STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS … · 2020-01-31 · 4 The appeal of the zoning...
Transcript of STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS … · 2020-01-31 · 4 The appeal of the zoning...
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
WASHINGTON, SC. SUPERIOR COURT
(FILED: January 30, 2020)
LOVE’S TRAVEL STOPS and :
COUNTRY STORES, INC.; :
MADELINE A. GINGERELLA, in her :
capacity as Trustee of the GEORGE A. :
GINGERELLA LIVING TRUST; :
DAVID A. GINGERELLA; ANGELO :
GINGERELLA; ROSEMARIE :
GINGERELLA; ANGELO COMFORTI; :
LUCILLE SPOSATO; DONNA :
LaPLANTE; WILLIAM GINGERELLA;:
LOUIS W. GINGERELLA, JR.; :
LOIS DELANEY; CAROL A. BROUGH;:
TONI R. SKOCIC; and MELANIE :
GINGERELLA :
:
v. : C.A. No. WC-2017-056
:
PHILIP SCALISE; DANIEL :
HARRINGTON; JONATHON URE; :
HARRY BJORKLAND; and TIMOTHY :
WARD, in their capacities as members :
of the Town of Hopkinton Zoning Board :
of Review; and RITA S. ADAM; :
GLENN T. BRADFIELD; :
WOOD PAWCATUCK WATERSHED :
ASSOCIATION; and HOPKINTON :
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, INC. :
DECISION1
THUNBERG, J. Before this Court is an appeal from a decision of the Zoning Board of Review
(Board) for the Town of Hopkinton (Town), filed by Love’s Travel Stops and Country Stores, Inc.
1 The voluminous record in this matter has been submitted by the Appellants as a three-volume
appendix. As the parties cite to this appendix in their briefs, the Court also will cite to said
appendix for ease of reference.
2
(Love’s or Applicant),2 and the owners of the property at issue (the Gingerella Family)
(collectively, Appellants).3 The Appellants appeal from the denial of their applications for a
special-use permit and for an aquifer protection permit, and also from the Board’s decision to
rescind five zoning certificates previously issued by the Town’s building official. The Appellants
contend that the Board misconstrued provisions contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance
(ordinance) and comprehensive plan, and that it also failed to consider competent evidence in the
record. They further contend that the Board lacked authority to consider an appeal of the zoning
certificates. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69.
I
Facts and Travel
This case previously came before the Court on Love’s appeal from the denial of master
plan approval. See Love’s Travel Stops and Country Stores, Inc. v DiOrio, No. WC 09-844, 2014
WL 1246540 (R.I. Super. Mar. 21, 2014). The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the matter
to the Town of Hopkinton Zoning Board of Review, sitting as the Platting Board of Appeals
(Platting Board). The following facts from that decision aptly describe the property and proposal:
“The property at issue in this case consists of an unimproved 18.4
acre parcel, otherwise known as Lot No. 59 on Tax Assessor’s Plat
2 Love’s is an Oklahoma-based, family-owned business that operates travel stops at more than 500
locations in over forty-one states nationwide. See The Love’s Family of Companies,
http://www.loves.com/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2020). According to its website, Love’s
Stores:
“provid[e] professional truck drivers and motorists with 24-hour
access to clean and safe places to purchase gasoline, diesel fuel,
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), travel items, electronics, snacks,
restaurant offerings, and more.” Id. 3 The property at issue originally was acquired by the late Frank Carl Gingerella and his deceased
brothers and sister. (Email from Catherine Studley, daughter of Frank Carl Gingerella, to building
official Brad Ward, Sept. 23, 2015, App. at 1984). Ms. Studley stated that the families of these
deceased “siblings have grown exponentially” and are “far too many to name and describe . . . .”
Id.
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7 in the Hopkinton Land Evidence Records (the Property) . . .
Located in a manufacturing zone since the inception of the Town’s
[z]oning [o]rdinance (the [o]rdinance) in 1971, the Property is
bounded by Route 3, Interstate Route 95, a state-owned Park-and-
Ride, and another unimproved parcel . . . It is undisputed that the
property across the street was zoned as residential until 2006, at
which point it was rezoned as manufacturing.
“Love’s has proposed developing the Property as a travel stop for
passenger vehicles and tractor-trailer trucks. Specifically, the
proposal involves installation of a twenty-four hour facility with a
single, 10,800 square-foot building containing a fifty-six seat, [a
Subway] restaurant, a gift shop, restrooms, and a fuel-filling station
. . . The fuel-filling station would accommodate automobile traffic
in the front of the building and diesel trucks in the back of the
building . . . To accommodate these uses, the site would contain
eighty-nine automobile parking spaces as well as fifty-six tractor-
trailer truck stalls, each measuring nine by eighteen feet . . . The
truck stalls would provide temporary overnight parking for truckers,
most of whom would leave their truck engines running for heating
or cooling purposes.
“On January 1, 2008, the Town’s zoning official issued three zoning
certificates for the Property. The certificates designated the Property
as being within a manufacturing zone, and each required the
applicant to obtain special use permits. Accordingly, on October 2,
2008, Love’s filed an application for three special use permits;
namely, Use Category 554 (gasoline service stations); Use Category
581 (eating places) and Use Category 5995 (gift, novelty and
souvenir shop, convenience store as accessory to gasoline service
station).” Id. at *1-*2 (internal citations omitted).
