States CP

Solvency --- General

Solvency --- Top-Level --- Federal follow-onCounterplan leads to federal follow-on --- empirics and assumes counterplan mechanismMehta ‘13

Jal Mehta: Harvard Graduate School of Education “How Paradigms Create Politics: The Transformation of American Educational Policy, 1980-2001” 2013 https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33063299/Mehta_--_How_Paradigms_Create_Politics_--_AERJ_2013.pdf?sequence=1

THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL POLICY: THE LONG SHADOWS OF A NATION AT RISK The consensus around standards-based reform at the state level paved the road for federal standards legislation, first in two pieces of legislation in 1994 (Goals 2000 and the reauthorization of the ESEA) and then in the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act. Table 3 briefly summarizes the trajectory of federal reform. Unlike the state reforms, the details of the federal reform have been well-described by previous scholars (see Jennings 1998, McGuinn 2006, DeBray 2006), so I focus here briefly on four conceptual points about the power of the A Nation at Risk paradigm in setting the direction for reform and particularly in enabling a major shift towards federal control (puzzle #5).50 First, A Nation at Risk provided the impetus and basis for what became the federal movement for reform. The meeting between President George H.W. Bush and the nation’s governors at Charlottesville (the Charlottesville Summit) in 1989 is widely agreed to be the first step at the federal level towards standards-based reform (McGuinn, 2006; Vinovskis, 1999). For the governors, it reflected an effort to create national support for a state school reform movement which had been developing since A Nation at Risk. For the president, it provided a way to stake his claim to an issue that had been rising in voters’ concerns since A Nation at Risk (Hess and McGuinn 2002). While there has been some disagreement about whether the governors or the president initiated the meeting,51 the important point from this perspective is that the two groups were able to come together because they had a similar understanding of the educational problem, as the joint communiqué released at the end of the meeting suggested: “The President and the nation’s Governors agree that a better educated citizenry is the key to the continued growth and prosperity of the United States… [A]s a Nation we must have an educated workforce, second to none, in order to succeed in an increasingly competitive world economy.” The key outcome of the meeting was a set of National Education Goals, a series of educational targets that the nation would aim to meet by 2000. These goals also reflected the paradigm defined by A Nation at Risk in that they focused primarily on output targets rather than increased inputs. Most notably, they promised that America would be first in the world in international tests of math and science by 2000, a goal that was consistent with the focus on international competition in A Nation at Risk. Second, the convergence of a redefined educational paradigm with broader changes in party politics in the 1990s and early 2000s created a context in which leaders of both parties saw advantage in pushing a centrist agenda of standards-based reform at the federal level. The push to embrace federal standards-based reform came in two movements: President Clinton brought Democrats on board for Goals 2000 and the 1994 ESEA legislation, and President George W. Bush brought along Republicans for No Child Left Behind in 2001. For President Clinton, federal support for standards was a natural extension of the work he had done on standards in Arkansas and as the governor’s co-chair at the Charlottesville Summit. It also supported his claim to be a New Democrat, as holding schools accountable and challenging the teachers unions enabled him to separate himself from old-style liberals’ argument that fixing schools meant sending more money. Taking on a Democratic Congress who wanted the 1994 ESEA reauthorization to be primarily about funneling greater resources to high poverty students, Clinton successfully argued, consistent with both A Nation at Risk and his New Democrat philosophy, that the path to improved performance was not more money but higher standards and greater accountability for results. For President George W. Bush, education proved to be the perfect issue on which to stake his claim to be a “compassionate conservative,” mixing traditionally liberal ends of creating opportunities for disadvantaged students with conservative means of standards and accountability. Bush renounced the longtime Republican stance in favor of abolishing the Department of Education in favor of a Texas-style regime of more tests and

accountability, substantially erasing the nearly 30 point edge that Democrats had previously held on the educational issue. When he made education reform his primary domestic initiative during his first year, he was able to bring over Republicans in Congress who had previously been hostile to greater degrees of federal control (see Rudalevige, 2003 and DeBray, 2006 for more detail on the Congressional politics). Overall, both presidents did tack to the center as the median voter theorem would predict, but A Nation at Risk is important in explaining the context in which it came to be rational to do so. A Nation at Risk set the parameters for what seemed like sensible centrist education reform, and it triggered the state reform movement that gave these former governors experience with standards in the first place .52 Third, the new paradigm created a wide basis of support behind the standards-based vision at the federal level . This coalition, developed in the early 1990s, was critical to the passage of the 1994 ESEA, and was similarly supportive of No Child Left Behind. As in the states, these groups came from left and right, with concerns ranging from economic competitiveness to greater equity—they supported similar policies, but not for the same reasons. Business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce, the National Alliance of Business, and most prominently the Business Roundtable, began to throw their support behind educational reform as a central input in the battle for international economic competitiveness. The National Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers were each comprised of many members who were pursuing some version of

standards and accountability in their states; these collective associations in turn advocated federal assistance to state standards-based reform. Equity driven groups like the Education Trust and the Citizens Commission on Civil Rights also became strong backers of standards-based reform. Influential policy academics came on board, most notably Stanford’s Marshall “Mike” Smith, who is credited with an influential early formulation of standards-based reform (Smith & O’Day, 1991), and the Fordham Foundation’s Checker Finn, perhaps the best-known conservative commentator on education reform. These groups and individuals helped to develop the framework for standards based- reform in the early 1990s and provided critical direction and support for federal standards legislation . When Clinton drew together his policy team, much of its expertise came from those who had been extensively involved in the standards movement, including Secretary of Education Richard Riley, the former governor of South Carolina, undersecretary of Education Mike Cohen, who had been the NGA’s lead education staffer at Charlottesville and was former co-president of the National Alliance for Restructuring Education, and Mike Smith, the co-author of the systemic reform framework. As was the case in the states, this wide coalition was able to overcome the objections of the NEA to greater accountability.53 Fourth and finally, the paradigm enabled the expansion of the federal role (puzzle #5) because the paradigm had created a convergence among state reforms on which the federal government could piggyback without seeming overly intrusive. Forty-two states had some version of standards by 1994, and the federal legislation was crafted to expand upon these existing efforts . Goals 2000 funded the development of state standards, and Improving America’s Schools Act, which was the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, predicated the delivery of Title I funds on the development of state standardsbased reform. While George H.W. Bush’s proposal for national standards had gone down to political defeat, Clinton was able to head off the most virulent objections to national control by building on state standards. No Child Left Behind in turn built upon the framework established in the 1994 reforms—an “evolution” not a “revolution” as one scholar put it54—but added a harder edge of accountability. In a neat move of jujitsu, federal policymakers and advocacy groups simultaneously drew upon the existence of state action to claim legitimacy for federal reforms that built on top of them, but criticized the slow and uneven pace of state reforms to argue that more stringent federal measures were necessary .55 The result was No Child Left Behind, which simultaneously deferred to states in the content of the standards and the cut scores for success, but also created a series of requirements—mandating annual tests in years 3-8 and creating an escalating series of sanctions for schools that did not improve—that substantially increased federal requirements for states and schools. In the longer view, by creating a movement of state reform , A Nation at Risk enabled the federal government to gradually expand its influence in a previously local realm by creating a state consensus (49 states had adopted standards by 2001) upon which the federal government could piggyback

Familiarity reduces opposition- causes follow-onGolden ’99

Dylan Golden: JD Candidate at UCLA Law, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, “The Politics of Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reduction: The Role of Pluralism in Shaping the Climate Change Technology Initiative”, Lexis

Individual states vary widely in their fossil fuel consumption and in the amount of carbon dioxide they release into the atmosphere. California emits as much carbon dioxide as all of Scandinavia combined. 46 Texas is the seventh largest carbon dioxide producer. 47 Some states emit a globally negligible amount of carbon dioxide.

Some conservative interests may therefore oppose the CCTI on the grounds that it involves a further expansion of federal power into an area which is properly under the jurisdiction of states. Those who believe firmly in strong state governments are similar to the "Greens" (discussed below) in that the "rent", in this case the penalty,

at stake in the CCTI is non-economic.  [*188]  This group does have some justification for their position. Attempted state action involving manipulating markets, generally through the tax system, in the name of the environment tells us a great deal about how various stakeholders - such as business entities, environmental interest groups, and political groups - might respond to federal or international action. 48 State legislatures also provide a forum to raise issues and

change perceptions. 49 State environmental policy frequently influences Congress. 50 State action increases the feasibility of federal action because: familiarity aids the political process , legislators understand the politics in terms of

income, consumption and their regional interests, administrative agencies know how to  [*189]  administrate and may estimate impacts, interest

groups know where they stand , and practical experience can guide legislative drafting. 51 Such grassroots action may

also stimulate support among the populous by encouraging people to take personal responsibility for the environment. 52 Action at the state level may also spur more informed federal action, which in turn could spur international action . State-federal agreements are possible on the carbon tax issue and the commerce clause does not prohibit joint or unilateral action. 53 Energy taxes have already been implemented jointly in the case of gasoline taxes. 54

Solvency --- Top-Level --- Aff links to solvency deficitsThe aff links to states solvency deficits – normal means is state implementationVergari ‘10

Sandra Vergari: Associate professor of Education at the University of Albany “Safeguarding Federalism in Education Policy in Canada and the United States” Publius, Vol. 40, No. 3, Canadian and U.S. Federalism (Summer 2010), pp. 534-557

The United States is an intriguing case for analysis due to the dynamic nature of education policy and the intergovernmental relations resulting from federal and state activism. The federal government has been increasingly active in trying to promote several uniform objectives that are believed by many to be in the national interest. However, the federal government lacks political and technical capacity to implement its education policies and must rely on state cooperation . For their part, the states have shown varying levels of interest in equity and excellence and, as a whole, have worked to safeguard federalism. Many states were reluctant to implement the Graduation Counts Compact in a timely manner. In the end, the federal government used its spending power to require a policy that matched many elements of the compact. The federal government "borrowed strength" and used existing state policymaking as leverage to advance a uniform policy (see Elmore and Fuhrman 1990; Manna 2006). In contrast, if a policy commitment of CMEC is not ultimately upheld by each province/territory, the Canadian federal government does not have standing to try to impose the policy.

