STINSON Eugene Govt Sentencing Memo

8/9/2019 STINSON Eugene Govt Sentencing Memo

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Case No. 3:09CR243(JBA)

:

v. ::

EUGENE STINSON : August 10, 2010

GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING

The government respectfully submits this memorandum in anticipation of the August 16,

2010 sentencing of the defendant, Eugene Stinson. In October 2009, a federal grand jury

returned an indictment charging Mr. Stinson with Conspiracy to Steal Firearms from a Federally

Licensed Firearm Dealer and Theft of Firearms from a Federally Licensed Firearm Dealer.

Those charges stemmed from an ATF stingoperation, using information from a cooperating

defendant, in which Eugene Stinson set up a scheme to steal numerous assault rifles from

American Precision Manufacturing (APM), a federally licensed firearms dealer. Eugene

Stinson organized the plan, and then instructed his father, Michael Stinson, and another

individual, on when, where, and how to steal the guns.

Mr. Stinson elected to proceed to trial, alongside his two co-defendants. The jury rejected

Mr. Stinsons claim of entrapment and found him guilty on both counts of the indictment.

The government disagrees with the PSRs calculation regarding Mr. Stinsons prior

felony convictions as a basis for enhancement. The government submits that Mr. Stinson has

only one prior conviction that qualifies to enhance his base level offense. The government agrees

with the PSRs remaining calculation. Thus, with six levels added because the offense involved

between 25-99 guns under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b) and a two-level adjustment because the

defendant was an organizer, leader, supervisor or manager in the criminal activity, Mr. Stinsons

Case 3:09-cr-00243-JBA Document 196 Filed 08/10/10 Page 1 of 31


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base level offense is 30. With a criminal history category III, the resulting Guideline range is

121-151 months. Because the statutory maximum sentence is 120 months imprisonment, the

applicable advisory Guideline sentence is 120 months imprisonment.

For the reasons stated below, the government submits that a sentence of 120 months

imprisonment the applicable Guideline range is reasonable.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following is based on law enforcement officers reports, recorded conversations,

videotaped events and the evidence presented at trial. On late August, less than two months

before the theft of the firearms in the instant case, numerous assault rifles had been stolen from

American Precision Manufacturing, the federally licensed firearms dealer (APM). Thereafter,

in late August and September 2009, at least eight of those firearms had been recovered in

Bridgeport by state and federal law enforcement officers during seizures and controlled

purchases. Detective Sanford Dowling, an ATF Task Force Officer (ATF TFO) testified at

trial that because these weapons were semi-automatic assault rifles and were recovered from the

streets of Bridgeport, specifically in the Marina Village and PT Barnum Housing projects

(P.T.). He also testified that because of the new condition of the guns, indicating that the guns

were most likely coming from a dealer and many more could be forthcoming, law enforcement

officers believed it was a matter of urgency to discover the source of these guns to prevent more

guns from flooding the streets and getting into the wrong hands.

In late September 2009, as detailed at trial, Ameed Stevenson, an employee of APM,

confessed to ATF law enforcement officers. Among other things, Ameed Stevenson provided

information about his role in the provision of information to Eugene Stinson in August 2009



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regarding the layout and operational methods of APM. Specifically, Ameed Stevenson told ATF

agents and TFOs that he knew an individual known to him as Nast (later identified as Eugene

Stinson), who lived with Ameed Stevensons sister in the P.T. Barnum Housing Project. Based

on conversations with Eugene Stinson, Ameed Stevenson believed that Eugene Stinson had a

criminal enterprise of about eight people that performed robberies and shootings for him.

According to Ameed Stevenson, in about August of 2009, Eugene Stinson asked him to get

weapons from APM, which Ameed Stevenson initially declined to do. After much pressure from

Eugene Stinson, of whom Ameed Stevenson said he was afraid, Ameed Stevenson gave two

weapons he had previously taken from APM to Eugene Stinson.

Eugene Stinson continued to pressure Ameed Stevenson to assist him in stealing more

firearms. Eventually, in late August 2009, Ameed Stevenson told Eugene Stinson about a door at

APM that could be accessed from the outside, which was left unlocked, that led to the room where

the firearms were kept. Ameed Stevenson also told Eugene Stinson where the guns were located

once inside the building and that third shift was the best time to steal the guns.

Ameed Stevenson provided information to law enforcement officers that, shortly after he

had provided such information to Eugene Stinson, guns were stolen from APM. A day or two

after the guns were stolen, Eugene Stinson called Ameed Stevenson and questioned Ameed

Stevenson about APMs reaction to the missing firearms. Ameed Stevenson testified at trial that a

few days after the initial theft of firearms in August 2009, Eugene Stinson had called and asked

him to repair two of the stolen APM Century Arms guns. When Ameed Stevenson went to

Eugene Stinsons apartment at the P.T. Barnum Housing project at Eugene Stinsons request to

get the guns, Eugene Stinson handed a bag with greyhound tickets on it containing the two rifles



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to Ameed Stevenson. At that time, Ameed Stevenson saw five more Century Arms rifles from

APM in the trunk of a car, which Eugene Stinson opened. When Ameed Stevenson attempted to

return the guns to Eugene Stinson later that same day (although he did not repair them), Eugene

Stinson instead told Ameed Stevenson to bring them to his father, Michael Stinson. Ameed

Stevenson then met with Michael Stinson, while on the phone with, and at the instruction of,

Eugene Stinson. Ameed Stevenson handed his phone to Michael Stinson with Eugene Stinson

remaining on the phone on the phone. After speaking with Eugene Stinson, Michael Stinson took

the bag with greyhound tickets on it, which contained the two guns. Two guns in that same bag

with the greyhound tickets were later recovered during a controlled purchase on September 21,

2009 in the PT Barnum Housing project. Based on the above information, Ameed Stevenson

believed that Eugene Stinson was involved in the in the initial theft of approximately thirty assault

rifles from APM.

