Stanford Journal of International Relations Spring 2014

Out of FocusZooming in on the Periphery

Marilyn Harris US Gun Control and the ϐ

ǣ13ǡǡ

ǣ13

ǣ

ǲǳǣ

S$ amp() V+- XV N- ( 01023$455

Cara Reichard

Lilian Rogers

Sam Rebo

Mark Bessen

ǣ

Jessie Brunner

STANFORD JOURNAL ofINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Cover Illustration Designed by Lawrence RogersSource Photo httpcommonswikimediaorgwikiFileRousseff_UN_General_Debatejpg7KH6WDQIRUG-RXUQDORIQWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQVDQDIiquestOLDWHRIWKHHSDUWPHQWRIQWHUQDWLRQDO5HOD-tions at Stanford University is published twice yearly

Copyright copy 2014 No material may be reproduced without the consent of the journal

ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

SJIR Editorial Board

ǦǦSophie Wiepking-BrownTony Liu

Ariella Axler

Pepito Escarce

ϐRaven Jiang

Alina Utrata

Alisha AdamJackson BeardChris BernedoAlbert ChenLaura ConigliaroLewam DejenKyle GschwendNoelle Herring

Franz EssigJaclyn MarcatiliElizabeth MargolinWill RaynerAlina Utrata

This Journal could not have been published without the support of the Department of International Relations and the Publications Board of the Associated Students of Stanford University The Journal would like to thank Professor Michael Tomz for his continued guidance and assistance

ȋǯȌYura KimHannah LongCaitlin LuGina McGuireNick ObletzAbraham RomeroCara TaAmanda Zerbe

Spring Two thousand fourteenVolume Fifteen

Issue One

ȁͳȁ͵

From the EditorsFor our Spring Issue ldquoOut of Focus Zooming in on the Peripheryrdquo we selected papers that would uncover issues that have been for one reason or another pushed to the margins The ǡǡǡǡǦϐspectrum of states While several papers focus on one country the implications of the issues at hand have far-reaching global consequences

First Marilyn Harris explores Pakistanrsquos education system in ldquoSociety in Crisis Addressing Educational Links to Religiously Motivated Violence in Pakistanrdquo This paper delves into the countryrsquos legacy of religious indoctrination in both public schools and religious seminaries arguing that the ensuing promotion of intolerance is a threat to international security

Next Cara Reichard details the link between US gun control policy and gun-related crime in Ǥǲϐǡǳϐǡbut is to blame for cross-border crime rates as well

Lilian Rogers examines a recent crackdown on journalists in ldquoChinese Muckrakers Investigative Journalism Censorship and Reformrdquo Recognizing that the Chinese Communist Party may be ǡϐto document the changes and reforms taking place in the government

Calling attention to cultural differences in the treatment of mental illness Mark Bessen contributes ldquoThe New Face of Depression Addressing the Stigmatization of Mental Illness in Japan and Beyondrdquo He explores the variation of attitudes toward and personal experiences of mental illness across cultures In particular he contrasts the stigmatization of mental illness in Japan with the proliferation of diagnoses of anxiety and depression in Western cultures

The Journal then shifts to the issue of nations lacking recognition or legitimacy in Sam Reborsquos ldquoThe lsquoStateless Statersquo Transnistria and the World Overrdquo He offers a glimpse into the unique development of a small Eastern European state Transnistria following the collapse of the Soviet Union Through Transnistria he explores the plight and challenge of ldquostateless statesrdquo

Finally Jessie Brunner evaluates the importance of multilateral treaties in ldquoThe Forgotten Instrument of Foreign Policyrdquo She argues that the United States should play a more active role in shaping international treaties to reassert its commitment to universal human rights

We hope that you enjoy and learn from these articles as we have and that further research is conducted in these areas More information and our archives can be found on the web athttpsjirstanfordedu

Sophie Wiepking-Brown lsquo14 and Tony Liu lsquo15Editors-in-Chief

ͶȁʹͲͳͶ

Table of ContentsSociety in Crisis Addressing Educational Links to Religiously Motivated Violence in Pakistan

ϐ

Chinese Muckrakers Investigative Journalism Censorship and Reform

The New Face of Depression Addressing the Stigmatization of Mental Illness in Japan and Beyond

The ldquoStateless Staterdquo Transnistria and the World Over

Multilateral Treaties The ForgottenInstrument of Foreign Policy13

p 6

p 15

p 44

p 38

p 32

p 22

Spring 2014 | Volume XV | Issue 1

ȁͳȁͷ

On August 11 1947 Pakistanrsquos founder and ϐ ǡ 13 Pakistani Constituent Assembly ldquoWe are starting in the days where there is no discrimination no distinction between one community and another no discrimination between one caste or creed and anotherhellip You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the Staterdquo1 Jinnahrsquos vision of tolerance for all religions and religious minorities has not been realized in modern Pakistan where thousands of lives are lost to religiously motivated violence every year ldquoExtremism Watchrdquo published by the Jinnah Institute in Pakistan reports the following for the week of November 26 to December 1 alone a bomb explosion in Karachi a Hazara Shrsquoia man killed in Quetta attacks on two schools (one bombed and the other torched) a young couple Ǣϐfollowing day in subsequent sectarian attacks2 Sectarian interreligious and terrorist violence are premeditated actions they are the product of

Society in CrisisAddressing Educational Links to Religiously

Motivated Violence in Pakistan

ȁʹͲͳͶ

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

a doctrine that is rooted in intolerance and preaches a militant response to those who hold different religious beliefs Since these are learned behaviors ϐ a person conforms to this doctrine and commits violent acts in its name Education shapes the lens through which a person views the world and the values disseminated by a curriculum are reinforced through years of study In order to address the problem of religiously motivated violence of Pakistan it is necessary to examine the countryrsquos educational institutions and the forces that have ϐǤmadrassahs foster intolerant mindsets in a handful of cases they have produced destructive religious extremism the most well known examples of which are the terrorist groups Al-Qaeda and the Taliban The consequent violence threatens the safety of Pakistanrsquos citizens and prohibits the realization of a peaceful progressive nation

ĊĈĊēęĎĘęĔėĞǣĊēĊėĆđĎĆĆēĉčĊĔěĎĊęǦċČčĆēĆė To understand the modern public school and madrassah it is important to discuss the 1980s a period when internal and external political forces drastically altered the landscape of education in Ǥ ǦǦǡ ϐAli Bhutto in the 1977 military coup carried out a program of reforms known as ldquoIslamizationrdquo in an effort to establish a more ideological state Zia set out to Islamize all aspects of Pakistani society including the civil service the armed forces public morals research organizations science and technology and the educational system3 At the 1977 educational ǡ ϐ Pakistani education ldquoour curriculum must ensure that our children are brought up educated as good Pakistanis and good Muslims They must imbibe the lofty ideals and principles of Islamrdquo4 New curricula

Marilyn Harris is a sophomore majoring in Management Science amp Engineering She is passionate about security studies and hopes to use this major to bring technical insight into her excitement for history and politics An enthusiast for all things Russian she is particularly interested in the future of nuclear deterrence in the Eurasian and South Asian space She is very grateful to Dr Syed Rifaat Hussein who introduced her to South Asia and the politics of the region through his seminar last fall as a visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) This paper is the culmination of her work for his class

ȁͳȁ

guidelines were put in place and Islamiyat or Islamic studies was made compulsory This policy affected public schools in particular because madrassashsmdashreligious seminariesmdashalready focused their teachings almost solely on the study of Islam Islamization impacted madrassahs in a different manner Ziarsquos policy in conjunction with the Soviet-Afghan war radicalized the madrassahs and transformed them into a political tool used by both international and internal actors When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the event posed several serious geopolitical

EDUCATIONAL LINKS TO VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

problems the US feared the further spread of the ϐǢǡSoviet Unionrsquos strategic ties with India worried about encirclement Thus both were eager to aid ǡ ϐ taken refuge in Northern Pakistan in their war against the Soviet invaders Madrassahs were adopted as an instrument in achieving these ends and became the recruiting base for Muslims worldwide to join a war that was phrased as a battle between the ldquoMuslim world and the godless communistsrdquo5

At the same time Zia exacerbated the pre-existing latent tensions between the various Islamic sects in the country Pakistan has four main religious sects the Deobandi Barelvi Ahl-e-Hadith Jamat-i-Islami (all of which are Sunni) and the Shirsquoa Zia favored the Deobandi sect politically giving its scholars positions in the government and designating Sunni Islam (to which the Deobandi sect belongs to) the countryrsquos preferential denomination Zia also instituted a zakat a voluntary religious tax that the countryrsquos Shirsquoa Muslims staunchly opposed6 The religious makeup of Pakistanrsquos neighboring countries and political developments in the region also impacted relations among the sects The Iranian Revolution which brought a Shirsquoa government to power in Iran in 1979 heighted Shirsquoa sectarian consciousness within neighboring Pakistan and encouraged the sectrsquos aspirations for ϐsupport Hoping to counteract this surge of Shirsquoa activity Sunni Saudi Arabia began to fund the Ahl-e-Hadith sect The Shirsquoa bid for more political power provoked a violent reaction from the Deobandis who founded the militant political party Sawad-e-Azammdashtoday known as Millat-i-Islami or SSPmdashin 19857 Throughout the Soviet-Afghan war the sects ϐǡfundmdashwhich directly funded madrassahsmdashand Ǧ ϐ ϐthe mujahedeen In attempts to increase their share of the funds sectarian parties enlisted madrassah students in annihilating other opposing sects8 After the end of the war the Pakistani government neglected to curb the extremist schools of thought ϐsince

ĚćđĎĈĈčĔĔđĘ The problems facing Pakistani public schools provide a framework for understanding how education promotes intolerance the starting point from which violence can emerge Because most students in Pakistan attend public school this ϐon to the Pakistani madrassah and the madrassahsrsquo ties to sectarianism According to the 2011-2012 Economic Survey of Pakistan nearly 28 million students are enrolled in 222000 mainstream public educational institutions at the pre-primary primary middle and high school level9 Public

Source Ronald de Hommel uploaded on Flickr

Religion and secular class for girls in Lahore Pakistan taught in a madrasa a type of school-ing where 13 or Pakistani youth are educated

schools educate the majority of the Pakistani population under 15 and the 2001 census of Pakistan reveals that nearly 70 percent of the population never surpass the middle level of education (up to Class 10) with 484 percent of the population never continuing education after primary school10 The Economic Survey likewise ϐ ǡ ͳͻǤͷ students enrolled in primary school with a steep drop in middle school enrollment (down to 57 million students) Thus the values imparted to students and the portrayal of what it means to be a member of a Muslim state have a wide-reaching effect on children of impressionable ages as it is the only formal education they will receive Several recent studies have been conducted to evaluate the problematic contents of public school curricula and textbooks One such study ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo was carried out in 2002 by the Sustainable Policy Development Institute in Islamabad (SDPI) as a response to the revised curriculum issued by the Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of Education in the same year The study examined subjects that offered the greatest opportunity for political or ideological manipulation Social Studies English Urdu and Civics for Classes 1 through 12 Another study ldquoConnecting the Dots Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistanrdquo was conducted by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom and published in 2011 It evaluated both public school and madrassah curricular texts and used one-on-one and group interviews to assess the attitudes of teachers and students towards religious minorities violence and jihad Rather than preparing children to be enquiring critically thinking members of society these studies showed that public school curricula and pedagogy today indoctrinates children to hold prejudicial views against minorities and ϐǤ The SDPI study found that the presence of ldquoperspectives that encourage prejudice bigotry and discrimination towards fellow citizens especially women and religious minorities and other towards nationsrdquo were among the key faults with textbooks11 The most frequent examples were comments referencing Hindus Pakistani history lessons which largely overlooked Hindu ǡ ϐ

statements such as ldquoHindu has always been an enemy of Islamrdquo or presented false or incomplete versions of historical events particularly with regards to partition12 ldquoThe Hindus and the Sikhs killed Muslims whenever they were in a minority They burnt their houses and forced them to migrate to Pakistanrdquo read one such Class 8 Punjabi textbook13 The SDPI study ϐ exclude non-Muslim Pakistanis from being citizens ldquoor from even being good human beingsrdquo14 It should then come as no surprise that only 60 percent of Pakistanrsquos public school teachers could correctly identify non-Muslims as citizens Some expressed the notion that non-Muslims possessed rights of citizens but to a lesser extent ldquoNon-Muslims are also Pakistani citizens however their citizenship is not equivalent to Muslims and this is why they are referred to as lsquominorityrsquordquo said one Sindh public school teacher15 Many public school teachers had never met a non-Muslim or had only interacted with religious minorities on a very limited basis However many teachers reported still trying to teach respect for and proper treatment of religious minorities even though it was not part of their syllabi16

