[ABBREVIATED] STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Albany County Case # 2960-91, settled on January 10, 1996, in Albany, NY providesirrefutable evidence of pattern of misconduct and overt acts of conspiracy by the Grossmans, andothers, acting in concert. The FDA Tucson EIR (Establishment Inspection Report) of 5/5-6/28/99, also provides irrefutable evidence of pattern of misconduct and overt acts of conspiracyby the Grossmans and others, acting in concert. Both Vivra Inc and the Grossmans had “uncleanhands” when they recruited (fraudulently induced) Davidson’s employment in Tucson, AZ inSeptember of 1998. The conspiracy to defraud by the federal court defendants, began in Albany,NY. It should have been stopped in Albany, NY by state and/or federal regulators. TheDavidsons bore the consequences of the conspiracy in Tucson, AZ. Because of his belief in theAMA Principles of Medical Ethics and Oath of Hippocrates, Davidson “blew the whistle” onGrossman in April 14, 1999, in his letter to Dr Antoine El Hage of FDA.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE [from 1st Cert. Petition: before Final Judgment of Ninth circuit]

The State court proceeding began when Jay Grossman, M.D. and his spouse EudiceGrossman (referred to collectively as "the Grossmans") filed a Complaint againstRobert M. Davidson, M.D. and his spouse Vanessa E. Komar, R.N. (referred tocollectively as "the Davidsons") on July 2, 1999, in Pima County Superior Court (the"State court proceeding"), alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotionaldistress. On October 13, 1999, Michael J. Meehan ("MJM"), then of the law firm Meehanand Associates, entered into an attorney-client relationship with the Davidsons inconnection with the litigation initiated on July 2, 1999. It was agreed by MJM that hewould file compulsory counterclaims of assault and battery (in the workplace) againstthe Grossmans. It was further agreed that MJM would bring on behalf of the Davidsons,such other legally-cognizable causes of action against the Grossmans, as would besupported by discovery of the nucleus of operative facts from which the state courtproceeding arose. On April 28, 2000, the Davidsons counterclaimed with charges ofassault and battery.

The Davidsons retained the legal service of the Law Office of Kenneth Joel Haber, P.C.on August 30, 2000, when it had become clear to the Davidsons that they might begetting less than sound legal advice (and less than vigorous legal representation) fromtheir then Counsel of Record in the State court proceeding (Michael J. Meehan, whowas then with the firm Meehan & Associates). Kenneth Haber was retained to reviewthe nucleus of operative facts that gave rise to the State court proceeding, and to thenopine legally as to whether the Davidsons have (or at minimum, had) a viable federalcivil RICO cause of action. On November 20, 2000, Kenneth Haber provided a copy oftheir "Prosecution Memorandum" to the Davidsons.

This Court may take judicial notice of the Prosecution Memorandum of November 20,2000, provided by Kenneth Haber to the Davidsons. This is a document of readily verifiableauthenticity which provides this Court with prima facie evidence that the Grossmans' filing ofthe State court proceeding and MJM's filing of the Motion to Withdraw as counsel of record in

the State court proceeding, were both motivated by bad faith.

On February 1, 2001, MJM, then of the law firm Quarles & Brady Streich Lang("Q&BSL"), filed Notice of Change of Law Firm in the State court proceeding. OnDecember 17, 2001, four months before the scheduled trial date in the State courtproceeding, MJM and Q&BSL filed Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record andContinue Trial in the State court proceeding, citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 5.1 (A)(2) (B)as statutory authority for their motion to withdraw. On or about January 11, 2002, theTrial Court Ordered that attorney withdrawal and continuance of the State courtproceeding is granted. On or about February 11, 2002, the Davidsons (proceeding prose), filed an interlocutory appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals citing deprivation offundamental rights by the Trial Judge's Order of January 11, 2002, including the rightsof Due Process and Equal Protection under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

So as to avoid lapsing of relevant statutes of limitations, the Davidsons (againproceeding pro se) filed Plaintiffs' Original Complaint with the U.S. District Court,Arizona District (CV-03-00110-FRZ) on February 19, 2003, under 18 U.S.C. Section1964 (c) for violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962 (b), (c), and (d) and pendent statelaw claims, for conspiracy to defraud the Davidsons, study subjects, practice patients,and the United States, against 22 named corporate and individual defendants, alleging21 counts. On April 30, 2003, the Davidsons filed their First Amended Complaintagainst the same 22 named defendants, alleging 17 counts.

