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Step 4: Connect your narrative to key drivers of value

Total Market

X

Market Share

=

Revenues (Sales)

-

Operating Expenses

=

Operating Income

-

Taxes

=

After-tax Operating Income

-

Uber is an urban car service company, competing against taxis & limos in urban areas,

but it may expand demand for car service.The global taxi/limo business is $100 billion in

2013, growing at 6% a year.

Reinvestment

=

After-tax Cash Flow

Uber will have competitive advantages against traditional car companies & against newcomers in this business, but no global networking benefits.

Target market share is 10%

Uber will maintain its current model of keeping 20% of car service payments, even in the face of

competition, because of its first mover advantages. It will maintain its current low-infrastructure cost model,

allowing it to earn high margins.Target pre-tax operating margin is 40%.

Uber has a low capital intensity model, since it does not own cars or other infrastructure,

allowing it to maintain a high sales to capital ratio for the sector (5.00)

The company is young and still trying to establish a business model, leading to a high cost of

capital (12%) up front. As it grows, it will become safer and its cost of capital will drop to 8%.

Adjusted for operating risk with a discount rate and

for failure with a probability of failure.

VALUE OF OPERATING

ASSETS

Adjust for time value & risk

The Uber narrative (June 2014)

Cash Uber has cash & capital, but there is a chance of failure.10% probability of failure.

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Step 4: Value the company (Uber)

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Step 5: Keep the feedback loop

1. Not just car service company.: Uber is a car company, not just a car service company, and there may be a day when consumers will subscribe to a Uber service, rather than own their own cars. It could also expand into logistics, i.e., moving and transportation businesses.

2. Not just urban: Uber can create new demands for car service in parts of the country where taxis are not used (suburbia, small towns).

3. Global networking benefits: By linking with technology and credit card companies, Uber can have global networking benefits.

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Valuing Bill Gurley’s Uber narrative

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Different narratives, Different Numbers

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Step 6: Be ready to modify narrative as events unfoldNarrative Break/End Narrative Shift Narrative Change

(Expansion or Contraction)

Events, external (legal, political or economic) or internal (management, competitive, default), that can cause the narrative to break or end.

Improvement or deterioration in initial business model, changing market size, market share and/or profitability.

Unexpected entry/successin a new market or unexpected exit/failure in an existing market.

Your valuation estimates (cash flows, risk, growth & value) are no longer operative

Your valuation estimates will have to be modified to reflect the new data about the company.

Valuation estimates have to be redone with new overall market potential and characteristics.

Estimate a probability that it will occur & consequences

Monte Carlo simulations or scenario analysis

Real Options

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Let the games begin… Time to value companies..

Let’s have some fun!

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Equity Risk Premiums in Valuation

¨ The equity risk premiums that I have used in the valuations that follow reflect my thinking (and how it has evolved) on the issue. ¤ Pre-1998 valuations: In the valuations prior to 1998, I use a risk premium of 5.5%

for mature markets (close to both the historical and the implied premiums then)¤ Between 1998 and Sept 2008: In the valuations between 1998 and September

2008, I used a risk premium of 4% for mature markets, reflecting my belief that risk premiums in mature markets do not change much and revert back to historical norms (at least for implied premiums).

¤ Valuations done in 2009: After the 2008 crisis and the jump in equity risk premiums to 6.43% in January 2008, I have used a higher equity risk premium (5-6%) for the next 5 years and will assume a reversion back to historical norms (4%) only after year 5.

¤ After 2009: In 2010, I reverted back to a mature market premium of 4.5%, reflecting the drop in equity risk premiums during 2009. In 2011, I used 5%, reflecting again the change in implied premium over the year. In 2012 and 2013, stayed with 6%, reverted to 5% in 2014 and will be using 5.75% in 2015.

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The Valuation Set up

¨ With each company that I value in this next section, I will try to start with a story about the company and use that story to construct a valuation.

