Stoic Sources of Spinoza's Ethics – Paul O Kristeller

8/12/2019 Stoic Sources of Spinoza's Ethics Paul O Kristeller

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Stoic and Neoplatonic sources

of Spinoza's ethicsPaul Oskar Kristeller

a

aColumbia University, USA

To cite this article:Paul Oskar Kristeller (1984): Stoic and Neoplatonic sources of

Spinoza's ethics, History of European Ideas, 5:1, 1-15

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STOIC ND ~EOPL TONIC SOURCES OFSPINOZ S ETHIC. PP UL OSK R KRISTELLER~

Spinoza was an independent and original thinker, and we must try tounderstand his doctrine in all its detail on the basis of his writings and in termsof their own meaning and development. This is a difficult task, for hiswritings, and especialiy his Ethics are complicated and hard to understandand in part even obscure, and their method and terminology impose a difficulttask on a careful and precise reader and interpreter. I am not competent toattempt a comprehensive interpretation of his thought. and shall limit myselfto a subject which is perhaps less important, but also quite interesting, namelyto the sources of Spinozas Erhics. As all other original thinkers. Spinoza readmany of his predecessors, knew their doctrines, often transformed them, andoccasionally even cited them. The knowledge of his sources may help us tounderstand better certain aspects of his thought, and above all, to definemore precisely his place in a philosophical tradition which is not uniform butfairly continuous and which extends from Greek antiquity down to moderntimes. I should like to cite a remark made by Freudenthal with reference toSpinoza that might be applied also to other leading thinkers: Who wants tomake the significance of a philosopher depend on the narrowness of hisphilosophical education?

It has always been known, and it has been much emphasised by thehistorians of philosophy during the nineteenth century, that Spinoza wasdeeply influenced by the philosophy of Descartes, that he took over withoutchange many concepts and doctrines of this philosopher, and that his ownviews developed out of an effort to resolve certain problems and difficulties ofCartesian metaphysics, and above all, to overcome his rigid dualism of mindand body, or more precisely, of thought and extension. More recent scho-lars, and especially Harry A. Wolfson, have shown that the doctrine ofSpinoza, like that of Descartes, contains many concepts and technical termsthat go back to the Latin, and in the case of Spinoza, also to the Hebrewscholasticism of the Middle Ages and of the sixteenth century.3 Yet thestudies of Gilson on Descartes scholastic sources have been siipplemented byMatthias Meier and others who have called attention to the Platonist andStoic elements in Descartes. In a similar way, I shall try to show that Spinozatoo had other sources besides Descartes and Aristotle, and that he was also

* This paper is based on a lecture given at the University of Haifa on 22 March 1982,and at the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem on 2XMarch 19X2. An Italian version of the lecture (Fonti antiche e rinuscimentuli llEtica

lb Spinoza) was published in memory of Giorgio Radetti by the Circolo dellaCuitura e delle Arti. Trieste in 1981.

?423 West 120th St., New York, N7 10027, U.S.A.

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2strongly influenced by Stoic and Neoplntonic concepts, either in their originalancient form. or in the tr~~Ilsf(~rr~~~tion they had undergone during theRenaissance. I hope this attempt which is by no means completely new, mayhelp us to clarify some important and even central points in Spinozasthought, and may serve as a supplement or antidote to an exaggeratedemphasis on the Cartesian, Aristotelian and scholastic elements in Spinozasthought whose presence I do not wish to deny or to ignore.

I should like to mention in passing that there arc traces of ancient scepti-cism in Spinozas doctrine, as has been recently shown by Di Vona andPopkin, and also dements of Epicureanism such as the precept that the sageshould avoid sadness and should enjoy with moderation the innocent plea-sures of life. There are also echoes of Machiavelli in Spinozas politicalwritings, and perhaps also in a curious passage of his Ethics where he statesthat actions which are called bad according to custom are ~~ccornp~~nie~i by sadfeelings,7 and then stresses the fact that religion and custom arc not the samefor all human beings.

1 shall forego the temptation further to pursue these scattered notions,interesting as they are, and shall concentrate instead on the Stoic and Neo-platonic elements of Spinozas thought. I cannot mention all points of detailthat may be related to our topic, but must make a selection, and deal onlywith those thoughts that seem to me imp(~rt~~nt and to reflect Stoic andNcoplatonic rather than Cartesian or Aristotelian influences.

I should like to begin with the title of Spinozas major work. ~~~?~~fi. It hasoften been observed that this title does not quite seem to fit a work whichdeals for the most part with metaphysical problems and has for its basis andstarting point the doctrine of the divine substance, of its attributes and of itsmodifications. As a matter of fact, most readers and commentators haveconcentrated on the first part of the work which deals with God, and on thesecond part which deals in a similar speculative fashion with the human mind.But in reading Dantes Divine Cumecly, we should not stop with tht: Z~r~ertl~~.as many readers and critics have done. and in reading Spinozas Et l r i c s weshould not stop with the second part. It is the last three parts of the workwhich deal with the passions and with the happiness or beatitude of man, thatis. with topics which also traditionally belong to the realm of ethics. If thework begins with rn~t~lpllys~cal speculations, this merely means, as the authortells us more than once, that a valid system of ethics must be based onmetaphysics and on physics. Thus we read in one of his letters that a greatpart of ethics must be founded on metaphysics and on physics, as is known toeverybody, and in the treatise on The Improvement of the Intellect theethical goal of all philosophical inquiry appears very clearly. In the preface tothe second part of his Ethics Spinoza says explicitly that among the things thatare derived from Gods essence he wants to discuss only those that may leadus to a knowledge of the human mind and of its supreme happiness. Thisview of the relation between ethics and the theoretical disciplines of meta-physics and physics is completely different from that of Aristotle and of hissuccessors for whom ethics has many connections with the theoretical disci-

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Sources of Spinozas Ethics 3plines, to be sure, but does not have them for its foundation. On this point,Spinoza rather follows the tradition of the Stoics (and also of the Epicureans)who grounded their ethics firmly upon their logic and physics although theyconsidered ethics as the most important part of philosophy for which theother parts merely serve as foundations or introductions. The subject whichSpinoza calls metaphysics is treated by the Stoics, at least to some extent, as apart of their logic and physics.