ϐ student perspectives Like their teachers students struggled to correctly identify religious minorities as citizens Some were skeptical of the positive role religious minorities could play in Pakistan while others believed that minorities could successfully contribute to the development of Pakistan17 In terms of interaction with religious minorities student opinions ranged from tolerant (ldquoThey are just like Muslims and there are no differencesrdquo ldquoThey are like our brothersrdquo) to intolerant (ldquoThey are mad because they worship idolsrdquo ldquoI donrsquot feel good eating with non-Muslimsrdquo) Less than 50 percent of the interviewed students had non-Muslim friends often they simply did not know any religious minorities or were under societal pressure not to befriend them18

ǲ ǳ ϐ manner in which educational materials treated violence and jihad as an area of concern ldquoThe ϐthey were sacrosanct and above criticism Indeed the overall effect of the ideological lessons is to make Islam reinforce and legitimize both Pakistani nationalism and militarizationrdquo19 A Grade 5 Punjab social studies text underscored the necessity of

ͺȁʹͲͳͶ


protecting Pakistan and its status as an Islamic state ldquoTo keep the Islamic identity and existence it is necessary for our country to safeguard religion and its values Pakistan is the only country which came into being in the name of Islamrdquo20 It was not explicitly stated that the only way to safeguard Pakistan was through violence but in the context of other curricular material and the treatment of the idea of jihad students could certainly come to associate the preservation of the nationrsquos Islamic identity with armed struggle The SDPI study found that jihad was a recurring core concept in the curriculum with learning outcomes centered on educating students on and promoting jihad21

While public perception often equates jihad with terrorism and extremism jihad can be interpreted to mean simply ldquostrugglerdquo even an internal struggle against onersquos impulses to do harm to oneself and other human beings22 In this sense promoting jihad would be an encouragement towards moral betterment for students However jihad is also used to refer Ǣ ϐǲǳϐas problematic All the public school teachers interviewed believed that jihad referred to violent struggle ldquocompulsory for Muslims to engage in against the enemies of Islamrdquo Only ten percent of teachers extended this meaning to include non-violent struggle as well23 The views of students largely mirrored those of their instructors Out of the students interviewed many phrased their ǲǳǲϐǳagainst either the enemies of Islam or non-Muslims One tenth grade boy in KPK explicitly stated that Kashmir Afghanistan and Waziristan were all places for jihad where ldquoMuslims were oppressedrdquo24 A small minority of students as with the teachers described jihad as having broader connotations as well ldquoJihad is of several kindsmdashit means to promote education and health It also means to seek control over oneself And it also means to protect onersquos countryrdquo said one male student from KPK25 However the overwhelming conclusion of ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo was that ϐ ǡ ǡbeing absorbed and expressed in the thinking of public schools in Pakistan The current practices of public school classrooms present a threat primarily because

ȁͳȁͻ


of the narrow worldview they present to students Pakistani children are exposed to educational ϐa negative prejudicial view of religious minorities since many do not continue their education past primary school the historical record of their country and the worldview presented to them by their instructors during those brief years is the main conception of Pakistan they take into adulthood ϐSDPI study and ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo is that hate and intolerance can become a learned habit Rather than fostering democratic and open mindsets the authors of the SDPI study worry that ldquothe minds

that have been taught to hate do not have always to hate the enemy they have been told to hate they can create lsquothe otherrsquo from amongst themselves and exercise violence against anyone even against their own countrymen Violence comes naturally to those to whom the military and the use of force ϐǤǳ26 The Brookings Institutionrsquos 2010 report ldquoBeyond Madrasasrdquo notes that of the militants who came out of a madrassah most also attended public school27 Public schools clearly

According to The Subtle Subversion and Connecting the Dots public school curricula promulgate a limit-ed conception of jihad which is contributing to reli-ϔǤ


propagate a militant interpretation of jihad that encourages violence against enemies of Islammdashwith 80 percent of teachers considering non-Muslims enemies28 This contributes to the potential for the latent intolerant attitude of a public school-educated youth to manifest itself in violent actions towards non-Muslim minorities

ĆĉėĆĘĘĆčĘǣĔđĎęĎĈĆđĔĔđċĔė13ĎčĆĉĆēĉĊĈęĆėĎĆēĔĒĎēĆēĈĊ The Arabic word madrassah carries two contemporary meanings In general usage it translates to school but in this context it is an educational institution for the study of Islamic subjects like the Qurrsquoan the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad law and jurisprudence29 Madrassahs provide free education room and board it is often the only accessible form of schooling for Pakistanrsquos poorest classes and thus plays an additional social welfare role30 Madrassahs are not required to register with the government and so it is difficult to pinpoint exact numbers of how many religious seminaries currently exist in Pakistan Official figures for registered madrassahs hover between 12000 and 15000 while estimates including those unregistered often exceed 2000031 At between 15 and 2 million students enrollment estimates are much lower for madrassahs than public schools

ĚėėĎĈĚđĆĆēĉęęĎęĚĉĊĘ The Dars-i-Nizami the standard curricula used today in Pakistani madrassahs dates back to the early 1700s The Dars emphasizes grammar law and philosophy providing more practical training for prospective lawyers judges and administrators All madrassahs in Pakistan use the Dars today but instruction is tailored to the particular madhab of the sect to which the madrassah belongs Studies are supplemented with other modern texts and more recently the study of secular subjects such as mathematics and computers32 The flaws found in madrassah curricula by the ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo survey are largely due to the fact that the texts used by the Dars are extremely old most of them were originally written between the 11th and 14th centuries They not only reflect the religious scholarship of the day but

the conditions of the society in which they were produced The teachings on murtids or those who have turned away from Islam instruct that the deserters should be arrested and subsequently killed either immediately or in some cases after a three-day grace period33 The world presented in these older texts lacks concepts like nations armies and constitutional legality and thus it is difficult to reconcile it with modern realities such as the fact that Pakistani law recognizes religious minorities as equal citizens with constitutionally protected rights34

The madrassah students interviewed in the ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo survey expressed a wide range of opinions on religious minorities On the whole student opinion was more favorable towards religions of the bookmdashChristianity and Judaismmdashversus Hinduism and Ahmadi (Ahmadi is a branch of Islam that is viewed as illegitimate by other Muslim sects) The majority of students expressed the opinion that ldquoIslam taught them to respect and behave well toward religious minoritiesrdquo35 Many unlike their public school counterparts considered religious minorities to be Pakistani citizens with some even recognizing that non-Muslims had equal rights (whether or not these were actually recognized by the government) As in public school curricula rhetoric that glorified violence and presented a limited view of jihad was also found Textbooks often cited the verse ldquokill the pagans [or infidels or unbelievers] wherever you find themrdquo and in every textbook reviewed jihad was reduced to violent conflict with no wider meaning of personal development However the students expressed views on jihad that were also more nuanced than those of their public school peers While jihad was viewed as an obligation of every Muslim one student noted ldquojihad can be done with pen as well as through speechrdquo37 Despite this ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo found that although there was a clear understanding of nonviolent jihad its predominant meaning just as in public schools was to fight This tendency towards violence was also reflected in a 2003 study conducted by Tariq Rahman on militant attitudes among student groups from different types of educational institutions When asked what Pakistanrsquos priorities should be in solving the Kashmir conflict 60 percent of students supported

ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ


taking Kashmir away from India by open war 53 percent supported taking Kashmir away from India by supporting jihadi groups and 34 percent supported addressing the Kashmir problem through peaceful means only Out of all the groups surveyed Rahman found that the madrassah students were the most intolerant in their worldview and that they were the most supportive of an aggressive foreign policy38

ĊĈęĆėĎĆēĎĘĒ Nevertheless the militancy associated with madrassashs is not solely the product of curriculum because unlike Pakistani public schools madrassahs play a complex role in national sectarian politics Since the first madrassahs appeared in the 700s different madhab or schools of thought have emerged over the centuries39 These madhab manifest themselves in modern-day Pakistan as four main religious sects Deobandi Barelvi Ahl-e-Hadith Jamat-i-Islami (all of which are Sunni) and Shirsquoa The sects exert influence over the madrassahs through five Waqat boards the organizational structure under which the religious seminaries are organized The boards primarily serve a political purpose lobbying for madrassah interests at the national level and furthering their sectarian interests within society Their secondary purpose is to attend to curriculum design examinations and the awarding of sanads or diplomas without being registered to a specific board a madrassah cannot confer degrees on their students40

Recent history naturalized violence within Pakistani society As previously mentioned throughout the Soviet-Afghan War sects turned to madrassahs for foot soldiers to annihilate their opponents and secure political dominance Militant groups that have flourished as a result of this violent pivot include the Deobandi Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammat the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Jundullah all of which have ties to the Pakistan Taliban and receive funding from the terrorist organization41 Madrassahs now serve as a tool of indoctrination for Pakistani sects rather than institutions of Islamic learning that promote reasoned debate and critical thoughtful scholarship In some cases madrassahs have been enlisted to

ȁͳȁͳͳ


violent sectarian struggles An empirical case study on Ahmedpur East published in 2009 is one of the few detailed examinations of the link between madrassahs and sectarian violence In Ahmedpur East a region of nearly one million people madrassah involvement in sectarianism was evaluated using several indicators a) if the madrassah hosted visits by sectarian leaders whose documented speeches have in the past incited violence b) if students participated in sectarian processions as documented by police authorities c) if the madrassah management lobbied for or provided leadership on sectarian issues (ie distributing materials at the school giving sermons at the adjoining mosques) and d) if managers or students of the madrassahs were involved in reported sectarian crimes The study found that out of 363 madrassas Deobandi and Shirsquoa madrassahs had high rates of involvement in sectarianism (80 percent and 70 percent respectively)42 Involvement by the other two sects was much lower Deobandis comprised 46 percent of the madrassas in Ahmedpur East while Shirsquoa madrassahs accounted for three percent43 More data is necessary to measure the extent of madrassah involvement in sectarian violence but it is evident that a portion of madrassah students are being brought into the folds of sectarianism at a young age and they are participating in violent acts against other sects that only serve to deepen and perpetuate grievances

ĔēĈđĚĘĎĔē The faults in Pakistanrsquos education sector pose both long- and short-term concerns to the countryrsquos national security The most immediate is the threat posed by sectarian violence which has killed more than 4000 people with over 8000 injuries since 198944 This does not include the fatalities due to terrorist violence which have claimed the lives of 5882 civilians security force personnel and terrorists in the past year alone45 Violence is not isolated to particular corner of Pakistan with attacks occurring throughout the countrymdashespecially in Balochistan and Sindh provinces While attacks were once solely religiously based the past few months have seen a rise in attacks against ethnic Hazaras whose Asiatic features are their only distinguishing factor As this shift in targeted groups shows in the longer term this civil violence

generation of militant jihadis endangering not only Pakistanis but also any and all global enemies of the terrorist organization Reforming both the public and madrassah educational institutions is critical to addressing the civil crisis Pakistan faces today

ēĉēĔęĊĘ1Jinnah ldquoMr Jinnahrsquos Presidential Addressrdquo2Jinnah Institute ldquoExtremism Watchrdquo3Ali Islam and Education 304Riaz Faithful Education 101 5Ibid 1056Ibid 109-107Ibid8Ibid 1109Government of Pakistan ldquoPakistan Economic Survey 2011-2012rdquo10Rahman Denizens of Alien Worlds 1211Nayyar and Salim ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo vi12Ibid 2113Rahman Denizens of Alien Worlds 2914Nayyar and Salim ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo vi15Hussain and Salim ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo 6016Ibid 6517Ibid 8518Ibid 87-8819Nayyar and Salim ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo 6520Hussain and Salim ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo 4621Nayyar and Salim ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo 8022Ali Islam and Education 6923Hussain and Salim ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo 5724Ibid 9125Ibid 9226Nayyar and Salim ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo 79-8027Graff and Winthrop ldquoBeyond Madrasasrdquo 2728Ibid 8029Ali Islam and Education 1530Ibid31Ibid 2532Rahman Denizens of Alien Worlds 81-333Hussain and Salim ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo 50-234Ibid 5335Ibid 9836Ibid 5537Ibid38Rahman Denizens of Alien Worlds 93 39Riaz Faithful Education 5440Ibid 8041Yusuf ldquoSectarian Violencerdquo

threatens to be come more indiscriminate The SDPI study authors noted ldquothe minds that have been taught to hate do not have always to hate the enemy they have been told to hate they can create lsquothe otherrsquo from amongst themselves and exercise violence against anyone even against their own countrymenrdquo46 A September 2012 study on sectarian violence by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre raises several concerns ϐǡordinary citizens second sectarian organizations may ldquoembrace larger mandates and launch attacks against the Pakistani government state security forces and Western targetsrdquo47 Although other political social and economic factors contribute to this problem the fact remains that these attacks are by and large driven by religious differences which have been exacerbated for decades by educational curricula that instructs children to treat ldquothe otherrdquo with hostility rather than tolerance A solution to the problem of sectarian violence would thus have to address this problem ϐ in schools ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo outlined a series of policy recommendations and suggested curricular changes for the government In 2006 revised curricular guidelines were created but new textbooks incorporating substantial revisions were never published48 Thus the problem is not with external forces but with a failure on the part of the Ministry of Education itself to invest in public education Pakistanrsquos educational problem is a national security concern Acceptance of and cooperation with religious minorities is tantamount to addressing a contentious point of ϐǤWhen schools underscore the differences rather than similarities between Hindus and Muslims and distort the facts of their historical interaction in South Asia children imbibe a narrow intolerant mindset that does little to change the paradigm of suspicion and animosity between Pakistan and India Letting sectarian violence run unchecked resigns the country to an existence disrupted by ǡ ǡ ϐ ǤAllowing religious sects to manipulate madrassahs ϐorganizations like the Taliban to continue operating and passing on their extremist rhetoric to the next

ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ


42Ali Islam and Education 53

43Ibid 4744South Asia Terrorism Portal ldquoSectarian Violencerdquo45 South Asia Terrorism Portal ldquoFatalities in Terrorist Violencerdquo46Nayyar and Salim ldquoThe Subtle Subversionrdquo 79-8047Yusuf ldquoSectarian Violencerdquo48Hussain and Salim ldquoConnecting the Dotsrdquo 13

ĎćđĎĔČėĆĕčĞAli Saleem H ǣ ϔ

Conformity in Pakistanrsquos Madrassahs Karachi Oxford University Press 2009

Graff Corinne and Rebecca Winthrop ldquoBeyond Madrasas Assessing the Link Between Education and Militancy in Pakistanrdquo The Brookings Institution Accessed December 10 2012 httpwwwbrookingseduresearchp a p e r s 2 0 1 0 0 6 p a k i s t a n - e d u c a t i o n -winthrop

Hussain Azhar and Ahmad Salim ldquoConnecting the Dots Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistanrdquo Washington United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2011 Accessed November 27 2012 httppurlfdlpgovGPOgpo30312

Jinnah Muhammad Ali ldquoMr Jinnahrsquos presidential address to the Constituent Assembly August 11 1947rdquo Government of Pakistan Accessed December 7 2012 httpwwwpakistaniorgpakistan legislationconstituent_address_11aug1947html

Jinnah Institute ldquoExtremism Watchrdquo Jinnah Institute Accessed December 10 2012 httpwwwjinnah-instituteorgissuesextremism-watch

Ministry of Finance ldquoPakistan Economic Survey 2011-2012 Educationrdquo Government of Pakistan Accessed December 7 2012 httpǤϐǤǤȀͳͳͳʹǤǤ

Nayyar AH and Ahmad Salim comp ldquoThe Subtle Subversion The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistanrdquo Islamabad Sustainable Development Policy Institute 2002 Accessed November 27 2012 httpwwwsdpiorgpublicationspublication_details-286-34html

Rahman Tariq Denizens of Alien Worlds A Study of Education Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan Karachi Oxford University Press 2004

Riaz Ali Faithful Education Madrassahs in South Asia New Brunswick Rutgers University Press 2008

South Asia Terrorism Portal ldquoFatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2012rdquo South Asia Terrorism Portal Accessed December 7 2012 httpwwwsatporgsatporgtpcountriespakistandatabasecasualtieshtm

South Asia Terrorism Portal ldquoSectarian Violence in Pakistan 1989-2012rdquo South Asia Terrorism Portal Accessed December 7 2012 httpwwwsatporgsatporgtpcountriespakistandatabasesect-killinghtm

Yusuf Huma ldquoSectarian Violence Pakistanrsquos Greatest Security Threatrdquo Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Accessed November 28 2012 httpwwwpeacebuildingnoRegionsAsiaPakistanPublicationsSectarian-violence-Pakistan-s-greatest-security-threat

ȁͳȁͳ͵


US Gun Control and the Problem of Arms Trafficking

In April 2009 during a visit to Mexico City President Barack Obama announced that there was ldquoa new era of cooperationrdquo between the United States and Mexico1 His words part of a longer speech that addressed Americarsquos own culpability in the horrific drug-related violence that Mexico faced went further than American politicians have historically been willing to go in acknowledging that Mexicorsquos problems are inextricably linked to the policies of the United States Some of the most commonly discussed of these policies include drug regulation and immigration reform but one issue that has received a great deal of attention in recent years is the trafficking of guns Since entering office the Obama administration has emphasized Americarsquos share of the responsibility for the widespread cartel violence within Mexico and has called for bilateral solutions that address issues on both sides of the border However this rhetoric has been followed by very little in the way of action While both countries agree that arms trafficking between the United States and Mexico plays a significant role in enabling cartel violence the American government has proven unable or unwilling to turn that understanding

into meaningful reform The politicization of gun control makes it an issue that is nearly impossible to address even in regard to domestic problems let alone out of concern for a neighboring country Over time the Obama administration has seemed to move further away from its initial bold statements making it increasingly unlikely that a solution to the problem of arms trafficking will be found at the federal level


Cara Reichard is a junior majoring in political science She is interested broadly in international relations and more WTIGMAacuteGEPP] MR MWWYIW SJ LYQER VMKLXW ERHdemocratic development She spent this past summer on campus working in the Political Science Summer Research College and most recently she spent this fall quarter studying abroad in the Bing Overseas Studies Program in Paris This paper was originally written for a political science course entitled ldquoOrganized Crime and Democracy in Latin Americardquo

ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ

6RXUFHKWWSAgraveLFNUFRPSKRWRV1

Mexican Marines in combat against a drug cartel

ȁͳȁͳͷ

ĎĔđĊēęėĎĒĊĎēĊĝĎĈĔ Putting aside for a moment the question of responsibility there can certainly be no question that the past decade has seen a sharp spike in the levels of violence within Mexico times ϐin December 2006 he declared for all intents and purposes an all-out war against the drug cartels unsurprisingly the cartels decided ϐ Ǥ timesǯ met with intense resistance from the cartels in the form of increased militarization which moved them to use guns not only for targeted assassination but also as tools for war against the government and against each other2 By the timesϐǡͳͲͲǡͲͲͲhad been murdered approximately half as a result of drug-related violence3 Between 2005 and 2010 homicide rates in Mexico increased by 65 percent4

One cannot study the consequences of gun violence in Mexico however without questioning its source Mexico itself has highly

trade That is to say it has focused its efforts on the elimination of drug supplies within Mexico to the exclusion of all other aspects of the cross-border drug trade This policy has consistently used force and aggression in an attempt to undermine the cartelsmdasha tactic that while achieving short terms successes like the temporary eradication ϐǡproven unable to enact lasting change A change in rhetoric accompanying Obamarsquos election seemed ϐwilling to look beyond these supply-side solutions and acknowledge Americarsquos own role in the perpetuation of the drug trade a role that includes ϐ ϐ weaponry for the cartels In 2009 during a visit to Mexico then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton blamed a failure in US anti-narcotics policy for the spike in violence within Mexico over the past few years pointing out that among other things ldquoOur inability to prevent weapons from being illegally smuggled across the border to arm these criminals causes ϐǡǤǳ6 That same year in a joint press conference with Calderoacuten Obama stated ldquoThis war is being waged with guns purchased not here but in the United States More than 90 percent of the guns recovered in Mexico come from the United Statesrdquo7 That ldquo90 percentrdquo has become a widely declared statistic a rallying point for those advocating increased gun controlmdashthough the accuracy of the number itself is suspect an issue that will be addressed shortly The larger issue however is that no matter how promising this ldquoAmerica-at-faultrdquo rhetoric might seem it is only meaningful in its indication of a policy shift to comemdashyet the bluntness of these statements was followed by little in the way of ǯ ϐ ǡand signs indicate that he has begun moving even ϐhis second term

čĊĞęčĔċͻͲĊėĈĊēęǫĔđĊĎēęčĊ ĊĝĎĈĆēėĒĘėĔćđĊĒ The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is a government agency whose mission includes the prevention of ldquoillegal ϐ ϐǤǳ8 One of the jobs

restrictive gun laws Being in possession of high-caliber weapons is illegal and the Ministry of National Defense runs the only authorized retail Ǥ ǡ ϐalternate sources of weapons and all signs ϐone Despite the evidence regarding cartelsrsquo use of arms American drug policy has historically focused on the supply side of the US-Mexico drug

ARMS TRAFFICKING BETWEEN US AND MEXICO

ϔan illegal weapons smuggling ring in Arizona

6RXUFHKWWSZZZLFHJRYLPDJHVQHZVUHOHDVHVSKRHQL[BVPMSJ

it undertakes in the advancement of this goal is tracing weapons that are recovered from criminals in Mexico and turned over to the Bureau by the Mexican government The ldquo90 ǳ ϐ ϐ the results of these traces but a closer look at the statistic shows that it is likely misleading In ʹͲͲͺǡϐ30000 weapons from criminals within Mexico Of these only about 7200 or 24 percent were passed along to the ATF for tracing Out of those the ATF was only able to actually trace about 4000 Approximately 87 percent of these 4000 weapons were demonstrated to have originated in the United States9

In total the guns that were traced back to the United States made up less than 12 percent of the guns seized in Mexico that year At the same time that 12 percent cannot be said to constitute an accurate sample of the total number of guns in Mexico for many of the weapons that were not turned over to the ATF were almost certainly not of American origin ldquoThere are some classes of weaponshellipwhich make very little sense for the Mexicans to pass to the ATF for tracing since they obviously are not from the United Statesrdquo10 When analyzed closely 90 percent is almost certainly too high a percentage to be an accurate representation of the share of Mexican weapons that originate in the United States Given the large number of unknown variables however the real number is impossible to determine ϐǡleft only with the undeniable fact that American ϐrecovered by Mexican authoritiesmdashthough admittedly a fairly sizeable one Yet even if 90 percent were taken as the true number those in opposition to increased gun regulation can easily make the argument that while the United Statesrsquo proximity to Mexico might make it an ϐǡno means the only option As the cartels grow in power and wealth in an increasingly globalized world it becomes both easier and cheaper than ever before to turn to other international markets11 Despite the highly restrictive gun laws of Mexico itself weapons within Latin America many of them remnants of the Cold War have

become increasingly accessible to the cartels as ǯ ϐ ǡ Central and South America12 At the same time as a result of rampant corruption within the ǡ ϐwithin Mexico itself often end up in the hands of the cartels While Mexico has a relatively small defense budget compared to many of its neighbors ldquoit nonetheless imports millions of dollarsrsquo worth of war material annually Corruption drains some ϐ Ǥǳ13 Meanwhile extensive desertion from the Mexican military is also a major problem for the government and ϐ ϐǡdeserters can make themselves desirable to new employers (ie drug lords) if they arrive with their government-issued weapons in tow14

All of this proves that even if the United States were able to seal off its border with Mexico entirely the cartels would continue to have access

to guns in one way or another It comes down to the balance between supply and demandmdashthe cartels are powerful enough that as long as they ϐǡ ϐ obtain them The ease of supply however cannot be ignored and what these alternative sources of weapons do not disprove is that the gun control policy of the United States the country that serves as the most convenient source of weaponry for the cartels has a meaningful effect on the prevalence of these weapons in Mexico and the subsequent rates of violent crime The relationship between the twomdashUS gun policy and Mexican crime ratesmdash



ͳȁʹͲͳͶ

President Pentildea Nieto discusses issue of arms traf-ϔ -dent Obama

ȁͳȁͳ

can be seen perhaps most clearly through an examination of the recent expiration of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban in the United States

čĊĘĘĆĚđęĊĆĕĔēĘĆē A particularly contentious piece of policy the Federal Assault Weapons Ban was a ten-year bill that expired in 2004 The authors of ldquoCross-Border Spillover US Gun Laws and Violence in Mexicordquo analyze the effect that the expiration of the ban had on crime rates in Mexico Notably this timesϐǡthat its effects can be analyzed distinctly from the effects on crime rates due to Calderoacutenrsquos policy changes Additionally the fact that California maintained its own state-level assault weapons ban even after the expiration of the federal bill allows the experiment an important point of comparison The authorsrsquo research ultimately shows that the assault weapons ban did in fact have a tremendous impact on the rates of violent crime in Mexico especially in border towns According ϐǡ ǲ ȏ Ȑinduced 60 more homicides in municipios at the non-California entry ports as compared with municipios 100 miles away [from the border] and caused at least 239 additional deaths annuallyrdquo15 These numbers are not trivial and they stand as Ǧϐbetween US gun policy and Mexican crime rates In an address to Congress in 2010 President Calderoacuten recognizing this connection asked that lawmakers direct their efforts towards ϐ ǡ that they consider the reinstatement of the assault weapons ban He added ldquoI understand that the purpose of the Second Amendment is to guarantee good American citizens the ability to defend themselves and their nation But believe me many of these guns are not going to honest American handsrdquo16

Calderoacutenrsquos acknowledgement here of the inevitable pro-gun opposition that such a suggestion would face in Congress is an indication of the US governmentrsquos inability to make or change gun control policy based on Mexicorsquos internal problems even when the resulting ϐǤǲǦ

Border Spilloverrdquo suggest all evidence points to a ldquoclear policy implication that stricter control of guns in the US could help curb rising violence in Mexico which ties directly into the current contentious ϐǦborderrdquo17

