Mechanized brigades x 2

Mountain brigade x 1

Special forces brigade x 1

SAM regiment x 1

Air Force units

Squadron x 1 (forming)

Equipment



Attack helicopters: 15

Combat aircraft

Mi-24 x 5

Paramilitary: ca. 1200

Uzbekistan


Armored brigades x 1 •

Mechanized brigades x 11

Mountain brigade x 1

Airborne brigade x 1

Air assault brigades x 3

Air Force units

Fighter-bomber regiments x 2

Fighter regiments x 2

Equipment



Attack helicopters: ca. 40

Combat aircraft

MiG-29 x 30

Su-17 x 26

Su-24 x 34

Su-25 x 20

Su-27 x 25

Paramilitary: ca. 20,000

Information is f mm The International Institute for Strategic Studies]The Military Balance 2000-2001, London: Oxford University Pr,2000.

US Army NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) vehicles on the move.

At operational levels a curious force-reducer couldalso be observed to have come into play in the ending ofthe 1991 ground war. The Army's doctrinally recog-nized fourth (and final) stage of battle is "reconstitu-tion." According to that scheme, it is proper to pause toreorganize, regroup and assess after a main engage-ment, rather than try for the more traditional attempt atpursuit or exploitation after a defeated foe. Thus, whennot even a whisper of protest was heard to come fromanywhere within the Army's chain of command con-cerning the cease-fire put in place prior to the Iraqis'complete destruction, the explanation (in so far as anywas offered) was that the silence simply reflected theUS military's traditional subordination to civilian au-thority.

It is now understood that at least part ofthat silencecould be better attributed to the fact that few command-ers thought it wrong to quit at that point. Since the endof the Vietnam War, two generations of Americanofficers have gained most of their combat experience farfrom actual battlefields in training maneuvers and com-puter wargames. Indeed, at the end of engagements insuch affairs it seems at least reasonable to pause toreorganize, regroup and assess. After all, the referees orcomputer program have already declared the victor.From such a perspective seemingly nothing more re-mains to be done.

And finally, US helicopters, though often perform-ing superbly in both transport and combat roles, haveseveral times shown during the past decade that theyremain, by their very nature, relatively delicate. Thefrustrated helicopter deployment attempt during theKosovo Crisis pointed out that they demand fleet-widemaintenance to a degree hard to maintain with today'sminimum manning levels in the high-tech field ofavionics.

Strategies Against SaddamIf the resolution that swept the United States after the

attacks of 11 September 2001 proves to be lasting, andthe war expands to Iraq, several options are available.

First, a new "decapitation" aerial campaign, similarto but even larger than Desert Fox, could be launched.The aim would be to sever the communications linksbetween Saddam and his forces' higher headquarters.That might enable some bold officers to finally succeedat a coup. Of course, the great weakness of this kind ofsettlement comes from the fact its success would in allprobability lead to nothing more than Saddam's re-placement by another Ba'ath Party dictator, Saddam Itraded for Saddam II.

Alternatively, the revived Coalition could conduct abuild up of ground forces in Kuwait until they reachedthe approximate size of a strong corps. At that point,with a new aerial campaign against Saddam's remain-ing conventional forces launched early on, the Coalitioncorps would advance far enough to occupy some townor city, most likely Basrah. That done, a government of"liberated Iraq" could be set up that would aim to unitethe Marsh Arabs, the dissident Aldulaimi tribes ofwestern Iraq, the remnants of the Kurds and the IraqiNational Council (the latter really little more than abunch of political ne'er-do-wells assembled by theCIA).

The hope in this case would be that by providingsuch an on-the-ground, in-country alternative to theBaghdad government, high ranking officers in Saddam'sarmy might again be motivated to get a coup underway,this time a decisive one. This scenario has an advantagein that it provides a political instrumentality for headingoff, at least initially, the rise of any new dictator as in thefirst scenario above. But it also has the distinct disad-vantage of drawing out the process of getting rid ofSaddam over time, perhaps even dragging it out foryears. Given the situation is already fraught with un-knowns, to pick a strategy that extends the confronta-tion is to do little more than replay the ending of the Gulf

14 #208

Scout helicopter taking off.War: stop short of achieving a real solution and settle forhoping for the best.

A third scenario has a new aerial campaign starting,running its course and stopping with Saddam still inpower. The idea would simply be to so pummel hisarmed forces and wreak havoc among his WMD pro-grams as to buy more time before he is again strongenough in any way to be an international threat. Again,though, the foundational idea behind such thinking isonly to allow more time during which the United Statesgoes on hoping for the best without actually having to dosomething decisive to make it happen.

The hard truth is the Middle East is likely to remainan arena of conflict even if the West moves to invadeand occupy Iraq, replacing that regime with a newgovernment by direct force of arms (and likely alsodividing Iraq into three to five ethnically based states).No matter how the details of the dictator's end gameplay out, the one surety is there is more war to come inthe Middle East.

Numerous studies have shown the number of armedconflicts across the globe involving Muslims on one orboth sides outnumbered those with no Muslim involve-ment by three to one. Conflicts involving Muslims alsotended to be bloody. Of the six wars fought in the 1990sin which 200,000 or more were killed, three werebetween Muslims and non-Muslims (Sudan, Bosniaand East Timor), while two were between Muslims(Somalia and the Kurds). Only one war in that categoryof ferociousness, in Angola, was fought between non-Muslims.

Thus the chances for a really happy ending here aresmall. In the end, it may come down to simply having topick the least odious of the bloody options. The realchange that needs to occur is one that goes beyondsingle campaigns or wars, requiring the evolution of anentire civilization. There are few, if any, applicablehistoric examples of how to accomplish that, and it goesfar beyond the scope of this article to invent one.

Selected Sources

Binnie, Jeremy, ed. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States,2001 Edition. Coulsdon, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group,Ltd., 2001.

Eldridge, Bo. "Desert Storm: Mother of All Battles," Command, Nov/Dec1991, pp. 12-44.

Hammond, James. W., Jr. Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality. Westport,CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.

Hough, Harold. "Could Israel's Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?"Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 1997, pp. 407-410.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking ofWorld Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Leonhard, Robert. The Art of Maneuver Warfare. Novato, CA: Presidio,1991.

Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca,NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996.

Wesley K. Clark, Gen. (ret.) Waging Modern War. New York: Perseus BookGroup, 2001.


Update AfghanistanBy Gary Romano

A captured Soviet tank in Afghanistan.

Since 1979 the Afghan people have been at war, firstagainst a Soviet sponsored governrnent (and the Sovietsthemselves), as well as against each other. As the U.S.militarily intervenes in Afghanistan in wake of theKl lSeptember 2001 terrorist attacks on the.Pentagon andNew York City, it finds two factions vying for power inthat country: the Taliban and the. Northern Alliance(officially called the United Front): Understanding thehistory and roots of these two organizations provides abetter comprehension of the current military and politi-cal environment in Afghanistan.. ;;:.:, ,:...

Post-Soviet DisintegrationIn December 1979 the Soviet Union intervened in

Afghanistan to support a recently established, commu-nist government. This intervention did not set well withmuch of the Afghani populace, with opposition devel-oping to both the changes wrought by the governmentand the usual high-handed communist policies. Af-ghanistan had a history of guerrilla warfare, and numer-ous groups soon took up arms to challenge the Commu-nists. Over the next ten years, the Soviets and commu-nist Afghan troops clashed in battles and skirmishes. Amosaic of indigenous resistance organizations (referredto collectively as the mujahideen} gained control of

much of the countryside. The Communists could hold•;'• thetcities and major towns, but winning the support of

the majority of Afghan citizens was beyond their politi-•*;' carcapacity. In the end, an entire Soviet army was tied

down in the war with little to show other than a constantdrain on resources. United States and Pakistani aid wascrucial to supporting the anti-communist Afghani groupsover the ten year fight. By design, this aid was providedto a wide range of groups with varying political, ethnicand religious affiliation to prevent the dominance of anyone group. Among other things, numerous volunteersfrom the Islamic world joined the ranks of the

•••• mujahideen, giving the conflict an international aspect.By 1989, the Soviets could no longer sustain their

intervention politically or economically and withdrewfrom Afghanistan, leaving the Communist governmentto continue the fight. That regime held out against themujahideen until 1992, when it was finally overthrown.When the Afghans began to face the prospect of creat-ing a new post-communist government, there was noconsensus on who should take the lead. The aid that hadsupported so many different organizations had createda fractured political situation.

The immediate solution to the Afghani power vacuum

The Second String: Other Transnational Middle Eastern TerroristsBy Gary Romano

HizballahHizballah (the Patty of God) is one of the more militant

Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. It was established in1983 in Lebanon and is supported by Iran. Hizballah's objec-tives include opposing Israeli, U.S. and other Western interestsin the Middle East and establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon.Currently, Hizballah has a core cadre of about 500 "soldiers"and several thousand volunteers.

Hizballah fighters during amass rally.

The Hizballah has specialized in suicide car bombs attacks.Accordingly, they deal in advanced explosive and detonationdevices, as well as deploying skilled individuals who deliverthe bombs. In addition to developing car bombs, Hizballah runsfactories, notably one in Gaza City, to manufacture handgrenades and tactical explosives.

Hizballah has attacked Israeli soldiers and citizens and theSouth Lebanon Army (an ally of the Israelis). Their mostinfamous attack to date was against the U.S. Marine barracks inBeirut in 1983. The bomber used a truck to force entry throughthe Marine base perimeter and detonated the explosives it wascarrying adjacent to the barracks. The attack resulted in thedeaths of 241 Americans and led to the U.S. withdrawing itsground contingent from the country.

Though Hizballah is based in Beirut, it can participate inoperations outside the Middle East. In March and July 1992there were two bombing attacks in Buenos Aires, Argentina,one against the Israeli Embassy. These attacks killed in excessof 100 people. Though adifferent group, the Supporters of God,took responsibility for the attack, it was later discoveredHizballah had ties to it and probably manufactured the bombsused in the attack.

Hizballah also may be connected to Osama bin Laden'sorganization, al Qaeda ("The Base"). In October 2000 an AlQaeda operative met with Hizballah security chief, ImadMughniyah. The nature of their meeting and its results are notknown, but it may have been related to the al Qaeda attack onthe USS Cole in Yemen, which resulted in the deaths of 12 U.S.servicemen. The devices used in that assault had a specializedconfiguration favored and mastered by Hizballah members.These facts have led many in the U.S. government to suspectHizballah as the manufacturers of the weapons.

Hizballah has continued its terrorist activities to the presentday despite significant efforts to eliminate the organization.More threatening is a recent alleged truce between Hizballahand HAMAS (see below for a description of the latter). Beforethis, the two organizations competed for political dominance inLebanon. In Tehran, Iran in April 2001, Hizballah and HAMASagreed to concentrate their efforts against their common en-emies—Israel and the West.

Hizballah is also cultivating and image of being a legitimatepolitical organization. It has liberalized many of its views onIslamic law, especially regarding women, and has establishedschools, hospitals and other social services in Lebanon.Hizballah's members also hold nine seats in the LebaneseParliament.

HAMASHAMAS is a Sunni Muslim group, established in 1987 in

the Gaza Strip. It recruits disenfranchised, unemployed, youngPalestinian men who had been radicalized during the distur-bances against Israel.

HAMAS focuses its efforts on bombing (suicide and re-mote), kidnapping and assassinations. It aims at Israeli citizenssettling in disputed Palestinian lands. HAMAS' efforts havebeen to date limited to the Middle East, and HAMAS leadershipformally declared in September 2001 they would not pursuetargets outside the region.

Though HAMAS cooperated with the Palestinian Libera-tion Organization (PLO) for many years, they broke ranks in theearly 1990s when the PLO began moving toward comprise withIsrael. Soon after the split, mass arrests by Israeli securityforces removed some of HAMAS' best leaders and fightersfrom the field. Currently, HAMAS is believed to have only 200full-time operatives.

Despite this, HAMAS has several strengths which couldhelp it recover in the near future. First, HAMAS still recruitsnumerous young men and women, thereby keeping its ranksintact. Second, it allegedly continues to receive funding fromIran and organizations based in the U.S. and Europe. Third, itsrecent reconciliation with the Hizballah suggests a restorationof its training programs in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, andQom, Iran, and the resupply of weapons. Fourth, HAMAS issupposedly developing stronger independent ceUs to mitigatefuture disruption of the organization by security forces.

Egyptian Islamic JihadThe Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) has been conducting

terrorist operations since the 1970s in the hope of overthrowingthe secular Egyptian government and replacing it with anIslamic state. Up until 1993, the EIJ focusedits efforts in Egypt,attacking high-profile government officials. EIJ was respon-sible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadatin 1981 and attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassanai-AIfi and Prime Minister Atef Sedky, both in 1993.

Since 1993, EIJ has ceased operations in Egypt. Instead, EIJfocuses on targets elsewhere, relying on its network of opera-tives in Middle Eastern, Islamic and European nations notably

continued on next page


in the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Afghanistan. One of theirmost notorious recent attacks was the 1995 bombing of,the Egyp- ,tian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. EIJ also prepared an attack in1998 on the U.S. Embassy in Albania, which was prevented bytimely international efforts. , .-

, Allegedly, the EIJ is funded and supported by both Iran andOsama bin Laden's al Qaeda, although the details of these ties aremurky. It is known that some of EU' s leaders have spent significanttime with bin Laden in Afghanistan. Additionally, EIJ was affili-:,:!ated with terrorist facilities in Afghanistan which were attacked by;:theU.S.in 1998. ; / ' ';.;•, ' • • ' ; ' '^.(\ .

AI-Gama'at al-lslamiyya (Islamic Group)The Islamic Group (IG) is another Egyptian based terrorist

organization, originating in the 1970s. As with the EIJ, the IG hopesto replace the secular Egyptian government with an Islamic regime. -.Until 1998, the main focus of IG activities was attacking Egyptian'government officials and political leaders. This included a 1995 :

assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.-;,"The most infamous IG attack during this:time was the shooting of58 tourists at Luxor, Egypt. Following this attack, the Egyptiangovernment began a more active pursuit of the IG. This led .to theIG's declaration of a ceasefire in 1998. " Î, ,\

In recent years, the IG has aimed at the United States. In 1990,Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the IG' s spiritual leader, moved to theU.S. to build the IG organization there. By 1993, Rahman wasready to launch his first operation. This included attacks against the,United Nations building in New York City, arid the Lincoln andHolland tunnels. Though other groups participated in this opera-tion, it is clearÎG members played crucial leadership, logistical.andintelligence roles. Rahman's operatives also had a hand in the first ;bombing of the World Trade Center. The conspirators, includingRahman, were arrested by U.S. authorities, tried and sentenced in1995. : . V

Despite the arrests, anti-U.S. activities continued. In 1998, IGrepresentatives, coordinated by Osama bin Laden, signed a fatwa.'(an Islamic legal decree) that formally called for attacks on U.S.interests. IG leaders soon appeared in a bin Laden propagandavideo echoing that caff. In 2000, Rahman called for an end to theIG's ceasefirean Egyptänd a continuance of operations against theU.S. Though some IG factions still remain inactive, many arethought to be heeding Rahman's call.

Soldiering on in the desert war.

was a coalition formed from former resistance fightergroups. But unity was not to last. The major divisionsamong Afghanis are ethnic and religious. The majoritygroup is the Pashtuns, who live mostly in southernAfghanistan and are typically Sunni Muslims. Theother dominant ethnicity include the mostly Persian-speaking Shia Muslims in the northern and westernparts of the country.

Within a few years, a coalition of Persian-speakinggroups, which became known as the Northern Alliance,seized power. The government was headed byBurhanuddin Rabbani, but its military commander,Ahmed Shah Massoud, was considered to be the realpower behind the coalition. Massoud, known as the"Lion of Panjsher," had a legendary reputation as beingthe one resistance commander the Soviets could notdefeat (the Panjsher Valley being the site of severalmajor battles in the 1980s). Still, despite their bestefforts, the Northern Alliance could not unify the coun-try. A number of significant, though smaller oppositiongroups (mostly Pashtun) continued to resist centralcontrol. Other groups were fearful of giving up theirweapons and territory to a government that might beless than reliable in returning their trust.

Without a unified government and with so manyarmed independent militias, Afghanistan fractured intoseveral quasi-independent satrapies with local warlordsabounding. Each faction and local militia made andenforced its own laws. Public order broke down asmilitias focused less on policing and more on findingways to profit off commerce. Public utilities functionedlittle, if at all, and the already limited road networkbecame virtually impossible to traverse. The situationwas ready for someone to move into the vacuum. Anda new force did just that.

The Rise of the TalibanAs Afghanistan disintegrated, its neighbors, espe-

cially Pakistan, were concerned the chaos would spillinto their countries. So they began to look for a newforce that might unite the nation. In the summer of 1994a mercantile convoy, owned by wealthy Pakistanis, wasstopped and held prisoner by local bandits outside ofKandahar (the second largest city in Afghanistan). Inresponse, the Pakistani government helped organizeand arm Afghani students attending the fundamentalistmadrassas (Islamic school) in Pakistan. Some 2,000 ofthese students recovered the convoy and reportedlyfreed numerous prisoners being held by the bandits.This act of bringing order to disorder became legendaryin Afghanistan and drew many supporters to the stu-dents' ranks. These students, now bolstered by otherAfghanis, formed a new party, the Taliban (translated as"the Seekers" or "Religious Students" from the originsof many of its members).

The Taliban's first major conquest was nearbyKandahar, where they replaced despotic rule in the city

18 #208

with a centralized Islamic regime. Instead of massa-cring the opposition, the Taliban disarmed them and letthem return to society. This raised hopes for a nationalif Pashtun-based government that could overcome thelocal warlords galvanized war-weary Afghanis in thesouthern part of the country. The initial advance of theTaliban through Pashtun areas was welcomed withmuch public support. But as the Taliban moved into thenorth, their reputation began to shift. Their campaignquickly brought them to cities such as Herat which werepopulated by cosmopolitan Persian-speakers. TheTaliban showed less restraint there, engaging in repres-sive activities and public executions of those whoresisted.

Still, for the most part, the Taliban's advance overthe next two years was relatively bloodless. A combina-tion of their reputation of harsh reprisals against cap-tured opposition members, clever political bargainingwith local warlords, and a desperate civilian populacelonging for stability, resulted in most cities and townscoming over to the Taliban voluntarily rather than beingcaptured by combat. And as the Taliban occupied moreterritory, they became stronger militarily as they cap-tured more weapons, including artillery, tanks andaircraft. Pashtuns with experience in the Afghani mili-tary also joined the Taliban, providing the skills neededto operate armor and other modern weapons.

Additionally, Pakistan provided crucial support tothe Taliban in the form of new weapons and training forrecruits. The Pakistani support for the Taliban was inpart a reaction to terrorist attacks allegedly tied to theNorthern Alliance against Pakistan itself. Further, somekey Pakistani leaders were ethnic Pashtuns sympatheticto the Pashtuns in Afghanistan who also dominated theTaliban. Pakistan also hoped the Taliban would bringstability to Afghanistan and thereby restore commercebetween the countries, as well as re-open the traderoutes with the former Soviet republics to the north ofAfghanistan. This trade was crucial in light of Pakistan'sgrowing foreign debt and balance of payments deficit.

Given all those factors, the situation began to "snow-ball." As the Taliban's strength increased, so did itsferocity as well as its attachment to Islamic fundamen-talism. The main impetus for this shift was the Taliban'sleader, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Omar, who lost aneye in the war against the Soviets, is currently based inKandahar. Under his leadership, the Taliban created agovernment based on local shuras (assemblies) com-posed of Taliban loyalists. The shuras interpret andexecute a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of Is-lamic law that includes, among other things, mandatorybeards for men, restrictions on women's dress, workand education, and prohibition of photography of anykind.

Many of the harsh measures were in response to thedisintegration of the country. Most public utilities func-tion minimally if at all; schools and other facilities have

been bombed and shelled into destruction; the postalservice does not connect outside of the country; roadsare largely unusable, and the economy, except for theopium trade, is almost non-existent.

Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance, which was with-drawing to the north in front of the Taliban advance, wasalso getting a bad reputation. Summary executions andshelling of civilian populations became common tac-tics. A confrontation was not long in coming.

The Occupation of Kabul and theStalemate

The Taliban were halted by enemy forces just out-side Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, in 1996. To launch anoffensive against the city, the Taliban needed morefunds for weapons and supplies. A deal with Osama binLaden, the Saudi contractor turned international terror-ist, provided the cash. The Taliban agreed to let binLaden use the rural Afghani mountains as base for hisown operations. In exchange, bin Laden provided $3million to the Taliban. This infusion of cash strength-ened the Taliban enough to capture Kabul in September2001.

By 1997, a stalemate between the Taliban and theNorthern Alliance began to emerge. The latter, runningout of space to retreat, began to get desperate, knowingthe Taliban would treat them harshly if they capitulated.The Northern Alliance also gained critical allies outsideAfghanistan, including Russia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistanand Uzbekistan. Those nations were wary of the Taliban'scommitment to support fundamentalist Islamic move-ments in their own countries. They also observed theprominence of Afghani terrorists and Islamic funda-mentalists (some with connections to the Taliban) inAlgeria, Kashmir, Bosnia and the Philippines. In re-sponse, Russia and the others began to provide money,arms and other support to the Northern Alliance.

Current Force Composition andStructure

In mid-2001, the Taliban had approximately 45,000

Taliban troops prepare a rocket launcher.


Osama bin Laden: Man with a MissionOsama bin Mohamed bin Awad bin Laden is the son

of the wealthy Saudi building contractor, Mohamed binLaden. Bom in 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Osamawas educated as an engineer and grew up in a turbulenttime in the Islamic world. This was the era of the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Iranian Revolution and the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan, all of which did much toradicalize him. And unlike many other third worldrevolutionaries, Osama was not fighting against colo-nial oppression or class division per se* but rather for abroader concept of Islamic civilization.

Osama joined the Afghan resistance after the SovietUnion invaded that country in 1979. The Bin LadenCorporation had extensive contacts with the Saudi elite,and through those contacts Osama developed his knackfor networking. Using his money and contacts, heplayed a significant role in mobilizing, training andcoordinating Arabs and other volunteers who joined theAfghan resistance, turning the war against the Sovietsinto something of a pan-Islamic War of Resistence.Many militants throughout the Islamic world wouldjoin the Afghan resistance to not only fight the Sovietsbut to also gain experience for future struggles else-where.

Osama participated in the 1989 general resistanceoffensive against the forces ofthe Communist DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan. Thisoffensive, encouraged by Pa-kistan, was supposed to ex-ploit the withdrawal of Sovietforces. However, itturnedintoa setback when themujahideen assaulted Com-munist strongpoints and weredecimated in turn. Resistanceleaders claimed the Pakistanisintentionally ordered the of-fensive in order to weaken theresistance and open the wayfor their own front men inAfghanistan. And since Paki-

Osama bin Laden stan was a client of the U.S.,so the reasoning went, the

Americans had betrayed the mujahideen.

Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989 a hero,a victor in the war against the mighty Soviet Union.When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, heurged an all-Islamic war to evict the Iraqis, but opposedthe introduction of Western forces into the region. Thisled to a rift between Osama and the Saudi government,and his forced relocation to the Sudan, then later toAfghanistan, where he continued his operations underthe protection of the Taliban. At this time, the ArmedIslamic Movement, sometimes known as the Interna-tional Legion of Islam, was the main transnationalMuslim fundamentalist force.

As it developed, Bin Laden* s organization becameknown as al Queda ("The Base"). Al Queda trained notonly terrorists but also guerrilla fighters who haveparticipated in insurrections in regions as diverse asCentral Asia and the Balkans, as well as in Somalia,Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen and the Philippines.Owing to their experience in the anti-Soviet war, binLaden's followers,are sometimes known as the "Af-ghans." Bin Laden was involved with Somali urbanguerrillas in their campaign against United Nationsforces in the early 1990s, and several anti-Americanbombings, such as the attacks on the U.S. embassies inKenya and Tanzania in 1998. He worked with theIranian and Sudanese governments in the former opera-tion, mobilizing a transnational Islamic force to fight inthe Horn of Africa.

Some of bin Laden's grievances with the UnitedStates include his opposition to American support forthe state of Israel and its occupation of Palestinian lands,the ongoing US/UK bombing and sanctions campaignsagainst Iraq, and the general havoc wrought by Ameri-can military operations in the Middle East, from theSomali mission creep to the cruise missile attacks on theSudan and Afghanistan in 1998. More generally, theUnited States is viewed as maintaining and spreadingWestern dominance over Muslim lands through itseconomic and media control and corrupting Islamicsociety in the bargain.

A critical thing to understand is the United States, inits current "war on terrorism," does not face a smallband of fanatics. Rather, it is up against a transnationalnetwork with extensive political, financial, military andunconventional warfare capabilities. One of bin Laden'spossible objectives is to draw the United States into awar in central Asia where he expects American forces tobe defeated in a protracted guerrilla campaign, in thesame manner as the Soviets were defeated in Afghani-stan in the 1980s. Whether this scenario plays outremains to be seen.

—Tlie Editors

20 #208

troops, supported by almost all of Afghanistan's re-maining armor and air power. The Northern Alliancewas composed almost entirely of infantry, with little inthe way of mechanization, numbering about 15,000troops. As always with such forces, there is a widerinfrastructure which provides support, intelligence, etc.,to the fighters.

The armies of both the Taliban and the NorthernAlliance are essentially militias. Both sides have someunits with names tied to the former Afghani army (forexample, the Taliban's Central Army Corps of Kabul orthe Northern Alliances' 6th Corps), but those units haveneither the discipline, organization or leadership to beconsidered regulars.

The Taliban's militias operate independently, typi-cally under the leadership of religious or tribal leaders.The officer corps is made up almost exclusively ofmilitiamen, with only a handful of former professionalAfghani army officers holding command positions. Themost effective Taliban units are composed of foreignvolunteers. One of the better known of these units is the55th Brigade, which is composed of bewtween 400 and600 foreign volunteers. This unit is affiliated with binLaden and al Queda. There are also a number of smallervolunteer units totaling some 3,000 to 8,000 Pakistanis,depending upon who is making the estimate.

In contrast, the Northern Alliance has many formerarmy officers in its ranks. Central to the NorthernAlliance's organization is The Guard, a unit about 800strong. The Guardis composed of veterans who are welltrained and equipped. They have high morale and haveproven as effective against the Taliban as they wereagainst the Soviets in the 1980s.

Over the years of ci vil war, the 126 aircraft that madeup Afghanistan's air force have slowly been whittledaway due to combat damage and operational wear andtear. The Taliban controls the remaining fighters andbombers. These aircraft lack the numbers and technol-ogy to be a an effective material factor in any conflict.However, their psychological effect on the NorthernAlliance has had a marked impact. In the past few years,attacks by Taliban aircraft have routed Northern Alli-ance troops on the ground. The Northern Allianceoperates a handful of helicopter transports and gun-ships, but they are effective only for raids and have not

had a decisive effect on recent engagements.

Recent EventsThe Northern Alliance faced a serious setback on 9

September 2001. Massoud was wounded by terrorists(most likely affiliated with or at least trained by alQaeda) posing asjournalists. By 15 September, Massoudhad died from his wounds. The leader of the NorthernAlliance, Burhannudin Rabbani, is considered by manyanalysts to be a figurehead. General Mohammed Fahimwill take Massoud's place. To date, Fahim has notexhibited the charisma of Massoud, who kept theAlliance's many factions in line. One of the prominentleaders of the Northern Alliance who may eventuallycontest Fahim's leadership is General Rashid Dostum.Despite having worked in coordination with the formerCommunist government and switching sides a numberof times in Afghanistan's civil war, Dostum has built upa relatively strong army. Much of his army's strength isthe result of weapons and funding received from thenation of Uzbekistan.

On 1 October, a Supreme Council of Taliban oppo-sition groups was created in Rome, Italy. This supremecouncil includes the Northern Alliance as well as Afghanileaders such as the exiled king. The Supreme Councilwill include a larger base of ethnic groups than theNorthern Alliance alone and could help promote accep-tance of alternatives to the Taliban by the Afghanipeople.

The FutureAs of October of 2001, the Taliban is facing a

shifting of power in their fight with the Northern Alli-ance. The neutralization of the Taliban's airpower byU.S. and UK strikes removes one of its key strategicadvantages over the Northern Alliance. The Talibanmay also have to divert units from the front to confrontcivil unrest. In the past two years there have been anincreasing number of uprisings based on citizen discon-tent with the Taliban regime. In a country where most ofthe people are well-armed and many have experience incombat, these uprisings could become a significantthreat to the government.

As always in Afghanistan, the situation is chaoticand any number of factors can influence the country'sfuture. ^^. __


The British Wars in Afghanistanby Andrew Preziosi_,

Painting of the laststand in Afghanistan.

By 1839 over 100 years of warfare had given England both the foundation ofa huge overseas empire and naval supremacy. The subcontinent of India wasslowly but surely becoming part of the British Empire, while Singapore, Cantonand Hong Kong were major trade enclaves in eastern Asia. Commerce flowedfreely between East and West, and, with it vast amounts of wealth went intoEngland's coffers.

At the same time, the Russian Empire, the 19th century's greatest land power,wanted a share of the spoils and proposed to gain the wealth of the Orient byusing the old, overland Silk Road, the land route through central Asia. Acampaign to gain the Silk Road would require time and patience to seize CentralAsia, as well as bases and supply depots. The Central Asian states would have tobe systematically conquered and integrated into the Tsar's realm. But the prizewas great: all that England had worked so hard to establish in south and eastAsia,

Thus the stage was set for the "Great Game, " the conflict between the RussianEmpire and Great Britain for control of Asia, a contest, that would last for some75 years f pitting the two super-powers of the 19th Century against each other.

The First Afghan War, 7839-42

Casus BelliInitial Russian military advances and diplomatic

overtures toward Dost Mohamed, the Amir of Afghani-stan, rebounded and forced him temporarily into theBritish camp. But Dost Mohamed demanded too muchfrom London. As important as Afghanistan was toIndia, the British had to maintain the strength of theirbuffer states on the frontier, notably the militant Sikhnation (at this time still independent). If the Britishacceded to the Amir's demands, then Afghanistan wouldgain a foothold on the Indian subcontinent and completecontrol of the strategic mountain passes—that couldbecome an open conduit for any potential Russianadvance were the Afghanis to ally with the Tsar.

So British refused Dost Mohamed's demands, con-firmed Sikh control of Peshawar (with the eastern outletof the Khyber Pass), and decided to restore a formerruler of Afghanistan to the throne, Shah Shujah. TheBritish needed to invade Afghanistan in order to putShujah on the throne as their client. Thus began one ofthe most incredible campaigns of 19th century imperialwarfare.

The WarThe First Afghan War spanned three years but was

not much of a conflict at first, though it would establisha pattern that would be repeated during the SecondAfghan War and the Russian invasion of 1979-89.

During the first phase of the campaign, 1839, theBritish Army of the Indus, under command of Sir JohnKeane, marched into Afghanistan. Actually, "British"is a misnomer, as almost all armies fielded by the Britishin India were composed of around 75% native troops(called "sepoys," meaning "soldiers"), with the other25% being European or Eurasian in origin. At this timeoperations were controlled by the Honourable EastIndia Company, a chartered British corporation that ranits own government and army as well as trade with thesubcontinent. The Army of the Indus, a powerful 30,000man force drawn from the Bengal and Bombay presi-dencies, marched via the southern route from Quetta toKandahar through the Bolan Pass. Meanwhile to thenorth, a Sikh covering force in the Khyber kept DostMohamed and his main army pinned.

Reaching Kandahar in Afghanistan, the Army of theIndus was given a breather to bring up supplies andreplace transport animals. This was critical, as themarch overland proved exhausting, with its heat, hu-midity and disease. Fortunately, actual armed resis-tance was minimal. Resuming the advance in June, theBritish ran into the only major force positioned to stopthem at the fortress of Ghazni, but they stormed it withlittle loss. The march continued, and soon the Britishwere in Kabul, installing the Shah on the throne whileDost Mohamed fled.

For the next two years the Army of the Indus moppedup resistance and settled into the routine of occupation.Alas, the idle was not to continue. A new British govern-ment demanded immediate reductions in manpower andexpenditures in Afghanistan. So in August 1841, subsi-dies to Afghani tribal chiefs who were keeping the peacewere reduced. In response, the Afghans rose in revolt,British and the Shah's garrisons were bottled up, and thearmy in Kabul was soon isolated.

It was at Kabul the dam burst. The British had en-camped outside the city walls proper, not wanting toappear as an army of occupation but simply an ally of theShah. A riot at the lightly guarded British residency withinthe city turned into a massacre in which some officialswere killed. The Afghans expected the British to marchinto the city and exact retribution, but the new commanderof the Amry of the Indus, the ailing Major General WilliamElphinstone, failed to respond. So the Afghans becameemboldened. William Macnaghten, the British ministerattached to the Shah' s government, tried to smooth thingsover but was in turn assassinated at what was to have beena treaty signing.

Elphinstone and his officers, after some debate, de-cided to withdraw to Jalalabad where a strong Britishgarrison was stationed. They started the withdrawal as anorganized force of 4,5000 on 6 January 1842. But theywere hampered by their families and camp followers,amounting to 12,000 civilians, as well as the severe winterweather. The Afghans in the hills along the route merci-lessly harassed the British. Within a matter of days theAfghans had not only cut the column to pieces, but haddestroyed it in its entirety. Men, women and children werekilled, captured or taken hostage. The last organized unitwas the 44th Regiment of Foot, which was overrun atGandamak on 13 January. Only one man reached thesafety of Jalalabad, Dr. William Brydon. The infamousRetreat from Kabul had ended.

This debacle changed London's attitude and an Armyof Retribution was soon organized in India. The Army ofRetribution fought its way back up the Khyber, whileanother force advanced independently from the south.Despite some miss-steps, both columns arrived in Kabulin September of 1842 and soon re-established control.Among other things, they rescued several of the prisonerstaken in the prior winter's retreat. Akbar Khan, who hadled the rebels, took to the hills.

Ironically, the Afghanis had allowed the Shah tocontinue to rule from his fortress at Kabul, at least until theson of a rival murdered him during a military review. Atthe same time Dost Mohamed was rallying his ownfollowers. London knew that while its armies could seizeAfghani cities, they could not hold the countryside. Whenthe British again evacuated Kabul in late 1842, DostMohamed seized the throne, once more establishing linkswith the Russian government. The war had accomplishednothing except giving the Afghanis victory over a Britisharmy.


The Great GameCentral Asia

in the 19th Century

RepercussionsIn the decade following, India erupted into war. The

British decided it was time to replace the buffer states onthe frontier with direct rule to ensure a first line ofdefense against the Russians. Scinde and Gwalior werethe first to fall, followed by the powerful Sikh Kingdom.The Sikhs, under Ranjit Singh, had built up a welltrained and well armed army along European lines. Butupon his death, the government became divided. Still, ittook the British two wars to quell the Sikhs, with finalvictory coming in 1859. Interestingly, Dost Mohamedsent a contingent to fight against the British in theSecond Sikh War.

A period engraving of Kabul.