On June 6, 2003, defendants Grossman appeared and filed "Defendants Jay and EudiceGrossman's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."On June 17, 2003, the case was stayed as to Vivra Inc, Magellan Specialty Health Inc,Allied Specialty Care Services (referred to collectively as the "Magellan defendants") bythe filing of the Magellan defendants' Notice of filing Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (Chapter11 was filed on March 11, 2003, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of NewYork).

On July 1, 2003, the U.S. District Court granted the Grossmans' Motion to DismissPursuant to Rule 8 based on the Court's finding "that the prolixity of the FirstAmended complaint renders the pleading incomprehensible." The Davidsons weregranted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint upon the lifting of the automaticstay in compliance with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure and in accordance with the provisions of the court's Order. It was furtherordered that Defendants Vivra Inc, Magellan Specialty Health Inc, and Allied specialtyCare Services LLC shall file a Petition to Lift Automatic Stay upon a finaldetermination of the bankruptcy proceedings. It was further ordered that theDavidsons are granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in compliance withthe pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on or before 30days from the date of the filing of the Petition to Lift Automatic Stay and toserve it upon Defendants in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The Davidsons were absolutely prevented from filing a Second Amended Complaint inthe Federal court proceeding until 30 days after the Magellan defendants filed a Petition

to Lift the Automatic Stay. Not only was the Magellan defendants' petition notforth-coming, the Automatic Stay was replaced by a permanent injunction after theirDischarge Confirmation in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Other than filing a Motion forPreliminary Injunctive Relief to the U.S. District Court, the Davidsons had no legalremedy which would allow them to ever file a Second Amended Complaint in thefederal court proceeding. Thus, the Trial Judge's Order of July 1, 2003, dismissing thefederal court proceeding without prejudice under FRCP Rule 8, had the same effect as adismissal with prejudice as to all of the defendants, yet it was not appealable as a finaljudgment.

In a Motion for Injunctive Relief to the U.S. District Court on or about October 21,2003, the Davidsons asserted that the holdings of the Arizona Court of Appeals inMemorandum Decision of February 27, 2003 and Arizona Supreme Court on August 8,2003, in Denying the Davidsons' Petition for Review, caused irreparable injury to theDavidsons. The Davidsons asked that the State court proceeding be preliminarilystayed and that the interlocutory award of costs and attorney's fees awarded by theArizona Court of Appeals and Supreme court be stayed pending final adjudication of theFederal court proceeding. On November 24, 2003, the district court dismissed the casepursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), denied all other pending matters,and ordered that there be no further filings in the federal case. On December 1, 2003,the Davidsons timely-filed Notice of Appeal.

The Davidsons filed Plaintiffs' Original Complaint & Application for Injunctive Reliefagainst Defendant Michael J. Meehan and Defendant Quarles & Brady Streich Lang onNovember 20, 2003, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1367 forBreach of Fiduciary Duty, Professional Negligence, and Legal Malpractice. MJM andQ&BSL filed Motion to Dismiss on December 22, 2003. The Davidsons responded byfiling Objection to Motion to Dismiss on January 13, 2004. MJM and Q&BSL respondedby filing Reply to Objection to Motion to Dismiss on January 27, 2004. U.S. DistrictCourt Trial Judge Frank R. Zapata, the same trial judge who had previously dismissedthe Davidsons' federal cause of action (Davidson et al v. Vivra Inc, et al) under theYounger abstention doctrine, ordered and adjudged on February 2, 2004, that theMotion to Dismiss is Granted in the Davidsons' federal cause of action (Davidson et alv. Meehan et al), again citing the Younger abstention doctrine. The Davidsonstimely-filed Notice of Appeal on February 10, 2004.

The Davidsons assert that "the Federal Case (Davidson, et al v. Vivra Inc, et al) isbased upon the 'same nucleus of operative facts' as the State Case". The Davidsonssought to add additional RICO counterclaims in the state court proceeding after theTrial Judge's dismissal with prejudice (under Younger doctrine) of the federal courtproceedings, because these additional counterclaims "arose out of the conduct,transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the originalpleading." The Davidsons' counterclaims of assault and battery in the State courtproceeding represent two of the Hobbs Act violations alleged in the federal courtproceeding. The Davidsons have alleged that these Hobbs Act violations comprise partof the pattern of racketeering activity in the federal court proceeding.

The State court proceeding is presently scheduled for trial on October 13, 2004. ThisCourt may take judicial notice of Minute Order of April 29, 2004, in the State courtproceeding. The Minute Entry of April 29, 2004, from the State court proceeding states,"To allow the extensive proposed amendments to the answer and the counterclaimwould greatly prejudice the plaintiffs [the Grossmans] given that the trial date is set forOctober 13, 2004." "Defendants '[the Davidsons] motion to amend their answer to addcounterclaims and parties and defendants' motion to enlarge the time to comply withRule 26.1 and to extend the discovery deadline are hereby denied."