From a normative perspective the fact that US policies are proven to be directly correlated to hundreds of violent deaths in Mexico ought to be enough for an immediate policy shift at the federal Ǥ ϐ stand on the issue of gun control have proven time and time again to be toxic to the accomplishment of any meaningful change in such policy The 2012 shooting in Newtown Connecticut demonstrated that even a domestic tragedymdashone that visibly shook the nation and brought gun control to the forefront of the political agendamdashwas ultimately not enough to overcome the barriers of the pro-gun lobby and the intense politicization of gun control as proven by the defeat of the reform bill in the Senate A sense of neighborly duty towards Mexico then will almost certainly not be enough to get this kind of legislation passed The reality then begs the question of what exactly President Obama meant when he spoke of a ldquonew era of cooperationrdquo That is not to say that he has not taken steps to address the situation ϐ ǡ example he called on Congress to ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing ϐ ȋȌǤ itself is not necessarily indicative of a radically new era howevermdashthe Convention was signed by President Bill Clinton in 1997 and the Senate has failed to ratify it ever since18 As for US gun control reform at the federal level Obamarsquos largest push for that came unsurprisingly in the aftermath of the Newtown shootingmdasha push that while still a work in progress seems to have run out of steam in the ensuing months especially after the defeat of the reform bill So despite the strong rhetoric of the Obama ǯ ϐ ǡ Ǧ partisan politics seem to have once again proven themselves insurmountable obstacles to the enactment of any real gun control reform at the federal level This has left other actors such as the ϐ ǡ ϐϐ


the face of severe limitations ĕĊėĆęĎĔēĆĘęĆēĉĚėĎĔĚĘ In December 2010 US Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was shot and killed near the Arizona-Mexico border In the aftermath of his death as the details were pieced together an astonishing truth emerged Not only were the guns that were recovered at the crime scene American guns but they were weapons that the ATF had knowingly allowed to cross the border to drug cartels inside Mexico19

Operation Fast and Furious as it was called was created by the ATF in 2009 in an attempt to build a strong case against major Mexican drug lords The agency ldquopermitted hundreds of guns to be purchased and retained by suspected straw buyers with the expectation they might cross the border and even be used in crimes while the case was being builtrdquo20 The operation lasted 15 months ͳǡͷ ϐ knowingly allowed to pass from gun dealers to ldquostraw buyersrdquo or people without criminal records who are paid to purchase weapons on othersrsquo behalf Though not entirely unprecedentedmdashsomething very similar though on a much smaller scale had been attempted in 2006 in ldquoOperation Wide Receiverrdquo without much successmdashFast and Furious was born from the desire of the ATF to produce more substantial results than their limited resources generally allowed ldquoThe aim of Fast and Furious was to investigate and not as the ATF had grown accustomed to interdict Instead of arresting the so-called lsquostraw purchasersrsquohellipFast and Furious called for agents to surveil them and ϐǡpawns and to the large playersrdquo21

When the details of Fast and Furious became public it created a political scandalmdashnot only because guns involved in the operation were turning up at the scenes of crimes against American agents but also because the ATF had lost ϐlet ldquowalkrdquo across the border and into the hands of the cartels22

Fast and Furious was therefore portrayed ϐǡmany ways it probably was The premise of Fast and Furious however was not without merit and it is important to look at what the operation says about the position that the ATF had found

itself in There is no law in the United States that ϐȄ agencyrsquos mission to prevent it As a result the ATF a ǡϐby government policies in its efforts to follow through on its job description forced to prosecute Ǧϐ ǲ Ǧsmuggling laws US attorneys in Arizona for years refused to help the ATF build gun cases knowing prosecutions would likely result in at best minor sentences for straw purchasers who buy guns for criminal organizations but have no impact beyond thatrdquo23 With this in mind it is no wonder that the ATF was looking for ways to expand its reach The laws and regulations at work within the United States make it nearly impossible for the agency to reach the key players in the arms and drug trades limiting the agency instead to going after dispensable actors such as the straw purchasers By creating Operation Fast and Furious the ATF was hoping to move beyond these small-time playersmdashwhose arrests have no affect whatsoever on the illegal industriesmdashand let the weapons lead agents to those most responsible for the violence in Mexico That ldquogunwalkingrdquo is what the ATF resorted to is indicative of the fact that despite the effects of ϐ ǡ be devastating its prevention has not been made a priority in any US policymaking to date With an ϐ Ǧ ǡ are loath to involve themselves in debate on issues of gun control As a result basic reforms that have often been suggested to facilitate the work of the ATF with the potential for real impact continue not to be enacted or even seriously addressed These reforms include laws addressing the inconsistencies regarding background checks that lead to the so-called ldquogun show loopholerdquo the rules regarding bulk ϐǡregistry of guns that would allow the ATF to track ϐǤ Short of contentious policymaking such as the ǡϐϐ ϐ federal government increasing the size of the ATF and the amount of resources directed towards it With about 2500 special agents responsible for keeping track of more than three times that many gun dealers nationwide there is no question that the agency the only one of its kind is stretched far too


ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24

čĊęĆēĈĊĔĉĆĞ President Obama traveled to Mexico in May to meet with President Enrique Pentildea Nieto Unlike Obamarsquos meeting with Calderoacuten in 2009 the two leaders more or less avoided discussion of cartel violence focusing their dialogue instead on the economic relationship between the two nations During the press conference Obama said ldquoWe are very much looking forward to cooperation in any ways we can to battle organized crimerdquo25 When asked about the failed gun control reform bill he ǡǲϐǤǳ26

These are on the surface at least optimistic Ǥǡǡϐof 2009 in which Obama and Clinton eagerly accepted responsibility on behalf of the United States for its role in Mexicorsquos cartel violence and pledged to make domestic changes that would have international impact Some of this is likely due to the change in Mexicorsquos presidency for Pentildea Nieto represents a shift away from Calderoacutenrsquos extreme stance against the cartels Nonetheless ϐ ǡ to have developed a different view of what realistically his administration can accomplish The United States was in uproar following the revelation of Operation Fast and Furious However until such time as the government can get past the politicized nature of gun control and begin to create real and meaningful reform initiatives like Fast and Furiousmdashinitiatives created below the level of federal policymaking in desperate attempts to address with limited resources the very real problems that exist between the United States and Mexicomdashare likely all that we are going to see

ēĉēĔęĊĘ1Stolberg ldquoObama Seeks Curbs on Arms Salesrdquo2Burton et al ldquoMexicordquo3DeLay ldquoHow Not to Arm a Staterdquo 64UNODC Global Study on Homicide 505Dube et al ldquoCross-Border Spilloverrdquo 76Landler ldquoUS Feeds Mexico Drug Traderdquo7Factcheckorg ldquoCounting Mexicorsquos Gunsrdquo8Bureau of Alcohol Firearms Tobacco and Explosives ldquoAbout ATFrdquo9Burton et al ldquoMexicordquo

10Ibid11Castantildeeda ldquoWhatrsquos Spanish for Quagmirerdquo12Burton et al ldquoMexicordquo13DeLay ldquoHow Not to Arm a Staterdquo 1914Ibid15Dube et al ldquoCross-Border Spilloverrdquo 316Sheridan ldquoMexicorsquos Calderoacuten tells Congress he ǤǤϐǤǳ17Dube et al ldquoCross-Border Spilloverrdquo 2318Walser ldquoUS Strategy Against Mexican Drug Cartelsrdquo19Heath et al ldquoATF let hundreds of US weapons fall into hands of suspected Mexican gunrunnersrdquo20Ibid21Verini ldquoMexican Rouletterdquo22Ibid23Ibid24McKinley ldquoUS Stymied as Guns Flowrdquo25Archibold and Shear ldquoObama Arrives in Mexican Capitalrdquo26Ibid

ĎćđĎĔČėĆĕčĞArchibald Randal and Michael Shear ldquoObama

Arrives in Mexican Capital to Meet with New Leaderrdquo New York Times May 2 2013

Booth William and Steve Fainaru ldquoUS Mexico align against common foe brutal narcotics traderdquo Washington Post November 22 2009

Bureau of Alcohol Firearms Tobacco and Explosives ldquoAbout ATFrdquo httpwwwatfgovcontentAboutabout-atf

Burton Fred and Scott Stewart ldquoMexico Economics and the Arms Traderdquo Stratfor Global Intelligence July 9 2009

Castantildeeda Jorge ldquoWhatrsquos Spanish for Quagmirerdquo Foreign Policy JanuaryFebruary 2010

Factcheckorg ldquoCounting Mexicorsquos Gunsrdquo Annenberg ǤϐͳǡʹͲͲͻǤhttpwwwfactcheckorg200904counting-mexicos-guns

DeLay Brian ldquoHow Not to Arm a State American Guns and the Crisis of Governance in Mexico Nineteenth to Twenty-First Centuriesrdquo Southern California

Quarterly Vol 95 No 1 (2013)Dube Arindrajit Oeindrila Dube and Omar Garcia

Ponce ldquoCross-Border Spillover US Gun Laws and Violence in Mexicordquo APSA 2012 Annual Meeting


Paper August 13 2012 Feinsten Dianne Charles Schumer and Sheldon ǡǲǤǤϐto Mexico A Report to the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Controlrdquo June 2011

Goodman Colby and Michel Marizco ldquoUS ϐǣInsights Illuminate Key Trends and Challengesrdquo 2010 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Heath David John Solomon and Gordon Witkin ldquoATF let hundreds of US weapons fall into hands of suspected Mexican gunrunnersrdquo The Center for Public Integrity March 3 2011

Landler Mark ldquoClinton Says US Feeds Mexico Drug Traderdquo New York Times March 25 2009

McKinley James ldquoUS Stymied as Guns Flow to Mexican Cartelsrdquo New York Times April 15 2009

Sheridan Mary Beth ldquoClinton US Drug Policies Failed Fueled Mexicorsquos Drug Warrdquo Washington Post March 26 2009

Sheridan Mary Beth ldquoDespite Obama pledge Democrats show little enthusiasm for CIFTA ϐǡǳ Washington Post October 21 2010

Sheridan Mary Beth ldquoMexicorsquos Calderoacuten tells ǤǤ ϐ warsrdquo Washington Post May 21 2010

Stolberg Sharyl ldquoIn Mexico Obama Seeks Curbs on Arms Salesrdquo New York Times April 26 2009

Walser Ray ldquoUS Strategy Against Mexican Drug Cartels Flawed and Uncertainrdquo Backgrounder The Heritage Foundation April 26 2010

Verini James ldquoThe Fast and the Ridiculousrdquo Foreign Policy June 27 2012

Verini James ldquoMexican Rouletterdquo Foreign Policy August 30 2011

UNODC Global Study on Homicide Trends Contexts and Data Vienna 2011


ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ

From 1980 to the present Chinarsquos press has been labeled ldquonot freerdquo by the US-backed non-governmental organization Freedom House consistently scoring around 80 on an index where a score of 100 indicates the highest level of oppression This index underscores a familiar perspective on Chinarsquos approach to the media one of repression and control However in the face of the rising complexity of Chinarsquos political and economic environment the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) must carefully balance control with concern for the needs of its constituents As a result the government is attempting to appear more open and attentive This allows for the emergence of a type of journalism in China that is still subject to repressive media controls but is able to navigate Chinarsquos media environment resulting in reports on sensitive issues Despite censorship a myriad of reports detailing corruption scandal and official abuse have been disseminated in recent decades This journalism described as ldquomuck-raking and revelatoryrdquo can be called investigative journalism insofar as it is public interest reporting and challenging traditional strictures of authority1 The occurrence of investigative journalism within a country with an authoritarian government seems impossible Yet Chinese investigative journalism does indeed exist having undergone an evolution from an internal Party evaluation mechanism to

Chinese MuckrakersInvestigative Journalism Censorship and Reform

A Case Study of Caixin Media


a watchdog enforcer holding government officials and private enterprises accountable This paper first asserts that investigative journalism does indeed exist in China albeit in a qualified form and then seeks to explain what factors enable its existence within an authoritarian environment

Lilian Rogers Class of 2013 majored in International Relations at Stanford graduating Phi Beta Kappa and with honors She is currently working in the Government Affairs and Policy department of the American Chamber of Commerce China in Beijing