EmpiricsWeiss ‘13

ELAINE WEISS: National Coordinator for the Broader Bolder Approach to Education (BBA) “MISMATCHES IN RACE TO THE TOP LIMIT EDUCATIONAL IMPROVEMENT Lack of Time, Resources, and Tools to Address Opportunity Gaps Puts Lofty State Goals Out of Reach “ September 12, 2013 http://krouskoffconsulting.com/lhcss/resources/broaderboulderapproach.pdf

While the new resources that Race to the Top provides and its focus on using data to improve instruction hold promise, the program also has fundamental flaws. At a basic level, there is a disconnect between factors that drive achievement gaps and the policy tools RTTT promotes to close them. With its focus on in-school policies that target and assess only a narrow set of academic issues, Race to the Top’s policy agenda fails to address multiple opportunity gaps that drive the majority of achievement gaps. Even in the best of circumstances, then, Race to the Top could not achieve what it sets out to do. That mismatch is exacerbated by the initiative’s mandate that states fix a complicated , expensive set of problem s on the cheap and in an unrealistically short period.8 The initiative demands major changes and new investments by states, at a time when their financial, staff, and other resources are at a low . Moreover, it asks states to enact the changes and make new investments in a very short time with a tiny amount of new funding (relative to states’ education budgets). These poor circumstances further erode the initiative’s potential. The initiative’s rollout illustrates constraints that states faced from the beginning. Race to the Top was first announced in November 2009, and immediately after, in November and December, the department hosted informational conference calls as well as two technical assistance workshops. First-round applications were due in January 2010,9 and Round II applications, intended to give states more time if needed, were due in June 2010. In other words, even with the extra time, states had to pull together two hundred-plus page applications and secure potentially hundreds of local district and other sign-ons in the

space of a few months. Not only states were pressed—so were reviewers, since first-round winners were announced in April 2010 and Round II winners in September. It is not surprising, then, that our exploration of RTTT’s implementation among the 11 Round I and II grantee states and the District of Columbia finds some successes but many more challenges. The constrained deadlines forced nearly all states to pull back on promises they made in their proposals and to request multiple extensions . Even so, states piloted and implemented new teacher and principal evaluation systems , but often without sufficient planning or input. Districts report a lack of resources to develop them, metrics that make no sense, and results that suggest a lack of validity. Furthermore, the need to focus so much energy on the evaluations themselves left states and districts without sufficient resources to use them as intended . Many teachers are failing to receive the feedback, guidance, or support, based on the evaluations, that could improve their instruction. The exceptions to this pattern tend to be in states or districts that laid strong foundations for implementation through extensive engagement and planning, that were already fairly high-performing, and/or that had additional resources.

Solvency --- Top-Level --- Plan causes state backlashCP solves implementation better than the aff --- federal intervention causes state backlashMcGuinn ‘09

Patrick McGuinn: Professor of Political Science @ Drew University Ph.D. in Government (and an M.Ed. in Education Policy) at the University of Virginia “The New Politics of Education: Analyzing the Federal Education Policy Landscape in the Post-NCLB Era” Educational Policy 2009 Volume: 23 issue: 1, page(s): 15-42 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0895904808328524

Conclusion The national policy landscape around education has historically been more fluid and complex than it has often been portrayed and has only become more so in the contemporary NCLB era. New policy has created new politics in education , in the sense that the law has spurred the mobilization of established interest groups, induced the creation of new entrants, and pushed these groups into new and often cross-cutting coalitions. The expanded federal role has caused the states to push back and has made some congress ional Republicans and Democrats recant their initial support for the law. On the other hand, the unevenness of standards across states has also renewed calls for national standards and tests and has strengthened the calls of the civil rights and business communities for school accountability measures. Thus, we argue, political scientists and policy researchers need to take account of the rapid changes that have taken place in the past 7 years (2002 to 2009) in the education policy arena as they contemplate the future direction of federal school reform efforts.

States water down the aff during implementationVergari ‘12

Sandra Vergari: Associate professor of Education at the University of Albany “The Limits of Federal Activism in Education Policy” Educational Policy 26(1) 15–34 http://journals.sagepub.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/0895904811425910

Policy Implementation Policies often change during implementation . This is due to practices and political demands of policy implementers and responses from policy makers and administrators who rely on others to implement policies (Fuhrman, 2004; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; McLaughlin, 1987). The federal government relies on states and localities to implement federal education policy. Across federal policies, state administrative discretion exists along a continuum of almost no discretion to substantial freedom. Federal programs such as Social Security disability benefits reflect a strong preference for uniform implementation. States enjoy more freedom when implementing other programs so long as they comply with basic features of the enabling legislation and regulations (Nugent, 2009). Federal education policy implementation is shaped by interests and capacities of agencies and administrators at all three levels of government . The federal government has often lacked both capacity and will to enforce its education policies fully. Although the federal role in education has expanded, staffing at the U.S. Department of Education has not.2 In cases where states and districts are not complying with federal regulations, it may be difficult morally and politically for the federal government to withhold funds since doing so may impact innocent students. The extent to which states and school districts implement federal education policy in a robust manner also varies according to their political interests and technical

capacities. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) has emphasized changing not only state policies but also relationships between states and school districts. In relying on states to influence districts and schools, NCLB reflects an assumption of “far more powerful and competent state education governance than exists” (Fuhrman, 2004, p. 145). Weak implementation in a given state may be due to lack of will, inadequate capacity, or both . If state agencies are not effective implementers of federal policy it is difficult for school districts to “get it right” (Cross, 2004, p. 154). As experienced implementers of federal education policy, state and local officials have special claims to knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of a given policy. These circumstances make it difficult for federal officials to ignore state assertions about a policy and give states power in their interactions with the federal government (Nugent, 2009). In the case of NCLB, state and local officials engaged in aggressive lobbying of the federal government. States offered vigorous resistance to threats to their legal, fiscal, and administrative interests during the initial implementation of NCLB. Yet the federal government needed state and local cooperation to implement NCLB effectively. Thus, state and local resistance to various components of NCLB provided leverage in securing bargains and waivers from the federal government (Dinan, 2008; Nugent, 2009; Shelly, 2008). The preceding discussion leads to the following claims: (a) implementation of federal education policy requires state and local cooperation , (b) a state may lack will and /or capacity to hold its school districts accountable for robust policy implementation , (c) in the face of federal threats to state fiscal and administrative interests, states act to protect their interests , (d) when states do not like a federal policy but want the attached funding, they may do the minimum necessary for compliance , (e) state and local experience and knowledge pertaining to education policy provide bargaining power in negotiations with the federal government, and (f) states are not at the mercy of the federal government and can often change the original shape of federal education policy during implementation. Next, I examine recent cases of education policy implementation that support these claims .

Local stakeholders block implementation of federal policyGamkhar ‘12

Shama Gamkhar: Associate Professor of Public Affairs at University of Texas at Austin “The State of American Federalism 2011–2012: A Fend for Yourself and Activist Form of Bottom-Up Federalism” Publius:The Journal of Federalism volume 42 number 3, pp. 357-386

Local stakeholders resist RTTT conditions RTTT has expanded federal involvement in state education policy , but its success still depends crucially on state and local implementation and these players have resisted the federal intrusion . Texas is a vocal representative of the states that did not apply for RTTT funding in opposition to national mandates, in this case the curriculum and evaluation standards. Texas Commissioner of Education Robert Scott views national curriculum standards as ‘‘a step toward a federal takeover of the nation’s public schools’’ (Thevenot 2009). Although state applications for RTTT funding reflect their intention to comply with the accountability standards required by the federal program, local and statewide stakeholders continue to balk even after applications are submitted and the grant is awarded. New York (NY) teacher unions have been high-profile protestors against their state’s plan for RTTT funding; their main complaint was the use of student test scores to evaluate teacher and principal performance (Newsday 2011). This issue was resolved in 2012, but many critics of the compromise agreement, between NY teacher unions and the State, consider it unstable (Santos and Hu 2012). Hawaii became the most recent case where teacher unions rejected, by an overwhelming majority, the

performance-based evaluation and compensation system required by their RTTT grant contract (Strauss 2012) Research shows that teachers and administrators overwhelmingly support NCLB’s and RTTT’s underlying principles regarding accountability and their dissatisfaction is with the heavy reliance on federal intervention in these areas (Murnane and Papay 2010). The federal accountability mandates have created a one-size-fits-all framework focused on reading and math that could result in the loss of ground in other academic programs, as well as locally developed alternative accountability systems that might be more beneficial for improving student performance (Livingston 2011). Rivlin, in her article in this issue, goes further, to recommend that the federal government might ‘‘do more with less,’’ by ceding K–12 education to the states

States backlash to defend federalism --- empiricsVergari ‘10

Sandra Vergari: Associate professor of Education at the University of Albany “Safeguarding Federalism in Education Policy in Canada and the United States” Publius, Vol. 40, No. 3, Canadian and U.S. Federalism (Summer 2010), pp. 534-557