¨ With each valuation, rather than focus on all of the details (which will follow the blueprint already laid out), I will focus on a specific component of the valuation that is unique or different.

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Stocks that look like Bonds, Things Change and Market Valuations

Training Wheels On?274

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Training Wheels valuation:Con Ed in August 2008

In trailing 12 months, through June 2008Earnings per share = $3.17Dividends per share = $2.32

Why a stable growth dividend discount model?1. Why stable growth: Company is a regulated utility, restricted from investing in new growth markets. Growth is constrained by the fact that the population (and power needs) of its customers in New York are growing at very low rates. Growth rate forever = 2%2. Why equity: Company’s debt ratio has been stable at about 70% equity, 30% debt for decades.3. Why dividends: Company has paid out about 97% of its FCFE as dividends over the last five years.

Riskfree rate4.10%10-year T.Bond rate

Beta0.80Beta for regulated power utilities

Equity Risk Premium4.5%Implied Equity Risk Premium - US market in 8/2008

Cost of Equity = 4.1% + 0.8 (4.5%) = 7.70%

Growth rate forever = 2.1%

Value per share today= Expected Dividends per share next year / (Cost of equity - Growth rate)= 2.32 (1.021)/ (.077 - ,021) = $42.30

On August 12, 2008Con Ed was trading at $ 40.76.

Test 2: Is the stable growth rate consistent with fundamentals?Retention Ratio = 27%ROE =Cost of equity = 7.7%Expected growth = 2.1%

Test 3: Is the firm’s risk and cost of equity consistent with a stable growith firm?Beta of 0.80 is at lower end of the range of stable company betas: 0.8 -1.2

Test 1: Is the firm paying dividends like a stable growth firm?Dividend payout ratio is 73%

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A breakeven growth rate to get to market price…

$0.00

$10.00

$20.00

$30.00

$40.00

$50.00

$60.00

$70.00

$80.00

4.10% 3.10% 2.10% 1.10% 0.10% -0.90% -1.90% -2.90% -3.90%

Val

ue p

er sh

are

Expected Growth rate

Con Ed: Value versus Growth Rate

Break even point: Value = Price

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From DCF value to target price and returns…

¨ Assume that you believe that your valuation of Con Ed ($42.30) is a fair estimate of the value, 7.70% is a reasonable estimate of Con Ed’s cost of equity and that your expected dividends for next year (2.32*1.021) is a fair estimate, what is the expected stock price a year from now (assuming that the market corrects its mistake?)

¨ If you bought the stock today at $40.76, what return can you expect to make over the next year (assuming again that the market corrects its mistake)?

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Current Cashflow to FirmEBIT(1-t)= 5344 (1-.35)= 3474- Nt CpX= 350 - Chg WC 691= FCFF 2433Reinvestment Rate = 1041/3474 =29.97%Return on capital = 25.19%

Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t).30*.25=.0757.5%

Stable Growthg = 3%; Beta = 1.10;Debt Ratio= 20%; Tax rate=35%Cost of capital = 6.76% ROC= 6.76%; Reinvestment Rate=3/6.76=44%

Terminal Value5= 2645/(.0676-.03) = 70,409

Cost of Equity8.32%

Cost of Debt(3.72%+.75%)(1-.35)= 2.91%

WeightsE = 92% D = 8%

Op. Assets 60607+ Cash: 3253- Debt 4920=Equity 58400

Value/Share $ 83.55

Riskfree Rate:Riskfree rate = 3.72% +

Beta 1.15 X

Risk Premium4%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.09

3M: A Pre-crisis valuationReinvestment Rate 30%

Return on Capital25%

Term Yr$4,758$2,113$2,645

On September 12, 2008, 3M was trading at $70/share

First 5 years

D/E=8.8%

Cost of capital = 8.32% (0.92) + 2.91% (0.08) = 7.88%

Year 1 2 3 4 5EBIT (1-t) $3,734 $4,014 $4,279 $4,485 $4,619 - Reinvestment $1,120 $1,204 $1,312 $1,435 $1,540 , = FCFF $2,614 $2,810 $2,967 $3,049 $3,079