On October 19, 2009, Ameed Stevenson pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the stealing,

and unlawfully taking or carrying away, from the premises of a person who is licensed to engage

in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, one or more firearms in the

licensees business inventory that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 922(u) and 924 (i)(1), and also entered into a

cooperation agreement with the government. On that same day, Ameed Stevenson was released on

bond to actively cooperate with ATF. Up through Ameed Stevensons guilty plea, Eugene

Stinson had continued to call Ameed Stevenson in an attempt to gain information about shipments

of firearms at APM.

Later that day, on October 19, 2009, Ameed Stevenson, under the direction and



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supervision of ATF, engaged in a recorded conversation with Eugene Stinson at the P.T. Barnum

Housing Complex. During that conversation, Ameed Stevenson told Eugene Stinson that there

would be guns available to be stolen from APM that week on Thursday. Eugene Stinson told

Ameed Stevenson to show him the layout of APM the following day.

On October 20, 2009 in the morning,Ameed Stevenson placed a recorded call to Eugene

Stinsons cell phone and asked Eugene Stinson if he was interested in meeting at APM. Ameed

Stevenson then asked Eugene Stinson if he wanted to come up now. A red Dodge Charger

bearing CT registration 604 XLC, known to be operated by Eugene Stinson, was seen by TFO

Sanford Dowling and ATF Special Agent Dennis Turman traveling in the area on Jewitt Street in

Ansonia, CT, which is directly behind APM. Ameed Stevenson alerted the ATF Task Force

Officers that the vehicle was one that he knows Eugene Stinson uses. Ameed Stevenson then

asked Eugene Stinson if he was up in the area now and Eugene Stinson responded, Yeah, where

you at? Eugene Stinson inquired about the exact location of APM and Ameed Stevenson

provided more detailed directions. Eugene Stinson then told Ameed Stevenson that he would call

him when he arrived.

Shortly thereafter, at approximately 10:17 a.m., Ameed Stevenson met with Eugene

Stinson at APM in front of the facility on the sidewalk. Ameed Stevenson was provided a

recording device to be worn on his person during the meeting. After meeting Eugene Stinson,

Ameed Stevenson walked to the back of the facility with Eugene Stinson. While in the back of

the facility, Eugene Stinson and Ameed Stevenson talked about different ways to enter the

building. Eugene Stinson stated to Ameed Stevenson, I would have to send somebody I feel

comfortable with going in there. Not only that. Thats serious. Lets say if a mother fucker gets



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Toast is street parlance for firearms.1

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caught, thats serious. You talk about being caught with toast. Now thats federal. A mother1

fucker is gonna give you up. Know what I mean? Like it sounds simple. Dont get me wrong. I

would rather a mother fucker go in there rather than me but at the same time (Eugene Stinson

sighs). Ameed Stevenson suggested to Eugene Stinson that he use a dope fiend. Eugene

Stinson then stated to Ameed Stevenson, You say there are two doors and then to the right.

Ameed Stevenson articulated directions to the work area (through the bay doors) that led to where

firearms were being stored inside the facility. Eugene Stinson then departed the area.

Due to the fact that Eugene Stinson was already at APM, and law enforcements belief that

Eugene Stinson was planning to enter the facility prior to Thursday, law enforcement officers

instructed Ameed Stevenson to call Eugene Stinson and change the date from Thursday to

Wednesday night. Ameed Stevenson, under the direction and supervision of ATF, then placed a

recorded call to Eugene Stinson at approximately 12:25 p.m. Ameed Stevenson said that he

would be coming back to work tonight and told Eugene Stinson he would be there until 4:00 a.m.

Eugene Stinson responded, Oh, youre gonna be there. Ameed Stevenson said he would be

working on a machine. Eugene Stinson responded, Yeah, Its set up for . . . Im setting it up

now. Eugene Stinson then asked, Well, who else gonna be there with you? Ameed Stevenson

responded that he would be alone, and Eugene Stinson said, Oh, O.K., alright. Ameed

Stevenson said that the firearms would be prepared for shipment on Wednesday, October 21, 2009

between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m. Eugene Stinson then said, Ah, shit, I thought you said Thursday

they were coming. Ameed Stevenson said that the shipment had been changed up.

Later, around midnight, due to safety issues, law enforcement officers instructed Ameed



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Stevenson to call Eugene Stinson and change the door through which one would need to enter

APM to access the firearms. Ameed Stevenson called Eugene Stinson. The following is an

excerpt from the transcribed conversation.

Ameed Stevenson: Remember the door I showed you in the back right?

Eugene Stinson: Yeah.

Ameed Stevenson: Well dont go through that door. There is going to be a smaller

door on the right hand side where those yellow canisters is at.

Eugene Stinson: Right.

Ameed Stevenson: That door will bring you right into the room so you dont have to

worry about turns and all that (unintelligible) but, um listen. It, it, it, it gotta be done by

like, has to be done before four oclock though.

Eugene Stinson: Right...yeahyeahdont worryit is.

Ameed Stevenson: Yeah.

Eugene Stinson: But listen. So you said the middle one right? Boom!

Ameed Stevenson: Naw.

Eugene Stinson: The middle one.

Ameed Stevenson: Naw. Dont go through that one. Go to the one the right hand side

that big door dont evendont worry about that one.

Eugene Stinson: OK.

Ameed Stevenson: Go through the small door and go up the steps. You are going to

see a yellow bin.

Eugene Stinson: OK.



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Ameed Stevenson: There are a lot of gas cans in it. There is one door. Turn that knob

and you will be able to come right in.

Eugene Stinson: OK.

Ameed Stevenson: Im gonna leave it open.

Eugene Stinson: Alright. Alright.

Ameed Stevenson: OK.

Eugene Stinson: Yup.