Source Yao Xu uploaded on Flickr

ĆĎĝĎēĊĉĎĆ To answer the question ldquoWhat explains the existence of investigative journalism in Chinardquo I look ϐǡBeijing named Caixin Media Caixin has been hailed as one the few news organizations in China that does independent reporting The company is able to carry out investigative journalism because of its unique position within Chinarsquos media landscape Unlike state-run media which is naturally ϐǡonly a networking relationship with the government And while Caixin depends on maintaining favorable relationships with government propaganda ϐǡ ǯ government or party posts Editors make their own judgment calls Neither a representative of the Central Propaganda Department nor one from the local propaganda departments work at the organization passing judgment on stories Another feature of Caixin that results in independent reporting is the organizationrsquos efforts to produce professional journalism Professionalism entails adherence to an industry code of conduct For the journalism industry professionalism has generally been interpreted to mean Western reporting standards traditionally emphasizing objectivity and independence For Caixin journalists this means utilizing anonymity and having two sources for every fact Reporters also emphasized choosing their own angles when reporting a story instead of just portraying the government viewpoint or the most popular stance In one example of developing a critical voice a reporter at Caixin recounted how after an earthquake in Yushu Qinghai province reporters on the scene from other media outlets were content with placatory answers ldquoThey just look They donrsquot absorb They donrsquot question and they donrsquot investigate furtherrdquo (Interviewee 1) Caixin reporters on the other hand will keep digging until ϐǤǡone of the most clear-cut characteristics of Caixin as independent media organization is its ownership structure The majority of Caixinrsquos operating budget comes from advertising not state subsidies Caixin also maintains a shareholder ownership structure The newspaper-publishing group Zhejiang Daily Media Group Co Ltd holds 40 percent of Caixinrsquos shares2 The rest are split up among individuals ǤǲǦϐ

businessrdquo not a propaganda arm As Zhan Jiang has commented in regard to Caijing Caixinrsquos predecessor ǲϐSouthern Weekend the censorship rules are expected to be followed strictly but for more independent commercial media like Caijing the limits are more ϐǤǳ3 This is because employees who ϐϐas health insurance and housing subsidies when they Ǥϐamong reporters working at Caixin Reporters often stated that they chose between a comfortable state media job and a job that affords less security but more freedom The average Caixin reporter makes only about 2000 to 3000 yuan (around $500) per month This incentive structure suggests that those in the business of investigative journalism have chosen this career path for deeper reasons than material ϐǤ

13ĔĚėēĆđĎĘęĘǯĆĈęĎĈĘĔėĔěĊėēĒĊēęęėĆęĊČĞǫ Two main schools of thought seek to explain investigative journalism in China One side emphasizes actions by news organizations that allow them to skirt government censors The use of such ldquoguerrilla tacticsrdquo enables news organizations to undertake investigative journalism This position is primarily advanced by media scholar Jingrong Tong who has done extensive work in identifying strategies used by news organizations to carry out independent reporting Other scholars claim that the CCP has allowed investigative journalism because ϐ Ǥ leads this group of arguments that claim seemingly courageous coverage actually serves as a regime-stabilizing mechanism and thus comprises a part of a CCP strategy to stay in power Much of the literature on Chinese journalism addresses the counter-intuitive and paradoxical role that investigative journalism maintains Journalists have been called ldquoorganic intellectuals of the system but with an outsider spiritrdquo4 In many ways investigative journalists in China have occupied a nebulous space of working within the system while simultaneously challenging it In her article ldquoGuerrilla Tactics of Investigative Journalists in Chinardquo Jingrong Tong describes a variety of tactics and strategies journalists use to negotiate what is politically safe and what is professionally desired5 In order for journalists to do the kind of reporting they want ldquothey

CHINESE MUCKRAKERS AND CENSORSHIP

ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵

must engage in a constant problem-solving process during the collection of information and the writing of reports about how best to overcome constraints and to achieve their goals Safely reporting on politically risky events has become a key element of the Chinese journalistrsquos craftrdquo6 Different tactics ranging from the selection of the article theme to the timing of the publication of the piece to the platform it is published on to the word choice used in a story can all aid a news organization in its quest to publish sensitive reports Rather than focusing on how journalists may sneakily challenge the government another body of work claims ldquowatchdogrdquo reporting is actually toothless In a foundational article Zhao describes how watchdog journalism actually serves to strengthen Party power by ldquosmoothing the rough edges of the ongoing Chinese transformation and policing the political economic and social boundaries of an emerging authoritarian market societyrdquo7 She goes on to posit that the presence of investigative reporting is actually a way for the Party to ldquoappeal selectively to the people through the media to achieve its objectives of checking bureaucrats and maintaining its legitimacy for it objective of sustaining long-term rulerdquo8 The Party can use media reports to show sympathy with the public assuring them that their concerns are being heard Investigative reporting also serves as a source of information allowing bureaucrats to ϐǤinvestigative journalist even goes as far as to say ldquoIf you analyze these publications over time you ϐinterests of the momentrdquo with media scholar Hugo de Burgh adding ldquowith the implication that ϐǤǳ9

We are left with two bodies of work that make claims about the state of investigative journalism in China yet the picture remains incomplete One describes how journalists subvert the government and another claims journalists serve the government We lack an approach that synthesizes these two explanations into a more comprehensive explanation We need an understanding of investigative journalism in China that puts these two bodies of work in dialogue ǡ ϐ incorporates them into one description

ĊĘĊĆėĈč I spoke with over 30 different Caixin employees during the summer I spent working there in 2012 In my interviews I asked subjects about their everyday ϐ experiences I interviewed 19 reporters nine mid-level or high-level editors and two interns I also interviewed the heads of advertising for the website and the magazine and the employee in charge of circulation for the magazine The interviews were not recorded and were conducted in Mandarin Chinese For the content analysis of Caixin articles I Ǥϐǡexamples of reporting dating back to when Editor-in-Chief Hu Shuli was working at Caijing during the nineties Prominent examples have been pulled from this earlier stage of reporting primarily from ϐ through interviews A more meticulous sample comprising of Century Weekly (Xin Shiji) Caixinrsquos ϐ ǡ Ǧfashion starting with the issues dating from January 2010 and continuing through December 2011 Finally the most closely articles were drawn from the aforementioned sample yet are unique in the fact that despite being printed in the initial publications they no longer appear in virtual form in the Caixin online archives when searched for in February 2013 It is not clear when these articles were censored from the website if they were self-censored or deleted by the government However the fact that they no longer appear in the archives demonstrates that there is a level of controversy or sensitivity surrounding these particular articles For the time period between January 2010 and December 2011 there are nine such articles

ĔēęĊĝęĚĆđĎğĎēČēěĊĘęĎČĆęĎěĊ13ĔĚėēĆđĎĘĒ Chinese investigative journalism has its roots in the Party structure It did not form independently of the government system instead it was developed and encouraged by the Communist Party Yulun jiandu or supervision by public opinion is viewed as comrade-like criticism or self-criticism within the system10 As Jingrong Tong explains ldquoinvestigative journalism in China is expected reveal the problems and pitfalls within the society in order to correct them rather than challenging the prevailing political system and overthrowing Party rule completelyrdquo11 With the introduction of the concept of yulun jiandu


investigative journalism enjoyed a golden period in the 1990s when changing social conditions created a public desire for investigative journalism However investigative journalism quickly surpassed helpful critiques when journalists began to pursue riskier topics As a result ldquoThe CCP is trying to limit the scope and scale of lsquomedia supervisionrsquo to a manageable level while Chinese journalism is struggling to break through the boundaries the CCPrdquo has set12

Liberalization efforts started by Deng Xiaoping in the eighties are an important piece of the puzzle of Chinese investigative journalism In this initial period of reform there was an impetus for stark changes such as the creation of journalistic laws cuts in state subsidies of press ϐǤ13 Whereas all media had previously been state controlled and state owned new publications that were at least partially privately owned began cropping up As media outlets began to rely on ϐǡǦhitting reports had to be met As long as Chinese citizens demand muckraking with their dollars investigative journalism remains lucrative This is supported by the commercial popularity of evening investigative journalism television shows and the commercial success of newspapers such as Southern Metropolitan Daily Chinese citizens are eager to pay for reporting that goes beyond the surface Things changed however with the Tiananmen Pro-democracy movement in 1989 When students marched upon Tiananmen Square demanding wider freedoms including freedom of the press they were violently suppressed and a wave of retraction occurred in government policies As a result existing control mechanisms were bolstered and stricter regulations were applied to reporting in the country The Chinese government has orchestrated one of the largest coordinated systems of censorship in human history The primary means of government control over Chinese media organizations occurs through the issuing of operating licenses Publishing content without a license is illegal The threat of having a license revoked looms as a Ǥϐϐϐof certain topics Such bans can range from being

ϐǡ a particular protest to being quite broad such as a moratorium on any mention of a certain government agency for example the railway ministry This corporeal threat is tied to an indeterminate pressure to align with certain Party-held opinions and avoid topics that are political landmines King demonstrates that the Chinese ldquocensorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent reinforce or spur social mobilization regardless of contentrdquo14 According to China scholar Perry Link censors pay attention to posts on topics associated with events that have collective action potential regardless of whether they criticize the state or not Sensitive content is not always the primary consideration of the Chinese censorship structure An interviewee at Caixin explained that in her experience there were two ways an article ǣϐȋmentioning protests at Tiananmen Square) or if the article had been re-posted and circulated among a large number of people despite having harmless content (Interviewee 2) Link has also posited that self-censorship is a way for the government to keep news organizations in check Link has likened Chinarsquos censorship system to an ldquoanaconda in the chandelierrdquo15 Link argues that the vagueness of censorship decisions is a far more effective tool of suppression than outright stipulations Journalists would rather err on the side of caution by practicing self-censorship than risk losing their license We have now injected some complexity into the homogenous conception of Chinese media as party mouthpieces The 1990s saw investigative journalism reach its peak as newly commercialized news organizations boldly pursued sensitive issues while a rising China grappled with new challenges Investigative journalism in China is unique from muckraking in the West because it grew out of a desire to help the ruling regime adapt and improve While some investigative journalists viewed themselves as challenging the CCP most conceived of their roles as aiding the CCP in improving its governance Reform ϐof society media included There is potential for the forces of marketization and the professionalization of the industry to bump up against the censorship and control system put in place by the government This system is also more than just a draconian machine that demarcates in black and white what can and


ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ

cannot be published Rather this system thrives on ambiguity and leaves much space for negotiation Enterprising news organizations such as Caixin take advantage of this space and explore whether this leeway is part of an intentional government strategy to enhance its chances of survival

ĚĊėėĎđđĆĆĈęĎĈĘ Chinese news organizations have developed an arsenal of techniques to skirt government censorship The goal of these tactics is to allow news companies to cover sensitive issues without consequence As Hu has stated ldquoI know how to measure the boundary lines We go up to the linemdashand we might even push it But we never cross itrdquo16 Guerrilla tactics facilitate this approach Statements from interviewees as well as an analysis of Caixinrsquos reporting reveal that the company does indeed employ many of these tactics which may be why the company has not yet been shut down What tactics to use how to use them and at what time is crucial ϐǤϐits own strategy through years of trial and error as well as Hursquos knack for making spot-on predictions as to where boundaries lie Using the guerrilla tactics mentioned in existing literature and supplementing these with the tactics mentioned in interviews and article analysis guerrilla tactics can ϐǣǡhaving a business focus writing style techniques use of different channels and organizational makeup An examination of these categories should show the extent to which guerrilla tactics have enabled Caixin to succeed in publishing stories on controversial subjects The tactic of timing is directly related to being in tune with the current political atmosphere Timing involves being able to predict the repercussions of publishing a given story A news organization that uses this tactic might publish a controversial story quickly in order to get it to the public before a ban is put in place Caixin has wholeheartedly embraced and developed this tactic In a talk held at Stanford University Hu Shuli explained how Caixin utilized timing in order to maximize the effect of its coverage of the highly sensitive Wenzhou rail crash story in 2011 As Hu recounts soon after the crash occurred Caixin produced a twenty-page report detailing the background and precursors leading up to the event Caixin reporters had all the preparatory materials

gathered and were waiting for the right time to make use of them They waited for an appropriate opening before revealing all they had uncovered Another tactic that is relatively unique to ϐ Ǥ ǡ ϐ has enjoyed a certain amount of leeway This is ϐ ϐto thrive in China As one interviewee remarked ldquoCaijing focused on the stock market in the beginning because the content was too complex for propaganda ϐ ǳ ȋ ʹͲȌǤ interviewee stated that government restrictions were Ǥ ϐ ǲ government on economic issues and on economic policiesrdquo he said ldquoBut law and international relations are more closely watchedrdquo (Interviewee 34) Business magazines have increasingly leveraged this leeway to branch out into more sensitive topic areas The wiggle room has grown as economic publications have been trusted by the government to cover not ϐ ǣ ǲ ϐ ǮǦϐpressrsquo these independent publications leverage their ȄϐȄǡfunctioning as a watchdog in areas beyond the boundaries of business journalismrdquo17