The proposed project would require installation of five underground storage tanks (UST),
four of which would be capable of storing 20,000 gallons of fuel, and the fifth would have a
12,000-gallon capacity. (Department of Environmental Management (DEM) Approval Letter,
App. at 1987.) The Appellants applied for approval from the DEM to install said tanks, and on
March 3, 2009, the DEM granted said approval, subject to various conditions. Id.
On December 4, 2008, Appellants applied for five zoning certificates for the property.
(Zoning Certificates, App. at 202-206.) Said applications sought certificates for a restaurant, a
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gasoline service station, a convenience store, and certificates for overnight parking for long-
distance trucking (Use Category 422, local and long-distance trucking) and shower facilities.
(Zoning Certificates, App. at 202-06.)
On January 12, 2009, the Town’s zoning official denied the application for shower facilities
as being a use that is not permitted under the ordinance; however, he did issue zoning certificates
for a restaurant, a gasoline service station, a convenience store, and overnight parking. Id. The
zoning certificates for the restaurant, the gasoline service station, and the convenience store each
required Appellants to obtain a special-use permit. Id. at 202, 204, and 206. The zoning
certificates for the gasoline service station and overnight parking for local and long distance
trucking, with storage, additionally required Appellants to obtain an aquifer protection permit. Id.
at 203 and 206.
On July 22, 2009, multiple parties appealed to the Board regarding the issuance of the
zoning certificates.4 (Appeal of Zoning Certificates, App. at 197.) They asserted that they were
not given notice and an opportunity to oppose the zoning certificates. Id. at 198-99. They further
asserted that the zoning official erroneously issued the zoning certificates because the proposed
uses for the property, taken together, combine into a truck stop, which is not a permitted use under
the ordinance. Id. at 199. In addition, they maintain that Use Category 422, local and long-distance
trucking, is restricted to “businesses actually engaged in the provision of commercial trucking and
storage” and that such use does not permit overnight parking for the proposed truck stop use. Id.
4 The appeal of the zoning certificates was filed by Steven A. Wilmes, Karen M. Wilmes, Glenn
T. Bradfield, Rita S. Adam, the Wood Pawcatuck Watershed Association, and the Hopkinton
Historical Association, Inc.
5
Meanwhile, on January 15, 2015, the Board commenced a protracted public hearing5 on
the applications for the aforementioned special-use permit and aquifer protection permit. The
Board consolidated the applications with the previously filed appeal of the zoning certificates.
The following witnesses testified at the hearing: civil and environmental engineer, Eric
Prive; environmental engineer, Donna Pallister; professional engineer, Paul Bannon; owner of
SAGE Environmental, Rick Mandile; Love’s Vice President of Real Estate and Development,
Rick Schuffield; acoustical consulting scientist, David Coate; environmental professional, Marc
Wallace; registered landscape architect, John Carter; professional interstate truck driver, Will
Gosbee; real estate appraiser, Raymond Leuder; professional planner, Ashley Sweet; Hopkinton
Historical Society, Inc. representative, Richard Prescott; real estate appraiser, Peter Scotti; and
former Hopkinton zoning officer, Brad Ward. At the conclusion of the testimony on January
19, 2017, the Board closed the hearing, deliberated over the record evidence, and issued an oral
decision via multiple motions.6
In its decision, the Board denied the application for a special-use permit, as well as the
application for an aquifer protection permit. In denying the special-use permit, the Board found
that a travel stop is not a permitted use under the ordinance and thus is prohibited.7 It further found
5 The hearings took place on January 15, 2015; February 26, 2015; March 26, 2015; April 23,
2015; May 7, 2015; June 18, 2015; July 23, 2015; September 24, 2015; October 22, 2015;
December 9, 2015; January 28, 2016; March 31, 2016; May 5, 2016; June 2, 2016; July 7, 2016;
September 22, 2016; October 20, 2016; November 17, 2016; and January 19, 2017. 6 Prior to the commencement of the final hearing day, the Board recognized the recusal of a fellow
Board member. This Board member had been present and vocally active at all of the previous
hearing days. The reason for his recusal is not evident from the record. 7 The parties have variously referred to the proposal as one for a travel stop, a travel center, a travel
plaza, and/or a truck stop. However, the precise characterization of the proposal does not affect
the outcome of this Decision.
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that the special-use permit would not be compatible with the neighboring uses and would adversely
affect the surrounding neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their properties.
With respect to the aquifer protection permit, the Board found that it would be
environmentally detrimental and would adversely affect property values because the proposed
USTs would be located in a prohibited area. The Board granted the appeal of the zoning
certificates by rescinding them and declaring them null and void.
The Board later memorialized all of its motions in a written decision that it issued on
January 30, 2017 and recorded in the land evidence records on January 31, 2017. The Appellants
timely appealed.
After carefully reviewing the voluminous record in this case, the Court now renders its
Decision. Additional facts will be provided in the analysis portion below.
II
Standard of Review
This Court’s review of a zoning board decision is governed by § 45-24-69(d), which
provides:
“The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning
board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
The court may affirm the decision of the zoning board of review or
remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify
the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
which are:
“(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance
provisions;
“(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of
review by statute or ordinance;
“(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
“(4) Affected by other error of law;
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“(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence of the whole record; or
“(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
Section 45-24-69(d).
Our Supreme Court requires this Court to “review[] the decisions of a . . . board of review
under the ‘traditional judicial review’ standard applicable to administrative agency actions.”
