Stephen M. George Suit 12 5 11

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Case AssignmentStandard CiviiAssignment

Case number 3:11CV-668-H

Assigned: Judge John G. Heyburn II

Judge Code: 4412

Designated Magistrate Judge: James D. Moyer

Magistrate Judge Code: 44AN

12/5/2011

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AO 4 40 ( Re v. 12109) S ummon s i n a C iv il A c ti on

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTfo r t he

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C iv il A ctio n N o.

Plaintiff

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~f~p(-hE,J f-I~0€7Jt"SR._Defell lumt

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SUMMONS IN A CIVn.. ACTION

To: (Def endant 's name Q1Idadd re s s)

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A la wsu it ha s hee n filed again st yo u.

W ithin 21 days after se rv ice of this sum mons on you (no t coun ting the day you received it) - or 60 days if you

are the U nited S tate s o r a U nite d S tates a gen cy, o r an o ffice r o r em plo yee o f the U nited S ta tes describe d in F ed. R. Civ .

P. 1 2 ( a)(2 ) o r (3) - you m ust se rve on the plain tiff an answ er to the a ttached com plain t o r a m otion under R ule 12 of

the Fe deral R ules o f C iv il P ro ce du re. T he an sw er o r m otio n m ust be serv ed o n the plain tiff o r plain tiff's atto rn ey,

w ho se n am e an d a ddress are:

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If yo u fa il to respo nd, ju dgm en t by defa ult w ill be en te red a gain st yo u fo r the relief dem an ded in the c om pla in t.

Y ou also m ust file your answ er or m otion w ith the court.

CLERK O F C OU RT

Date: _

S ig na tu re o f C le rk o r D ep ut y C le rk



A O 4 40 (Rev. 1 21 09 ) S ummo ll ll i n a C i vi l A c ti on ( Pa ge 2 )

C iv il A c tio n N o .

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not beflled with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. "(1))

T his sum m ons fo r ( no me o f in div id ua l a nd litle . jf an y) . . 5 ± e t . . . . . . . ; H. ~~was rece iv ed by m e o n ( da te )

o I perso nally serv ed the su mm on s o n the indiv idua l a t (place)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -on (d a te) ; or

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------(] I left the su mm on s at the in div idu al 's residen ce o r u su al p lace o f abo de w ith ( nome)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, a p erso n o f su ita ble a ge a nd d isc re tio n w ho re sid es th ere ,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -on ( da te ) , and m ailed a co py to the in div idu al's last kn ow n a ddress; o r

---------------(] I served the sum mons on ( na m e o f i nd i vi du al )

des ign ated by law to acc ept serv ice o f pro cess on behalf o f ( n am e o f o r ga n iz at io n )

on (d a le) ; Or

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------

,w ho is

(] I re tu rn ed the sum m ons u nexecu ted becau se ;o r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

o Other ( specify);

My fe es a re $ fo r tra ve l a nd $ fo r se rv ic es , fo r a to ta l o f $---------- ---------- 0.00

I d ec la re u nd er p en alty o f p erju ry tha t th is in fo rm atio n is tru e.

Date :

S e rv er 's s ig n a tu r e

P rin ted n am e a nd title

S er ve r' s a d d re ss

Addi ti on a l i nf on n at io n r eg ard in g a tt emp te d s erv ic e, etc;



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 1 1 D E C - 5

LOUISVILLE DIVISION

CASE NO. 3:2011-CV- lR~ if-\-\

u~~_::::-:: -:.. .: ..:. ::: ... C:.: T !::'-T ~ ; ; ~~ : ;:'~':;'~ : :.~ .~ F

P H i2 : 1

JOHN DAVID LEE

Plaintiff TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED

v.. VERIFIED COMPLAINT

FOR VIOLATION OF

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

STEPHEN M. GEORGE, In His:

Individual Capacity Only

Defendant

Plaintiff John David Lee (hereinafter known as "Plaintiff Lee" or "Plaintiff"), in support of

its Complaint against Defendant Stephen George (hereinafter known as "Defendant George" or

"Defendant"), alleges and states as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND STANDING

The Plaintiff files this action against Defendant, pursuant to the Stripping Doctrine, seeking

Prospective Relief from further future acts of violations of well established Constitutional,

human and fundamental, well established in the Constitution of the United States. This action is

the companion complaint to case number 3:2011-CV-607-S, which is a petition for declaratory

judgment requesting Retrospective Relief from actions alleged against the Defendant for

allegations of past violations of the Plaintiff, filed against Defendant in his official capacity as a

state court judge.

1



Plaintiff Lee alleges that Defendant George used his position of power as a justice in

Jefferson County Circuit Court, Family Division Nine (9), under color of law, to commit

violations of the Plaintiffs l S I , 4th, 8th , 9th ,10th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution as well

as other fundamental unenumerated rights and substantive due processes. The Stripping

Doctrine authorizes the Plaintiff to file such a suit against the Defendant in his individual

capacity Ex Parte: Young, 209 U.S. 123. 28 S.Ct. 441 . 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Defendant is not

coveted by sovereign immunity under this action and must defend complaint in his individual

capacity as a citizen. Although this particular suit is not claiming monetary damages for

negligent behavior, Plaintiff Lee is also authorized to bring this suit pursuant to KRS 44.072. A

Cause of Action for Negligence under this statute will be brought in an additional suit against

Defendant in Circuit Court at a later date. Nonetheless, KRS 44.072 strips Defendant of absolute

immunity in his individual capacity.

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Lee is a resident of Kentucky, residing at 4123 Sanctuary Bluff Ln. Louisville,

KY 40241 and Petitioner in a divorce action adjudicated in Jefferson County.

