Stiglitz Lesson's

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Restoring Growth and Stability Restoring Growth and Stability in a World of Crisis and Contagion: Lessons from Economic Theory and History Lessons from Economic Theory and History Joseph E. Stiglitz Paris February 2012

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Restoring Growth and Stabilityin a World of Crisis and Contagion.

Transcript of Stiglitz Lesson's

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Restoring Growth and StabilityRestoring Growth and Stability in a World of Crisis and Contagion:Lessons from Economic Theory and HistoryLessons from Economic Theory and History

Joseph E. StiglitzParisFebruary 2012

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O liOutlineI. DiagnosisII. PrescriptionsIII. Role and theory of contagionIV. Some general comments on the failure of modern

imacroeconomicsV. Concluding remarks

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I. DiagnosisI. DiagnosisB f th i i th US ( d t l t t th l b l)• Before the crisis, the US (and to a large extent the global) economy was “sick,” supported by a real estate bubble, that led to a consumption bubblethat led to a consumption bubble• Bottom 80% of Americans were consuming roughly 110% of their

income• Not sustainable• Even after deleveraging, savings rate is likely to exceed 6% in US

E ft b ki t i f ll fi d l t t i t t• Even after banking system is fully fixed, real estate investment won’t return to normal for a long time, given excess capacity

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Fi i l d R l C i iFinancial and Real CrisisWhil b bbl “hid” d l i bl it l ft i it• While bubble “hid” underlying problems, it left in its aftermath additional problems• Excess capacity in real estateExcess capacity in real estate• Excess leverage

• Major mistake of Administration was to think that fixing the b ki t ld “ ffi ”banking system would “suffice”• But they didn’t succeed in restoring lending

• But even deleveraging won’t suffice to restore economy• But even deleveraging won t suffice to restore economy• Won’t (and shouldn’t) return to world with consumption 110% of

income• Though with deleveraging (and fixing other problems) growth might

be restored to normal• To restore economy to full employment will require growth of more

than 3% over an extended period of time

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U d l i P blUnderlying Problems1. Structural transformation2. Inequality3. High oil prices4. Globalization5. Build up of global reserves

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1. STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

• Great Depression was structural transformation from agricultural to manufacturing—this is a structural transformation from manufacturing to services• Productivity growth well in excess of global growth in demand• Implying decrease in demand for labor in manufacturing globally

If labor gets “trapped” in declining sector then income will decline• If labor gets trapped in declining sector, then income will decline

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• Technical change can always induce large distributive consequences

Standard models ignore these• Standard models ignore these• With perfect markets, winners can compensate losers — but they

seldom do• With free mobility all workers can be better off

• With imperfect markets, those in rural sector worse offdecrease in welfare of those in “trapped sector” has spillover effects on• decrease in welfare of those in trapped sector has spillover effects on others

• And especially if there are efficiency wage effects, there can be d iadverse macroeconomic consequences

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B i M d lBasic ModelT t (i d t i lt )• Two sectors (industry, agriculture)

(1) βα = βDAA (p, pα) + E DMA (p , w* )(2) H(E) = βDAM (p pα) + E DMM (p w* ) +I(2) H(E) βD (p, pα) + E D (p , w ) +Iβ is the labor force in agriculture, (1 - β) is the labor force in

industry, α is productivity in agriculture,Dij is demand from those in sector i for goods from sector jw* is the (fixed) efficiency wage in the urban sectorw is the (fixed) efficiency wage in the urban sector,I is the level of investment (assumed to be industrial goods), p is the price of agricultural goods in terms of manufactured p p g g

goods, which is chosen as the numeraire, and E is the level of employment (E ≤ 1 - β);

d h h li d th l b f t itand where we have normalized the labor force at unity.

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R lResultsNormally (under stability condition, other plausible

conditions) with immobile labor

an increase in agricultural productivity unambiguously yields a reduction in the relative price of agriculture and inyields a reduction in the relative price of agriculture and in employment in manufacturing.