On October 21, 2009, at 1:38 a.m., ATF surveilled the red Dodge Charger and a second

car, a Silver Ultima, staking out APM. At 1:56 a.m., the Silver Ultima returned. Two

individuals, David Harvin and Michael Stinson, exited the Silver Ultima and attempted to open

the wrong door to APM. The Silver Ultima left the premises of APM. Minutes later, Ameed

Stevenson received a call from Eugene Stinson, during which he told Ameed Stevenson that the

door was locked. The following is an excerpt from the transcribed conversation.

Eugene Stinson: The door aint open.

Ameed Stevenson: Yeah it is you went to the wrong one then. Because

Eugene Stinson: The one on the right. You said the little one on the right.

Ameed Stevenson: Yeah the little one on the right. Right next to, to the yellow cages.

There is a yellow cage with gas cans in there.

Eugene Stinson: Im talking about on the side. You know the middle shutter and

the one to the right.

Ameed Stevenson: No.

Eugene Stinson: The first door?



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Ameed Stevenson: Not that one. Nah, nah, you have to back up. Back up, on the

same walkway.

Eugene Stinson: Uh huh.


Eugene Stinson: And where is that?

Ameed Stevenson: Its in the back where the yellow cabinets is at. Im going to open

it right now.

Eugene Stinson: Alright, but

Ameed Stevenson: Its already, Its already openhuh?

Eugene Stinson: But the one you told me. Where the shutter thing you told me and

that little one to the right. Not that one?

Ameed Stevenson: No not that one. When you on that walkway you come down and

youre going to see a yellow fence, a yellow cage. And youre going to see a, a, a, a, a

little gas containers in there. And there is a door right to the right.

Eugene Stinson: Alright. And its, and its um, and thats open.


Eugene Stinson: And then you go through there and what you gotta do go up

steps?

Ameed Stevenson: Right. You want me to open the big door?

Eugene Stinson: How many steps do you gottahow many steps you gotta go up?

Ameed Stevenson: Its like, Its like three or four.

Eugene Stinson: Alright then to the right is another door.



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Ameed Stevenson: Right. Thats the one.

Eugene Stinson: Alright. And right through that door is where it is at.


Eugene Stinson: Alright just, just be watching your phone cause I may have to call

you back.

Minutes later, the Silver Ultima returned to APM. The two individuals exited the car.

Ameed Stevenson opened the door for them. The two entered the building wearing gloves and one

wearing a black mask, and loaded 29 firearms from APM into four duffle bags. This was

surveilled by ATF and captured on videotape by the security camera installed by APM.

The two then exited the APM business building with two duffle bags and placed one

duffle bag containing the guns into the trunk of the car. While Michael Stinson (the father of

Eugene Stinson) was holding the second bag, ATF deployed flash bangs and took the two

individuals into custody. ATF seized the guns that were in the trunk of the car, the guns in the

duffle bag that was on the ground outside the car, and the remaining guns that had been packed

into two additional duffle bags that were left inside APM.

Lawenforcement officers were immediately deployed to find the Red Charger and to

arrest Eugene Stinson, but to no avail. Eugene Stinson was arrested the following morning at P.T.

Barnum.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 22, 2009, Eugene Stinson was arrested pursuant to a federal complaint. On

October 28, 2009, a federal grand jury in Bridgeport returned a four-count indictment against the

defendants in this case, Eugene Stinson, Michael Stinson and David Harvin, charging them each with



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Conspiracy to Steal Firearms from a Federally Licensed Firearm Dealer, in violation of Title 18,

United States Code 922(u), 924 (i)(1) and 371, and Theft of Firearms from a Federally Licensed

Firearm Dealer in violation of 18, United States Code 922(u), 924 (i)(1) and 2; and charging David

Harvin and Michael Stinson each with being a Felon in Possession of Firearm, in violation of Title

18, United States Code 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

The government began its presentation of evidence before a jury on March 4, 2010. On

March 9, 2010, the jury rendered a verdict, finding Eugene Stinson guilty on both counts in the

indictment.

The Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) found that the base offense level under U.S.S.G.

2K2.1(a) was 26 because the firearms involved in the offense were semi-automatic and capable

of accepting extended magazines and because Mr. Stinson had at least two felony convictions for

a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. PSR 20. The PSR applied a six-level

enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) because the offense involved between 25-99 guns,

but added only three levels due to the limitations prescribed under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b). PSR 21.

The PSR added a two-level adjustment because the defendant was an organizer, leader, supervisor

or manager in the criminal activity under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. PSR 22. The PSR provided no

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. PSR 26. Finally, the PSR concluded that Mr.

Stinson had accumulated six criminal history points, and fell within Criminal History Category III

PSR 32. As a result, according to the PSR, Mr. Stinson faced a guideline range of 135-168

months incarceration, with a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months under 18 U.S.C.

924(i). See PSR 60, 61. Moreover, the PSR set forth Mr. Stinsons criminal record contains

prior drug and violent felony convictions, . . . that he has spent significant time incarcerated by



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53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony : (a) A person is guilty of assault in the seconddegree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to

such person or to a third person; or(2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he

causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous

instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) he recklessly causes serious

physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (4) for a

purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor,

unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to such

person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or (5) he is

a parole from a correctional institution and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or

member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, he causes physical injury to such employee or member.

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the State of Connecticut,that although he has earned his G.E.D. and received college credits

while imprisoned, he continues to engage in illegal activities, PSR 75, and that the Court

may wish to consider the defendants prior periods of state incarceration, when fashioning a

sentence that will serve the statutory purposes. PSR 71.

