Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 1 HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED ARMS IN...
-
Upload
stephen-morton -
Category
Documents
-
view
215 -
download
1
Transcript of Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 1 HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED ARMS IN...
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 1
HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED
ARMS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON
1701 VIOLATION – CASE STUDY
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 2
Hizbullah Deployment Overview
Hizbullah’s military assets are deployed within populated areas throughout Lebanon, as part of its strategy, doctrine and preparation
for war.
5,000 Activists
≈30,000 Rockets
Hizbullah’s Deployment in Southern Lebanon
Command
Unit
Sector
Village
Each village area contains
dozens of activists and hundreds of
rockets
Concept of Operation
Massive long-range strike
Targeting mostly Israeli population centers
Territorial defense of the launching units
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 3
Background
The events of September 3rd join two
previous incidents of explosions in
Hizbullah arms depots located within
villages in Southern Lebanon
Previous Arms Cache Explosions
Tayr Falsay 12/10/09
An arms depot in the house of a senior Hizbullah
official exploded. Hizbullah operatives immediately
began to remove the arms, using trucks to transport
them to the nearby village of Dir Kanoon. UNIFIL
access was denied throughout the event
Hirbit Silim14/7/09
A series of explosions were observed in a building
on the outskirts of Hirbit Silim. Evidence of rockets,
mortars, artillery shells and more were found on
site, as well as vehicles and equipment indicating
that the site was active. LAF played a role in denying
UNIFIL access to the site, as Hizbullah activists
removed military evidence from the scene.
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 4
Background
“LAF and UNIFIL should intensify
efforts to discover and remove
weapons…make sure no armed
elements are in the area and prevent
possible smuggling…Ensure that
UNIFIL’s freedom of movement is
fully respected and ensure that
UNIFIL is able to discharge its
responsibilities according to UNSCR
1701”
Strengthen current activities…
improve their capacity to respond
promptly to such incidents and
ensure a presence at incident
sites within a minimum time
delay….include a set of
coordinated procedures to
immediately seal off and isolate
areas in which incidents have
taken place and ensure that they
are effectively secured”
“UNIFIL Investigation - Hirbat SilimUNIFIL Investigation - Tayr Falsay
UNIFIL‘s Lessons Learned
11/09/09 08/01/10
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 5
Overview
Based on IDF intelligence, corroborated by Lebanese
media reports, the Shihabiya site, owned by Wisam
Saloum, a senior Hibzullah activist, was known to be used
for Hizbullah military activity. The site contained arms, in
violation of UNSCR 1701, which specifically prohibits
armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of
the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL between the
Blue Line and the Litani River. In addition, the proximity of
these weapons endangers the local population, which
UNIFIL is required to protect, as per its mandate.A fire broke out at 1245 in a Hizbullah arms asset, followed by some secondary explosions.
Hizbullah operatives immediately cordoned the area, preventing all access. After
extinguishing the fire, the operatives transferred the arms from the shed into the nearby
building and removed all evidence. LAF and UNIFIL representatives were shown into the shed.
At night, after UNIFIL and LAF departed, dozens of activists transferred the weapons into
trucks and nearby buildings, and from there to other villages, all undistributed by UNIFIL or
LAF.
Shehabiyya, Southern Lebanon || 1245, 03/09/10
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 7
Initial Events 03 September 2010
TIMELINE
Fire observed in a known Hizbullah arms depot in Shehabiyya. Secondary explosions follow
1245
Hizbullah activists block off the area, extinguish the fire and transfer contents to nearby building
1413
Hizbullah activists arrive on scene1517
LAF forces arrive but are not granted entry into the area of the arms shed
1428
LAF forces depart from the scene1530
IDF informs UNIFIL regarding the incident1330
IDF updates that it believes munitions were present1418
Trucks arrive and begin to load the site’s contents1550
Following UNIFIL request, IDF provides UNIFIL with precise coordinates of trucks
1630
IDF informs that several trucks were 100m from the building and were being loaded
1550
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Focus Points
Unclassified || Slide 8
Indications of weapons and ammunition at site - secondary explosions,
shed roof blown off and top was immediately covered with plastic sheets.