A great difficulty for the understanding and interpretation of SpinozasEthics derives from the method which he follows in presenting and developinghis metaphysical and ethical doctrines. Spinoza defines his method in thevery title of his work as geometrical, and he actually presents his reader witha strict sequence of definitions, axioms, theorems (propositiones) and demon-strations that is but occasionally interrupted by scholia, corollaries and ap-pendices. In this methodological procedure the Ethics of Spinoza isfundamentally different from, and even opposed to, the Ethics of Aristotle.Aristotle clearly states in the first book of his Nicomachean Ethics that allethical doctrines are valid but in an approximate fashion and far removedfrom the precision of mathematical knowledge. Aristotle also states furtherthat each discipline has its own particular method which may be more or lessprecise, depending on the subject matter and its exigencies. This statementled to the question, often discussed by the commentators of Aristotle and alsoby Galileo, whether the excellence (nobilitas) of a discipline depends on theexcellence of its subject matter or on the precision of its method. In contrastto Aristotle, the Stoics treated also the field of ethics with a precise methodbased on definitions and demonstrations.

Yet Spinoza went even further when he explicitly adopted for his ethics themethod of geometry. He had used this method also in an earlier work, writtenin 1663, which he entitled Parts I and II of Descartess Principles of Philos-ophy, Demonstrated According to the Geometrical Method. He meant togive to his Ethics a precise and scientific form when he applied to it themethod of the mathematical disciplines, and especially of geometry, whichwas considered by Descartes and by other ancient and modern thinkers as themost precise of all methods.

If we try to find earlier examples for the application of the method ofgeometry, that is, of Euclid, to a philosophical treatise, we do not find it inthe Aristotelian tradition and not even in Descartes, but in the Elements ofTheology and in the Elements of Physics of the Neoplatonist Proclus who alsocomposed a commentary on the first Book of Euclid. The analogy strikes meas significant, although there is no clear evidence that Spinoza knew orimitated Proclus. In applying this method not only to metaphysics and physics, but also toethics. Spinoza even went beyond Proclus. Thus we read in the preface to thethird part of the Ethics as follows: I shall use the same method in discussingthe nature and force of the effects and the power of the mind over them, as Idid in the preceding sections when I dealt with God and the mind, and I shallconsider human actions and desires in no other way than if I had to talk aboutlines, surfaces and bodies. These words show us the wide distance thatseparates Spinoza in his very conception of ethics from the Aristotelian

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4 Paul Oskur Kristellertradition. However. I trust most scholars will agree with me when I say thatthe geometrical method of Spinozas Ethics does great honour to his acumenand to the precision of his reasoning. but that it constitutes a rather hard andartificial crust which we must penetrate and even crack if we wish to arrive ata real understanding of the substance and coherence of his thought.

The basic doctrine of Spinoza, which is developed in the first part of hisEthics, concerns the divine substance. its attributes, that is, thought andextension, and its modi, that is, the particular things which are understood aspassing and individual expressions and manifestations of the divine substance.whereas this substance. considered in itself. is infinite and eternal. Theconcept of a single substance from which all existing things are derived as itsmodifications is quite alien to the doctrine of Descartes whose dualismSpinoza is trying to overcome. and also completely alien to Aristotle and tothe Aristotelian tradition which had always posited a multitude of corporealsubstances. The only thinker prior to Spinoza in whose work we find a similardoctrine is Giordano Bruno. In his dialogue De lu causa, Bruno posits a singledivine and infinite substance which comprises form and matter and fromwhich all particular things are derived as mere passing accidents andmanifestations. Ix In order to arrive at his own position, all that Spinoza had todo was to replace Brunos concepts of form and matter with the Cartesiannotions of thought and extension. and to use the term modi instead ofBrunos accidents. something he had to do anyway since for Spinoza, inrelation to the divine substance. both the attributes and the modi are acci-dents. The term accident thus became ambiguous for him, and consequentlyhe made no use of it. A conceptual affinity between Bruno and Spinoza hasbeen observed by several scholars, such as Sigwart, Lovejoy and M eon,yet they speak in terms of broader notions and do not emphasise this precisepoint of agreement between the two thinkers, namely the relation between asingle substance and its many accidents or modi.We have no direct evidence that Spinoza knew or read Brunos work, butthere is a certain probability that he did; Spinoza had a reading knowledge ofItalian, to judge from certain books in his private library. Brunos writingswere rare and difficult to obtain, to be sure, but they were not prohibited inProtestant Holland as they were in the Catholic countries, and the De lu cuusuwas printed in London in 1584. Moreover, the conceptual similarity is so closethat a direct influence is more likely than a chance coincidence. Finally,Spinoza presents the doctrine of a single substance and of its modi already inhis Short Treatise which was written before the Ethics and has been preservedonly in Dutch, and he appends to this treatise two dialogues, a literary genrewhich he does not use elsewhere, and introduces in these dialogues, as a chiefinterlocutor who expresses the views of the author, a certain Theophilus. Inthe De la cuusu, which consists of five dialogues, Bruno uses as a spokesmanfor his own views an interlocutor who from the second dialogue on is calledTeofilo (he appears also in the Cerzu delle ceneri), whereas in the first dialogueof De la cuusu and in the dialogues De linfinito he is called Filoteo, a name

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Sources of S@ozas Ethics 5that has the same meaning and is almost identical.