Britain now controlled what became known asthe Northwest Frontier. Relative peace reigned until1857 when the Sepoy Revolt broke out. Indian sol-diers serving in British Indian Army rose in mutiny.The reasons for the revolt are complex, ranging fromfears of subjugation of religion to Christianity, torumors of British using forbidden cow and pork fat togrease rifle cartridges. In the end, the British sup-pressed the rebels. Among other things, the SepoyRevolt resulted in the British government takingdirect control of India and forming a more profes-sional army there.

Meanwhile the Russians continued their slowbut steady advance south and east. On the British side,two schools of thought for Indian defense emerged.One, was the Forward Policy, advocating the Britishshould advance as far into central Asia as possible inorder to counter the Russian threat. The other schoolargued for Masterly Inactivity, deliberately to avoidprovoking a war on the frontier the Russians couldexploit. The debate became moot when a Russianmission cunningly gained admittance to the court ofAmir Sher All in Kabul. The British, seeing a re-newed Russian threat, protested.

The 2nd Afghan War, 1878-81

Casus BelliLong standing tensions came to a head when a British

Mission tried to invite itself to Kabul, only to be stoppedat the border and told to turn around—or else. This rebuffproved to be an excuse for war.

The WarThe Second Afghan War began in November 1878,

with some 38,000 British and Indian troops advancing onthree fronts into Afghanistan. The Afghans for the firsttime fielded regiments and batteries to face their oppo-nents instead of the usual tribal militias. The advance ofthe British South Afghanistan Field Force (SAFF) mir-rored the march of the Army of the Indus in 1839 and littlehappened. The Peshawar Valley Field Force, from whichgreat things were expected, moved up the Khyber towardFort Ali Masjid, only to discover during its final advancethe enemy had disappeared.

The smallest column, General Frederick Roberts'Kurram Valley Field Force, encountered the Afghanarmy at Piewar Kotal. A two day battle ensued in whichthe Afghanis were completely outmaneuvered and fellback in full retreat. Roberts advanced to the ShutargardanPass and prepared to strike at Kabul. This was a seeminglyauspicious beginning to what promised to be a decisivecampaign, but events proved otherwise.

A brief lull began in which the Kurram and PeshawarField Forces brought up reserves, established bases andundertook punitive campaigns against recalcitrant tribeson the Northwest Frontier. To the south, the SAFF tookKandahar and Ghazni. At this point, Sher Ali fled Af-

24 #208

ghanistan. He left his son to negotiate a treaty, whichwas finally approved in May 1879. However, the Brit-ish mission that was sent to Kabul was confronted bysome Afghan regiments demanding their pay, whichwas in arrears. Words became threats, shots were fired,the embassy was besieged, and within a matter of hoursthe mission itself was massacred. So the war resumed.

Roberts' force was the only column still fully opera-tional and while reinforcements were rushed up fromIndia, it was he who defeated the Afghanis at Cherasiaband then re-entered Kabul. Regardless, the situationagain deteriorated. Roberts was in a tight spot, butunlike the situation in 1841, Roberts and his men weremore than an match for the Afghanis and despite somevery close calls, soon had Kabul under control.

The bulk of the SAFF marched on Kabul, won avictory at Ahmed Khel, and reinforced Roberts. Unfor-tunately, the commander of the British garrison inKandahar dispatched a column to suppress a localinsurrection that turned out to be the last (and best)regular force fielded by the Afghanis during the war.Hopelessly outnumbered and caught off guard atMaiwand, the British were nearly annihilated and forcedto retreat in disorder. Kandahar was under siege.

Roberts took a column of picked troops from Kabuland, after marching 20 days relieved Kandahar anddecisively defeated the besiegers. Another eight monthsof skirmishing, punitive campaigns and negotiationsfollowed, until peace was declared in April of 1881.Amir Abdur Rahman finally took office and the British,once again withdrew from Afghanistan.

Repercuss/onsThe loss of thousands of beasts of burden in the war

proved disastrous to the Indian economy and the GreatGame now began in earnest. The Russians continuedtheir advance, conquering the central Asian states ofKokand, Bokhara, and Khiva (1864-76). They annexedMerv in 1885, on Afghanistan's northern borders. Inresponse, the Amir aligned with the British, established

An RAF plane in India, in the front seat isthe Governor-General's daughter.

firm control of his country and forcedRussian influence out of Afghanistan.This more or less restablized the North-west Frontier. So the Russians began tolookinto Kashmir, Gilgit andNepal alongIndia's northern frontier for another routeto the Orient.

But in 1914 war broke out in Europe,which diverted Russian attention fromthe East. Now it was the turn of Germanand Turkish agents to stir up things inAfghanistan. This they did, but Britishsubsidies held the kingdom's loyalty. Gen. Roberts

The 3rd Afghan War, May-June 1919

Casus BelliThe latest Amir, Amanulla, citing civil unrest in India,

decided to come to the rescue of his Muslim and Hindu"brothers" and declared war. The losses the British andIndians had sustained during the Great War in Europefurther weakened British India, so a real threat waspresent.

The WarFighting lasted a mere 45 days between brave, well

led, but ill-equipped Afghan troops and war weary butwell supplied Anglo-Indian forces. On the Khyber frontthe British were briefly stymied at Bagh but then brokethrough and marched to Dakka. There they bivouacked ina valley and were treated roughly by enemy artillery firefrom the surrounding hills. Roberts, on his old stompinggrounds of the Kurram valley, saw the Afghans initiallyhold the British. The Afghans advanced on the Britishbase at Thai, besieging the reinforced brigade stationedthere until a relief force fought its way through.

British training, arms, supplies and the new weaponof airpower began to swing the balance. The Royal AirForce bombed Kabul, but the Amir stood firm. He wantedsovereign rights for Afghanistan and declared he wouldcontinue the fight until they were granted. Indian govern-ment officials, seeing their frontier policy collapsing,agreed and by early August a peace treaty was signed,recognizing Afghanistan's independence. The British-Afghan wars were finally over.

Repercuss/onsThe fall of the Romanovs in the 1917 Revolution

ended the Russian threat to British India. The new Sovietgovernment's attentions were absorbed first with win-ning the Civil War, and then establishing a new order inthe old Russian Empire. India held firm despite theJapanese threat in World War Two, and the entire issue ofImperial frontier defense became immaterial when theBritish withdrew from India in 1947. It was not until1979, with the Soviet invasion, that a foreign army wouldagain march into Afghanistan.


works

H ij ^^5^ Croup of Soviet ForcesGermany

"G-SoF-G", as designer Ty Bomba likesto call this one, is an update of a much wargamed

topic, a hypothetical Warsaw Pact attack on the NATOcountries during the 1970s. Ty has discarded many of theshibboleths of the Cold War era and has come up with somenew conclusions about World War Three. Among otherthings, G-SoF-G gives a much more realistic appraisal of thepotential of both Warsaw Pact and NATO nations to conductchemical and tactical nuclear warfare. The game is on theoperational level, with divisions as the basic building blocks.Units include the usual array of armored, mechanized andairborne formations as well as the often neglected Sovietartillery divisions. A simple air system is included, andairmobile units have some special capabilities to operate overa wide area. There are also optional rules for special forces,electronic warfare and USAF Wild Weasels.

Drive on StalingradTy Bomba strikes again! Drive on Stalingrad is a re-

vamping of the SPI wargame of the same title, the 1942 Axisoffensive that reached the Caucuses and ended in the destruc-tion of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Ty includes a lotof information about the campaign that has come to light in thelast couple decades. In the initial setup, the Soviets receivetheir historical reserve armies, deployed behind the front linesand sent into combat only under certain contingencies. Thecombat results table gives a more realistic depiction of thekind of slugfests that city fights turned into on the EasternFront. The supply system has been simplified, and doctrinaldifferences between Axis and Soviet forces are now portrayedrealistically. For example, the Germans can use a more flex-ible sequence of play, choosing to either move-then-attack orattack-then-move. However, the Soviets can catch up in timeto launch their historical Stalingrad envelopment. The gameincludes scenarios showing both the opening moves of thecampaign and the Soviet winter counteroffensive.

Rough & ReadyDesigner Richard Berg returns to the pages of Strategy &

Tactics with three battles of the Mexican-American War: PaloAlto, Sacramento and Resaca de la Palma. These battles sawa small but well trained US army overcome some brave foes,though leadership on both sides was sometimes less thanbrilliant (to put it mildly). But players now get their chance tostep into the boots of old "Rough and Ready" Zachary Taylorand his opposite, General Mariano Arista. The game rules areplayer-friendly, with provisions for leadership, fire and shockcombat, lancer combat bonus in charges, and assorted odditiessuch as grass fires obscuring the enemy's line of battle!

Operation Elope 1918-1919Operation Elope covers the little known Allied interven-

tion on the Archangel front during the Russian Civil War.Some 15,000 British, US and French troops advanced downthe Northern Dvina River, their objective—overthrow theReds ! The Bolsheviks threw 20,000 men back against them ina campaign that may have decided the future of Europe fordecades. Elope uses a variant of S&T's Blood on the Tigrisgame system, only this time adapted for winter warfare. Unitsinclude river monitors and aircraft, among other things.

—Perry Moore, designer.

Chosin: X Corps Escapes the TrapChosin is the companion game to S&T 190's Gauntlet:

Battle of Chongchon. It's a regimental/battalion level simu-lation of the Chinese IX Group Army's offensive against theUS-UN X Corps in late 1950. Among other things, thiscampaign saw the US 1 st Marine Division fight its way out ofthe Chinese trap at the Chosin Reservoir, the destruction ofTask Force Faith, and the successful UN evacuation fromHungnam. Each army has its own advantages. The Chineseare experts in infiltration, while the US has tons of firepower.Three combat results tables show differences in tactics.Airpower is represented on the operational level, with bothtactical and B-29 strikes, and airlift. Special rules allow forChosin and Gauntlet to be combined into one grand game.Plenty of "what if' forces, including US atomic weapons. Areyou willing to risk World War Three to win in Korea?

—Joseph Miranda, designer.

EDITORIAL CONTINUED

Special operations forces. The same dilemma as electronic... warfare—special operations units tend to operate on a higher

level than maneuver forces, conducting long term or longrange raid/recon, insurgency and PSYOP missions.

Intelligence. Intelligence has two general components inwargames: determining the enemy's capabilities and, per-haps more critically, determining his intentions. Finding theenemy is especially important in low intensity operations,such,as counterinsurgency and terrorism counteraction. Buthow do you build a player's intentions into a wargame? Doesthe designer use, perhaps, a card system, as was the case inKrieg, to require players to think a turn ahead?These are issues we are addressing in the simulations we do

at Decision Games. We're interested in your input on all this.

KudosI'd like to thank everyone involved in putting together this issue.There was a lot of last minute activity, and staff, writers andeveryone else did a fine job in the "rapid reaction" mode.

26 #208

FYIForYour

Information

DID YOU KNOW>• Osama Bin Laden recruitedresistance fighters for the CIA duringthe Russian invasion of Afghanistan.

>• The city of Kandahar in southernAfghanistan was in the 4th centuryBC a Macedonian colony called"Alexandria."

** Tacit Rainbow is an antiradarmissile that can loiter in a designatedarea for 45 minutes. The project wascancelled by the Air Force but thecomponents are being adapted toother missiles.

2^- Ghengis Khan marched an armythrough Afghanistan in the year 1221on his way to India.

>• The Harm antiradar missile has arange of 15 miles

>• The city of Herat in westernAfghanistan was once capital ofTamerlane's empire.

*" The nuclear powered aircraftcarrier USS Enterprise has a range of470,000 miles without having torefuel [that's about the distance fromthe Earth to the moon and back. ed.].

*• Kabul, Afghanistan's currentcapital, was captured in 1738 by thePersians under Nader Shah.

>~ The aircraft carrier USS TheodoreRoosevelt has a top speed of 35+knots.

*> At the Battle of Panipat, 14January 1761, an Afghan army underAhmad Shah Abdali defeated aMarathan army on the plains north ofDelhi.

>~ The American C-17A cargo planecan carry 76 tons of cargo out to arange of 2800 miles

>• The British 44th Regiment of Footmade its last stand at Gandamak,Afghanistan in January of 1842.

>• The U.S. Multiple Launch RocketSystem, or MLRS, has a maximumrange of 25 miles.'

>• Kokand, Bokhara, Khiva andMerv were central Asian kingdomsconquered by the Russians in their19th century march toward India.

2*- The Automatic Self Poweredcannon (ASP) is a 30mm gun that canbe mounted on a vehicle or M2.50tripod. It can fire 450 rounds a minuteout to a range of several miles.

2» In 1923 the British Royal AirForce suppressed an uprising in Iraqusing but nine transport aircraftconverted to bombers that attackedrebel villages and forced theircapitulation.

2* Britain has recently purchased 65cruise missiles from the UnitedStates.

2" At its highpoint, the Soviet armythat fought in Afghanistan in the1980s included elements of at leasttwo airborne and five mechanizeddivisions, plus several independentairborne, mechanized, air assault,special operations and KGB brigadesand regiments.

2=- An AFM-86 airborne launchedcruise missile is 20 feet 9 inches longand weighs 975 Ibs.

2* The Khyber Pass is located ineastern Afghanistan.

FOOTNOTES

Afghanistan in TurmoilAfter the Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan in 1989, the victoriousresistance movements should havebeen able to establish a legitimategovernment. They had just driven outthe Red Army, no small feat. Yet inthe wake of the Soviet withdrawal,the new Afghanistan government wasconfronted by a revolutionaryinsurgent force that eventually wouldseize control in Kabul—the Taliban.What caused the turnaround?

In 1992, the resistance move-ments defeated the Marxist govern-ment the Soviets had left behind tocontrol Afghanistan, then marchedinto Kabul. The victorious guerrillafactions formed an alliance amongthemselves and set up a newgovernment. This consisted of a 50-member ruling council headed bySibghatullah Mojadedi. BurhanuddinRabbani was named interim presi-

dent. But the new government wasfraught with bickering. Competingfactions could not agree on how torun the country. Unable to unite thenation, the void was filled by theforces of guerrilla leader GulbuddinHekmatyar, who began a campaign tooverthrow the government.

So Afghanistan was once morethrown into civil war. As the fightingescalated, each faction established defacto fiefdoms independent of anycentral control. Beginning in late1994, a militia of Pashtun Islamicfundamentalist students based inPakistan, the Taliban, emerged as anincreasingly powerful force. Thesestudents were largely orphans ofAfghan freedom fighters and held arespected position among Afghans fortheir dedication. By early 1996, theTaliban had become a force to bereckoned with in Afghanistan as itsfighters advanced into the countryand restored some semblance oforder.

In an effort to retain their powerin the face of the Taliban's threat,Rabbani and Hekmatyar signed apower-sharing accord that made thelatter premier. However, it was toolittle, too late. In September 1996, theTaliban captured Kabul and declaredthemselves the legitimate governmentof Afghanistan. They imposed theirinterpretation of Islamic law in thetwo thirds of the country theycontrolled. By the summer of 1998the Taliban appeared on the verge oftaking over the entire country. Ifnothing else, they could end thefactionalism and banditry that hadbecome a way of life in Afghanistan.

However, the Taliban's strongreligious fundamentalism and theiracceptance of anti-Western terroristsincreasingly alienated the UnitedStates. In 1998, the U.S. launched acruise missile strike against terroristcamps near Kabul run by Osama binLaden, the Saudi contractor turnedinternational terrorist who the U.S.accused of complicity in attacksthroughout the region.


From the Dustbin of History

'Oceania was at war with Eurasia; Oceania was alwaysat war with Eurasia."

—George Orwell

In March 1999, the UnitedNations brokered a peace agreementbetween the Taliban and the opposi-tion forces fighting in the north, aptlycalled the Northern Alliance. TheAlliance's forces were led by AhmedShah Massoud. He was a mujahideen(resistance) leader who was respectedby all sides in the country. Still,despite Massoud's influence, he couldnot stop the Taliban and so by the endof the decade, the Taliban controlledsome 85% of the country. However,the Taliban government was notgenerally recognized by the interna-tional community. Pakistan, whichhad supported the Taliban for years,was one of the few countries to givethem diplomatic recognition.

Meanwhile, just as the Talibanwere on the verge of military victorywithin Afghanistan, their army ranout of steam and proved unable tomake the final push to crush theNorthern Alliance. Both sides dug inand regrouped. The Taliban couldconceivably have mobilized sufficientstrength to launch a final offensiveand totally control the country. But on11 September 2001, the United Stateswas struck by massive terroristattacks launched against the Pentagonand the World Trade Center, attacksblamed on Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden was operating out ofAfghanistan with the Taliban'sconsent, and within days, the UnitedStates had organized a coalition ofnations to bring the fight againstterrorism to Afghanistan. Operatingon the principle that "my enemy'senemy is my friend" the U.S. and itspartners began aiding the NorthernAlliance. The U.S. and Britain alsolaunched a series of airstrikes andinfiltrated special operations forcesinto Afghanistan itself as part of anew "war on terrorism."

During the first phase of opera-tions, U.S./British airpower attackedand destroyed Afghan early warningsystems, communication andcommand facilities, and aircraft. Thesecond phase was an air campaignagainst opposition ground forces. The

final phase, apparently, is for specialoperations forces units, supported byair and backed by mobile groundforces, to enter the fray in search ofterrorists, [information in this articleis current as of October 2001. ed.]

The Taliban ArmyThe Taliban have about 45,000

men under arms. About 40% of thesefighters are conscripts, the restvolunteers. These troops have varyingdegrees of training, reliability andexperience on the battlefield. Theforce is built around brigade sizedunits and the elite troops are thosetrained by Osama bin Laden. His 55Brigade has been one of the mostproficient fighting units in the waragainst the Northern Alliance. BinLaden's units have an overall strengthof about 5,000 men.

The Taliban army has severalhundred tanks and armored vehicles.The tanks include T-54s, 55s and 62s.These are left over from the Sovietoccupation and many have beenrebuilt in Afghan workshops. Thereare a number of heavy artillerypieces, mortars and vehicle-mountedrocket launchers for fire support.There are also about 100 aircraft,including Mig-21 fighter-bombersand Hind (Mi-24) attack helicop-ters—although many of these aircraftwere destroyed in the American airoffensive against the country.

Since Afghanistan has been at warfor over 20 years, the basic soldierskills of the Afghan infantrymen mustbe rated highly. They can live in thefield, survive and fight. They arecapable of sound small unit tacticsand are a masters of using terrain toadvantage. Where the Afghanmilitary starts to lose its efficiency isat the battalion/brigade level. Firesupport is primitive at best. Airsupport is capable but communicationequipment is scarce and directingartillery or airstrikes onto targets isdifficult.

The Northern AllianceThe Northern Alliance is the

remains of the pre-Taliban govern-ment. Despite controlling less than10% of the country [in mid-2001, ed.]and commanding an army of less than10,000 regulars, it is still recognizedas the legitimate government ofAfghanistan by most of the world.The military, political and spiritualleader of the movement was AhmedShah Massoud. He was a resistancecommander in the 1979-1989 waragainst Soviet occupation and acharismatic leader who could unitediverse factions within the alliance.He was assassinated 9 September2001. Massoud's intelligence chief,General Mohammed Fahim, thenbecame the alliance's chief.

The Alliance itself is composed ofthe following groups:

Jamia 't-i-Isla 'mi (IslamicSociety): Massoud was one of theJamia't's leaders until killed. Its mainarea of operations is north of Kabuland the Panjsher Valley.

Jumbesh-i-Milli Islami (NationalIslamic Movement): This was formedin 1992 from former Afghan armytroops. Its leader is General RashidDostum.

Hizbi Wahdat-Khalili (IslamicUnity Party): Leader is Abdul KarimKhalili.

Additionally, several otherresistance movements dating back tothe war against the Soviets stilloperate independently in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Armed ForcesDisorganization

The conflict between the NorthernAlliance and the Taliban has leftAfghanistan with a chaotic militarysituation. Much of the old militarysystem has been divided among thewarring factions. However, bylooking at the structure prior to theCommunist collapse, we may get alook at how the military units areorganized under the various factions.

The smallest unit of the oldAfghanistan army was the Delgai.

28 #208

There were two types. One hadbetween 11 and 33 soldiers, the otherbetween 33 and 99. Three Delgaimade up a Tolay. Three Tolay madeup a Kandak. Three Kendaks made upa Lewa. Three Lewas made up aFerga. Two or three Fergas combinedinto an Urdu. Urdus were usuallycombined on a regional basis. Thereare Urdus in Kandahar, Kabul andother key regions of the nation.

Ground forces are classified asPeyada-Nezam or infantry, Quwa-e-Zerahadr or mechanized, andToopchi or artillery. There are alsoregional militia groups probablyorganized along conventional lines,though those may been blurred inrecent days with the defection ofTaliban troops to the NorthernAlliance and vice versa.

Afghani WeaponsThe Afghans inherited loads of

communist weapons at the end of theSoviet occupation. Being a poornation, Afghanistan was in noposition to buy new equipment, andso they made do with these. Fieldrepairs and modifications werecommonplace to bring damagedequipment to operational readiness.Since the breakup of the Soviet Unionin 1991, the former Soviet statesfound they could gain hard currencywith exports of weapons, spare parts,ammunition, and the technicians torun weapons systems. Many of thesefound their way into Afghanistan.

The Soviets designed theirweapons to be "soldier-proofed," thatis, rugged and easily repaired in thefield. Even the most unsophisticatedAfghani fighter, with a little luck, canbe deadly with the weapons available.The basic infantry weapons are goodand the mortars, rockets and fieldartillery can hit targets at long range,something the U.S. found out fromexperience in Vietnam. The armoredvehicles are fast, hard to hit and havegood armor protection, though oftencramped for the crews. Though thearmor will not stand up to U.S.antitank rounds, it can still be deadlyto the unwary soldier. Even the oldMiG-21, with luck, is capable ofbringing down a U.S. jet with its airto air missiles. The table has thestandard weapons used by theAfghans.

Infantry WeaponsWeapon Type JRate of Fire.AK47 : Assault rifle .' , 600 rounds.per minuteAK 74 . Assault rifle : . 650 rounds per minuteSKS .Rifle • Semi-autoSVD . Sniper rifle .- Semi-autoPK Machine gun 720 rounds a minuteRPD ; Machine gun 700 rounds a minuteMarkov Pistol, 8 round magazine

Armored Fighting VehiclesWeaponT-62BMP1BMP2BTR60

TypeMBTIFVIFVIFV

"Main Gun115mm gun73mm gun30mm gun14.7 MG

CannonlMortarslMissilesWeapon Type Warhead/RangeM-43 160mm Mortar 89 Ib shell/2.5 milesM-46 130mm Cannon 73 Ib shell/17 milesBM-21/24 - 240mm Rockets 103 Ib warhead/8 milesScud (SS-1) .Battlefield Miss. 2,2051b warhead/174 mi.

AntiaircraftWeaponZSU 23-4SA-2Stinger

AntitankWeaponAT-1RPG-7

TypeSPAASAMSAM

TypeATOMRPG

Light VehiclesWeaponZIL.130URAL 375

AircraftWeaponMig-21

Mi-8

Mi-24

TypeTruckTruck

TypeFighter/Bomber

Attack Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

Gun/Warhead4 x 23mm guns287 Ib warhead7 Ib warhead

Warhead11 Ib warhead ,5 Ib round

Main Gun5.5 ton load10 ton load

Weapons4 Hard points+ 23mm cannon6 Hard points+ 12.7mm gunHard pnts/wing pylons+ 23mm cannon

Use ' • *:

Standard small armImproved small armStandard rifleLimited number on handGeneral purpose MGOlder weaponStandard pistol

UseOld but effective tankAPCNewer APCWheeled APC

UseReliableReliable, long ranged gunPowerful but inaccurateCapable of chemical/nuclearwarheads

.UseAntiair and personnelUp to 92,000 ft.Up to 1,500 ft

UseCan penetrate 53 inchesCan penetrate 13 inches

UseReliable truckHeavy truck

UseNimble fighter

Gunship/transport

Heavily armed gunship/transport

Abbreviations:ATGM: Antitank guided missileAPC: Armored personnel carrierIFV: Infantry fighting vehicleMBT: Main battle tank

MG: Machine gunRPG: Rocket propelled grenadeSAM: Surface-to-air missileSPAA: Self-propelled antiaircraft vehicle


For Your

Information

Special OpsThe U.S. deploys a wide range of

special operations forces (SOF),which are assigned various "uncon-ventional" missions. While thesemissions frequently change, the typesof SOF in the U.S. Army order ofbattle include:

Special Forces: Sometimes known asthe "Green Berets" (after theirheadgear), Special Forces (not tobe confused with the more generaldesignation, special operationsforces) missions have includedorganizing friendly guerrillas,counterinsurgency, and conduct-ing long range reconnaissance andraid operations.

Rangers: Rangers are light infantry,capable of raiding and othertactical and operational level •missions.

Delta: This is a highly trainedcounter-terrorist unit.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP):PSYOP is responsible forpropaganda and other communi-cations designed to win withoutfighting.

Civil Affairs: Civil Affairs' originalmission was establishment ofmilitary government in liberatedand occupied territories, buteventually shifted to assistingfriendly governments in buildingup their infrastructure.

Special Operations Aviation: Thisoperates specialized helicoptersthat provide support to SOF onthe ground, including clandestineinsertion and extraction.

Additionally, the U.S. Air Forcehas its Special Operations Wings,which fly gunship, PSYOP andinsertion/extraction aircraft. And theNavy has its SEAL units, whichconduct amphibious based specialoperations. Marine force recon unitsare also counted among U.S. SOF.

Dune BuggiesU.S. special operations forces that

will be involved in the fighting inAfghanistan will use a variety ofequipment. Though they can and douse standard U.S. weaponry, theytend to procure specialized weaponsneeded to accomplish the mission.One of their most unusual weapons isthe Fast Attack Vehicle. This is anupgraded "dune buggy" made byNordac which is loaded with weaponsand sophisticated location and

communications equipment. It is a 4x2 wheeled vehicle which can reachspeeds of 75 miles per hour. It can bearmed with machine guns or TOWantitank missiles, depending on theneed. It carries a crew of three andcan be loaded with fuel, water andammunition. It has Global PositioningSystem (GPS) and sophisticatedcommunication equipment—just thething for special operations in enemyterritory.

JDAMThe Joint Direct Attack Munitions

was a U.S. attempt to find a cheapand effective "smart bomb." TheUnited States had proven in the 1991Gulf War air campaign that precisionmunitions, such as the cruise missile,could effectively destroy heavilydefended enemy targets whileminimizing the danger to friendlyaircraft and pilots. However, the useof precision munitions was expensive.The cruise missile cost about $2million per copy—and this for a one-shot round. The use of expensivemunitions also ignored the stockpileof "iron (unguided) bombs" in theinventory.

After the Gulf War, the U.S. AirForce took the lead and began toresearch various inexpensiveguidance systems for iron bombs. InOctober 1995, after much work withcivilian contractors, the Air Forceawarded a contract to HMD Corpora-tion for the Joint Direct AttackMunition (JDAM). The new systemwas a sophisticated tail kit which canbe attached to the Mark 80 250 Ibbomb, the Mark 81 500 Ib bomb, theMark 83 1000 Ib bomb, the Mark 822000 Ib bomb, the BLU 110 1000 Ibbomb, and the BLU 109 2000 Ib hardtarget penetrator bomb.

The system incorporates aguidance control system that uses aninertial navigation system coupledwith the Global Positioning System.The guidance system is linked to theaircraft's navigation system and isconstantly updated while the aircraftis in flight. Because the guidancesystem uses a three-axis InternalNavigation System, the bomb is notsusceptible to jamming or interfer-ence from the ground.

With the system in place, thestandard bomb can be launched as faraway as 15 miles from its target andwill land with an average error ofnine feet. JDAM equipped bombs can

be dropped from the B-l, B-2 B-52,F-15E, F-16, F-22, F-l 17 and F/A-18,and from high or low altitude.Deploying aircraft can use anynumber of maneuvers, including leveldropping, lofting or tossing.

The Air Force requested 4,635JDAM kits in the initial order. Eachkit costs $18,000. The JDAMs havebeen used extensively in Afghanistanand it is likely the Air Force willreorder in greater numbers, increasingthe efficiency of their bombing effortand reducing the cost per unit.

The Lancer Strikes BackThe U.S. Air Force's B-l bomber

program has been fraught withcontroversy. The aircraft, which wasdesigned to replace the aging B-52intercontinental bomber, proved to beoverly- sophisticated and trouble-prone in the field. Still, the aircraftemerged in the 2001 U.S. campaignin Afghanistan as a powerful strikebomber. What was the background onthe B-l ?

In November 1969, the UnitedStates Air Force issued a specificationfor a multi-role, long-range bomber,capable of flying intercontinentalmissions without refueling. Once nearthe target, the aircraft was expected topenetrate both contemporary andpredicted future enemy air defenses.The aircraft could carry bothconventional and nuclear bombs aswell as extensive electronic counter-measures (ECM) equipment.

After careful evaluation ofproposed designs, in June 1970 theAir Force selected the Rockwellcorporation to build the B-l. Acontract for five test aircraft wasissued and Rockwell went to work.The First aircraft took to the air inDecember 1974. The new bomberwas sleek, fast and sophisticated,perhaps too much so to be viable. Theprototype had a swing-wing (variablegeometry) design. With wings sweptback, it could streak to mach l .25.With its wings extended, it couldmaintain stable flight at slower speedsfor take-offs and landings. The B-lwas powered by four General Electric010-GE-102 turbofan engines whichallowed the aircraft to take off with amaximum weight of 477,000 Ibs. Theengines also allowed the aircraft tocarry up to 84 x 500 Ib bombs or avariety of missiles. On long rangemissions, the B-l could obtain anunrefueled flight of 7,455 miles.

30 #208

These flight and bomb carryingcharacteristics of the B-l wereimpressive. However, the heart of thenew bomber was its sophisticatednavigation, radar and electroniccountermeasures suite. The aircraftcould fly "nap of the earth," closelyfollowing terrain in order to avoidenemy radar. The 147 foot longbomber could fly at an altitude of 200feet at speeds of 600 miles an hour. Itcould jam enemy radars, confuseenemy radar tracking missiles andpenetrate any air defense on theplanet.

Unfortunately, flying such lowlevel missions had a downside. TheB-l's advanced electronics failed onoccasion and there was no room forerror when the slightest miscalcula-tion could plow the aircraft into theground. The complex jamming arraysof the electronic countermeasuressystem were so good that it did, onoccasion, jam the electronics of thebomber itself! These and otherproblems led to extensive testing andmodifications. Finally, in June 1977,President Jimmy Carter canceled theB-l program in favor of the cruisemissile.

Though the cruise missiles wereeffective, they could not project thesame punch as the B-l which, couldbe reused on multiple missions andprovide an aerial "show of strength."Still, proponents of the aircraft knewif they could resurrect the programand incorporate modifications into anew version of it, they might have awinner. In October 1981, PresidentRonald Reagan authorized theconstruction of 100 B-1B bombers.

The B-1B, or Lancer as it wasnow called, had a stronger airframe,better electronics, strengthenedlanding gear, improved engine designand many other new features. Mostimportant, the B-lB's electronicjamming equipment was improved.The infrared countermeasures, radarlocation and warning systems wereintegrated to complement its low-radar cross-section and form adefensive package for the aircraft.

The first B-l B took to the air inOctober 1985. Much of the develop-ment and testing program had beenaccomplished on the B-l A, and so thetest flights proceeded quickly. Theaircraft was accepted by the Air Forceand the first production model wasdelivered in July 1985.

The new aircraft was assigned tothe nuclear deterrence role until theGulf War of 1991. Though theaircraft could have been used toattack Iraqi targets in the Gulf, the AirForce decided to retain the aircraft inits primary role and the B-l sremained in the United States on alertto counter any nuclear attack.

The B-lBs proved expensive tooperate. After they entered service,the B-l B fleet never achieved the AirForce's objective of having a 75-percent mission capable rate. In 1992and 1993, the B-1B mission capablerate averaged about 57 percent. TheAir Force blamed the low rate on thelevel of funding provided to supportthe B-1B logistics support system.Concerned about the low missioncapable rate, the Air Force decided toreconfigure many of the bombers tocarry conventional ordnance. Withproper funding and care, the availabil-ity of the B-lBs rose to 84.3%.

The 2001 war in Afghanistanoffered the B-l B a new opportunity todemonstrate its capabilities. Theoriginal aircraft was designed to carryMk-82 non-guided 500 Ib gravitybombs. Improvements in the aircraft'sbomb bays and delivery systemsallowed it to deliver up to 30 ClusterBomb Units (CBUs) per sortie forenhanced conventional attacks.Another upgrade consisted of amodification for the bomb modulefrom the original configuration of 28x 500-pound bombs to 10 x 1,000-pound cluster bombs per bomb rack.The B-1B can also carry the JDAMand the Wind Corrected MunitionsDispenser (WCMD), Joint StandoffWeapon (JSOW) and Joint Air toSurface Standoff Missile (JASSM)for standoff capability.

The B-l B has already flownseveral bombing missions overAfghanistan and with its powerfulbomb load and ability to fly "nap ofthe earth" missions with little fear ofbeing downed, the Lancer willundoubtedly prove its worth in anywar.

The / Oth MountainWhen U.S. forces entered

Uzbekistan in October of 2001,elements of the Army's 10thMountain Division were sent toprovide ground combat capability.Much like the 82nd AirborneDivision, the 10th Mountain hasbecome one of America's "fire

brigades." The division has anunusual history.

In 1943 the United States realizedit might have to fight in the moun-tains of northern Italy or the Alps ofGermany. In order to execute thismission, the Army would need aspecially trained mountain division.With that in mind, the I Oth LightDivision (Alpine) was activated on 15July 1943 and assigned to the XICorps. The 10th Light included threeinfantry regiments, the 85th, 86th and90th. The division artillery consistedof the 604th Field Artillery Battalion,605th Field Artillery Battalion and616th Field Artillery Battalion. Theother units of the division came fromthe reorganization and redesignationof units of the Mountain TrainingCenter, with the exception of the727th Antiaircraft Artillery MachineGun Battalion, which was furnishedby the Antiaircraft Command.

The 10th Light Division (Alpine)was organized to test the organizationand equipment needed to fight in thehigh mountains. It was designed tooperate in primitive terrain whereroad nets were poor or nonexistentand under adverse and extreme winterweather conditions. Because of itsunique mission, the unit had littleheavy equipment or heavy transport.The division was organized under theLight Division Table of Organization72 (Pack) which called for 490officers, 19 warrant officers and8,355 enlisted men. Officers and menfor the division had experience inmountain warfare, knew how to ski orhad grown up in mountainous areas.

The unit was sent to Camp Hale,Colorado for training. The camp is atan altitude of over 9,000 feet andgave the troops the first exposure tothe rigors of mountain training. Theofficer selected to command the 10thLight Division was Major GeneralLloyd E. Jones. He had previously

STRATEGY & TACTICS 3 I

commanded the task force thatoccupied Cold Bay and Amchitka inthe Aleutian Islands. The AssistantDivision Commander-was BrigadierGeneral Frank L. Culin, Jr. He hadalso served in the Aleutians.