The government submits that Mr. Stinson has only one prior conviction that qualifies to

enhance his base level offense. First, Mr. Stinsons 1995 conviction for Second Degree Assault

qualifies under the modified categorical approach as a crime of violence. There is no dispute that

this conviction qualifies. Indeed, the official court records make clear that Mr. Stinson with the

intent to cause physical injury . . . did cause physical injury . . . by means of a deadly weapon, to

wit: a pistol, in violation of Section 53a-60(a)(2). Amended Information dated May 1995.2

Second, Mr. Stinsons prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute narcotics

does not qualify as a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a). The official court

documents in the governments possession at this time regarding Mr. Stinsons 2002 conviction

for possession with intent to distribute narcotics do not specify the type of narcotic involved.



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Thus, based on the modified categorical approach, this conviction does not qualify. See e.g.,

United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 949 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Cohens, 2008 WL

3824758, 6 (D. Conn. August 13, 2008); United States v. Lopez, 536 F. Supp.2d 218, 223 (D.

Conn. February 18, 2008).

Thus, the government submits that Mr. Stinsons base level offense is 22 under U.S.S.G.

2K2.1(a)(3). The government agrees with the PSRs remaining calculation. Thus, with six

levels added because the offense involved between 25-99 guns under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b) and a

two-level adjustment because the defendant was an organizer, leader, supervisor or manager in the

criminal activity, Mr. Stinsons base level offense is 30. With a criminal history category III, the

resulting Guideline range is 121-151 months. Because the statutory maximum sentence is 120

months imprisonment, the applicable advisory Guideline sentence is 120 months imprisonment.

U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a).

For the reasons stated below, the government submits that a sentence of 120 months

imprisonment the applicable Guideline range is reasonable.

II. SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS

After the Supreme Courts holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which

rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, a sentence satisfies the Sixth

Amendment if the sentencing judge (1) calculates the relevant Guidelines range, including any

applicable departure under the Guidelines system; (2) considers the calculated Guidelines range, along

with other 3553 factors; and (3) imposes a reasonable sentence. United States v. Fernandez, 443

F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. (2006); see also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103,

113 (2d Cir. 2005). The 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense



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and history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to serve various goals

of the criminal justice system, including (a) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment, (b) to accomplish specific and general

deterrence, (c) to protect the public from the defendant, and (d) to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective

manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the sentencing range set forth in the guidelines; (5)

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

[T]he excision of the mandatory aspect of the Guidelines does not mean that the Guidelines

have been discarded. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111. [I]t would be a mistake to think that, after

Booker/Fanfan, district judges may return to the sentencing regime that existed before 1987 and

exercise unfettered discretion to select any sentence within the applicable statutory maximum and

minimum. Id. at 113; see also United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)

(Even after Gall and Kimbrough, sentencing judges, certainly, are not free to ignore the Guidelines,

or to treat them merely as a body of casual advice.) (quoting United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103,

113 (2d Cir. 2005)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that in the overwhelming majority of

cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be

reasonable in the particular circumstances.Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 27; see also United States v.

Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (In calibrating our review for reasonableness, we will

continue to seek guidance from the considered judgment of the Sentencing Commission as expressed

in the Sentencing Guidelines and authorized by Congress.).



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The sentencing court is required to calculate the pertinent Guidelines range, and although

the Guidelines are advisory, and variance is allowed, even when solely based on policy considerations

the court is required to state the reasons for any variance and provide sufficient justifications for the

extent of any departure. United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 163 (2d Cir. 2008).

Appellate courts review a district courts sentence for reasonableness. See Rita v. United

States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); Cavera, 550

F.3d at 187;Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 26-27. The reasonableness standard is deferential and focuses

primarily on the sentencing courts compliance with its statutory obligation to consider the factors

detailed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). United States. v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 350 (2d Cir. 2005)). The Supreme Court has

recently reaffirmed that appellate courts must review sentencing challenges under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see also Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. In Gall, the Supreme

Court held that a reviewing court must first satisfy itself that the sentencing court committed no

significant procedural error. Id. If there is no procedural error, the appellate court may then

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. Id.; see also Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (appellate scrutiny encompasses both procedural and

substantive review); Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at127 (same).

III. ARGUMENT

In this case, the government seeks a sentence of 120 months imprisonment the applicable

Guideline range.

First and foremost, Mr. Stinson engaged in very serious criminal conduct by organizing

and supervising the theft of numerous assault rifles from a federally licensed firearms dealer. Mr.



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Stinson set up a plan, in which his father, Michael Stinson, and another individual, entered a

firearm assembly business with the intent to steal numerous assault rifles. Indeed, Michael

Stinson testified that he had every intention of reselling those assault rifles on the streets of

Bridgeport. Any crime that involves the theft of a firearm, much less the illegal theft, possession

and intended distribution of twenty-nine semiautomatic assault weapons into a city that is rife

with violence stemming from the presence of illegal drugs, guns and gangs, has a serious

detrimental impact on the safety of others in the community and warrants a punishment that

dissuades Mr. Stinson and other individuals from committing similar crimes.

Second, Mr. Stinsons criminal history supports a sentence of 120 months. Mr. Stinson

has engaged in violent and dangerous criminal activity and has repeatedly violated his conditions

of probation.

Specifically, at the age of 16, Mr. Stinson was arrested for having a weapon in a motor

vehicle. After receiving a suspended sentence, he violated his probation, for which he served six

months in jail. In 1994, at the age of 18, Mr. Stinson was arrested for attempted murder. He was

convicted by guilty plea in 1995 of First and Second Degree Assault for a particularly heinous

crime regarding a family dispute, during which he shot a pregnant woman in the stomach and then

chased and shot at her relatives. For that, he was sentenced to 90 months in jail, with five years

probation. Accordingly, Mr. Stinson served time beginning on September 8, 1995 and was

released to supervised parole on October 1, 1999. PSR 30. During this incarceration, he

received disciplinary tickets. PSR 30. He absconded from parol on March 20, 2000. Id. Mr.