If we pass from Spinozas metaphysics to his ethical and moral doctrineswhich he presents mainly in parts III and IV of his major work, we observeagain quite easily and on many points that his general outlook is Stoic ratherthan Aristotelian. It is significant that Spinoza had both Seneca and Epictetusin his library. 2X Moreover, the Stoic writings of Justus Lipsius were widelydiffused and read during the seventeenth century, hence it is likely that heread them, although he did not own them. We do not read only the bookswhich we own, and vice versa, we do not read all the books which happen tobe in our library.

Spinoza states in the sixth proposition of the third part that each thing tends(~~~2~~~~~) y itself to persist in its existence.5 This principle which doniinatesthe entire section that follows, and which is often referred to with a somewhatless than fortunate abbreviation as the principle of the conarus, is nothing elsebut the impulse of selfpreservation which occupies a central place in the Stoicsystem of ethics.

Spinoza also follows the Stoics when he places the doctrine of the passionsat the centre of his ethics. Aristotle has comparatively little to say on thepassions in his Ethics. and deals with them mainly in his Rhetoric, and as aresult, the medieval copyists and commentators considered Aristotles rhe-toric as a part of his moral philosophy.2n It was mainly the Stoics who treatedthe theory of the passions as a major part of their ethics. They attemptedabove all a classification of the passions.2 and defined virtue as a victory ofreason over the passions. However, Spinoza modified the doctrine andterminology of the Stoics on several significant points. Since the word passionitself (passio) has an overtone of passivity, Spinoza uses for the emotions ingeneral the term affectus and then distinguishes between passive affects orpassions and active affects which are actions of the human mind. He theninsists correctly that a passion or passive affect can be overcome only byanother affect and not by a mere thought. Hence he interprets the victory ofreason over the passions as a victory of the active affects which originate inthe mind over the passive affects which originate in our sense experience andnot in the mind. In this manner, the philosopher (the sage of the Stoics) canfree himself from the servitude of the passive affects (which are the subjectmatter of the fourth part) and attain the intellectual freedom which isdescribed in the fifth and last part of his work. Spinoza follows the Stoicdoctrine also in his classification and description of the passions although hemodifies it on the basis of some original conceptions. Spinoza posits threebasic passions which he calls gladness (lueritiu), sadness (rrisritirr) and desire(cupiditus) . The St oics had added a fourth basic passion. namely fear,which is omitted by Spinoza and treated by him as a sub-species of sadness? Ishall not discuss in detail the various definitions of the individual passions inwhich Stoic conceptions are mixed with Aristotelian, Cartesian and originalnotions. However, it is important to note that Spinoza recognises as activeaffects only certain forms of gladness (laetitiu) and of desire (cupiditas)whereas he entirely omits sadness (~r~~fi~iff)n this connection.. Also theStoics had a theory of positive affects which is not too well known. They

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6distinguished three of them, will (volunr~~s), joy (~~~f~j~~) and cautioncuufio), which are evidently the counterparts of three passions (cnpidiras,hetitiu and metus), leaving the fourth passion (trisritiu) without a positive

counterpart.3 Spinoza, who may have known this doctrine from Cicero,omits also caution which would have been the counterpart of fear (WWUS)which he had also omitted from the basic passions.

I shall touch only briefly on other Stoic elements in Spinoza. Clearly Stoicand not Aristotelian is his radical determinism, and also his tendency to denyany form of contingency and to explain it merely through our ignorance of itscauses3 Spinoza also follows Stoic doctrine when he despises with Epictetusall goods and evils of fortune because they are not in our power.3I4 when herejects compassion as a mere sentim~nt,~ when he considers reason as thefoundation of virtue, and when he insists with Pomponazzi and Kant thatvirtue must be desired for its own sake.* It is also easy to think of Stoicinfluences when Spinoza considers human reason as a part of the divinemind, and when he suggests in the last section of his work that not all humanbeings but only the sages attain an eternal existence.4

In his Wzics Spinoza speaks rather seldom of political and social problems.but he deals with them in his other writings, and especially in the Tractatustheologicn=politicus and in the Tructutus politicrrs. The doctrine of naturallaw which is prominent in the Tructatus pokricus is quite characteristic ofSpinoza who also cites and criticises the ideas of ~lachiav~lli and of Hobbes.The theory of natural law is ~lnkno~/rl to Aristotle (although it has beenattributed to him again and again, whereas he only states that there is anaturat justice), and it is clearly of Stoic origin. According to Stoic doctrine,all human laws have a common and natural foundation and model in auniversal law which is inherent in the soul of the world, the divine principle ofall things. The doctrine of natural law, as it was defended in the seventeenthand eighteenth centuries by Hugo Grotius, by Spinoza himself and by manyother thinkers needs much further inquiry and clarification, not only in itsrelation to medieval philosophy and jurisprudence, but also to the Stoicdoctrine which was widely diffused in the late sixteenth and in the seven-teenth century. It is usually forgotten that the famous words with which theStoic philosopher Chrysippus began his treatise on Iaw are cited nd pre-served in their original Greek wording in the Corpus Jtrris R~~~~~i~i, and thatalso in the Middle Ages which followed (just as does our time) the ruleGrneca sunt non leguntur, the words of Chrysippus could be read in Latin inthe manuscripts and editions of the Digest: The law is the queen of all thingshuman and divine. It must be the prince, leader and head of the good andbad, and accordingly the rule of he just and unjust and of those animals thatare by nature social, prescribing what should be done and forbidding whatshould not be done.J These words and ideas that still had some impact onthe American constitution have been forgotten or rejected during the last fewdecades, and I consider this as a grave loss for our legal system and for ourmoral and political thought.