The area was blocked off by large numbers of personnel who rapidly
arrived. LAF and UNIFIL arrived on the scene but were not granted access.
Access was ultimately granted to shed only at 1750 (5 hours later).
Reporters were also denied access.
Concealment efforts included cordoning the area, covering the roof,
cleaning the area and waiting for the veil of darkness for clean-up
operations.
Efforts to sanitize the scene relied on large amounts of trucks, other
vehicles, personnel and many hours of labor.
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 10
Clearing the Depot 03 September 2010
TIMELINE
UNIFIL and LAF officers are permitted entry to the cleared shed, not the building
1750
Long and heavy objects (likely rockets) are transferred from shed to a nearby location
2239
Hizbullah operatives form a human chain to transfer objects to nearby location. Objects are also removed through windows
2254
The trucks headed to Nabatiya0236
IDF conveys 3 possible munitions locations (one in Sela’a and two in Shehabiya), all which buildings known as Hizbullah military sites prior to the incident and to which the trucks arrived from the shed
1900
The convoy crosses the Litani River without being stopped. Materials are transferred to a mosque in Nabatiya.
~0310
UNIFIL states that it does not intend to search the houses with ammunition1945
IDF provides coordinates for truck obscured within a field nearby, intended for later transfer.
2200
IDF requests UNIFIL engagement after extensive activity in the building. FC responds that area is cordoned and that the shed has been inspected.
0005
UNIFIL encounters local resistance2330
UNIFIL informs the IDF that LAF would depart and return the next morning. 2100
IDF informs that the convoy began to move north. UNIFIL responds that exits are blocked.
0240
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Focus Points
Unclassified || Slide 11
Hizbullah went through great efforts to obscure the military equipment from the
scene, waiting until nightfall to transfer the goods to other locations in the
village, as well as another nearby village and a village north of the Litani River.
Hizbullah worked throughout the day and at night to clear the scene of evidence. LAF and
UNIFIL were prevented access until this was completed.
UNIFIL and LAF’s assurances of checkpoint effectiveness proved irrelevant, reason remains
to be seen.
The transfer to the mosque in Nabatiya reflects yet again Hizbullah use of civilian and
religious sites for military purposes. Probable rockets appeared in the aerial imagery.
The trucks and houses whose locations were conveyed to
UNIFIL and LAF were not inspected.
Hizbullah’s military assets removed from the scene
under the cover of night.
Side roads were used for the transfers, rather than major
thoroughfares.
THE MOSQUE IN NABATIYA
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 13
The Aftermath 04 September 2010
UNIFIL and LAF arrived late on scene, inspecting the shed only once access
was permitted by Hizbullah.
UNIFIL was only granted complete access to the shed the following day and
the building four days later, on September 7th.
Investigations later showed that massive amounts of water were used to
wash down the shed to obscure evidence.
LAF and UNIFIL failed to maintain grip and control of the scene following the
explosion and especially after nightfall, allowing the removal of equipment.
LAF and UNIFIL checkpoints failed to meet Hizbullah’s convoys and check
them, as required by 1701.
In two similar recent events (Hirbat Silim – 7/09, Tayr Falsay–
10/09), UNIFIL investigations recommended changes and lessons
learned that were not implemented.
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Summary
Unclassified || Slide 14
Third event in a little more than a year – emphasizing ongoing Hizbullah violations of UNSCR 1701
Hizbullah’s military deployment within civilian populations and exploitation of local population violates 1701, endangers population in routine and wartime.
LAF’s conduct – cooperation with Hizbullah and ongoing, increasingly hostile provocations
Need for independent and proactive UNIFIL fulfillment of its mandate: prevent illegal arms in AOR, protect population.
Threat to Israeli security, to Lebanon and regional stability.
Need for decisive action from the UN and the International Community to disarm Hizbullah and other armed militias, starting with south of the Litani.