Restivo v. Lynch, 707 A.2d 663, 665 (R.I. 1998) (quoting E. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Rocha, 118
R.I. 276, 285, 373 A.2d 496, 501 (1977)). Accordingly, the Court ‘“lacks [the] authority to weigh
the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or to substitute [its] findings of fact for
those made at the administrative level.”’ Id. at 665-66 (quoting Lett v. Caromile, 510 A.2d 958,
960 (R.I. 1986)). In performing this review, the Court “may ‘not substitute its judgment for that
of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.’” Curran v.
Church Community Housing Corp., 672 A.2d 453, 454 (R.I. 1996) (quoting § 45-24-69(d)).
However, the applicant always bears the burden to demonstrate why the requested relief should be
granted. See DiIorio v. Zoning Board of Review of City of East Providence, 105 R.I. 357, 362,
252 A.2d 350, 353 (1969) (requiring “an applicant seeking relief before a zoning board of review
to prove the existence of the conditions precedent to a grant of relief”).
In reviewing a zoning decision, the Court ‘“must examine the entire record to determine
whether “substantial” evidence exists to support the board’s findings.’” Salve Regina College v.
Zoning Board of Review of City of Newport, 594 A.2d 878, 880 (R.I. 1991) (quoting DeStefano v.
Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 122 R.I. 241, 245, 405 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979)).
‘“Substantial evidence’” is defined as ‘“such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means [an] amount more than a scintilla but less
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than a preponderance.’” Lischio v. Zoning Board of Review of North Kingstown, 818 A.2d 685,
690 n.5 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 424 A.2d 646,
647 (R.I. 1981)). If the Court ‘“can conscientiously find that the board’s decision was supported
by substantial evidence in the whole record,’” it must uphold that decision. Mill Realty Assoc. v.
Crowe, 841 A.2d 668, 672 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Apostolou v. Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 509, 388
A.2d 821, 825 (1978)). However, in cases that involve questions of law, this Court conducts a de
novo review. Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 791 (R.I. 2005).
III
Analysis
The Appellants contend that the Board misconstrued the ordinance and the comprehensive
plan, and that it also failed to consider competent evidence in the record. They further contend
that the Board lacked authority to consider an appeal of the zoning certificates. Alternatively, the
Board maintains that it properly found that a travel stop is not a permitted use under the ordinance.
It additionally maintains that denial of the aquifer permit was proper and that because the zoning
certificates conferred a vested right on Love’s, the issuance of said certificates was appealable.
A
The Special -Use Permit
Love’s filed a single application for a special-use permit to construct a “Travel Stop.” Said
application listed three uses: namely, Use Category 554 (gasoline service stations); Use Category
581 (eating places); and Use Category 5995 (gift, novelty, and souvenir shop). Appellants
maintain that they satisfied the standard for the issuance of that permit, and that the Board erred in
failing to grant the permit.
Section 10 of the ordinance, entitled “Special-use permits,” provides, in pertinent part:
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“(D) In granting a special-use permit, the zoning board shall be
satisfied by legally competent evidence that the proposed uses
and/or structure:
“(1) Will be compatible with the neighboring uses and will not
adversely affect the surrounding neighbors’ use and enjoyment
of their property;
“(2) Will be environmentally compatible with neighboring
properties and the protection of property values;
“(3) Will be compatible with the orderly growth and
development of the town, and will not be environmentally
detrimental therewith;
“(4) That all best practices and procedures to minimize the
possibility of any adverse effects on neighboring property, the
town, and the environment have been considered and will be
employed, including but not limited to considerations of soil
erosion, water supply protection, septic disposal, wetland
protection, traffic limitation, safety and circulation; and
“(5) That the purpose of this ordinance, and as set forth in the
comprehensive plan, shall be served by said special-use permit.”
Ch. 134, § 10 of the ordinance.
The burden of proof in an application for a special-use permit is on the applicant; therefore,
if an applicant fails to present adequate competent evidence to prove that the applicable standard
for issuing a special-use permit has been met, the zoning board of review must deny the
application. See Toohey v. Kilday, 415 A.2d 732, 735 (R.I. 1980); Dean v. Zoning Board of Review
of City of Warwick, 120 R.I. 825, 831, 390 A.2d 382, 386 (1978); R-N-R Associates v. Zoning
Board of Review of City of Providence, 100 R.I. 7, 12, 210 A.2d 653, 656 (1965). Furthermore,
“As a condition precedent to the grant of a special exception, an
applicant must establish that the relief sought is reasonably
necessary for the convenience and welfare of the public . . . To
satisfy the prescribed standard, the applicant need show only that
‘neither the proposed use nor its location on the site would have a
detrimental effect upon public health, safety, welfare and morals.’”
Toohey, 415 A.2d at 735–36 (quoting Hester v. Timothy, 108 R.I.
376, 385-86, 275 A.2d 637, 642 (1971)).
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Similar to the Supreme Court, this Court “interpret[s] an ordinance in the same manner in
which [it] interpret[s] a statute.” Prew v. Employee Retirement System of City of Providence, 139
A.3d 556, 561 (R.I. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Thus,
“When construing or interpreting an ordinance, this Court applies
the same rules of construction that we apply when interpreting [a]
statute[ ]. [It] give[s] clear and unambiguous language in an
ordinance its plain and ordinary meaning. However, when it is
determined that an ordinance is unclear and ambiguous, this Court
must look to the legislative intent behind the enactment. Most
notably, under no circumstances will this Court construe a statute to
reach an absurd result.” Sauro v. Lombardi, 178 A.3d 297, 304 (R.I.