The result of mobility-constrained agricultural sector productivity growth is an extended economy-wide slumpproductivity growth is an extended economy wide slump

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G D iGreat Depression• From 1929 to 1932, US agriculture income fell more than

50% Whil th h d b id bl bilit t f• While there had been considerable mobility out of agriculture in the 1920s (from 30% to 25% of population), in the 1930s almost no outmigrationin the 1930s almost no outmigration• Labor was trapped• Could not afford to move• High unemployment meant returns to moving low

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Financial and Real Causes of Downturn• Banking crisis was a result of the economic downturn, not

a causeB t fi i l i i h l t t d t• But financial crisis can help perpetuate downturn

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G E diGovernment Expenditures

• Under the stability condition, an increase in government dit i b l t d iexpenditure increases urban employment and raises

agricultural prices and incomesEven though problem is structural Keynesian policies workEven though problem is structural, Keynesian policies workEven more effective if spending is directed at underlying

structural problemstructural problem

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E i f h G D iEmerging from the Great Depression• New Deal was not big enough to offset negative effects of

declining farm incomeAnd New Deal was not sustained• And New Deal was not sustained

• Cutbacks in 1937 in response to worries about fiscal deficit led once again to a downturn

• And much of Federal spending offset by cutbacks at state and local level

• Analogous to current situation, where government employment is now lower by nearly 1 million from where it

b f i iwas before crisis• Local government alone has lost 824,000 since the peak

of employment in September 2008of employment in September 2008• 276,000 government jobs lost over last 12 months

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WWar• WWII was a massive Keynesian stimulus• Moved people from rural to urban sector• Provided them with training• Especially in conjunction with GI bill• It was thus an “industrial policy” as well as a Keynesian

policyF d i d i W id d i l b• Forced savings during War provided stimulus to buy goods after War• In contrast to the legacy of debt now• In contrast to the legacy of debt now

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WWagesIn model, under normal condition, lowering urban wages

lowers agricultural prices and urban employmentHi h ( i id) t th bl• High (rigid) wages are not the problem

• Lowering wages would lower aggregate demand—worsen the problemthe problem

• In this crisis, the US—country with most flexible labor market—has had poor job performance worse than manymarket—has had poor job performance, worse than many others

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Monetary policy was not cause ofMonetary policy was not cause of Depression• And it is unlikely that it could have, by itself, reversed

downturn, contrary to claim of FriedmanThi i h id d t t f t h th i• This recession has provided test of monetary hypothesis

• Massive monetary expansionM h d th b k b t did ’t it t• May have saved the banks, but didn’t resuscitate economy

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MMonetary arrangements• But gold standard did inhibit adjustment• Countries that left gold standard (like Argentina) did better

• Though some of gains were based on “beggar thy neighbor” competitive devaluations

• Internal devaluation is no substitute for exchange rate• Internal devaluation is no substitute for exchange rate flexibility

• Obvious lessons of these experiences for currentObvious lessons of these experiences for current downturn

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An Aside on Irrelevance of StandardAn Aside on Irrelevance of Standard Macro-models• Since such structural transformations occur very seldom,

rational expectation models are not of much helpSi th t l i i t t l t d l ith• Since the central issue is structural, aggregate model with single sector not of much help

• Since among major effects are those arising from• Since among major effects are those arising from redistribution, a representative agent model is not of much helpe p

• Since central issue entails frictions in mobility, assuming perfect markets is not of much helpp p

• Problems exacerbated by efficiency wage effects

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R fReferenceDomenico Delli Gatti; Mauro Gallegati; Bruce C.

Greenwald; Alberto Russo; Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Sectoral Imbalances and Long Run Crises ” presented to IEAImbalances and Long Run Crises, presented to IEA meeting, Beijing, July, 2011.

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2 INEQUALITY2. INEQUALITY• Redistribution from those who would spend all of their

income to those that don’t lowers aggregate demandL i i i lit i t t i f th• Large increases in inequality in most countries of the world

• America said “spend as if your income was going up ” that• America said spend as if your income was going up, that is—borrow

• Problem exacerbated—downturn leading to lower wages• Problem exacerbated—downturn leading to lower wages and incomes

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Th l i li iThere were alternative policies• Combating inequality directly (e.g. through progressive

taxation)I d t di• Increased government spending

• But “political economy” made such alternative unacceptableunacceptable

• Instead, tax cut for rich exacerbated problems, putting increased burden on bubble/debt for sustaining economyincreased burden on bubble/debt for sustaining economy before crisis

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3 RISING OIL PRICES3. RISING OIL PRICES• Meant US and European consumers were spending more

of their income abroadI ff t di t ib ti f il i t i t• In effect, a redistribution from oil consuming countries to oil rich countries

• But a redistribution which lowered global aggregate• But a redistribution which lowered global aggregate demand

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4 GLOBALIZATION4. GLOBALIZATION• Global competition for limited number of manufacturing

jobsShifti ti d t d d bl• Shifting comparative advantage compounded problems for US and Europe