The first division field exercisewas held early in November 1943.Though the exercise was successful,the unit was soon crippled by aninfluenza epidemic. Unit training wasfinally completed on 5 February 1944in preparation for combined training,which was to last from 7 February to22 April.

The 10th Mountain Division wasdeployed to the Italian theater in 1944and received its baptism of fire on 28January 1945. The division fought itsway into the Po Valley in northernItaly and engaged the Germans untilthe end of the war.

Despite its success in combat andits high state of training, after the warthe Army saw no need for a highlyspecialized unit such as a mountaindivision, and the 10th was accord-ingly disbanded. But in 1985, the unitwas reactivated as a light division,stationed at Fort Drum. Its missionwas to act as the reaction force in anycontingency. Lacking heavy vehiclesand fire support weapons, the divisioncould be moved quickly anywhere inthe world in a moment's notice on AirForce transports.

Since its reactivation, the lOhMountain Division has served inSomalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and now inAfghanistan. Although the exactstructure of the force sent to Afghani-stan is still classified a look at thedivision's structure in Somalia willshow what the task organization ofthe 1 Oth may look like.

HHC, 2d Brigade, 10th MountainDivision2d Battalion, 14th Infantry3d Battalion, 14th Infantry2d Battalion, 87th InfantryCompany E (TOW), 87th Infantry[Provisional]HHC, Aviation Brigade, 10thMountain Division3d Battalion, 25th Aviation3d Squadron, 17th CavalryHHB, 10th Mountain DivisionArtillery2d Battalion, 7th Field ArtilleryHHC, 10th Mountain DivisionSupport Command46th Support Battalion210th Support Battalion (Forward)710th Support Battalion (Main)Battery A, 3d Battalion, 62d AirDefense ArtilleryBattery B, 3d Battalion, 62d AirDefense Artillery10th Signal Battalion41st Engineer Battalion

r f r- l. J L \?

^ f§]l]( (olW/r~^J J r^ /

(ë^U^^m^T^)Fill out (please print legibly) the order form andsend it with your check payable to Strategy &Tactics (please no Canadian Checks) to: DecisionGames, PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598 or call (661) 587-9633 (9:00am-4:00pmPST) to place your credit card order. 24hour faxline is 661/587-5031.

1 Name:| Address:1 Citv State1 Country

|v/MC#1| Signature

1 Exp. Phone #

A complete game in everyissue!

Individual subscriptions are:

S&T(6) ,S&T(12)

U.S. $99.00 $189.00Canada $109.00 $209.00

Overseas $129.00 $249.00

Zip

110th Military Intelligence BattalionLong Range Surveillance Detachment

l Oth Military Police Company

The Flying HindIn the mid-1960s the Soviet

Union decided to add a helicoptergunship to its arsenal. Using thesuccessful Mi-8 helicopter as astarting point, the Soviets decided tobuild a heavily armed and armoredhelicopter that could dominate theground battlefield. They werefortunate in that the Isotov turbo shaftengines used in the Mi-8 werepowerful. In fact, Isotov had added aneven more powerful engine, the TV3-117, to its inventory. This was theengine selected for the project.

Soviet engineers set to work tobuild the new gunship. After muchtrial and error, the new helicopter,designated the Mi-24 (NATO codename, "Hind") entered service in1973. It was an impressive piece ofmilitary hardware. The helicopter was70 feet long with a rotor diameter of55 feet, 9 inches. The Hind waspowered by two Isotov TV3-117turbo shaft engines, which gave it atop sped of 208 mph and a serviceceiling of 14,750 feet. The excep-tional engines not only gave thehelicopter great speed but also madeit nimble in the air

While the Hind was heavilyarmored, much of its weight wastaken up in the ordnance it carried.The helicopter had a 12.7mmremotely controlled gun in a turretunder the nose. It had wingtip pylonsfor antitank missiles and four underwing hard points for rocket or cannonpods. The helicopter could carry 32 x57mm or 20mm rockets or twin23mm GSh-23 cannon. It could alsocarry standard bombs, scatterablemines and a variety of other weapons.The cabin can carry eight armedtroops and their weapons, making thisa dual use gunship/transport.

About 3,000 Hinds have beenproduced since the assembly lineopened. During the Soviet war inAfghanistan it proved to be aneffective weapon against lightlyarmed resistance forces. Thehelicopter has been widely exported,and the Afghan government hasseveral at its disposal. Though theHind is getting on in years, it is still arugged, reliable "flying tank" whenairborne.

32 #208

B AC K TO IRAQ

Index1.0 Introduction

2.0 Game Components

3.0 Set Up & Scenarios4.0 How to Win

5.0 The Turn Sequence

6.0 Stacking

7.0 Coalition Zones of Control8.0 Supply

9.0 Reconstitution & Recovery

10.0 Movement

11.0 Combat

12.0 US 101st Airmobile Division13.0 Optional Rules

14.0 Charts & Tables

15.0 Spec Ops Rules

Advanced Game

AG l .0 Strategic TargetsAG 2.0 Airstrikes

AG 3.0 Special Operations Forces (SOF)AG 4.0 Command Control (C2)

AG 5.0 Additional Forces

AG 6.0 Advanced Game Order of Battle

CreditsDesign & Development: Ty Bomba & Joseph MirandaPlaytest Group: David Collins, David Bolt, Ted Schlinkert,Jeff Millefoglie, Ray CrawfordMap: Joe YoustCounters: Larry Hoffman© 2001 Decision Games Made in USA. All rights reserved

1.0 INTRODUCTION1.1 Back To Iraq, 3rd Edition (B2I3e) isa "what-if ' simulation of the fighting thatmight occur across the northern littoral ofthe Persian Gulf if the US-led anti-terrorismCoalition decides on a ground war to finallysettle with the Baghdad regime.

B2I3e is a two-player wargame of low-to-intermediate complexity that posits thismight-be war lasting about a month. Webelieve that is about the maximum timebefore the Coalition ground force'sdiminishing supplies, coupled with a lossof the domestic political will necessary tocontinue the fighting, would bring about asettlement if victory were not achieved inthe field. Rules for the Advanced Gamefollow the main body of these rules.

1.2 Game ScalesEach hex equals 17 miles (27.54 km.)

from side to opposite side. Each game turnrepresents two days. The units of maneuverare mostly brigades and divisions, eachwith about 1,000 to 15,000 men and up to350 or so armored fighting vehicles.Coalition air supremacy is built into severalaspects of the rules and is therefore notrepresented by separate aircraft unit-counters.

1.3 Some Definitions

If a rule is said to apply to "all Coalitionunits," that means it applies to all units inthe game opposed to the Iraqis and theIranians. That is, Coalition units are allthose unit-counters not marked with "IQ"or "IR" nationality identifications.

If a rule applies to only one or some ofthe nationalities opposing the Iraqis/Iranians, the specific names of thosenationalities will be used in that rule.

If a rule is said to apply to Coalition"Great Powers" units, that means it appliesto Coalition units belonging to the US, UKand France.

If a rule is said to apply to Coalition"Minor Powers" units, that means it appliesto all Coalition units other than thosebelonging to the US, UK and France.

If a rule is said to apply to all "MilitantIslamic" units, it applies to all Iraqi andIranian units. If a rule applies only to Iraqiunits, or only to Iranian units, those specificnationality names will be used.

2.0 GAME COMPONENTS2.1 The components to a complete game ofB2I3e include these rules, the map sheetand 176 die-cut counters (also called "units"and "unit-counters"). Players must providethemselves with a standard (six-sided) dieto resolve combat and other probabilisticevents that occur during play.

2.2 The Gome MapThe game map represents the militarily

significant terrain in the Iraq theater ofoperations and its environs when portrayedat this scale. A hexagonal ("hex") grid isprinted over it to regulate unit placementand movement. A unit is always in only onehex at any one instant.

Each hex contains natural and/ormanmade terrain features that may affectmovement and combat. The map's terrainrepresentations have been altered slightlyfrom their real-worldconfigurations in orderto make them conform to the hex-grid. Butthe terrain relationships from hex to hex areaccurate to the degree necessary to presentplayers with the same space/time problemsthat would be faced by their real-worldcounterparts if this war were to actually

STRATEGY & TACTICS RI

take place.

Each hex on the map has a unique four-digit number printed in it. It is provided tohelp you find any specific locations referredto in the rules (for example, the city ofBasrah is in hex 3429), and to allow you torecord unit positions if a match has to beinterrupted and taken down before it can becompleted.

2.3 The Counters

There are 176 counters in the game,most of which represent combat units.Others are provided as informationalmarkers and memory aids. After readingthrough these rules at least once, carefullypunch out the counters. Trimming the "dogears" from their corners with a fingernailclipper greatly facilitates handling andstacking during play and also enhancestheir appearance. Each combat unit-counterdisplays several pieces of information:nationali ty, type, combat strengths,reinforcement status, specific identificationand mobility class.

2.4 Sample Combat Unit

This unit is the US 1st ArmoredDivision. It has an attack factor of nine, adefense factor of eight, and a movementfactor of nine. Because it has printing onboth sides, it is said to be a "two-step" unit(see 2.10).

Front

Movement' Attack Defense

Unit Size

S Specific Unit ID.

"Reduced" side

B AC K TO IRAQKuwaiti army — black on green

Turkish units — black on gray

Syrian — green on yellow

Joint Forces Command—white on olivedrab

Israeli — blue on white

Al-Qaeda—black on orange

Militant Islamic Color Schemes

Iraqi Republican Guard — white on red

Iraqi regular army — black on red

Iranian Revolutionary Guards — white onblack

Iranian regular army — black on gray

Design Note. At the time we're going topress, it looks as if Syria would not play anactive part in this ground war if it occurs.The Damascus regime is claiming to havegotten completely "on board" with the USanti-terrorism Coalition, but their heartsurely isn't in it, to say the least. So wedoubt their army would be either. We 'vetherefore included counters for their 1stand 2nd Corps, which would represent themaximum limit of their participation in aground war here, no matter on what side.Instructions are not given, however, forthose units' inclusion in the two scenariospresented in this simulation. Just keep theSyrians off to the side and feed them intoyour games later on, as the unfolding ofactual world events may dictate.

The situation is similar with the twoTurkish units included in the counter-mix.At press time, it seems f airly certain Ankarawould allow its territory to be used as abase of attack by other Coalition forces,but it seems doubtful the Turkish armywould actively participate. Players shouldagain make rules and set up adaptations asevents unfold in reality.

2.6 Unit Identities &Abbreviations

Unit nationalities and the specificformations within each national force arefurther identified by numbers and

2.5 Sides & Abbreviations

Unit nationality, and therefore the sideeach is on, is indicated by their colorschemes and abbreviations to the left oftheir unit-type-boxes. Other abbreviations,used to facilitate the specific identificationsof some units, also appear to the right of theunit-type-boxes.

Coalition Color Schemes

United States units — black on olive drab

United Kingdom units — black on khaki

French units — black on light blue

Coalition "Euro Corps"— gold on lightblue

abbreviations. Those abbreviations are asfollows:AA — Al-AbyedAC — Armor CommandAD — Adrian

ADC — Air-Defense CommandAN — Al-NidahAQ — Al QuedaBG — BaghdadC - Cavalry

Co — CommandoEC — Euro CorpsF — FranceGSS — General Security ServiceHM — Hammurabi

IQ — IraqIR — IranK — KuwaitKCG — Kuwait City Garrison

L — LightMIR — Military Intelligence Service RapidInterventionNB — Nebuchadnezzar

MD — MedinaMEF — Marine Expeditionary Force

NT — NATOPG — Presidential GuardRI — Rapid InterventionSAIR — Supreme Assembly of the IslamicRevolutionSBM — Security Battalion of MilitaryIntelligenceSdFe — Saddam's Fedayeen

SF — Special ForcesSRG — Special Republican Guard

T — TurkeyUK — United Kingdom

US — United States

2.7 Unit Sizes

Units' organizational sizes are indicatedby the symbol atop their unit-type boxes.From largest to smallest they are: XXXX-Army, XXX-Corps, XX-Division, X-Brigade, II-Battalion. If the size symbol ofa unit is bracketed, that formation is ad hocor irregular, meaning it is not normally apart of its army's order of battle and wasorganized specifically for this campaign.

2.8 Unit Types & Mobility Classes

All ground combat units in the gamebelong to one of four basic mobility types.They are either mechanized ("mech"), non-mechanized ("non-mech"), airmobile orstatic. Mechanized ground units are thosewhose primary means of moving is providedby wheeled or tracked motorized vehicles.Non-mechanized units' primary means oflocomotion is provided by legs. Airmobileunits are heliborne, while static units, as theterm implies, never move after being placedon the map. These mobility distinctions areimportant for movement and combat (seesections 10.0 and 11.0).

R2 #208

Mechanized

Armor (or Tank)

Combined Arms (or US"Medium Division")

Mechanized Infantry

Motorized Infantry

Motorized Marines

Motorized Paratroopers

Motorized Special Forces

Headquarters (Advanced Game only)

Special Operations Forces or SOF(Advanced Game only)

Special Operations Forces have theirfactors highlighted, indicating that theseunits have special capabilities. Note thatthese are distinct from other types of SpecialForces/commandos.

Non-Mechanized

Mountain Infantry

Special Forces

Paratroops

Airmobile

Air Assault

Air Units

Conventional Airstrike (Advanced Gameonly)STEALTH Airstrike (Advanced Gameonly)Surveillance (Advanced Game only)Special Operations Aviation (AdvancedGame Experimental Rule only)

I—•—I Static

^1 Garrison

Air Defense Artillery &Rockets

B AC K TO IRAQ2.9 Attack & Defense Factors

These numbers, referred to collectivelyas "combat factors," are measures of eachunit's relative ability to attack and defend(see section 11.0). If aunithas three numbersacross its bottom edge, the first number isalways its attack factor, followed by itsdefense factor, followed by its movementfactor.

2.10 Movement Factor

This is a measure of each unit's abilityto move across the hex field printed on themap. Units pay different movement coststo enter or cross the different types ofterrain in and around the hexes into whichthey move (see section 10.0).

2. / / Step Strength

All ground units in the game containone or two "steps" (also called "strengthsteps"). That is an arbitrary term used toshow the ability of units to absorb certainamounts of casualties and equipment lossesbefore becoming entirely ineffective. Thoseground units with printing on only one sideof their counters are "one-step" units. ThoseCoalition units with a stripe running acrosstheir reverse sides are said to be "two-step"units. On the Militant Islamic side all unitsare one-steppers. See section 11.0 for moredetails.

2./2 Other Counters

The uses of the following counters areexplained at appropriate points throughoutthe rest of the rules.

Game Turn Indicator (see section 5.0)

Militant Islamic Prestige Point markers(MIPPs, see 4.2)

Weather Indicator (see 13.1)

Coalition Aerial Supply marker (see 8.13)

Nuclear Detonation marker (see 13.8)

Chemical Warfare marker (see 13.4)

Coalition Reconstitution marker (seesection 9.0)

Coalition Heavy Strike Marker (see 13.16)

Naval Gunfire marker

Strategic Target markers (Advanced Gameonly)

3.0 SET UP & SCENARIOSImportant note: The Strategic Target,Airstrike, Headquarters, Israeli and Al-Qaeda units are used only when playingthe Advanced Game.

3.1 Choose Sides & Set Up

Players first choose which side eachwill control, the Coalition side or theMilitant Islamic side, which of the twoscenarios they will play, and the optionalrules (see section 12.0) and advanced game

rules (see section 14.0) they will use. Allunits of both sides appropriate to thescenario being played are available at thestart of play and begin at their full step-strength. Stacking rules (see section 6.0)must be observed by both players whensetting up. There are no reinforcements foreither side in either scenario.

3.2 Scenario One: On To BaghdadThis is the standard "Gulf War II"

scenario, wherein we're assuming PresidentGeorge W. Bush decides not to be prudent.That is, he cites Saddam's possession ofWMDs (weapons of mass destruction) anduninterrupted support of terroristorganizations as rationales for extendingthe war on terrorism into a second phase:the invasion, conquest and probable nationaldismemberment of Iraq.

Unlike the corresponding scenario inthe earlier editions of this game, there isnow no chance for Iranian intervention oneither side. That is because it now seemsprobable, that during the build up for sucha campaign great diplomatic pains wouldbe taken to keep the Iranians sidelined,most likely by assuring them any othercourse of action on their part would resultin massive retaliation from the Coalition.Or perhaps a "carrot approach" would beused, trying with economic aid, etc., tocontinue the recent trend of relativederadicalization within the Tehran regime.

3.3 Coalition Set Up in ScenarioOne

The Coalition player sets up first in thisscenario. He takes all the units marked withan asterisk (*) in their upper-left cornersand sets them up in Kuwait, Saudi Arabiaor Turkey, generally where he desires butwith some exceptions. The exceptions arethat the KCG unit may begin only in thatcity (3634), and the Kuwaiti and Saudiarmies may set up only within theirrespective countries.

3.4 Iraqi Set Up in Scenario One

The Iraqi (Militant Islamic) playertakesall the units in the counter mix belonging tothat nation and sets them up anywhere inIraq, except he may not place any units inany of the rough or mountain hexes innorthern Iraq (the "Kurdish territory" areais delineated on the map), and his ADC unitmust be set up in 2517. Further, all white-on-red Iraqi units of other than divisionsize must all be set up in Baghdad or hexesadjacent to that city.

Within those restrictions, Iraqi unitsmay be set up in Coalition zones of control(see section 7.0). Note that there is neverany restriction in either scenario on the

STRATEGY & TACTICS R3

counter mix "in ~tne~"'i box or me oame


BACK TO IRAQ

6.0 STACKING6.1 "Stacking" is the term used to describethe piling of more than one unit into a hexat the same time. The general rule is theCoalition player may stack up to three unitsof any sizes, types and nationalities in anyone hex at any one time, while the MilitantIslamic player may stack up to threedivisions in any one hex at any one time.For stacking purposes, every unit in theMilitant Islamic order of battle smallerthan a division (see 2.7) equals one-third ofa division, while the corps-sized SRG unitequals one division for stacking purposes.Also see rules 3.4 and 3.8.

6.2 Stacking & Movement

The stacking rule is in effect at all timesthroughout the game turn. That meansplayers must pay attention to the sequencein which they move their units or riskhaving early moves block units movedlater in the phase. Note there is no limit onthe number of units that may enter and passthrough a given hex over the course of amovement phase, as long as the three-unitstacking limit is met instant by instant.

Units beginning a movement phasestacked together need not remain togethersimply because they were stacked; theymight be moved off individually or insmaller groupings.

Players should keep a constant eye oneach other's stacking situations, preventingover-stacking at all times. And both shouldalso check each other's stacks at the end ofevery phase in the turn sequence. If anyhexes are found to be over-stacked at thosetimes, the owning player must eliminatethe excess units of his choice needed tobring each hex back within stacking limits.

6.3 No Fog of War

Both players are free to examine theunits beneath the top units of his opponent'sstacks at any and all times.

Design Note. The Coalition has excellentsatellite reconnaissance available, whilethe Chinese, Russians or some private-corporation are probably selling the samekind of information to the Militant Islamicside.

6.4 Free Stackers

None of the counters illustrated in rule2.12 have any stacking value. That is, eachmay be added to any stack according to thespecific rules governing their uses. Further,the two zero-attack factor units given in thecounter mix the US KCG and the IraqiADC have no stacking values and aretherefore never counted toward the stackinglimit within their hexes of placement (3634and 2537, respectively).

B AC K TO IRAQ7.0 COALITION ZONES OFCONTROL7.1 "Zones of Control" ("ZOC") are anabstraction used to show how the large-size Coalition units, by using computerizedartillery and aerial support systems, canproject their power, inhibiting MilitantIslamic movement, into areas adjacent tothem.

With but three exceptions (see 7.2below), all Coalition ground units exert"Zones of Control" into the six hexessurrounding their location hexes at all times.There is no difference in effect between ahex containing ZOC exerted there by oneunit and a hex containing ZOC exertedthere by more than one unit. Militant Islamicunits never exert ZOC.

7.2 ZOC Limits

With three exceptions, Coalition ZOCsextend both into and out of all kinds ofterrain.

The first exception is ZOCs ofmechanized units never extend intomountain hexes, even if the mechanizedunit being considered is in a mountain-roadhex. A mechanized unit in a mountain roadhex, though, does project ZOCs normallyinto all surrounding non-mountain hexes.Non-Mechanized, dismounted mechanizedand airmobile ZOCs are unaffected bymountain terrain.

The second exception is non-airmobileZOCs do not extend across all-reservoir,all-lake or all-sea hex sides. For example, aCoalition unit in Kuwait City projects ZOCinto 3534 and 3635, but not into any of theother surrounding hexes.

The third exception is non-airmobileZOC do not extend across escarpment hexsides.

7.3 ZOC Effects

All Militant Islamic units must stoptheir movement for that movement phasein the first hex they enter containing aZOC. They may not move any farther thatphase. Militant Islamic units that begintheir side's movement phase already in aZOC may not move at all that phase, thoughthey can still attack (and may possiblyadvance after combat, see 11.23).

7.4 ZOC Loss

Out of Supply (OOS) Coalition unitsdo not project ZOCs.

7.5 No ZOC Negation

The presence of a Militant Islamic unitin a hex containing a Coalition ZOC in noway negates that ZOC for any other MilitantIslamic units. Thus, once in aZOC a Militant

Islamic unit may escape it only bydestroying the ZOC-projecting Coalitionunits or by waiting until the ZOC-projectingCoalition units are OOS or going through amandatory reconstitution turn.

Note that the movement-inhibitingeffects of ZOCs work only against MilitantIslamic units, ne ver against Coalition units.That is, a Coalition unit beginning its side'smovement phase with Militant Islamic unitsin its ZOC isn't pinned by their presence.Such Coalition units may move, providedonly that one or move adjacent hexes isempty of Militant Islamic units.

7.6 ZOC & Militant IslamicSupply Lines

Militant Islamic units may trace theirsupply lines into, but never through, hexescontaining ZOC. And, as given in7.5 above,the presence of a Militant Islamic unit in aZOC in no way negates that ZOC for otherMilitant Islamic units for any purposes.

8.0 SUPPLY8.1 Units require supply to operate at theirfull (printed-on-the-counter) potentials formovement and combat. There are nocounters representing the supplies actuallyconsumed by units. Instead, that process isrepresented abstractly, through "supply linetracing."

8.2 Supply StatesThere are two supply states and every

unit in the game always exists in one or theother of them. A unit is "in supply" if it cantrace a supply line to an appropriate supplysource hex. A unit is "out of supply"whenever it is unable to trace a completesupply line. Units may exist indefinitely inthe OOS supply state. No unit is evereliminated simply for being OOS.

8.3 When to Check Supply

The supply status of each of each side'sunits is checked at the instant the playerbegins its movement during his movementphase. Units found to be OOS at that instanthave their movement factor halved for thatplayer turn. Round up remainders. Forexample, "half of a printed movementfactor of "3" is "2."

Check the supply status of all units ofboth sides involved in each given battle atthe start of each fight's resolution process.Any units of either side found to be OOS atthat instant have their appropriate combatfactors halved for that battle. When halvingmore than one combat factor, add togetherall those to be halved on the same side, thendivide just once. No unit or attacking forceever has its combat factor reduced belowone for any reasons.

R6 #208

Also check the supply status of ZOC-projecting Coalition units at the start ofevery Militant Islamic movement phase.Any Coalition units found to be OOS at thattime lose their ZOC for that phase (seesection 7.0).

8.4 How Units Are Supplied

Units are supplied when they are ableto "trace a supply line" (apath of contiguoushexes) to an appropriate "supply source"hex.

8.5 Iraqi Supply Source Hexes

Iraqi supply sources are both Baghdadhexes (2516, 2517). Once a Baghdad hexhas been occupied, even if just temporarily,by a Coalition ground unit, that hex losesits supply capacity for the rest of the game,even if retaken by the Militant Islamic side.

8.6 Iraqi Limited Supply SourceHexes

Provided no Coalition ground unit hasyet entered those hexes, Iraqi units in Mosul(2105), Kirkuk (2509) and Basrah (3725)are supplied while in those hexes. Iraqiunits outside those hexes may not tracesupply to them as if they were Baghdadsource hexes (though supply lines going toBaghdad may certainly be traced throughMosul, Kirkuk and Basrah). Once enemyoccupied, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basrah losetheir limited supply capacity for the rest ofthe game.

8.7 Iranian Supply Source Hexes& Limited Source Hexes

Iranian supply source hexes are all themap edge road exit/entry hexes that lieinside Iranian territory (for example: 4228,4227, 4225, etc.). Those road hexes losetheir supply capacity when occupied byCoalition ground units, but regain it assoon as Coalition occupation is ended(decided on a hex-by-hex basis any numberof times per game).

Provided no Coalition ground unit hasyet entered those hexes, Iranian units inIranian city hexes are supplied while inthose hexes. Iranian units outside thosehexes may not trace supply to them as ifthey were map edge source hexes (thoughsupply lines going to map edge Iraniansupply source hexes may certainly be tracedthrough Iranian city hexes). Once enemyoccupied, Iranian city hexes lose theirlimited supply capacity for the rest of thegame.

Design Note. If the evolving real-worldsituation would bring Syrian and/or Turkishunits into play, their supply source hexeswould be the map edge road entry/exithexes within their respective countries.

B AC K TO IRAQ8.8 Coalition Supply Source Hexes

Coalition supply source hexes areKuwait City and the map edge road entry/exit hexes in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Allthe map edge road hex supply sources losetheir supply capacity when occupied byMilitant Islamic units, but regain it as soonas that enemy occupation is ended. (In bothscenarios, Coalition loss of Kuwait Cityresults in instant Militant Islamic victory,see 4.6). There are no nat ional i tydistinctions when tracing supply toCoalition units from Coalition sources.

8.9 No Dual-Nationality MilitantIslamic Supply Sourcing

In Scenario Two there is never anydual-nationality Militant Islamic supplysourcing. That is, Iranian and Iraqi unitsmay trace only to sources specific to eachone's own nationality. The supply lines ofboth Militant Islamic nations may co-existin and through the same hexes at the sametime.

8. / 0 Tracing Supply Lines

Supply lines consist of two portions:the non-road portion and the road/highwayportion. Tracing is done from a unit orstack to a supply source. The non-roadportion of a supply line may be up to fourhexes long, from the unit or stack tracingthe supply line to a road or highway hex.Don't count the hex in which the tracingunit or stack is located; do count the hex inwhich the road or highway being traced tois located. For example, a unit in 1722 is"four hexes away" from the 1718 road hexand is "five hexes away" from the 1220road hex.

Once a supply line has reached a roador highway hex (belonging to the road orhighway that is actually to be used for therest of supply line tracing), it may not leavethat road and/or highway path again. Fromthat road or highway hex, trace a path ofconnected (cont iguous) road and/orhighway hexes — of any length — to anappropriate supply source for that unit orstack. Note that the path of a road/highwaysupply line portion may contain both roadand highway hexes.

Units located in road or highway hexesneed not bother tracing a non-road portionfor their supply line; they may simply tracealong the road or highway to an appropriatesupply source hex. Similarly, units withinfour hexes of an appropriate supply sourceneedn't make use of a road/highway supplyline portion. They may simply trace thenon-road portion of their supply line directlyto that supply source. Finally, of course,units located directly in appropriate supply

source hexes needn't do any supply linetracing at all. They are automatically insupply in those hexes.

8. / / Supply Line Limits

Neither portion of any supply line maybe traced into or through hexes occupied byany enemy ground unit. Similarly, the non-road portion of a supply line may not betraced into or through hexes or hex sidescontaining natural terrain prohibited to themovement of the tracing unit. For example,a mechanized unit could not trace the non-road portion of its supply line into or througha non-road marsh hex (see 10.14).

Supply lines may not be traced into orthrough the territory of any nation notinvolved in the scenario being played (seesection 3.0). Nor may supply normally betraced across all-sea, all-reservoir or all-lake hex sides, but see 8.14foran exception.Both portions of all supply lines may betraced across river hex sides.

Militant Islamic supply lines may betraced into, but not through, hexescontaining Coalition ZOC.

Within the limitations above, supplylines may be traced into and through hexesempty of enemy ground units, even thoughsuch hexes may have been occupied orpassed through last by enemy units.

8.12 Supply Hex Capacity

Except as described above, there are nolimits on the number of appropriate unitsthat may trace supply to a given supplysource hex during the course of a playerturn, game turn and the entire game.

8.13 Coalition Aerial Supply

Once per good weather game turn, atany time during the game turn sequence,the Coalition player may declare one hexanywhere on the map to be receiving aerialsupply. A Coalition unitinahexso suppliedis considered to be fully supplied for therest ofthat game turn, but only while in theaerially supplied hex. The aerial supplymarker may not be placed on bad weathergame turns, but is otherwise indestructible.(And, yes, aerial supply may be used toescape the strictures of 8.11.)

The marker may be placed once at anytime during a good weather game turn.Once placed it remains in effect in that hexfor the rest of that game turn. At the end ofthe game turn, retrieve it and hold if forpossible use again in later game turns.

8.14 USMC Coastal Supply

The US Marine Corps MEF unit isalways in supply while in coastal hexes.Further, the MEF may trace the non-roadportion of its supply line across all-sea, all-


lake and all-reservoir hex sides.

8.1S Willful OOS

Both players may deliberately movetheir units into hexes where they will, orlikely will, become OOS.

9.0 RECONSTITUTION &RECOVERY

9.1 The 15 game turn limit approximatesthe maximum amount of time before theCoalition forces engaged here would haveto pause to conduct general rest andregrouping efforts that would mark the endof the war or at least its initial campaign.But current US Army doctrine also calls fortactical pauses at the end of individualbattles, which are referred to in game termsas "reconstitution phases." Since the USArmy would be providing the single largestcomponent of the entire Coalition force, itis likely its approach to these matters wouldalso come to govern the pace of the entireCoalition campaign. Accordingly, allCoalition units must pause for occasionalreconstitution turns throughout the game,either at that player's discretion or whenrequired by die roll.

9.2 At the start of play put the"Reconstitution" counter on the Game TurnRecord Track in the box for Game Turn 4.As the last step of Game Turn 4's Weather& Reconstitution Determination Phase (see5.2), the Coalition player rolls a die. If theresult is a five or six, Game Turn 4 becomesa mandatory reconstitution game turn. Inthat case immediately move thereconstitution marker forward four boxeson the Turn Record Track to Game Turn 8.The Coalition player need not make anotherreconstitution check until the start of GameTurn 8.

On a die roll of one through four, thereis no mandatory reconstitution that turn.Move the marker ahead on the track justone box. In that case the Coalition playerwil l have to check for mandatoryreconstitution again at the start of the verynext game turn (5). Every t ime areconstitution turn is required by die roll,move the marker ahead four turns andmake no more checks until the start ofthatgame turn.

9.3 Mandatory ReconstitutionEffects

When a reconstitution turn has beenmandated for the Coalition side by die roll— which in reality would mean it has been"mandated" by the growing lack of supplyand the fatigue of the soldiers in the field —the resultant turn of inactivity is called a"mandatory reconstitution game turn." Onsuch game turns no movement or attacking

BACK TO IRAQis allowed for any Coalition units. Coalitionunits still defend normally (taking supplyinto account, etc.), and there is no directeffect on Militant Islamic operations.

Design Note. Yes, in reality, MilitantIslamic units also become disorganizedand tired; but it is the Coalition that issetting the tempo of this war. The greaterrestrictions on Militant Islamic mobilitybuilt into their low movement factors, onestep-organization and lesser combat poweraccount for that side's always-slower paceof operations.

9.4 Discretionary Reconstitution

On any game turn during which theCoalition player is obligated by the rulesabove to make a reconstitution die rollcheck, he may instead announce—prior torolling that die — that he will instead call a"discretionary reconstitution." In that casemove the marker ahead four turns on thetrack. A discretionary reconstitution is thesame as a mandatory one except Coalitionunits still can—within normal terrain-prohibition and turn sequence rules — moveone hex (still not attacking, but they dodefend normally). Again, Militant Islamicoperations are not directly affected.Design Note. The advantages of calling adiscretionary reconstitution turn aretwofold: 1) the Coalition player can use thelimited movement it allows to ensure, inmost situations, the Militant Islamic playerwon't be able to take advantage of thereconstitution to launch powerful attacks;and 2) in picking an opportune time toreconstitute, three turns of uninterruptedoperations are guaranteed during a periodof his own choosing.

9.5 Recovery

At the end of every game turn in whichthe Coalition forces went through areconstitution phase, mandatory ordiscretionary, the Coalition player may turnall of his reduced units back to their full-strength sides, provided they remainedstationary and were in overland supply (notOOS or aerially supplied) throughout thatgame turn. ACoalitionunitthat was alreadyreduced at the start of a reconstitution turnand that was attacked during it is still eligiblefor flipping, provided only that it held itsground (remained in the same hex)throughout the game turn. Coalition unitsthat begin a reconstitution turn at full-strength, but are then reduced during combatany time that game turn, are not eligible forrebuilding that turn.

10.0 MOVEMENT10.1 Every ground unit in the game has a"Movement Factor" printed in its bottom-

right corner. That movement factor is thenumber of "Movement Points" (alsoreferred to as "MPs" and "MFs") availableto the unit to use in moving across the mapduring its side's movement phase everygame turn.

10.2 Movement Strictures

MPs may not be accumulated from turnto turn or phase to phase, nor may they beloaned or given from one unit to another. Aplayer may move all, some or none of hisunits in each of his movement phasesthroughout the game, within the limits givenin this section and the rules above, at hisown discretion. Units that move are notrequired to expend all their MPs beforestopping. The movement of each individualunit or stack must be completed before thatof another is begun. A player may onlychange the position of an already movedunit or stack if his opponent agrees to allowit.

Units move from hex to adjacent hex—no "skipping" of hexes is allowed—andthey pay varying costs to do so dependingon the terrain in the hex being entered andalong its hex sides. The movement of oneside's units takes place only during its ownplayer turn. No enemy movement takesplace during its player turn.

10.3 No Minimum MovementAbility

No unit may enter a given hex unless ithas available sufficient MP to pay for allthe involved movement costs.

/ 0.4 Stack Movement

To move together as a stack, units mustbegin their movement phase already stackedtogether. But units are not required to moveas a stack simply because they started theirmovement in the same hex. In suchsituations those units might be movedtogether, individually or in smaller sub-stacks. Note that in Scenario Two, Iranianand Iraqi units may not move, stack orattack together, but there are never anysuch nationality restrictions on the Coalitionside (but see 11.24).

/0.5 Sp/itting Stacks

When moving a stack a player may haltit temporarily to allow a unit or sub-stack tosplit off and move away on a separatecourse. The units left behind in the original(or "parent") stack may then resume theirown movement, even splitting off moresub-stacks and lone units if desired. Butonce a player begins moving an entirelydifferent parent stack, he may no longerresume the movement of earlier stackswithout his opponent's permission.

R8 #208

ƒ 0.6 Stack MF

If units with different movement factorsare traveling together in a stack, the stackmust use the movement factor of the slowestunit. Of course, as the slower units exhausttheir MPs, the owning player may leavethem behind to continue moving with thefaster units.