2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Chapter 134, § 5 of the ordinance, entitled “District use regulations,” provides:
“The following District Use Table establishes in each district those
uses permitted and those uses permitted by special-use permit or by
aquifer protection permit. All uses not so permitted in a district are
prohibited therein. Except for those uses and activities specifically
identified in subsection (a) of this ordinance, which follows below,
any accessory use customarily incident to a use permitted in a
district and located on the same lot shall be permitted; any accessory
use customarily incident to a use permitted in a district by special
use permit or aquifer protection permit and located on the same lot
shall be permitted upon the grant of the special-use permit or aquifer
protection permit unless limited by special condition attached to the
grant of the special-use permit or aquifer protection permit.” Ch.
134, § 5 of the ordinance (emphasis added).
It is clear, from the foregoing, that uses not expressly enumerated in the ordinance are deemed
prohibited.
The term “use” is defined as, “[t]he purpose or activity for which land or buildings are
designed, arranged, or intended, or for which land or buildings are occupied or maintained.” Id.
at § 2. An accessory use/structure is defined as, “[a] use of land or of a building, or portion thereof,
customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the land or building or the structure
in which the use takes place. The incidental sale of products raised on a farm shall be considered
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accessory thereto.” Id. at § 2. Thus, an accessory use is a use that “is something less than a primary
permitted use [and] is demonstrated by a characterization of accessory uses as ‘dependent on’ or
‘pertaining to.’” Mola v. Reiley, 241 A.2d 861, 864 (N.J. 1968). Accordingly, “[a] primary use
must be and must continue to be dominant to an accessory use. Id.
Interestingly, “[t]he name by which a business or use is designated or called is not of
controlling importance in determining whether the use comes within the terms of the ordinance,
and the question is determined by the activities or character of the business or service.” 101A
C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 123. Furthermore, “[w]hether a proposed use falls within a
particular use category in a zoning ordinance is a question of law.” Id.
According to the Town’s zoning map, the property at issue in this case is located in a
manufacturing zone. The ordinance requires an applicant to obtain a special-use permit for a
gasoline service station, an eating place, and a gift, novelty, or souvenir shop. Here, Love’s filed
a single application for a travel stop that combined multiple primary uses into a single primary
use; namely, a travel stop, so-called.
Such a use is not listed in the district use table, and thus, it is clearly and unambiguously
prohibited. See Ch. 134, § 5 of the ordinance (“All uses not so permitted in a district are prohibited
therein”); see also Del Vecchio v. Lalla, 523 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (1988) (“Construing the Zoning
Ordinance to permit multiple primary uses through resort to the special permit provisions of the
ordinance would effectively nullify the provision pertaining to accessory uses”); Enterprise
Citizens Action Committee v. Clark County Board of Commissioners, 918 P.2d 305, 312 (Nev.
1996) (holding that three requests for minor changes, when taken together, “amounted to a non-
conforming use of the property because their effect would have been to allow manufacturing in a
district which expressly forbids manufacturing”).
12
Although a travel stop is not an expressly prohibited use in the ordinance, its absence from
the district use table, as a permitted use, necessarily means that it is a prohibited use. See Ch. 134,
§ 5, of the Ordinance; Exxon Corp. v. Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York,
515 N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (N.Y. App. 1987) (“In construing a zoning regulation, the issue is not
whether the use is permissible, but, rather, whether it is prohibited”) (internal quotation omitted);
see also City of Warwick v. Campbell, 82 R.I. 300, 305, 107 A.2d 334, 337 (1954) (“Zoning
ordinances may be permissive in form, permitting specified uses and buildings and prohibiting all
others within a district, or they may be prohibitive in form, prohibiting specified uses and buildings
and permitting all others.”). Consequently, the Court concludes that the Board did not err in
finding that the proposed use was not a permitted use under the ordinance.
The Appellants nevertheless contend that several uses may exist on a single property in a
manufacturing zone that, when combined, constitute a permitted use not listed in the district use
table. As support, they point to the existence of an industrial park across the street, which contains
multiple uses, although it is not listed as a permitted use in the ordinance. They maintain that the
Board’s interpretation of its ordinance to allow the industrial park evidences the Board’s
interpretation of the Town Council’s intent to allow multiple permitted uses on one piece of
property to be combined into a separate, single use. Essentially, Appellants are contending that
the Board may not selectively enforce the provisions of the ordinance.
In the instant matter, the industrial park across the street is very dissimilar to a travel stop.
As such, the two properties are not similarly situated. Furthermore, even if the properties were
similarly situated, that fact alone would be insufficient to show that the Board arbitrarily and
capriciously denied the special-use permit.
It is well-settled that:
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“[t]he mere fact that consents were granted to owners of premises
somewhat similarly situated does not in itself show that consent was
arbitrarily refused to this applicant. The question is not whether
someone else has been favored. The question is whether the
petitioner has been illegally oppressed. Exercise of discretion in
favor of one confers no right upon another to demand the same
decision. Unlimited discretion vested in an administrative board by
ordinance is not narrowed through its exercise. Calculated failure to
lay down general standards in the ordinance should not be nullified
by interpretation that each case passed upon creates a standard that
must be generally followed thereafter. The council may refuse to
duplicate previous error; it may change its views as to what is for
the best interests of the city; it may give weight to slight differences
which are not easily discernible.” Matter of Larkin Co. v. Schwab,
242 N.Y. 330, 336–37 (1926).
See also E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 20-15 (4th ed. 2002) (“Since each case must be
decided on its own facts, it follows that merely because the Zoning Board takes certain action in
one situation, it is not bound in another . . . Generally, therefore, it is not a relevant factor that a
variance [or a special-use permit] has been granted to neighbors or similarly situated properties.”).