Stinson then violated his conditions of probation by committing another crime. On April 17,

2001, he was charged with Possession with Intent to Sell Narcotics, and was sentenced to fifteen



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months in jail, and was released on September 24, 2003. PSR 31. Further, Ameed Stevenson

provided information that Mr. Stinson sold crack and heroin in P.T. Barnum, from the time of Mr.

Stinsons release in 2003 up until the time of Mr. Stinsons arrest in the instant matter. In fact,

Ameed Stevenson was arrested in 2004 for selling cocaine, which he reported he was selling for

Mr. Stinson. In total, to date, Mr. Stinson has served approximately 76 months, over six years

behind bars. PSR 32.

His criminal history demonstrates that Mr. Stinson cannot conform his conduct to the law,

nor can he can comply with orders of the court. Clearly, Mr. Stinsons prior convictions and

encounters with the criminal justice system have not served as wake up calls for him nor deterred

him from further engaging in criminal activity. Nor has more than six years in prison had any

effect on his propensity to engage in criminal conduct

Based on his conduct in this case, the government agrees with the PSR that Mr. Stinson

should receive no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. In addition, his lack of acceptance

demonstrates a lack of accountability for his actions, which makes it unlikely that Mr. Stinson will

be able to conform his conduct to the law and will likely continue to commit crimes in the future.

Moreover, Ameed Stevenson told law enforcement officers from the outset that he felt physically

threatened by retaliation from Mr. Stinson should Mr. Stinson discover that Ameed Stevenson had

cooperated. This apprehension was based on Ameed Stevensons belief that, in the past, Mr.

Stinson was responsible for Ameed Stevenson and a friend of his being robbed and tied up in

Ameed Stevensons home, that Mr. Stinson was previously involved in a home invasion and that

Eugene Stinson also had had a serious violent altercation with Ameed Stevensons cousin.

Moreover, Ameed Stevenson had seen Mr. Stinson with guns on a daily basis when Ameed



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Stevenson lived with him at the apartment in the late 1990's and early 2000s, and during that

time, he had several times seen Mr. Stinson arrive at home covered in blood that was not his own.

And, at a break in the trial testimony of Ameed Stevenson, Mr. Stinson made a comment to

Ameed Stevenson, which Ameed Stevenson perceived as a threat.

Nothing in his past record indicates that Mr. Stinson will change his ways. He has been

arrested repeatedly for violent crimes and ones that involve illegal possession of guns. In 1992,

Mr. Stinson at the age of 17, was convicted of having a Weapon in a Motor Vehicle. In 1995, he

was convicted of First Degree and Second Degree Assault, in which he used a pistol to injure two

of the individuals. In the instant case, Mr. Stinson set in motion a scheme to steal numerous

assault rifles to resell on the streets of Bridgeport. Cf. United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555,

559 (7 Cir. 1990) ([r]ationally, if a defendant has been convicted for the same offense more thanth

once, he has demonstrated the need for greater sanctions to deter him from committing that same

crime againgreater sanctions than might be required for a defendant who has never been

convicted for a similar offense.); United States v. Chavez-Botello, 905 F.2d 279, 281 (9 Cir.th

1990) [t]he recidivists lapse into the same criminal behavior demonstrates his lack of

recognition of the gravity of his original wrong, entails greater culpability for the offense with

which he is currently charged, and suggests an increased likelihood that the offense will be

repeated.); see also United States v. Thomas, 1998 WL 514001, at *3 (2d Cir. 1998)

(unpublished opinion).



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A. Eugene Stinson Should Receive a Two-Level Enhancement for Role Because

He Planned, Organized, and Directed the Theft and Instructed Others During

the Commission of the Theft.

The defendant asserts that he was not an organizer or leader in the offense of conviction.

Def. Memo at 7. Mr. Stinson sets forth there is no evidence that the defendant managed or

supervised David Harvin or his father, Michael Stinson. Def. Memo at 7. The defendant asserts

that an argument could be made that Michael Stinson supervised the actual theft and was

responsible for its commission. Id.

Pursuant to the Guidelines, a two-level increase in the offense level is appropriate [i]f the

defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in . . . criminal activity. . . . U.S.S.G.

3B1.1(c). According to the Application Notes to 3B1.1(c), [t]o qualify for an adjustment

under this Section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of

one or more other participants. U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, Application Note 2. Facts relied on at

sentencing, including findings as to the defendants role, need be established only by a

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Jacobo, 934 F.2d 411, 418 (2d. Cir. 1991);

United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 182-3 (2d. Cir.) cert denied, 498 U.S. 844

(1990). The sentencing courts finding concerning a defendants leadership role in committing an

offense will not be disturbed unless found to be clearly erroneous. United States v. Valdez, 16

F.3d 1324, 1335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 810 (1994); see also United States v. Ivezaj, 568

F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2009).

A defendant is properly considered a manager or supervisor if he exercised some degree

of control over others involved in the commission of the offense or played a significant role in the

decision to recruit or to supervise lower-level participants. United States v. Horton, WL



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2382261, *1 -2 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Hertular, 562 F.3d 433, 448 (2d Cir.

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, a defendant need only manage

or supervise one other participant to warrant a role enhancement. Id. (citingUnited States v.

Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 223 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that recruiting single drug courier into

conspiracy could by itself support enhancement). Whether a defendant is considered a leader

depends upon the degree of discretion exercised by him, the nature and degree of his participation

in planning or organizing the offense, and the degree of control and authority exercised over the

other members of the conspiracy. United States v. Caver, 2002 WL 109315, 2 (2d Cir. 2002)

(quoting United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.

Beaulieau, 959 F.2d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir.1992)).

The evidence established that Mr. Stinson planned, organized and directed the theft of

firearms from APM and supervised others during the planning and commission of the theft.

