International Symposium onLogistics and Port Development

Universidad del Turabo

Gurabo, Puerto Rico, 7-9 May 2009

Strategies for Security of Maritime Domain

Panagiotis D. Scarlatos, Dr.-Eng.Chair & Professor – Department of Civil Engineering

Director – Center for Intermodal Transportation Safety & Security

Maritime Domain

"All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities,

infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”

National Strategy for Maritime Security1. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness

Effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain andidentifying threats as early and as distant from shores as possible.

2. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration PlanIntegrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to interests

in the Maritime Domain.

3. Maritime Operational Threat Response PlanEstablishes roles and responsibilities, and facilitates coordinated government

response to threats against the Nation-State and its interests in the Maritime Domain.

4. International Outreach and Coordination StrategyProvides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken

with foreign governments and international organizations.

5. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery PlanRecommends procedures and standards for the recovery of the

maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption.

6. Maritime Transportation System Security PlanImproves the national and international regulatory framework

regarding the Maritime Domain.

7. Maritime Commerce Security PlanEstablishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain.

8. Domestic Outreach PlanEngages non-Federal input to assist with the development

and implementation of maritime security policies.

Threats• Nation-State Threats

• Terrorist Threats

• Transnational Criminal and Piracy Threats

• Environmental Destruction

• Illegal Seaborne Immigration

Maritime Security Activities• Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Actions

• Protect Maritime-Related Population Centers and Critical Infrastructure

• Minimize Damage and Expedite Recovery

• Safeguard the Ocean and Its Resources

Strategic Actions• Enhance International Cooperation

• Maximize Domain Awareness

• Embed Security into Commercial Practices

• Deploy Layered Security

• Assure Continuity of the Maritime Transportation System

1. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

Effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the

United States.

Enhanced and innovative collection of intelligence, integration ofcorrelated open source information, and incorporation

of automated algorithms to assist human analytic efforts.

Information sharing, situational awareness, and collaborative planning through the national maritime Common Operating Picture (COP).

COP is a near-real time, dynamically manageable, network-centric virtual information grid shared by all U.S. Federal, state, and local agencies

with maritime interests and responsibilities.

MDA Goals

• Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter and defeatthreats as early and distant from U.S. interests as possible;

• Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the fullspectrum of maritime threats; and

• Sustain the full application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and theefficient flow of commerce.

MDA Objectives

• Persistently monitor in the global maritime domain:o Vessels and craft

o Cargoo Vessel crews and passengerso All identified areas of interest

• Access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure.

• Collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decisionmakers to facilitate effective understanding.

• Access, develop and maintain data on MDA-related mission performance.

2. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration PlanUses existing capabilities to integrate all

available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain.

3. Maritime Operational Threat Response PlanFacilitates coordinated U.S. government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the Maritime Domain by establishing

roles and responsibilities, which enable the government torespond quickly and decisively.

4. International Outreach and Coordination Strategy

Maritime DomainA Strategic Environment in a Globalized World

• Oceans cover 70% of the Earth’s surface.

• The world’s oceans and waterways offer all nation-states a network to their security and prosperity.

• There are more than 100,000 ocean-going ships and millions of workboats, fishing vessels and recreational vessels.

• More than 40% of the world’s merchant ships enter the U.S. harbors every year.

• Approximately 30,000 containers enter U.S. ports every day.

• Nearly 95% of all international commerce enters the U.S. through the nation’s 361 public and private ports.

• Over 80% of the world trade travels by water.

• U.S. has 98,000 miles of shoreline and 3.5 million square miles of water within the Exclusive Economic Zone.

• Two-thirds of the world’s population live within 240 miles of a seacoast.

IOCS Strategic Goals• A coordinated policy for US government maritime

security activities with foreign governments, international and regional organizations,

and the private sector.

• Enhanced outreach to foreign governments, international and regional organizations, private sector partners,

and the public abroad to solicit support for improved global maritime security.

5. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP)

MIRP Overview• Recovery management procedures for the Government and designated representatives

(e.g., the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG)) to make decisions affecting national maritime recovery efforts.

• Provides recovery management procedures for those making decisions at theincident site and at non-incident sites that provide support.

• Based on the nature and circumstances of the incident, atransition in focus from homeland defense operations to recovery

management may occur.

• Initial post-incident decisions made by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

regarding short-term, targeted operational actions to help maintain flow of commerce through non-incident sites.

• Lists roles and responsibilities related to maritime transportation capabilitiesof federal, state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector.

• Evaluation of the effectiveness of the recovery plan, through an exerciseprogram that includes periodic validation of the concepts of this plan.

• Identification of follow-up steps and recommendations of continuous improvement of recovery management.

MIRP Objectives• Identify pre-designated key national government/industry stakeholders

immediately available to advise on matters pertaining to recovery from Incident of National Significance (INS)

affecting the Maritime Domain.