Safeguarding Federalism Subnational governments use a variety of means to protect their interests and "safeguard federalism" (Nugent 2009). As discussed later, state resistance to federal education policy and implementation approaches that are less than faithful to policy purposes are salient examples of safeguarding federalism in the United States. In Canada, despite subnational adoption of some similar education policies, some jurisdictions prefer policy diversity on curriculum and accountability matters. Participation in regional curriculum consortia initiatives is voluntary, and Saskatchewan and Yukon have modified centrally defined curricula in accordance with local values and priorities (Ben Jaafar and Anderson 2007). Under federalism, "it can be difficult to create, monitor, and enforce cooperative agreements, especially when states have incentives to shirk, as they often do, and unless there is a body with real enforcement powers" (Rom 2006: 233). In Canada, CMEC fulfills a national coordinating role, but lacks enforcement power. The ability of the United S tates federal government to enforce its education policies is hampered by politics, capacity limitations, and concerns that withholding funds punishes children who need the aid. Thus, states and school districts can often alter the original shape of federal education policy (Cross 2004; Fuhrman 2004; Superfine 2005; Vergari 2007). In both Canada and the United States, there has been some movement toward national education policy over the past two decades. In Canada, these dynamics have occurred in the absence of federal activism. In the United States, presidents and education department secretaries use the "bully pulpit" and the federal government can exercise its power of the purse to support national education policy. In both countries, there are also political, economic, and cultural factors that inhibit development of national policy.

Solvency --- Top-Level --- Bottom-up good / Top-down badOnly bottom-up reform ensures coalition-building and effective implementationRavitch ‘10

Diane Ravitch: historian of education, an educational policy analyst, and a research professor at New York University's Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development “The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice are Undermining Education” March 2010 http://www.capitolreader.com/bonus/The%20Death%20and%20Life%20of%20the%20Great%20American%20School%20System.pdf

Top-down efforts of reform are flawed. There are no simple solutions or magic bullets when it comes to education. “ School reform is a slow , steady labor-intensive process.” Capable administrators, dedicated teachers, and collaboration between all parties (students, parents, teachers, and administrators) and safe environments are what make educational systems successful. Ultimately, students, teachers, parents, and administrators all need to buy into reforms. In other words, successful reform will be bottom-up. The top-down reform movement created a hostile school environment. Students disliked the emphasis on standardized tests , teachers felt ignored and disrespected by the reformists, and the high rate of teacher firings and school closings created a climate of fear and uncertainty . Put simply, “trust, not coercion, is a necessary precondition for school reform.” Raising math and reading test scores became the ultimate tenets of the reform movement. As a result, many schools cut back or dropped art classes, music classes, physical education, history, civics, social sciences, and science classes. Not surprisingly, because teachers’ jobs depended on standardized exams, they tended to teach to the tests. This distorted the educational process. First, teachers devoted inordinate time teaching students how to navigate the exams. And second, schools became adept at finding ways to artificially inflate test scores. For example, schools found ways to exclude (by transferring, suspending, or not enrolling) low-performing students.

Decentralized decision-making results in better policy through experimentationSaam ‘13

Nicole: professor for methods of empirical social research at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg/Germany, “Policy Innovation, Decentralised Experimentation, and Laboratory Federalism,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 16 (1) 7, January 31 2013 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/16/1/7.html

All three hypotheses about the specific determinants and effects of laboratory federalism have been confirmed by our simulation model: Both a larger degree of decentralisation and an increase in the number of lower-level jurisdictions have a positive effect on the long-term overall performance of the policies in a federal state and simultaneously reduce the risk of low overall performance through decreasing the dispersion of possible performance values through policy error correction by mutual learning . An additional important result is that our three hypotheses still hold if we take into account some widely discussed problems of policy learning and policy transfer from other

jurisdictions. Our simulations with non-imitable policies and complementary policies (with the transplant effect) demonstrate that these impediments slow down the knowledge generation effect in decentralised systems, but do not eliminate these advantages of experimentation . Therefore decentralised experimentation and mutual learning can be seen as a rather robust knowledge generation mechanism, which seems capable of producing considerably

positive effects despite a number of serious imperfections. A crucial result is that this evolutionary mechanism can also produce both a larger overall performance and provide an insurance function against the persistence of erroneous policies. 4.2From the theory of federalism, it is evident that this knowledge generation effect through decentralised experimentation is only one effect among a number of other effects, leading to difficult trade off problems. In our last set of simulations we analysed two kinds of trade offs. The simulations demonstrated clearly that static cost advantages of the central level are getting outpaced in the long run by the dynamic advantages of laboratory federalism. This implies that the importance of static cost advantages should not be over-estimated in decisions about the long-term structure of a federal system. If, however, it can be demonstrated that the central level has itself superior policy innovation capabilities, which, however, is empirically very unclear, then a real long-term trade off between these dynamic advantages of the central level and the dynamic advantages of decentralised experimentation might occur, but only in the case of a large innovation capabilities differential between the central and decentral level. Due to these and other (here not considered) trade off problems through several important advantages and disadvantages of centralisation and decentralisation, we cannot derive a general policy conclusion that

the most decentralised system is the best solution. What we can derive from our simulation results is that more decentralisation increases this specific knowledge generation effect through experimentation and mutual learning, and that this advantage of decentralisation is a very important effect that should always receive much attention in studies about the optimal vertical allocation of competencies and should have a considerable weight in the ensueing trade off analyses. So far, it is neglected in many discussions about centralisation or harmonisation of policies.

Solvency --- A2: Deficit --- Rollback --- GeneralNo rollback --- state coalitions ensure political durabilityMcGuinn ‘09

Patrick McGuinn: Professor of Political Science @ Drew University Ph.D. in Government (and an M.Ed. in Education Policy) at the University of Virginia “The New Politics of Education: Analyzing the Federal Education Policy Landscape in the Post-NCLB Era” Educational Policy 2009 Volume: 23 issue: 1, page(s): 15-42 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0895904808328524

Conclusion The national policy landscape around education has historically been more fluid and complex than it has often been portrayed and has only become more so in the contemporary NCLB era. New policy has created new politics in education , in the sense that the law has spurred the mobilization of established interest groups, induced the creation of new entrants, and pushed these groups into new and often cross-cutting coalitions. The expanded federal role has caused the states to push back and has made some congressional Republicans and Democrats recant their initial support for the law. On the other hand, the unevenness of standards across states has also renewed calls for national standards and tests and has strengthened the calls of the civil rights and business communities for school accountability measures. Thus, we argue, political scientists and policy researchers need to take account of the rapid changes that have taken place in the past 7 years (2002 to 2009) in the education policy arena as they contemplate the future direction of federal school reform efforts. Although it remains unclear what the ultimate consequences of these new coalitions for NCLB and federal policy making will be, we think some patterns of influence are more and less likely. First, the civil rights and practitioner coalition (FEA) is, at present, so large and diffuse that it appears unlikely to be very effective in rolling back NCLB’s test-based accountability measures. By contrast , it is the groups representing state-level educational policy makers—chiefs, state school board members, and governors—who are apt to be most influential with Congress in negotiating what the terms of federal authority ought to be. We also posit that it is an open question whether teacher unions and practitioner groups will regain their “in-group” status, to use Gimpel’s (1998) term, just because the Democrats have regained control of both the House and the Senate. Reports of a growing split between teachers union and civil rights groups over school reform greatly complicate the Democratic Party’s position on school reform (Hoff, 2008). And Democratic President-elect Barack Obama’s public support for charter schools and merit pay—two reforms generally opposed by teachers’ unions—underscores the press of competing ideas and demands. There is no doubt that the earlier education consensus described by Baumgartner and Walker (1989), and the noninnovative period Peterson and Rabe (1983) documented, are over. In the new pluralistic and information-rich post-NCLB environment, interest groups and organizations can no longer afford not to put forward innovative proposals, forge coalitions, and actively communicate with members. The important questions for the next phase of policy research about the federal role are how interest groups and think tanks interact with each other, how changes in the external environment are understood by those working inside Congress, and what the effects of this “new politics” will be on future legislation. What is clear, however, is that viewing the national politics of school reform through a narrowly partisan, ideological, or group prism is no longer sufficient, if indeed it ever was. Media and scholarly coverage has highlighted the political opposition and implementation challenges engendered by NCLB and suggested that federal education policy is likely to revert back to something like the framework enacted in the 1994 Improving America’s Schools Act. We argue here, however, that such a view ignores important changes to the national politics of education since 1994 that have created a more diverse and complicated environment for the upcoming reauthorization. During the past 10 years, the established ideological positions and interest group

landscape in education have been fundamentally disrupted, and as a result the political terrain on which the NCLB reauthorization debate will occur is quite different than the one on which the 1994 and 2000 debates took place. Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of the pending reauthorization, we believe that the basic framework of test-based school accountability instituted by NCLB may prove to be more durable than is often predicted because the political shifts wrought by the law —particularly in the interest group and think tank sectors — are deeper and more complicated than many presume .