• One of factors contributing to growing inequality• One of factors contributing to growing inequality

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GLOBAL RESERVES5. GLOBAL RESERVES• Build up of reserves weakened global aggregate demand• Some of it based on precautionary savings—response to

i i b ti thi bl t ( t i ith lcrisis exacerbating this problem too (countries with large reserves did better)

• Some of it reflecting high oil prices• Some of it reflecting high oil prices• Some of it part of export-led growth—most successful

growth strategygrowth strategy

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R fReferences• UN Commission• J. E. Stiglitz, Freefall

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II. RemediesIncrease aggregate demandAddressing underlying issues• Facilitate the structural transformation

• Adapting to changing comparative advantage• Helping economy move into services

Red ce ineq alit• Reduce inequality• Reduce dependence on oil

R d d f l b l• Reduce need for global reserves• Finish the task of fixing the financial system and

underlying real estate problemunderlying real estate problem

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Finishing the Task of Fixing the FinancialFinishing the Task of Fixing the Financial System

Redirecting financial system to its core mission lending• Redirecting financial system to its core mission—lending (carrots and sticks)• Restricting speculative activities, proprietary trading (“ringfencing”)

H l i it d i l b k• Helping community and regional banks• Bailout was directed at helping the big banks• More than 300 small banks have gone bankrupt, more than 800 are on

th “ t h li t”the “watch list”• While investment of large firms is largely back to normal, small and

medium size enterprises Reregulating the banks• Reregulating the banks• Restricting excess leverage (Basel III doesn’t go far enough, failed to

understand insights of Modigliani and Miller)• Doing something about the too big to fail financial institutions• Doing something about the too-big-to-fail financial institutions• Transparency (e.g. OTC derivatives)• Prohibiting predatory lending

Stopping anti competitive practices• Stopping anti-competitive practices

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MMortgages• Real estate markets continues to fall• Foreclosures continue apace

• Administration efforts inadequate• More than 20% of mortgages underwater

• What is needed: Homeowners’ Chapter 11• What is needed: Homeowners Chapter 11• Alternatively: carrots and sticks to get banks to

restructurerestructure• Changing in accounting rules• Tax incentives

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I i A D dIncreasing Aggregate Demand• Government spending in a world with fiscal deficits

• High return investments lower debt/GDP in medium termWell designed tax and expenditure programs can yield balanced• Well designed tax and expenditure programs can yield balanced budget multiplier of 2-3.

• Shifting composition of taxes and expenditures can increase GDP

• Cutbacks in spending can impede transition• Especially since two of critical services (education and health) are

i ll fi dtypically government financed

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D i f S i lDesign of StimulusHi h lti li• High multipliers

• High job multipliers• Sensitive to sectoral/skill mix of unemployedSensitive to sectoral/skill mix of unemployed• Money gets quickly into system

• Assistance to states and localities, which otherwise would have to fire t hteachers

• Addressing long term problems• Facilitating restructuringg g• Reducing inequality• Investments (infrastructure, technology, education)• Protecting the environment• Protecting the environment

• Sensitive to long term nature of problem• Short term palliatives won’t work• Scope for longer term investment strategy

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Obj iObjections• With interest rate fixed at low levels, deficits won’t crowd

out private investmentP bli i t t d i i t i t t• Public investment crowds in private investment

• Ricardian equivalence doesn’t holdW ll d i d i t t i f t fi l iti• Well-designed investments improve future fiscal position, should lead to more consumption todaySavings today translates into spending tomorrow; if future• Savings today translates into spending tomorrow; if future periods demand constrained, increases income in future; expectation of that leads to more consumption today:expectation of that leads to more consumption today: with rational expectations, multipliers are larger

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P i IPromoting Investment• In US biggest needs are in public sector• What is holding back private investment?

• Excess capacity in many sectors• Lower interest rates and supply side policies won’t help

• Macro-uncertaintyMacro uncertainty• Government could issue “macro-Arrow-Debreu” securities• Speeches about confidence, green shoots, won’t work

I l t d ti• In long run, counterproductive

• NOT too high taxes, regulatory uncertainty• Lowering corporate tax rate will have no significant effect, except on g p g p

cash constrained firms• To extent that investment is debt financed, cost of capital will increase

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A G G h SA Green Growth Strategy• Raising carbon prices will induce significant amounts of

new investmentU t i t b t b i b i di• Uncertainty about carbon price may be impeding investment• Government could provide carbon price guarantees paying off if• Government could provide carbon price guarantees, paying off if

carbon price is lower than critical level in future years

• Reducing dependence on oil will also have benefits for gglobal aggregate demand