Unsigned Minute Entries are not appealable under Arizona law. The State court's denialof the Davidsons' motion to amend their answer to add counterclaims and parties anddefendants' motion to enlarge the time to comply with rule 26.1 and to extend thediscovery deadline, represents a total denial of a state forum in which to "pursue theissues presented" and "raise constitutional challenges" and directly refutes Trial JudgeFrank R. Zapata's underlying assumption, that the State court proceeding provides theDavidsons with an adequate state forum in which to pursue the issues presented.The Davidsons exhausted all avenues for appellate review of their federal constitutionalinjury within the Arizona state court system. Neither the Arizona court of Appeals, northe Arizona Supreme Court reached the federal constitutional issues raised by theDavidsons on appeal. With the filing of the Minute Entry of April 29, 2004, theDavidsons have now been permanently denied a legal remedy for federal constitutionalinjuries under color of Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 5.1 and the Prescription Drug User Fee Act,in both the Federal court proceedings and in the State court proceeding. The Davidsonsnow have no forum whatsoever, either state or federal, in which to raise their federalconstitutional concerns. By inappropriately dismissing the Davidsons' federal courtproceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine, the Trial Judge (Frank R. Zapata)has wrought irreparable harm to the Davidsons.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE[from Cert. Petition: after Final Judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court]

The filing of the State court proceeding (a defamation action) in an Arizona trial court inJuly of 1999, was a conscious attempt by the State court plaintiffs (Jay Grossman and EudiceGrossman) to avoid the very real possibility of a federal court ever reaching the issuessurrounding their conduct in interstate commerce over the last two decades, in both Albany, NYand Tucson, AZ. Their “attack the messenger” strategy in this “whistle blower” action has beenextraordinarily successful. In Arizona, the State court plaintiffs (Jay Grossman and EudiceGrossman) have triumphed in the midst of alleged adversity. For alleged “losses” in connectionwith the sale of Grossman’s medical practice and the stock purchase and sale of Vivra stock,Grossman has been awarded damages against the Davidsons. By reason of Grossmans’violations of the substantive federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), Grossmans have beenawarded damages against Davidsons in a default judgment in the State court proceeding. SeeAppendices F, G, H, and HH. By reason of the concerted acts of the State Actors in the StateAction, Davidsons have suffered actual damages and deprivation of constitutionally-protectedfundamental rights.

The nucleus of operative fact upon which this case is based, centers primarily around thefederal court defendants’ (Jay Grossman, Eudice Grossman, and others) conduct in both Arizonaand New York performing clinical research studies on behalf of various pharmaceuticalcorporate sponsors in support of New Drug Applications. The defendants in the Federal courtproceedings have by the very nature of their business (contract clinical research and specialtymedical practice) willfully injected themselves, their business, and their conduct, into the streamof interstate commerce.

This is still a very “live” case and controversy (see FN1 below). Now that the ArizonaSupreme Court has finally ruled, there are no “ongoing state court proceedings” to bar filing afederal RICO complaint. Davidsons’ federal RICO claims have never been litigated. Davidsonsrequest this Court to judicially notice the Supplemental Brief and Petition for Rehearing in U.S.Supreme Court Case No. 04-1687, as they are both material to issues (mandatorydisqualification and state action) raised in the Petitions presently before this Court. The “finaljudgment” in the State Court proceeding was a default judgment by a trial judge who failed todisqualify herself on numerous occasions under mandatory disqualification statutes of theArizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The default judgment struck Davidsons’ counterclaims(assault and battery in the workplace), granted Grossmans alleged damages of $7.8 million foralleged defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and entered sanctions againstDavidsons, all without ever reaching the merits of the case or Davidsons’ constitutional concernsregarding Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 5.1 and the Prescription Drug User Fee Act. It is quite clear fromthe record that both the State trial judge, Jane L. Eikleberry (referred to herein as “JLE”) and theFederal District Court judge, Frank R. Zapata (referred to herein as “FRZ”) violated mandatorydisqualification statutes.

Michael J. Meehan (referred to herein as “MJM”) was believed to have been anhonorable, well-respected, practitioner of law in Tucson, Arizona when Davidsons retained MJMas their legal counsel on October 13, 1999. Davidsons did not anticipate that MJM wouldabandon and slander his clients to achieve his judicial ambitions. See Appendices Q throughZ.