• Recommend national priorities for recovery of maritime transportation systemsafter a national Transportation Security Incident (TSI).

• Recommend federal policies and procedures for recovery of national maritimetransportation after a security incident (and support recovery of critical local

and regional transportation systems).

• Describe a maritime infrastructure recovery exercise program consistent with the National Exercise Program.

• Procedures for coordinating among federal, state, local and private sector partners, and cooperation with foreign governments and

international entities, as appropriate.

Recovery Management Support by Non-TSI Sites

Recovery Management at the National TSI Site

6. Maritime Transportation System Security Plan

Maritime Transportation System Security (MTS Security)

A systems-oriented security regime built upon layers of protection and defense-in-depth

that effectively mitigates critical system security risks, while preserving the functionality and efficiency of the MTS.

Most effective security risk management strategies involving cooperation and participation of both

domestic and international stakeholders acting at strategic points in the system.

MTS Security Components• Risk Management

• Security Information Management

• International & National Regulatory Framework

• Stakeholder Responsibility & Coordination

• Credentialing

• Leverage Safety Frameworks

• Security Technology

• Security Training

Security Network for Key Elements of MTS

Ports and Port Facilities Vessels and Small Boats Infrastructure

Inherent Security Features Inherent Security Features Inherent Security FeaturesOwner/Operator Security Plans Owner/Operator Security Plans

Federal Agency Programs Federal Agency Programs Federal Agency Programs Oversight Oversight Oversight

Area Maritime Security Plans & National Maritime Security Plan

National Strategy for Maritime Security – MTS Security

7. Maritime Commerce Security Plan

Maritime Commerce Security Plan (MCSP)Maritime security has been important to the United States since its earliest days. The

importance of protecting the Maritime Domain was recognized by our Founding Fathers, who identified national defense, protecting the coast, and

detecting smuggling as among the first responsibilities of the new federal government. More than two hundred years later, maritime commerce security

remains critical to the national security and economic health of the United States.

Containerized cargo has made the maritime transportation process so efficient that transportation costs are no longer a significant barrier to international trade.

Low transportation costs combined with free trade agreements have created an explosive growth in global trade, raising our standard of living. This efficient

global supply chain now stretches from the far reaches ofthe planet directly into the heartland of America.

Maritime transportation of bulk, break-bulk and containerized cargo is the primary mechanism,and in many cases, the only feasible one, for moving goods and commodities around the world quickly and cheaply. The ships that ply the Maritime Domain are the primary

mode of transportation for world trade, carrying over 80% of world trade by volume, making the Security of the Maritime Domain critically important to the prosperity

and liberty of billions of people. Improving the security of this complex supply chain is critical for our national security.

MCSP Challenges

Vulnerability in not limited to seaport cities. MTS is the backbone of the intermodal supply chain.

The security plan must intercept threats well before they reach the country’s borders.

The threat assessment encompasses the totality of thetransportation process including

cargo, vessels, crew, ports of call and intermodal connections (trucks, railroads, pipelines and aircraft).

MCSP Framework

Accurate data.

Secure cargo.

Secure vessels/ports.

Secure transit.

International standards and compatible regulations

Risk Management Approach

MCSP Current Initiatives

Advanced Electronic Cargo Information.

Automated Targeting System.

Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment.

Container Security Initiative.

Megaports Initiative (specialized radiation detection equipment).

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.

Operation Safe Commerce.

8. Domestic Outreach Plan (DOP)

Create implementation plans for National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).

Maintain transparency and foster dialogue with stakeholders.

Comply with existing laws regulating government outreach.

Establish recommendations for follow-on interagency coordinating body.

DOP Audience• Congress

• Maritime media

• Non-governmental organizations/trade associations.

• Maritime industry/private sector.

• Vessel security officers/facility security officers.

• State/local government officials dealing with security .

• Emergency responders.

• Area maritime security committees/Coast Guard Captains of the Port.

• Defense/security industry (contractors, etc.)

• Presidential security advisory committees.

• Maritime labor unions.

• Interagency/intra-governmental.

MARITIME TERRORIST RISKS & LIABILITY

Radiological or Nuclear DetonationSecure hazardous materials at their point of origin

Disruption of Port OperationFacilitate the restart of ports and container shipping system

Maritime TerrorismMaritime terrorism policies must not be motivated by

commonly perceived threats

Maritime CommerceNeed to recognize operating risks and investigate the extent of their own tort liability

Civil LiabilityAdmiralty jurisdiction over claims may preempt competing legal rules that

apply on land

Maritime CargoCommercial contracts should specifically consider and address terrorism risks

Tort LiabilityPolicy makers should carefully review the scope and rationale (pros & cons)

of third-party liability for terrorist attacks

High Profile Maritime Terrorism Incidents (1961-2009)

Hijacking of Santa Maria Cruise Ship (Portuguese and Spanish Rebels, 1961)