Specifically, Mr. Stinson approached Ameed Stevenson initially to discuss illegally obtaining

firearms from APM. Eugene Stinson obtained the information about the layout of APM just prior

to the August theft of firearms from APM. Shortly thereafter, it was Eugene Stinson who

requested that Ameed Stevenson repair the two Century Arms rifles. Eugene Stinson then

instructed Ameed Stevenson to bring the two guns back to his father Michael Stinson. When

Ameed Stevenson went to Michael Stinson, it was only after Eugene Stinson spoke to Michael

Stinson on the phone that Michael Stinson took the two guns from Ameed Stevenson.

After that, Eugene Stinson repeatedly and continuously contacted and attempted to contact

Ameed Stevenson to inquire about and pursue the theft of additional firearms from APM. When

Ameed Stevenson finally responded to Eugene Stinsons calls, under the instruction and



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Toast is street parlance for firearms.3

21

supervision of law enforcement officers, Eugene Stinson invited Ameed Stevenson over to his

apartment at P.T. to discuss the layout of APM and a plan. During that conversation, Eugene

Stinson requested that Ameed show him the layout the next day. The following morning Eugene

Stinson arrived at APM to stake it out. Eugene Stinson asked questions regarding the details

about how to get in, including which door to enter, and when was the best time to accomplish the

theft. Eugene Stinson discussed whether he should send someone in or do it himself.

I would have to send somebody I feel comfortable with going in there. Not only that. Thats

serious. Lets say if a mother fucker gets caught, thats serious. You talk about being caught with

toast. Now thats federal. A mother fucker is gonna give you up. Know what I mean? Like it3

sounds simple. Dont get me wrong. I would rather a mother fucker go in there rather than me

but at the same time.

It was Eugene Stinson that Ameed Stevenson called to change the date when the firearms

would be shipped (thus moving up the date of the planned theft) from Thursday to Wednesday.

After speaking about the shift in dates, Eugene Stinson responded, Yeah, Its set up for . . . Im

setting it up now. It was also Eugene Stinson whom Ameed Stevenson called to change the door

through which one needed to enter APM that night.

When David Harvin and Michael Stinson arrived that night at the time and place that

Ameed Stevenson had discussed with Eugene Stinson, it was clear that Eugene Stinson had set it

up with the two based on the information he had received from his conversations with Ameed

Stevenson. Significantly, when Michael Stinson and David Harvin were outside APM but at the

wrong door, it was Eugene Stinson (who was not even at APM) who called Ameed Stevenson to



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rectify the problem. Michael Stinson testified at trial that he and Ameed were like family.

Michael Stinson could have called Ameed Stevenson directly. But instead, all the conversations

regarding the planning and commission of the theft were with Eugene Stinson. After getting

specific details about which door to enter, Eugene Stinson told Ameed Stevenson, Alright just,

just be watching your phone cause I may have to call you back. Clearly, Eugene Stinson received

the information and instructed Michael Stinson on where to enter APM.

Thus, the evidence proves beyond a preponderance that Eugene Stinson planned,

organized and directed the theft, and was instructing at least Michael Stinson on how to commit

the crime at the time. See, e.g., United States v. Horton, WL 2382261, *1 -2 (2d Cir. 2010) (role

enhancement applicable where defendant helped negotiate prices, helped recruit certain co-

conspirators, [and] helped direct the activity of the co-conspirators to some degree, where

defendant (1) served as a key point of contact between the conspiracy and the New York buyer

(actually an undercover agent), (2) negotiated prices and arranged payment and delivery details,

and (3) decided to recruit others to buy guns in South Carolina and to deliver them for sale in New

York.); United States v. Franco, 2007 WL 625080, 1 (2d Cir. 2007) (The district court applied a

role enhancement based on its findings that [defendant] recruited co-defendant []and others as

participants in this endeavor and that [defendant] was the decisionmaker in the planning and

execution of the crime.).

Moreover, regardless of whether anyone other than Eugene Stinson was leading the

conspiracy, [i]t is well-established that one conspirators leadership role is not dispositive on the

question of whether another was also a leader. United States v. Reyes, 2010 WL 2802607, 4

(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 106 n. 6 (2d Cir.1994); citing



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U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a

leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.)).

Accordingly, Eugene Stinson should receive a two-level enhancement for role.

B. The Defendants Claim of Imperfect Entrapment is Meritless.

Mr. Stinson argues that it is abundantly clear that he had been aggressively targeted by

law enforcement and the cooperating witness. Def. Memo at 4. He also asserts that Detective

Dowling testified that the Defendant was set up to commit the crime of conviction, and Ameed

Stevenson was tasked to target the Defendant to commit the offense of conviction. Id. The

defendant seeks a departure based on the doctrine of imperfect entrapment because the

Government engaged in aggressive encouragement of wrongdoing, and that there can be no

argument that there would have been no crime committed without the active participation of the

Government and its aggressive pursuit and targeting of the Defendant. Id. at 4-5.

A departure for imperfect entrapment is based on conduct by the government that does

not give rise to an entrapment defense but that is nonetheless aggressive encouragement of

wrongdoing. United States v. Reyes, 2007 WL 1857571, *3 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotingUnited

States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

departure has no express basis in the Guidelines, but the policy statement in Section 5K2.12 can

reasonably be read to authorize such a departure in appropriate cases. Id.(rejecting a claim of

imperfect entrapment under U.S.S.G. 5K2.12 (the textual source for the imperfect entrapment

departure), where [o]rdinarily coercion will be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only

when it involves a threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property or similar injury.).