2. Defendant George is a resident of Kentucky, residing at 3012 Falmouth Dr. Louisville,

KY 40205.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This action arises and is brought under the Stripping Doctrine, legal fiction of the United

States.

4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (deprivation

of rights), of federal statute and Sections 1, 2, 8,9,10 and 14 of the United States Constitution

(collectively "guaranteed rights").

2



5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., and Section 242

Deprivation of Rights under color of law.

6. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title 18, U.S.C.,

Section 242.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS AND ARGUMENT

7. Plaintiff asserts evidence to demonstrate that such violations of guaranteed rights are

planned, intentional, malicious and organized for profit to the chosen few at the Plaintiffs'

expense due to Defendant's prejudicial and bias stance toward Plaintiff Lee.

8. On February 13, 2009, Defendant met in ex parte fashion with opposing counsel in his

chambers without the benefit of the Plaintiff's counsel present. Defendant admits the meeting

took place (Exhibit "A") and therefore violating the Plaintiffs 14 th Amendment right of Due

Process. Defendant contests that substantive content was not discussed. However, Mr. Mark

Hall Esq., the Plaintiff's former counsel, with nothing to gain and everything to lose provided a

sworn affidavit in direct contradiction to the Order of the Defendant (Exhibit "B"). Plaintiff

Lee contests that if a decision was made without attorney Hall present and Mr. Hall was merely

informed of the decision when the Defendant contacted him telephonically, then substantive

content had to have been discussed. This ex parte violation would have been grounds to

disqualify the Defendant. The Defendant chose to ignore the law and has refused to disqualify

himself in this case.

9. On June 7, 2010 Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated his right to Due Process

when he moved the Court to set a hearing to set aside a wrongfully applied Domestic Violence

Order based on exculpatory evidence. The Defendant is required to schedule such a hearing

under the law but refused.

10. On July 20, 2010, Defendant violated the Plaintiff's rights of Due Process, pursuant to

the 14 th Amendment of the U. S. Constitution when he illegally destroyed exculpatory evidence

that the Plaintiff legally subpoenaed for his trial to be heard on July 15, 2010 (Exhibit "C").

Defendant is required to provide evidence to Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, pursuant to Civil Rules of

Procedure 26.02, even if the Defendant excludes it from entering the trial. Instead, Defendant

shredded evidence, creating spoliation of evidence, forever dismissing any support of the

3



Plaintiffs innocence. Plaintiff believes Defendant falsely stated that he did not review the

evidence before destroying it. Plaintiff believes the Defendant read the email communications,

found that they laced with fraudulent contents that would force him to reverse many of his

rulings due to fraud affecting the proceedings and decided to destroy the evidence instead of

applyingthe law that would reverse any injustices upon the Plaintiff.

11. OnNovember 29,2010, Defendant entered an Order prohibiting Plaintiff from filing any

complaint or legally filed civil action against any party on behalf of his children. This Order

violates the Plaintiffs fundamental and Due Process rights to redress and protection of his minor

children.

12. OnMay 20, 2011, Defendant ordered Plaintiff to dismiss a legally filed complaint against

a 3rd party, filed in a different court within Jefferson County Circuit Court (Exhibit"D").

Defendant claims he has jurisdiction to enter such an order. Plaintiff alleges the Defendant

violated the Plaintiffs 14thAmendment rights of Due Process. Kentucky statutes; KRS 344.450,

KRS 405.010 and CR 17.03, all give Plaintiff the right to file suit on behalf of his minor

children, even if he is the non-custodial parent. Non-custodial parental rights supersede that of

the Court or the Guardian ad Litem. United States v. DeLuca, 692 F2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.

1982)

13. On June 6, 2011, Defendant violated the Plaintiffs 4th Amendment rights to the U.S.

Constitution by unlawfully and illegally incarcerating him for failure to dismiss the legally filed

civil action described in item #9. Plaintiff contests that the Defendant incarcerated him without

probable cause. This was due to the Plaintiffs failure to dismiss the action as ordered on May

20th , (Exhibit"D"). Plaintiff filed a timely motion under CR 62.01, staying any proceedings

from that Order. This would include incarcerating the Plaintiff. Not only did the Defendant act

outside his jurisdiction or beyond it, he violated CR 62.01, which clearly gives the Plaintiff the

right to request additional findings of fact under CR 52.02, which was completely ignored. The

Defendant is required to provide such findings of fact or conclusions of law upon request.

Instead, Defendant ordered Plaintiff to be incarcerated. The circumstances surrounding this

event show with clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant acted outside the law to

punish another individual and violating his most basic rights.

4



14. On October 5, 2011, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated his 1st Amendment rights to the

Constitution by ordering him to censorship, disallowing him to record any writings, print books

or make any comments that the Respondent in the family court action could deem as harassing or

embarrassing, even if true. Defendant also threatens incarceration for violation of the Order

(Exhibit "E"). Not only does the Plaintiff have the right to freedom of speech, he has the right to

be free from harassment and constant fear of threat from a government official for acts that he

clearly has the rights to perform.

15. Defendant, with malice and intent, continued to violate the Plaintiff's fundamental and

protected rights to parent his children, develop and maintain a healthy relationship with his three

(3) minor children, all of male gender aged 14, 12 and 10. The Supreme Court has long

recognized as a component of substantive due process the right to familial relations. See Prince

v.Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158. 166.64 S.Ct. 438. 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Mever v. Nebraska, 262

U.S. 390. 399. 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745. 753. 102

S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). There is "a fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in

the care, custody, and management of their child,"). See also, Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126,

1136 (9th Cir.2000) f'Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live

together without governmental interference."); Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and

Youth Services. 103 F.3d 1123. 1125 (3d Cir.l997) ("We recognize the constitutionally protected

liberty interests that parents have in the custody, care and management of their children."). See

generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054. 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). The Due

Process Clause "includes a substantive component that provides heightened protection against

government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Id . at 2060. These

decisions recognize that the right of a man and woman to marry, and to bear and raise their

children is the most fundamental of all rights - the foundation of not just this country, but of all

civilization. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526,32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).