Use of Coaster Claudia to transport weapons (Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1973)

Hijacking of Achille Lauro Cruise Ship (Palestine Liberation Front, 1985)

Targeting of Cruise Ships on the Nile River (Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, 1992-94)

Hijacking of Turkish Passenger Ferry in Black Sea (Chechen Rebels, 1996)

Suicide Bombing of the USS Cole (Al Qaeda, 2000)

Suicide Bombing of the M/V Limburg (Al Qaeda, 2002)

Use of Karine A to transport weapons (Palestinian Authority, 2002)

Hijacking of the M/V Penrider Oil Tanker (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, 2003)

Use of the Abu Hassan Fishing Trawler to transport weapons (Lebaneze Hezbollah, 2004)

Attacks against the Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah Oil Terminals (Jamaat al-Tawhid, 2004)

Bombing of the Phillipine Superferry 14 (Abu Sayyaf & Jemaah Islamiyah, 2004)

Suicide attack aginst the Port of Ashrod (Hamas & Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, 2004)

Multiple Hijackings of the Horn of Africa Sea (Somalia Pirates, 2006-09)

Potential Present Maritime Terrorism Acts

Use of a commercial container ship to smuggle chemical, biological, or radioactive materials for an unconventional attack carried out on land

or at a major commercial port.

Use of a “Trojan Horse” such as a fishing trawler, resupply ship, tug or similar innocuous-looking vessel to transport weapons.

Hijacking of a vessel as a fund-raising exercise to support a campaign of personal gain, political violence directed toward ethnic, ideological, religious, or separatist designs.

Scuttling a ship in a narrow Sea Lane of Communication (SLOC) to block ordisrupt maritime traffic.

Hijacking of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carrier that is then detonated asa bomb or used as a collision weapon.

Use of a high-speed boat to attack an oil tanker or offshore energy platformto affect international oil trade or cause major pollution.

Directly targeting a cruise liner or passenger ferry to cause mass casualties bycontaminating the ship’s food supply, detonating an on-board or submersible

improvised explosive device (IED), or by ramming the vessel with afast-approach, small, attack craft.

MARITIME SAFETYINCIDENT ANALYSIS FACTORS

SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTLabor-Management Relations

Less-Than-Adequate (LTA) CommunicationsLanguage Problem

Social and Cultural Barriers and Conflicts

SUPERVISIONLack of Coordination of TasksInadequate Work Preparation

Inadequate Briefing, InstructionLack of Resources

Supervisor Not In Touch

MANNINGLong Working Periods, Much OvertimeFrequent Change of Watch Schedule

Wrong Person AssignedToo High/Low Work Load

PERSONNELLack of Motivation

Lack of SkillLack of Knowledge

WORKPLACE CONDITIONSAnthropometric Factors/Dimensions

Lack of Information, Inadequately Presented Information

PHYSICAL STRESSNoise, Vibration

Sea Motion, AccelerationClimate, Temperature

INADEQUATE TOOLS AND EQUIPMENTRight Tools and Equipment Unavailable

LTA Assessment of Needs and RisksInadequate Tool or Aid

MAINTENANCEFailure Not to Detect During IMR

Lack of MaintenanceInadequate Maintenance

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONSToo Low Visibility for Observation

Traffic Density Hinders Vessel Control

EMERGENCY PREPARDNESSContingency Plans not Updated

Training IgnoredLacks Initiative to Deal with Emergencies

BUSINESS CLIMATEEconomic Conditions

Market Change

ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MANAGEMENTPolicy, Ethical Values

Focus on Liability and PunishmentCommunicate Policy

Set Standard by ExampleCompany Loyalty and Commitment

Response to Feedback from EmployeesVessel Undermanned

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENTPressure to Keep Schedule and CostsInadequate Procedures and Checklists

SE MANAGEMENTCritical System and Cargo Documentation

InspectionFollow-up on Non-Conformities

Incident Reporting, Analysis, ImprovementWork Instruction

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH MANAGEMENTInformation about Health RisksPersonal Protective Equipment

Health Control of PersonnelWorkspace Inspections

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENTHiring and Selection Policy

Inadequate Training ProgramSelection/Training of Officers

SYSTEM ACQUISITIONSubstandard ComponentsSubstandard Contractors

Control of Contractors

DESIGNDeviation from Standards/Specifications

Inappropriate RegulationsDesign Error

MAINTENANCE POLICYLack of Priority to Inspection/Maintenance/Repair (IMR)

Lack of Competent Repair Personnel

RISK ANALYSIS

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)

Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

“As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable” (ALARP) Principle

FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Hazard Identification

Risk Estimation (Possibly Fuzzy Set)

Risk Control Options

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Decision-Making

Panagiotis (Pete) D. Scarlatos, Dr.-Eng.

pscarlatos@civil.fau.edu561-699-2579