Although Spinozas Ethics placed man as an individual at the centre, as weshall see the work contains some interesting remarks about the relations

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Sources of Spinozas Ethics 7which link the individual with other human beings and with the wider politicaland social community. A reasonable and virtuous person attains his highestgoal, the tranquillity of the mind, not only for his own benefit, but he is alsowell disposed towards all other persons, and willing to join a community thatis based on just and moral principles. Also in this area we recognise a Stoicorientation when Spinoza defines a human being with Seneca as a socialanimal, and not with the Aristotelian tradition as a political animal. Stoic isalso the exclusion of the animals from the social community of men, andStoic is the belief that all free persons, that is, all philosophers and sages, andthey alone, are linked with each other by nature through mutual friendship.

Whereas we may observe in parts III and IV of the Ethics, and especially inthe theory of the passions. a strong Stoic flavour, we find instead a distinctNeoplatonic element in Spinozas doctrine of the highest end of our life. as itis described especially in the fifth part of the Ethics. It is not always possiblefor us to determine with certainty the specific sources of his doctrine. Theworks of Plato and the Neoplatonists do not appear in the catalogue ofSpinozas library. with the exception of Leone Ebreo whose dialogues on loveSpinoza owned in a Spanish translation. Spinoza mentions Plato and thePlatonists very rarely in his writings, and when he does mention them his toneis rather critical or even polemical. Thus he says in a letter that the authorityof Plato, Aristotle and Socrates has but little weight for him, but in myopinion this sentence merely means that he does not recognise the authorityof the three ancient philosophers when it is opposed to reason. We certainlycannot deny, on the basis of this statement alone, that there are manyPlatonising concepts in the thought of Spinoza, if he does not present them assuch or if he is not conscious of their origin. Even if he never read Plato,Plotinus or Proclus, he could not help knowing many of their thoughtsthrough other indirect sources. even through some authors who are notknown to be pure Platonists. There are Neoplatonic elements even in thethought of most Aristotelians of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance,including Averroes, Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas, and in the writings ofthose sixteenth-century Jewish writers whom Spinoza read in his youth, andof some of the Spanish authors whose works he had in his library.

The concept of God as a cause of himself which appears at the verybeginning of the Ethics is ultimately traceable to Proclus, as was noticed longago,-2 and the same is true of the famous distinction between God as naturanafurans and the sum of all modi as natura nafurata.53 The terms occur in themedieval Latin versions of Aristotle and Averroes, and Spinozas immediatesource may have been a passage in Aquinas,, but the concept itself is nodoubt of Neoplatonic origin.

Clearly Neoplatonic is also the distinction between the various forms ofknowledge as it appears repeatedly in the Ethics and with minor modificationsalso in the early treatise On the Improvement of the Intellect. Spinozaposits as the first form of knowledge, opinion or imagination which is basedon a vague experience or on representations based on memory. The second

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8 PuihE Uskar Kristeflerform is reason (t-do), that is, the knowledge through general concepts, andthe third form is intuitive knowledge through adequate ideas. From thecorresponding passage in the treatise On the Improvement of the Intellect itappears even more clearly that the second form of knowledge consists in akind of reflection which proceeds from one thing to another. whereas thethird kind is a direct knowledge of its object through its own essence andcause. Leaving aside the lower form of knowledge provided by opinion orimagination, we thus have two degrees of knowledge in the proper sense ofthe word which we may call with Kant discursive and intuitive, a distinctionwhich is made also by Aristotle and more fully developed in Plato and theNeoplatonists. This doctrine recurs in many medieval philosophers whoclearly distinguish between reason (r o) and intellect (~~zre~~e~~~~.~).othforms of knowledge are clearly distinct from the mere opinion and imagi-nation which is based on sense perception and of which Spinoza does notthink very highly. In the course of his work it becomes quite clear that allstatements made by Spinoza on the divine substance, on its attributes andmodi and on the relation between the human mind and God are based onintuitive knowledge.

Of great interest is Spinozas doctrine of the slavery and freedom of man, acontrast that is indicated in the very titles of parts IV and V of the Ethics.5 Incontrast with the entire Aristotelian tradition, Spinoza clearly and consis-tently rejects the idea that man has a free will (fibenrm ~irb~triuin),or a facultyof willing (vo~~/~r~s) distinct from the intellect. or a free choice betweenseveral possible actions. This freedom is an illusion. and even God is freeonly in the sense that he is not determined from the outside but depends onlyon his own nature and essence. Although a person has no free choicebetween his actions, he is free in another sense and in two different respects.We must attribute to man some freedom if he can make a basic choicebetween the unhappy life dominated by passions and the happy life ruled bythe intellect and by its active affects. Without this basic freedom of decisionneither the Ethics nor the treatise On the Improvement of the Intellectwould make any sense, for both works are written with the explicit purpose ofadmonishing and guiding the reader so that he may relinquish the life of thesenses and passions and adopt the life of the intellect and of the active uffccts.It is this latter kind of life which philosophy holds out before him andprescribes to him, and which contains in itself the perfection and happiness ofwhich he is capable.

Whereas this basic freedom which we might call existential is presupposedbut not explicitly demonstrated by Spinoza who does not even apply the termfreedom to it, he distinguishes explicitly between the slavery of the life of thepassions and the freedom of the life of the intellect. This distinction appearsin the titles of parts IV and V of the Ethics, as we have seen, in the prefaces tothese two parts, and in the last propositions of part IV where the person whofollows the intellect and leads the life of the philosopher and of the sage iscalled a free man. Hence there are two basic forms of human life which areradically different from each other, the unfree life of the passions and the freelife of the intellect. Since we have the choice between these two forms of life.