16. In violating these rights, the Defendant has denied the Plaintiff the most basic activities in

which he is to develop a relationship with the minor children for over 2 Y z years now. Defendant

has denied the Plaintiff to coach his son's athletic teams, most specifically baseball, even in the

best interest of the children (Exhibit "F"). The Supreme Court has legally recognized some

fundamental rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, including the right to have

family relations and develop the personalities of their children. These enumerated rights are

5



traditionally associated with the 9th Amendment of the United States because they are "retained

by the people". The Defendant has repeatedly stated that the decision of who coaches the

children resides with the custodial parent. This is simply not true. The sole custodian allows the

children to play baseball for their step-father, who has no rights to the children and will not allow

the Plaintiff, a proven coach to do so. Sole Custody rights do not typically decide these matters

but matters concerning education, medical attention and religion. Defendant has intentionally

failed to do his job under the best interest of the child standard, therefore, negligent or ignored by

malicious means.

17. Defendant denied the Plaintiff on two separate occasions to engage his children in family

therapy, even at the urging of the Ouardian ad litem and Plaintiffs psychologist. Defendant has

also ordered Plaintiff is not to engage in conversation with his children or even approach them or

embrace them in hugs unless it is during the Plaintiffs visitation time. This ridiculous notion is

without merit and clearly demonstrates his efforts to keep the Plaintiff from his children and

allow no involvement. All without cause. Defendant has denied the Plaintiff the right to attend

his minor children's school functions, plays, musicals or sporting events, unless it is during his

limited visitation time. Defendant has limited the Plaintiffs visitation time and held it far less

than the recommended standard by the state of Kentucky, without cause and in direct violation of

the "best interest of the child" standard and has prohibited Plaintiff from communicating with

sons via "text messaging" for over 2 Y2years. All of these rights are protected under the 9th

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Defendant has made these findings with no evidence

whatsoever of any misconduct of the Plaintiff since February 24, 2009 and in fact has ignored

evidence to the contrary and conduct of the Respondent in the family court action that would

undoubtedly lead to a change of custody, based on the best interest of the child standard in any

other family court.

18. On January 26, 2010, the Defendant penalized the Plaintiff for reporting acts of child

sexual abuse against their mother. KRS 620.050 protects any reporter of child abuse and grants

immunity. Defendant actually lists this reporting as reason to grant sole custody of the children

to the other party (Exhibit "0") stating that there was no evidence to support the Plaintiff s

claim. Evidence in the form of the children's own testimony that the abuse had occurred, as well

as testimony from the children's former therapist confirmed the suspected abuse. In addition to

6



this evidence, the Defendant stated at the custody trial, on the record and during a bench

conference that "he believed everything the children had told him" (VR: 12-3-09 2:50pm).

19. Defendant has repeatedly denied the Plaintiff access to his own medical records and those

of his minor children. Defendant has violated this basic and fundamental right without cause in

an effort to protect himself from the evidence contained in those records.

20. Defendant interfered with the terms of the Plaintiff's Automatic Stay of Execution

afforded to him under Chapter 7 Bankruptcy filing and the Securities Investor Protection Act of

1970. On December 1,2009, Judge George stated, on record (VR: 12/1109-9:03:50AM);

"Custody and visitation would only be tried due to Mr. Lee's Bankruptcy filing".

On January 26, 2010, Defendant awarded Jill Stanley, Respondent in the divorce action

$40,000 in attorney fees and professional fees (Exhibit"H"). The Court stated it considered the

financial resources of the parties. Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; therefore, he had no

financial resources. Plaintiff Lee's Automatic Stay of Execution did not end until March 2, 2010

when his Chapter 7 Bankruptcy was discharged. Jill Stanley was remarried on July 27,2009 and

therefore ineligible to receive maintenance or support pursuant to KRS 407.5101 (21), which

defines attorneys fees as "support" as does 11USC 362(a) (6) of the US Bankruptcy Code unless

recipient is not eligible. Therefore, the award becomes property of the estate, which is protected

under the Automatic Stay. Defendant repeated this act on October 11, 2010 when he awardedJill Stanley an additional $20,000 in attorney fees when she was deemed ineligible for

maintenance or support (Exhibit 10). (Also see Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services. Inc.. 270 F.

3d 374 - Court of Appeals. 6th Circuit 2001).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff contests that the Defendant knew or should have known that the allegations

contained herein blatant violations of the Plaintiffs rights. Plaintiff firmly believes that the

Defendant is provided enough administrative staff and that he has ample experience as a former

attorney, judge and now Chief Justice that he was well aware that he had ceremoniously violated

1



the rights of the Plaintiff and did so maliciously and with intent to cause him harm. In Hoskins v.

Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1. 10 (Ky. 2004). the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated, in relevant part;

It[T]he judiciary should be particularly vigilant to restrain its own

exercise of power, because of its unique position as the final andunchecked arbiter of constitutional disputesj.]"

The Plaintiff is simply asking this Court to apply the principles of law to the factual

information contained in this complaint and take the appropriate measures to resolve them. The

evidence submitted in this complaint pales in comparison as to what is left to be presented.

These behaviors are well documented in various Court Orders. The Plaintiff attests that it will be

difficult, if not impossible for the Defendant to survive this case based on those malicious and

ridiculous orders that he somehow believes he has the right to act accordingly and restrict the

Plaintiff. Stephen M. George, using his position of authority under the color of law has bullied

the Plaintiff for far too long and should be sanctioned and consequently reminded of the freedom

this great nation affords each and everyone of its' citizens. In the opinion of the Plaintiff, the

Defendant has disgraced the courts and severely damaged the Plaintiff s faith in the judicial

process itself and has no business judging anyone ifhe cannot set aside his personal feelings for

such individuals.