In her article on guerrilla tactics Jingrong Tong lists several strategies that involve a journalistrsquos writing Ǥ ϐ choice of themes She states ldquojournalists can subvert ϐ most sensitive aspects of banned events and seeking safermdashbut perhaps deepermdashthemes insteadrdquo18 This often involves pointing out larger societal problems ϐǡ ϐ ϐ Ǥ often uses this tactic by writing articles in a tone that seems to imply constructive criticism The idea is that these criticisms and discoveries can be used to help China improve This gives the reports room to take an aggressive tone Another tactic that came up in interviews with Caixin reporters is the use of a variety of channels to maximize the dissemination of sensitive content One channel that Caixin frequently uses is its English-language website and publication The clearest example of this involves a somewhat sensitive editorial Hu Shuli wrote about the trail of Bogu Kailai the


wife of disgraced politician Bo Xilai The editorial criticized the woeful state of the rule of law in China and maligned Chinarsquos corrupt and ineffectual ϐǤǡǯmajority shareholder refused to allow the editorial to published in the Chinese magazine so instead the editorial was packaged as an article and sent to the South China Morning Post The Post refused to publish it as well so eventually Caixin translated the piece into English and posted it on the English website Another important tactic that has to do with different channels is the use of cross-regional reporting yidu jiandu This is when a news organization from one region in China will report on controversial news that occurred in a different region As Cho explains ldquoYidi jiandu leverages the political and administrative gaps that develop when competing power interests come into playrdquo19 More concretely there may be a local ban on reporting a certain event but no national ban For example before the nationwide ban on SARS reporting was issued Caijingrsquos SARS reporting was largely motivated by the dearth of coverage on the important topic This was because propaganda ϐ preventing local reporters from publishing reports There are also aspects of Caixinrsquos organizational structure and its individual staff members that facilitate its bold reporting The company as a whole is liberal and reform-driven which explains its desire to do investigative journalism It is also pro-market and pro-business Caixinrsquos reporters are committed to pointing out problems in both the Chinese economy and society as well as searching for solutions This is important because it serves as an impetus for many of the companyrsquos controversial and risky moves The decision by many news organizations to avoid daring reports can be chalked up to a lack of visionmdashsomething that is absolutely necessary in a hostile media environment like in China The Caixin organizational structure is centered on trusting journalists by giving them the freedom to pursue their own stories Caixin uses the hierarchy of a typical news organization but there is a strong emphasis on a collaborative and equal work environment This type of frankness ϐbecoming easily frustrated

ĔěĊėēĒĊēęęėĆęĊČĞ Though it may seem counter intuitive there are actually many ways in which independent reporting aids the Chinese government Several scholars have ϐ ϐ encourage sensitive reporting as a regime-stabilizing mechanism This accords with the original conception of investigative journalism as yulun jiandu or a tool of self-criticism for the Party However these works have updated the concept to apply to Chinarsquos modern authoritarian state There are two main purposes ǡ ϐ a safety valve for the frustrations of citizens and second to act as a source of information enhancing the responsiveness and accountability of the party Zhao refers to investigative journalists as ldquowatchdogs on a party leashrdquo who ensconce party legitimacy by appeasing angered masses and by Ǥ ϐ this argument positions investigative journalists not only as spokespeople for the Chinese citizenry but also as their counselors as vehicles for venting The implication is that by watching such news programs and by reading investigative reports the impetus for ϐthe issue has been discussed in an open forum This argument takes investigative journalism as an outlet for citizens to express dissatisfaction preventing resentment from building up to a breaking point The second useful function of investigative journalism for the government is information gathering At its simplest level investigative journalism provides a trustworthy source of information about the ǦǤϐϐ outbreak through investigative reporting In the ϐ ǡ ϐ the incident This becomes even more important as the central government tries to oversee and keep in check local bureaucracies Investigative journalism ldquoserves as the central leadershiprsquos eyes and ears on local situationsrdquo20 As Zhan Jiang elaborates ldquoAs a general rule the central government has an interest in reducing the information gap between the center and localities regarding potentially volatile problems ϐǤ21 In addition to this educative function investigative reports also enable a higher degree of responsiveness


ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ

ϐǤ where government accountability is derived from elections authoritarian regimes must rely on alternative forms to formulate policy that is responsive to its constituentsrsquo needs The media is a crucial part of this responsiveness The most obvious function Caixin provides for the central government is high-quality ϐ Ǥ ϐ ϐoperation of markets We have seen how Caixin ϐas an opportunity to report on controversial issues not related to the economy This leeway originated in a fundamental function Caixin provides to the government economic information which ensures some baseline level of stability as consumers and businesses become better informed However this function has grown outdated as Chinarsquos markets mature More recently corruption has become a high priority on the CCPrsquos agenda as well as a policy issue that independent media can help tackle The severity and reach of corruption has become so extreme that citizens and government ϐ facing China today While the CCP wants to and must address the issue of corruption it is still a ϐupon the competency and legitimacy of the regime Caixin produces a wealth of corruption reporting In the 2010-2011 sample of Century Weekly magazines used corruption reporting included stories about judicial abuses of power pay-offs to land bureaus and government ministries cover-ups of vaccine contamination and mining accidents and economic crimes such as insider trading by ϐ ǡto name a few These stories can prove useful in ϐ or serve a positive press if government action has already been taken Interviewees also mentioned various ways in which they thought Caixin provides a service for the government One journalist relayed a conversation he had with a government censorship ϐǡ ǡ ǲ ǯcontrol you but I love you because you are willing to report on controversial issues and often when you do you take the Chinese side not the Western

viewpoint You are still Chinese media and you help us reduce the amount of trash out thererdquo (Interviewee 18) Another reporter mentioned the education level of his colleagues when discussing the credibility Caixin maintains As he explains Caixinrsquos reporters are more capable of understanding and explaining complex news ldquoOther media donrsquot understand these issues very well so we correct their mistakes For example there is a lot of outrage because China is a contributor to the IMF but Caixin will explain how the IMF functions and why itrsquos good for China to be contributingrdquo (Interviewee 34) In this way Caixin as well as other independent news organizations are able to provide levelheaded analysis while still allowing ldquothe Chinese voice to be heardrdquo (Interviewee 36) Another way the CCP can use independent reporting for its own agenda is in defending its international reputation The CCP can point to news organizations like Caixin and tell critics of its human rights record and lack of civil rights that China does in fact have a free press As Jingrong Tong describes ldquoSince 2007 there has been an increasing need for the ruling Party to build up a national image that is open and different from what was being described in the Western mediahellipIt is important to show the outside world an image of open government which helps to maintain legitimacy and achieve recognition from international societyrdquo22 A reporter backed up this view stating ldquoThe government can take advantage of us because we are seen as independent journalism So the government can parade us around and saymdash look we tolerate themrdquo (Interviewee 34) The overall tone underpinning these arguments is that Chinese investigative journalists are not fully responsible for driving independent reporting rather they are simply playing into the governmentrsquos hand being co-opted as government tools only satisfying the publicrsquos desire for information as a byproduct As Zhao states ldquoTo the extent that it exposes safe targets and investigates violations of existing laws ǡ ϐ ǯ mouthpiece of both the Party and the peoplerdquo23 Zhao has made the argument that the relationship between independent media and the government is not hostile but synergistic Many situations are indeed win-win for news organizations and the government however labeling the relationship as cooperative is a misleading portrayal Rather than an intentional government strategy for system maintenance allowing investigative journalism to persist happens


ϐ government and news organizations in some situations There are other factors that make it unlikely that the government really has as much Ǥϐ ϐ ǡ are epiphenomenal byproducts not intended solutions The decentralization and fragmentation of the state prevents the implementation of a fully cohesive plan dictating the extent of loosening up Instead news organizations and divisions within the government itself take advantage of the fractures to pursue their own goals The current political climate is also a strong force in determining the severity of government media scrutiny Finally the market and the professionalization ϐ can overpower government efforts to control the media environment

ĎēĉĎēČĘ Through extensive analysis of Caixinrsquos operations and reporting we have found that the use of guerrilla tactics has been crucial in facilitating the news organizationrsquos investigative journalism Company-wide strategies including Caixinrsquos sensitivity to timing its slant as a ϐǡtechniques a creative use of a variety of channels and its organizational and cultural style are critical features of Caixinrsquos success By extension we would expect that news organizations in China that aim to conduct investigative journalism without being shut down must also implement such strategies ϐǦin-chief Hu Shuli has had in providing protection for Caixin It may be the case that guerrilla tactics can only take a news organization so far in China and that an extra guarantee in the form of someone such as Hu Shuli is also necessary Hursquos ability to read government signs is a guerrilla tactic in itself and allows her to package news so that it will be seen as being helpful for the government and thus less likely to be censored Independent media and the Chinese government use each other but investigative journalists are not government mouthpieces When the party agenda and the journalistic agenda overlap there is a moment of harmony but this does

not mean that independent reporting is predicated ϐǤ ǯvast bureaucracy and increasing decentralized government the independent reporting done by news organizations has proven helpful in many respects We have seen how high-quality independently researched news analysis has helped government ϐ oversight In many cases investigative journalists have served as the eyes and ears of the central government by monitoring local bureaucracies To some extent ϐby serving as a channel for public opinion In this way investigative journalism serves as a type of catharsis or a way for frustrated citizens to vent Though these ϐ ǡ would be incorrect to characterize them as the result of an integrated and intentional government strategy for regime-stabilization Certainly many government ϐ reporting however the central government is not coordinating a system-wide strategy of selective tightening and loosening of media controls in order to bolster regime legitimacy Instead investigative journalism has been based upon the strategies that news organizations have developed to skirt government censors sometimes working in tandem with government objectives yet motivated by varying factors Those factors include company ideologies based on the ideals of promoting further reform and opening an increasingly strong dedication to professionalization among news organizations and robust market demand for high-quality independent reporting ǡ ϐ ϐǤǡǦϐhave the power to shut down Caixin Why donrsquot they There are costs associated with shuttering a popular and well-respected news organization Government ϐϐdown Caixin would outweigh the costs As long as Caixin goes up to the line but doesnrsquot cross it it is actually better for the government that the news organization continues to exist By meeting some government needs Caixin is able to pursue its own agenda and take advantage of the gray areas The reason Caixin doesnrsquot push even further for example calling for democratic elections or improved relations with the Dalai Lama is because this would immediately result


ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ

in their demise This does not mean however that independent media such as Caixin cater to party goals They work around obstacles but always with the view of accomplishing their own agenda not the CCPrsquos That does not mean there arenrsquot sometimes ϐ ǡ nature of the relationship is fundamentally one of push and pull

ĒĕđĎĈĆęĎĔēĘ Given that Caixin has been able to thrive at conducting investigative journalism despite the CCPrsquos stringent censorship regime what should we expect about the future of Chinarsquos political system Will Chinarsquos new leadership embrace political liberalization Is the existence of a news organization like Caixin evidence of broader opening up China is a particularly interesting case as the ldquoChinese journalism system is one of the most important contemporary journalism systems in the world either judging from the rise of political and economic power of China or looking at the role of China in the worldrsquos shifting power structuresrdquo24 Even more important than these standard indicators of Chinarsquos cloutndashits economic might and increasing involvement in the international systemndashis the fact that China is at a crossroads Faced with issues such as income disparity rural poverty high rates of corruption and growing environmental concerns the Chinese leadership must decide how to address the costs associated with Chinarsquos political economy China-watchers are eagerly anticipating in what way the government may evolve in order to respond to new challenges As Fewsmith comments ldquoThe question is whether Chinarsquos model of political economy can ϐ the future will bend that model to the breaking pointrdquo25 The Economist emphasizes the fork in the road facing new president Xi Jinping ldquoMr Xi can continue to clamp down on discontent or he can start to loosen the partyrsquos control Chinarsquos future will be determined by the answer to this question does Mr Xi have the courage and vision to see that assuring his countryrsquos prosperity and stability in the future requires him to break with the pastrdquo26 Studying the existence of investigative journalism in China allows us a peek into whether Chinarsquos new leadership might embrace political liberalization in the future

ϐǯpolitical future Many claim that China is currently at a tipping point However the CCP has proved extremely resilient in the past For now it seems that despite the work of organizations such as Caixin China remains a politically closed system However as the government attempts to tackle the social and political issues facing the country we may see more leeway for independent media to report on these same issues For example the CCPrsquos current campaign against corruption may allow Chinese media more leeway to report on such events because this reporting aligns with the government agenda There have already been signs that the central government might be more tolerant of corruption reporting A CNN article reports how several websites dedicated to airing corruption complaints have cropped up in the past few months27 This is just one example of where a government agenda and muckraking agenda align With the use of clever strategies such as the guerrilla tactics outlined in this paper and mutually aligned interests Chinese independent media may be able to produce some truly important reporting in the coming years

ēĉēĔęĊĘ1De Burgh The Chinese Journalist 362ldquoCaixin Media Completes New Round of Fundraisingrdquo3Zhan ldquoEnvironmental Journalism in Chinardquo1254Yu Media and Cultural Transformation in China 955Tong ldquoGuerrilla Tacticsrdquo 530-35 6Ibid 5307Zhao ldquoWatchdogs on Party Leashesrdquo 5778Ibid 5929Ibid 81310Tong Investigative Journalism In China 2511Ibid 2512Ibid 5013Scotton and Hachten New Media 2114King et al ldquoCensorship in Chinardquo 115Link ldquoChina The Anaconda in the Chandelierrdquo16Barboza ldquoPushing (and Toeing) the Line in Chinardquo 17Hu ldquoThe Rise of Business Media in Chinardquo 8418Tong ldquoGuerrilla Tacticsrdquo 53119Cho ldquoOrigins of Investigative Journalismrdquo 17020Tong ldquoGuerrilla Tacticsrdquo 58821Ibid 12422Tong Investigative Journalism In China 6523Tong ldquoGuerrilla Tacticsrdquo 592