10.7 Enemy Units

Units may not enter hexes occupied byenemy units.

ƒ 0.8 Terrain

There are two general classes of terrainon the map: natural and manmade. Eachclass is divided into several different types(see below). There is never more than onetype of natural terrain in any one hex, butmore than one type of manmade terrainmay exist in one hex along with the naturalterrain.

/0.9 Natural Terrain

There are nine types of natural terrainand water bodies on the map: clear, rough,mountains, dunes, escarpment, marsh, saltpans, rivers and lakes/seas/reservoirs. Theeffects these terrain types have on themovement of ground units are describedbelow and are also summarized on theTerrain Effects Chart (see 14.1) for quickreference.

10.10 Clear

Clear terrain is the "base" terrain of thegame; it contains no elevations over 500feet or slopes over 10 percent. That is,hexes with only clear terrain in themrepresent areas devoid of any naturalfeatures that would significantly enhancedefense or slow movement at this scale ofsimulation. Each clear hex costs all unitsone MP to enter. All cities are considered toexit in clear terrain hexes.

For a hex to be considered clear terrain,that must be the only kind of natural terrainshown within it. For example, hex 2316 isclear terrain. Hexes containing naturalterrain types other than clear, or in additionto some clear terrain, are identified by thepredominant terrain pictured within them.For example, hex 3029 is marsh, hex 2637is rough, hex 3215 is mountain, and 3236 issalt pan.

I O.I I Dunes

Mechanized units may not enter dunehexes. Non-mechanized units pay two MPper dune hex entered, while airmobile unitspay one MP.

I O.I 2 Hill

Hill hexes represent topographicallymore rugged areas with elevations varying

B AC K TO IRAQfrom 500 to 2,000 feet above thesurrounding base terrain and containingslopes of between 11 and 30 percent. Allnon-mechanized and airmobile units payone MP to enter each rough hex, butmechanized units pay three MP.

10.13 Mountains

Mountain hexes are topographically themost rugged areas on the map, projectingmore than 2,000 feet above surroundingbase areas and containing slopes of morethan 30 percent. Mountain hexes areprohibited to all mechanized units exceptwhen traveling along roads (see 10.19) ordismounted (see 10.21 ). Mountain infantryand airmobile units pay only one MP permountain hex entered, while all other typesof non-mechanized units pay two MPs.

If a hex has both mountain and roughterrain within it, that hex is considered to bemountain.

10.14 Marsh & Salt Pans

Marsh is a catch-all term for severalkinds of wet ground, varying from coastalsalt marshes and tidal flats to river floodplains. Mechanized units may enter marshhexes only on roads or when dismounted(see 10.21 ). Non-mechanized units pay twoMP for each marsh hex entered; airmobileunits pay just one MP.

Saltpan hexes are treated as clear terrainin good weather and as marsh during badweather. If a mechanized unit is in a saltpan hex when the weather goes bad, it isimmobilized there until good weatherreturns. It defends normally, as if on amarsh hex with a road, but may not attackin any way.

10. IS River Hex Sides

Rivers run between hexes, along thehex sides, rather than lying in-hex.

Whenever a mechanized unit crosses ariver hex side, even if on a road or highway,the moving player should first roll a die. Ina situation with a crossing stack, roll justone die for the entire stack. Add that die rollresult (from +1 to +6) to the entry cost forthe hex being moved into.

Whenever a non-mechanized unit orstack crosses a river hex side, no die roll ismade; simply add an addition MP (+1) tothe entry cost of the hex being moved into,even if on a road or highway.

In cases of mixed mechanized and non-mechanized cross-river movement, make adie roll for the mechanized units and one+1addition for the non-mechanized units.Airmobile unit movement is not affectedby rivers in any way.

/ 0.16 All-Lake, Reservoir & SeaHex Sides

No mechanized or non-mechanizedground unit movement is allowed acrossthese types of hex sides. Airmobile unitmovement is unaffected by such hex sides,but an airmobile unit may not end its movein any kind of all-water hex.

10.17 Escarpment

No mechanized or non-mechanizedground unit movement is allowed acrossthis types of hex side. Airmobile unitmovement is unaffected by such hex sides.

10.18 Manmade TerrainManmade Terrain exists in six types:

roads, multi-lane highway, cities, towns,fortifications and international borders.

ƒ 0.19 Road & HighwayMovement

Roads and highways can be used toenhance movement and negate normalterrain effects on movement. Roads allowmechanized units to move along theirpaths,from road hex to contiguous road hex viathe exact course of the road, at a cost of onlyone-half (0.5) MP per hex, no matter whatother terrain types are in the hexes. Whenmoving along road paths in that same way,non-mechanized units pay one MP per roadhex, no matter what other terrain types arein the hexes. Highway travel is the same asroad travel, except mechanized units payonly 0.25 (one-quarter) movement pointper hex.

Units may combine road, highway andcross-country movement during the samemovement phase, in any combinationswithin the limits of the traveling unit'soverall movement factor.

Airmobile unit movement is not inanyway enhanced (or hindered) by roads orhighways.

10.20 Cities, Towns, Fortifications& Borders

Units entering city hexes when not usingroad or highway movement do so at thecost of one MP per city hex.

Units entering hexes containing atown,fortification or international border havetheir movement costs determined by theother terrain features in or around that hex.These features by themselves have no effecton unit movement.

10.21 Dismounting CoalitionMechanized Units

The Coalition player may use thefollowing procedures to temporarilydismount one, some or all of his US, UKand French mechanized units (most likely


in order to campaign in mountains).

At the start of each of his movementphases throughout the game, the Coalitionplayer may declare he is converting any ofhis US, UK, or French mechanized unitsinto non-mechanized infantry.

The unit(s) selected must be in overlandsupply and not adjacent to any MilitantIslamic units at that instant. Note the chosenunits are "dismounted" on a piece of scrappaper. Such units may not move or attack inany way that turn.

A dismounted unit is considered non-mechanized infantry with a movementfactor of four. It may operate in thedismounted mode as long as the Coalitionplayer desires, but its combat factors arehalved while doing so.

Remounting (converting back tomechanized status) takes place as in steptwo above. Similarly, such units may notmove or attack during the player turn ofremounting.

ƒ0.22 Coalition Airpower &Militant Islamic Movement

During bad weather turns all movementfactors of all Militant Islamic mechanizedunits are increased by two MP, while thoseof non-mechanized units are increased byone MP (continue to take into accountsupply status, etc.).

I 1.0 COMBAT

11.1 During a player's side's combat phasehe may attack all enemy units adjacent toyour units across playable hex sides. Theplayer whose player turn it is is considered"the attacker," and the other is "thedefender," no matter what the overallsituation across the map. Attacking isalways voluntary.

ƒ ƒ.2 Mufti-Hex & Multi-UnitAttacks

An enemy occupied hex may beattacked in one battle by as many of eligibleunits as the player can bring to bear fromthe surrounding hexes; however, no singleattack may have as its objective more thanone hex.

Not all the units stacked in a given hexneed to participate in the same attack. Somecould attack into one adjacent defender-occupied hex while others attacked intoanother hex or simply did not attack at all.No defending unit, however, may everrefuse combat.

f ƒ.3 Indivisibility of Units

No single attacking unit may have itscombat factor divided and applied to morethan one battle. Likewise, no defending

BACK TO IRAQunit or stack may have part of its defensestrength attacked by one or a few attackerswhile another part is attacked by others.Defending units stacked together are treatedas if they constituted one combined unit.No attacking unit may attack more thanonce per combat phase and no defendingunit may be attacked more than once percombat phase.

f 1.4 Attack Sequencing

Aside from the restrictions describedabove, there is no artificial limit on thenumber of attacks each player may set upduring his combat phase. The attacker neednot declare all his attacks beforehand andhe may resolve them in any order he wishes,as long as the resolution of one is completedbefore that of the next is begun.

ƒ /.5 Combat Procedure

Normally the attacking player shouldstrive to have more attack factors involvedin a given battle than the defender hasdefense factors. Such attacks are called"high odds attacks." To resolve them, theattacking player must first calculate his"odds." Do that by adding up the combatfactors of all the attacking units involved ina battle. Then determine the combat factorsof the enemy units defending in the battle.Divide the attacker total by the defendertotal and round off (down) any remainder.

Example: 26 attack factors versus 7 defensefactors yields an odds ratio of 3:1. That is:26/7=3.71, which rounds down to 3. Toturn that "3" into a ratio, you must set a " 1 "next to it on the right. Thus "3" becomes"3:1" (which is read "3-to-l"), whichcorresponds with a column heading oneach the Combat Results Tables.

/1.6 Poor Odds Attacks

Battles in which the attacking force hasfewer combat factors than the defender arecalled "poor odds attacks." Procedures aremodified in that now you divide thedefender's total by the attacker's. Roundremainders up, and set the "1" on the leftside.

Poor Odds Example: A force with 5 attackfactors is attacking a force with 11 defensefactors. Divide 11 by 5 (11/5=2.2), andround up (2.2 becomes 3), then set the "1"on the left ofthat "3," yielding odds of 1:3.

ƒ / . 7 Odds Limits

Note that the column headings on theCRT range from 1:2 to 5:1 on the CoalitionCRT and from 1:1 to 6:1 on the MilitantIslamic CRT. If the combat ratio obtainedfor a given battle is lower than that shownon the CRT in use for an attack, that battlereceives automatic results of "AS" or

"AS*." No die roll is made. If the combatratio obtained for a given battle is greaterthan that shown on the CRT in use for anattack, that battle receives automatic resultsof "DE" if it is a Coalition attack, and"DL1*" if it is a Militant Islamic attack. Nodie roll is made.

The Coalition Player always uses theCoalition CRT for his side's attacks, andthe Militant Islamic Player always uses theMilitant Islamic CRT for his side's attacks.

ƒ ƒ.8 Shifting Preliminary Odds

The odds ratio obtained aftercompleting the steps described above iscalled the "preliminary odds ratio." Thatratio may be shifted to the left or right onthe CRTs by the things described below.When shifting, it is important to rememberall odds shifters that apply in a given battleare cumulative in their effect.

/ƒ .9 Extreme Odds

It is possible to end up with an oddsratio that lies beyond either the highest orlowest CRT column heading, such as "1:3"or "7:1." Once all applicable odds shiftershave been applied, if you do end up withodds off one end or another of the CRT inuse for that battle, use the no-proceduredescribed above in 11.7 to get your combatresult.

ƒ f. f O Combat Resolution Die Roll

To resolve a battle, find the odds columnof the proper CRT corresponding to itsodds ratio and roll a die. Look down theproper odds column on the CRT until youcross-index with the number you just rolled.That is your "combat result" for that battle.For example, if you're the Coalition playerand you're attacking at 2:1 and roll a "3,"your result is "AS."

ƒ ƒ. ƒ ƒ Coalition CRT CombatResults

The "DR" ("Defender Retreat") resulton the Coalition CRT means the entiredefending Militant Islamic force (unit orstack) must retreat-after-combat one hex(see 11.22). If this result is asterisked (*),the Militant Islamic player makes a MIPPscheck (see 4.2).

The "AS *" ("Attack Stalled") result onthe Coalition CRT means no step or unitlosses are suffered by either side and noadvance- or retreat-after-combat takesplace. Note that this result is alwaysaccompanied by an asterisk on the CoalitionCRT, which means every time it comes upthe Militant Islamic player makes a MIPPscheck (see 4.2).

The "DE" ("Defender Eliminated")result on the Coalition CRT means all units

RIO #208

of the Militant Islamic side involved in thatbattle are permanently removed from playand put into the "dead pile." Theparticipating Coalition units are allowed tomake an advance-after-combat (see 11.23).

11.12 Militant Islamic CombatResults

The "DR*" ("Defender Retreat") resulton the Militant Islamic CRT means theentire defending Coalition force (unit orstack) must retreat-after-combat one hex(see 11.22). Note this result is alwaysaccompanied by an asterisk (*) on thisCRT, meaning every time it occurs theMilitant Islamic player makes a MIPPscheck (see 4.2).

The "AS" ("Attack Stalled") result onthe Militant Islamic CRT means no step orunit losses are suffered by either side andno advance- or retreat-after-combat takesplace.

The "DL1*" ("Defender Lose 1 Step")result on the Militant Islamic CRT meansone strength-step (total) is removed fromany one of the Coalition units involved inthat battle. The choice of which Coalitionunit will suffer the step loss is up to theMilitant Islamic player. The participatingMilitant Islamic units are allowed to makean advance-after-combat (see 11.23) if thesingle step removal completely clears thedefender hex of Coalition units. Note thisresult is always accompanied by an asterisk(*) on this CRT, meaning every time itoccurs the Militant Islamic player makes aMIPPs check (see 4.2).

11.13 Terrain Effects on Combat

Both natural and manmade terrain typeshave effects on combat, which are usuallyshown by shifting the odds column used onthe CRT in favor of the defender (to theleft). For example, the combat effect fordefending in rough terrain is "LI." Thatmeans if the defending force in a battle is ina rough hex, after the preliminary oddsratio is calculated, that ratio wouldbe shiftedone column leftward on the CRT. So if,say, the preliminary odds ratio was "3:1"here, the rough terrain in the defender'shex would change that to "2:1."

Only one type of in-hex natural terraineffect and one type of manmade terraineffect may ever be applied to any singlebattle, but the combat factor halving due toattackers coming across river hex sides arepart of the calculation before figuring theshifts received for in-hex terrain (see 11.20below).

11.14 Roads & Highways

Roads and highways don't work tonegate any of the combat effects of

B AC K TO IRAQmanmade or natural terrain; they affectonly movement, not combat. Note, though,that mechanized units may attack into orout of mountain or marsh hexes only if theydo so along the course of a road runningfrom their location hex into the hex beingattacked (see 11.16 & 11.18 below).

ƒ /. ƒ 5 Cities, Towns & Fortifications

Units defending in a city hex gain athree-column leftward odds shift. Forexample, what would otherwise be a 4:1attack into clear terrain would be changedto 1:1 if the defending force were in a cityhex.

Units defending in a town hex gain aone-column leftward odds shift. Forexample, what would otherwise be a 4:1attack into clear terrain would be changedto 3:1 if the defending force were in a townhex.

In Scenario Two, Militant Islamic unitsdefending in a refurbished Saddam Linehex gain a one column leftward shift fordoing so. In Scenario One the Saddam Lineis considered not to exist.

11.16 Mountains

Units defending in a mountain hex gaina two-column leftward odds shift. Forexample, what would otherwise be a 4:1attack would be changed to 2:1 if thedefending force were in a mountain hex.Mechanized units may attack into or out ofmountain hexes only when located on aroad hex that runs from their location hexinto the hex being attacked, and even thentheir combat factor is halved (round upremainders) for all such attacks. Also notethat mountain infantry units have no specialcombat properties in mountains, just amovement advantage (see 10.13).

11.17 Rough

Units defending in a rough hex gain aone-column leftward odds shift. Forexample, a4:1 attack into would be changedto a 3:1 attack if the defending force werein a rough hex.

/f.f8Marsh<£Sa/tPan

Mechanized units may attack into orout of marsh hexes only when located on aroad hex that runs from their location hexinto the hex being attacked, and even thentheir combat factor is halved (round upremainders) for all such attacks. Non-mechanized and airmobile units attackinginto a marsh hex do so without penalty.Further, if all the units involved in an attackinto a marsh hex are non-mechanized and/or airmobile, that attack gains a one columnrightward odds shift (in favor of thoseattackers). Remember, salt pans are treated

as clear terrain in good weather and asmarsh in bad weather (see 13.1).

11.19 Clear

Clear hexes have no combat effects inthemselves.

M.20 R;Ver Hex Sides

Units other than the US MEF and 101 stAirmobile Division that are attacking acrossriver hex sides have their attack factorhalved (round down all remainders). TheMEF's and 101st's attack strengths arenever affected by river hex sides.

11.21 Dunes

Mechanized units may not attack intodune hexes unless dismounted. Non-mechanized and airmobile units may attackinto and out of such hexes without penalty.

/1.22 Retreat After Combat

Whenever a "DR" or "DR*" result isobtained, the player owning the involveddefending force in that battle must retreatthat unit or stack one hex. In general, theexact direction of retreat is up to the owningplayer, but note the following exceptions.

No Militant Islamic unit or stack mayever retreat into a Coalition ZOC. Thepresence of other Militant Islamic units ina hex containing a Coalition ZOC in noway negates that ZOC.

If more than one hex is available toreceive the retreating units or stack, theowning player must choose the one thattakes the retreating force closer to a validsupply source. If more than one such hexexists, the choice is up to the owning player.(Also see rules 3.5 and 3.9.)

A retreating stack may not be brokenup to retreat into more than one hex unlessstacking terrain requirements dictate thatbe done.

Retreating-after-combat does not useup MPs. However, units are still not allowedto retreat into hexes where their en try wouldbe prohibited using normal movement. Forexample, mechanized units may not retreatinto mountain or marsh hexes except alongthe path of a road.

f 1.23 Advance After Combat

With one exception, whenever thedefender's hex is cleared of all units by thatfight 's combat result, the victoriousattacking units may advance-after-combatinto that hex (stacking limits must beobserved). Such advances are notconsidered part of normal movement andthey don't cost any MPs, but advancingunits must still observe normal terrainmovement prohibi t ions. Victoriousattackers may advance across river hexsides.

STRATEGY & TACTICS RI I

B AC K TO IRAQAdvancing is an option. It is never mandatory, but the decision

to advance or stay must be made immediately after the battle isresolved and before that of the any other is begun. An advancingattacker may send just one or a few units, if he wishes, rather thana full stack. Also note there is never any defender advance-after-combat; victorious defenders simply hold their ground.

The lone exception cited at the start of this rule is that the US101st Airmobile Division never advances after combat.

11.24 Great Power Attack Participation Requirement

No Coalition attack may take place unless at least one GreatPowers unit (US, UK or F) is involved in it.

f 1.25 Enveloping Attack

When a defender hex is attacked by units from hexes directlyopposite each other, or by units in three hexes with one hex betweeneach and the next, or by units from more than three hexes, shiftthose odds one column rightward if the attacking force is MilitantIslamic, and two columns rightward if it's Coalition. The presenceof other defender-side units in the hexes next to the defender hexbeing enveloped in no way serves to negate this shift. In thediagram, the defending unit is undergoing an enveloping attack.

12.0 US IOIST AIRMOBILE DIVISION12.1 The 101st Airmobile (Air Assault) Division is unique in that:

1 ) it is the only unit in the game that is not allowed to both move andfight during the same player turn;

2) it never advances after combat;

3) it can attack enemy units up to five hexes away from its locationhex;

4) when it attacks with one or more Coalition units, that attack isthereby automatically considered enveloping;

5) it suffers unique effects during bad weather; and

6) it can give defensive support to other Coalition units beingattacked up to five hexes away from its location hex.

12.2 Move or Fight

The 101 st is the only non-static unit in the game that cannot bothmove and fight (or fight and move) during a single player turn. Itcan do one or the other, but never both during the same player turn.It is the Coalition player's choice, decided on a turn-by-turn basis.

12.3 No Terrain Costs

When the 101st is moved, the unit (called the "base element")is understood to be "rebasing" by flying, in its organic air transport,to its new location hex. During such moves the 101st may enter allhexes at the cost of only one MP per hex, and it also ignores riversand all-water hex sides. While rebasing it may fly over all terrain,water bodies and enemy unit but it may never end its moves inmarsh or mountain hexes, even if those hexes contain roads orhighways. Nor may it end a move in any hex containing any enemyunits.

(2.4 No Advance After Combat

The 101 st never advances after combat, even if the enemy forceit attacked was in a hex immediately adjacent to its location hex.

ƒ 2.5 Combat

The 101st defends normally. When attacking it may project itscombat factor against enemy units in hexes up to five hexes awayfrom its base element's hex. Count from the base element to theenemy occupied hex. Don't count the base element's hex. Do countthe enemy occupied hex. This attack range may be traced through allterrain types and enemy occupied hexes but may not go over anyneutral nation's no-go territory (see 3.5 and 3.9).

When the 101st attacks, all terrain effects are still taken intoaccount, except that the heliborne unit's attack factor is neveraffected by river hex sides. The 101st suffers combat losses in thesame way as normal attacking units, in both ranged and adjacentattacks.

Whenever the 101 st attacks an enemy occupied hex with one ormore other Coalition units, that attack is automatically considered tobe an enveloping attack.

The 101st may attack across the escarpment into marsh andmountains even though its base element may not occupy such hexes.

12.6 Defensive Support

Provided the 101 st neither moved nor attacked during that gameturn's Coalition player turn and no Militant Islamic units are in anyhexes adjacent to its base element at that instant, the Coalition playermay commit the 101st to provide defensive support to any otherdefending Coalition unit within its five hex range. To do so, theCoalition player simply announces the defensive commitment of the101st after the Militant Islamic player has declared an attack, andthen adds in its combat factor when calculating the defense strengthof the hex being attacked.

12.8 Bad Weather & the 101 st

During bad weather turns the attack and defensive supportstrength of the 101st is halved (round up remainders). Its range isalso affected. Roll one die and subtract one from the result; to get itsrange for that bad weather game turn (0-5). The base element'sdefense strength of its own hex is unaffected by weather.

12.9 lOlstZOCThe 101st base element projects ZOC normally into the hexes

immediately around it, including mountain and marsh hexes, theescarpment, and all-water hexsides.

12.10 101st Supply

The 101st is required to trace a supply line like other groundunits (which the 101 st is considered to be). However, the non-roadportion of its line may extend to 10 hexes.

13.0 OPTIONAL RULESDesign Note. Players should decide which of the rules from thissection before thev begin play. They add more realism at the cost ofsome simplicity.

13.1 Seasons & Weather

At this scale of simulation, weather comes in two types: goodand bad. At the start of every game, before setting up, determine theseason of the year during which the campaign will be fought byrolling a die. A result of one through five means the campaign willbe fought in the dry season; a result of six means it will be fought inthe wet winter months.

13.2 Determining Weather

The first game turn of all matches of both scenarios isautomatically good weather. At the start of every game turn after thefirst, roll one or two dice to determine the weather as describedbelow.

RI2 #208

If the war is being fought in the drymonths, roll two dice (or one die twice). Aresult of 2 or 12 means the weather is badfor that game turn. Ifthe campaign is beingin the winter, roll just one die. In that casea result of six means the weather is bad forthat game turn.

13.3 Bad Weather Effects

Good weather has no effect; all therules above were written describing goodweather procedures. On bad weather gameturns, the following apply: 1 ) treat salt panhexes as if they were marsh, rather than asclear terrain, for all movement and combatpurposes; 2) the Coalition player's aerialsupply marker is not available; 3) allMilitant Islamic mechanized MPs have twoadded to them, while all that side's non-mechanized MP have one added to them;and4) there is apossiblerange-diminishingeffect on the 101st (see 12.8).

ƒ 3.4 Chemical Warfare (CW)

Each game turn, during either side'scombat phase, the Militant Islamic playermay declare that he is using chemicalwarfare to enhance one, some, or all of hisattacks or defenses. The declaration is madeon a case by case basis by that player. Toregister his use of CW in a battle, he takesthe CW marker and places it atop any hexof Coalition units involved in the chosenbattle. The effect on that unit or stack isreduce their combat factor by half (roundup all remainders) for that one battle.

ƒ 3.5 Coalition Response to CWEvery time the Militant Islamic player

uses chemical warfare, the Coalition playerrolls a die to determine if Washingtondecides to respond in a "limited", fashion(that is, in kind), or to use some form ofmassive retaliation. On a roll of one throughthree a limited response has been ordered,while a four through six brings a massiveresponse.

f 3.6 Limited Response

When a limited response has beenauthorized, the Coalition player, during therest ofthat Militant Islamic player turn orhis own following player turn, make oneuse of chemical warfare exactly like that ofthe Militant Islamic use. Note, though, thathe may not make use of it in the same battlethat just triggered the authorization, normay he use it against units in a town or cityhex.

13.7 Massive Response

Here the assumption is the USAdministration decides to respond withsome weapon system — such as smalltactical nukes, neutron bombs or some

B AC K TO IRAQheretofore unsuspected new "wonderweapon" of great destructive power — farmore potent in its effects than chemicals,with the idea being to "teach a lesson." If amassive response is authorized, theCoalition player may, as soon as the MilitantIslamic player's triggering battle has beenresolved, simply search the board, chooseany one stack of enemy units and removethem to the dead pile. Again, though, hecan't choose any town or city hexes.

13.8 Militant Islamic NuclearWeapons

In Scenario Two, the Militant Islamicplayer may make use of a small stockpi le ofnuclear weapons. One Militant Islamicnuclear strike may be attempted each gameturn. To make such an attempt, the MilitantIslamic player announces it at the very startof a game turn, places the nuclear explosionmarker atop any hex of Coalition unitsanywhere on the map, and rolls one die.Consult the table below. Note that a one isadded to all die rolls made after the firstgame turn.

Nuclear Detonation Table

Die Roll

1,2 ,3

4

5,6,7

Result

Hit on Target

Hit off Target

Strike Failed

13.9 Hit on TargetIf he obtained a "Hit on Target," the

Militant Islamic player immediately rollsanother die. That result is the total numberof step losses that must be suffered by theCoalition units in the struck hex. If there ismore than one unit in the hex, the MilitantIslamic player apportions the step losses ashe chooses. The he also makes a MIPPscheck (see section 4.0).

The nuclear strike marker remains inthe hex throughout the rest of the gameturn. Normal terrain entry costs are doubledfor all non-airmobile units entering thathex during the game turn. Remove themarker at the end of the game turn.

ƒ 3.10 Hit off Target

If he obtained a "Hit off Target," theMilitant Islamic player rolls another die.The result indicates the hex which hasactually been struck by the errant strike. Aone means the strike hit one hex directly tothe "north" of the originally intended hex.(For these purposes, consider, for example,hex 4136 to be directly "north" of hex4137.) A two means the detonation occurredone to the northeast of the intended hex(hex 4237 in our example here); a threemeans one hex to the southeast, etc. Oncethe actual strike hex has been determined.

go through the procedure given in 13.8 ifthere are any units of either side in the finalstrike hex. Make a MIPP generation checkregardless of the location and outcome ofthe final strike.

13.11 Strike Failed

A "Strike Failed" result means justthat: there is no effect. The device wasn'tsuccessfully delivered or simply didn't gooff. No MIPPs check is made.

13.12 Effects on Towns & Cities

If a town or city hex is struck on eitherkind of hit result, the additional effectsthere are: 1) if a town hex, that place ishenceforth treated as if it no longer exists,but the natural terrain there does persist inits normal movement and combat effects;2) if a city hex, that hex is considered roughterrain for the rest of the game, and the hexpermanently loses any supply capacity itmight have had. Note that a strike on KuwaitCity does not generate a sudden deathvictory for the Militant Islamic player.

13.13 Coalition Response toNuclear Attack

Whenever either kind of hit result isachieved by a Militant Islamic nucleardevice, the Coali t ion player shouldimmediately roll one die to determineWashington's response. If the result is onethrough five, the result is atactical response.If the result is a six, the result is massiveresponse. In the first case, the Coalitionplayer is allowed to reply exactly asdescribed above in 13.7. If the result is asix, some portion of the US strategic nucleararsenal has been unleashed. In that case,play stops and the Coalition player isdeclared the winner of the game.

If the hex nuked by the Militant Islamicplayer contained a town, add one to theCoalition player's response die roll. If itwas a city hex, add two.

13.14 Coalition Naval GunSupport

Once per game turn the Coalition playermay call in naval gun support for use byany of his units attacking into, or defendingin, a coastal hex. When figuring his combatfactor in such a situation, he should roll adie and add that result to his supportedforce's attack or defense value. The limit isno supported force may receive more navalgun support factors than are contributed bythe supported ground units themselves.

Support factors have no step or combatstrength of their own. They may be usedonly in with attacking or defendingCoalition ground units.

STRATEGY & TACTICS RI3

B AC K TO IRAQf 3. f 5 US 4th MechanizedInfantry Division

The US 4th Mechanized InfantryDivision is the test unit for every newweapon, communications device andtactical scheme that comes along.Accordingly, in every battle in which itparticipates a one column odds shift isgenerated in favor of the Coalition side.There is an up-pointing arrow printedbetween that unit-counter's attack anddefense factors as a reminder of this.

13.16 The Coalition Heavy StrikeMarker

Once during each game turn, theCoalition player may, regardless of theweather, commit his heavy strike marker tosupport any one of his attacks or defenses.The effect of the marker is to shift thecombat odds one column in his favor.

13.17 The MEF

The US Marine Corps MEF unit hasriverine and amphibious movement andcombat capabilities. That is, it can moveacross one all-sea, all-reservoir or all-lakehex,side, provided that hex side was thefirst one crossed in its move that phase andthat it moves no farther that phase after thecrossing. Likewise, it can attack acrosssuch hex sides, as well as river hex sides, asif they were clear hex sides. Note too thatMEF is always in supply when in coastalhexes.

14.0 CHARTS & TABLESLocated at the end of the Advanced

Game Rules.

ADVANCED GAME RULES

INTRODUCTIONThe Back to Iraq (3rd ed.) Advanced

Game rules and units provide more depthto the simulation, as well as showing bothsides the dilemmas and advantages posedby command control considerations, limitedstrategic intelligence, and the employmentof special operations forces and terrorists.Advanced Game rules are prefaced by"AG."

AG 1.0 STRATEGICTARGETS

The Militant Islamic player has a set ofStrategic Targets markers, which representcritical installations and other key targets.These markers are placed face down on themap and may be discovered and attackedby Coalition forces. The effects of thesemarkers are detailed in the Strategic TargetMarkers Chart.

AG I.I Deploying StrategicTargets

The Militant Islamic player picks adesignated number of Strategic Targetmarkers and places them during initial setup.Strategic Target markers are picked andplaced within the following restrictions:

Scenario I

( 1 ) The Militant Islamic player sorts throughthe markers and selects any four. Heexamines them and then places them facedown in Iraq outside the Kurdish Zone.Following this:

(2) He picks AT RANDOM six additionalmarkers and does not examine them. Heplaces them in Iraq outside of the Kurdishzone, face down. After they are placed, hemay examine them.

Scenario 2

( 1 ) The Militant Islamic player sorts throughthe markers and selects any five. Heexamines them and then places them facedown in Iraq and/or Iran. Following this:

(2) He picks AT RANDOM ten additionalmarkers and does not examine them. Heplaces them in Iraq and/or Iran outside ofthe Kurdish zone, face down. After they areplaced, he may examine them.

(3) At least ten Strategic Target Markersmust be placed in Iraq, including all C4INodes picked in step (1).

Both scenarios: All Strategic Targetmarkers must be placed in cities and/ortowns, not more than one per hex.

Design note: the selection of StrategicTarget markers at random represents theusual confused intelligence situation, aswell as the impact ofpre-game Coalitionbombing.

AG 1.2 Strategic Target markers are notunits, can not move or attack (unlessotherwise stated), do not count againststacking, do not block enemy Lines ofSupply, nor have any effect on the gameother than those detailed in the StrategicTarget Markers chart.

AG 1.3 Revealing and attackingStrategic Target markers

The Militant Islamic Player may alwaysexamine Strategic Target markers on themap. The Coalition player may do so onlyif they have been revealed and flipped faceup. Strategic Targets may be revealed (andpossibly attacked) by various game actions.Once revealed, a Strategic Target markerremains on the map, face up (unless theChart indicates that it is removed fromplay). A face up Strategic Target may never

RI4 #208

B AC K TO IRAQbe flipped face down.

AG 1.4 Certain Coalition actions can reveal or eliminate thesemarkers:

(1) The Coalition player enters the hex with a land unit. At thispoint, the marker is flipped face up (if not already) and removedfrom the map.

(2) The Coalition player conducts a successful SOF mission targetinga face down marker in an adjacent hex. At this point the marker isflipped face up (and take any action for flipping it face up, asdetailed on the chart).

(3) The Coalition player makes an Airstrike against the hexcontaining the Strategic Target marker. Depending upon the outcomeof the Airstrike Table, this may cause the Strategic Target markerto be eliminated; however this does not necessarily reveal what themarker contained (keep the marker flipped face down off-map untilafter the game is over and then reveal it). See the Airstrike Table forresults. Also, Surveillance Airstrikes may cause face down markersto be revealed. In this event, the marker is not eliminated.

(4) If for any reason the Iraqi player decides to reveal the marker (hecan do this at any time), the marker is flipped face up. Take anyaction for flipping the marker face up, as detailed on the chart.

AG I.S SCUD attacks

SSM markers allow the Militant Islamic Player the opportunityto make "SCUD" attacks. These are explained on the Chart.

AG 1.6 Victory Conditions

( 1 ) At the end of the game, the Militant Islamic player receives thefollowing MIPPS:

For each WMD still on the map: 2 dice roll, totaled, for each.

(2) At the end of the game, the Coalition player receives extravictory points, as follows:

Eliminate all Terrorist Bases and WMD: counts as one city forVictory determination purposes (that's one city for three or moretotal, not per marker). There must be at least one marker in the gamefor this to count.

(3) To keep the game balanced, when using this rule: Increase thenumber of MIPPs the Militant Islamic Player needs for Victory by+ 10.

AG STRATEGIC TARGET MARKERS CHART

• Air Defense Command. For each face up Air Defense marker onthe map, the Coalition player deducts one counter from the totalnumber of Airstrikes he receives each turn.

• C4I (Command-Control-Communications-Computers-Intelligence) Node: If all C4I Nodes have been eliminated,then Iraqi units may not advance after combat, regardless ofHeadquarters. One C4I Node provides all Iraqi units withadvance after combat capability (the C4I Node may be face upor face down). Iraqi Headquarters do not have to trace a Line ofCommunications to C4I nodes to provide their usual functions,the C4I Node simply has to be on the map, somewhere.(Comment: the Iraqis are really centrally controlled andSaddam, needless to say, does not encourage initiative on thepart of his subordinates.)

• Deception: ( 1 ) If attacked by Conventional or Stealth Airstrike,the marker is automatically revealed regardless of the combatresults, and the Militant Islamic player gets 1 MIPP (propagandaabout "inept" Coalition bombing and attacks on civilians). Themarker is then removed from the map. (2) If attacked by aSurveillance Airstrike, it remains face down unless revealed bya Target Reconned result, at which point it is flipped face up and

removed from the map (no MIPPs are gained in this event). (3)If a Coalition ground unit enters its hex, the marker is flippedface up and removed from the map (no MIPPs are gained in thisevent). If aCoalition ground attack is made against its hex, thereis no effect on the marker unless the units advance after combatinto the hex, at which point the marker is revealed and remove(no MIPPs are gained in this event). (4) If revealed by a SOFMission, the marker is flipped face up and removed from themap (again, no MIPPs are gained in this event).

• Hostages: ( 1 ) If an Airstrike eliminates a Hostage maker, then rollone die and increase the MIPPs by that result. (2) If a SOF unitreceives aMission Successful result against a Revealed Hostagemarker, then remove the marker from the map and reduce theMIPP total by 1 die roll (never to below 0). (3) If a ground unitenters a hex with a Hostage marker, then remove the markerfrom the map but do not reduce the MIPP total.