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Sources of Spinozas Ethics 9we are led to the paradoxical formula which is not found in Spinoza butimplicit in his thought: a human person has the free choice between the freeand the unfree life. This conception appears almost in the same terms inPlotinus, as I tried to show more than fifty years ago in my dissertation, andit appears also in Augustine, although with some significant modifications.For Augustine, because of original sin, the basic choice is no longer free, andwe need the intervention of divine grace in order to restore its freedom to ourcorrupt will. I am not prepared to decide whether Spinoza knew the doc-trine of Plotinus directly or indirectly. or whether he took up the doctrine ofAugustine and arrived indirectly and unconsciously, through the omission ofsin and grace, at a doctrine similar to that of Plotinus. But even if Spinozaarrived independently at this doctrine, it remains worthy of note that hecompletely agrees on such an important point with the thought of the founderof Neoplatonism.

Another basic notion of Spinoza which lends itself to similar considerationsis the doctrine of eternity. The concept of eternity is introduced at thebeginning of the first part of the Ethics and appears again among the essentialqualities of God and of his attributes and in the last part among the qualitiesthat are attributed to our intellect or at least to a part of it. The sameconcept underlies also the important doctrine according to which our intellectis able to know all things sclh specie aeterrzitatis. From the context it becomesclear that this obscure and often cited but rarely explained phrase refers to thethird kind of knowledge, that is, to intuitive knowledge which grasps all thingsin God and through God, but not in themselves or in their real or temporalexistence. By eternity Spinoza does not merely understand an infinite exten-sion in time (duratio), but rather a quality which transcends all time andbelongs to the reality of God. This doctrine of an eternity which is not aninfinitely extended time but belongs to a higher reality beyond all time andwhich surpasses and transcends all temporal things was discussed by Plotinusin a separate treatise. and remained alive in the thought of many laterthinkers. We may especially mention Augustine who clearly distinguishesbetween eternity and time,5 and Boethius who defines eternity as the simul-taneously complete and perfect possession of an unlimited life. It seemsclear to me that Spinoza followed this tradition. although we cannot deter-mine with certainty which particular thinker was his direct source in thismatter. On the other hand, this doctrine acquires in his thought some newtraits, as had been the case with the other traditional doctrines which wediscussed before.

Spinozas links with the Neoplatonic tradition become even clearer whenwe consider his doctrine of the love of God which occupies a prominent placein the last part of his Ethics. In his first attempt to define love, Spinozacriticises some unnamed predecessors who might be identified with LeoneEbreo and who define love as the will of the lover to be united with hisbeloved object. But further on, when Spinoza identifies the love of theintellect for God with the highest good common to all human beings, hefollows a broad metaphysical and theological tradition that begins with Platoand includes the Neoplatonists, many Christian and Jewish thinkers of the

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IOMiddle Ages, and all Renaissance Platonists from Ficino to Bruno, andamong them Leone Ebreo.h9 That Spinoza in his theory of love was especiallyinfluenced by Leone Ebreo has been shown by Gebhardt and others andseems to me highly probable, and I do not agree with Wolfson who tries tominimise this influence. We know that Spinoza had a Spanish translation ofLeone in his library, and Spinozas doctrine of love does share many traitswith that of the Renaissance Platonists and especially of Leone Ebreo. In thePlatonist tradition of the Renaissance, the love for God is always linked withthe knowledge of God, just as in Spinoza, but the two concepts of love andknowledge are always clearly distinguished. and at the most it is discussedwhether the love for God and the knowledge of God are parallel or simul-taneous acts of the mind, or which of the two acts is superior to the other. Theproblem is still related to the debate between the schools of Thomas andDuns Scotus about the superiority of intellect and will, and it reappears in adebate between Marsilio Ficino and the Dominican Vincenzo Bandello whichI had occasion to study a number of years ago. The formula intellectuallove for God which combines the two acts of intellect and will seems to occuronly in Spinoza71 who firmly opposed a distinction between will and intellect,but it happens that just on this point Leone comes closer to him than does anyother Platonist when he uses the term mental love. In contrast to Leone.however, Spinoza denies that there is a love of God for man, and insistsinstead that God has an intellectual love for himself, and that the intellectuallove of the human mind for God is derived from this divine love.77 At this lastpoint, Spinozas doctrine is closer to Ficino than to Leone Ebreo.

The doctrines of freedom, of eternity and of love are different conceptualexpressions of a deeper basic attitude which pervades the entire thought andwork of Spinozn and which links him not only with Leone. but with the entireNeoplatonic tradition, and especially with Plotinus and Ficino. The know-ledge of God and the intellectual love for God which constitute the contentand goal of our contemplative and philosophical life are based on an immedi-ate spiritual conscience and experience. We sense and experience that we areeternal, as Spinoza states in a characteristic passage. We are here con-fronted with the same layer in Spinozas thought that has prompted somescholars to call him a mystic. The word mysticism easily makes us think of allkinds of visions, and of a tradition that is religious rather than philosophical.Yet we may be permitted to speak also of a philosophical and metaphysicaland even of a rational mysticism which opposes an inner experience of Godand of the intelligible world to the common external experience of the dailyand corporeal world, but interprets this inner experience through rational andphilosophical concepts. It is in this sense that we may call Spinoza a mysticalphilosopher and compare him, not with visionaries or religious enthusiasts,but with the contemplative philosophers of the Western tradition. that is, withPlato, Plotinus and many other philosophers of antiquity, of the Middle Ages,of the Renaissance and of modern times. Unlike his predecessors, Spinozamanaged to include in his speculative philosophy also the metaphysics ofDescartes, the physics and mathematics of the seventeenth century, and thepolitical ideas of Machiavelli, Hobbes and other early modern thinkers. Yet