24Tong Investigative Journalism In China 425Fewsmith China Today China Tomorrow 28326ldquoThe Man Who Must Change Chinardquo27Bower ldquoAnti-Corruption Websites Pop Up in Chinardquo

ĎćđĎĔČėĆĕčĞBarboza David ldquoPushing (and Toeing) the Line in

Chinardquo New York Times April 18 2005 Accessed May 4 2013

Bower Eve ldquoAnti-Corruption Websites Pop Up in Chinardquo CNN June 27 2011 Accessed May 13 2013

ldquoCaixin Media Completes New Round of Fundraising Tencent Becomes Shareholderrdquo PE Daily July 16 2012 Accessed November 26 2012 httpwwwpedailycnItemaspxid=218907

Cho Li-Fung ldquoThe Origins of Investigative Journalism The Emergence of Chinarsquos Watchdog Reportingrdquo In Investigative Journalism in China Eight Cases in Chinese Watchdog Journalism edited by David Bandurski and Martin Hala 165-176 Hong Kong Hong Kong University Press 2010

De Burgh Hugo The Chinese Journalist Mediating Information in the Worldrsquos Most Populous Country London RoutledgeCurzon 2003

Fewsmith Joseph ldquoConclusion Chinarsquos Next Three Decadesrdquo In China Today China Tomorrow Domestic Politics Economy and Society edited by Joseph Fewsmith 277-84 Plymouth UK ƬϐǡʹͲͳͲǤ

Hu Shuli ldquoThe Rise of Business Media in Chinardquo In Changing Media Changing China edited by Susan Shirk 84 Oxford Oxford University Press 2011

King Gary Jennifer Pan and Molly Roberts ldquoHow Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expressionrdquo Working Paper 2012 October 23 2012

Link Perry ldquoChina The Anaconda in the Chandelierrdquo New York Review of Books April 11 2002 Accessed June 24 2012 httpwwwnybookscomarticlesarchives2002apr11china-the-anaconda-in-the-chandelier

Scotton James Francis and William A Hachten New Media for a New China Chichester West Sussex UK Wiley-Blackwell 2010

ldquoThe Man Who Must Change Chinardquo Economist October 27 2012 httpwwweconomistcom


newsleaders21565210-xi-jinping-will-soon-be-named-chinaE28099s-next-president-he-must-be-ready-break

Tong Jingrong ldquoGuerrilla Tactics of Investigative Journalists in Chinardquo Journalism 8 (2007) 530-813

Tong Jingrong Investigative Journalism In China Journalism Power and Society London Continuum 2011

Yu Haiqing Media and Cultural Transformation in China London and New York Routledge 2009

Zhan Jiang ldquoEnvironmental Journalism in Chinardquo In Changing Media Changing China edited by Susan Shirk 125 Oxford Oxford University Press 2011

Zhao Yuezhi ldquoWatchdogs on Party Leashes Contexts and implications of investigative journalism in post-Deng Chinardquo Journalism Studies 12 (2000) 577-597

͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ

Mental illness is pervasive and entrenched in global society Mood and anxiety disorders such as ldquodepressionrdquo (as it is called in the West) have been observed by the World Health Organization in nearly every population studied around the world1 However mental illnesses manifest differently in distinct cultures Depression and other mood and anxiety disorders exist across cultures the societal manifestations and implications of those disordersmdashincluding social stigmamdashhowever are far from universal The stigmatization of mental illness leads to negative public perception and dramatically affects patientsrsquo willingness to seek treatment to overcome a disorder The social philosophy regarding depressive symptomatology varies dramatically between Japan and the West Although depression is similarly present in both cultures the Japanese have traditionally viewed moderate distress as a characteristic part of the human experience while Western societies have long labeled almost any level of depression or extended sadness as pathological In the modern day on the other hand Japanese society typically ϐstigma on terms like ldquodepressionrdquo Throughout the East different cultures have incredibly variable perspectives on mental illness one of the most dramatic of which exists in Japan Social regimentation has brought Japan to the forefront of the world economy and has established the nation as an innovative technological hotspot but it is not without its pitfalls Japanrsquos social ideals which emphasize maintenance of a harmonious mainstream have led the culture to cover up

The New Face of DepressionAddressing the Stigmatization of Mental

Illness in Japan and Beyond


anomalies including mental illnesses such as mood and anxiety disorders The emergence of the social issue in Japan known as hikikomori has highlighted the Japanese perspective on mood disorders and management of mental illness Hikikomori describes the condition of youthsrsquo withdrawal from all societal ties and shutting themselves in their homes for months or years Though the causes of hikikomori are not certain many psychologists have accepted that the purported one million individuals removed from society suffer from unrecognized and untreated psychological disorders They are essentially socially pressured into hiding partly due to negative stigma A biopsychosocial understanding of mental illness suggests that negative stigma not only affects the social understanding and treatment of mental ǡ ϐ ǡ ϐ case of hikikomori in Japan In order to appreciate the role of stigma on mental illness we must understand both the terminology and the global prevalence of mental illness cross-culturally The term ldquomental illnessrdquo encompasses a wide range of conditions from developmental disorders like autism to disorders that typically manifest later in life such as schizophrenia However the most common mental illnesses worldwide are anxiety and mood disorders which will be the focus of this discussion2 Major Depressive Disorder (or ldquodepressionrdquo) is a mood disorder characterized by low mood and loss of interest in daily activity Generalized anxiety disorder is a broad term for a condition characterized by irrational and pathological fear or anxiety The terms ldquodepressionrdquo and ldquoanxietyrdquo are both quite ambiguous and are general terms that are subdivided into various other disorders For the purposes of this discussion the ϐ ǲ ǳ taken to reference mood and anxiety disorders as a whole

Mark Bessen is studying geology and English at Stanford University He enjoys AacuteGXMSR[VMXMRKLMOMRKERHHMZMRK1EVOMWEPWSEpassionate activist for mental health awareness

With terminology established the prevalence of mental illness is most easily understood quantitatively In a world of seven billion over 121 million individuals suffer from depression or another mood disorder which is just under two percent of the world population3 Major depression is the number one cause for disability around the world but less than a quarter of those affected have access to treatment which often comes in the form of psychotherapy andor medication After an extensive and ongoing evaluation of the probable causes of mental illness the US Surgeon General asserts that mental illness is ldquoconsidered the product of a complex interaction among biological psychological social and cultural factorsrdquo4 The term ldquodepressionrdquo has primarily been used to describe a ldquodeveloped worldrdquo disorder that

MENTAL ILLNESS IN JAPAN

to mood and anxiety disorders However many causes beyond biology are at play Social economic and political factors also contribute to proliferating mental illness Low strata of income poor level of education and occupational instability have been linked to increasing the prevalence of mental illness The Department of Health and Human Services states ldquoCulture and society play pivotal roles in mental health mental illness and mental health servicesrdquo and must be taken into consideration in order to study mental illness as a complex global subject6 Another complicating factor is that the presentation of mental illness also varies cross-culturally Research has shown that the experience of depression is different in distinct cultures Psychiatrist and researcher Wen-Shing Tseng drawing from his study of depression across cultures since the 1960s ϐdepression diagnoses in the West but low rates of diagnosis in non-Euro-American societies7 Tseng established that the manifestation of depression in non-Western societies must come in different forms than the traditional Western emotional expression associated with depression According to his research the perception as well as the emotional experience of depression varies between cultures In another study that supports this position researchers Tanaka-Matsumi and Marsella conducted empirical studies asking Japanese Japanese-American and Caucasian-American students to associate words with ldquodepressionrdquo8 The Japanese students primarily listed words like ldquorainrdquo and ldquocloudrdquo and colors such ǲǳ ǲǡǳ ϐ and descriptions The Japanese-Americans and Caucasian-Americans on the other hand provided words like ldquosadnessrdquo and ldquolonelinessrdquo which depict internalized moods These results solidify the theory that the Japanese do not experience or conceptualize depression in the same way and likely contribute to ϐ13Ǥ These variations in expression have further substantiated the altered perception of mental illnesses in different cultures including how people respond differently to individuals suffering from mood and anxiety disorders Mental illnesses are not consistently recognized as disorders across all cultures There are substantial cross-cultural variations amongst societiesrsquo accepted views regarding mental illness Perception of mental illness is dramatically affected by racial ethnic and

manifests most obviously in socioeconomically developed nations While the majority of research ϐǡϐillness can be characterized as a ldquopanhuman phenomenonrdquo5 Mental illness is assumed to be omnipresent in global society based on the fact that some individuals are biologically predisposed

͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

Source Kaip Kine uploaded on Flickr

Hikikomori describes the condition of youths withdrawal from all social ties

ȁͳȁ͵͵

cultural backgrounds An interesting analysis of these cultural variations involves the comparison of Western versus Eastern philosophy on mental illness In the past Eastern cultures tended to ldquogive positive values for depressive complaints and even encourage themrdquo and typically have viewed mental illness as a part of the humanism and personal development central to Confucianism In contrast Western cultures ldquotolerate depressive symptoms only as acute phenomenardquo and quickly label any extended sadness as pathological9 In the last half century however as Eastern nations like Japan have progressed into modern developed societies and established high pressure economies ϐaddressed Although depression and anxiety were not considered an issue in the past the stress of development has likely increased the prevalence of mood disorders the recognition of mental illness however has remained low What explains this discrepancy Even as the incidence of mental illness is increasing its appearance in the public eye has been diminished by social stigma The stigma surrounding mental illness substantially impacts the characteristics and manifestations of mental illness The stigmatization ǡ ϐ mood and anxiety disorders contributes to the perpetuation and exacerbation of these disorders The differences in the perception of mental health manifest in a number of ways such as how symptoms are expressed how individuals cope with illness the nature of family support and patientsrsquo willingness to seek treatment10 Cultural perception affects the disposition of individuals with mood or anxiety disorders and subtleties in ϐstudy mental conditions cross-culturally Methods of coping often vary culturally typically falling into a dichotomy of either internal or external expression Internal expression which is more common in a conformist society like Japan that somewhat suppresses individual expression often results in isolation Other populations exhibit external expression and rely on community involvement to overcome an individualrsquos disorder perhaps through ϐǤ One more easily recorded factor regarding the impact of social stigma on mental illness is the prevalence of the diagnosis of mental illness

Most Asian cultures for example avoid labeling and diagnosing mental illness in order to save face and retain family honor while health professionals in Westernized countries like the United States readily provide diagnoses allowing ldquodiagnoses of [hellip] emotional disabilities and disorders [to] proliferaterdquo11 The treatment of mood disorders including patientsrsquo ϐ therapeutic techniques is critically tied to the public healthcare resources of a society These factors are all fundamentally connected to social stigma of mental illness but the extent to which stigma exists in society is quite variable One particularly negative and harmful example is observed in Japan where mental illness is highly stigmatized The stigma of mental illness is very dramatic in Japanese society Based on World Health Organization diagnostics Japan and other East Asian nations have low rates of self-reported mental illness compared to the United States and most European Union nations ϐ Japan12 The Japanese have established remarkably minimal outpatient mental healthcare even in Japanrsquos rapidly developing social and economic climate Japanese may even ldquomilitate against pathologizing the individualrdquo and resist employing medical treatment13 According to researcher A Borovoy this has left major depression dramatically under-diagnosed leaving those suffering from ldquosystemic chemical imbalancesrdquo to fend for themselves or focus on the very limited coping strategies and familial support available In order to effectively quantify the stigma of mental 13ǡϐcompared the responses of Japanese and Australian study participants to vignettes of individuals with varying degrees of mental illness The participants were then asked to identify their personal stigma (how he or she felt towards the person described) and their perceived stigma (how he or she thought others viewed the person in the vignette) on a numbered scale The Australian participants primarily scored very low on the stigma scale while negative attitudes towards mental illness were much more common among the Japanese subjects Both personal and perceived stigmas were found to be very high in the 13ǡϐAustralians15

Research in cultural psychiatry suggests that this stigma may not only shape mindsets in Japan but also fundamentally change society by engendering


purely a Japanese phenomenonmdashit has not been observed on any notable scale anywhere else in the world An obvious question surfaces why does this phenomenon occur almost exclusively in Japan What factors are unique to Japan as compared to either other Eastern cultures or similarly developed nations To answer these questions an analysis of Japanese social dynamics is necessary Traditional Japanese society espouses a form of conformism in which individualism is restrained in favor of ϐǤAs individual mindsets have begun to shift towards individualism in recent years society has remained regimented Their form of protest is quintessentially Japanese no ostensible imposition is made on others rather it is the refusalmdashwithdrawal and negative symptomatologymdashthat is characteristic That is isolation is used as a defence against transitioning from adolescence to adulthood in a society they disagree with18