Solvency --- A2: Deficit --- Patchwork / UniformityPatchwork is a net benefit – not a deficit --- experimentation creates better policyEvers ‘14

Williamson M. Evers: a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of the Institution’s Koret Task Force on K–12 Education, specializes in research on education policy especially as it pertains to curriculum, teaching, testing, accountability, and school finance September 4, 2014 http://www.hoover.org/research/against-common-core

Now, I want to turn to the closely related matter of competitive federalism. Competitive federalism is horizontal competition among jurisdictions . We know that it works in education at the inter-district level. Economist Caroline Hoxby studied metropolitan areas with many school districts (like Boston) vs. metropolitan areas contained within one large district (like Miami or Los Angeles). She found that student performance is better in areas with competing multiple districts , where parents at the same income level can move—at the margin—from one locality to another nearby, in search of a better education for their children. We have seen competitive federalism work in education at the inter-state level . Back in the 1950s, Mississippi and North Carolina were at the same low level. Over the years, North Carolina tried a number of educational experiments and moved well ahead of Mississippi. We have likewise seen Massachusetts move up over the years from mediocre to stellar (though under Common Core, Massachusetts is sinking back again). We know that national standards are not needed for success in international comparisons. Back in the 1970s, the United States and Canada were both in the middling, mediocre ranks internationally. Both countries are rather similar in culture and level of commercial and industrial development. The United States has continued to wallow in mediocrity, even as we centralize K-12 education. Yet Canada (which has more competitive federalism in education than the United States and has no Ministry of Education in its central government) has climbed into the ranks of advanced nations in academic performance . Why is this important? Because one of the pillars of the case for national curriculum-content standards is that they are necessary for individuals to succeed in a global marketplace and that all top-performing countries have them. The case of Canada refutes that. Let’s turn to the background of the Common Core. Content standards, tests, and curriculum that had been provided by the states—thus far—will now because of Common Core be provided by federally-endorsed national curriculum-content standards, federally-funded tests, and curriculum (some of it federally funded) based on those tests and curriculum-content standards. The Common Core national standards had their origins in several Washington, D.C.-centric lobbying and policy-advocacy groups—namely, the National Governors Association (NGA), the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO), and Achieve Inc. Shortly after the Obama administration came to power, it adopted and endorsed the national standards. It used competitive grants to coerce states into adopting Common Core. It paid for Common Core national tests and intervened in the test-creation process. It created a panel to oversee and monitor the national tests. It granted states waivers from the burdens of No Child Left Behind (NCLB)—conditional on continued adherence to Common Core or a federally-approved alternative. Central to the thinking (and rhetoric) of the advocates of Common Core on education reform was the idea that state performance standards were already on a downward slide and that, without nationalization, standards would inexorably continue on a “race to the bottom.” The name given to the Obama administration’s signature school reform effort, the Race to the Top program (RttT), reflects this belief. The idea is that to prevent states from following their supposed natural dynamic of a race to the bottom, the federal government needs to step in and lead a race to the top. I would disagree . While providers of public education certainly face the temptation to do what might look like taking the easy way out by letting academic standards slip,

there is also countervailing pressure in the direction of higher standards ( especially , as long as there are competing standards in other states ). If policymakers and education officials let content standards slip, low standards will damage the state’s reputation for having a trained workforce. Such a drop in standards will even damage the policymakers’ own reputations. In 2007, the Thomas B. Fordham Institute looked empirically at state performance standards over time in a study called The Proficiency Illusion. The study showed that while states had a variety of performance standards (as would be expected in a federal system), the supposed “race to the bottom” was not happening. The proponents of the Common Core wrong in their claims that state performance standards were inevitably and everywhere on a downward slide. Why is this important? Because the other case for national curriculum-content standards is that without nationalization there will be a race to bottom and that only national standards can reverse a supposedly already-existing “race to the bottom.” But the facts refute this. This topples the other principal argument for national standards. To finance its Race to the Top program, the U.S. Department of Education took discretionary stimulus money that could be used as conditional grants, and then turned a portion of that money into a competitive grant program. It used the grants to encourage states to adopt the national standards. Policy analyst Michael Petrilli aptly called inducements to adopt the standards “the carrot that feels like a stick.” The department also paid for national consortia to develop national tests aligned with the national curriculum–content standards. The administration created another inducement in the form of No Child Left Behind waivers. In return for adopting the national standards or a federally approved alternative, states could escape NCLB sanctions for not making timely gains in student achievement. U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan went beyond what the law allows, by substituting the Obama administration’s favored education reforms (including national curriculum-content standards and tests) for NCLB’s accountability measures. I would add that the new accountability systems under the waivers can all too easily hide deficiencies in the performance of children in previously closely watched sub-groups and may weaken incentives to improve performance of those children. To some extent, federal officials have commandeered state curriculum-content standards and tests and substituted national standards and tests; to some extent, some state officials embraced the national standards-and-testing cartel as a relief from political pressure within their state and a relief from competitive pressure from other states. In any case, national standards and tests will change curriculum content, homogenize what is taught, and profoundly alter the structure of American K-12 public education. Nationalizing standards and tests would, according to this analysis, eliminate them as differentiated school-reform instruments that could be used by states in competition over educational attainment among the states. Sonny Perdue, governor of Georgia at the time Common Core was created, did not like it when the low-performing students of his state were compared with students in other states that had different standards from Georgia’s. He became the lead governor in bringing the NGA into the national standards effort. So, Yes, Common Core does undermine “competitive federalism.” Indeed, in part, it was designed to do so. Federalism is not only distinction from and rivalry between the federal government and the states; it is also rivalry among the states and among local governments within the states. As economist Richard McKenzie writes, the Founders sought to disperse power “among many different and competing governments—at the federal, state, and local levels.” The insight of competitive federalism is that fifty-one state school boards are better than a single federal Executive-branch office . Fifteen-thousand local school boards are better than either fifty-one state school boards or a single federal office. As political scientist Thomas Dye puts it, “intergovernmental competition” was seen by the Founders as an “auxiliary precaution” against the “monopoly abuse of power by a single centralized government.” Competitive federalism encourages innovation, allows movement between jurisdictions that enhances liberty, and permits a better match between policies and voter preferences. Common Core’s national uniformity runs counter to competitive federalism. Let’s turn to Alexis de Tocqueville, the most famous

observer of American society in our history and see what he can tell us about national education standards. Tocqueville is famous for his portrait of nineteenth-century America and his philosophic insights on why the American society has flourished—and also where it might go wrong. It is worth reminding ourselves what some of Tocqueville’s insights were. Once we do, we can consider the current nationalization of K-12 public-school curriculum, with Tocqueville’s insights in mind. One of Tocqueville’s major insights was that Americans have benefited from popular participation in the large number of churches, charities, clubs, and voluntary associations in our country, as well as in state and local governments, which stand between the individual and the national government in Washington, D.C. In essence, Tocqueville believed that the civic health of America depended on popular participation in entities like associations to create and maintain religious, private, or charter schools, as well as in local authorities like school districts with fully-empowered schools boards. Such activity fosters civic virtue and “habits of the heart” and encourages everyday citizens to take on necessary social tasks that in pre-modern society lowly subjects were not allowed to undertake, but were instead the duty of the aristocracy. When Tocqueville described nineteenth-century American society he spoke, for example, of township school committees that were deeply rooted in their local communities. In those days, state control of local public education took the form of an annual report sent by the township committee to the state capital. There was no national control. Large sums (much of it taxed from laborers and farmers) were spent by these school committees, and their efforts reflected, Tocqueville thought, a widespread American desire to provide basic schooling as a route to opportunity and advancement. He admired the fact that in self-activating America, one might easily chance upon farmers, who had not waited for official permission from above, but were putting aside their plows “to deliberate upon the project of a public school.” At the same time, Tocqueville observed in European countries that activities like schooling that had formerly been part of the work of guilds, churches, municipalities, and the like were being taken over by the national government of those countries. Tocqueville feared that if either Americans neglected their participation in associations or local governments or Europeans lost their intermediate entities to the national governments, the tendency would be toward a loss of a liberty and a surrender to a soft despotism. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville described how in Europe “the prerogatives of the central power” were increasing every day and making the individual “weaker, more subordinate, and more precarious.”Once, he said, there had been “secondary powers” that represented local interests and administered local matters. Local judiciaries, local privileges, the freedoms of towns, provincial autonomy, local charities—all were gone or going. The national central government, he wrote, “no longer puts up with an intermediary between it and the citizens.” Tocqueville said that, in Europe, education, like charity, “has become a national affair.” The national government receives or even takes “the child from the arms of his mother” and turns the child over to “the agents” of the national government. In nineteenth-century Europe, the national governments already were infusing sentiments in the young and supplying their ideas. “Uniformity reigns” in education, Tocqueville said. Intellectual diversity was disappearing. He feared that both Europe and America were moving toward “centralization” and “despotism.” Tocqueville believed that in non-aristocratic societies (like America), there is strong potential for the national government to become immense and influential, standing above the citizens, not just as a mighty and coercive power, but also as a guardian and tutor. Tocqueville maintained that religion (as a moral anchor) as well as involvement in local government (such as school districts) and voluntary organizations could help America counter the tendency toward tyranny. Joseph Califano, President Jimmy Carter’s Health, Education and Welfare Secretary, articulated Tocqueville-style concerns about a centralization of schooling: “Any set of test questions that the federal government prescribed should surely be suspect as a first step toward a national curriculum. … [Carried to its full extent,] national control of curriculum is a form of national control of ideas.” Unless Common Core is stopped, its officials will dismantle what remains of state and local decision-making on classroom lessons and replace it with a new system of

national tests and a national curriculum. This policy is Tocqueville’s nightmare: As in Europe, education “has become a national affair” and Common Core is the vehicle for imposing in America a one-size-fits-all centralization like that administered by the National Ministry of Education in France. Federalism , including horizontal inter-jurisdictional competition, allows policies better matched to needs and preferences of voters . It allows individuals and families to “vote with their feet”—to move to jurisdictions that they like, where the authorities don’t act counter to their liberties and preferences. Competitive federalism allows experimentation by alternative jurisdictions . One state can try one policy, while another state tries something else. This is why it is called the “laboratory of democracy.” This feature of federalism is what brought Massachusetts, Indiana, California and several other states to have the outstanding curriculum-content standards that they had before the Common Core. This is the feature of federalism that facilitates an exit strategy from Common Core: It allows states that are leaving Common Core to repeal and replace the national curriculum-content standards with outstanding pre-Common Core state standards. This can be done on an interim basis, while those states design their own replacement standards for the long run. Then the rivalry that takes place under competitive federalism will go back to work to the benefit of teachers, students, and everyone who wants a well-educated citizenry—and also everyone who wants to have the freedoms that are protected by the U.S. Constitution’s Madisonian system of federalism.