As the district use table does not list a travel stop, a travel plaza, a travel center, or a truck
stop as a permitted use, the Court concludes that the Board’s denial of the special-use permit was
not in violation of constitutional provisions. Furthermore, as the application sought a prohibited
use, the Court will not address the merits of the evidence presented by Love’s to support its
application for a special-use permit—a mode of relief which constitutes a conditionally permitted
use—as the Board lacked statutory authority to grant the special-use permit.
B
The Aquifer Protection Permit
The Appellants contend that the Board erred in denying the application for an aquifer
protection permit by applying the wrong standard when it denied the permit. According to the
“Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Areas Map,” the property was not located in a non-
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transient, non-community wellhead protection area. See App. at 2332. The Appellants maintain
that the Board erred in ignoring the map when it found that the proposed USTs would be
environmentally detrimental.
The Town’s aquifer protection provisions of the ordinance prohibit USTs within primary
protection zones, and it is undisputed that the property is located entirely within such a zone. See
System Overview from Rhode Island Department of Health, dated March 15, 2006 (App. at 49);
Transient Public Water System Worksheet, dated March 19, 2006 (App. at 50-52); DiPrete
Engineering Best Management Practice Work Plan, dated April 24, 2009 (App. at 6 and 38) (listing
the Hopkinton Golf Pavilion (Pavilion) as having a non-community public well with a 2934-foot
radius). However, Appellants contend that because the Town failed to depict said primary
protection zone on the Town’s “Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Areas Map,” as required
by the ordinance, the prohibition does not apply to the property. See App. at 2332. They further
maintain that the Board misapplied the ordinance and exceeded its authority when it ignored the
governing map—which depicted the property within a secondary protection zone—and instead
found that USTs are environmentally detrimental in primary protection zones, per se, regardless
of what is depicted on the governing map.
An aquifer protection permit is defined as “[a] permit allowing a use designated by the
letter ‘A’ in the primary or in the secondary groundwater and wellhead protection zone district in
the district use table of this ordinance.” Ch. 134, § 2 of the ordinance. As local and long-distance
trucking, with storage (Use Category 422) and gasoline service stations (Use Category 554) are
designated by the letter “A,” Love’s had to file an application for an aquifer protection permit.
A wellhead protection area is defined as
“The critical area surrounding a community water system well or
non-transient non-community water system well through which
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water will move toward and reach such wells, as depicted on that
certain map titled ‘The Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Map,
Hopkinton, RI,’ dated March 22, 2004 or the most recent revision
adopted by the town council, which map is on file in the records of
the Town Clerk of the Town of Hopkinton.” Id. Ch. 134, § 2 of the
ordinance.
A community water system is defined as “[a] public water system which serves at least fifteen (15)
service connections used by year-round residents or regularly serves at least twenty-five (25) year-
round residents.” Id. A non-transient non-community water system is a “non-community water
system that regularly services at least twenty-five (25) of the same persons over six (6) months of
the year.” Id.
A primary groundwater and wellhead protection zone overlay district consists of:
“Those areas depicted on that certain map entitled ‘Groundwater
and Wellhead Protection Map, Hopkinton, RI’, dated March 22,
2004 or the most recent revision adopted by the town council, which
map is on file in the records of the town clerk of the Town of
Hopkinton.” Id.
A secondary groundwater and wellhead protection overlay district constitutes “[a]ny area within
the Town of Hopkinton that is not within the Primary Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Zone
Overlay District.” Id.
The district use portion of the ordinance specifically prohibits “[n]on-residential UST
installations in a primary protection zone district.” Ch. 134, § 5(a)(2) of the Ordinance.
Furthermore, “[n]on-residential UST installations (except those regulated by RIDEM) are
permitted in the secondary protection zone by aquifer protection permit only.” Id. Thus, according
to the aforementioned provisions, non-residential USTs are prohibited within the wellhead
protection area of a non-transient, non-community well.
At the hearing, DiPrete Engineering employee, Mr. Prive, testified that he had obtained
approval from the DEM for the installation of the proposed USTs. (Tr. 47-48, Jan. 15, 2015, App.
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at 224.) He testified, in detail, about the proposed system, including its many safety features. Id.
at 47-54 (App. at 224-226); Tr. 48-54 and 72-73, June 18, 2015 (App. at 625-627 and 631-32).
Ms. Pallister testified that a neighboring property, the Pavilion, contained a well that had
been classified as a non-transient, non-community well with a wellhead protection radius of 2,934
feet, and that, as such, its wellhead protection area encompasses the entire property at issue. (Tr.
67-72, Dec. 9, 2015, App. at 941-946; BPMWP Section 10, App. at 38.) As previously stated,
non-residential USTs, such as the ones sought in this case, are prohibited in such wellhead
protection areas.
On December 8, 2008, Ms. Pallister requested, on Love’s behalf, that the DEM reduce
Pavilion’s wellhead protection radius to 1,750 feet. (Letter to DEM, dated December 8, 2008;
App. at 43-46). The DEM refused the request, stating that if the wellhead protection area was
reduced as requested, “a contaminant outside this [wellhead protection area] still has the potential
to migrate to the well . . . and enter the public water system.” (Letter from DEM, dated December
10, 2008; App. at 56.)