DEM AND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

The Plaintiff requests a Trial by Jury in this matter.

PRAYER FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The balance of the equities favors the issuance of a Permanent Injunction to allow the Court

to determine the merits of the case. Wherefore pJaintiffprays this Court issue equitable relief as

follows:

8



1. Plaintiff requests that the Court issue a Prospective Relief in the form of a Permanent

Injunction against Defendant, Stephen M. George directing his future behavior not to violate

well established, fundamental rights of the Plaintiff.

2. Plaintiff requests that the Court, consider the harshest penalty be administered, up to and

including incarceration as penalty for future violation of these well established fundamental,

constitutionally guaranteed rights by the Defendant, Stephen M. George.

3. If the Jury finds the Defendant guilty of the claims brought herein and finds that they

were committed with malice and forethought and administered prejudicially, the Plaintiff

requests that the Defendant be disqualified from any further involvement in any case involving

the Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455: US Code - Section 455 and that all previous Orders

entered by the Defendant be set aside and rendered void or invalid.

4. The requested injunctive relief will stop these wrongs and will serve the public interest in

that it may curb the malicious behavior of the so that certain inalienable rights of

citizens of the United States and Kentucky illbe preserved.

Jo D. Lee, pro se

412 .Sanctuary Bluff Ln.

Louisville, KY 40241

Phone: 502-419-0596

Facsimile (502) 742-9076

Email: [email protected]

STATEMENT OF VERIFICATION

omplaint and it is correct to the best of my knowledge.

9

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]



NO . 08C I504095 JE FFE RSON C IR CU IT C OU RTFAM IL Y D IV IS IO N N IN E

JOHN D AV ID LE E P E T I T I O N E R

vs. ORDER

JILL LEANNE LEE R E S P O N D E N T

*"***"*

T h is mat te r is before .th e C ou rt on th e P etit ioners m otion for th e C ou rt to recu se and

to vacate all O rde rs entered in this ma tte r s in ce Febru ary 1 6, 2009. T h e bas is o f th e

m otion is th e s ugges tion th at th is C ou rt h ad an ex parte commu nicat ion w ith R es po nd en t's

counse l and J.C . W antland, w ho w as a w itnes s in th e dom es tic v io lence cas e th en pe nd ing

b etw ee n th es e p artie s. This C ou rt never m et w ith J.e. Wantland and M r. Karem . M r.

Karem did approach th e Cou rt an d advis ed th e Cou rt th ere was an eme rg en cy th at

affected th e th en schedu led h earing . A t th at t ime, th e Cou rt and M r. Karem went in to

ch ambers , and M r. H all was te le ph o ne d to discuss th e emerg en cy · issue. A t no time did

th is Cou rt h ave any discuss ions of any subs tantive is sues with Mr. Karem ou ts ide of th e

presence of Mr. Hall.

In addit ion, M r. H all was aware of th e c irc ums ta nces s u rro u nd in g th at ph one call.

No add it io na l in fo rma tio n has been obtained s ince th at t im e. If M r. Lee was concerned

about any e x p arte c on tac t, it shou ld h av e b ee n ad dre ss ed at th at t ime. Perhaps it is now

addressed because of th e confusion in th e b illin g s tateme nt th at w as submit ted indicating

th at th e Cou rt met with M r. Karem and Mr. W antland. T h at d id not occu r, and th e only

contact was wh en Mr. Karem advised th e Cour t of an emergency, and M r. H all was

contacted for a te leconference.

1

Plaintiff AExhibit __



M r. Lee h as also m ade a m otion for th e appoin tm ent of a Paren tin g Coordin at or .

Ms. Lee h as been awarded so le cu stody of th e ch ildren. T herefore , the motion for th e

ap po immen t of a P aren ting C oo rd inator Is D enie d. However, if th e part ies are u nable to

re ac h an ag re em en t, th e C ou rt will co ns ide r an app ro priate m eth od to re so lve is su es s uch

as wh o will be supervis ing Mr. Lee 's c on ta ct w ith h is c h ild re n in ste ad of M r. Lee contact ing

Mr. W inner, wh o contacts M r. W aterm an or M r. Karem , wh o th en contacts M s. Lee, and

'the C Y 9 1 e is t h en re ve rs ed .

T h is is a final and appealable O rder. th ere being no ju st reason for de lay.

co: louis P. Wi'nner, Counsel fo r PetitionerMeidinger Tower - 22ndFloor462 S ou th Fou rth S treetLo uis ville , K entu cky 4 02 02

louis I.Waterman and Scot t Karem, Counse l for RespondentF irs t T ru st C entre , S uite 700 N orth200 Sou th Fifth StreetL ou is ville , K en tu ck y 4 020 2

Chr is topher Harrell, Guard ian Ad L item fo r chi ldren2500 Bards town R oad, Su ite 4Lo uis ville , K en tu cky 4 02 05



NO. 08-CI-504095 JEFFERSON C IR CU IT C OU RT

FAM ILY DIVIS IO N N1NE (9)

PETmONERO HN DA VID LEE

v . AFFIDAVIT OF MARK HALL

nu.LEANN E LEE RESPONDENT

**********

A ffian t. M a rk H all, a fte r firs t be ing duly sw orn, s tate s a s fo llo ws:

1) I am an atto rney licensed to practice law inthe C omm onw ealth o f K en tucky.

2) I fo rm erly represented M r. John Dav id Lee in the Jefferson C ircu it C ourt, Fam ily

D iv is io n N in e.

