Stephen M. Sohinki Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement
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Transcript of Stephen M. Sohinki Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement
Stephen M. Sohinki
Director
Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement
ASQ 2005 NationalEnergy and Environmental
Conference
September 18-22, 2005
Price-Anderson History
Price-Anderson Act enacted in 1957 provided
prompt compensation for a nuclear incident
Provided broad financial coverage for damage, injury, and costs of evacuation (up to statutory limit
of $9.43 billion per incident)
Required DOE to indemnify contractors
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Price-Anderson Amendment Act (1988) extended indemnification for 15 years and required DOE to establish and enforce nuclear safety rules
Nuclear safety rules for radiological protection, quality assurance, safety basis and contractor employee protection have been issued by DOE
Price-Anderson History (cont’d)
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Price-Anderson Amendment Reauthorization
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act extended current indemnification levels until December 31, 2004.
It also required DOE to promulgate final rules by December 2003 to enforce Occupational Safety and Health requirements.
Price-Anderson History (cont’d)
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Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act extended indemnification until December 2006 Proposal to repeal remission of Civil Penalties for not-for-profits deferred Proposal to increase coverage to $10 billion per incident deferred All enforcement requirements were unchanged
Price-Anderson History (cont’d)
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Price-Anderson History (cont’d)
Energy Policy Act of 2005 Indemnifies DOE contractors until December 2025 Increases coverage to $10 billion per incident, subject to
adjustment for inflation. Repeals remission of civil penalties for nonprofits upon
signing of new contract. Civil penalties limited to total feespaid to contractor in year of violation.
No reimbursement for legal expenses in retaliation cases in which employee wins, unless required by contract signed prior
to statute’s effective date
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Enforcement Philosophy
Relationship with contractors different from NRC’s arms-length relationship with regulated utilities
Use of program as a tool to promote proactive contractor behavior resulting in safety performance improvement
Emphasis on promoting contractor timely identification, reporting, and correction of noncompliances
Noncompliance Tracking System
Mitigation6
The Big Picture Problems
OE perception: Lack of progress being made in nuclear safety performance improvement
Complex still event-driven
Too many recurring violations
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The Big Picture Problems (cont’d)
Failure to learn from operating experience – thismeans inadequate:
Corrective Actions Root Cause Extent of Condition Performance Assessment
Real senior management commitment lacking
It all comes down to culture
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INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Definition
An organization’s values and behaviors – modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members – that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority (emphasis added)
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INPO Principles
Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety
Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety
Trust permeates the organization
Decision-making reflects safety first
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INPO Principles (cont’d)
Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique
A questioning attitude is cultivated
Organizational learning is embraced
Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination
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EFCOG Assessment Guide Highlights obstacles and approach to overcome
obstacles Available at the following address: http://www.efocg.org/workgroup/paaa
EFCOG PAAA Working Group developing extent of condition guidance
Improvement Initiatives
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OE will examine all options available to encourage senior management to address recurring violations: Use of full authority in 2004 Escalation for recurring violations expected to be a continuing trend Compliance audits?
Improvement Initiatives (cont’d)
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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model
Strong Human Performance Effective
Operational Processes
Supporting Programs & Safety Features
SAFE OPERATIONS
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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model
Safe Operations
No serious or potentially serious nuclear safety events
Only rare occurrences of other important events with lesser nuclear safety consequences
Safe Operations
No serious or potentially serious nuclear safety events
Only rare occurrences of other important events with lesser nuclear safety consequences
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Safe Operations
Serious Events
Loss of all criticality contingencies
TSR safety limit violation
Fire in primary confinement/containment
Explosive safety (ORPS Category 1)
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Safe Operations
Serious Events (cont’d)
Radiation exposure (any ORPS reportable)
Radioactive area contamination (100 x 835 value)
Radioactive material loss (100 x 835 value)
Any unplanned offsite release of radioactive material
Personnel contamination requiring medical assistance
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Safe Operations
Other Important Events
Loss of one or more criticality controls
TSR and DSA violations (non safety limit)
Actuation of an SSC
Fire (other ORPS reportable)
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Other Important Events (cont’d)
Explosive safety (other ORPS reportable)
Radioactive area contamination (10-100 x 835 value)
Radioactive material loss (<100 x 835 value)
Personnel contamination (other ORPS reportable)
Safe Operations
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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model
Human Performance
Management demonstrates effective leadership and commitment to nuclear safety
Workers exhibit a sound nuclear safety culture
Contractor personnel are well qualified
Human Performance
Management demonstrates effective leadership and commitment to nuclear safety
Workers exhibit a sound nuclear safety culture
Contractor personnel are well qualified
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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model
Effective Operational Processes
Broad and effective efforts to identify safety and quality problems
Problems effectively resolved & corrected
Excellence in work management and conduct of operations
Effective Operational Processes
Broad and effective efforts to identify safety and quality problems
Problems effectively resolved & corrected
Excellence in work management and conduct of operations
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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model
Strong Supporting Programs & Safety Features
Safety Basis & Criticality Safety Controls
Radiological Program Controls
Other Quality Assurance Programs
Facility & Safety Condition
Strong Supporting Programs & Safety Features
Safety Basis & Criticality Safety Controls
Radiological Program Controls
Other Quality Assurance Programs
Facility & Safety Condition
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0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Old ORPS New ORPS
Serious Nuclear Safety Events
Note: Dominated by Radiation Exposure Events23
050
100150200250300350400
Old ORPS New ORPS
Other Important Nuclear Safety Events
Note: Dominated by SB Noncompliance, Spread of Contamination, and Personnel Contamination Events
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64%
60%63%
67% 68%
57%
69%
65% 64%
71%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Identifying Problems (NTS W/ORPS)
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Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851
Supplemental Proposal issued January 26, 2005
Comment period ended April 26, 2005
Comment resolution essentially complete
Final Rule package to Office of Management and Budget by September 30, 2005
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Enforcement philosophy same as nuclear
Enforcement process similar to nuclear
Contractors have 180 days from final publication to submit Safety and Health Program
DOE has 90 days to review and comment
Enforcement starts one year from final issuance
Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851
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Civil Penalties $70,000 per day per violation potential maximum No exemption for not-for-profits Contract or Civil Penalty but not both
Noncompliances Severity Level I Serious Severity Level II Other than serious
NTS Reporting Thresholds to be established
Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851
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