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Current Cashflow to FirmEBIT(1-t)= 4810 (1-.35)= 3,180- Nt CpX= 350 - Chg WC 691= FCFF 2139Reinvestment Rate = 1041/3180

=33%Return on capital = 23.06%

Expected Growth in EBIT (1-t).25*.20=.055%

Stable Growthg = 3%; Beta = 1.00;; ERP =4%Debt Ratio= 8%; Tax rate=35%Cost of capital = 7.55% ROC= 7.55%; Reinvestment Rate=3/7.55=40%

Terminal Value5= 2434/(.0755-.03) = 53,481

Cost of Equity10.86%

Cost of Debt(3.96%+.1.5%)(1-.35)= 3.55%

WeightsE = 92% D = 8%

Op. Assets 43,975+ Cash: 3253- Debt 4920=Equity 42308

Value/Share $ 60.53

Riskfree Rate:Riskfree rate = 3.96% +

Beta 1.15 X

Risk Premium6%

Unlevered Beta for Sectors: 1.09

3M: Post-crisis valuationReinvestment Rate 25%

Return on Capital20%

Term Yr$4,038$1,604$2,434

On October 16, 2008, MMM was trading at $57/share.

First 5 years

D/E=8.8%

Cost of capital = 10.86% (0.92) + 3.55% (0.08) = 10.27%

Year 1 2 3 4 5EBIT (1-t) $3,339 $3,506 $3,667 $3,807 $3,921 - Reinvestment $835 $877 $1,025 $1,288 $1,558 = FCFF $2,504 $2,630 $2,642 $2,519 $2,363

Lowered base operating income by 10%Reduced growth rate to 5%

Increased risk premium to 6% for next 5 years

Higher default spread for next 5 years

Did not increase debt ratio in stable growth to 20%

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Evaluating the Effect of Tax Reform on January 1, 2018

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Anyone can value a company that is stable, makes money and has an established business model!

The Dark Side of Valuation284

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The fundamental determinants of value…

What are the cashflows from existing assets?- Equity: Cashflows after debt payments- Firm: Cashflows before debt payments

What is the value added by growth assets?Equity: Growth in equity earnings/ cashflowsFirm: Growth in operating earnings/ cashflows

How risky are the cash flows from both existing assets and growth assets?Equity: Risk in equity in the companyFirm: Risk in the firm’s operations

When will the firm become a mature fiirm, and what are the potential roadblocks?

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The Dark Side of Valuation…

¨ Valuing stable, money making companies with consistent and clear accounting statements, a long and stable history and lots of comparable firms is easy to do.

¨ The true test of your valuation skills is when you have to value “difficult” companies. In particular, the challenges are greatest when valuing:¤ Young companies, early in the life cycle, in young businesses¤ Companies that don’t fit the accounting mold¤ Companies that face substantial truncation risk (default or

nationalization risk)

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Difficult to value companies…

¨ Across the life cycle:¤ Young, growth firms: Limited history, small revenues in conjunction with big operating losses

and a propensity for failure make these companies tough to value.¤ Mature companies in transition: When mature companies change or are forced to change,

history may have to be abandoned and parameters have to be reestimated.¤ Declining and Distressed firms: A long but irrelevant history, declining markets, high debt loads

and the likelihood of distress make them troublesome.¨ Across markets

¤ Emerging market companies are often difficult to value because of the way they are structured, their exposure to country risk and poor corporate governance.

¨ Across sectors¤ Financial service firms: Opacity of financial statements and difficulties in estimating basic

inputs leave us trusting managers to tell us what’s going on.¤ Commodity and cyclical firms: Dependence of the underlying commodity prices or overall

economic growth make these valuations susceptible to macro factors.¤ Firms with intangible assets: Accounting principles are left to the wayside on these firms.

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