See also United States v. Oliveras, 2010 WL 46872, 3 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that a departure



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based on sentencing manipulation . . . would likely require a showing of outrageous government

conduct, and that consideration of such wrongful government conduct should be considered,

perhaps more aptly, under the rubric of imperfect entrapment, citing to United States v. Bala,

236 F.3d 87, 91-93 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Here, there was no government aggressive encouragement of wrongdoing, or wrongful or

outrageous government conduct. To the contrary, the government, to its credit and for the safety

of the residents of Bridgeport, aggressively investigated the theft of numerous assault rifles, which

led to the discovery of Eugene Stinson as the one responsible for the theft. ATF law enforcement

officers deemed their investigation urgent due to the fact that many assault rifles were being found

on the streets of Bridgeport in the hands of criminals and it was necessary to stem the flow. Law

enforcement officers tenacious investigation resulted in the development of a cooperating witness

in less than one month, who gave information about Eugene Stinsons involvement in the August

theft of firearms from APM. Moreover, Ameed Stevenson testified, and the phone records

demonstrated, that Eugene Stinson continued to call Ameed Stevenson up through the time of the

instant offense to inquire about getting more guns from APM.

The government presented evidence at trial that Eugene Stinson was not induced, and that,

even so, Eugene Stinson was predisposed to commit the crime based on his prior criminal

involvement with guns and his ready willingness to seize the opportunity to commit the instant

offense. A jury found there was no entrapment.

It strains credulity to suggest that there can be no argument that there would have been no

crime committed without the active participation of the Government and its aggressive pursuit and

targeting of the Defendant. Contrary to Mr. Stinsons argument, without the governments



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intervention in this case by their aggressive investigation because of the imminent danger

associated with numerous assault rifles being stolen and sold on the streets of Bridgeport, many

more guns may have been stolen at the instruction of Eugene Stinson.

C. The Defendant Has Not Met His Burden to Show That His Family

Circumstances Are Extraordinary.

The defendant also seeks a departure or non-guidelines sentence for extraordinary family

circumstances. Mr. Stinson asserts that he is the father of three young children who rely on him

for both financial and emotional security, that his separation from them has resulted in them

obtaining lower grades and poor emotional health, that one minor child has a significant health

issue, and that his own emotional health has been adversely affected by this separation. Def.

Memo at 6. The government respectfully submits that a departure or non-guidelines sentence on

this basis is neither warranted nor supported by the case law.

Family ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a

sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. 5H1.6. Where a

defendant requests a departure based on a personal characteristic or circumstance that is not

ordinarily relevant to a departure analysis, the Court may nevertheless consider such

characteristic or circumstance only if [it] is present to an exceptional degree. U.S.S.G.

5K2.0(a)(4). See also United States v. Leung, 360 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing U.S.S.G.

5K2.0) (a circumstance that is not normally relevant in determining whether a sentence should

be outside the applicable guideline range may be relevant . . . if [it] is present to an unusual degree

and distinguishes the case from the heartland of cases covered by the guidelines.) (internal

quotations omitted). The Commentary to 5H1.6 provides additional guidance on the narrow



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parameters of this type of departure, advising that such a departure requires, inter alia, that the

loss of caretaking or support is one for which no effective remedial or ameliorative programs

reasonably are available, making the defendants caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to

the defendants family. U.S.S.G. 5H1.6, Commentary 1(B)(iii).

The Second Circuits recent jurisprudence on this issue demonstrates that the defendants

family circumstances, while unfortunate, are within the heartland of cases, and do not, under the

circumstances of this case, support a departure from the guideline range. The adverse effect on a

defendants family from a defendants imprisonment does not ordinarily warrant a downward

departure, because [d]isruption of the defendants life, and the concomitant difficulties for those

who depend on the defendant, are inherent in the punishment of incarceration. United States v.

Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d

124, 128 (2d Cir. 1992)). The presence of hardship resulting from imprisonment is therefore

ordinarily not enough to warrant a departure. It is only extraordinary circumstances . . . not

capable of adequate consideration . . . [that] may constitute proper grounds for departure. Only if

the district court finds the hardship to be exceptional may it downwardly depart on that basis.

United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 534 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). See also

United States v. Smith, 331 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the Guidelines disfavor

departure based on family responsibilities [and] such a departure is not permitted except in

extraordinary circumstances); United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 338 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating

that a downward departure for family circumstances must be reserved for situations that are truly

extraordinary); United States v. Trupin, 475 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that the record

does not demonstrate that [defendants] presence was essential to his wifes well-being; and that



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According to Judge Kearse in dissent, the facts of Galante barely sufficed under an4

abuse-of-discretion review. See Galante, 111 F. 3d at 1037-39 (Kearse, J., dissenting). In

denying the governments petition for en banc review, the full Court made clear that the panels

majority decision was limited to its precise facts and not an invitation to district judges to depart

downward in the absence of truly exceptional family circumstances. United States v. Galante,

128 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1997)(en banc)(per curiam). See also United States v. Faria, 161 F.3d 761,

762 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing en banc courts limitation of Galante to its unique facts).

27

the separation of [defendant] from his wife caused by incarceration is not sufficiently unique to

[defendant], but rather is true of every married defendant who runs afoul of the law and is then

separated from his family. While tragic, it is a tragedy of defendants making.).

The Second Circuit has found that the absence or presence of adults who can step in

during the defendants incarceration to assist with caring and providing for the defendant's

dependents . . . is a central part of the extraordinary family circumstances inquiry. United States

v. Huerta, 371 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2004). A departure for family circumstances is not available

where other relatives could meet the familys needs . . . or the defendants absence did not cause

a particularly severe hardship. United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2005)

(internal quotations omitted). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128-30 (2d Cir. 1992)

(granting departure where defendant was the sole caretaker of four young children, including an

infant).

Departures have also been granted where the defendant is the sole financial supporter of

the family. For example, in Galante, the defendant was granted a departure because he held the

primary role in the upbringing of his two young children, given his wifes limited language skills

and her lack of ability to earn sufficient money to support the family. 111 F.3d at 1035. The

defendant had commitments to both the mother, who had little income, and his father, who was

critically ill and might have required his assistance in the future. Id. See also United States v.4



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Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (granting a departure where the defendant worked two

jobs to support wife and two children, grandmother, and disabled grandfather who depended on

defendants physical strength to help him get in and out of his wheelchair).