• A New Innovation model—focusing on saving the environment, rather than saving labor• Especially important in a world with high unemployment

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Gl b l SGlobal StrategyI ld f l b li ti h t tt i l b l t• In world of globalization, what matters is global aggregate demand

• Reform of global reserve system key• Reform of global reserve system key• Improving recycling of savings from reserve

countries to where investment is badly neededy• Bernanke was wrong—the problem was not a savings glut• G-20 strategy of encouraging consumption is misguided

• Planet will not survive if everyone aspires to US patterns of• Planet will not survive if everyone aspires to US patterns of consumption

• Enormous needs for investments in developing countries and to retrofit global economy for global warmingretrofit global economy for global warming

• Mistake was that financial markets didn’t allocate capital well• Part of the problem is that there needs to be better risk mitigation

f ilitifacilities

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Li i d S f M P liLimited Scope for Monetary Policy• Short-term interest rates can’t get any lower• QE II effect on LT interest rates limited• Hard to show any quantitatively significant effect of

change in interest rates on investment or consumption, especiall in periods of e cess capacit e cess le erage• especially in periods of excess capacity, excess leverage

• Especially when “credit channel” is blocked, because of failure to fix banks

• QE I and II didn’t work—why expect QE III to do so?

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• Temporary measures likely to limit asset price effects, and even smaller consumption effectsI l b li d it l k t fl t h• In a globalized capital market, money flows to where return is highest• In emerging markets where it’s not needed• In emerging markets, where it s not needed• Not in US, where it’s needed

• Most effective channel may be through competitive os e ec e c a e ay be oug co pe edevaluation• But that only works if others don’t respond• They do respond, with exchange rate interventions, capital controls,

etc• Leading to fragmentation of global capital market• Leading to fragmentation of global capital market

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• Low interest rates may even be ensuring that we have a jobless recovery

Evidence that this (and other recent recessions) are different• Evidence that this (and other recent recessions) are different• In vintage capital model (putty-clay), low long term interest rates

induce firms to use capital intensive technology—making labor redundant

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III Interconnectivity andIII. Interconnectivity and Contagion:Contagion: How the Crisis Spread AroundHow the Crisis Spread Around the World

• Theoretical question: Does Interconnectivity lead to more• Theoretical question: Does Interconnectivity lead to more or less systemic stability?

• Standard answer: spreading of risk, with concavity, leadsStandard answer: spreading of risk, with concavity, leads to better outcomes

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B t i t if ith iti• But economic systems are rife with non-convexities—e.g. bankruptcy

• Interlinked systems are more prone to system wide• Interlinked systems are more prone to system wide failures, with huge costs• privately profitable transactions may not by socially desirable

(G ld Sti lit "E t liti i E i ith I f t(Greenwald-Stiglitz, "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2), pp. 229-64. 1986)

• May lead to systemic risk• This crisis illustrates the risk

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Incoherence in StandardIncoherence in Standard Macro-frameworks• Argue for benefits of diversification (capital market

liberalization) before crisisW b t t i ( d b i• Worry about contagion (worsened by excessive integration) after crisis

• Optimal system design balances benefits and costs• Optimal system design balances benefits and costs• “Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of

Globalization,” Journal of Globalization and Development, 1(2),( )• “Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial

Integration May be Undesirable,” American Economic Review, 100(2) May 2010 pp 388-392100(2), May 2010, pp. 388-392

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A A l P blAn Analogous ProblemWith i t t d l t i id th• With an integrated electric grid the excess capacity required to prevent a blackout can be reducedreduced • alternatively, for any given capacity, the probability of a

blackout can be reduced. B t f il i t f th t l d t• But a failure in one part of the system can lead to system-wide failure • in the absence of integration the failure would have• in the absence of integration, the failure would have

been geographically constrained • Well-designed networks have circuit breakers, to g ,prevent the “contagion” of the failure of one part of the system to others.

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A Si l E lA Simple Example•

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Si l E l ( )Simple Example (cont.)•

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Simple Example (cont )Simple Example (cont.)