Notwithstanding, the fact that the property is located entirely within a wellhead protection
area of a non-transient, non-community well, Appellants maintain that the ordinance prohibits
USTs within such areas only when they actually are depicted on the applicable “Groundwater and
Wellhead Protection Areas Map.” Thus, although the property is located in a prohibited wellhead
protection zone, Appellants maintain that because the Pavilion’s non-transient, non-community
well was not depicted on the Town’s “Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Areas Map,” as
required by the ordinance, the property, technically, is located in a permitted, secondary wellhead
protection zone. See Ch. 134, § 2 of the Ordinance; Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Areas
17
Map, dated March 22, 2004 (App. at 2326); and Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Areas Map,
amended September 28, 2009 (App. at 2257).
The Appellants further maintain that the DEM permits for the USTs are evidence that the
proposed USTs satisfy environmental requirements. In light of these permits, they then contend
that the Board erroneously failed to consider whether there was legally competent evidence in the
record to show that the USTs “will not result in concentrations of pollutants in the groundwater
that will adversely affect the groundwater as a source of potable water . . . .” Ch. 134, § 5(b)(d) of
the Ordinance. Pursuant to the DEM’s Rules and Regulations and/or the DEM’s governing statute,
DEM did not have to consider the ordinance’s absolute prohibition on the installation of USTs
within the wellhead protection area of a non-transient, non-community well. Thus, the Board and
the DEM did not review the proposal under the same regulations or requirements.
In Rhode Island, “[t]he general rule is that statutory requirements comprising the essence
of a statute are mandatory.” Gryguc v. Bendick, 510 A.2d 937, 941 (R.I. 1986) (internal quotation
omitted). In Gryguc, the DEM granted the landowner a permit to construct a hazardous waste
treatment facility after a public hearing. Id. at 938. Property owners within 500 feet of the facility
subsequently filed for declaratory relief, asserting that because they did not receive the requisite
notice under G.L. 1956 § 23-19.1-10(b)—the Hazardous Waste Management Act—the permit was
null and void. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of that Act was “to protect the
public and the environment ‘from the effects of the improper, inadequate, or unsound management
of hazardous wastes.’” Id. (quoting § 23-19.1-3(1)).
It then concluded “that the health and the safety of the public in conjunction with the proper
disposal of hazardous waste are the essence of the statute and that the notice provision contained
in § 23-19.1-10(b) is, at best, subsidiary to these concerns.” Id. In so concluding, the Supreme
18
Court observed that “the statutory provision in question is directed at public officers, and
substantial, though imperfect, compliance will not prejudice private rights or the public interest
where the fault of imperfect compliance rests with the public officer.” Id. (citing Town of Tiverton
v. Fraternal Order of Police, 118 R.I. 160, 164-65, 372 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (1977)).
In “determining whether a statute is directory or mandatory, [the Court] must ascertain the
legislative intent.” Town of Tiverton, 118 R.I. at 165, 372 A.2d at 1276. In addition, ‘“statutes
imposing apparently mandatory time restrictions on public officials are often directory in nature.’”
West v. McDonald, 18 A.3d 526, 534 (R.I. 2011) (quoting New England Development, LLC v.
Berg, 913 A.2d 363, 371 (R.I. 2007)). Thus, the “time within which boards or commissions must
meet and take official action, or within which ordinance must be published to become effective,
[is] construed as directory.” West, 18 A.3d at 534 (citing 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction § 57:19 (7th ed. 2008)).
There are a variety of factors that the Court considers “when analyzing whether time
provisions are directory or mandatory, including (1) the presence or absence of a sanction, (2)
whether the provision is the essence of the statute, and (3) whether the provision is aimed at public
officers.” West, 18 A.3d at 534. Furthermore, while in general, “statutory requirements
comprising the essence of a statute are mandatory . . . [p]rovisions so designed to secure order,
system and dispatch are generally held directory unless accompanied by negative words.” Id.
(Internal quotations omitted.)
In West, the City of East Providence failed to update its ordinance to conform with its
comprehensive plan within the eighteen-month statutory period set forth in chapter 22.2 of title 45
of the General Laws, entitled the “Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use
Regulation Act” (CPLURA). Id. at 533. However, although the CPLURA used mandatory time-
19
provision language, the Supreme Court, nevertheless, held the language to be directory because
the “provisions dictating the time within which zoning ordinances must be brought into conformity
with comprehensive plans are not the essence of broader land-use planning statutes; nor is the
administrative act of zoning the kind of government action from which the citizenry requires
safeguards against abuse.” Id. at 535.
G.L. 1956 § 46-12-3(21) permits the DEM:
“To promulgate and enforce rules and regulations to govern the
location, design, construction, maintenance, and operation of
underground storage facilities used for storing petroleum products
or hazardous materials to prevent, abate, and remedy the discharge
of petroleum products and hazardous materials into the waters of the
state . . . .” Section § 46-12-3(21).
One of the stated purposes of those rules and regulations is to “[p]rotect the air, soil, and waters of
the state, including groundwater, from pollution resulting from the underground storage of
regulated substances and hazardous materials[.]” Section 250-RICR-140-25-1.1(A)(1).