3) . In preparation for the contempt hearing that was scheduled in this case fo r

February 24.2009, I put opposing counsel on notice that Mr. Lee in tended to ca ll one o r m ore of

the minor children t o t es tif y.

4) In response to this notification, I received a call from opposing counsel, Scott

Karem, on February 12, 2009. indicating that Mrs. Lee objec ted to the children testifying. M r.

Karem indicated that he w anted to bring the issue in fron t o f the C ourt as so on a s po ssib le . Mr.

Karem s ta te d th at he in tended to see the Court the fo llow ing day, on February 13.2009. I asked

Mr. K arem to con tac t me prio r to going to the courthouse so that I cou ld appear and argue M r.

Lee's posit ion. Mr . K arem a gree d to n otify me prio r to go ing to Court .

5) O n February iI 2 00 9, o pp os in g counsel, Scot t Karem, fa iled to con tac t roe prio r

to ' g oing to this Court's chambers. I received a c all from th e Court. The Court indica ted tha t I

was on speaker phone w ith the C ourt and M r. Karem. Wi th ou t in fo rm i ng the C ourt of any aspec t

1

Plaintiff

ExhibitI



of the case or the Petitioner's position, this Honorable Court indicated that the children would

not be testifying at the upcoming domestic violence hearing.

6) After hearing the Court's decision, I attempted to explain why the children were

necessary at the hearing and I explained that Mr. Lee only desired the Court to interview the

children in chambers about allegations contained in the EPO complaint that the children

witnessed directly. The Court informed me that an interview would be the only way any child

would testify but the Court would not allow it in this situation. I

,- ,

7) I have no knowledge of what was discussed prior to the Court contacting me by

phone.

FUR THER A FFlA .NT SA YETH NAUG HT.

COMMONWEAL ' rH OF KEN11JCKY )

) 5S

COUNTY OF JEFFERSON )

Subscribed and sworn to before me by Mark Hall on March 2 ~ t t - .2010.. q J . t J / U AMy commission expires:



JOHN DAVID LEE

JEFFERSOI-.J CIRCUIT COURTNO.OBC!504095

FMJi; LY DlV!SIOh NI\lE

r - ; ~1"IT1Ji·~=h

'IS

JILL U: ' ,ANNE LEE (now STt\NLE'J'1

This matter came before the COLIn on July 15, 2010 for Trial. The Petitioner

appeared self-represented. The Respondent appeared with counsel, the Han. Louis 1

·'/Jatennan. The Court had ordered the children's fanner therao.st. Or. Ginger Crumbo, to

submit her records under seal atter they had been sunpoenaec by the Petitioner.

Hovv ever, Mr. Lee wanted those records to prove t t 131Dr. Crurnbo was t::!3.sc~dqainsl :!U!:l.

and had the Cour t rmd that information prior t':) the last Orcj(~r reSirictin,;; his Vt$ltatiofl. lilf;

Court i'l1Ight not nave done so. Mr. Lee wm; not aBogll lg any conduct that nad occu.reo

subsequent to tile last Order restricting his visitation. The Court ruled the records were not

relevant to the current motions, and declined to admit them.

Therefore. the Court has shredded Dr. Crurnbo's records without reviewing mern

\

! I /! i./,'

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i ' . . . . 'to i/.' ._' i i . ._ , / { , . ;:'f { i '

STEPHE~.I\(Ni. GEORGE ..UUDGE.. .~

JEFFERSOr--J CIRCUiT count

FA.M!L Y D1V!StOf\J NINE./ '

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.-~----

Plaintiff

Exhibit c.



~t~\ \~~O NO.08C1504095

JOHN DAVID LEE

JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURTFAMILY DIVISION NINE

PETITIONER

vs . ORDER

JILL LEANNE LEE (now STANLEY) RESPONDENT

*** *** ***This matter came before the Court on May 19, 2011 for a hearing on the

Guardian Ad Litem's motion to hold the Petitioner in contempt of court for tiljng a civil

action on behalf of the minor children. It is also before the Court on the Respondent's

motion to hold the Petitioner in contempt of court for failing to pay his share of the

parties' debt as previously ordered and for violating Orders regarding the children's

baseball activities. The Respondent has also requested an award of attorney fees. The

Petitioner, John Lee, appeared in person and self-represented. The Respondent. Jill

Stanley. appeared in person and with counsel, the Hen. Louis Waterman. The Guardian

Ad Litem. the Han. Christopher Harrell, appeared on behalf of the minor children.

On November 29, 2010, this Court entered an Order prohibiting Mr. Lee from

"filing any complaint or action on behalf of the minor children." Despite this, on March 3,

2011, Mr. Lee filed a Verified Complaint of Malpractice, Negligence and Fraud against

the children's prior therapist, Dr. Ginger Crumbo, in Jefferson Circuit Court naming the

children as plaintiffs. Consequently, the Court finds Mr. Lee in contempt for his willful

contravention of the Court's Order of November 29.2010. He may purge himself of this

contempt by dismissing the claim against Dr. Crumbo (case number 1 1C I 0 1 5 7 4), and

filing proof of such with this Court, within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order. If he

fails to do so, he shall appear before the Court at Motion Hour on Tuesday. May 31,

Plaintiff ~

Exhibit _lL



2011 at 1:00 p.m. to show cause why he should not be incarcerated in the Jefferson

County Jail for a period of thirty (30) days.