• Info War Facility (Information Warfare) : Add+1 to the die rolleach time a MIPP check is made if the InfoWar Facility is faceup. (Comment: this marker represents media/PSYOP facilitiesused to amplify the political effects of actions.)

• Infrastructure: Any city hex containing a face up Infrastructureconstitutes a Supply Source for that country ' s units (Comment:Infrastructure represents power grids, arms factories, depots,etc., which support military operations).

• SSM (Surface-to-Surface Missile site): For each SSM markeron the map (face up or down), the Militant Islamic player maylaunch one "SCUD" Attack per turn. SCUD Attacks are executedat the end of the Militant Islamic turn, after all other actions areresolved. No unit on the map is targeted (it's assumed themissiles are being fired at cities in countries friendly to theCoalition). To make a SCUD attack, roll one die on the SCUDAttack Table (what else?).

• Terrorist Base: For each Terrorist Base on the map at the start ofthe game, the Militant Islamic player recieves one of the Al-Qaeda "Al-Nida" SOF units, to a maximum of two such units(in addition to other SOF he may receive). See the SOF rule.Destroyed Terrorist Bases count for Victory Purposes (see theVictory Conditions). However, if a Terrorist Base is destroyedin the course of the game, do not deduct any Terrorist units fromthose on the map.

• Uprising: Roll one die upon this being revealed. "1-3" = no effect(remove from map); "4-6" the marker remains on the map, faceup, for the rest of the game thisis an exception to 1.4(1). AnUprising has the following effects on its own and all adjacenthexes: (1) Militant Islamic units must pay+1 movement pointcost to enter such hexes. (2) Militant Islamic supply may not betraced through these hexes unless occupied by a friendly landunit. Once revealed, the marker remains on the map for theremainder of the game, and may never be attacked, regardlessof the presence of friendly or enemy units. (Note: when facedown, it may be attacked and eliminated by Coalition airstrikes ;if an eliminated result occurs, then remove the marker—bombing friendlies doesn't take to make them go away.)

• Weapons of Mass Destruction ("WMD," nuclear, chemical,biological): These have no effect on combat per se (since theoperational warheads would be already assigned to units andaccounted for by the game ' s chemical and nuclear attack rules).However, these markers do count for victory purposes (see theVictory Conditions).


B AC K TO IRAQAG SCUD ATTACK TABLERoll two dice and total the results

2-3 Missiles expended: SSM marker is revealed and removed.

4-5 Launchers spotted: SSM marker is flipped face up (if notalready); it remains in play.

6-8 City hit: the Militant Islamic player receives one die rollworth of MIPPs.

9 International Reaction: the Militant Islamic player rollsone die and must deduct that number of MIPPs from hiscurrent total; however, the total may never go below 0.

10 No effect.

11 Israel Intervenes: the Militant Islamic player rolls twodice and receives their total in MIPPs; Coalition receivesadditional units (see Additional Forces, Rule 5.2). If thisresult is rolled again, treat as "City Hit".

12 No effect.

AG 2.0 AIRSTRIKESAG 2.1 The Coalition player receives Airstrike counters. These arein addition to the Heavy Strike Marker used in the Basic Game.Airstrikes represent the operational and strategic level air missionsagainst enemy C2 capabilities and Strategic Targets. There are fourtypes of Airstrikes: Conventional, STEALTH, Surveillance andSpecial Operations Wing.

• The US Special Operations Wing is used only when playing withthe experimental Special Operations Wing rule, so don't worryabout it now. The Israeli Airstrike counters are used only if theIsraeli Intervention event is triggered; see SCUD Attacks.

AG 2.2 Aircraft Availability

At the start of each Coalition player turn, the Coalition playerdetermines the number of Airstrikes he will have for use that gameturn.

(1) Scenario 1 : Roll one die, add "4" to the result, and receive thetotal.

(2) Scenario 2: Roll one die, add "2" to the result, and receive thetotal.

Thus the Coalition will end up with five to ten aircraft supportcounters (Scenario 1) or three to eight (Scenario 2) with which toconduct missions throughout that game turn. The Coalition playermay select any mix of Conventional, STEALTH and Surveillancecounters up to the counter limit. Israeli air units may be selectedonly if using the Additional Forces rule, and are in addition to theCoalition total. The Militant Islamic player never receives Airstrikes.

• For example, in Scenario 1, the Coalition player rolls one die andit comes up a "3"; he adds another "4" to it, and chooses sevenAirstrikes: Four Conventional, two Stealth and one Surveillance

AG 2.3 Airstrike availability

Each Airstrike aircraft counter can perform only one missionper game turn. Airstrikes may never be eliminated or participate inground combat. Note that each turn the Coalition player rolls anew,receiving the number indicated above for use throughout the turn.Unused Airstrikes may not be accumulated from turn to turn. AllAirstrike counters are removed from the map upon completion oftheir missions; they do not remain in play and thus will not affectother types of combat.

AG 2.4 Targeting

The Coalition player has an Airstrike Sub-Phase. This occursduring the Coalition Combat Phase, prior to any ground combattaking place. The Coalition player resolves all airstrikes in hisAirstrike Sub-Phase, in any order. He first places all availableAirstrike markers on the map on any appropriate target hexes. TheCoalition player may target the following counters (only):

(1) enemy Headquarters units

(2) enemy Strategic Targets (face up or face down)

AG 2.5 Resolving AirstrikesTo resolve an Airstrike, the Coalition player rolls one die per

target hex and checks the Airstrike Table.

(1) Each Airstrike may consist of only one type of air unit.Conventional, STEALTH, Surveillance and Special OperationsWing counters may not be placed in the same target hex in the sameturn. Only one airstrike combat may be made against a single hexper turn, combining all Airstrikes against the hex into one attack.(2) More than one airstrike counter may be employed against thesame target hex. For each airstrike counter after the first, +1 isadded to the die roll (e.g., if three airstrikes were used against atarget hex, then there would be a +2 die roll modifier).

(3) Conventional Attacks must be resolved on the ConventionalTable. Stealth attacks must be resolved on the Stealth Table.Surveillance attacks must be resolved on the Surveillance Table.Special Operations Wing attacks must be resolved on the SpecialOperations Wing Table.

AG CONVENTIONAL AIRSTRIKE TABLE1 (or lower) Collateral Damage: If the hex contains a city,

then the Militant Islamic Player receives two (2)MIPPS. If it contains a town, the Militant Islamicplayer receives one (1) MIPP.

2 No effect

3 No effect

4 No effect

5 Suppression: Flip all Operational Headquartersunits in the hex to their Suppressed sides.

6 Suppression AND Strategic: Same asSuppression, plus any Strategic Marker is the hexis eliminated.

7 (or higher) Suppression AND Strategic AND Collateral:Same as Suppression AND Strategic, but if thehex contains a city or town, add the effects ofCollateral Damage (as above).

Die roll modifiers (cumulative):

+ 1: per attacking air unit (after the first one).

+2: the Coalition player can make any kind of Response againstenemy use of Chemical or Nuclear weapons this turn and the targethex does not contain any city or town hex.

-1 : attack is against a hex containing any rough or city.

-2: attack is against a hex containing mountain (supersedes anyrough or city terrain in the hex)

RI6 #208

B AC K TO IRAQAG STEALTH AIRSTRIKE TABLE1 No effect

2 No effect

3 No effect

4 Strategic: Any Strategic Marker unit is the hex iseliminated.

5 Strategic: as above.

6 Strategic OR Suppression: The Coalition playerhas a choice: either inflict a Strategic result (asabove) OR a Suppression result (flipping allOperational Headquarters in the hex to theirSuppressed sides).

7 (or higher) Strategic OR Suppression: as above.



+ 1: the Coalition player can make any kind of Response againstenemy use of Chemical or Nuclear weapons this turn and the targethex does not contain any city or town hex.

-1: attack is against a hex containing any rough or city.


AG SURVEILLANCE AIRSTRIKE TABLE1 No effect

2 No effect

3 Target Reconned: Any Strategic Marker in thehex is flipped face up.

4 Target Reconned: as above.



7 (or higher) Target Reconned: as above.



-1 : attack is against a hex containing any rough or city.


Comments: the Airstrikes represent operational and strategic levelair warfare. Tactical close air support and battlefield interdictionare accounted for by overall cuts to Militant Islamic unit combatand movement factors. Each conventional Airstrike represents awing's worth of sorties. The number of counters received is basedon the proportion of operational-strategic sorties versus close airsupport/air superiority sorties conducted during the 1991 GulfWar air campaign. Conventional air units represent missionspackages of fighters, bombers, electronic warfare, and otheraircraft needed f or each mission. Each STEALTH counter representsa squadron of Stealth aircraft or a salvo of cruise missiles. Sincethese excel in pinpoint attacks they have a higher chance ofdestroying Strategic Targets, but are less effective against areatargets such as military units, hence the mix of Strategic versusSuppressed results. The Coalition gets more A irstrikes in Scenario1 than in Scenario 2 as some of their airpower must be diverted tokeeping the Iranian air force in check. Why are the die rollmodifiers differentfor Conventional and Stealth attacks for Nuclear/Chemical Response? This reflects the Stealth's use of precisionguided weapons, which carry a smaller pay load.

AG 3.0 SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES(SOF)AG 3.1 Players have counters representing various types ofunconventional forces, grouped together in the game as SpecialOperations Forces (abbreviated as "SOF"). SOF are used in thegame to perform long range intelligence, raids, PSYOP, and (forthe bad guys) terrorism. SOF units are treated as other groundcombat units, except as noted.

• The SOF counters which this rule affects include all those withtheir combat and movement factors highlighted. All other specialforces units are treated as normal combat units.

AC 3.2 Land Movement of SOF markers

SOF markers have a movement of four (4) hexes. They maymove four hexes in any direction, regardless of the presence ofterrain, hexsides, and/or enemy Zones of Control (ZOCs do notstop their movement). They may enter hexes containing enemyunits by using Infiltration (see below). Coalition SOF may moveacross all sea hexes, but must end the move on land.

AC 3.3 Infiltration

SOF may enter hexes containing enemy ground units, but thiscosts them one (1) extra movement point for each occupied hexentered. Each time a SOF unit enters a hex containing an enemyground unit, the owning player rolls one die. On a "6" the unit iseliminated. On any other result, the unit is not affected. The SOFunit may then continue moving. If for some reason, the SOF endsits movement in a hex containing an enemy unit, it is eliminated.Strategic Target markers by themselves cost no extra movementpoints to enter nor cause an elimination check die roll. Enemy unitsmay not enter hexes containing SOF units.

AG 3.4 Stacking

A player may never have more than one SOF marker in a singlehex. SOF markers do not count against stacking limits for non-SOFunits.

AG 3.5 SOF markers are always in supply. If using the CommandControl rule, they are always "In Command."

AG 3.6 SOF Missions

SOF Missions are conducted during the player' combat phase.A player may use his SOF units to conduct these missions againstcertain hexes called "SOF Target Hexes." A SOF Target Hex is ahex which the SOF unit is adjacent to and has a target describedbelow. No more than one SOF unit may participate in any oneMission, and a single target within a single hex may be the subjectof a maximum of one SOF Mission per player turn (i.e., no morethan one SOF attack against a particular turn per hex, and if thereis more than one target type in that hex, only one of them may bechosen). See the SOF Missions Table for results against each typeof target. There are three types of Target Hexes, listed below:

(1) a hex containing an enemy Headquarters: this mission maycause an Operational Headquarters to become Suppressed.

(2) a hex containing an enemy Strategic Marker: this mission maycause the Strategic Marker to be flipped face up or eliminated.

(3) a hex containing a city in an enemy country that is not occupiedby a unit that is on the attacking SOF' s side: this mission may causegain/loss of MIPPs. (for ex: A Coalition SOF could conduct thismission against an Iraqi city that was occupied by an Iraqi unit, butnot against one that is occupied by a Coalition unit, the idea beingthat a captured city is no longer a viable target for special operations.)


B AC K TO IRAQAG SOF MISSIONS TABLE

1 SOF unit is eliminated *

2 SOF unit is eliminated *

3 No Effect

4 No Effect

5 No Effect

6 (or higher) Mission Successful (see below)


+ 1: US or UK SOP unit conducting the mission

+1 : Target hex contains NO enemy ground unit or revealed TerroristBase

+ 1: Coalition SOF attacking a hex located in a Kurdish area,Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia

+ 1 : Iranian SOF attacking a hex in Iran

Mission Successful:

Target is a Headquarters: Headquarters is suppressed and if theMilitant Islamic player is making the attack, he makes a MIPPcheck.

Target is a Strategic Marker: If the marker is face down, flip itface up (and take any action detailed on the Strategic TargetsChart for revealing it). If the marker is already face up, then itis eliminated.

Target is an enemy city: The Militant Islamic player rolls one dieand subtracts "3" from the total. If the outcome is positive, it isadded to the MIPPs total; if it is negative, it is subtracted fromthe MIPPs total; if 0, there is no change to the MIPPs total(obviously; note the final range of results will be -2, -1, 0, +1,+2, +3). The MIPPs total may never be reduced to less than 0.

*: If the Coalition is attacking, then the Militant Islamic Playermakes a MIPP check.

AC 3.7 Attacking SOF units

A player may attack an SOF unit during the friendly combatphase. If the SOF unit is defending in the same hex as other groundcombat units, then resolve the combat normally. If the SOF unit isdefending in a hex with no other ground combat units, then:

(1) Non-SOF units have a combat strength of "1" when attackingan SOF unit, regardless of their printed combat strength or supplystatus. SOF units use their printed combat strengths when attackingenemy SOF.

(2) Apply combat results normally, but a result which forces a SOFto retreat into an enemy unit or ZOC does not eliminate it. Instead,the unit is "Neutralized": Remove the SOF unit temporarily fromthe game. Roll one die. It is placed on the Turn Record Track thatnumber of turns later and is received as a reinforcement at the startof the friendly Player Turn. Place it on any friendly Headquarters;"Al-Nida" units may also be placed on any Terrorist Base (revealedor not). If no hex is available for placement, the unit is eliminatedinstead of being replaced.

(3) Apply defensive terrain effects normally, except that a SOF unitwhich is defending in a hex adjacent to a city hex receives the citydefense bonus. (Why? Technically, they'd be operating within thecity limits, but given the game scale this isn't shown on the map.)

AC 3.8 Coalition SOF

Coalition SOF have no ZOC and no reduced step.

AG 3.9 SOF Airborne Movement

Two Coalition SOF markers per turn may use airbornemovement. Simply pick the unit(s) up and place them on any otherhex(es) on the map. A SOF unit may not conduct any othermovement in the turn it uses airborne movement. It may conductSOF Missions in the same turn. Airborne movement may not beused to move from or land in a hex containing an enemy combatunit. Militant Islamic SOF units may never use airborne movement.

AG 3.10 Militant Islamic SOF substitution

The Militant Islamic player may. prior to start of play, replacethe following combat units with one SOF marker each. Simplyremove the unit from play and place a corresponding SOF markeron any valid deployment hex.

(1) Iraqi 999 brigade (Scenarios 1 and 2)

(2) Iranian 29th Special Forces Division (Scenario 2 only)

AG 3.11 Al-Nida units

The Militant Islamic player receives one "Al-Nida" unit perTerrorist Base Strategic Target marker he picks during initialdeployment (that's once per game, not turn). Al-Nida units areplaced anywhere in the countries indicated by deploymentinstructions, not just on Terrorist Bases. These units are treated asother SOF.

Designer comments: The SOF markers in the game representoverall operational capabilities rather than specific specialoperations units per se. For example, a US SOF unit mightrepresent a task force including one or more Special Forcesdetachments, a Ranger battalion, plus attached special operationsaviation support and a PSYOP team. The missions of SOF units inthe game represents pretty much the kind of operational-strategicmissions which would be conducted in the course of a conventionalcampaign in the Persian Gulf. The game's scope precludes longterm SOF support for insurgents and so forth. SOF interdiction ofenemy movement and lines of supply are reflected in their ability tosuppress Headquarters, which indirectly affect these other gamefunctions. SOF attacks on cities represent terrorism as well asPSYOP and stirring up the locals to revolt. Note that the MilitantIslamic player has an advantage in this regard, given the nature ofthe modified die roll results which are more likely to increaseMIPPs. As for attacking SOF, this is difficult since the units areoperating either or in clandestine mode, or are in the case ofCoalition units, can be aerially inserted and extracted before theenemy can concentrate sufficient strength against them.

AG 4.0 COMMAND CONTROL (C2)AG 4.1 Both sides have Headquarters units which represent centersof gravity for operational level command control as well as combatsupport formations (such as artillery and engineers) and logisticsactivities. Headquarters provide Command-Control support toother units in the game (Command-Control is abbreviated as "C2").The number on the Headquarters counters is their "C2 Radius." thenumber of hexes from the Headquarters to the unit(s) being providedcommand control support. Headquarters units have two sides. Thefront is their "Operational" side; the reverse is their "Suppressedside." By attacking enemy Headquarters units, the player canseriously undermine their ability to support combat units. C2 statusaffects the following game functions (each explained in their ownsections following):

(1) Supply status

(2) Ability to advance after combat

•The Suppressed side of a Headquarters is used only as a result ofthe Headquarters being attacked by Airstrikes or SOF Missions;

RI8 #208

B AC K TO IRAQotherwise, Headquarters are one step units and are eliminated iftake a single loss in ground combat.

• Headquarters are mechanized class units. Coalition Headquartershave no ZOCs.

AG 4.2 Headquarters units provide C2 Support to units which are"In Command." In order to be "In Command," a unit must be ableto trace a line of hexes (called a Line of Communications) from itsown hex (exclusive) to any friendly Headquarters unit's hex(inclusive). The number of hexes in this Line of Communicationsmaybe no longer than the Headquarters' Support Radius. The Lineof Communications may not be traced into an enemy unit, anenemy Zone of Control, or prohibited terrain. Units which cannottrace a Line of Communications are said to be "Out of Command."A unit's Command status is checked at the instant any gamefunctions calls for it and may change during the turn owing tomovement and combat.

For example: a Headquarters with a C2 Radius of "2 " couldprovide C2 support to friendly units up to two hexes distant.

AG 4.3 National restrictions

Any Coalition unit may use any friendly Coalition Headquartersto provide C2. Iraqi units may use only Iraqi Headquarters, andIranian units may use only Iranian Headquarters for C2. (Exception:see Israeli and Al-Qaeda intervention units.)

AG 4.4 C2 and supply status

• All this replaces of the Basic Game Supply Line rule.

In order to be In Supply, a unit must be able to trace a Line ofCommunications to a friendly Headquarters unit, as defined above.In addition, the Headquarters unit itself must be within a number ofhexes equal to its support radius (and within the above restrictionson tracing) of a friendly road hex which in turn traces back to afriendly supply source. Note that for Coalition units to Recover(rule 9.5), they would have to trace a LOS to a headquarters unit inaddition to other provisions of the rule.

(1) Headquarters units themselves need only trace a Line ofCommunications to a road which traces to a supply source, orsupply source itself, not to another Headquarters.

(2) Coalition Marine units may trace the initial part of their Line ofCommunications through all sea hexes/lake/reservoir hexsides to aHeadquarters.

(3) Coalition airmobile units may trace a Line of Communicationsthrough any types of hexes, including those containing enemy unitsand all-sea, to a Headquarters.

(4) Units in an automatic supply situation (Coalition Marines oncoastal hexes, air supply, any unit occupying an appropriate SupplySource hex) are not affected by this rule.

(5) Units not normally needing supply (air, special ops folks, etc)are not affected.

(And before anyone asks, you can NOT trace from one Headquartersunit to another in order to extend the Line of Communications; i.e.,no bucket brigading of supplies).

AG 4.5 C2 and Advance after Combat

(1) Iraqi units may advance after combat only if they are InCommand. Otherwise, they may not advance after combat.Additionally, if all Iraqi C4I Node Strategic Targets have beeneliminated, then no Iraqi unit may ever advance after combat,regardless if they are In Command or not. (Note: elimination of allC4I Nodes does not affect Iraqi supply status.)

(2) Iranian and Al-Qaeda units may advance after combat only ifthey are In Command. Otherwise, they may not advance after

combat. The status of Iraqi C2 Nodes does not affect them.

(3) US, British, French, Euro-Corps and Israeli units may alwaysadvance one hex after combat, regardless of C2 status. OtherCoalition units must be In Command to advance after combat.

(4) Additionally, US, British, French, Euro-Corps and Israelimechanized class units may, if In Command, advance TWO hexesafter combat. The first hex must be the hex vacated by the defender.The second hex can be in any direction, as long as it is a playablehex.

(5) SOF units follow normal advance after combat provisions fortheir side. They may advance after combat only during normalcombat, not after SOF Missions.

Comment: The restrictions on advance after combat represent thereal world inflexibility of third world armies, as well as the superiormobile warfare doctrine of Western forces. And yes, I know, thereare no Israeli mechanized units in the counter mix, but the provisionis therefor completeness.

AG 4.6 Suppression of Headquarters units

A Headquarters unit may be Suppressed (flipped to itsSuppressed side) as a result of the following game actions:

(1) Airstrikes (see Airstrike rule).

(2) Special Operations Forces attack (see SOF rule).

A Suppressed Headquarters may not be used to trace Lines ofCommunications. If a Suppressed Headquarters is Suppressedagain, there is no further effect.

AG 4.7 Recovery from Suppression

All Headquarters, Coalition and Militant Islamic, automaticallyrecoverfrom Suppression during a Reconstitution phase, mandatoryor discretionary (but only in those turns in which a ReconstitutionPhase occurs). All Suppressed Headquarters returned to theirOperational sides if they are in an overland supplied position andhave remained stationary throughout that game turn. (Comment:OK, so why do Militant Islamic Headquarters recover at the sametime as Coalition? Because the pressure is off for a couple of days,so they have a chance to get things together.)

AG 5.0 ADDITIONAL FORCESAG 5.1 Players may bring in Israeli and Al-Qaeda forces at apolitical cost.

AG 5.2 Israeli Intervention

If a SCUD attack results in Israeli Intervention, then theCoalition player receives Israeli forces. These include:

( 1 ) On all turns following, when the Coalition player determines itstotal airpower for the turn, he rolls one additional die to receiveIsraeli Airstrikes: on a " 1 -3" one Israeli Airstrike is received for theturn; on a "4-6" two Israeli Airstrikes are received for the turn. Anew die roll is made every turn for the remainder of the game.(2) Additionally, the Coalition player may at his option bring in theIsraeli airborne division as a reinforcement at any time followingintervention being triggered. The Israeli Airborne division is initiallyplaced on any hex containing clear or clear/town hex in Iraq thatdoes not contain a Militant Islamic unit (it may contain a StrategicTarget only). Placement uses up the unit 's movement for the entireturn, but it may attack normally if using the Move-Fight sequence.AG 5.3 The Israeli airborne unit functions in all respects as aCoalition unit, with the following exceptions:

(1) It may only enter hexes in Iraq and (Scenario 2) Iran (it mayattack across borders). If forced to retreat into other countries, it isremoved from play permanently (not considered eliminated, justwithdrawn for diplomatic reasons).


B AC K TO IRAQ(2) It may never stack with any Coalition unit other than US, UnitedKingdom, French or Euro-Corps.

(3) If it is involved in a combat, then any MIPPS that the MilitantIslamic player gains for that combat are increased by " 1." Thisapplies only to asterisked and plus sign results on the CRT.

(4) It may use only US Headquarters as a C2/Supply source. It mayuse Coalition airborne supply.

(5) If the Israeli airborne division enters the game, then no CoalitionSaudi, Kuwaiti or Syrian unit may ever attack into hexes in Iraq andIran for the remainder of the game. This is so even if the Israeli unitis eliminated. (Why? Because no one in the Muslim world is goingto participate in an attack on another Islamic state alongside theIsraelis.)

AC 5.4 AI-Qaeda Intervention

There are four possible Al-Qaeda units which possible may bedeployed in the game (Al-Qaeda, or "The Base," is Osama BinLaden's organization). These units include the 55th Brigade, theIslamic Volunteer Division ("IVD") and two "Al-Nida" SOF units(the latter being the terrorist organization set up in the 1990s inconjunction with Saddam Hussein; "Al-Nida" means "The Call").These units are deployed as follows:

(1) "Al Nida" units: see the Strategic Targets rule.

(2) During initial setup, the Iraqi player rolls one die. Results are asfollows: " 1 -2" no effect; "3 :" receive the 55 Brigade; "4-5:" receivethe "IVD" division; "6" receive both the 55 Brigade and the "IVD."

*Alternatively, players can use current information torn from theheadlines to determine which Al-Qaeda units will be in play.

During initial setup, the Militant Islamic player may place Al-Qaeda units on any hexes he could normally deploy his land units.These units function as a Militant Islamic unit, with the followingexceptions:

(1) They may not stack with Iraqi or Iranian units.

(2) If an AL-Queda unit is involved in a combat or SOF mission,then any MIPPS that the Militant Islamic player gains for thatcombat/SOF Mission are increased by "1" (that's 1 MIPP, not onedie roll).

(3) Each time an Al-Qaeda unit is destroyed, then the MilitantIslamic player deducts 2 MIPPs from his current total (to a minimumofO).

(4) Al-Qaeda units may use any Islamic C2 and Supply sources.

AC 5.5 Additional US Airmobile Capacity

The US maintains a considerable fleet of helicopters at divisionand higher levels. When using this rule, the Coalition player mayhave any one US light infantry, mountain, marine or airborne unitconduct one "Airmobile Move" per turn. This is done by pickingthe unit up and placing it on any other hex on the map. The 101stAirborne Division may not attack in the same turn that an AirmobileMove is being conducted.

An Airmobile move is conducted as follows: the unit must startin a position from which it could draw overland supply, or whichis being airborne supplied. It is then moved up to 10 hexes over anytype of terrain or enemy units. It may not land in hexes containingall-sea or enemy units. If may start and end in hexes adjacent toenemy units. It may not attack in the same turn it conducted anairmobile move. A qualified unit may use either Airmobile ornormal movement in the same turn, not both.

SOF units may not use Airmobile movement (they use theirown Airborne Movement rule instead).

AG 5.6 US Special Operations Wing (ExperimentalRule)

The Special Operations Wing unit represents aircraft capable ofemploying strategic PSYOP and assorted hi-tech informationwarfare stratagems. The unit is in the game to allow players toexperiment with various breakthroughs in information warfare,cyberwar, and such. Players should feel free to add to or change theSpecial Operations Airstrike Table results in accordance withwhatever is going on in the headlines.

(Tactical level PSYOP is built into the combat results table, andspecial operations aviation insertion/extraction and fire supportmissions are built into the SOF unit capabilities.)

The Special Operations Airstrike is treated exactly as otherAirstrikes, except that:

( 1 ) Its targets are ground units, cities and Strategic Target markers.

(2) The combat is resolved on the Special Operations AirstrikeTable.

AG SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRSTRIKETABLE

1 No effect2 Political Reaction: The Militant Islamic Player

makes a MIPPS check.

3 No effect

4 No effect

5 No effect

6 Operation Effective: See target list, below, andapply one of the options.

7+ Operation Effective: as above.


+1: 10 or more Militant Islamic units (not Strategic Targets) are inthe deadpile.+1 : Coalition currently occupies at least two Militant Islamic citieswith ground units.

Target is a hex containing ground units: Mass Surrenders. Rollone die for each Militant Islamic unit in and adjacent to thetarget hex AND which are adjacent to at least one Coalition landunit. Órïa l -4 there is no effect. On a 5-6 the unit is immediatelyeliminated (exceptions follow); Special Operations Forces,Republican Guards and Revolutionary Guards are eliminatedonly on a 6; Al-Qaeda units are never eliminated.

Target is a Revealed Strategic Marker: Neutralization. Themarker may not conduct any of its functions until "un-Neutralized". Rotate the marker sideways to indicate this. Themarker becomes un-Neutralized at the end of the nextReconstitution Phase.

Target is a Baghdad hex that is not currently occupied byCoalition units: Major Political Cascading Effects: TheCoalition player rolls two dice and subtracts "9" from the total.If the outcome is positive, it is added to the MIPPs total; if it isnegative, it is subtracted from the MIPPs total; if 0, there is nochange to the MIPPs total (note the result ranges will be from-7 to +3). The MIPPs total may never be reduced to less than 0.

Target is any other enemy city: Minor Political Cascading Effects:The Coalition player rolls one die and subtracts "4" from thetotal. If the outcome is positive, it is added to the MIPPs total;if it is negative, it is subtracted from the MIPPs total; if 0, thereis no change to the MIPPs total (obviously). The MIPPs totalmay never be reduced to less than 0.

R20 #208

B AC K TO IRAQAG 6.0 ADVANCED GAME ORDER OFBATTLE

AG 6.1 Scenario I

Coalition: add to initial deployment:

3 x US Headquarters (anywhere in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait)

1 x JFC Headquarters (anywhere in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait)

5 x SOF markers (place anywhere in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait)

1 x Airmobile Move marker

See Airstrikes and Special Operations Wing rules for Airstrikeavailability

Coalition: add to reinforcements:

1 x Israeli airborne division (see Israeli Intervention rule)

Militant Islamic: add to initial deployment:

8 x Iraqi Headquarters (anywhere in Iraq)

10 x Strategic Targets (picked at Random, see rule for placement)

May substitute l x SOF for the Iraqi 999 brigade (anywhere inIraq)

1 x 55 Brigade (see AI-Qaeda rule)

1 x Al-Qaeda 55 Brigade, 1 x Islamic Volunteer Division(anywhere in Iraq; see Al-Qaeda Intervention rule)

l x Al-Qaeda SOF for each Terrorist Base picked (anywhere inIraq)

AG 6.2 Scenario 2

Coalition: add to initial deployment:

4 x US Headquarters (anywhere in Saudi Arabia and/or Turkey)

2 x JFC Headquarters (anywhere in Saudi Arabia or Turkey)

5 x SOF markers (place anywhere in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait)

1 x Airmobile Move marker

See Airstrikes and Special Operations Wing rules for Airstrikeavailability

Coalition: add to reinforcements:

1 x Israeli airborne division (see Israeli Intervention rule)

Militant Islamic: add to initial deployment:

8 x Iraqi Headquarters (anywhere in Iraq or Kuwait)

4 x Iranian Headquarters (anywhere in Iraq or Iran)

15 x Strategic Targets (picked at Random, see rule for placement)

May substitute 1 x SOF for the Iraqi 999 brigade and l x SOFfor the Iranian 29th Special Forces Division (anywhere in Iraq, Iranor Kuwait except Kuwait City)

1 x Al-Qaeda 55 Brigade, 1 x Islamic Volunteer Division(anywhere in Iraq, Iran or Kuwait; see Al-Qaeda Intervention rule)

l x Al-Qaeda SOF for each Terrorist Base picked (anywhere inIraq, Iran or Kuwait except Kuwait City)

AG 6.3 Un/1 Abbreviations

IVD: Islamic Volunteer Division

JFC: Joint Forces Command

MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force

RG: Republican Guard

SOCPG: Special Operations Command, Persian Gulf

SAS: Special Air Service

SOW: Special Operations Wing

14.2 COALITION COMBAT RESULTS TABLE

Die Roll Odds Ratios

123456

1:2DR*AS*AS*AS*AS*AS*

1:1DRDRDR*DR*AS*AS*

2:1DEDRDRDR*DR*AS*

3:1

DE

DE

DR

DR

DR*

DR*

4:1

DE

DEDE

DE

DR

DR*

5:1

DE

DE

DE

DE

DE

DR

Notes

Final

Final

odds greater than 5:1

odds less

An asterisked (

have automatic DE results.

than 1 :2 have automatic

*) result means a MIPPS

AS* results.

check is made.

STRATEGY & TACTICS R2I

B AC K TO IRAQ

14.3 MILITANT ISLAMIC COMBAT RESULTS TABLE

Die Roll Odds Ratios

123456

1:1DR*

AS+AS+ASASAS

2:1DL1*

DR*

AS+

AS+ASAS

3:1DL1*

DR*

DR*

DR*

DR*

AS

4:1DL1*

DL1*

DR*

DR*

DR*

DR*

5:1DL1*

DL1*

DL1*

DL1*

DR*

DR*

6:1DL1*

DL1*

DL1*

DL1*DL1*

DR*

Notes

Final odds greater than 6:1 have automatic DL l * results.Final odds less than 1:1 have automatic AS results.An asterisked (*) result means a MIPPS check is made.A plus sign (+) after a result means the Militant Islamic player receives one MIPP,though no actual MIPPs check is rolled.

14.1 TERRAIN EFFECTS CHARTTerrain Type Mech Non-MechClear

Rough

Mountain

Escarpment

Dunes

Town

City

Road

Highway

Marsh

Salt Pans

River

Saddam Line

All water

Notes

L/R= shift odds left

OTiH = Movement

P= Prohibited. NE=

1

2

P Except Roads

P

P

OTiH

1

.5

.25

P Except roads

Consider clear ingood weather, marshin bad weather

+ to +6

OTiH

P except for 101st&MEF, see 12.0,11.20 & 13.17

1

1

2(MtnInf- l )

P

2

OTiH1

1

1

2


+ 1

OTiH

P except for 101st&MEF, see 12.0,11.20& 13.17

Combat Effects

NE

LI

L2 Mech-50% on roads,otherwise P

P

NE for non-mech;P for Mech

LI

L3

Usually NE, seeMountains above

NE

Non-Mech 1R;Mech -50% on roads,otherwise P


Halved when attackingacross except for 101st,which is NE

NE Scenario 1, IL Scenario 2

P except for 101 st&MEF, see 12.0,11.20& 13.17

or right that number of columns on the CRTs.

cost determined by Other Terrain in the Hex.