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Liberalization is UnambiguouslyLiberalization is Unambiguously Welfare Decreasing•

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• Basic insight: even with mean preserving reductions in risk associated with risk pooling, the probability of any particular country falling below the bankruptcy thresholdparticular country falling below the bankruptcy threshold may increase with economic integration

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S G l R lSome General Results• Full integration never pays if there are enough countries• Optimal sized clubs• Restrictions on capital flows (circuit breakers) are

desirable

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ff• Formally, two effects: • Trend reinforcement—negative shocks move us down further (equity

depletion)p )• Modeling using stochastic differential equations, with probability

that at any given time an agent goes bankrupt modeled as bl i fi t tiproblem in first passage time

• With trend reinforcement, there is an optimal degree of diversification• Battiston Stefano Domenico Delli Gatti Mauro Gallegati Bruce• Battiston, Stefano, Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Gallegati, Bruce

Greenwald, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Liaisons Dangereuses: Increasing Connectivity, Risk Sharing, and Systemic Risk,” paper g y g y p ppresented to the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, February 27, 2009, New York, NBER Paper No.

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Fi i l i li kFinancial interlinkages• Bankruptcy cascades (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003; Gale and Allen• Bankruptcy cascades (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003; Gale and Allen,

2001) – The bankruptcy of one firm affects the likelihood of the bankruptcy of those

to whom it owes money, its suppliers and those who might depend upon it y, pp g p pfor supplies; and so actions affecting its likelihood of bankruptcy have adverse effects on others.

• The “architecture” of the credit market can affect the risk that one bankruptcy leads to a sequence of others.

– If A lends to B, B lends to C and C lends to D, then a default in D can lead to a bankruptcy cascade.

– On the other hand, if lending all goes through a sufficiently well capitalized clearing house (a bank), then a default by one borrower is not as likely to lead to a cascade

– But a very large shock which leads to the bankruptcy of the “clearing house” can haveBut a very large shock which leads to the bankruptcy of the clearing house can have severe systemic effects

• Further externalities are generated as a result of information costs and imperfections.

If it i d ’t f ll k th it ’ h t i ti i l di th– If unit i doesn’t fully know other units’ characteristics—including the relationships (contracts) of those with whom it engages in a relationship, including all the relationships with whom those are engaged, ad infinitum—it cannot know the risks of their honoring their contract.

– Explains some of adverse effects of non-transparent over the counter credit default swaps

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A i PAsymmetric PatternsO i l d l l d t i l ti hi i• Our canonical model also assumed symmetric relationships in which all ties/contracts were identical.

• In the presence of convexities, such symmetric arrangements p , y goften characterize optimal designs.

• But that is not so in the presence of non-convexities, and there are many alternative architecturesare many alternative architectures. • For instance, a set of countries can be tightly linked (a “common

financial market”) to each other, but the links among financial markets may be looser The former is designed to exploit the advantages ofmay be looser. The former is designed to exploit the advantages of risk diversification, the latter to prevent the dangers of contagion.

• Circuit breakers might be absent in the former but play a large role in the relations among the “common markets.”relations among the common markets.

• Different architectures may lead to greater ability to absorb small shocks but less resilience to large shocksg

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Reducing the set of admissible relationships and• Reducing the set of admissible relationships and behaviors can have benefits• Reducing the scope for these uncertainties,g p• Reducing the potential for information asymmetries, • Reducing the burden on information gathering.

I l li t ith l i t ti• In large non-linear systems with complex interactions, even small perturbations can have large consequences• Understanding these interactions major research U de s a d g ese e ac o s ajo esea c

agenda• Broader research agenda: Design of optimal networks,

circuit breakers: optimal degree and form of financialcircuit breakers: optimal degree and form of financial integration

• Beginning of large literature

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freferencesG ld B d J E Sti lit T d N P di f M t• Greenwald, Bruce and J. E. Stiglitz, Towards a New Paradigm of Monetary Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

• Jeanne, Olivier and Anton Korinek, 2010, “Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigo ian Ta ation Approach ” American Economic Re ie 100(2) pp 403 407Pigouvian Taxation Approach,” American Economic Review, 100(2), pp. 403–407.

• Haldane, Andrew G., 2009, “Rethinking the Financial Network,” address to the Financial Students Association, Amsterdam, April, available at http://www bankofengland co uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386 pdfhttp://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf (accessed September 22, 2010).

• Haldane, Andrew G. and Robert M. May, 2010, “Systemic risk in banking ecosystems ” University of Oxford mimeoecosystems, University of Oxford mimeo.

• Korinek, Anton, 2010a, “Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View,” working paper, University of Maryland.

• 2010b “Hot Money and Serial Financial Crises ” working paper University• ——, 2010b, Hot Money and Serial Financial Crises, working paper, University of Maryland, presented at the 11th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, November 4-5.