Beginning January 26, 2010, Mr. Lee was ordered to contribute $1,506 toward

the parties' marital debt. This obligation was extinguished with the Court's Judgment of

October 11, 2010. Therefore, Mr. Lee should have paid a total of $12,801 ($1,506 per

month times 8.5 months). Mr. Lee admits that he has made no contribution towards this

debt. He claims that he does not have the financial resources to pay. He also believes

that the Court has lost jurisdiction over the issue because he has appealed the

Judgment. Mr. Lee has not posted any supersedeas bond, nor has he been granted any

injunctive relief by a higher court. Therefore, this Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the

Order. The Court has previously made findings concerning Mr. Lee's ability to pay his

legal obligations, and is unaware of any changes in his financial circumstances.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Mr. Lee in contempt for his willful failure

to comply with the Court's Order concerning his contribution to the marital debt. He may

purge himself of this contempt by paying Ms. Stanley $500 per month until the balance

is extinguished. His first payment shall be due within fifteen (15) days of the entry of thrs

Order. Ms. Stanley is awarded a common law judgment against Mr. Lee in the amount

of $12.801, which shall collect interest at the [udqrnent rate of 12% per year until it IS

paid in full.

The Court has entered numerous orders concerning the children's involvement in

baseball. In summary, Mr. Lee is not permitted to coach the children; he is not permitted

to recruit any of the children's teammates to his team; and he is required to make the

children available for their scheduled activities, including baseball, during his visitation



time. Ms. Stanley alleges that Mr. Lee blatantly disregards all orders concerning

baseball.

The Court's most recent Order concerning baseball was entered March 8, 2011..

The following month, on April 21, 2011. Mr. Lee sent an email to Mr. Waterman stating:

Instead of me filing a motion asking for my time to be madeup and falling on deaf ears of the Court, I am giving yourclient an option. She can agree up front to agree to makingup this time, at a time of my choice or Nick will NOT beattending his baseball games this weekend. I realize there isa Court Order in place ordering me to ensure the boys get toevery game or face contempt.

Additionally. when the boys are in my care and I havevisitation, they will be playing baseball for me.

If I am jailed (sic). Big deal! (Emphasis in original.)

There is no allegation that Nick missed the game in question. However,

consistent with his threats, Mr. Lee did not take the parties' son, Sam, to his baseball

practice the following weekend.

The following month, on May 11, 2011, Mr. Lee sent a text message saying that

he had two injured players on his team and would have to forfeit unless Nick and Jack

played for him. When he was reminded that the children could not play for him, he

responded, I O U don't dictate what they do .... They are going to play. File ur motion.

Also, when I have them, they will not be at ur games."

Despite this round of threats, Mr. Lee denies that the Children played for his

team. He claims that he only practices with them in the backyard and that he has not

coached them in any organized activity. Even so, he has listed both Nick and Jack on

his team roster.



Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Mr. Lee in contempt for his willful

violation of the Court's orders concerning baseball. Mr. Lee may purge himself of this

contempt by removing Nick and Jack from his team roster and providing proof to the

Court within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order, and by strictly complying with the

Court's Orders as they relate to baseball. Additional violations may result in his

immediate incarceration.

The parties are unclear as to some of the restrictions conceming baseball. Mr.

Lee is permitted to "practice" with the children in his backyard during his visitation. He is

prohibited from coaching them in any organized practice or game. Mr. Lee is also

permitted to recruit former teammates of his children. He is not permitted to recruit any

current teammates.

The Guardian Ad litem suggested that it might be in the children's best interest

that they not participate in baseball. Certainly. with the level of conflict between the

parents concerning this recreational activity, the emotional harm to the children may

outweigh any benefit. However, the Court will not prohibit them from playing at this time.

As sale custodian, this is Ms. Stanley's prerogative.

Ms. Stanley has asked the Court to order Mr. Lee to provide a complete itinerary

two weeks in advance of traveling with the children. Mr. Lee took the children to Florida

for Spring Break and allegedly gave her only two days notice of their plans. In the

future, if Mr. Lee travels outside of Kentucky with the children. he shall provide Ms.

Stanley with his planned departure and return date, along with contact information, two

weeks prior to leaving.



Finally, Ms. Stanley asks the Court for an award of attorney fees. This issue is

reserved. All other pending motions not specifically addressed herein are denied.

Except as it relates to Ms. Stanley's request for attorney fees. this is a final and

appealable Order and there is no just cause for delay in its entry.

\ ENTERED IN COURT

1 DAV iD L . N IC~O:. .SON . CLERKi

i M A V Z 0 2 0 1 11

DATE

cc: John lee, Petitioner

4123 Sanctuary Bluff Lane

Louisville, Kentucky 40241

Louis I.Waterman. Attorney for Respondent

First Trust Center, Suite 700 North

200 South Fifth Street


Christopher Harrell. Guardian Ad Litem

2500 Bardstown Road. #4




Oct0511 02:16p

: O - 0 5 - 2 G l 1 14:08 F R O M - C O U R T O f J U S T I C E smmm

p.1

'"-m P.O01/00e Hie

NO. 08CI504095 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT. FAMILY DIVISION NINE

JILL LEANNE LEE (now STANLEY}

PETITIONERJOHN LEE

VS. OROER

RESPONDENT

This matter came before the Court on October 4, 2011 for a hearing on tr e

Petitioner's motion to hold the Respondent in contempt of court for interfering with lus

visitation; on the Respondent's motion to hold the Petitioner in contempt of court f.lr

contacting her business aSSociates in violation of the parties' Agreed Ortler of Novemh s r

24, 2008; and on the Respondenfs motion for the Petitioner to sign a quitclaim deed :0

effect the snor t sale of the former marital residence. The Petitioner, John Lee, appearee in

person and with counsel. the Hon. Dean Sutton. The Respondent, Jill Stanley, appearec In

person and self-represented.

InterferS!nce with Visitation

Ms. Stanley took the parties' children on vacation from JulV 18-31,20". t ne

weekend of July 29, 2011 would have otherwise been Mr. Lee's weekend With the children.

Ms. Stanley notiffed Mr. Lee of her plans, through counsel, on July 11, 2011, meaning t iat

he had 12 days notice. Mr. Lee believes that Ms, stanley's actions constitute a violatior. of

the Court's vi~itation Orders.