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Sources of Spinozas Ethics I1in addition to these novel and rnodern elements in Spinozas thought weshould also pay some attention to the metaphysical notions that are ofNeoplatonic origin, and to the moral doctrines that are of Stoic provenance.They have been neglected by most modern interpreters of Spinoza, but theyare an integral part of his thought, and they make it possible for us to inserthim in the great metaphysical and ethical tradition which extends from Platoto Hegel - at least - and which I believe, in spite of recent changes andinnovations, has not lost its philosophical validity and relevance.

On the other hand, our philosophical tradition is not uniform, but complexand full of contradictions, and hence philosophers and historians of philos-ophy will continue to discuss and interpret it in different ways. I hope thisdiscussion will go on without interruption, and in a form that is both seriousand worthy of our tradition. P. 0. KristellerColumbia University

NOTES1. wer aber moechte die Bedeutung eines Philosophen von der Beschraenktheit

seiner philosophischen Bildung abhaengig machen? J. Freudenthal, Spinoza unddie Scholastik, in Philosophische Aufsaetze, Eduard Zeller zu seinem fuenfzig-jaehrigen Doctorjubifaeum gewidmet (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 83-138 (p. 137).

2. Spinozas first published work is entitled Renati Des Curtes Principiorum Philo-sophiae par.s I et II, More Geometric0 demonstratae (1663). See Spinoza, Opera.Vol. I, ed. C. Gebhardt (Heidelberg, lY25), pp. 123-230.

3. H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy ofspinoza , 2 ~01s. Cambridge, Mass., lY34). Cf.E. Gilson, Etudes sur le r6le de la per e mkditvale dans la formation du systPmecartCsien (Paris, 1930); Index sco[astic-cart~sien (Paris, 19 13). See also Freuden-thal. lot. cit.; R. Mckeon. The Philosophy ofSpinoza (New York, 1928). pp. 21-52; G.Radetti. Spinoza, in Questioni di storiografia filosofica. ed. V. Mathieu(Brescia, 1979). pp. 355-434.

4. M. Meier, Descartes und die Renaissance (Miinster, 1914).5. P. i Vona, Spinoza e lo scetticismo classico, Rivista critica di storia della

filoso-Sofia 13 (1958), pp. 29 l-304: R. H. Popkin. The History of Scepticism fromErasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, lY79), pp. 229-48 and 278-99. For the Neoplato-nit sources of Spinoza, see a1s.o H. Siebeck. Ueber die Entstehung der termininatura naturans und natura naturata. Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie 3(1890), pp. 37 8; C. Gebhardt. Spinoza und der Platonismus. Chronicon Spi-nozanum 1 (1921). pp. 178-234.

6. Ethica IV. prop. 45, schol. (Opera II, pp. 244-5).7. Ethica III, Affectuum definitiones. 27 Explicatio (p, 197): quod omnes omnino

actus, qui ex consuetudine pravi vocantur, sequatur tristitia.8. Epistola 27: magnam ethices partem, quae, ut cuivis notum, Metaphysics. et

Physica fundari debet (Opera IV, pp.16 1).9. De intellectus emendutione et de via, quu optime in veram rerum cognitionem

dirigitur. (Opera, pp. 5 ff.).10. Opera II. p. 84: sed ea solummodo. quae nos ad mentis humanae, eiusque

summae beatitudinis cognitionem, quasi manu, ducere possunt.

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12 Paul Oskar Kristellet11. Cf. Stoicorurn Veterum Frugtnenta, ed. H. von Arnim I (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 16. fr.

46. Chrysippus places physics after ethics (II. pp. 16-17. fr. 42). but also for himethics remains the main part of philosophy.

12. ~~~~cu ordine ~~~~zetri~~ ~~~~~~~~tr~t~i He had used the same method in an earlwork. see above, note 2.13. Aristotle, Nicomuchean Ethics I I. 1094 b 11-13 and 19-27.14. Nobilitas scientiae a quo sumatur. Quaestio est a quo sumatur magia nobilitas

scientiae, an a nobilitate subiecti, an a certitudine demonstrationis. vel aequaliterab ambobus (L. Ferri, Intorno atle dottrine psicologiche di Pietro Pompo-nazzi. . , . . Atti della Reale ~~~d~~~~~l ri Lincei Ser. II. Vol. 3 (~~e~~~~j~ dellaClasse di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Fiiologiche. 1876). pp. 333-548 (pp. 423-S).Cf. Galileo Galilei, Opere, Ed. Naz. 6 (1896), p. 237; 7 (1897), p. 246.

15. See above, note 2.16. Pro s, The Elements of Theology. ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1963):Procli Diadochi Lycii Elementutio Physica, ed.H.Boese (Berlin, 1958, giving the

Greek text and the medieval Latin translation); In ~rj~?z~~ ~l~clidi.~ e~e??~e~zt[~rc{~ytlibrum co~~zentari~, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1873). Proclus Elements ofTheology were twice translated into Latin, first by William of Moerbeke O.P.(s.XIII) and again by Francesco Patrizi. The former translation survived in anumber of manuscripts but was printed only in our time (Procli ElementatioTheologica translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke, ed. C. Vansteenkiste, Tijd.schr@voor Ph~lo.~o~~hie 13 119511, pp. 263-302 and 49 l-531). Patrizis translation wasprinted in Ferrara in 1583. An Arabic compendium of the work of Pro s wastranslated into Latin around 1200 under the title Liber de causis, circulated widelyin manuscripts but was printed only in 1882 (Die pseudo-aristotelische SchriftUeher das reine Cute, bekannt unter dem Narnen Liber de causis, ed. 0. Bar-denhewer, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1882). This work was commented upon byThomas Aquinas and printed repeatedly in his collected Opera (Rome, 1570;Venice, 1593: Antwerp, 1612; Paris. 1660). It is likely that Spinoza read this workrather than the Elements of Pro s.