State education policies lead to uniformityVergari ‘10

Sandra Vergari: Associate professor of Education at the University of Albany “Safeguarding Federalism in Education Policy in Canada and the United States” Publius, Vol. 40, No. 3, Canadian and U.S. Federalism (Summer 2010), pp. 534-557

What factors encourage the development of national policy? First , when subnational units in a country face common problems and pressures, they may be motivated to adopt common policy responses . One of the foremost challenges confronting education policymakers in Canada and the United States is economic competition. U.S. President Barack Obama (2010: 1) has avowed: "countries that out- educate us today will out- compete us tomorrow." Both global and subnational competition create political pressure for the provinces/territories and states to ensure a well-educated labor pool . Concerns about not falling behind other jurisdictions motivate subnational policymakers to consider similar education policies. While workforce preparation and economic concerns feature prominently in public discourse on education in both countries, a well-educated citizenry is also essential for ensuring a thriving democracy. Second , policy learning encourages the development of national policy . Policy ideas float across jurisdictional borders. Subnational governments may be sensitive to each other's actions because they offer examples of how to satisfy voter preferences or serve as benchmarks for citizen assessment of government (Harrison 2006). Moreover, policymakers may choose to judge policy ideas according to logic al or analytical criteria rather than partisanship (Kingdon 1995). Various entities contribute to policy learning and development of national education policy.10 In Canada, such entities include CMEC, Canadian Education Association (CEA), Canadian Council on Learning (CCL), and regional curriculum consortia. All thirteen provinces and territories are CMEC members and CMEC calls itself "the national voice for education in Canada" (CMEC 2008a: 11). CMEC fulfills some functions that are comparable to those of the U.S. D epartment o f E ducation. For example, CMEC administers the Official Languages

Program, manages a pan-Canadian student assessment program, develops and reports on education indicators, partners with Statistics Canada to provide education statistics, provides a clearinghouse to facilitate recognition of foreign educational and occupational credentials, and consults and acts on other issues such as Aboriginal education. Founded in 1891, CEA sponsors forums, undertakes research, and publishes education resources. "Sustaining members" are the thirteen provincial/territorial ministries of education and the federal department of HRSDC.11 CCL was established in 2004 with a focus on lifelong learning. It was funded originally through a five-year, C$85 million grant from HRSDC. In 2009, HRSDC announced that the grant would not be renewed; at this writing, CCL's future is uncertain. According to an HRSDC official, Canada needs better learning information "that is more aligned with labour market demand and takes into account international competitive challenges" (Mahoney and Galloway 2010: 1). Entities that contribute to policy learning and coordination in the United States include the National Governors Association (founded in 1908 and composed of the nation's governors, it receives state and federal funding), Council of Chief State School Officers (founded in 1927, members are heads of state departments of education), Achieve, Inc. (an education reform entity founded in 1996 by governors and corporate leaders), and the Education Commission of the States (an interstate compact created in 1965 that receives state and federal funding). Preferences for efficiency and economies of scale are a third set of factors encouraging national policy. Subnational governments with similar capacity challenges and policy priorities face incentives to cooperate . They can avoid wasteful duplicative efforts and use resources more efficiently by working together on education policy . In both Canada and the United States, there have been regional efforts at cooperation on standards, assessments, and other education initiatives. The Western and Northern Canadian Protocol for Collaboration in Education was established in 1993 by the education ministers of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, Yukon, and Northwest Territories. Nunavut joined in 2000. The Atlantic Provinces Education Foundation was established in 1995 by the education ministers of Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. Regional efforts in the United States include the New England Common Assessment Program (NECAP) (a four-state partnership formed in 2002) and the New England Secondary School Consortium (a five-state partnership formed in 2008). NECAP "is often regarded as the best example of an assessment/ accountability consortium to date" (National Association of State Boards of Education 2009: 1). Subnational jurisdictions in Canada and the United States share similarities in required school-year length and years of instruction. During the past two decades in both countries, there have been centralizing trends such as reduced numbers of school boards and expanded provincial/state roles in regulating curriculum, mandating assessments, financing public education, monitoring local compliance, and intervention in local governance (Levin 2005; Ben Jaafar and Anderson 2007; Henley and Young 2008; Fusarelli and Cooper 2009). In Canada, at least five provinces have taken steps to remove elected school board trustees from office or place them under provincial supervision. In the United States, about twenty-nine states have laws permitting state takeovers of school districts (Ziebarth 2004; Ungerleider and Levin 2007). As discussed below, dynamics encouraging national policy are tempered by subnational preferences for policy autonomy.

Solvency --- A2: Deficit --- Intl. signalStates solve international signal and foreign policy effects – aff distinctions are a mythGlennon ‘16

Michael Glennon: Professor of International Law @ Tufts. “Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity” Oxford University Press

The second myth— that we can readily distinguish domestic and foreign affairs —also originated early in U.S. constitutional history. From the outset, federal practice under the new Constitution reflected this supposed distinction. President George Washington appointed Thomas Jefferson as his secretary of state and assigned him the task of handling international issues, and early in the nineteenth century, the Senate established the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House of Representatives the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The supposition that there exists a neat distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, although more defensible and doubtless expedient in 1789 and the early nineteenth century, regrettably persists today in the academy, politics, and government. Dedicated specialist journals such as Foreign Affairs and International Security inform the international cognoscenti of pioneering thought in the many and diverse fields subsumed by the label "foreign affairs." Leading academic institutions establish departments in the equally broad field of international relations, which overlaps substantially with political science, law, economics, and numerous other disciplines. Departments of international relations offer a wide variety of popular courses to students captivated by the significance and seeming romance of foreign studies and by the excitement of travel and study abroad programs. "The idea that international and domestic affairs are easily differentiated continues to exercise a firm grip on intellectual and political lite in the United States. C 1 1 Here

again, however, this assumption is a fiction . As early as i974> long before the emergence of "globalization" (a term we analyze in greater depth later), the estimable former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, noted the avalanche of commentary celebrating (or

bemoaning) the blurring of national boundaries. He remarked that "[i]t has ceased to be useful , if it ever was, to deal with foreign policy as a category distinct from domestic policy "6 A moment s reflection shows why. Consider the issue of economic assistance to developing countries. Contrary to popular belief, most such assistance is spent within the United States and measurably stimulates the U.S. economy. Or consider arms sales to foreign countries. What may at first blush seem like a paradigmatic foreign policy issue turns out to be much more complex. Arms sales abroad fuel a massive domestic industry that provides skilled jobs to thousands of Americans and exerts a nontrivial influence on the U.S. economy. Conversely, consider several putative local issues. Suppose that state or local legislators decide that all students must pass a course in calculus to graduate from high school. This requirement would directly affect the comparative prospects for the American labor force in an intensely competitive global economy. Or consider state healthcare requirements, which, notwithstanding the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,7 remain robust and, so it would seem, fall squarely within the province of traditional state laws governing domestic matters such as the health, safety, and welfare of a states population. But state healthcare requirements also add to the cost of products competing within global markets and influence decisions by multinational businesses on where to establish their headquarters or local offices. Or consider state privacy laws, which typically govern official authority to secretly record the telephone conversations (and, today, also the emails and other forms of communication) of State residents. Increasingly, many of those communications involve persons not only in other states but in foreign nations. Finally, consider the weighty legal questions that vex the formulation of counter terrorism strategy, which is surely, at first glance, a classic topic of foreign rather than domestic policy. Flying an airplane into a building and killing three thousand people is of course criminal. But by and large, it is criminal because of state laws, which criminalize, among other conduct, murder and property destruction. And those crimes were perpetrated against not only the U.S. citizens killed or injured in the terrorist attacks of September n, 2.001, but also against nearly four hundred foreign nationals from about eighty foreign countries.8 It is not for nothing that the cabinet officer charged with principal responsibility for counterterrorism policy is called the Secretary of Homeland Security. Nor is it coincidental that a focal point of the debate on how to fight terrorism is whether it is properly conceptualized as crime or war, as a responsibility of the military or of law enforcement. International and domestic security turn out, in the

end, to be not all that different. The third myth is related: that foreign policy is or should be , with a few minor and inconsequential

exceptions, exclusively federal. American lawyers internalize this fiction first in law school. Law courses often draw an artificial distinction between state and federal law, even though the law in particular areas —such as corporate regulations and

criminal prohibitions—frequently overlaps and interacts. Relative to foreign affairs, in particular, few fictions become more firmly implanted in the psyches of American lawyers, inculcated over the years by scores of familiar ipse dixits of

the Supreme Court and the popular media. Unexamined dicta are repeated—often acontextually—from decisions dating back to the

nineteenth century and continuing to the present. "It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, one nation," as the Court said in 1840.9 "For local interests the several states of the union exist," it said in 1889, but "for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one nation, one people, one power."10 "[I]n respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear," it said in 1937. "As to such purposes the state ... does not exist"" "Power over external affairs is not shared with the States," it said in 1941; "it is vested in the national government

exclusively."12 And again, in 2011, the Court announced that "where foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to speak 'with one voice and ac[t] as one ,' is particularly important."13 The popular media have absorbed and often reiterate this myth. A 2011 New York Times editorial attacking Arizona's immigration law, for example, captured the popular understanding of state competence in the constitutional scheme. "By the framers' intent, foreign-policy making is entrusted to the federal government through presidential and Congressional

powers," the Times opined. "That authority is exclusive, barring any state intrusion."'4 These and other sweeping, absolutist pronouncements have only the flimsiest connection with what modern state and local governments actually do .n The Constitution empowers the federal government to exercise potentially plenary authority in foreign relations, but it does not contemplate exclusive authority in this realm by default—nor, as a practical matter, could it.16 The distinction is crucial. The text of the Constitution often leaves decisions about the allocation of foreign relations authority between the state and federal governments to the

latter s discretion. Rut in the exercise of that discretion, the federal government often does not, in fact, choose to exclude the states; concurrent authority is relatively common. It is, of course, a truism that the Constitution vastly increased the federal government's powers in foreign relations as compared to the Articles of