Pursuant to the DEM rules and regulations, a wellhead protection area is defined as “the
three-dimensional zone, surrounding a public well or wellfield through which water will move
toward and reach such well or wellfield, as designated by the Director pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws
Chapter 46-13.1.” Section 250-RICR-140-25-1.5(131) (emphasis added). In contrast, the
ordinance defines a wellhead protection area to include both public wells and non-transient, non-
community wells.8
8 As previously stated, the ordinance defines a wellhead protection area as:
“The critical area surrounding a community water system well or
non-transient non-community water system well through which
water will move toward and reach such wells, as depicted on that
certain map titled ‘The Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Map,
Hopkinton, RI,’ dated March 22, 2004 or the most recent revision
adopted by the town council, which map is on file in the records of
20
The Court finds that the essence of the ordinance is to protect, from pollution, the critical
areas surrounding both community (public) and non-transient, non-community (non-transient,
non-public) water systems. Furthermore, although the language relating to the “Groundwater and
Wellhead Protection Areas Map,” essentially, is in the nature of a notice provision, it contains no
mandatory language, sanctions, or time provisions, and is directed at public officers. See West, 18
A.3d at 534. Thus, the Court finds that such language does not implicate the essence of the aquifer
ordinance provisions aimed at protecting the Town’s water supplies; rather, the Court finds that
the language relating to the “Groundwater and Wellhead Protection Areas Map” is directory in
nature.
The presumed purpose of maintaining a current map in the town clerk’s records is to
provide potential applicants with notice. Here, though, the pertinent “Groundwater and Wellhead
Protection Areas Map” did not depict the Pavilion’s non-transient, non-community water system.
However, Appellants were aware of the existence of the Pavilion’s non-transient, non-community
wellhead protection area. For example, Ms. Pallister corresponded with the DEM requesting a
reduction in size of that wellhead protection area. See Tr. 67-72, Dec. 9, 2015, App. at 941-946;
BPMWP § 10, App. at 38; Letter to DEM, dated December 8, 2008, App. at 43-46; Letter from
DEM, dated December 10, 2008, App. at 56.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the lack of a current “Groundwater and Wellhead
Protection Areas Map” did not prejudice Appellants. See e.g., Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 33
(R.I. 2001) (stating that “the filing of a timely claim against an estate in the probate court
constitutes a waiver of the right to actual notice since the objective of the notice requirement was
the Town Clerk of the Town of Hopkinton.” Ch. 134, § 2 of the
Ordinance (emphasis added).
21
to give creditors an opportunity to timely file their claims and to be heard”); Izzo v. Victor Realty,
132 A.3d 680, 686 (R.I. 2016) (holding no deprivation of due process where individual challenging
inadequate notice had received actual notice of a petition to foreclose a right of redemption).
In its decision, the Board found that the aquifer permit would be environmentally
detrimental and would adversely affect property values because the proposed USTs would be
located in a prohibited area. The Appellants contend that, in making these findings, the Board
misconstrued ordinance provisions.
However, the Court finds that the Board simply could have denied the aquifer permit
application based upon the fact that the ordinance prohibits USTs in non-transient, non-community
wellhead protection areas. See e.g., Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building Authority v.
Capco Endurance, LLC, 203 A.3d 494, 499 n.2 (R.I. 2019) (internal quotations omitted) (“[I]n
reviewing the trial justice’s legal determinations, this Court has a prerogative to affirm a
determination of a trial justice on grounds different from those enunciated in his or her decision[,]
as well as a prerogative to overturn such a determination on different grounds”); Mesolella v. City
of Providence, 439 A.2d 1370, 1373 (R.I. 1982) (“In this jurisdiction it is well established that [the
Court is] allowed to sustain a correct judgment even if it was reached through faulty reasoning or
mistake of law.”). Consequently, the Court concludes that the Board was not clearly erroneous in
denying the aquifer permit.
C
The Zoning Certificates
The Appellants contend the Board erred in finding that Appellants possessed vested rights
in the zoning certificates, thus allowing the parties who challenged said certificates to file an
22
appeal. Instead, Appellants contend that zoning certificates are not appealable and that the Board
lacked the authority to consider any such appeal.
It is well-settled that ‘“[u]nless an individual is qualified as an appellant, his [or her]
purported appeal will be considered void.’” Lombardi v. City of Providence, 69 A.3d 846, 850
(R.I. 2013) (quoting Adams v. United Developers, Inc., 121 R.I. 177, 179, 397 A.2d 503, 505
(1979)). The Zoning Enabling Act permits zoning boards to hear appeals only from aggrieved
parties. See § 45-24-63(a) (“A zoning ordinance adopted pursuant to this chapter shall provide
that an appeal from any decision of an administrative officer or agency charged in the ordinance
with the enforcement of any of its provisions may be taken to the zoning board of review by an
aggrieved party.”); Section 45-24-64 (“An appeal to the zoning board of review from a decision
of any other zoning enforcement agency or officer may be taken by an aggrieved party.”).
For purposes of a zoning appeal, an aggrieved party consists of “(i) [a]ny person, or
persons, or entity, or entities, who or that can demonstrate that his, her, or its property will be
injured by a decision of any officer or agency responsible for administering the zoning ordinance
of a city or town; or (ii) [a]nyone requiring notice pursuant to this chapter.” Section 45-24-31(4).
Thus, the issue is whether a party may be aggrieved by the issuance of a zoning certificate.
A zoning certificate is defined as “[a] document signed by the zoning-enforcement officer,
as required in the zoning ordinance, that acknowledges that a use, structure, building, or lot either
complies with, or is legally nonconforming to, the provisions of the municipal zoning ordinance
or is an authorized variance or modification therefrom.” Section 45-24-31(70). Zoning certificates
are issued pursuant to § 45-24-54, which provides, in pertinent part:
“In order to provide guidance or clarification, the zoning
enforcement officer or agency shall, upon written request, issue a
zoning certificate or provide information to the requesting party as
to the determination by the official or agency within fifteen (15)
23
days of the written request. In the event that no written response is
provided within that time, the requesting party has the right to appeal
to the zoning board of review for the determination.” Section 45-
24-54 (emphasis added).