No Effect

R22 #208

Unpunched Games Punched Games STRATEGY & TACTICS3W Panzerkrieg $403W Raid on Richmond 253W Royalists & Roundheads I (zip) 403W SS Amerika 753W Salvo 303W Scratch One Flat Top 303W Sink the Bismarck 303W Spitfire 403W Spires of the Kremlin 453W Star Force Terra 253W Strategy (zip) 103W Tide of Fortune 303W To the Far Shore 403W 2WW(zip) 10XNO Cent of Glory (min. rules) 14XNO Europe at War 40XNO Florida 30XTR Back to Iraq (zip) 30XTR Black Gold (zip) 30XTR Miss. Banzai (zip) 30XTR Nato, Nukes & Nazis (zip) 45XTR Poland 39 (zip) 30XTR Smithereens 30XTR Wahoo! (zip) 20YAQ Apache 60YAQ Asteroid Pirates 50YAQ Barbarians 50YAQ Demons Run 30YAQ Fast Attack Boats 50YAQ Ironbottom Sound 75YAQ Marine 2002 P60YAQ Murfreesboro 50YAQ Pickett's Charge 50YAQ Superiority . P40

Punched GamesAH Amoeba War $35AH Dune 30AH Enemy in Sight 18AH France 1940 24AH Kriegspiel 30AH Management 50AH Origins of WWII 18AH Samurai 27AH Stalingrad 18AH Verdict II 80AH Waterloo 24ADV CMS Johnny Reb 40ARIEL Seastrikc 50ATTX 8th Army 25BTL Airforce & Dauntless 50BTL Dauntless 24BTL Flat Top 36BTL Submarine 36CADACO Fighter Bomber 65CONF Overlord ( I st) 30CONF Imperium 40DYNGM Airport 27FGU Lords & Wizards (zip) 15CD W 1940 21GDW Battle for Midway (zip) 45GDW Marita Merkur 42GDW Western Desert 48GOG Invasion Sicily 45GW Superpower 36GxD Star Fighter 36HG Campaign 30HISTO CM Eagle Day (zip) 24IDEAL PT 109 40MB Hotels 45MB Shogun 100MB Tank Battle 75NAI Wagon Wheels-Oregon 24OSG Dark December 30OSG Panzerkrieg 30PB Calling All Cars (metal) 75PB Camelot 50PB Pit w/bell 25PB Risk (wood pcs) 35RAVEBRG Enchanted Forest 20SDC Hue (zip) 30SWGPOstksrieg 30

StrOMat HockeyStrOMat BasketballSTATPRO Baseball, 1956ST COLE Poland 39 (zip)SPI American RevSPI Army Grp SouthSPI BarbarossaSPI Battlefleet MarsSPI Bull RunSPI CASPI Crimean WarSPI Desert WarSPI Drive on StalingradSPI El AlameinSPI Fast CarriersSPI Franco-Prussian WarSPI Freedom in GalaxySPI FrigateSPI Foxbat & PhantomSPI Global WarSPI GrenadierSPI Isl. War-Bloody Ridge (zip)SPI Isl. War-Saipan (zip)SPI KoreaSPI Kursk (71)SPI Lee Moves NorthSPI Mod Btl 2-Bundeswehr (zip)SPI Moscow Camp.SPI NATOSPI Op. TyphoonSPI OutreachSPI Panzer 44SPI PatrolSPI Search & DestroySPI SeeloweSPI SniperSPI Solomons CampSPI SorcerorSPI Strategy ISPI TankSPI Task ForceSPI War in the IceSPI Wellington's VictorySPI Wilderness Camp, (zip)SPI Yeoman3W MNB 1-3TSR Onslaught3M Breakthru3M OhWahRee3M Ploy3M Point of Law3M Stocks and Bonds3W Modern Naval BattlesVG 2nd FleetVG 3rd FleetVG 5th FleetVG 6th FleetVG Open FireVG VietnamYAQ BomberYAQ CVYAQ IroncladsYAQ StarfallYAQ Ultimatum

-- - .

$30307535456045303336

1203045304854303027604818184236

Z482551247542302448482448309036303675485445243035504020182424242424243036483024

f Order form is on \.( Page 39 of the^»^ magazine ^-^^^~~~^ ** 1 "

;/

Iss# Title Price1 Remagen Bridge2 More Tanks3 Tactical Weapons Symbols4 Gamescience: Vietnam6 Siege of Bodenberg7 Patrol8 Diplomacy Special Issue1 1 Brittany Campaign12 Rules for Naval Wargames13 Battle of Britain1 5 Trafalgar16 Avalon Hill Interview1 7 Table Top Wargaming30 Combat Command34 Armageddon37 Scrimmage38 CA39 Fall of Rome40 Panzer Armee Afrika4 1 Kampfpanzer42 The East is Red43 American Civil War44 Tank!45 Operation Olympic46 Combined Arms47 Wolf Pack48 Sixth Fleet49 Frederick the Great50 Battle for Germany5 1 World War I52 Oil War53 Punic Wars54 Dixie55 Breitenfeld56 Revolt in the East57 Panzergruppe58 Conquistador59 Plot to Assassinate Hitler60 The Road to Richmond61 October War62 South Africa63 Veracruz 184764 Raid!65 Cobra66 Constantinople67 Stonewall68 Kharkov69 Tannenburg70 Crusades71 Cassino72 Armada73 Panzer Battles74 Ney vs. Wellington75 Napoleon's Art of War76 China War77 Paratroop78 Patton's 3rd Army79 Berlin '8580 Wilson's Creek81 Tito82 Fifth Corps83 Kaiser's Battles84 Operation Grenade85 Fighting Sail86 Cedar Mountain87 Desert Fox88 BAOR89 Sicily: Race to Messina90 Monmouth91 RDF92 Iwo Jima93 American Civil War94 Nordkapp95 Soldiers of Queen96 Singapore97 Trail of Fox98 Central Command99 Thunder at Luetzen100 Super Powers101 Cromwell's Victory

$175907565605555455550604040

P80P60

3050

P60P50

50453545

P50P40P55P60P55P65P60P40P55

35P50P40

504030

P5045

P35P25P25P45

45P50P40

405525303050

P45P25

30P25P30

502025

P30303050

P55353530504540

P4050454040404040

/T ^~

^jf"* -*ijj^^^

Deserl Fox-A

GamesBuy • Sell • Trade

G.A.S.If we don't have what you're looking for in stock, orif you don't see it on our list, use our free GameAcquisition Service (it's a G.A.SJ). Just note thegames you're looking for on your order and we'll behappy to search for those hard to find games. Oncewe've found them, we'll send you a postcard andgive you first chance before we place it in our ads.

STRATEGY & TACTICSIss# Title Price

102 Monty's D-Day $50103 Road to Vicksburg 40104 Colonies Revolt 60105 Ruweisat Ridge P25106 Pleasant Hill 40107 Warsaw Rising P30108 Remember the Maine 40109 Target: Libya 40110 Hastings, 1066 401 1 1 Korea 40112 PattontoWar 30113 Battle of Abensberg 40114 Battle of Eckmuhl 40115 Kanev 30116 Manchu 301 1 7 North German Plain 30118 The Tigers are Burning 30119 Horse Soldiers 40120 Nicaraugua 20121 Indian Mutiny 25122 Pegasus Bridge P30123 Campaign in Valley 30124 Fortress Stalingrad 50125 Far Seas 50126 Beirut '82 20127 Rush for Glory 20128 Africa Orientale 30129 Harvest of Death 20130 Tsushima 25131 Donau Front 15132 Iron Cross 25133 Baton Rouge 20134 Anzio Beachhead 30135 Sideshow 30136 Borodino: Doomed Victory 40137 Men at Arms 40138 Eylau 15139 Arabian Nightmare 30140- Objective Tunis 20142 Red Beach One:Tarawa 15143 Rio Grande: Valverde 15144 Chad: The Toyota Wars 15145 Trajan 30146 Italian Camp: Sicily 25147 Holy War: Afghanistan 15148 Cropredy Bridge 151 49 Franco-Prussian War 30150 Italian Camp: Salerno 50151 Vittoria/Friedland 15152 Case Green 15153 Felix/ZAMA 15154 Russo-Turkish War 25


"STRATEGY & TACTICS S&T ISSUES MINT ARES COMMAND

Iss # Title155 Italian Camp: Anzio1 56 White Eagle Eastward157 Roman Civil War159 Zeppelin1 60 Italian Camp: MedWar161 Successors162 Clontarf/Saipan163 Seven Years War164 Balkan Wars165 Caesar in Galha1 66 Savage Station1 67 Austro-Prussian War1 68 Operation Shock Troop169 Battles of Atlanta I170 Battles of Atlanta II1 7 1 On To Moscow1 72 Molotov's War173 30 Years War174 Indo-Pakistani War175 Germania1 76 Blood on the Tigris177 100 Years War178 Guadalcanal179 First Afghan War180 Reinforce the Right1

182 Balkans 19411 83 Byzuntium

Price$20

1530161625162530304030302525251730302030303020202530

1 85 First Arab-Israeli 251 89 Charlemagne (copy rules) 25190 The Gauntlet: Korea 20191 Sea Devils 25195 Borodino & Friedland (NLB) 25196 Vietnam Battles 201 97 Great Med. Btls

Bannock/Tambur.198 OTT: Lemberg/Verdun199 Forgotten Axis: Finnish200 French For. Legion (index)201 Crimean War (SPI)202 Invasion Taipei204 Twilight of Habsburgs206 Forgotten Axis: Romania207 War of 1812208 Back to Iraq (3rd ed)S&T Special Edition #1-4Book 1Book 2Book 3Book 4

S&T ISSUES PUNCHED26 Grunt31 Flying Circus32 Borodino33 Winter War35 Year of Rat

S&T ISSUES PUNCHEDNO MAG33 Winter War52 Oil War63 Veracruz 1 84764 Raid67 Stonewall71 Cassino86 Cedar Mountain

^" --

20302030202020202020

20/ea.90

1 101101 10

$6036606042

$45202020252030

S^

ƒ Order form is o n ^ .( Page 39 of the )^ . ^ magazine.""•-~- — -""/

NO MAG54 Dixie55 Breitenfeld56 Revolt in East59 Plot to Assassinate Hitler61 October War63 Veracruz 184764 Raid!72 Armada76 China War79 Berlin 8584 Tito86 Cedar Mountain94 Nordkapp100 Superpowers105 Ruweisat Ridge108 Remember the Maine115 Kanev146 It. Camp: Sicily152 Case Green1 63 Seven Years War168 Oper. Shock Troop194 to current

S&T ISSUES W/O GAMES28, 37. 49176. 179-187. 189-current

WARGAMER Vol.1

$25453020402020202020154535201535151010152515

$155

Iss # Title Price1 Battle for Ring $1007 Marston Moor 609 Bloody Buna 4012 Aces High 401 3 Forward to Richmond 4016 Carrier Strike1 8 Birth of a Nation19 Sturm Nach Osten20 Little Round Top22 No Trumpets No Drums23 Decision @ Kasserinc24 Lawrence of Arabia25 Never Call Retreat26 Race to the Meuse27 Peter the Great28 Port Stanley29 Lodz: Blitz in the East30 Stars and Bars31 Clash of Steel32 Napoleon at Lut/en34 Khyber Rifles35 West Wall36 Unconditional Surrender37 China Incident38 Hath No Fury39 Hcllfire Pass40 Fight on the Beaches41 O'Conner's Offensive42 End of Iron Dream43 Wellington44 Mac-Arthur45 Custer'sLuck46 House of Sa' ud47 Struggle for Stalingrad48 The Red Baron49 Napoleon vs. Charles50 Knights of Justice51 Duel in the Desert52 Glory Road53 Dunkirk54 Condottieri56 First Team57 Race for Tunis58 Empires: 191459 Bloody Keren60 Anvil-Dragoon6? F:illpn Haolp

60P40

505050605030

PI. 5P20

6515302030402530152015151530252540153530304015

P20301520

P2520151595

1 World Killer2 Wreck of BSM Pandora3 Barbarian Kings (no game)5 Citadel of Blood7 Rescue from the Hive8 Ragnarok9 Delta Vee10 Return Stainless Steel Rat1 1 Albion1 1 Albion (no game)1 2 Star Trader1 5 Nightmare House (no mag)1 5 Nightmare House1 7 Mongoose & Cobra (RPG)

Spec Ed #2

BATTLE FLAG

$P30301025

P2525252525102520252515

1 , 3, 4. 8- 1 1 , 2 1 -23, 25-27 $ 1 0 each

BATTLEPLAN6 Central America8 Deluxe Third Reich9 Air Superiority

BOARDGAME JOURNAL1.2

BROG NEWSLETTER

$101010

$5

vo!2nos7-12 $5 each

C3I1 3, 6 8 9 $1C w«^,.1 p-.lr-h

CAMPAJGN MAGAZINE99 Origins '80 $10101 1942 Cross of Iron 10111 Origins Reports 10

COMMAND1 Blitzkrieg '412 Sunrise of Victory4 Lion of Ethiopia5 Hamburger Hill6 Krim7 Kadesh8 Jutland9 Inchon10 Alexandras1 1 Hougoumont12 Chaco1 3 Desert Storm1 5 I Am Sparatcus16 19181 7 Gettysburg18 Tet19 Port Arthur20 Cortes21 B lood & Iron22 Antietam (game only)23 Shogun Triumphant24 Czech '3825 When Eagles Fight26 When Tigers Fight28 Like Lions They Fought29 191430 Across Potomac3 1 Budapest 4532 Bunker Hill34 Death & Destruction35 Mason-Dixon36 SS Panzer37 Mukden & Moscow Option38 Gr. War-Near East39 World War 186240 Moscow Burning41 Battle of Bulge42 Hell B4 Night/Blitz 4042 Hell B4 Night/Blitz 40

(game only)

$10010060506060804050

P3015

P4050302540402525101616202520251620203535

P35352535353535

25

43 Chattanoga44 Dark Victory45 Op. Sea Lion/Yarmuk46 End of Empire47 Perfidious Albion48 Tom. World 249 Warmaster Chess50 Back to Iraq (2nd)52 Grunwald

COMMAND (NO MAG)16 191817 Lees Greatest Gamble

COMPETITIVE EDGE1-4.6,8-9, 12

CONFLICT4 NORAD5 Nomonhan6 War in Indochina7 Rifle & Musket

COUNTERATTACK

FIRE & MOVEMENTi2-7 9-1 ()8, 21,

• 11-15.17-20,37-38.41,45,48, 53, 8322-27, 29-32, 36, 39-40, 42-44. 46-4749-52. 54-56, 59, 73,7733-35, 57-58, 60-72, 74-76.78-82,84-Current

GAME NEWS1-6.8. 10. 11

THE GENERAL1 7:6. 1 8: 1 -2, 1 8:4, 20: 1 , 20;4-5, 22: 1 ,22:4-5, 25:2, 25:5, 26:2-5, 27:4-5,28: 1 , 28:3. 29:2, 29:4-6, 30: 1 -2, 3 1 :5

GRENADIER1 DNO/UNT6 Operation Crusader7 Marita Merkur8 Marita-Merkur9 White Death1 0 French Navy/WWII1 1 Narvik1 2 Dutch in Fall of France13 French Armor in BoF14 Fall of France15 Streets of Stalingrad1 6 Kanev17 Fall Blau18 Bomber22 Battle Over Britain24 Games of ACW26 Wargaming w/o Intell29 World in Flames30 Gleam of Bayonets3 1 Ambush

JAGDPANTHER12 Anvil-Dragoon15 Jacksonville

MOVESIVIVX V Lw

12 4 33 34 39 49.5689. 906-8 11-32 35-38 40-4850-55, 57-59, 62, 7861,63-77.79-889 1 to current

$353530353540182535

$88

$7

$60757560

$15

$403025

15

10

6

$7

$7

$4020202020151515151515121212101010101010

$4040

$252012

1067

R24 #208

ScßT GAME VARIANT FORHOLY WAR:AFGHANISTANA Toolkit for the First War of the 21stCentury: Afghanistan 2001.rev. 10/12/01

About the Game KitMap: use S&T 147 Holy War: Afghanistan map. Note that SalangTunnel is destroyed (mark mountain hex 3613 with black "X" counterto indicate no road connection here).

Scale: 30 km/hex, 2 day turns (same as "Arabian Nightmare")Length of game: As desired. Adjust based on losses/Victory.Units: Afghani (all) = regiment/battalion/irregular

American/Allied = battalion/companyUnit Size

a= after combat strength indicates strength is doubled for attacks.

d= after combat strength indicates strength is doubled for defense.* p= after movement allowance i ndicates paratroop (ai r droppable).

h = after movement allowance indicates airmobile (helicopter-borne).

m = after movement allowance indicates mountain troops.

L= movement allowance indicates "leader"—can choose 7 (leg)or 12 (mech)

Taliban Forces

Taliban Army—white Taliban Irregulars—greyTaliban Leadership—dk. grey

Bin Laden/terrorists/Holy warriors/Islamic Legion—black

American/Allied Forces

Russian Spetznatz—brown French Foreign Legion—It. blueU.S. Marines—dk. blue U.S. Army—GreenU.S. CIA—dk. grey United Kingdom—red

Northern Alliance—orange, tan

SETUP1. American/Allied units

2. Afghan rebels (Northern Alliance, etc)

3. Taliban (set up inverted, except regiments)

4. All Afghani rebels can make one turn's move, if possible

Start locations are provided with Order of Battle/Scenario notesbelow.

SEQUENCE OF PLAYAmerican/Allied Player (goes 1st in each turn)

Add Reinforcements, Check for Taliban Defections

Search (may examine do inverted Taliban units, plus those inneighboring hexes)

Move American/Allied (but not Afghan rebels)Combat (American/Allied and Afghan rebels)Move Afghan rebels (only)Drop Food Aid

Taliban Player

Add ReinforcementsMoveCombat

MOVEMENTUsual wargame rules: move any or all units, one at a time, can't

skip hexes, etc. May break-down or build-up Afghani units at anytime (3 battalions = 1 regiment, same type).

Terrain Effects ChartLeg* Mech Combat Effect

Clear/desert 1 1 none

Rough 2 2 defender doubled

Marsh 3 NA attacker halved

Mountain 4 NA defender tripled

Road 1 1 none

Track 2 2

City

Town 1

none

defender doubled

none

* Leg is any unit with less than 8 MP

Air-mobile units may either move using their movement allow-ance or may be moved to any hex anywhere on the map at no costwithin 12 hexes of either an American/Allied battalion or base.Only air-mobile commandos may land in mountain hexes. Whenair-moving to or from a hex next to any Taliban combat unit, an air-mobile unit has a 1 -in-6 chance of being shot down (eliminated byStinger missiles, AA, etc).

Taliban may move one non-mech battalion (or leader) peravailable helicopter unit as above. Helicopter unit is lost at end ofmove (i.e., shot down).

Paradrop: May drop anywhere, but once dropped, may moveonly as regular leg unit. If moved to a friendly airbase, unit may beair-dropped again.

Overrun is allowed at odds of 6-1 or greater. Defender isautomatically eliminated and attacker may keep on moving.

Taliban dummy counters may be placed and moved as desiredby the Taliban player.

STACKINGUnlimited

ZONE OF CONTROL (ZOC)Units must stop upon entering enemy ZOC (except Irregulars),

may leave next turn. Can't move directly from one ZOC to anotherZOC (except Irregulars). ZOCs do not force combat. Only Ameri-can battalions and Afghani regiments have ZOCs. ZOCs do notextend into mountain hexes, except along roads. ZOCs do notextend into City hexes or neutral countries (Iran, China, all on T. l )

COMBATUsual wargame rules: figure odds, rounding in favor of de-

fender. All defenders in hex must be attacked as a single defensestrength. Units are not required to attack. Any defender may beattacked only once per turn.

Units with combat strength in parentheses, i.e., ( 1 ), can't attack,may only defend.

American/Allied units attack and defend at half strength if outof supply.

Casualties are doubled for American/Allied units that are out ofsupply.

Collateral civilian casualties may be estimated each combattaking place in a population (-50,000 people), town (-100,000), orcity hex (-500,000). Compute casualties for both defender andattacker, add them, and multiply this total by a hex-type multiplerto obtain civilian casualties. Population multipliers: populationhex—2x, town hex—4x, city hex— 1 Ox (assumes most of populace


DefHFox UnfGames

EXTREMELY RARE ITEMSGDW Eagles (zip/P)GDW Pharsalus (zip)OBRG CamdenOBRG SaratogaOBRG BrandywineSPI Bloody April (box)SP1 Great War in the East

SPI War in Europe (P)SPI Westwall Quad

$195165909090

200P200

200P145

AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH

Unpunched Games Unpunched Games Unpunched Games

Unpunched GamesAH New AcquireAH Adv. Squad Leader Rules (2nd)AH Age of RenaissanceAH Air BaronAH Air Assault-CreteAH AirforceAH Alpha OmegaAHAH

Arab-Israeli WarASL Action Pack #2

AH Axis & Allies: EuropeAH Axis & Allies: PacificAH B-17AH Baseball StrategyAH Battle CryAH Battle for ItalyAH Bitter WoodsAH BlackboardAH Blood Reef: TarawaAH Breakout: NormandyAH Bridge Too FarAH BureaucracyAH CandidateAH Code of BushidoAH Colonial DiplomacyAH Cosmic EncounterAH Deluxe DiplomacyAH Dinosaurs of the Lost WorldAH DiplomacyAH Doomed BattalionsAH CMPTR-Fifth Fleet (IBM)AH FirepowerAH FlattopAH Flight LeaderAH Foreign ExchangeAH Fortress EuropaAH GI Doz Scenario BundleAH Global SurvivalAH GuerrillaAH Gung Ho!AH Hedgerow HellAH History of the World (new)AH Hundred Days BattleAH Kampfgruppe Peiper IAH Kampfgruppe Peiper IIAH Kingmaker ( l st ed.)AH Kingmaker (2nd ed.)AH Last HurrahAH LuftwaffeAH Machiavelli (2nd ed)AH Main Battle TankAH Magic RealmAH MaharajaAH Mustangs (Smithsonian)AH Napoleon's BattlesAH New WorldAH CMPTR-Op. Crusader (IBM)

$356055354040

P30P5025555525455540303550405040

3544555055

35P405070

P35P45P30504012652555255520

3944

P503022

P303535

P3030

P25352530

AH CMPTR-Op. Crusader (MAC)Outdoor SurvivalPanzerblit/,

AH ParatrooperAH Pegasus BridgeAH Princess Ryan Marines

Rail BaronRegatta

AH Republic of RomeRichtofen's WarRisk 2210 ADRoad KillShakespeareSpeed CircuitStar Wars: Queens Gambit

AH Starship Troopers (2nd ed.)AHAH

Stellar ConquestStock Market

P Indicates that there is a punched copyavailable for 40% OFF of the regular price.Z Indicates that there is a ziplock copyavailable for 10% off the regular price.

AH Stratege LegendsAH Strat. Legends bstr (red/bl)AH Strat. Legends Qa'ans ResurgAH Strat. Legends Cel. Veng.AH Struggle of NationsAH TAC AirAH Tactics IIAH Third ReichAH TobrukAH War & PeaceAH Wizards QuestAH Word PowerAH YellowstoneADG 2000 Update WIFADG Africa Aflame (zip)ADG America in FlamesADG Asia Aflame (zip)ADGCarriers/Planes in Flames (zip)ADG Days of Decision IIADGPatton in FlamesADGPatton Update (zip)ADGPlanes in Flames (zip)ADGShips in Flames (zip)ADG World in Flames DixADGWorld in Flames Ann. (98)ADGWorld in Flames Ann. (00)ADGWorld Cup FootballAD TCH Fighting Gen PattonAE Three Stooges Card gameARIEL GuerrillaARIEL Mystic WoodARIEL Sorcerers CaveARIEL Sorcerers Cave ExpanATL Corruption (card)ATTX Battle NormandyATTX Fight for the SkyAVP Avalanche: SalernoAVP AirLines (card game)AVP AirLines 2 (card game)AVP Blood on SnowAVP Digging (card)AVP Eagles: EylauAVP Great War @ Sea vol 2AVP Gr War @ Sea-Med (2nd ed)AVP Gr War @ Sea-North SeaAVP Gr War @ Sea-Plan OrangeAVP Gr War @ Sea-Plan BlackAVPGr War @ Sea-1904-05AVP Gr War @ Sea-1898AVP Imperium 3rd Mil.AVP Last Days Constan. (RPG)AVP MacArthur's ReturnAVP Op. CannibalAVP Panzer GrenadierAVP Panzer Grenadier: HOTSUAVP Red ParachutesAVP Red SteelAVP Res Publica (card)AVP Rome at WarAVP Scotland the BraveAVP 2WW@ Sea: East FleetAVP SOPACAVP Survival of Witless

$70 AVP Winter Fury $30P25 BAL H Hour 50P25 BTL Airforce 40

28 BT Body War (Italy import) 3033 BOHN Op. Husky: Sicily 4055 CAM Barbarians 4530 CENT Silo 14 3530 CHG America's Challenge (zip) 740 CHG Gettysburg 30

P25 CHG Magnetic Checkers 655 CHG Magnetic Chess 6

P25 CHG Magnetic Hex Puzzle 625 CHG Magnetic Solitaire 645 CHG Magnetic Tic-Tac-Toe 655 CHG PiQadilly Circus 30

P35 CHG Underground Railroad (zip) 725 CHX Glass Stones 4" tube-asstd colors 330 CHX Battlcmat V iny l -1" squares 1426 CHX Battlemat V iny l -1" hexes 14

7 CHX Battlemat V iny l -1" Num. hex 1420 CHX Megamat Viny l -1" squares 3020 CHX Megamat Viny l -1" hexes 3040 CHX Megamat Viny l -1" Num hex 3030 CMD/GEN War in France P75

P40 COA 6 Days of Glory 36P30 COA 1807: Eagles East 54P45 COA Achtung Spitfire 40

35 COA Africa 1880 5625 COA Army of Heartland 5430 COA Autumn of Glory 2825 COA Azteca 5650 COA Borodino'41 3420 COA Camp. Robt. Lee 4055 COA Chancellorsville 4020 COA Chariot Lords 5615 COA Clash of Armor Rules(WWII) 19

Z50 COA Close Action 4455 COA Courtisans of Versailles 4845 COA Devil to Pay (zip)25 COA Edelweiss 6030 COA Emperor Returns 34

120 COA Fear God/Dreadnaught 9525 COA Golan to Sinai25 (Clash Armor exp) 2035 COA Harpoon 4 56

225 COA Home B4 the Leaves Fal I (zip) 1109 COA Infernal Machines (Landship) 30

75 COA Jena 4475 COA Joan of Arc 5675 COA King's War 3645 COA La Bat. Albuera 3619 COA La Bat. Armee Nord (2nd ed) 4440 COA La Bat. Auerstadt 6040 COA La Bat. de Corunna 4438 COA La Bat. de Ligny 6038 COA La Bat. de Lutzen 7038 COA La Bat. Mont St. Jean 4028 COA La Bat. Orthez 6018 COA La Bat. Talavera 4842 COA Landships 3568 COA Lee Takes Command 3060 COA Leuthen 5675 COA Marching thru Georgia 3038 COA Miss. Fortress 3242 COA Napoleon at Leipzig 4038 COA Operation Spark 4245 COA PanzerKampfe (module) 1635 COA Prelude to Disaster 4210 COA Rising Sun 6642 COA Speed of Heat 4824 COA Summer Storm 7548 COA Supermarina I 5645 COA Supermarina II 2042 COA Tales of Ulysses 3038 COA The Apprentice (kid) 2028 COA Thieves of Bagdad 4845 COA VoxPopuli 4828 COA War for the Union 4245 COA War Without Mercy 5448 COA White Ensign (Harpoon rules) 2221 COA Zorndorf 48

CG Bobby Lee $45CG Dixie/Bull Run (card packs) 8CG Dixie/Shi loh (card packs) 8CG Eagles (card packs) 10CG EastFront 59CG EuroFront 35CG MedFront 40CG Mid-East Peace 20CG Napoleon (2nd ed.) 40CG Pacific Victory 60CG Quebec 1759 36CG Sam Grant 49CG Victory 39CG Victory Desert maps (5 & 6) 10CO Victory Island maps (7 & 8) 10CO Victory Ocean maps (9 & 10) 10CG Victory Steppe maps (11 & 12) 10CG Victory Alpine maps (13 & 14) 10CG Victory Forestmaps ( 15 & 16) 10CG Victory blocks (red) 12CG Victory blocks (blue) 12CG Victory blocks (gray) 12CG Victory blocks (green) 12CG Victory Elite blocks (red) 12CG Victory Elite blocks (blue) 12CG Victory Elite blocks (gray) 12CG Victory Elite blocks (green) 12CG Victory Elite blocks (orange) 12CG VolgaFront (zip) 25CG W a r o f l 8 l 2 36CG WestFront 50CG Wizard Kings 40CG WWII Logistics Set (mrkrs) 10CONF Overlord P75COM Trial of Century 30CRWNTAC High Ground 40DEC Pente (lube) 30DEC Pente Anniv Ed 35DG Across Suez (SPI) 10DG The Alamo (SPI) 15DG Antietam Campaign 35DG Battles/Ancient World, 2 35DG Battles/Ancient World, 3 48DG Battles/Ardennes(SPI) 38DG Battle for Germany (SPI) 15DG Blue & Gray (SPI) 35DG Cherkassy Pocket: Korsun 45DG Emperor's First Battles 35DG Empires at War 35DG Forgotten War: Korea 40DG Gettysburg (WotR/zip) 20DG Leningrad (SP1) 14DG Lords of the Sierra Madre 40DG Nap's Ist/Emp 1st Battles 40DG Napoleon's Last Battles (SPI) 35DG NUTS (N/S, cards) 40DG Over the Top! 38DG Over the Top! w/Mons & Marne 49DG Over the Top!w/Lemberg & Verdun 49DG Over the Top! w/all battles 59DG Rebels & Redcoats I 35DG Rebels & Redcoats II 35DG Seven Days Battles 28DG The Sun Never Sets 40DG Sun Never Sets w/FFL 55DG The '45 35DG Totaler Krieg! 80DG Totaler Krieg! Players Guide 20DG 30 Years War Quad (SPI) 35DG War of the Rebellion 35DG World War One (SPI) 15Dick/Grnwd Volley & Thunder 60DIPCO Chart Wars 35DYNG Outlaw Trail 40EGD Castle 17EGD Condottierre (2nd ed) 25EGD Democrazy (card) 15EGD Dragon Delta 30EGD Dragon's Gold 17EGD Dune (w/English rules) 60

36 #208

Unpunched Games Unpunched Games Unpunched Games Unpunched GamesFox

EGD Empires of Ancient World $40EGD Europa 1945-2030 40EGD EVO 35EGD Formula l Race 40EGD Formula I Pewter Cars 9EGD Formula I Dice Set 8EGD Formula 1 Race Sheets 5EGD Formula l-Circuit 3 & 4 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 5 & 6 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 7 & 8 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 9 & 10 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 11 & 12 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 13 & 14 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 15 & 16 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 17 & 18 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 19 & 20 20EGD Formula l-Circuit 21 & 22 20EGD Formula l-USA Pak-1 (23-26) 30EGD Formula l-USA Pak-2 (27-30) 30EGD Formula l-Circuit 31 & 32 20EGD Haloween Party 17EGD Knights Brave & Bold (w/Eng) 30EGD Montgolfière (2nd ed) 25EGD Mystery on the Nile 27EGD SavanahCafe 25EGD Serenissima 50EGD Vinci 30EGD Way out West 35EMS Columbia (zip) 30ENDGM $25,000 Pyramid 35ENDGM Concentration 32ENDGM Encore 30ENDGM Price is Right 26ENDGM Tickle Bee (kids 4 & up) 4EXCAL 1944 (zip) 30EXCAL East Front (zip) 125EXCAL Gettysburg High Tide P29EXCAL Great Western Rails 42EXCAL Iron Horse 14EXCAL Koniggratz (zip) 25EXCAL Plague 42EXCAL Sovereign of Seas 22EXCAL Tannenberg (zip) 15EXCAL TRAX 13EXCAL Wings (2nd ed.) 40FASA Taipan 35FFG Through the Desert 38FGA Pacific War Vol I 40FGU Bushido 18FLY BF Complete Brigadier 45FMG Rainforest (Insecta exp) 15FMG Trilobyte (Insecta exp) 15FPL Iron & Fire 30FRP Btl Beiden Pass (cards) 25GALATC Moonshot 40GDW 1815 (zip) P75GDW Air Superiority 40GDW Assault 40GDW Battle for Moscow (zip) 15GDW Beltstrike 25GDW Blood & Thunder 40GDW Capt Ed Harpoon P40GDW Case White ( Is ted) 60GDW Chieftain 40GDW Command Decision 45GDW Coral Sea (zip) 75GDW Desert Shield Fact Book 20GDW DNO(zip) 110GDW Double Star 50GDW 8th Army-Crusader 40GDW Fire in the East 75GDW Gulf War Fact Book 10GDW Harpoon Data Sheets

Battles of 3rd WW 20AS W Forms 15

GDW Harpoon Naval Rvw-94 15GDW Harpoon 30GDW Harpoon w/91 annex 30GDW Indian Ocean Adv. (zip) 75GDW Last Battle 25GDW Mayday (series 120) 25

GDW 1941 $35GDW Narvik (zip/Isted) 75GDW Narvik 60GDW Normandy Campaign 40GDW Pearl Harbor (zip) 75GDW Phase Line Smash 35GDW Race for Tunis 25GDW Red Empire (card) 12GDW SSN (zip) 75GDW Spain & Portugal 60GDW Stand & Die 60GDW Tarsus 40GDW Team Yankee 30GDW Their Finest Hour (z.ip/lsted) 85GDW Their Finest Hour 75GDW Traveller 40GDW Western Desert 80GMR April's Harvest 33GMR Ardennes P36GMR Austerlitz Z40GMR Black Wednesday 43GMR Champion's Hill 33GMR Circus Minimus (zip) 25GMR Enemy at the Gates 63GMR Frozen Hell 60GMR Game's Mill 49GMR In Their Quiet Fields (2nd ed) P35GMR In Quiet Fields (Ist) P40GMR Marengo 33GMR Matanikau 38GMR No Better Place-Murfree. 29GMR 7 Pines 49GMR Sicily 75GMR Stalingrad Pocket 40GMR Thunder @ Crossrds ( I s ted) 40GMSCN Twerps (zip) 10GMSMTH Pantheon 30GMT 1863 37GMT Africanus (zip) 16GMT Airbridge Victory 25GMT Austerlitz 65GMT Barbarossa: ACS 55GMT Barbarossa:AGN 89GMT Battle for North Africa 40GMT Battleline (card) 20GMT Brandywine 38GMT Britain Stands Alone 40GMT Caratacus (zip) 16GMT Caesar in Alexandria 45GMT Cataphract 65GMT Clash of Giants 45GMT Consul for Rome (zip) 16GMT Crisis: Sinai 1973 40GMT Diadochi (zip) 16GMT Dictator (zip) 16GMT 8th Airforce 40GMT For the People II 50GMT Formula One Motor (cards) 16GMT Galaxy (card) 25GMT Hornet Leader 45GMT Ivanhoe (card) 20GMT Invasion Sicily (zip) 30GMT Juggernaut (zip) 20GMT Juluis Caesar-Civil Wars 50GMT Iune6 46GMT Jurgurtha (zip) 20GMT Kasserine 42GMT Lost Victory 32GMT Oper. Shoestring 30GMT Paths of Glory II 50GMT Paths of Glory Player Guide 25GMT Phalanx (zip) 20GMT Pyrrhic Victory (zip) 15GMT Risorgimento 65GMT River of Death 79GMT Salamis (War Galley/zip) 20GMT Saratoga 29GMT Silver Bayonet 30GMT Simple GBoH Guide 20GMT SPQR Player's Guide 20GMT Thirty Years War 50