17. Part III, Praefatio (p. 138): de Affectuum itaque natura. et viribus, ac Mentis ineosdem potentia eadem Method0 agam, qua in praecedentibus de Deo, et Menteegi, et humanas actiones, atque appetitus considerabo perinde, ac si Quaestio delineis, planis, aut de corporibus esset.18. G.Bruno, De ia causa, princil~~o e uno. Diulogu setondu. Bruno. Dialogh~ it~liiani,ed. G. Aquilecchia (Florence, 195X), pp. 227ff.

19. C. Sigwart, Spinozas neuentdeckter Tractat von Goft, denr Memchen und dessenGlueckseligkeit (Gotha. 1X66), pp. 107-34. A. 0. Lovejoy, The Diulectic, ofBruno and Spinoza, University of California Publications, Philosophyl(Berkeley, 1904), pp. 141-74. McKeon, lot. cit p. 22.

20. He had in his library an Italian-Spanish vocabulary (in octave. no. 9) and perhapsan Italian edition of Machiavelii (in quarto. no. 14). See K. J. Servaas vanRooijen, lnventaire des Livres formant Ia BibliothPque de Benedict Spinoza(Hague and Paris, 1888), p. 175 and pp. 144-S. Cf. J. Freudenthal, DieLebengmchichte Spinozus in Quellenschriften, Urkunden und nicht nmtlichcnNuchrichten (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 160-4.

21. Korte Vt~~harzde~ing vat2 God, de Mensch, etz deszelfs We/stand (Opera i,pp. l-121).

22. Bruno, Dialoghi italiani, pp. 19ff: 19Iff.: 367ff, Cf.Sigwart, pp. 130-l.23. In duodecimo, no.8 (van Rooijen. p. 18X) and in octave. no. 8 (pp. 174-S).24. L. Zanta. La Renaissance du Stoicisme au XVI E si?cie (Paris. 1914). J. I-.

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Sources of Spinozus Ethics 13Saunders, Justus Lips : The Philosophy of Renuissance Stoicism (New York,1955); G. Abel. Stoizismus und fruehe Neuzeit: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte mod-ernen Denkens it-n Felde von Ethik und Politik (Berlin and New York. 1978).

25. Ethica III, prop. 6: unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverareconatur. Opera II. p. 146.26. Arnim III, p. 43, fr. 178, cf. p. 44. fr. 183.27. Aristotle, Rhetorica II, chaps. 1-11.28. P. 0. Kristeller, Rtnaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York, 1979), pp. 240

and 322.29. Arnim III, pp. 92-133.30. Ethica III, def. 3 (p. 139) and passim. As far as I can see, Spinoza shows but a

slight, if any, indebtedness to Descartes Trait6 des Passions (1649).31. Ethica IV, prop. 7 and 14 (pp. 214 and 219).32. Ethica III, prop. 11 schol. (p. 149).33. Arnim III, p. 94, fr. 3868.34. Ethica III, Affectuum definitiones 13 (p. lY4).35. Ethica III, prop. 59 (p. 188).36. Arnim III, pp. 105-7.37. Cicero, Tusc. disp. IV, 12, cf. Arnim III, pp. 1067, fr. 438.38. Ethica I, prop. 29 (p. 70) and prop. 33, scol. 1 p. 74: res aliqua nulla alia de causa

contingens dicitur, nisi respectu defectus nostrae cognitionis). Cf. Arnim II, p.281, fr. 965-71.

39. Ethica II, prop. 49, schol. (p. 136: res fortunae, sive quae in nostra potestate nonsunt), cf. Epictetus, Enchiridion, chap. 1.40. Ethica IV, prop. 50 (p. 247), cf. Arnim III, p. 163, fr. 641 and passim.

41. Ethica IV, prop. 24 (p. 226).42. Ethica IV, prop. 18. schol. (p. 222, line 29: virtutem propter se esse appetendam),

cf. Arnim III, pp. 11-13. P. Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, chap. 14, ed.G. Morra (Bologna, 1954). p. 202: praemium essentiale virtutis est ipsamet virtus.

43. Ethica II, prop II, coroll. (p. 94): mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectusDei. Cf. Arnim I, p. 111, fr. 495 (lines 8-9); II, p. 191. fr. 633 (lines 39-40); p.217, fr. 774 (line 17) and 776 (line 24).

44. Ethica V prop. 42, schol. (p. 308): sapiens sui, et Dei, et rerum aeternaquadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit; sed semper vera animiacquiescentia potitur. For the Stoics, only the souls of the sage live at least untilthe next conflagration. Arnim II, pp. 223-4.