It is clear from the foregoing statutory language that zoning certificates are advisory in
nature, i.e., designed to provide guidance or clarification. They do not constitute construction
permits; rather, they provide advice about current uses of a property and current compliance with
the pertinent ordinance. See § 45-24-54. Indeed, our Supreme Court has “recognize[d] that a
zoning certificate is not legally binding.” Parker v. Byrne, 996 A.2d 627, 633 (R.I. 2010).
Moreover, pursuant to the clear language of § 45–24–54:
“it is the zoning enforcement officer or agency, not the zoning board
of review, that is authorized in the first instance to ‘provide guidance
or clarification’ by providing ‘information to the requesting party as
to the determination’ of a particular zoning violation and/or
restriction. Although the requesting party may appeal to the zoning
board of review if no written response is provided within fifteen
days of the request . . . nothing in § 45–24–57, detailing the powers
and duties of zoning boards of review, authorizes these boards to
render advisory opinions . . . [T]he authority of zoning boards of
review is limited in scope to that expressly conferred by statute.”
Franco v. Wheelock, 750 A.2d 957, 960 (R.I. 2000).
Section 45–24–54 does not confer upon zoning boards the authority to review the issuance of
zoning certificates. Consequently, any such review would be ultra vires. See § 45–24–54; Franco,
750 A.2d at 960; Roland F. Chase, Rhode Island Zoning Handbook § 199 (3d ed. 2016)
(“Unfortunately for the requester, a zoning certificate, whether issued by the zoning enforcement
officer or the zoning board, is not legally binding and therefore is not appealable.”). As a result,
zoning certificates do not operate to vest any enforceable rights in either an owner of property or
an applicant for a zoning certificate.
The Appellants, nevertheless, contend that when the platting board relied upon the zoning
certificates to grant master plan approval, Appellants obtained limited vested rights under § 45-
24
23-40(g)(1).9 Their rationale tracks that of the Board’s decision, which found that because
Appellants were required to obtain the zoning certificates before they could receive master plan
approval, they acquired vested rights in those certificates and also in the subsequent master plan
approval.
Section 45-24-44, entitled, “Creation of vested rights,” provides in pertinent part:
“If an application for development under the provisions of this
section is approved, reasonable time limits shall be set within which
development of the property must begin and within which
development must be substantially completed.” Section 45-24-44(d)
(emphases added).
In the instant matter, neither Love’s, nor the Gingerella family, acquired any vested rights
in the proposed development under § 45-24-44(d) because, when they received the zoning
certificates, their application had not been approved. Furthermore, although the platting board
may have relied upon the zoning certificates to grant master plan approval, Appellants only
obtained limited vested rights under § 45-23-40(g)(1); namely, the right to proceed to the second,
preliminary plan stage of their application.
Considering that the advisory, nonbinding zoning certificates did not create any vested
rights in Appellants, there could be no injury to an aggrieved party under § 45-24-31(4)(i). With
respect to § 45-24-31(4)(ii), the Court observes that the Zoning Enabling Act does not require a
zoning official to provide a hearing or give notice to any party when considering an application
for a zoning certificate. Indeed, as the issuance of a zoning certificate is merely an administrative
act, it would appear inconceivable that the statute would require notice and a hearing.
9 Section 45-23-40(g)(1) provides, in pertinent part, “The approved master plan is vested for a
period of two (2) years, with the right to extend for two (2), one-year extensions upon written
request by the applicant . . . .” Section 45-23-40(g)(1).
25
In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the zoning certificates were not
appealable and that the Board acted in excess of its authority when it entertained the appeal and
rescinded said zoning certificates. Consequently, the Court concludes that the Board’s findings
and conclusions on the appeal of the zoning certificate are void. See Lombardi, 69 A.3d at 850
(stating that “[u]nless an individual is qualified as an appellant, his [or her] purported appeal will
be considered void”) (internal quotation omitted).
IV
Conclusion
After a thorough review of the entire record, this Court finds that the Board’s decision on
the applications for a special-use permit and an aquifer protection permit was not arbitrary and
capricious and was not in violation of statutory, ordinance, and planning board provisions. The
Board’s decision on those applications also was not affected by error of law and was not
characterized by an abuse of discretion. Substantial rights of the Appellants have not been
prejudiced as a result. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Board’s decision to deny the
applications for the special-use permit and the aquifer permit.
The Court further finds that the Board’s decision to hear an appeal of the zoning certificates
was arbitrary and capricious and was in violation of statutory, ordinance, and planning board
provisions. The Board’s decision, on that issue, also was affected by error of law and was
characterized by an abuse of discretion. Substantial rights of the Appellants have been prejudiced
as a result. Accordingly, this Court declares ultra vires the Board’s decision on the appeal of the
zoning certificates.
Counsel shall submit an appropriate order for entry.
26
RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT
Decision Addendum Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Love’s Travel Stops and Country Stores, Inc., et al. v.
Philip Scalise, et al.
CASE NO: WC-2017-056
COURT: Washington County Superior Court
DATE DECISION FILED: January 30, 2020
JUSTICE/MAGISTRATE: Thunberg, J.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: Kelly M. Fracassa, Esq.
Eric S. Brainsky, Esq.
For Defendant: Todd J. Romano, Esq.