The same issue arose between the parties during the summer of 2010. Mr. Lee at so

filed a contempt motion at that time, which was denied. The Court stated, and reaffirms. ts

position here, that Ms. Stanley is entitled to reasonable vacatlon with the children. r J 5

Stanley testified that she had relied on the Court's previous Riling when schedufing ier

1

Plaintiff

Exhibit ~



Oct 05 1102 16p

: O - O ~ · 2 0 ' 1 1 4 : 0 8

p2

F R C ~ C O U R T C F ; ~ ST IC f 5 0 2 5 9 5 3 4 & 2 N83 P m/D05 HID

vacation and notifying Mr. Lee. This is reasonable and Mr. Lee's motion for contempt as it

relates to this event is denied.

After reviewing the numerous orders entered in tms action, it appears that ml'(;h

time and effort has been expended in setting specific parameters for Mr. Lee's v;si tati l )n.

Ms. Stanley's time with the children is unfortunately. at times, an afterthought It has oeen

Ms. Stanley's practice over the past few years to visit her husband's family In Soulh

Carolina for a two-week penod dunng the s umme r Prospectively. she shall be ef'l.titled t, : a

ccnsecunve two-.week period of vacation with the children. She Shall notifY Mr. Lee of ller

intended vacation days at least 30 days In advance.

Next. Mr. Lee claims that Ms. Stanley interfered with hIS visItation on Labor D:y,

Specifically, he complains that her husband. who coaches Nick's baseball team, schedl,l~~d

a last-mlnute practice that day, which reduced Mr. Lee's time with the children. Ms. Stan'~y

claims that Nick had recently earned a spot on the all-star team, which had its first practice

on Labor Day. Ms. Stanley denies that her husband scheduled the practice.

The Court does not find that baseball practice constitutes an interference with

visitation, particularly in light of the chiloren's lire-long Involvement in the sport, and 11e

Court's previous orders that Mr. Lee is to ensure their attendance at practices that s ra

scheduled during his visitation. There Is no credible evidence that this practice was some

contrived scheme to interfere with Mr. Lee's visitation. Therefore, his motion for ecntempt

as it relates to Labor Day is denied.

Mr. Lee believes that the Court's Order of June 16. 2011 requires Ms. Stanle~! to

provide "make up" dates for any missed visitation, including the weekend of July 29. 2(' 1,

when she was on vacation with the children. This is not the case. That Order provided for

specific additional visitation as a result of the Misinterpretation of the summer sched .Ie

2



· 0-05-20 l' 14 :01 f R O U - C O U R T O F . U S T l t E msmm

p..3

T o o i 3 l P 0 0 3 1 0 0 5 H 10

vel v:;. I I V~ U P

The fm;t sentence on the last p.aragraph beginning on page 3. which reads: "Mr. Lee snnn

be entitled to make up his missed visitation," is to be read in context with the remainirg

paragraph, Because the C ou rt fin ds that M s, S tan ley w as en tit led to u nin te rru pted vacali(,n

time with her ohildren, Mr. Lee's motion for make up visitation is denied.

Contact with Business Associates and Clients

On November 24. 2008, the parties entered into an Agreed Order providing that

neither would contact the other's business associates or clients Mr. Lee sent a Subpo€ua

and Notice of Deposition to Ms. Stanley's client. Jennifer McCall, relative to a Circuit Ccurt

action that he has filed against Ms. Stanley and o thers . Other than this corresponden:e,

Mr. Lee has had no contact with Ms. McCall. Mr. Lee dld contact her former husbavd,

close friends, and her employer seeking personal information. In addition, Ms. Stanl3Y

alleges t ha t Mr. Lee made disparaging and threatening comments to these people ab:ut

her and Ms McCall. Mr. Lee allegedly claimed that the women were involved in a romantic

relationship and allegedly threatened Mr. McCan with legal action if he did not help Mr. t . se

jnvestigate Ms . McCa l l further.

The November 24, 2008 Agreed Order was a temporary order that was ' ot

incorporated into the Court's Decree in 2009 and therefore it does not survive entry of t re

Decree. Because there Is no current order preventin9 this type of behavior. Ms. Stanlt"ls

motion for contempt is denied.

However, effective with the entry of this Order, Mr. Lee shall not interfere in :lOy

manner with Ms. Stanley's busmeas or professional relationships. This includes, but is riot

limited to , contacting her businass aseoclates. c1jen1~or their friends and family members

for any inappropriate purpose. It also includes engaging in any type of behavior desigtled

to harass, embarrass or disparage Ms. Stanley. Although i f should be evident, it (;I :SO

3



mmmz

pA

T - 5 8 3 P . O U . / O O S F - 2 1 0

OS!Jl5." 02:17p- -

includes any behavior that would give rise to a civil cause of action against Mr. Lf~~,

including defamation. Mr. Lee's failure to strictly comply with these provisions may subjll:t

him to the Court's contempt powers, up to and including Incarceration.

Quitclaim Deed to Marital Residence

The Court's Judgment of October 10~ 2010 permits Ms, Stanley to s en th e p art ls s '

former marital residence at her discretion, including entering into a short sale. There a 'e

outstanding mortgages on the home of about $1,000,000. Ms. Stanley has received an

offer to purchase the home for $525,000. Her lender J S willing to accept this offer in

satisfaction of the first mortgage. M s. St.;!nley will be permtrted to payoff the secc nd

mortgage for 6% of the balance, or $5,000. Mr. Lee discharged his obligations relative to

the home in bankruptcy, and therefore he will rot be liable to the lender for any balance

due. Mr. Lee's only complaint is that he fears a negative credit event will affect his abilil!/ to

purchase the home he is currently leasIng.