This case does not fall within that narrow spectrum of cases in which defendants have

qualified for a departure based on extraordinary family circumstances. Mr. Stinson has made no

showing that his presence is essential to his family. He unfortunately suffers the same fate as

other defendants who are incarcerated after committing crimes separation from his loved ones

and the typical collateral consequences and effects that separation has on a family. Moreover, the

children have been residing, and will continue to reside, with their mother, Nicole Barnes, who

appears to have been, and continues to be, gainfully employed. There is also no record of Mr.

Stinson being gainfully employed other than the sporadic and short-lived employment noted in the

PSR.

While the lowered grades and emotional stress on the children in response to the

defendants incarceration are sad, they are, unfortunately, typical among young children who have

been separated from one of their primary caregivers as a result of incarceration. This is a tragedy

for both the defendant and his children, but it is a tragedy that often results from a parents

conscious choice to engage in criminal conduct. Indeed, this negative disruption in the

relationship between convicted parent and child is inherent in the punishment of incarceration.

Johnson, 964 F.2d at 128. Here, it is fortunate that the childrens mother is able and willing to

provide a necessary continuum of emotional and familial support for the defendants three

children. See United States v. Madrigal, 331 F.3d 258, 260 (2d Cir. 2003) (even though

defendants three youngest children faced very serious problems, including a learning disability



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In Madrigal,, the Court reversed a family circumstances departure that was premised on5

a female defendants relationship with her six children. Focusing again on the availability of

alternative caregivers, the Court observed the absence of evidence that the defendant was the

only person capable of providing adequate care for the youngest children and that [t]here was

also evidence that the family as a whole remained cohesive, that [the defendants] three older

children were doing well and were available to care for their younger siblings, and that [the

defendants] extended family was also available for caregiving. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that [u]nfortunate as the circumstances described by

the court are, they are not extraordinary, and that "[t]hey are the common collateral damage of

imprisonment and are far enough removed from those circumstances that existing case law has

found exceptional that we must conclude that the district court acted outside of permissible limits

in granting the downward departure for family circumstances. Id.

In Smith, the Court reversed a family circumstances departure for a defendant who had6

a close relationship with his two-year-old son and played a major role in caring for him,

including dropping him off at day care, feeding him dinner, bathing him, and putting him to bed,

and where the defendants incarceration would result in his wife having to discontinue her

college studies. Id. at 293. The Court observed that the defendant was not the sole caregiver or

financial supporter of his [2-year-old] son and that the concerns for the son may be alleviated

by the availability of Smith's mother and half-sister for child care. Id. at 294. To the extent that

the defendants college studies would be disrupted, the Court noted that [i]t is not unusual,

however, for a convicted defendant's incarceration to cause some hardship in the family. Id.

29

and major depressive disorder, departure was not warranted because the defendant-mother was not

the only individual available to tend to these unique problems); Smith, 331 F.3d at 293 (even5

though defendant had a close relationship with 2-year old son, a departure was improper where

defendant was not sole caregiver and extended family was available to assist remaining parent).6

Finally, in accordance with the Commentary to U.S.S.G. 5H1.6, the Court must

consider, inter alia, the seriousness of the offense and the danger to the member of the

defendants family due to the offense. U.S.S.G. 5H1.6, Commentary 1(A)(I) and (ii).

In this case, the defendants instant criminal conduct occurred during the time period he was

caring for the children. Eugene Stinson met with Ameed Stevenson outside his apartment where

he lived with and cared for his children. At that time, he had in his possession seven of the assault



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rifles from APM and handed over two of them to Ameed Stevenson right outside his apartment.

Later, while caring for the children at his apartment at PT, he engaged in the conversation with

Ameed Stevenson regarding the layout of APM and how many firearms would be available to

steal. Also during the time that he cared for his children in his apartment at PT, he engaged in the

sale of heroin and crack at PT. In addition, Mr. Stinson has served a significant amount of time in

jail for drug and firearms violations. He willingly engaged in the instant criminal conduct with full

awareness of the risk that detection by law enforcement would result in his incarceration. As he

stated to Ameed Stevenson when discussing the possibility of being caught stealing guns from

APM: Thats serious. Lets say if a mother fucker gets caught, thats serious. You talk about

being caught with toast. Now thats federal.

Mr. Stinsons criminal conduct, which exposed his three children to danger, coupled with

the seriousness of his offense weigh against a departure based on family circumstances created by

his own conduct.

Thus, Mr. Stinsons criminal record and conduct in this case demonstrate that he is a

dangerous and violent criminal, with the savvy to organize others to do his bidding. Because of

his violent criminal conduct and his choice to continue to engage in violent criminal activity with

no sign that he takes accountability for his actions, despite many wake up calls and lengthy

periods of incarceration, and to provide just punishment, to promote respect for the law, to protect

society from Mr. Stinson in the future and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between

similarly-situated defendants, the government submits that a Guideline sentence of 120 months is

warranted.



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IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the government submits that a sentence of 120 months is

reasonable, takes into account the particular circumstances of Mr. Stinsons case, in light of all the

section 3553(a) factors, and is sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the goals of

sentencing. The government respectfully requests that the Court exercise its discretion to

sentence Mr. Stinson to a sentence of 120 months imprisonment.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID B. FEIN

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/

FELICE M. DUFFY

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

FEDERAL BAR NO. CT21379

157 CHURCH STREET; 23RD FLOOR

NEW HAVEN, CT 06510

203-821-3833

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that on August 10, 2010, a copy of the foregoing Sentencing Memorandum

was filed electronically, and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice

of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the courts electronic filing

system, or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of

Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the courts CM/ECF system.

________/s/___________________________

FELICE M. DUFFY

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY


STINSON Eugene Govt Sentencing Memo

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Transcript of STINSON Eugene Govt Sentencing Memo