45. Lex est omnium divinarum et humanarum rerum regina. Oportet autem earn essepraesidem (etiam praesidere) et bonis et malis et principem et ducem esse, etsecundum hoc regulam esse iustorum et iniustorum et eorum quae natura civiliasunt animantium, praeceptricem quidem faciendorum, prohibitricem autem nonfaciendorum (Dig. 1,3,2). The Greek text is preserved in the Florentine manu-script of the Pandects and cited without the indication of this source by Arnim III,p. 77, fr. 314. The Latin translation, probably by Burgundio Pisanus (s.XII) wasapparently substituted in all medieval manuscripts and early modern editions. Iam indebted for much pertinent information to Domenico Maffei and to the latePeter Classen. The first sentence is an adaptation of two lines of Pindar (fr.169)quoted by Plato (Gorgius 484 b 4-5), as I was informed by Michael Landmann. Ido not claim that Spinozas concept of ius naturale or ius naturae (TractatusPoliticus 2,i; 2,4; Epistola 50; Opera III, pp. 27627 and IV, pp. 238-9) is directlyrelated to the Stoic Lex naturalis. Yet the influence of the Stoic doctrine on theRoman law and its tradition can hardly be denied.

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14 Paul Oskar Kristellrr46. Ethica IV, prop. 37, schol. 2 (pp. 237-Y).47. Ethica IV, prop. 35, schol. (p. 234. lines 7-8). Cf. Seneca, De heneficiis VII, 1.7

(sociale animal); Aristotle, Politica I 2, 1253 a 2-3.48. Ethicu IV, prop. 37, schol.1 (p. 237. line 2: non cum brutis). Cf. Arnim III.pp. 89-91.49. Ethicu IV, prop. 71 (p. 263).Cf. Arnim III, p. 161. fr. 63 l.50. In quarto. no.22 (van Rooijen. p. 152). L. Ebreo, Dialoghi damore. ed. S.

Caramella (Bari, 1929). A critical edition which makes use of five manuscriptsnow known (and unknown to Caramella) is being prepared by Professor WilliamMelczer.

51. Epistola 56 (IV, p. 261): non multum apud me Authoritas Platonis. Aristotelis, acSocratis valet.

52. Ethica I, def.1 (II, p. 45). Cf. Siebeck, pp. 371-2.53. Ethicu I, prop. 20, schol. (p. 71). Cf. Siebeck lot. cit.54. S. Th. I-II. qu. 95, a. 6, Cf. Wolfson I, p. I6 and pp. 253-S.55. Ethicu II, prop. 40, schol.2 (p. 122) and pussim. De intellectus emendutione

(pp. 1Off.).56. Part IV (p. 205): de servitute Humana, seu de Affectuum Viribus. Part V

(p. 277): de Potentia Intellectus, seu de Libertate Humana.57. Ethicu II, prop. 4X and 49 pp. 129-30).58. Ethicu I, definitio 7 (p. 46).59. Ethicu IV, prop. 67-72 (pp. 261-4): homo liber.Cf. the prefaces to part IV

(p. 205) and V (p. 277).60. Plotinus, Em. VI, 8, cf. P.O. Kristeller. Der Begriff der Se in der Ethik desPlorin (Tiibingen, 1929), pp. 78-89.61. On Augustines doctrine of freedom, see E.Gilson. Introduction Li ILtude de Suinr

Augustin (Paris, lY49), pp. 185-216.62. Ethicu I, def. 8 (p. 46) and prop. 10 (p. 64); V. prop. 23 and schol. (pp. 295-6).63. Ethicu V. prop. 29-30 (pp. 298-9).64. Enn. III, 7.65. Confessiones XI, 11: non autem praeterire quidquam in aeterno, sed totum esse

praesens. nullum vero tempus totum esse praesens. Cf.also XI 7 and 8.66. De consolutionr, V. 6: aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et

perfecta possessio. The words tota simul are often quoted out of context, and thusthe precise meaning of the doctrine becomes vague.67. Ethicu 111,Affectuum definitiones 6 (p. 192). In the Explicutio which follows

Spinoza criticises those qui definiunt Amorem esse voluntatem amantis seiungendi rei amatae.Cf. L. Ebreo. Diuloghi dumore, ed. Carama, p. 13: Iamorethe tt affetto volontario di fruire con unione la cosa stimata buona. Cf. J. C.Nelson, Renaissance Theory of L,ove (New York, 1958). p. X5.

68. Ethicu V, prop. 15-20 pp. 290-2) and 33-6 pp. 30 2), and especially prop. 20.demonstratio (p. 292).

69. Nelson, pp. 67-233.70. C. Gebhardt, Spinoza und der Platonismus, Chronicon Spinozunum I, 1921.pp. 178-234.71. Wolfson 71,277.72. See above, note 50.73. P. 0. Kristeller, The Philosophy of Mursilio Ficino (New York, 1943). pp. 256-88;

Le Thornisrne et lu pensPe italienne de la Renaissance (Montreal.l968), 93-123;Medieval Aspects of Renaissance Learning, ed. E. P. Mahoney (Durham, NorthCarolina, 1974), pp. 73-YO; A Thomist critique of Marsilio Ficinos theory of will

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Sowces of Spirzozas Ethics 1.5and intellect, in Harry Awtryn ~o~fs~~ jubilee Vo~~~~e Erl~~i.~hSection Vol. II(Jerusalem, 1965), pp. 463-94. M. Ficino The Phi[ebus Co~??~ze?zfur~ed. andtrans. IM. J. B. Allen (Berkeley. 1975).

74. Ethica V prop. 33-6 (pp. 30 2).75. Cf. Leone, pp. 44-7 and especially p. 45 for the phrase amore merrtule.76. Ethica V, prop. 17 and 19 (pp. 291--Z).77. Ethica V, prop. 35-6 (p. 302).78. Ethicu.V prop. 23,schol. (p. 296, line 4): Sentimus, experimurque, nos aeternos

esse. Cf. Prop. 2 (p. 281). prop. 6, schol. (p. 285) and prop. 27 (p. 297).

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Stoic Sources of Spinoza's Ethics – Paul O Kristeller

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