GMT Tigers in the Mist $38GMT Triumph & Glory 57GMT Ukraine 43 36GMT Veni, Vedi, Vici (zip) 10GMT Victory in the West 40GMT War Elephant (zip) 18GMT Wilderness War 50GMT Zero 45CM US A Friedland 42GPG Rebel Yell 35GRD Balkan Front 60GRD Damned Die Hard 60GRD For Whom Bell Tolls 70GRD Storm Over Scandinavia 70GRD The Urals 60GRD War of'Resistance: China 100GRD War in the Desert 90GREN Journey 20GRNFLD Sword & Flame 60HAN Backgammon 30HAN 221-B Baker St 30HAN Time the Game 30HAS Trivia 30HBO Lord of the Rings 55HBO LOR: Friends & Foes exp. 32HBO The Hobbit 55HBO Pass the Pigs 12HBO Mille Bornes Coll Ed 16HJ Norway 1940 200HJ SF3D 150HTB Pirates Plunder 18HTB Plague & Pestilence (card) 18HTG MDL MTB (zip) 40ICE Organized Crime 30ICE Starstrike 40ING One World Dom. (Risk var) 6JED African Campaign 50JED Europe at War 50JRG The Chicago Way 40Lion Ramp Challenge 45MB Axis & Allies 46MB Battleship 19MB Pathfinder 75MB Power Barons 75MB Samurai Swords 43MDS Wargames 2000 CD/IBM 30MED The Preventor 25MEN Pirateer 22MEN Boot ChroniclePirateer game hints novella 5METGM Dimension Demons 8METGM Dragons of Underneath 12METGM Gev (zip) 15METGM Holy War (zip) 15METGM Hot Spot (zip) 15METGM Ogre (zip) 15METGM Stellar Conquest 50METGM Warp War (zip) 15MFC 1835 45MFC 1856 45MFC 1870 45MFC Alexander & Cheops 18MFC Australian Rails (tube) 25MFC British Rails (tube) 25MFC Empire Builder(5th ed w/Mexico) 35MFC Euphrate & Tigris 50MFC Eurorails 30MFG Express 13MFG Family Business (2nd ed) 15MFG Freight Train 20MFG India Rails 35MFG Iron Dragon 30MFG Jerusalem 40MFG Manhattan 30MFG Modern Art 30MFG More Cosmic Encounter 35MFG Nippon Rails (tube) 25MFG Pyramids 25MFG Quo Vadis-Roman Senate 35MFG Starfarers Catan/Germ 88

MFG Starfarers Catan/Eng $60MFG Settlers of Catan (3rd ed) 35MFG SoC/5&6expan 20MFG Settlers of Catan/cards 20MFG Settlers of Catan/Seafarers 35MFG SoC/Seafarers expan 20MFG SoC/Cities & Knights expan 38MFG SoC/Cities & Knights-5&6 20MFG Silverton (2nd ed) 45MFG Simply Cosmic 20MFG Streetcar 30MFG Uncle Happy's Train Cm 15MIH Clash of Titans (zip) 35MIH Drive to the Baltic (zip) 32MIH Eastwall (zip) 35MIH Famous Victory P39MIH Fields of Glory P44MIH Gotterdamerung 45MIH In Flanders Field (zip) 30MIH Iron Bottom Sound II (zip) 42MIH Lodz 1914 (zip) 49MIH Pierce the Reich 35MIH Royal Tank Corps 42MIH Tank Commander (cards) 10MIH Triumphant Return (zip) 29MIH Turning the Tables (zip) 29MIH Tunisia 43 44MIH Velikye Luki (zip) 32MIH White Ensign (zip) 35MKD Barnet (zip) 18MKD Mortimer's Cross (zip) 20MKD Tewkesbury (zip) 20MKD Towton (zip) 20M&M Charge to Glory 40MWF Master of Wars 30NES Battle for Dresden 30NGS Global Pursuit 25NVA Ace of Aces 25NVA Axis & Allies 75NVA Bounty Hunter 45NVA Jet Eagles 35IStep Battlechrome (cards) 17OG Longstreet's Assault 40OMGA Carrier War 40OMGA Carrier War Expan. (zip) 20OMGA Desert Victory 40OMGA Victory in Europe (2nd ed/zip)40OMGA War to Death ( I s ted) 30OMGA War to Death (2nd ed/zip) 25OOB Apples to Apples 20OOB Apples to Apples exp. 1 13OOB Apples to Apples exp. 2 13OOB Apples to Apples Jr. 16OOB Shipwrecked 16OSG Air Cobra 40OSG 1806: Rossbach 48OSG Bonaparte in Italy 36OSG Hundred Days Battle (zip) P40OSG La Guerre de 1'Emperor 48OSG Last Days -Grand Armee 36OSG Napoleon at Bay (2nd ed) 48PB Lionheart 36PG Warlords of China 40PIN Fields of Honor-Am. Rev 30PM Army Gip No. 1944 (DTP) 20PRP Frozen Chosin 30PWG Duel for Kharkov 75PWG Gazala 50PWG Kanev 50QD Grant Moves South P75QD Incredible Victory P60QD Ironbottom Sound 75QD Norway 1940 75Miniatures RulesQuan Fire & Fury ACW Rules 23Quan Great Western Battles Scenario 15RAND Omaha Beach (folio) 50RIO GR Africa 40RIO GR Aladdin's Dragon 40RIOGR Andromeda 40RIOGR Attila 30


Unpunched GamesRIO GR Barbarossa $35RIO GR Barnyard Critters (card) 10RIO GR Big City X 40RIOGRBohanza 15RIO GR Cabale 40RIO GR Caesar & Cleopatra 20RIOGR Canyon 25RIO GR Cape Horn 30RIO GR Caprice 40RIO GR Carcassone 20RIO GR Carolus Magnus 40RIOGR Cartagena 25RIOGR Corsairs 20RIO GR Doge 40RIO GR Edison & Co. 40RIO GR El Caballero 20RIOGR El Grande 40RIOGR El Grande English Cards 10RIO GR El Grande Expan 25RIOGR Elfenland 40RIOGR Evergreen 30RIOGR Fossil 30RIO GR Frank's Zoo (card) 10RIOGR Galloping Pigs (card) 10RIOGR Ghost Chase 40RIO GR Gipf 25RIOGR Hare & Tortise 25RIO GR Hera & Zeus 20RIOGR Ido 50RIOGR Java 35RIOGR Kahuna 20RIO GR Katzenjammer Blues (card) 10RIO GR King of Elves (card) 15RIOGR Klunker (card) 10RIO GR Knights (card) 10RIOGR LaCitta 40RIOGR Landlord (card) 10RIO GR Lowenherz 40RIO GR Lost Cities (card) 20RIOGR Mama Mia (card) 10RIOGR Medici 30RIOGR Medina 40RIO GR Medeival Merchant 40RIOGR Merchant of Amsterdam 45RIOGR Meridian 40RIO GR Mississippi Queen 40RIO GR Money (card) 10RIO GR Princes of Florence 40RIO GR RA-Egypt 35RIOGR Richochet Robot 25RIOGR Samarkand 30RIOGR Samurai 40RIOGR Siesta 40RIOGR 6 Billion 25RIO GR Shark 40RIO GR Space Beans (card) 10RIOGR Stephenson's Rocket 40RIO GR Taj Mahal 40RIO GR Tally Ho 20RIOGR Tamsk 50RIO GR Tayu 60RIOGR The Reef 20RIO GR Tikal 45RIOGR Time Pirates 30RIOGR Torres 40RIOGR Toscana 30RIOGR T-Rex(card) 10RIO GR Traders of Genoa 40RIO GR Trick R. Treat (card) 10RIOGR Union Pacific 40RIO GR Vampire (card) 10RIOGR Vino 40RIOGR Web of Power 30RIOGR WyattEarp 20RIOGR Zertz 30SDI Dead of Winter 60SELRITE Kommisar (60s) 40SWGP Defiance 50SWGP Holowezyn 50SJG Car Wars 25SJG Car Wars Deluxe 30

Unpunched Games Unpunched Games Unpunched GamesSJG CoupSJG GEVSLS Bells of WarSMCN Assault on Tobruk (zip)SMCN Battle Ship (zip)SMCN Battlestations (zip)SMCN Dark Star (zip)SMCN Divine Wind (zip)SMCN Hannibal (zip)SMCN Kriegsmarine (zip)SMCN Lebenstraum (zip)SMCN Line of Battle (zip)SMCN Man of War (zip)SMCN Norsemen (zip)SMCN One World (zip)SMCN OrtonaSMCN Power & Resloution (zip)SMCN Rockets Red Glare (zip)SMCN Schnell Boote (zip)SMCN Seapower & StateSMCN Warring States (zip)SMCN West Front (zip)SMCN Wilderness (zip)SMG Material WorldSMGC Amer. Megafauna (zip)SMGC Burros & Bandidos (zip)SMGC Frontier (sup to B&B/zip)SMGM KesserlingSMTC SaguntoSPI Across SuezSPI Air WarSPI Alma (zip)SPI Antietam (B&G zip)SPI Ardennes OffensiveSPI Arena of DeathSPI Art of Siege-Acre (zip)SPI Austerlitz (zip)SPI Bastogne (+#20)SPI Battles for the ArdennesSPI Battle for StalingradSPI Blue and Gray ISPI Blue and Gray IISPI Bloody AprilSPI Breakout & PursuitSPI Bulge (zip)SPI Bundeswehr (Conf Series)SPI CassinoSPI Cemetery Hill (zip)SPI City FightSPI Cobra (zip)SPI Combined ArmsSPI CommandoSPI Descent on CreteSPI East is RedSPI Fifth Corps (zip)SPI FirefightSPI Flying CircusSP1 FuldaGapSPI KharkovSPI La Grand ArmeeSPI Lee at Gettysburg (zip)SPI LeipzigSPI LeningradSPI Lost BattlesSPI MechWar2SPI Modern BattlesSPI Mod Btl-Mukden (zip)SPI Mod Btl-Wurzburg(zip)SPI Modern Battles IISPI Mod Btl2-Jerusalem (zip)SPI Napoleon @ WaterlooSPI Nap @ War-Marengo (zip)SPI Napoleon's Last Battles

(zip/missing Quatre Bras)SPI NLB-Wavre (folio)SPI NATODivCmdrSPI Ney vs. Wellington (zip)SPI Nordlingen (folio)SPI October WarSPI Oil War (zip/copy'd rules)SPI Panzer Battles

$30155025252525

P252525252525252530

P25252540252525401638104090

P/Z40P70P40

30Z/P50

4055

P751008575

Z/P125Z/P185

20055

P40P40Z40

307040

P40Z50

P100Z/P60

50Z/P40

Z/P100P70

Z/P60P90

75852580

125P90

3540

. P14535

P75P45

5535

1506550

Z60P40Z50

SPI PanzerArmee AfrikaSPI ParatroopSPI Patton's 3rd ArmySPI Plot to Assn. HitlerSPI RagnarokSPI RaidSPI Red Star/White StarSPI Rescue from HiveSPI Rifle & SaberSPI ScrimmageSPI Shiloh(zip)SPI SoldiersSPI SpiesSPI SpitfireSPI StarforceSPI Stargate (folio)SPI StarsoldierSPI Supercharge (folio)SPI Sword & the StarsSPI Tamburlaine (zip)SPI Task ForceSPI Terr. Swift SwordSPI Thirty Years War QuadSPI Titan Strike (folio)SPI Up ScopeSPI Vector 3 (folio)SPI War Between StatesSPI World KillerSPRHD Bloodiest Day/AntietamSPRHD Bodyguard OverlordSPRHD Met at GettysburgSPRT Gettysburg:3 days/JulySPW Gorlice & Brusilov (expan)SPW The Schlieffen PlanSPW Serbia & RomaniaSPW Tannenberg & GaliciaSSI Great Naval Bat.II (IBM)STG Beer The Card GameSTGM Cry Havoc Seen BK lSTGM Dark BladesSTGM Starship CaptainSTGM Thunder-rin GunsSTUP Beer the Card GameTAB Central Powers-WWI

Axis & Allies Access.TAB New World Order-Mod

Axis & Allies Access.TAB Risk 2042 VariantTAUR Raiders of NorthTF Battlewagon (folio)TF Ceberus (folio)TF Columbus (expan)TF East Wind RainTF Grand Army of the RepublicTF King's BountyTF Op. Pegasus (folio)TF Starfire (folio)TF ViceroysTGC Red ChristmasTMJM 2038: Tycoon of AsteroidTMJM Age of ExplorationTsk Hob Lepoard IITSR Air War (zip)TSR BarbarossaTSR Battle Over BritainTSR Best of Dragon GamesTSR Buck Rogers Hi Adv.TSR Drive on StalingradTSR CobraTSR FirefightTSR Icebergs (zip)TSR La Grande ArmeeTSR Line in SandTSR Moscow 1941TSR Pacific Theater OperationsTSR Sniper Spec Forces (folio)TSR SpiesTSR Twilight War (zip)TSR Wellington's VictoryUDO Cold Days in HellUDO Triumph & Fall (zip)

$P50Z40Z40Z70

30Z/P45

5030

Z/P100Z/P50

4080

Z50Z/P75Z/P50

25Z/P60

40504050

P125P250

25Z/P75

25P275

40353535404030404040106

35303010

35

353550303013504025303030

P3050409045

P45Z20

35256050

Z1525504550

P5030

Z2030505925

UNV Harry Potter: Sorcerer's Stone $20UNV Harry Potter: Quidditch 20VG Ambush 40VG Civil War 35VG Cold War 30VG Dr Ruth's Good Sex 40VG Flashpoint Golan 40VG Gulf Strike (Isted) 50VG Gulf Strike (2nd ed) 40VG Gul Strike ( 1 st-3rd ed) 115VG Hell's Highway P45VG James Bond/007 Goldfinger 10VG NATO P40VG Omaha Beachhead P25VG Shell Shock 35VG Tokyo Express P45VNGRD Pas de Calais 60WAD Campaign 40WAD Rat Race 40WE Against the Reich P30WE AirCav P25WE Air & Armor ( I s t ed ) P25WE Chickamaugua 45WE Desert Steel 25WE Fire Team 40WE Imperium I 45WE Killer Angels 40WE Junta 30WE Soldiers 40WE StLo 40WE Western Front Tank Leader P40WHY Tenjo 50WILD 12 O'Clock High (cards) P26WIN Campaign Trail 96 10WIN Colorado Rails 20WIN Ferrocamles Pampas 20WIN MINE! 15WIN Rocky Mountain Rails

(exp for Rail thru Rockies) 15WIN TRANSSIB-Russ Mafia 40WIN Tramsport Austria 20WIN Tramsport Switzerland 20WIN US Rails

(exp for Rail Baron) 15WIN Tracks to Titicaca 40WIN Tracks to Telluride 50WIN Adv. Tracks/Telluride exp. 25WIN Veld Spoorweg 20WOLF Swords of Glory 35WOTC Filthy Rich 45WOTC Guillotine (card) 13WOTC MLB Showdown starter (card) 10WOTC MLB Showdown Draft 9WOTC MLB Showdown Booster 33W 1944: Second Front 503W Aces High (box) 603W Aces High (zip) 503W Aces High (2nd ed) 303W American Aces 303W Ancients II 403W Arabian Nightmare (zip) 253W Barbarians 453W Battle of the Alma 353W Battle Cry 503W Battle of the Ring (folio) 1003W Blitzkrieg in the South 353W Blood & Iron 353W Campaigns of Civil War 253W Crimean Shield 353W Crossbow & Cannon 2 403W Defense of Rorke's Drift 353W Forward to Richmond 353W Fury on Champlain 353W Give Me Liberty 353W Ironsides 353W Last Blitzkrieg 303W Last Battles: Prussia 403 W Lawrence of Arabia (2nd ed) 243W Light Division P503W Modern Naval Btls III 303W Napoleons Later Bat. 303W Never Call Retreat 50

38 #205

Counter Ziplock Bags3x5 inch ziplock counter bags.

Holds up to 100 counters per bag.

Only $5 for a roll of 100 bags.

Magazine Ziplock Bags9 x 1 2 inch ziplock bags.

Only $10 for a roll of 50 bags.

Blank Mapsheetsfor all your game design needs.

The maps (22 x34) are large or small hex inlong or short grain.

(Please specify which style you want.)Additional shipping charge for mailing in tubes.

$6 each or 4 maps for $20*.*Cannot combine 4 map purchase with other

discounts.

These magnetic counter holders make playingon a vertical surface a perfect alternative for

gamers with limited playing areas, small childrenor pets. Counter Magnets can be stacked 8-12high and come in: 5/8" for Panzerblitz size

counters (55 magnets/box) or 1/2" regular sizcounters (80 magnets/box).

$10.00 per box

If your order is thisamount or more:

$5O

$100

$15O

$2OO

$25O

$3OO

| $35O

$4OO

Your Discount isthis amount:

$5 :-

$15

$25 ;

$35

$45

$55

$65

$8O

If you subscribe toone of the magazinesdiscount is:

$7

$2O

$30

$45

$55

$7O

$80

$1OO

If you subscribe totwo of the magazinesdiscount is:

$IO

$25

$4O

$55

$7O

$85

$1OO

$12O

Deserf FoxGames

Buy • Sell • Trade

TOORDER:Discount asshown on thechart, no otheroffers or dis-counts can beapplied. If the order is more than $100include $2.00 for insurance. Shippingcharges are based on the chart below;orders shipped UPS unless otherwisespecified. Some items are one of a kind,please list alternates whenever possible.Credit memos issued on items out of stock.Any product return must be pre-autho-rized in writing. We encourage you to calland place your order by phone or visit ourwebsite. Prices are subject to change with-

QTY ISS #/TITLE PRICE TOTALout prior noticorder must be(please no CmDesert Fox GzVISA or Mastcof $40.00. Calitax for their cocry. Send nam

SUB TOTAL

1 1TAX (CA. RES.)

12/01

— nNAME

ADDRESS.

CITY, STATE. ZIP

PHONE

VISA/MC (ONLY)#_

EXPIRATION DATE .

SIGNATURE

EMAIL.

Desert Fox GamesPO Box 21598

Bakersfield CA 93390661/587-9633

Fax-661/587-5031Desert Fox listing now at

www.decisiongames.com

Hours: 9:00am-4:00pm (PT),Mon.- Fri.

Shipping Charges tSTH '1st item

$612

14(10)17(25)20(25)

Adt'l items$12

2(7)7(10)9(10)

Type of ServiceUPS Ground/US Mail Domestic PriorityUPS 2nd Day AirCanada, Mexico (Express)Europe (Express)Asia, Africa, Australia (Express)


A Day That Will Live in Infamyby Gary Romano

Battleship row after the attack on December 7th.

The attack against, and defense of,Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941,

was fought by thousands ofJapanese and American sailors,

soldiers, airmen and civilians.However, the strategies that guided

the course of the battle werecreated by a handful of men. Theirideas, views and plans opened the

war in the Pacific.

The U.S. CommandersOn 7 December 1941, the defense of Oahu and Pearl

Harbor was divided between the U.S. Army and Navy.There was no overall commander. The Army coordi-nated land and air defenses (at the time, the U.S. had noseparate Air Force; the Army Air Force controlled landbased air operations). The Navy was responsible forpatrolling the waters around Hawaii and maintainingdefenses within Pearl Harbor itself. The two top U.S.commanders on Oahu, Lieutenant General Walter C.Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, did not coordi-nate their military activities.

Lieutenant General Walter C. ShortWalter C. Short began his U.S. Army career in 1902

after receiving a commission upon graduation from theUniversity of Illinois. Short rose through the ranks,

AlaskaTer. (Ü.S.)Japanese dispositions,

late 1941U. S. S. R,

USN1CV1 BB3CLWESTCOASTUSA

C H I N A Nanking.

USN8 BB2 CA6 CL

AT PEARLHARBOR

C a r o l i n e Island

O C l URU.NA.

.. -^JBRITISH.<£. , MALAYA e*"*

S* , .^Singapore, ',.•;•;*»,/*. " 5. """"'" n„

ewBRITISH & Hebredi

OTHER ALLIESI n d i a n

O c e a n w . '7CL Caledonia :

AUSTRALIA (FrJ

A U S T R A L I A

Cartography by Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis

serving in a number of stateside and overseas positions.His assignments were primarily related to training andhe developed an affinity for adherence to procedures.After World War I, Short attended staff school. He waspromoted to brigadier general in 1937. Though notaggressive, he was considered a competent and profes-sional officer. His greatest asset was his affable person-ality, which enabled him to work well with others.When looking for a commander for Hawaii, the Chief ofStaff, General George C. Marshall, wanted a generalwho could help ease the tension between the militaryand Hawaii's civilian population. Marshall knew thecongenial Short, though not a brilliant strategist, wouldbe perfect for working with the Hawaiians.

Short became commander of the Army forces inHawaii on 7 February 1941. He immediately began toimprove relations with the civilian population. Shortalso examined Army defensive plans for Oahu. Thelocation itself, in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, wasideal for projecting U.S. power toward Asia, but it was

also distant from American supply and reinforcementsources.

Short considered three possibilities for a Japaneseattack against Oahu: by air; invasion from the sea; andsabotage by local operatives. An air attack was not takenseriously. Short and his staff believed the U.S. navalscreening force around Hawaii, combined with thedistance from Japanese air bases, made this scenariounlikely.

An invasion of Oahu was a possibility Short consid-ered in his plans; however, it was not deemed probable.To invade Hawaii, the Japanese would have to over-come tremendous logistical and strategic challenges,transporting thousands of sailors and soldiers fromJapanese bases in Asia, fighting through the U.S. navalscreen, and landing in the face of strong defenses. TheJapanese were much more likely to attack Malaya or thePhilippines.

Short considered the last possibility, sabotage, themost likely method of Japanese attack. His reasoning


was not without foundation. U.S. forces on Oahu hadintercepted a number of Japanese communiqués detail-ing espionage activities. Hawaii also had a significantJapanese-American population, which U.S. command-ers feared would be a source of sabotage. More, thethreat posed by "Fifth Column" saboteurs was fre-quently exaggerated in the opening years of World WarII.

Short based most of his defensive plans on thesabotage scenario. Planes were concentrated in openareas, while the ammunition and ordnance for aircraftand anti-aircraft weapons were secured in separatelocations. These measures made it easy to guard againstinfiltrators. However, attackers from the air could notask for more: unarmed aircraft parked in the open.

Admiral Husband E. KimmelWhile General Short was shaping land-based de-

fenses around the threat of sabotage, his counterpart,Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, was also tailoring hisplans to meet the wrong threat. Kimmel, a U.S. NavalAcademy graduate, had a career marked by a string ofpromotions and a penchant for discipline and order.Kimmel's outstanding service record was the basis forhis promotion on 1 February 1941 to Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet and Commander-in-Chief U.S. PacificFleet overmore senior admirals. Kimmel shared Short'sconcern of a Japanese attack but, filled with hubris,discounted the idea of a Japanese first strike against thepowerful U.S. fleet in the Pacific. Even if the Japanesewent to war with the U.S., Kimmel assumed it would beproceeded by a declaration of war or by an assault on thePhilippines.

Kimmel also considered three possible types ofsurprise attack: an attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor; asurface attack in the waters around Hawaii; and acombined attack on Pearl Harbor and ships operatingaround Hawaii. In any of these scenarios, his assump-

tion was the Japanesewould use submarines andsurface vessels to attack.If the Japanese used air-craft carriers, they wouldbe in a supporting role andnot be making the mainattack. Even if the Japa-nese attacked with air-craft, Kimmel believedthey would have little ef-fect. The U.S. Army's ex-tensive air defenses in Ha-waii would shoot downmost of the intruders. Heexpected any Japaneseaircraft that reached PearlHarbor would be denied

Admiral Yamamoto their best weapon, the tor-

pedo, since torpedoes supposedly could not operate inPearl's shallow depths. Accordingly, Kimmel main-tained the policy established by his predecessor, Admi-ral Richardson, of not deploying torpedo nets withinPearl Harbor.

Kimmel concentrated on the possibility of a surfacevessel attack in the waters around Hawaii. He plannedfor the Navy launching a strike in reaction to a Japanesedeclaration of war. Accordingly, Kimmel divided thefleet into three task forces. At any time, one task forcewas patrolling the seas around Hawaii, while the othertwo were anchored at Pearl Harbor. Kimmel wanted tohave more than one force at sea at a time; however, thetenuous oil supply line from the mainland to Hawaiiforced him to limit the number of ships he had patrol-ling.

The Japanese CommandersThe key Japanese leaders of the attack on Pearl

Harbor—Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, CommanderMinoru Genda and Commander Mitsuo Fuchida—wereall believers in the importance of airpower in navalwarfare. Their focus on aircraft was a distinct departurefrom the tradition of the Japanese Imperial Navy'sleadership, who favored large, decisive battles betweenopposing surface vessels.

Admiral Isoroku YamamotoYamamoto was educated at the Japanese naval acad-

emy and Harvard University. His naval career includedcombat during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05,during which he was wounded. Yamamoto recognizedthe potential of airpower early in his career and devel-oped a keen interest in its use. He was also known as arisk-taker, both in his profession and as a recreationalgambler.

Yamamoto was not a pilot, but he was widelyrecognized as a keen airpower strategist. In 1924, hewas made the executive officer of the Japanese navalflight school. Following this assignment, he was madea carrier division commander and director of the NavalMinistry's air department. In these posts, Yamamotowas a driving force in the modernization andprofessionalization of Japanese airpower. His skill andintelligence led to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy in August 1939.

Yamamoto did not want war with the United States.In his opinion, any gains the Japanese could makeagainst the U.S. would be temporary. Yamamoto be-lieved that the U.S., with its massive natural resourcesand manufacturing base, would inevitably defeat Japan.But dutifully following orders, he commenced develop-ing apian of attack against the U.S. in January 1941. Hiskey objective was the neutralization of the U.S. PacificFleet for at least six months, giving the Japanese time toconquer resource-rich Southeast Asia.


#208

Japanese Grand ^trgtegy^önd theAttack on Peart Marbbr

On the eve of World War II, Japan believed its,futuresecurity could be ensured only through the creation of theGreater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; The Greater, East :Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere wquld provide Japan with natural,resources (oil, rubber, metals)j cheap labor,, and,land vital to,the nation's defense. Japan began to sëcure.thé Sphere with theinvasion of China in me,,193,0s. By ,1-940, the Japanese weï&,eyeing resource-rich European and U.S.;,controlled territories,,such as Indochina, the Dutch Cast Indies and the, Philippines.The Western powers .were meanwhile focusing their military"attention on Germany and did not pösë;an immediate threat tóJapanese ambitions. However|the;U.S. Pacific Fleet, based inPearl Harbor, Hawaii, could react to a thrust into Europeancolonial territories by attacking the Japanese flank from theCentral Pacific. . . ' . • • • ) , ' : x - , . . ' "• ' :

To neutralize the U.S. threat, the Japanese planned toattack Pearl Harbor. The objective of-the attack was not thepermanent destruction of the U,S. Pacific Fleet, but rather topurchase time for an invasion,of Southeast Asia arid,the,securing of a defensive perimeter in the Pacific. ; ;,;

The Japanese attack on pearl Harbor was made in twowaves with a total of 360 planes. The Japanese raiders cohcën-,trated on the famous Battleship Row which harbored theArizona, California, Maryland, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-vania, Tennessee, and West Vifginia. Aircraft arid facilities atWheeler Field, Kaneohe Navial Air 'Station, Bellows Field,Hickam Field, and Pearl Harbor Naval Air Station were alsobombed and strafed. The results of the two attacks werestaggering: over 3,500 U.S. soldiers,, sailors, Marines and,civilians were killed or wounded. Eight U.S. battleships andnumerous other ships were sunk or badly damaged. Almost170 U.S. aircraft were destroyed, mainly on the ground. TheJapanese suffered minimal losses: 29 planes lost, five midgetsubmarines, and 185 sailors arid airmen.

;: ... Although the Japanese :did buy time for their attack into•: Southeastern Asia, the U.S. recovered faster than anticipated.,U.S,. aircraftcarriers had escaped unscathed from destruction

';at Pearl Harbor, largely by their being at sea during the attack:These earners .became the basis for U.S. naval operations inthe following year bf..fighïing in the Pacific. Arid the over-

• whelming:.production capacity of American industry would, quickly replace .lost aircraft arid build a new fleet.

" vThë.usüal militarycritique of the Pearl Harbor attack is theJapanese, made a mistake in concentrating on the battleshipsand ignoring the .base itself. Äs a result, they inflicted only arriirior"setback oh. the 'Americans. The Japanese could have

'forced the':y.S., out of PëàrlvHarbor in, two ways. First, they.could have launched an amphibious invasion. Although thisoption would have diverted Japanese strength from the attackon Southeast Asia, it wpüld probably also have meant thedestruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The seizure;of Hawaii.would have denied the U.S; its only real base short of the, westcoast. Oh.the other hand", such an attack would have placed theJapanese iri:a vastly overextended position and denied themtheir opportunity to seize economic objectives in Asia.

Second, the Japanese: could have concentrated on attack-ing Oahu's oil facilities. .Considering the tenuous American.supply-line across the Pacific, the destruction of the oil wouldhave curtailed U.S. operations or even forced a withdrawalfrom .Hawaii. Or maybe riot—a Japanese third wave attackafter thé elerhent of surprise had been dissipated might haverisked too'much. . . .

Regardless, either scenario would have resulted in thePacific war going in a different direction from its historicalcourse. One thing is certain: the Japanese attack on Pearl

, Harbor converted the U.S. from an isolationist country to anation that was prepared to fight a total war until victory wasassured. ' M

For more, on the Japanese plans to invade Hawaii in WorldWar II, see S&T# 186.

Pearl Harbor at zero hour.


«XHaleiwa Field v

OAHU, HAWAIIO Cities

X Air bases• Army /

Marine bases5 10 miles

.Kaaawa

.•'Scfiofield Barracks- ---- -

XWrjeeterFlela'

WaianaeO-""^ Mrs

he*

h Karl \ «*\ ^w^\ EwaFieldX \(XHickam «FortShatter

Camp Malakolfi • )L Field^ l

Y> Honolulu

.anikai

-«Bellows Field

-A

Order of BattleThe Japanese Strike ForceSix aircraft carriers (432 aircraft)Two battleshipsTwo heavy cruisersOne light cruiser

Nine destroyers

Three submarines (plus 26 more in advance of the StrikeForce)

Eight tankers

United States Navy, HawaiiEight battleships

Two aircraft carriers (not at Pearl Harbor on 1 Decem-ber)

Two heavy cruisersSix light cruisers

Twenty-nine destroyersFive submarines

Four Marine defense battalions (1 st(-), 3rd, 4th, 6th(-))One Marine aircraft group (21st)Naval/Marine aircraft total15 fighters61 patrol planes36 scout planes45 other aircraft

United States ArmyTwo infantry divisions (24th, 25th)Eight coast artillery regiments (15th, 16th, 41st, 55th,64th, 97th, 98th, 251st)Two bombardment groups (5th, 11th)Two pursuit groups (15th, 18th)Army aircraft total93 fighters35 bombers11 observation aircraft

-'"•"Si'

USS California sinks after the attack onPearl Harbor, 1941.

|pjTïï2/7/4Ifo9/n/Oï';ßy"°Joseph Miranda

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon bring to mind the events of 7 December 1941,

, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Both were surprise attacks. Both.iyere against a United States that was officially at peace. And bothgalvanized American opinion and triggered a war. But beyond thesuperficialities, does the analogy really hold up?

Global PolicyDespite an official policy of neutrality, on 6 December 1941 the

United States had been de facto hi state of "low intensity conflict" withthe Third Reich. American Lend-Lease weaponry armed and equippedthe British, and the U. S. Navy patrolled the Atlantic against the GermanU-boat threat. Of course, these operations were directed against thethreat in Europe, not Asia. The United States was largely at peace withJapan, at least until Pearl Harbor.

In 2001, the United States had several decades of "operations otherthan war" under its belt in the Middle East and else where. Among otherthings, the U.S. had: supported the creation of the state of Israel in1948, and then provided it with military aid in several wars; used theCIA to conduct clandestine and covert operations throughout theregion, to include support for the Shah's coup in Iran in 1953; sentgrounds troops into Lebanon in 1958and 1983; launched an unsuccess-ful military operation to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980, thenlater successfully intruded the U.S. Navy into the Persian Gulf; sup-ported the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union in the 1980s;supported Iraq in its war against Iran, also in the 1980s; defeated theIraqi invasion of Kuwait in the 1990-91 Gulf War, and continuedsanctions in the decade thereafter; and committed its ground troops toa less than successful intervention in Somali in 1992-94.

Interestingly enough, oil was a deciding issue in both the Pacific,pre-Pearl Harbor, and the Middle East. U.S. sanctions against ship-ments of oil to Japan did much to convince Tokyo that it would haveto take to the offensive in order to secure petroleum producing regionsin southeast Asia. Oil, of course, has been and continues to be adeciding issue in the control of the Middle East.

U.S. SfrofegyWhere the divergence between 1941 and 2001 takes place is in the

nature of the U.S. response. The American government has publiclydeclared a war on terrorism in 2001. The problem is that terrorism is notan enemy per se. It is, rather, a type of operation conducted in a moregeneral milieu of operations termed in Defense Department jargon aslow intensity conflict (LIC) or operations other than war (OOTW). Yetterrorism is being treated, at least in much of the popular discourse, asif it were a political movement if not an entire ideology. To talk abouta "war against terrorism" makes as much (or as little) sense as if onDecember 8th 1941 the United States had declared war on aircraftcarriers. To be sure, there have been insurgent forces which have usedterrorism as their primary mode of conflict, notably the foco revolu-tionaries of the 1960s and 1970s in Europe and Latin America. But thefoco revolutionaries were operating in a special situation: the expectedmass-based Marxist revolutions had failed, and in frustration, extremeradicals turned to terrorism as a means to spark a more generalrevolution, a method which, in the end, failed miserably.

But today, terrorism has become but one form of operation in atransnational arena of conflict. For example, Osama bin Laden'sorganization has used not only terrorism, but also guerrilla warfare,intelligence operations, and propaganda (or PSYOP/psychologicaloperations) as well as using financial resources to support alliedinsurgent forces. Of course, the "war on terrorism" can be seen assimply a U.S. government propaganda slogan. The actual conduct of

operations is against a specific enemy, the Taliban-Al-Qaedaalliance. There is no wider war against terrorism worldwide whichwould pit the U.S. against the endless milieu of insurgents, securityagencies, and paramilitaries which routinely violate human rightsdomestically and internationally

Then there's the strategic situation. The Japanese in 1941 wereoperating within a conventional warfare framework. The war in thePacific was an overt naval-air-land war. Victory was a function ofarmaments production and logistics, and the U.S. had several timesthe industrial capacity as Japan.

But the Taliban/Osama bin Laden organization has at leastparity if not the edge in unconventional warfare capabilities with itstransnational clandestine network and decades of experience inguerrilla warfare. Moreover, while the Japanese in World War IIlacked the geopolitical reach to attack the continental United Statesitself (disregarding some minor nuisance raids), moderntransnational insurgents have the ability, through terrorism andcyberwar, to bring the war right into the United States itself.

While the United States developed an effective military-indus-trial strategy to win in World War II, many of the measures enactedin the wake of September llth 2001 attacks seem to make littlesense. Internal security measures and suspensions of civil libertiestie up huge amounts or resources and effort in "closing the barndoor after the horse has escaped" as well as the barn having alreadybeen burnt down! It's the usual dilemma of confusing a rapidreaction with taking the initiative, and doing something as opposedto doing the right thing.