The fact that the entire Arizona judicial system is seemingly in “lock step” on this mattershould not deter this Court. This is an extraordinary case, imminently suitable for this Court’sexercise of certiorari. Petitioners have been denied a legal remedy by the Arizona judicial systemfor seven years due to “structural errors” in the State court proceedings which were no fault ofthe Petitioners.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE[from the last Cert. Petition: after final judgment of the 5th Circuit]

Davidsons have stated a non-frivolous claim for relief under the RICO Act, Civil RightsAct of 1871, and Declaratory Judgment Act. The dismissal of this case should be reversed on themerits by this Court. This a case in which questions of subject matter jurisdiction were raised forthe first time after trial. Davidson did not realize that Meehan’s Declaration of Michael J.Meehan (Document 41) was perjured until on or about January 2, 2008. Meehan’s perjuredaffidavit in support of his Motion to Dismiss (Document 41), substantially interfered with

Davidsons’ ability to fully and fairly try the case. It is clear and well-established law thatwhenever an officer of the court makes any misrepresentation, whether of commission, oromission, of silence, or of concealment, that attorney (officer of the court) commits “fraud uponthe court,” and deprives the judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Davidsons have suffered a continuing series of separate injuries. Bankers Trust Co. v.Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (1988). Davidsons’ RICO counts demonstrate a pattern of racketeeringactivity which caused a continuing series of separate injuries. Each turnover order andgarnishment proceeding against Davidsons in favor of Jay Grossman and Eudice Grossman inGregg County, Texas under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, represents aseparate new injury to Davidsons’ business and property. The nexus between the Section 1983injury, the RICO injury, and the pendant state law injury is found in the Minute Entry Order ofNovember 24, 2004, in the Arizona state action. This Order of the Arizona trial court provides avery direct link (see FN2 below) between Grossmans’ violations of the substantive RICO statute[18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)] alleged in Count One of the Amended Complaint (Document 19), andinjury to Davidsons’ business and property.

After the U.S. Court of Appeals Judgment of March 6, 2008, Davidsons moved theDistrict Court (Houston) to vacate and set aside the Judgment under Rule 60(b) (Document 95)and reinstate the lawsuit for jury trial on the merits, as to all parties and all counts. Davidsonsalso raised the issue of the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction on appeal. The DistrictCourt’s decision dismissing this case for improper venue, a decision that has been affirmed bythe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, was based on fraud or is void.

See Document 95 at page 9, ¶ 14, which states, “Any fraud connected with thepresentation of a case to a court is a fraud upon the court, in a broad sense. Moore & Rogers,Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 YALE L. J. 692 n. 266. There is a powerfuldistinction between perjury to which an attorney is a party and that with which no attorney isinvolved. Murray Fogler’s knowing, willful participation in Michael J. Meehan’s perjuredaffidavit and Motion to Dismiss (Document 41) is the relevant consideration in Davidsons’seeking relief from judgment or order based upon Fraud on the Court.”

Davidsons are not pro se litigants by choice. See Count Seven of the Amended Complaint(Document 19). Davidsons are pro se litigants by fiat of the trial court under color of ArizonaRule of Civil Procedure 5.1 (“ARCP 5.1”) in the Arizona State Action. ARCP 5.1 isunconstitutional, both on its face, and as applied to the Davidsons. To date, no federal or statecourt has ever reached the Constitutionality of ARCP 5.1.

Davidsons, appearing of necessity without the benefit of retained legal counsel, shouldnot be held to an impossible standard. Davidsons should not be expected to know the basis uponwhich the Fifth Circuit based its judgment, when the judgment was indisputably an affirmationwithout opinion (“AWO”), when even the Honorable District Judge is admittedly uncertain as towhether the Fifth Circuit rejected Davidsons’ arguments on appeal. The Order (Appendix B) ofApril 22, 2008, and the Order (Appendix C) of April 9, 2008, are quite remarkable in that evenafter jurisdiction re-vested (Appendix A) on March 6, 2008, in the District Court, the Courtapparently persists in the view that this lawsuit was properly dismissed for improper venue on

July 5, 2007.

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FN1: Davidsons were actually prevented from filing their federal Complaint with the U.S.District Court for Northern District of Texas (Case No. 3:06-CV-0920-M) until the ArizonaSupreme Court ruled, so as to avoid a second dismissal under Younger abstention.

FN2: See also the Amended Judgment (Nunc Pro Tunc), file stamped on January 4, 2005, in theArizona State Action found at pages 34-36 of Document 98. See the Judgment of November 26,2004, in the Arizona State Action.