• —— 2011 “Systemic Risk-Taking: Amplification Effects Externalities and• ——, 2011, Systemic Risk-Taking: Amplification Effects, Externalities, and Regulatory Responses,” working paper, University of Maryland.

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IV Failures of ModernIV. Failures of Modern MacroeconomicsMacroeconomics• Didn’t predict the financial crisisp

• Standard models assert that bubbles can’t happen• Standard models assert that shocks are exogenousStandard models assert that shocks are exogenous

• Key “disturbance” to the economy was endogenous

• Policy frameworks suggested that (a) keeping inflation low was necessary, and almost sufficient, for stability and growth; (b) government didn’t have instruments to prevent bubbles; (c) cheaper to clean up mess afterprevent bubbles; (c) cheaper to clean up mess after bubble broke

• EACH OF THESE BELIEFS WAS WRONG• EACH OF THESE BELIEFS WAS WRONG

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• Even after bubble burst, standard macro-economists claimed effects “contained”

b f di ifi ti• because of diversification• because markets have good “buffers”

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R t i (b d d i f t d d• Responses to crises (based on advice from standard economists) have clearly been inadequate• High unemployment 4 years after beginning of recession • Standard models didn’t focus on credit—and therefore didn’t have

much to say on repairing credit system• But theory of banking provided micro-foundations (including incentives of

banks and bankers)• Policies ignored lessons of this literature (Greenwald-Stiglitz, 2003)

• Even less to say on inherent deficiencies in securitization• Questionable improvements in risk diversification• Unambiguous attenuation of incentives (selection, monitoring, enforcement)• Some market participants took advantage of information asymmetries• Remarkable testimony to inefficiency, irrationality of markets that market

participants did not recognize these (and other) problems• Including risk of increased leverage

Market didn’t seem to learn lesson of Modigliani Miller• Market didn’t seem to learn lesson of Modigliani-Miller

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• Moreover, countries that have had highest persistent unemployment include those with allegedly most flexible labor markets (e g US) in contradiction to standardlabor markets (e.g. US), in contradiction to standard macro-economic models• But consistent with earlier studies of volatilityy

• Easterly, W., R. Islam, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001a, “Shaken and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility,” in Annual Bank Conference on

Development Economics 2000, Washington: World Bank, pp. 191-212.

• —— , ——, and —— , 2001b, “Shaken and Stirred: Volatility and Macroeconomic Paradigms for Rich and Poor Countries ” in AdvancesMacroeconomic Paradigms for Rich and Poor Countries, , in Advances in Macroeconomic Theory, Jacques Drèze (ed.), IEA Conference Volume, 133, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 353-372

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Th l l i t d ith i ll ti f it l• There were large losses associated with misallocation of capital before the bubble broke. It is easy to construct models of bubbles. But most of the losses occur after the bubble breaks, in the persistent gap between actual and potential outputgap between actual and potential output– Standard theory predicts a relatively quick recovery, as the economy adjusts to

new “reality”New equilibrium associated with new state variables– New equilibrium associated with new state variables (treating expectations as a state variable)

– And sometimes that is the case (V-shaped recovery)( p y)– But sometimes the recovery is very slow

– Persistence of effects of shocksExplained by slow recovery of balance sheets (Greenwald– Explained by slow recovery of balance sheets (Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1993, 2003)

– But current persistence is greater than can be explained by these models

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V C l di R kV. Concluding Remarks• Current downturn likely to be long

• And if something isn’t done soon about jobs situation, hysteresis effects will set in making return to full employment all the moreeffects will set in, making return to full employment all the more difficult

• Slump is more than a financial crisis• Though the financial crisis will make the return to full employment

all the more difficult

W h t l k t th d l i l bl d• We have to look at the underlying real problems and address them• Unless we do so we won’t succeed in recovering• Unless we do so, we won t succeed in recovering• And what we do may even be counterproductive

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Th i i i t l i i i th b t l• The crisis is not only a crisis in the economy, but also should be a crisis in economics• Standard models contributed to policies that led to the crisisStandard models contributed to policies that led to the crisis• Have provided us little guidance on how to respond• But the building blocks with which alternative theories can be

constructed are already availableconstructed are already available• Research in economic theory over past three decades has been

enormously rich and productive• The failure was to integrate adequately microeconomic insights into• The failure was to integrate adequately microeconomic insights into

macro economic models• This is one of the main challenges going forward

J.E. Stiglitz, 2011, “Rethinking Macroeconomics: What Failed and How to Repair It,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(4) 591 6459(4), pp. 591-645.