Confederation, and as we discuss in Chapter i, these changes were indispensable to the resolution of some of the most serious defects in the Articles.17 But neither the Framers nor the Constitution they painstakingly drafted proposed a rigid division between the respective foreign affairs roles of the state and national governments. Equally significant, categorical pronouncements such as

those quoted above ignore the real-life day-to-day conduct of state and local governments . In fact, state activities in the realm of foreign affairs have become so common as to call to mind the old story of the preacher asked whether he believed in baptism by immersion. "Believe in it?" he responded. "I Icll, I've seen it!" A survey of what states and cities actually do in the international realm will

be left to Chapter i. Suffice it to say here that their foreign affairs initiatives are frequent in number, broad in scope, and extensive in effect . To cite just a few examples, states and cities have implemented unratified treaties (including the Kyoto Protocol18 and die Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women19), taken stands on myriad foreign policy questions (from Vietnam to Nicaragua to the proposed nuclear weapons freeze), concluded oil import agreements with foreign countries, established local offices to represent them abroad,20 demanded that foreign corporations come up with

comprehensive written plans to protect the personal data of state residents, and used sister-city relationships to advance human rights agendas abroad/1 At first blush, one might think state and city officials responsible for such actions simply lack sufficient regard for the Constitution or knowledge of the

Supreme Court's interpretation of it. But another—and, we suggest, more accurate—interpretation would be that we are witnessing institutional gravity in action as political water seeks its lowest point : these officials have been doing what seems to them to be necessary or prudent for their localities, what their constituents want—and what Congress, after all, has seldom demanded that they stop doing.

Solvency --- Trans- bathrooms

1nc --- SolvencyThe Cplan solves without being a federal imposition. This avoids our disads.McCluskey ‘16Neal McCluskey is the director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom and maintains Cato’s Public Schooling Battle Map. “ Commentary Should the Feds Decide the Transgender Bathroom Issue?” - May 17, 2016 – #CutWithKirby - https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/should-feds-decide-transgender-bathroom-issue

Much of this debate has been framed as conservatives versus liberals, or traditionalists versus social change. But the root problem is not differing views . It is government — especially federal — imposition.

Before getting into what the feds should or should not do, let’s be clear about something. A couple of weeks ago, U.S. Secretary of Education John King called “hateful” North Carolina’s law — ground zero for all this — requiring, among other provisions, that public school restrooms be restricted by a person’s sex at birth. Now, the law’s supporters may hate transgendered people. But many — perhaps all — may also harbor no such animosity. Neither Secretary King, nor anyone other than those people, knows.

It is not hard to imagine how perfectly decent people might be against opening up school bathrooms. Single-sex bathrooms and locker rooms have long been the norm, and privacy about our bodies — especially from the opposite sex — has long been coveted.

Beyond being unfair, King and others may be playing with social fire by branding as hateful all who oppose open bathrooms. They may be provoking anger from people who before were just concerned. And would supporters of the administration’s directive pronounce that President Obama was hateful until 2012, when he changed to support gay marriage? Probably not.

Of course , transgendered students should — must — be treated equally by public institutions, and their desire to use the facilities in which they feel comfortable is utterly understandable.

By fair reckoning, we do not have a competition between good and evil, but what should be equally protected values and rights.

How do we resolve this? Most immediately, not with a federal mandate .

Unlike most of the education governing Washington does — think No Child Left Behind — the feds may have constitutional authority to act here. At least Washington is empowered to prohibit discrimination by state and local governments under the Fourteenth Amendment, though the new directive is technically linked to federal funds.

But just because Washington may do something does not mean it should.

First, it is far from clear that single-gender bathroom rules are discrimination on par with, say, racial segregation. At the very least, it is difficult to argue that bathroom rules create unequal provision of education tantamount to completely separate schools.

There is also good reason to believe that it is most effective to allow social change to evolve from the ground up, not be imposed. Seismic change is jarring, and imposition may create otherwise avoidable resentment and anger. Moreover, changing attitudes may well precede — not be driven by — changes in law. For instance, white survey responses on racial integration show that in 1942 only 32 percent of respondents thought black and white children should go to the same schools. By 1956 half said so. By 1963 almost two-thirds did. The federal Civil Rights Act did not come until 1964.

Solvency --- A2: Deficit --- Rollback --- Local rollback (Tyree)Supreme Court reversal on Grimm signals move toward states’ rights and non-intervention --- ensures localities loseGreen ‘17

Emma Green: staff writer at The Atlantic, where she covers politics, policy, and religion “The Trump Administration May Have Doomed Gavin Grimm's Case” MAR 6, 2017 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/the-trump-administration-may-have-doomed-gavin-grimm/518676/

The Supreme Court sent a n important case concerning a trans gender student in Virginia back down to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on Monday, in part because of the Trump administration ’s new position on the issues involved in the case. In Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., Gavin Grimm sued his school district for the right to use the boys’ bathroom, which corresponds with his gender identity. Under the Obama administration, it looked like Grimm might have a strong chance of success at the country’s highest court, potentially setting a precedent for school districts across the country. Now, that’s looking less likely . The Trump administration has rolled back Obama’s former policies, meaning that transgender students like Grimm may have to follow policies on bathroom use and other accommodations set by individual school districts. Grimm’s case has been winding its way through the court system for nearly two years. In the summer of 2015, a federal district court dismissed Grimm’s claims. The judges’ decision turned on their interpretation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in schools that get federal funds. Courts have disagreed about the meaning of sex discrimination: Some have held that it covers gender identity, meaning that it prohibits discrimination against transgender people like Grimm. Others, like the district court in Grimm’s case, have disagreed. The Obama administration supported the inclusive interpretation, instructing schools to accommodate transgender students. Last April, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a decision in Grimm’s favor: They held that the courts should defer to the administration’s interpretation of Title IX, meaning in effect that Gloucester County should have to let Grimm use the bathroom of his choice. The Supreme Court stayed the opinion and the school district appealed. In October, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Arguments were set for late March. But in February, the Trump administration withdrew the Obama administration’s guidance, arguing that “there must be due regard for the primary role of the States and local school districts in establishing educational policy.” This was a clear sign that Trump is backing away from the Obama administration’s inclusive interpretation of Title IX, favoring the previous status quo in which individual school districts decided how to deal with transgender students according to state and local laws. While Grimm’s attorneys encouraged the Supreme Court to move forward with the case despite the Trump administration’s new letter, the justices declined to do so on Monday, remanding the case back to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration “in light of the guidance document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017.” The Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the case at this point is a sign that this issue is likely to remain unresolved, at least for the near future. The courts have long been conflicted about the meaning of Title IX and other civil-rights statutes that deal with sex discrimination, in part because the law is arguably unclear about what sex discrimination means. In wrestling with cases like Grimm’s, they have consistently looked to the executive and legislative branches for guidance. So far, Congress hasn’t passed a law that clearly and incontrovertibly prohibits gender-identity discrimination in the context of education, employment, or other arenas. In practice, that has meant the White House and other

agencies have had an outsized influence in determining how cases like Grimm’s should be handled. With its guidance letter to schools, the Obama administration set up transgender kids for success in making anti-discrimination claims in court. That’s largely why Grimm was victorious at the Fourth Circuit. Now, the Trump administration has reversed their fortunes, making it less likely that students like Grimm will prevail. When Gloucester County is argued before the Fourth Circuit for a second time, Grimm will be missing much of the support that helped him win the first time—including the support of the White House.