But experience in low intensity conflict demonstrates thatvictory comes only through long range strategies which combinemilitary, intelligence and political operations towards realisticobjectives. Simply reacting to the last attack accomplishes little, ifnot being counterproductive to boot. There is a real danger, asdemonstrated in the counterterrorist wars fought in Latin Americain the 1970s, of these operations causing more destruction tocivilian lives than the insurgent terrorism.

Public AwarenessPrior to Pearl Harbor, there was a serious national debate in the

United States about America's role in the world, a debate whichpitted the pro-Allied interventionists against the isolationists. Sincethe end of World War II, the United States has had a bi-partisanforeign policy, in which both major political parties have supportedvarying degrees intervention abroad (albeit with some dissentduring the Vietnam era and into the 1980s). What was sorelylacking prior to September llth 2001 was an intelligent publicdiscussion of America's role in the world. To much of the nationaldebate was over sensationalized media events, and public aware-ness of the nature of modern low intensity conflict was largelylacking. " ' - • • •

The world at the opening of the 21st century has seen an end tothe division of the world into colonial and ideological empires, aswas the case in the early 20th century. Under'transnational capital-ism, finance, markets, média, communications, etc., have all be-come internationalized. At the same time,:conflict is increasinglybecoming transnational. Osama bin Laden's organization operatesbases, networks and units throughout much of the Islamic world—just as the United States, though its military basing and intelligenceoperations, also conducts warfare worldwide. On September 11ththe U.S. found itself in another global conflict. Whether this is theprecursor to another "world war" remains to be seen.

jjjjjjjjlijjjj^^ >'°v', 'A - ".:

within the country,,as in ^PPOrt'ig positions within the Soviet Union. The Soviet O/B went through numerous changes owing to

, -withdrawals, reorganizations, and »designations of units. Not included are numerous battalion level units, plusand other support units.

PSPlMfJ^SfWBBlSStfe

?Ss%°5r^8i8K0»E'ai'8pPi"Ä sWs s?

spSl ^ ilb^^^^s^^fSlÄ^^Ä;l|SÇinyaâai|i§ii||

l i ÄW^êsSgjB^^sisfe-^fijW

jïS;| ^§^^^l!i|p^Si^^s^J?f |

S§iMT^X^&ï8?W™*3AÊj°;%3?i

îwSaàœ^ïs^fev^vgjp

lASBSSiAllMS»

îliJelpiaa?i8;S:8|

lil'îlllSIillIsBilSil

^ffl a^jt °î88s?a' V *i ibb!s!X '|-'U wl3i V°K% ''

J| î n^n|j x |:gv°|rr;x

l iiglàHÎSlxjllIIH7vsA^:¥s¥^X:PK^;;;)v^^

iBIilliilllSssSs

^8 |™ ;5:H?at*>^Vsftf , K3:A, i*.osos

^^s^^^^Jp^H^^h^ôô^,^^^^^^

^Xi§i$p^

||i8|ipr i. ';IjEennezIuSSR '||R|iiiPf::,v'|||Al:|:*rJl?ÎSSv>;;||i'Ka|uOrr;?f '::?:';Shmdandi::' •'"'' :"XÊ-ÏX :: f :: ;';:X 'S'[~S :•: :• ' •

°>^'l'lT?^°°>:;'X:;-r.\ •ïyf? °°

S;i4ï;::?v:Â?r.;A-: '':';A'- .™o>K;:;>>,->Kv,^v:;^^;\. °,_ • -

S|KabÛlSgi?' jet'::

cSQonäuz;-®:;;' ,;::< ': -!:j >'yA>;::o;''';,;%0t', :

|ï|us1ifâ;gUSSR-;;Ilieifnel^SSR-,, :|i|ai|iK«i::::4

;;,; -;;|fQänä|na?5::;;:ft

: ,_A|Ï2l|:$:'vr:S\;j5f-"''

vJMaiaiiejShärif . '.ptjHazni SS' :./

:' :'ÄJ^zabadÄ:;V ', ' .f GarM'ï%!; •••i :::¥âf:>:%v,-X'' >>:c»:;>':

IJB'agrâmj:?',; ' i;||Ka%l|t;|î:' • ••'.JäShinMttä;;:;:;':/, /KQandànaï.' • ' .;;'" '. :

::r"Tj^l,jV=:°:°-:> '. v 'o--'';™>;rierat>y ^^ -asiK^'^

1988Termez, USSRKabulKabulKabulKabulShindand

•' _

; Termez, USSRSamarkand,USSRKizyl Arvat,USSRKabulQonduzAshkhabad,USSRKushka, USSR7

JalalabadQandaharBagramMazar-e-SharifGhazniFeyzabad

GardezBagramKabulShindandQandaharNE AfghanistanHeratKabulAfghanistan

l i GMRD = Guards Motorized

°Perati°naUy throughout

Afghan Government ^ J:t ^ .^ ,„.,TÏie government order'bf battle is tenuous at best/most AfgKan Army-divisionsKwere at Brigadestrength owing to desertions and casualties.

Afghan Government Armyjltlnit Éwations

I Corps HQII Corps HQIII Corps HQ7|nD l§r~8InD9InDïhnD "t'I2InDIJJnD ..fl?InD T

17InDl&InD -f19InD20InD ,,'2'SInD -t"Guard ArR _4 ArB7ArB15 ArB

' 2 Ï j M e B '22 MtB37 CdB*38CdB*203 AbR444 CdB*666 CdB*

1985BagramQandaharGardez

1979KabulQandaharGardez

"~%bulKabulAsadabadJalalabadGardezGhazniQandaharHeratMazar-e-Sfiarif Mazar-e-SE|rif? - FeyzabadBaghlan N[ahrinKKost Ktiost

JKabul_ ; KatlulLPul-e-Charki KabulQandahar QandaharKabul Kabul

FajahKabul ?

1986KabulQandaharGardez

Kabui/Ghâzhi/Qan'dahar KabulKabulChugha SeraiJalalabad *':?:?""GardezGhazni .Jf.'gj,Qandahar *Herat

KabulAsadabadJalalabadGardezGhazniQandaharHeratMjizar-e-SharifFeyzabadNahrinKhost

KabulQandaharKabul/Mazar-e-Sharif

mA » * T '

Afghan QovernmentArmy Deployment

December 1979

Notes1. Unit types: InD = infantry division; ArR =armored regiment; ArB = armor brigade;MeB = mechanized brigade; MtB = moun-tain brigade; CdB = commando brigade;AbR = airborne regiment.2. * 444 and 666 Commando units may besubordinate to 37 and 38 brigades.- = Not in order of battle? = location not known

Other Afghan Government Units(1985/16) ,§, •:,>„, ;|,

KHAD:Border Command: »v ••:•:•••Ministry of the Interior

Kabul Security Command:Sarandoy (gendarmerie)?

Tribal.militias:... ;.,Communist Party militias:

Not included are civil police, KHAD,agents, Peoples' :,,Democratic Party of Afghanistan me:mbers, bureaucrats;and other supporters of the Communist government.

1 x operational brigade5-9-x border brigades"

2 x regiments6 x' brigades/regiments20 x Battalions6+>tribal regiments, \,


The result was widescale opposition to the commu-nists and armed rebellion. Fighting spread throughoutAfghanistan, so that by mid-1979 the government hadlost control of the countryside. Another problem thegovernment faced was the disintegration of its ownarmed forces. Thousands of troops were deserting ordefecting to the resistance, taking their weapons withthem. Army strength fell from 80,000 men to 20,000.Taraki himself was killed in another coup in September1979, which brought Deputy Prime Minister HafizullahAmin to power.

The Soviets, meanwhile, were increasing their mili-tary assistance to the Afghan government. Soviet armspoured into the country. Soviet advisors commandedAfghan government units. Soviet aircraft began con-ducting combat missions against the resistance. As thegovernment's situation continued to disintegrate, theSoviets sent in several generals to appraise the situation.They found that militarily and politically the Afghangovernment was unable to control the situation and wasin danger of falling.

Soviet InterventionBy autumn 1979 Moscow realized the resistance

was on the verge of victory. In December, the SovietUnion began mobilizing their armed forces for inter-vention. On 24 December 1979 the Soviets struck. Theyflew in elements of the 105th Airborne Division toBagram military airfield, north of Kabul. The airborneunits then advanced on Kabul, and, with spetsnaz forces,seized control of the government. Babrak Karmal wasinstalled as prime minister.

Meanwhile, four motorized rifle divisions from theSoviet Central Asian and Turkestan military districts(the 66th, 201st, 357th, and 360th) advanced overlandinto Afghanistan, occupying the cities of Herat, Farah,and Qandahar, securing the Salang Tunnel, and linkingup with Soviet forces in Kabul. Also participating in theinvasion were elements of the 103rd and 104th GuardsAirborne Divisions. 40th Army Headquarters providedoperational control, and Soviet forces in Afghanistanwere designated as the Limited Contingent of SovietForces.

Most Afghan units were either disarmed by theirSoviet advisors or went along with the coup. ManyAfghan soldiers went home or defected to the Resis-tance. By mid-January 1980, the situation seemed undercontrol. The Soviet 40th Army headquarters moved toKabul, and three more motorized rifle divisions joinedthe contingent in Afghanistan. The Soviets also re-placed a number of their units that had been manned byreservists from Muslim areas of the Soviet Union andhad proven politically unreliable, fraternizing with theResistance.

One of the reasons that the invasion succeeded wasthe Soviets achieved both strategic and tactical surprise.Neither the Afghan government nor the resistance was

prepared for it. More, Western governments were takenunaware. The United States, still reeling from the fall ofthe Shah of Iran and the ongoing hostage crisis inTeheran, could make no countermeasures other thandiplomatic protests. By early 1980 the Soviets hadpresented the world with a fait accompli.

Why had the Soviets invaded Afghanistan? Af-ghanistan was an opportunity to advance into the vitalSouthwest Asian region, threatening Western access toMiddle Eastern oilfields, and gaining control of thePersian Gulf region. The Soviets were also concernedabout the collapse of Afghanistan's communist govern-ment in the face of an indigenous resistance movement.This would have been the first time an avowedly com-munist government had been overthrown by its ownpeople, and might encourage other anti-communistresistance forces. It could, conceivably, inspire resis-tance within the Soviet Union itself.

Still, the decision to intervene was far from unani-mous in Moscow. Senior military officers opposed anarmed intervention, believing the Soviet governmentdid not understand the political situation. An interven-tion in Afghanistan would not necessarily lead to aquick victory. More, there was the danger a largescaleprojection of Soviet ground forces outside the SovietUnion itself would lead to a massive Islamic and West-ern reaction. The decision to commit troops was madeby Soviet Communist Party First Secretary LeonidBrezhnev, without, apparently, consulting either theCommunist Party's Political Bureau or the military'sGeneral Staff, thus beginning 10 years of war.

Initial Soviet StrategyThe Soviet invasion plan was similar to those used

in the 1956 Hungarian and 1968 Czechoslovakian inter-ventions. In 1956 and 1968 the Soviets staged a coup inthe capital while mechanized and airborne units seizedkey cities. A show of force intimidated potential oppo-sition, and massive firepower crushed armed resistance.

Initially, this approach worked in Afghanistan. Butonce the Soviets settled in, they found themselves facedwith growing resistance attacks. There was an openrebellion in Kabul, ambushes of convoys, and commu-nist-held towns were under siege. The Soviets respondedby launching a series of limited offensives throughout1980 to rectify the situation. Mechanized troops, sup-ported by airpower, attacked resistance positions anddrove the guerrillas back into the mountains. Sovietforces secured the cities and towns, crushed the rebel-lion in Kabul, and set up convoy escorts to safeguard theroads.

Still, it became apparent the resistance wasn't goingto disappear, and so the Soviets, with their Afghangovernment allies, prepared for an extensivecounterinsurgency campaign. Early operations had re-vealed deficiencies in Soviet military doctrine. Sovietarmed forces had been trained and equipped for warfare

50 #208

under European conditions. Thus, units emphasizedtanks for shock effect, infantry mobility based on fight-ing from armored personnel carriers, and mass fire-power.

Soviet armored thrusts proved ineffective in Af-ghanistan because the resistance had no strategic ortactical rear area. There were no vital industrial centersfor the communists to seize and thereby paralyze theresistance by cutting off arms and ammunition. Sincethe guerrillas were not dependent on a logistic system,there was no need for them to hold ground. Instead, theycould retreat into inaccessible mountainous terrain whenconfronted with superior communist forces. Even thoughthe communists ended up in control of the terrain, theygained little as they lacked the personnel to hold cap-tured territory. The resistance would simply reoccupylost regions once the communists had moved to otherobjectives or had returned to their base camps.

Soviet doctrine prior to the invasion had empha-sized units following battle plans strictly. Initiative wasdiscouraged and junior leadership poorly developed,especially at the non-commissioned officer level. Atleast at the beginning of the war, Soviet army NCOswere conscripts who had been given additional training.This was unlike Western armies where NCOs werelargely recruited from private soldiers who showedleadership potential, or at least had several years oftroop experience. Guerrilla warfare is largely a war ofsmall unit operations, and so the lack of lower levelleadership effectively paralyzed Soviet tactics. Sovietforces were not trained in counter-ambush drills, andwhen confronted with even the most inept ambushcould not respond properly. Mechanized riflemen wouldstay within their armored vehicles rather than attempt-ing to counterattack. The Soviets were too restricted intheir operations, with mechanized units remaining roadbound and unable to engage opponents operating inmountainous terrain. Soviet forces did not conductroutine patrols outside their base camps, thus allowingResistance guerrillas control of the immediately sur-rounding areas.

Nonetheless, the Soviet military recognized theseproblems, reorganized and developed a new doctrinefor war fighting.

Soviet Counterinsurgency StrategyIn Western military doctrine, counterinsurgency strat-

egy requires a government to fight and win on threefronts: the political, the intelligence and the military.Politically, the government must rally the support of thepeople and translate it into victory. By mobilizingpopular support the government receives recruits, intel-ligence information, and political legitimacy, whiledenying these to the insurgents. Denied popular sup-port, the insurgents will be unable to function for lack ofreplacements, supplies, and sanctuary. Propaganda andpolitical reforms become major weapons in the fight fora people's allegiance.

On the intelligence front, the government's primarytarget is the insurgents' political infrastructure. Thisinfrastructure usually consists of an underground orga-nization that mobilizes the people for the insurgentcause, administers liberated areas and conducts variousforms of subversive warfare. The government mustidentify the members of this infrastructure and neutral-ize them. Otherwise, as long as the political infrastruc-ture remains intact, the insurgents can replace theirlosses and continue the struggle.

Militarily, the government must control major popu-lation centers, protect its supporters and break up guer-rilla units. A military victory is usually impossible byitself; rather, the government's main emphasis is onkeeping insurgent forces away from the people. Allmilitary operations must be planned for their politicaleffects. The indiscriminate use of firepower, for ex-ample, leads to noncombatant casualties and tends topush the people into supporting the resistance to gainrevenge.

But Afghanistan did not fit neatly into the standardinsurgency mold. The resistance was not an organiza-tion. It was a sizable sector of the populace whichendemically resisted any government.

The Soviets were no strangers to dealing with Is-lamic based revolts. In the 1920s and 1930s they haddefeated rebellions of Muslim tribesmen in Soviet Cen-tral Asia. The most severe of these was the Basmachirevolt of 1918-29. Soviet counterinsurgency strategy


Regimental Composition of Soviet DivisionsDivision Motorized Rifle Reg. Tank Reg. Artillery Reg.5th Gds Motorized Rifle 142, 190, 3361 6th Motorized Rifle 1 56, 1 67, 24954th Motorized Rifle 81 , 1 18, 33766th Motorized Rifle 33, 108, 34120 1st Motorized Rifle 92,122,191357th Motorized Rifle* 1 164, 1 166, 1 168360th Motorized Rifle** 1193, 1 195, 1197

*Also known as the 346th Motorized Rifle Division**Redesignated the 108th Motorized Rifle Division in 1980

5165466

201'346360

27224

86161220915920


X Qandahor

Soviet InterventionDecember 1979

POPULATION DENSITY, 1991 LANGUAGESr-. t* Kirghiz

1 -,\„

?/.-..

Persons per>

_-> 400

-/" /"~'\ ''J.' { 200

! ^ * *" 100 p

Population: 16.6 millionPopulation Density (/Km.2): 26Percent Urban: 20Refugees in Pakistan: 2 millionRefugees in Iran: 1 million

LANGUAGE FAMILIES AND BRANCHES

INDO-EUROPEAN FAMILY DRAVIDIAN FAMILY|™3 Iranic Branch gfl

?"--3 Dardic Branch ALTAIC FAMILY

DENSITY OF LAND MINESr.

/^ / / , ^! , ' -r-F; '^ -L-, j- --, ' 'f'"" ' \Minespe

f, -x-4^_;'>' '\ ,r.' /r • sq-Km.

'< '^ ,/, SsfiTST' 50 ?---2,„:

No land mines

ZONES OF CONTROL

/ i Taliban

Northern Alliance

^JC Pockets of%3sJ Northern Alliance

52 #208

Soviet DeploymentDecember 1985

The Course of the War1978: Afghan Communists seize power in April. Moslem

leaders declare Jihad (Holy War). Resistance spreadsthroughout the country.

1979: Increasing resistance pressure on Afghan government.December, Soviets intervene, seizing Kabul in an airborneassault.

1980: Soviets put down Afghan army insurrections and launchair-ground offensives to clear the resistance from strategiclocations.

1981 : Soviets begin widescale air assault and speimaz opera-tions. Primary Soviet emphasis is on small unitcounterguerrilla operations.

1982: Communists begin systematic depopulation of thecountryside. Soviets employ airpower and artillery againstresistance-held cities and towns, and reportedly chemicalwarfare against resistance infiltration routes. Soviets launchdivision sized sweeps to clear critical routes.

1983: Soviets increase their forces in Afghanistan and useairwar approach, with interdiction and air assaults di-rected against the resistance, resistance training improves.

1984: Soviets launch nationwide offensive. Division-sizedforces in action around Herat and Panjsher Valley : Sovietspush back resistance forces, but do not hold what theytake.

1985: Increase in resistance offensive activity. Communists

repeat offensives throughout the country. Main Soviettarget is the resistance's lines of communication.

1986: Resistance attacks on towns and cities increase. Com-munists strike back, retaking lost areas. Resistance im-proved weaponry begins taking toll of communist forces,especially aircraft.

1987: Afghan government announces unilateral ceasefire.Soviets pull back from isolated bases. USSR increasescity security, attempts to keep resistance off balance bylimited strikes.

1988: Resistance advances against major cities, overrun gov-ernment outposts. Soviet forces counterattack to retakelost towns. Soviet airstrikes directed against resistanceslow them down. Soviet withdrawal begins.

1989: Soviets complete withdrawal. Resistance closes in onKabul and other major cities.

1990: Communists repel resistance attacks on major cities.Resistance increasingly divided.

1991: Soviet Union and United States agree to halt all militaryassistance to Afghanistan by 1 January 1992.

1992: Mujahidin seize Afghan cities, communist governmentcollapses. Resistance factions begin fighting amongstthemselves.


Communist Air Order of Battle AfghanistanThis is the order of battle for Soviet air units within Afghanistan. It does not include air units based within the Soviet Union itself.The Soviets made extensive use of USSR-based airpower to conduct operations in Afghanistan.

Soviet (1982)Unit Location Aircraft27th Fighter Aviation Regiment {-) Bagram27th Fighter Aviation Regiment (-) Qandahar115th Fighter Aviation Regiment (-) Qandahar217th Fighter Bomber Regiment (-) Shindand200 Independent Guards Attack Aviation Squadron Shindand263rd Independent Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Kabul262rd Independent Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Bagram254th Independent Helicopter Squadron Qonduz181 st Independent Helicopter Regiment (- ) Feyzabad181th Independent Helicopter Regiment (-) Qonduz355th Independent Helicopter Regiment Qonduz280th Independent Helicopter Regiment Qandahar280th Independent Helicopter Regiment (-) Shindand302th Independent Helicopter Squadron Shindand50th Independent Composite Aviation Regiment Bagram

Afghan Government Air Force (1985)322 Air Regiment321 Air Regiment393 Air Regiment355 Air Regiment232 Air Regiment232 Air Regiment (-)377 Air Regiment? air transport regiment? attack helicopter squadron? attack helicopter squadronNotes: (-) = elements. ? = unidentified unit

BagramBagramBalkh ProvinceShindandKabulShindandKabulKabulJalalabadKabul

24xMiG2124xMiG2124xMiG2112xSu 172 x Su 17, 11 x Su 259+MiG215 x Mi 24, 8 x Mi 8,8 x Mi 249 x M i 821 xMio, 32 x Mi 821 x Mi 24, 22 x Mi 89 x Mi 6, 33 x Mi 86 x Mi 6, 9 x Mi 82 x Mi 2, 6 x Mi 24. 8 x Mi 87 x AN 26, 18 x Mi 24, 26 x Mi !

40 x MiG 21Su 7, Su 22MiG 17II 28, MiG 17Mi 4, Mi 6, Mi 88 x M i 8Mi 25, Mi 17An 2, An 26, II 18, An 1415 Mi 2415 Mi 24

EquipmentDesignation type speed range armament cargo load'ielicoptersvli-6 (Hook)vIi-8 (Hip)kli-24 (Hind)

CHUHAH

250 km/h225 km/h295 km/h

1000500320

MGMG/rockets/ATGMMG/rockets/ATGM/bombs

12,000kg4000 kg-

Fixed Wing AircraftAn 24/26MiG 17 (Fresco)MiG 21 (Fishbed)MiG 23 (Flogger)Su 7 (Fitter)Su 17 (Fitter C)Su 24 (Fencer)*Tu 16 (Badger)*

C/TF/IF/RI/EW/RGAGAFBB/EW

430 km/h1145km/h2070 km/h1350km/h1700km/h1284km/h1530km/h945 km/h

(max)(max)

(max)

550km1470 km1100km640km1450 km630km805km4800 km

(max)

(max)

3 x 23mm cannon, bombs, AAR/ASM23mm cannon, bombs, AAM23mm cannon, AAM2 x 30mm cannon, bombs2 x 30mm cannon, bombs, ASM1 x 23 mm cannon, bombs, AAM6 x 23 mm cannon, bombs, ASM

Notes1. Type: CH = cargo helicopter; UH = utility helicopter; AH = attack helicopter; C = Cargo; T = Transport; F = Fighter; I = Interceptor; R =reconnaissance; EW = electronic warfare; GA = ground attack; FB = fighter-bomber; B = bomber.2. Speed: cruising speed; (max) = maximum speed;

3. Range: operational range (with weapons/combat load); (max) = maximum range.4. Armament: AAR = air to air rocket; AGM = Air to surface missile; AAM = air to air missile;5. * = aircraft types based in the USSR.

r

k

tN

Cs~tN

VJ

\£/-t—,C

>v£

g

rji

w

|ft>^cüo

•Ml El

CO

ff>

1nm

MHMM

Ixtj to -;>&i

' -S '

-Î'?

'•Ö* »-S

I* '

rj

:Dii

i

STRATEG

Y & TAC

TICS

57

AFGHANISTAN^ AND AOfOINiNG LANDS ^; ' I^TT^1™?' • -*vwp.., , %c_. ,-i wT ^^Ä ^^ïg^w» v v^>l'- ' - . - ' . - • s«»«/"^. sfep* TURKMENISTAN; v. \ ^ ^^-r- iöAi 'r ' &*?? '.«&.' lj^$- V /&»

^.- *ifcAshkhabad / \ *% ,, m^mta),' /fé, ifc. <; *Mm" ' , .?' ""^v'",,»1;*-^" . V ^ - , . - v >- ' /-,,^ / \vfeehensC ' ^t' "v s, . . • , '"•v '*t"'*8av$yniL'en?$' - f - » ,"''.'&„„•„, " ,*/ ; ?**"•/ '• " \ •- ,»» ; „ ,. ,' " "-•-,

"-. *j»>^_,>- - jdflavmna . * "\ '• Stiurehï*' • • * • • ' •/',*'VWm_/. '•/,j.?'il' \' ' J> » (HJöttaAi ' """-

I 'N ^ \> --« -8^ fö*t^, , r^ / //A^Ït "iÄäC": C' H, NH a«<*a»\ '%uSh* , %l*tan ; ;"Sx .i. ^^«.rgan^Kaw - ^ .rï" '.' *•" ,„ X f % l: 4' -

"^•^—s^ftSwïï^. - ' "',,, hs^ ~~"«Serakf L-., '. ^""»"Xu t f*1*0^»» 'O«.. "wiA',,k; Ï£Ï""* ShtA««*1*8**» '"-"' 4 -' -• ! -7V, : * VS, '"Ä, ^ -HW»" **" """"a' - rfeyshtiöx >Mashhad j |v : , J?Sh«bsr9ten ,i%&"%/ft-l,Wtl(t'8nAS ' '' i <s^"' - ' ' '. J" ,J ^ , > '' , ', '3

t " X.,yA( ' ; J' \, ' *%}f//*fw"8hstn) ,», • ,"•'-,. fy.^r*f. -=.."* < %,,„«* :>",X l1""; *"* 'in' ' '"•'*•-*- ^

\ :rl, 'ï *Baar. ^.-r-' ito^j-^^'- , pBaÂi *• 4'' ,\:«:/' 8P>/<^H ; ,S^ ; *'V fl-< "\ ... ; '^" ,',.,-,„ -• •' '" " " v \v> TV«../ '-'%"' * ' ' • j #•'„,' -'i ' •&>•; 'l?"'' ' > ,! 1

'- ; / 'V - , ' jfBaaMœtfia. . ,„,L^"*>^^* ' ?X ; ^J ,„ , f v^^ 'JSMWf \Astar '^C ', ,** , ' /- , \" '\, N pshka \ •"•' \ i JT%^ * ,''''.J A' ' ' ' J' i ? ^ ' ,^ ; /V*1-.-.! ' T *a?° X ^ ' \

; *-, >6*«n' •X-" V" , ' -' -•" Xr'rt^' ' ,.,'/," J". .''*,'.' ",/ " • /*$- H.' •-'./-»> '\" B,,- ' ' ,"' ,. .Xfefeh-YeNow " ( ;» ; _ , ^ • ' ' ' • ' > } f A" • f . ' - , - ' -:'*„ *^ , ,,'.»'"*"****; '"'-. Ö ''

«juwiand -^ r ;, ni „'' , P , ., , , Bamian*"-' ' -o, ;T'/_, » ''• '•' 'Xff"*^ft** ,*# • , ' "f*J ' '/ wÄ-*rf'j*_? . , , -;-v ' "™ J** ut t -, »t * Badgah , - a"„t.«ii D & " ^mwür i** , ,L\, : ' "f ' / <•; • -&• " -J "*"'.' -,'*L«h

« =»? f'"A '" *rat", - ,./ , , . - • " ' Pajfab J ,_ ^ '1A^^ ,,;v*t! #? +

Muz*fw*terfS. '*afl"Wfef--." "'C* , »Midok \

ï* . il ikÜS"" v."**"1* ^Swwaf ^ ï * '-''** \»Ana':îttîag -^ ".OuhaK , YazW, Admskan, , }f t , , ,.,„«„ ft„ A.*»«*«' % , „c A, pow ,*Jsf ' ^ " ; f ;^

•N. / -4 - '4 .-. rB\i'--'Gat*V%^*> ; "n"'-:- '^B'"«*. : : • . „! '* Qa«hB§.' *V KhOWStV;i.,^" / ,. '-, ,-Udtanw • ^^

^ tt ® ' /**^ " * wtaS/ «^ " n 'o \ - * , ' j C *'' v ' -' â(tnyv ? "^' W' oJammtl , r mha ' J

I DAhN: , F,„h. C ' _ -T' ', p ..... ;, r :.;.;,Dah«hNo*,, ^ ,0etoram> , ^ ^ , ^ ,,^ ^. S8rgodhacj,_ â"'' " ï3"^ Art ,

{ - L - - .ayri - Qafldahar «ak. .Shïnkay Dardt(M,eyaha'- Äffet lsma.1 Khan c'hinW. - ''"'s.-oC S' f- '~ Ài - - . _ ' (Khandahar) ¥ _/'-^-x 7 ^ »Bhater toreölAmrto riauL-i

C A Maruf* r - - , ' , ' OJUilunJ iwls,,

2«UU '.^M , V . ,.-U..> Zh0b' ..<**^Safö Kas»è:€'-ur "ud '>,ïï.Kuchnay Darvishan , J * „Lelah QI,.™ '/''*', f28!,"; 'Jagraon ' -*|

/^ïïfetJW^- . ' ' *tets*n ''• -'S v- 'fa"dtot - 4n,baiJ/ r-h h n - t 'Alimardan Khan-E Bagat f ' ^ --V" - "C- „ Sailullah , , »e)i,- /;fc|fa > =',:îa :^ «Chahaf Borjak . '' ^ * Bostart '; '~ " -üënatinda >aranpur*

NosratAfaatf. / ;" " /Quettaö* - Dera Ghazi Khan. »MSaSfïh 8atewalna6' '•""»G **tar

Zahed.n ""--v. ^*~ •"'*** " 'A'*s«i«» *»"j , »ffanumangarh » ,

'B9m.FahraJ ' "*"• - ~,^~~"~~' ^< V ' * " ' "-* / X ' Noha, --

•Chagai -, • * 4&, <undi Dalbandn. , ' * .•^ ?&•*< ' tewDetW^l

^ ^ ' ' , Pugal. , ' .- "/ I

o Major cities • Taliban garrisons• Other cities/towns ^ Taliban training camps

.-—-Railroads ? al-Qaeda camps (suspected)Major Roads t Afghan refugee camps.

0 50 100 150

Miles

The Legend ReturnsSample Counters

The Resistance proved effective in knocking out thecommunist political infrastructure, especially in thecountryside, thereby destroying the government's abil-ity to control the people. Subversion of governmentforces destroyed the cohesion and effectiveness of theAfghan army, turning it into a recruit and supply conduitfor the resistance. Foreign military assistance providedto the resistance was the right type: infantry small armsand supporting heavy weapons. The United States andits allies did not try to turn the Afghan Resistance intoa high-tech force that would have lost all contact withthe people and be fatally bound to external sources fortraining and supply.

The communists lacked consistent political-mili-tary objectives. Appeals for national unity were ne-gated by repressive security measures; military attacksagainst noncombatants contradicted government claimsthat it represented the people; military offensives tookground from the cesistance but then abandoned it. Theend result was years of desultory warfare.

Yet, despite the communist errors, the resistanceproved incapable of consolidating the final victory.Throughout the conflict, resistance leadership was di-vided, and while resistance forces proved capable oflaunching many individual actions successfully, therewas no overall strategy. Victories led nowhere becausethe resistance lacked the means to build upon them.Instead, the war continued on through cycles of raidsand offensives, with neither side advancing militarily orpolitically.

While the resistance might appear on paper to beable to call upon the overwhelming majority of Afghanis,the fact was that it was never able to translate thesenumbers into troops in the field. Estimates of Resistancestrength usually ranged to several hundred thousand.But there was no consideration of what these numbersreferred to: fulltime fighters, part time militia, or pas-sive supporters among the people. As the accompany-ing module on the resistance movements indicates, totalresistance armed strength did not exceed 200,000 fight-ers. The remainder were either part time guerrillas orself-defense forces. So the resistance was never capableof defeating Soviet forces in the field (even puttingaside the resistance's political divisions). The actualnumber of guerrillas who could be employed on afulltime basis did not materially outnumber thegovernment's regular forces.

Still, despite all the errors, there can be no underes-timating the Afghan Resistance. As a result of the warin Afghanistan, the strategic situation in SouthwestAsia shifted completely. In the late 1970s U.S. powerhad collapsed in the region, with the overthrow of theShah of Iran and the American retrenchment in the wakeof Vietnam. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in1979, it seemed as if the Soviet Union was on the vergeof marching to the Persian Gulf. It was the resistance ofthe Afghans which, in the end, stopped the communistsand eventually gave the United States and its allies theopportunity to reverse the strategic trend.

The Afghan War was to cause serious repercussionswithin the Soviet military, repercussions which wouldbe eventually translated into political action. Manyveterans complained about inept political leadershipand betrayal of the soldiers on the fighting front. Therewere even reports of the war inspiring rightist Russianpolitical factions, with their own version of the"backstab" theory!

Marxist theories of the "class struggle" proved in-creasingly difficult to explain the failure of communismin Afghanistan (and, for that matter, in other countrieswhere anti-communist insurgencies fought on through-out the 1980s). This caused much alienation amongmembers of the ruling circles within the Soviet Unionitself. While a hardcore Marxist theoretician couldalways come up with a rationalization, it was apparentthat Marxism no longer represented the "tide" of his-tory. The Afghan Resistance could not simply be dis-missed as bandits or Western mercenaries; it was, rathera people in revolt against Marxism.

In the end, the Soviets were stalemated in Afghani-stan, militarily and politically. Unwilling to accept thecosts of further fighting, they withdrew. The Afghans,of course, continued fighting.

62 #208

How to use the feedback response page:Please read the following Feedback questions and give us your answers in the formof numbers. We appreciate and encourage you to make further comments aboutStrategy & Tactics, specific concerns about the hobby, or gaming in general.

Please read the feedback questions carefully! Whenasked a yes/no type question, 0 indicates no and 1indicates yes. When asked for a rating, please^use ascale of 1= poor, 2= fair, 3= good, 4= excellent.

1. Are you subscriber? (1= Yes, 0= No)

2. This issue overall

3. Back to Iraq(lead article & modules)

4. Back to Iraq, 3rd ed(game overall)

5. Back to Iraq, 3rd ed (rules)

6. Back to Iraq, 3rd ed (map)

7. Back to Iraq, 3rd ed (counters)

8. Update Afghanistan

9. The British Wars in Afghanistan

10. "A day that will live in infamy."

11. The Soviet War in Afghanistan

12. Toolkit for Holy War: Afghanistan

13. FYI14. Outgoing Mail

Please rate our performance in the following areasfor issues #206-209.

15. Range of article topics

16. Scholarly quality of articles

17. Graphic support for articles (maps, charts, etc.)

18. Proofing of articles (typos, grammar, details)

19. Range of game topics

20. Quality of game designs

21. Game artwork (map and counters)

22. Game proofing (errors that detract from play)

Please use the space below for your comments on thefollowing.

23. What do you like best about S&T?

24. What would you most like to see changed?

To purchase the game that covers

')att'es fea(urei' 'n ll"5 'ssue/

$20 US Customers$22 Canadian Customers$25 Overseas Customers

All prices include postage for first class or airmailshipping. CA residents add (90<t) sales tax. Sendname and address to: Decision Games

ATTN: S&T Game OfferPO Box 2 1598Bakersfield CA 93390

Return completed form to:Decision Games

P.O. Box 2 1598Bakersfield, CA 93390

FEEDBACK S&T #208

Please use additional paper orthe backof this photocopied form for further comments.

10 .

11 .

12 .

13 .

14 .

16

17

18

19.

20.

21.

22


Strategy & Tactics - Number 208

Documents

Transcript of Strategy & Tactics - Number 208