The Court has previously granted Ms. Stanley the right to short sell the mari:al

residence. Therefore. Mr. Lee shall present to her a fully executed quitclaim deed to t1 e

home on or before Thursday, October 6, 2011 at 4:00 p.m. Mr. Lee and Mr. Sutl)n

advised the Court on the record that they would comply with this timeframe.

This is a 'final and appealable order and there is no just cause for delay in its entr I-

DATE

ENTER ED ;N C OUR T !

DAVID L. N:CHOLSON. C L E F l K I !

e e l 0 S z e nley

--:~~~~--

4



Oct os 11 02: 17p

1 0 · tS - 2 0 i l 1 4 : 0 ; F RQ ~ C O UR r O F J U ST IC E

cc; DeanSutton,Attorney for Petitioner

800 Stone Creek Pa rkway, SUite 6Louisville, Kentucky 40223

Jill Stanley, Respondent

5108 Forest Grove PlaceProspect, Kentucky 40059

Christopher Harrefl, Guardian Ad litem

2500 Bardstown Road, #4Louisville, Kentucky 40205

msmm

p.5

N8:3' ? 005/005 HI 0



NO.08Ct504095 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

FAMILY DIVISION NINE

JOHN DAVID LEE PETITIONER

VS. ORDER

JILL LEANNE LEE (now STANLEY) RESPONDENT

This matter is before the Court on motions filed by each party. After considering

the motions, the Response filed thereto, if any, the Court orders as follows:

1. Mr. Lee's motion to coach the children's baseball teams is Denied. Ms.

Stanley has sole custody of the children and she will decide the children's

baseball activities. Mr. Lee's motion to lift the restrictions on his visitation

with the children, which would permit him to coach the children i f that is th e

league Ms. Stanley selects, is currently under submission.

2. Mr. Lee's motion to atter, amend or vacate all of the Orders entered in this

_ - case and in the domestic violence case is Denied,

3. Mr. Lee's motion for the Court to recuse itself is Denied.

4. Ms. Stanley's motion to hold Mr. Lee in contempt is held in abeyance

pending the Court's ruling on Mr. Lee's motion to reduce his child support

obligation heard during the financial trial held on July 15,2010.

5. Ms, Stanley's motion to require Mr. Lee to post a bond for each motion he

.Ms. Stanley files any motion for Rule 11 sanctions. the(\)-/ l\.. -.-::-

( : r L - V ourt will determine the appropriate sanction.

(lJ r f / ~

~V1

Plaintiff

Exhibit



This is a final and appealable Order, there being no just reason for delay.

, JUDGEJ FFERSONCIRCU COURT

FAMILYD ~ i l !;NEDATE

cc: John David Lee, Petitioner

6201 B urnh am P laceProspect. Kentucky 40059

Louis I.Waterman and Scott Karem, Attorneys for RespondentFirst Trust Centre, Suite 700 North200 South Fifth StreetLouisville, Kentucky 40202

C h ris to ph er H a rre ll, G u ard ia n A d L item fo r c hild re n2500 Bardstown Road , #4Louisvi l le, Kentucky 40205

2



6. Saying th ings to th e ch ildren th at u lt im ate ly led th em to m ake inappropriate

comments to th eir s tepbroth er, s uch as th at he is paying for everything In the.~o~~~;_

7. Continued to disparage Ms. Lee to oth ers via electronic m eans ;'

8. Hada friend disparageMs. lee to h er emp loye r;

9. Used Ms. Lee's pas sword to obtain , with ou t h er consent, h er ch arg e card bill

e le ctro nically, w h ic h h e c le arly o btain ed on 10 /26109 , according to h is own exh ib it; and,

10. Cont inued to in s is t t o p ro fes s ionals and oth ers , th at M s. Lee Is an alcoh olic -

and h a~ had inappropriate sexual exposu re to th e ch ildren, neith er of wh ich was

corroborated by any t es t ing o r any oth er tes tim ony. T he pictu re of th e s em i-nakec;l w om an

was clearly taken with ou t th e wom an's knowledge, and Nick den ied t ak in g It .

Mr. Lee, more often th an not, is pteasant and cooperative in face to face contact _ .

with th e profes s ionals involved in th is case. H is th erapis t, M ichelle Rowe, a licensed' -

clin ical social worker, is convinced that M r. Lee is h ones t with h er. Ms . Rowe found no .

bas is for th is Cou rt 's O rder entered on M arch 9, 2009. A t th e sam e tim e, sh e tes tified that -

'M r. Lee had a GAS score of 95. Ms . Rowe Is notquaUfied to adm tnis ter th at tes t, and was ' :

not aware th at any s uch tes t h ad been perform ed. H owever. s he s tates th at all o f h er oth er

"patients with personality d isorders all h ad a GAS score of 95 wh ile sh e treated them ,"

Neith er D r. Cabe, D r. Crum bo, nor Dr. M ancin i, believed that M r. Lee wou ld h ave a G AS

score of 95. At th e same time, h owever, Mr. Lee has relig iou s ly attended h is Cc?unseling -

sess lons , It does not appear th at th ey are su ccess fu l In m odify ing h is beh avlor,

D r. R onda M ancin i tes tified th at wh ile s he s upervis ed th e vis itation betw een M r. Lee -

and th e ch ildren, he was absolu te ly appropriate. H owever, s h e did no tes ting of M r. Lee.

In re viewin g D r. cebe's r epo rt s , D r : Manc in i t h o~.aah t. th e_ fil" $lw~s c ~n se rv ativ e, b ut s h e_was '

-:

Plaint'ff ,.Exhibit _"l.

s ,

Stephen M. George Suit 12 5 11

Documents

Transcript of Stephen M. George Suit 12 5 11