Trump rules enshrine states’ rights over access lawsNazaryan ‘17

Alexander Nazaryan: senior writer at Newsweek “TRUMP'S ROLLBACK OF OBAMA'S TRANSGENDER BATHROOM RULES MAY ACTUALLY HELP DEMOCRATS WIN FUTURE BATTLES” 2/23/17 http://www.newsweek.com/why-trumps-rescinding-obamas-transgender-bathroom-rules-may-help-blue-states-559867

On Wednesday, the Trump administration decided to rescind protections offered to transgender youth by President Obama. The move was expected, yet painful. Obama’s interpretation of Title IX, the 1972 equity law, would have allowed trans students to use bathrooms and locker rooms “consistent with their gender identity,” as the May 2016 guidance said. Eleven states sued, stifling the new rule. Trump provided the coup de grâce. But in doing so, he may have also given inadvertently left-leaning states a potent weapon in future battles against the White House. Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, was asked about the policy reversal at Wednesday’s press briefing. This is how he justified the shift: "The president has maintained for a long time that this is a states’ rights issue and not one for the federal government,” he said, reiterating a little later that it was Trump’s conviction that “this is not something the federal government should be involved in, that this is a states’ rights issue." States’ rights , of course, is a beloved Republican retort whenever Washington’s federal powers creep too close. Frequently, the rights of states are invoked when a liberal White House tries to impose policy on conservative states. At issue are often divisive social issues like gun rights and abortion. Shortly after the Sandy Hook school massacre, for example, in which 20 children were killed by an AR-15-toting gunman, it seemed that Obama would impose Second Amendment restrictions. Red states responded with restrictions of their own, regarding federal encroachment on gun ownership laws. Said a state legislator from Montana: “[The federal government] is diving off into areas unchecked that they’re not supposed to be involved in. Not only is it our right in state legislatures to do this, it’s our obligation to do it. Somebody’s got to put a ‘whoa’ on it.” Now the ‘whoa’ might come from the other side. In 2017, it is Democratic states that find themselves under assault from a hostile Capitol Hill. By deploying the very same states’ rights argument used by the White House in the trans youth fight, they might be able to win future battles in which Washington seeks to impose its own new order.

States supersede local authorityMcGuinn ‘16

Patrick McGuinn: Professor of Political Science @ Drew University Ph.D. in Government (and an M.Ed. in Education Policy) at the University of Virginia “From No Child Left Behind to the Every Student Succeeds Act” Article in Publius The Journal of Federalism · June 2016

However, ESSA for the most part is not likely to result in a return of education policymaking authority to the local level, but rather to the state level . A 2015 report from the Council of Chief State School Officers, for example, proclaimed that ‘‘Regardless of this uncertainty at the federal level, state education leaders remain firmly committed to state accountability systems that support educators, parents, and students by providing useful information that leads to improved outcomes for all students’’ (CCSSO 2015). While states have historically been relatively minor players in school reform, one of the enduring legacies of the Obama presidency may well be the invigoration and expansion of the state role in education (Anagnostopolous 2013). Going forward states will now have considerably more latitude to determine their own education agendas , though also less political cover from federal mandates. What remains to be seen is if states have developed (or can develop) sufficient political will and administrative capacity to maintain the momentum that has built up behind education reform over the past two decades (Camera 2015). Precisely how states will utilize this newfound authority is unknown, but one thing is certain: flexibility from federal mandates will result in widely divergent state levels of commitment to school reform, a wide range of policy approaches, and widely varying levels of effectiveness in improving school outcomes across the fifty states (Weiss and McGuinn 2016). That is American federalism at work, for better or worse.

Solvency --- A2: Deficit --- PrecedentCP includes state court action --- that sets precedentBolles ‘14

Alexandra Bolles: Senior Strategist, Campaigns & External Engagement @ GLAAD January 31, 2014 https://www.glaad.org/blog/court-rules-trans-students-can-choose-bathroom-they-identify-sets-legal-precedent

For the first time in the U.S., a court ruled it unlawful and a violation of human rights to prevent transgender students from using the bathroom of the gender with which they identify. This decision was reached after a three-year-long case in Maine, filed on behalf of transgender high school student Nicole Maines. Nicole and her family, which includes her parents and twin brother, were represented by the Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) of Boston. Since 2007, when she was an elementary school student, Nicole had been required to use the staff bathroom after a student's grandparent complained to the school. In 2009, the Maines family and the Maine Human Rights Commission sued the school district, arguing that Nicole was facing discrimination and that the school was not properly addressing harassment she received from fellow students. A Superior Court judge initially ruled against the Maines in November 2012, and stated: "In this case, the school acted within the bounds of its authority in prohibiting [the girl] from using the girls’ restroom; it did not itself harass [the girl] by its actions, and it was not deliberately indifferent to the harassment that [she] experienced from others." A resilient bunch, the Maines family did not stop working to defend Nicole and resolved to appeal the Court's decision. "I wouldn't wish my experience on another trans person," Nicole said to reporters in June after oral arguments were presented the state's high court. Still, she remained optimistic and determined to improve trans students' realities. "I hope [the court] understand[s] how important it is for students to be able to go to school and get an education, have fun, make friends, and not have to worry about being bullied by students or the administration and to be accepted for who they are. That's the most important thing." As of yesterday, the Maines family emerged victorious when the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the school district acted in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act. “This is a momentous decision that marks a huge breakthrough for transgender young people,” said Jennifer Levi, director of GLAD’s Transgender Rights Project, reported the Bangor Daily News. “Schools have a responsibility to create a learning environment that meets and balances the needs of all kids and allows every student to succeed. For transgender students, this includes access to all school facilities, programs and extracurricular activities in a way that is consistent with their gender identity. "I want to enjoy the moment, hug my kids and do some healing," said Nicole's father, Wayne, after the case came to its close. In addition to being the first time a U.S. court has ruled it unlawful to prevent trans students from using the bathroom that matches their self-identification, the Bangor Daily News reported that the case has set additional legal precedents : "It is the first time the state’s highest court has interpreted amendments to the Maine Human Rights act that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. It also is one of those rare times when a law court decision makes law , according to the American Civil Liberties Union of Maine." Not only has Nicole raised the bar for fair treatment of students who are trans, but she can serve as an admirable example of what young people can accomplish when they are devoted to bettering the world around them. Congratulations to Nicole and her family for making history!

Solvency --- Right to Education (HSS)

1nc --- SolvencyState action alone solves educational inequalityBrown 13 — Cynthia G. Brown, Vice President for Education Policy at the Center for American Progress, former Director of the Resource Center on Educational Equity of the Council of Chief State School Officers, former Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Education, holds a Master’s in Public Administration from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, 2013 (“How to Make School Funding Fair,” Education Week, May 21st, Available Online at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/05/22/32brown.h32.html, Accessed 06-14-2017)

Larger questions surround what states should do to address funding inequities between school districts. Most states have adopted funding formulas aimed at ameliorating differences in the ability of districts to raise funding from local property taxes. Property-wealthy towns are able to raise more dollars at lower tax rates than property-poor districts, leading to inequities in per-pupil funding. Yet, as the commission report points out, prior attempts to address these inequities, such as through state funding formulas, merely patch a broken system and fail to redress inequities or to produce the kind of academic achievement our children need and deserve.

The time has come to strongly consider the need for larger systematic reform of funding systems. In a chapter in the recently released book Education Governance for the Twenty-First Century: Overcoming the Structural Barriers to School Reform, I propose a "new" approach to school funding: States should adopt a state-based system of school financing —one in which states provide all nonfederal resources for education , and districts no longer have the power to raise funds from local property taxes .

Under such a system, all districts would receive the resources they need to educate all of their children. Funding levels would be based on the specific needs of the students and of the districts, not just the resources districts are fiscally able to raise based on local property values . Local schools and districts would be able to provide additional funding of up to 10 percent of their state allocation for local priorities and programs.

I say "new" in quotation marks because this is almost the same proposal President Richard M. Nixon's Commission on School Finance called for in 1972. Yet, more than 40 years later, almost no states have taken this approach, and the idea has practically fallen off the radar in school funding discussions. Hawaii and Vermont come the closest, with less than 10 percent of total funding coming from local sources. They are rarities in this country, however, and by far two of the smallest states.

I also say "new" because this method of funding schools has been adopted in other countries; it's just "new" to the United States. As a paper that CAP released last week shows, three Canadian provinces, for example, have each moved from joint local-provincial school funding systems—systems like those in most U.S. states—to provincial-level funding systems. Under such a system, the province has full responsibility for providing all funding for public schools, according to the report titled "Canada's Approach to School Funding." The province determines the resource needs for each district and ensures the district actually receives that funding.

These provinces—Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario—have each taken a unique approach to designing their provincial-level funding systems. Alberta, for example, has set up a centralized fund into which all property-tax dollars raised for education purposes flow. These dollars are then allocated on a per-pupil basis to every district in the province. Additional funding is provided by the provincial government on top of this allotment. In contrast, in Ontario, local school districts continue to raise

funding from local property taxes, but the tax rates are set by the provincial government. This allows the province to ensure that districts raise amounts consistent with the districts' overall provincially determined funding needs, and not inconsistent with principles of equality and equity.

To be sure, states can certainly have equitable funding systems that continue to allow local districts to set their own tax rates and raise money from local property taxes. New Jersey and Ohio are good examples; in these states, differences in property wealth do not dictate differences in per-pupil spending, and districts with greater educational needs receive additional funding. But most states have failed in this regard, despite decades of lawsuits and so-called reform efforts. It's time to try something else.

The National Commission on Excellence in Education's seminal 1983 report, A Nation at Risk, warned of a "rising tide of mediocrity" in this country. I worry today that mediocrity is found as much in our legislatures as in our schools. We need bold leaders with the political strength to tackle the problems in our system and fight for the solutions we need. Adopting a state-level system of funding education is an essential element of finally providing all children with a high-quality education .

Solvency --- 2NCState action solves by implementing progressive school financing Baker and Corcoran 12 — Bruce D. Baker, Professor in the Department of Educational Theory, Policy, and Administration in the Graduate School of Education at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, former Associate Professor of Teaching and Leadership at the University of Kansas, holds an Ed.D. in Organization and Leadership from the Teachers College of Columbia University, and Sean P. Corcoran, Associate Professor of Economics and Education Policy at the Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development and former Associate Director of the NYU Institute for Education and Social Policy at New York University, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Maryland-College Park, 2012 (“The Stealth Inequities of School Funding,” Center for American Progress, September 19th, Available Online at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/reports/2012/09/19/38189/the-stealth-inequities-of-school-funding/, Accessed 06-20-2017)

States must scrutinize regressive funding systems and implement progressive funding formulas and approaches that use financial resources in ways that will most effectively level the educational playing fields between their districts . Nationwide, school finance disparities continue to seriously undermine the mission of this country’s public schools. Eliminating these disparities must be a priority if our goal is to successfully educate this generation of children to compete and win in the global marketplace.

State action solves by eliminating local funding disparitiesWalter et al. 13 — Karla Walter, Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, et al., with Tom Hucker, Member of the Maryland House of Delegates, David Madland, Director of the American Worker Project at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, Nick Bunker, Research Assistant in Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, and David Sanchez, Special Assistant in Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, 2013 (“Improve the quality of education for all students,” States at Work: Progressive State Policies to Rebuild the Middle Class, Published by the Center for American Progress, March 21st, Available Online at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/StateMiddleClassPolicies-Ch5.pdf, Accessed 06-20-2017, p. 125-126)

Ensure equitable funding to poor jurisdictions

States must put an end to persistent school funding inequity that often leaves students from high-poverty districts without the resources they need to succeed in school. Too often , state and local funding of public schools entrench rather than alleviate existing disadvantages .

Local funding—generated primarily through property taxes—allows property-rich districts to raise far more support for their schools than property-poor areas. About 40 percent of school funding is generated at the local level across the country,42 but in states such as Illinois and Nevada, this number is about 60 percent.43

And although state tax revenue is supposed to ameliorate this inequality and provide increased funding for high-need districts, too often states fail to target state funding based on need, causing funding gaps to remain . In some cases state funding distribution methods may even exacerbate inequity in resources by providing state funding to the communities with the least need, according to a recent Center for American

Progress report by Rutgers University’s Bruce D. Baker and New York University’s Sean P. Corcoran.44 As a result, in 39 states, differences in per-pupil funding across districts still range by more than $1,000.45 To be sure, funding inequality cannot be blamed for all the problems of struggling schools, but failing to provide schools with the resources they need means that low-performing schools, which are often high poverty, may find it challenging to adopt necessary reforms.

In order to provide equal opportunity to students in high-poverty schools, state legislatures should adopt a state-centralized system of financing that allocates funding based on student need that all but eliminates local funding of schools , as Cynthia Brown, Vice President for Education Policy at the Center for American Progress, advocates for in an upcoming book.46 School districts would be prohibited from raising more than 10 percent in additional funds. Admittedly, this would be costly and politically difficult and would require significant commitment by the state government to provide sufficient aid to backfill local contributions. Yet some states have already undertaken this approach. Local revenues generate only 3 percent of public school funding in Hawaii, which has a state centralized system, and 8 percent in Vermont.47

At a minimum, states should implement progressive funding formulas that allocate resources through a weighted student funding system that takes into account [end page 125] student needs and the local district’s capacity to meet those needs. Such systems ensure the districts that spend the most are those with the greatest student needs.

States that have adopted more equitable systems of public school funding have seen results in the classroom. In New Jersey, for example, after lawmakers adopted a more equitable funding system, test scores improved and the achievement gap narrowed. Between 2003 and 2007 all New Jersey students improved their fourthgrade reading scores, and the gap between African American and white students continued to narrow through 2011. On eighth-grade math, all students in New Jersey improved between 2003 and 2011 and achievement gaps were narrowed for African American (but not Latino) students versus white students.48

Perms / Theory

Perm --- A2: Do BothPerm links to the net benefit - still includes federal action - no developed shielding argument sufficient to solve the link

Theory --- 50 state fiat --- 2NC --- Short50 State Fiat Good:

1) It’s predictable—the states CP has been the cornerstone of every domestic topic

2) It’s a relevant opportunity cost— key to logic and portable education --- actor choice is a relevant and abundant area of academic discussion in education

3) Counterplan “hasn’t happened” isn’t offense—otherwise, every aff would be equally illogical

4) Key neg ground on an aff biased topic --- limits the topic by excluding unreasonably small affs

5) Forces better aff research—teams have to look harder for the best 1ACs and refine their arguments before tournaments, which is the skill most intrinsic to debate

6) One Fed Key warrant checks --- they’re easy to find and beat the counterplan regardless of how many actors it fiats

7) Reject argument not team – at worst it means uniformity should be a question of solvency

Theory --- 50 state fiat --- 2NC --- Long50 state fiat is not bad:

Defense:- Uniformity and “real world” arguments link to the Aff. They fiat several

Federal Actors uniformly comply. Their inherency ev proves their Aff’s not realistic in the status quo.

- Doesn’t kill ground or topic-education– Affs can finds ways to answer uniform State fiat without resorting to military affs. Federal Signal args are still at the “heart of the topic”.

- Their “topic education” args are a farce – they choose to frame this as an “education” topic. But that’s just one word in the resolution. “Federal” is in the topic as well. The counterplan provides “topic education” for that word as well.

- Reject theory, not team – no reason we should lose for merely running the counterplan.

- Err Neg on theory. Aff gets to speak first and last… and also gets to choose the item we discuss. The round is structurally tilted in the aff’s favor and this counterplan’s a device to re-set the scales.

Offense:

- Functional Limits. Absent the States cplan, this topic is huge and multidirectional. Teams could require vouchers, ban them, or do them slightly differently. There are thousands of other Affs. States makes the topic manageable for the neg. This turns their topic-education claim – because no States means neg won’t ever be ready and will learn less once they’re forced to defend hyper-generics.

- Teaches us to seek the best policy option – which boosts education and critical thinking.

- Forces Aff to research tough Fed Key warrants – making their knowledge and inquiry go deeper.

Theory --- 50 state fiat --- A2: Not real worldStates have acted in unison beforePanko, 3

(Sr. Assoc. Editor-Best’s Review, “REGULATORS EYE INTERSTATE COMPACTS TO PRESERVE STATE REGULATION,” Bestwire, 10/16, Lexis)

About 200 interstate compacts are in exist ence, including 14 in which all 50 states participate , said McCarty. The odds of larger states joining an insurance compact are much lower than for smaller states because larger states realistically won't want to cede power, he said. But Florida is spearheading an effort to collaborate with Texas and California on some insurance matters, he added.

It’s real world – state coalitions are especially common in educationMcGuinn ‘09

Patrick McGuinn: Professor of Political Science @ Drew University Ph.D. in Government (and an M.Ed. in Education Policy) at the University of Virginia “The New Politics of Education: Analyzing the Federal Education Policy Landscape in the Post-NCLB Era” Educational Policy 2009 Volume: 23 issue: 1, page(s): 15-42 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0895904808328524

The State Leaders Unite in a Formal Coalition Research by political scientist Anne Marie Cammisa (1995) has suggested the tendency of governmental lobbies to form strategic alliances , particularly when greater federal resources are sought. The mobilization of many governors , chief state school officers, state legislators, and state boards of education against NCLB provided strong incentive for the D.C.- based groups representing them to forge a formal coalition as the reauthorization hearings gathered steam . Each group had exerted varying degrees of influence prior to that coalition building, however. During the prior ESEA reauthorization, the NGA had been given a fairly major role, helping Senate Health Education Labor and Pensions Committee chairman James Jeffords (then a Republican) to draft legislation in 2000. During this period, however, NGA’s education program had received a large infusion of cash from the Gates Foundation to focus on the redesign of high schools and proceeded to work on influencing state policy in that arena rather than on federal legislation. After the 2006 elections, however, there were 35 Democratic governors, and the new education chair, Democratic governor Christine Gregoire of Washington, promised to take a proactive role in the upcoming the reauthorization (Klein, 2007). Following the passage of NCLB, the CCSSO experienced what was considered a slump in political power. Having taken millions from the Education Department, it did not have an organizational incentive to take an oppositional stance to NCLB. The chiefs also did not vociferously attack the law; the executive director, Thomas Houlihan, preferred to negotiate issues with the administration in a nonconfrontational style (P. Sullivan, personal communication, November 2005). However, in the 110th, CCSSO’s new legislative director, Scott Frein, sought alliances with the NGA, the National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE), and NCSL. In April 2007, the chiefs, NASBE, and NGA endorsed a set of joint principles for the reauthorization, including growth models for states, revisions to the accountability requirements for special education and English language learners, and differentiation of state-level consequences for schools not making adequate yearly progress. NCSL, which had been part of the initial negotiations, did not sign onto the proposal. The senior education program director Shreve noted the

proposals had been developed “unilaterally and internally” at the NGA and that it had been unable to express its own concerns in what had been a “flawed process” (quoted in Klein, 2007, p. 28). As mentioned earlier, no ne of the state leaders’ groups signed the Forum for Educational Accountability’s Joint Organizational Statement on the NCLB act, signifying that they wanted to retain their collective influence to fight for very specific changes to the law .

Theory --- 50 state fiat --- A2: Topic educationEducation literature directly assumes the CP’s mechanismVergari ‘10

Sandra Vergari: Associate professor of Education at the University of Albany “Safeguarding Federalism in Education Policy in Canada and the United States” Publius, Vol. 40, No. 3, Canadian and U.S. Federalism (Summer 2010), pp. 534-557

National Policy and Federal Policy It is useful to consider education policy in federations in terms of formal and informal factors that promote similar policies across subnational units . We can think of such policies as national policies , whether they materialize through subnational units individually adopting similar policies or through coordinated commitments to adopt uniform policy. In contrast, federal policies are formal laws and regulations of the federal government. 9