This regimentation has allowed Japan to ϐ in the world allowing about three quarters of the population to maintain very high economic protection However societal regimentation has contributed to rampant school bullying at all levels of education The high-pressure environment makes dropping out and moving into the hikikomori lifestyle look like a welcome option Japanese family structure is hypothesized to be a contributing factor leading to Ǥǡϐfamilies often ldquopanderrdquo to the needs of offspring allowing them to remain out of school and work ϐ ǡ ldquoindependence is not as highly valued as in the westrdquo19 As the labor force has shifted in recent years those entering the job market have struggled and this economic insecurity has likely been a factor in cultivating the idea of social withdrawal Along with many other confounding elements in Japanrsquos conformist idealism these factors likely contribute to engendering hikikomori as a particularly Japanese condition But even the interaction of all these components does not seem to explain such a widespread phenomenon None of the socioeconomic factors attributed to hikikomori are unique to Japanmdashfor example South Korea has similar social norms and a successful economy yet there is no hikikomori observed there It is also common to hold the Japanese education system responsible but in recent years as


Many believe that Japanrsquos high-pressure society contributes to the rise in hikikomori cases

ǡ ϐ hikikomori In recent years hikikomori has surfaced as a substantial social dilemma in Japan (the term is used to describe both the phenomenon and individuals) Literally translated as ldquowithdrawnrdquo hikikomori is the quandary in which ldquohiddenrdquo youths in Japan remain reclusive for extended periods of months to years Hikikomori expert Ǥ ϐ ldquopeople who have spent six months or more in an asocial state being outside of education and

employment and having no intimate relationships with anyone outside of the immediate familyrdquo16 Males make up about eighty percent of hikikomori whose ages typically range from late teens to early thirties and the majority of hikikomori come from economically comfortable homes This ldquolost generationrdquo of over one million youthsmdashmaking up about one percent of the Japanese populationmdashlikely suffers from underlying psychological disorders in conjunction with unrealistic social pressures Based on research with hikikomori rehabilitation facilities and through extensive interviews with Japanese health care workers Borovoy argues that the Japanese hikikomori have come to lead hermitic lives possibly as a negative consequence of the Japanese outlook on mental illnessmdasha so-called ldquoantipsychiatryrdquo bias in Japan17

It appears strangely that hikikomori is

͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ

Source iFOCOS uploaded on Flickr

ȁͳȁ͵ͷ

the government has tried to alleviate pressures to mitigate school troubles the rate of hikikomori continues to increase And the rate of mental illness seems consistent with most developed nations So what is the tipping point that pushes the Japanese into hikikomori One potential factor is the function of stigma surrounding mental illness in society ǡ Ǥ ϐ 13ǡ ϐϐǤ20

Hikikomori is one dramatic substantiation of psychological distress in Japanese society it is a particularly vivid representation of the impact that stigma of mental illness has had in Japan In his chapter ldquoThe Mega-Marketing of Depression in Japanrdquo Ethan Watters provides evidence as to the impact of stigma on depression21 Watters presents a particularly elucidative illustration by including a comprehensive history on the changing nomenclature used in the psychological ϐ 13Ǥ ǡstates Watters ldquothe Japanese had a fundamentally different conception of depression than in the Westrdquo Psychiatry in Japan before that time focused almost exclusively on the severely mentally ill who required long-term inpatient care ldquotalk therapyrdquo and medication for moderate depression were not utilized at all This disconnect stemmed from the translation of the term ldquodepressionrdquo in Japanese the antiquated psychiatric term is utsubyocirc which usually describes a debilitating mental illness like schizophrenia that would require extended hospital stays In response to this notation and in order to address Japanrsquos traditional resistance to treatment pharmaceutical companies began to use syntactically unique methodology to market antidepressants to the Japanese populace Drug companies discarded the connotation-loaded word for debilitating depression utsubyocirc and coined a new phrase kokoro no kaze which means ldquoa cold of the soulrdquo The translation suggests that depression is merely a normal ailment that can be treated and cured As the stigma carried in the word utsubyocirc began to dissipate soon after the marketing campaign in the early 2000s antidepressant sales dramatically increased Such an immense shift in the perception of mental illness has contributed to measureable sociological impacts The change of terminology has appeared to have notable effects on the Japanese

ǯ Ǥ ϐterm for depression was so heavily stigmatized that even a simple shift like a change in nomenclature ϐ mental illness as measured by pharmaceutical prescriptions It is probable that mental illness was equally prevalent before the terminology change but such an explosion in the use of antidepressants and psychotherapy is testament to a stigma that has begun to become antiquated Similar to kokoro ǡǲϐpart because it is less stigmatizing than other terms for mental illnessrdquo22 Perhaps the shift in mindset during these pharmaceutical campaigns may help to alleviate the negative stigma on mental illness in Japan and thereby help counteract one of the driving forces of hikikomori As illustrated by the emergence of hikikomori the stakes of the impact of stigma on mental illness are ϐǡof mood disorders in society that is most troubling It appears that what makes hikikomori a culturally ϐǡbut the interplay of complicated social factors in response to it To extrapolate more generally what can we predict for other developing nations Furlong explains

Indeed many of the preconditions for the hikikomori phenomenon exist in the west and if we can establish that the condition relates to the fragmentation of social structures in the late modern period it would not be unreasonable to argue that acute social withdrawal may become widespread within the advanced nations23

Could social conditions like hikikomori develop in other countries in similar stages of development as Japan Itrsquos certainly a concerning preoccupation but research shows that it is not likely for a number of reasons Japan and the United States for example are both evolving socially and becoming less systematized However the shift in the United States has been gradual while traditional opportunities and ideals in Japan have been dramatically disrupted Furthermore although Japan has begun to face labor insecurity and changes to income equality more than 75 percent of the population is economically comfortable in the ǡϐsupport hikikomori In contrast the United States has a struggling job market and families can simply not


afford to shoulder the burden of additional family members out of work or school Perhaps most importantly eradication of the stigma of mental illness is being addressed much more in the United States than in Japanmdashantidepressants have become so accepted that they are advertised on American television Furthermore efforts have been moved to the education system as well in my high school health class at a public school we studied mental ϐ ǡrather than bypassing their existence The dramatic shifts in Japanese society in the last decade may imply that hikikomori cases will begin to steadily decrease The wealth of both research and media publication surrounding the topic in Japan highlights its public recognition Care centers and mental health clinics have been established and mental health care is being reevaluated in Japan24 Stigma not only affects the incidence of mental illness but forces mood disorders into hiding Simply by giving hikikomori a name stigma is removed naming the condition contributes to the healing process by establishing ϐǡ realistically overcome

ēĉĔęĊĘ1World Health Organization ldquoMental Healthrdquo2Ibid3Ibid4US DHHS Mental Health 265Pereira de Miranda ldquoDepressionrdquo 126US DHHS Mental Health7Tseng ldquoDisorders of Depressionrdquo 335-3428Tanaka-Matsumi and Marsella ldquoCross-Cultural Variationsrdquo 385-69Pereira de Miranda ldquoDepressionrdquo 1210US DHHS Mental Health11Borovoy ldquoJapanrsquos Hidden Youthsrdquo 57012Ibid 55613Ibid 55414Ibid 55815ϐǤǡǲǡǳͳǤ16Furlong ldquoJapanese Hikikomorirdquo 31117Borovoy ldquoJapanrsquos Hidden Youthsrdquo 55418Teo ldquoSocial Withdrawal in Japanrdquo 18219Furlong ldquoJapanese Hikikomorirdquo 310-1420ϐǤǡǲǡǳǦͺǤ21Watters Crazy Like Us

22Teo ldquoSocial Withdrawal in Japanrdquo 18323Furlong ldquoJapanese Hikikomorirdquo 309-1024Borovoy ldquoJapanrsquos Hidden Youthsrdquo 555-57

ĎćđĎĔČėĆĕčĞBorovoy Amy ldquoJapanrsquos Hidden Youths Mainstreaming

the Emotionally Distressed in Japanrdquo Culture Medicine and Psychiatry 32 no 4 (2008) 552-76

Furlong Andy ldquoThe Japanese Hikikomori Phenomenon Acute Social Withdrawal Among Young Peoplerdquo The Sociological Review 56 no 2 (2008) 309-25

ϐǡ Ǥǡ ǡ Christensen Kumiko Yoshioka Anthony F Jorm and Hideyuki Nakane ldquoStigma in Response to Mental Disorders a Comparison of Australia and Japanrdquo BMC Psychiatry 6 no 21 (2006)

Pereira de Miranda Damiana (2000) ldquoDepression Across Cultures The Construction of Depressive Disturbances in Greater Sao Paulo Brazilrdquo ProQuest Information amp LearningTanaka-Matsumi Junki and Anthony J Marsella ldquoCross-Cultural Variations in the Phenomenological Experience of Depression Word Association Studiesrdquo The Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 7 no 4 (1976) 379-96

Teo Alan R ldquoA New Form of Social Withdrawal in Japan A Review of Hikikomorirdquo International Journal of Social Psychiatry 56 no 2 (2010) 178-85

Tseng Wen-Shing ldquoDisorders of Depressionrdquo In The Handbook of Cultural Psychiatry 335-42 San Diego Academic Press 2007

US Department of Health and Human Services Mental Health Culture Race and EthnicitymdashA Supplement to Mental Health A Report of the Surgeon General Rockville MD US Department of Health and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Center for Mental Health Services 2001

Watters Ethan ldquoThe Mega-Marketing of Depression in Japanrdquo In Crazy Like Us The Globalization of the American Psyche 187-248 New York US Free Press 2010

World Health Organization ldquoMental Health Ǥǳ ϐ ʹͲͳͳǤ ǣȀȀwwwwhointmental_healthmanagementȀϐȀ ȋ ȌǤ


͵ȁʹͲͳͶ

Current democratic systems hold true that no matter how small or poor any individual person may be each person should have a say in the broader policies and laws that govern us By virtue of the national governments we elect we even have a small say in the making of international law through organizations like the UN and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Unfortunately many individuals around the world are effectively excluded from this statute not because they necessarily live in undemocratic countries but because they live in unrecognized self-governing territories When every person has the right to be citizens of the world and thus equal exclusion of peoples through non-recognition of their countries denying them a place at the negotiating table should continue no longer1 By not recognizing the sovereign governments of millions worldwide the UN is effectively saying these people do not exist We need not only a solution to specific unrecognized states but also a broad-ranging solution for stateless states the world over In turn the international community represented by the United Nations needs new guidelines for statehood This lack of recognition has hurt few countries more than Transnistria the breakaway Moldovan Republic in Eastern Europe Having

The ldquoStateless StaterdquoTransnistria and the World Over

e Transnistrian ag ies over a memorial statue

long been the economic powerhouse of Moldova under the USSR Transnistria declared independence in 1992 from Moldova after Moldova declared independence from the USSR since Transnistria had both a higher percentage of Russians and the new nation was worried that Moldova would seek to join Romania due their strong cultural similarities2 Following a brief civil war where Russian troops entered in support of the breakaway republic Transnistria signed a ceasefire with Moldova that has held to this day Along with South Ossetia Abkhazia and Nogorno-Kabakh Transnistria has been described as one of the ldquofrozen conflictsrdquo following the end of the Soviet Union3 If Transnistria is taken as a case study the need for change in international doctrine regarding statehood is very apparent


Sam Rebo is a junior studying International Relations with specializations in RussiaEastern Europe and International Security He spent this spring at Stanford in Paris and fall at Stanford in Moscow where he worked at the French Institute of International Relations and Transparency International respectively On campus he is a member of the Debate Society and 1SHIP92PYFERHMWERSJAacuteGIVSJXLI7XERJSVHUS-Russia Forum In the future he aspires to join the US Foreign Service

ȁͳȁ͵

httpcommonswikimediaorgwikiFileBenderskii_memorial_slavy_11jpg

čĊėĆēĘēĎĘęėĎĆēĔđĎęĎĈĆđĎęĚĆęĎĔē This frozen status in addition to continued Russian military and monetary aid has seen Transnistria evolve into a type of Leninist enclave In its capital of Tiraspol one can expect to see old Soviet-style propaganda as if the Cold War had never ended old Russian coupes weaving ϐǡǲȏǯȐatop a pedestal in front of the Parliament building ǯ ǡ ϐ ϐ ϐ like the Militant Angel of Egalitarianismrdquo4 The country has political problems and corruption sure but as Frank Jacobs pointed out in a New York Times article entitled ldquoTransnistrian time-sliprdquo Transnistria is no ldquoSoviet Pompeiirdquo since ϐthe country5 In fact according to their tourism website the reason why Transnistria has kept ϐstatues of Lenin to remain in the nation is that ldquowe appreciate our history and unlike many of our ǡϐitrdquo6 Indeed ties to Transnistriarsquos communist past seem largely symbolic Nonetheless Transnistria has few friends in the international arena It is only recognized by two other unrecognized states Abkhazia and South Ossetia whereas Russia has a non-diplomatic mission in their capital Russiarsquos involvement is particularly worrisome especially is for many who advocate for a solution to the problem of Transnistriarsquos separation In the World Politics Review Matthew Rojansky Deputy Director for Russia and Eurasia at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently commented that ldquoAs a strongly pro-Kremlin outpost on the doorstep of NATO and the EU [Transnistria] offers Moscow a narrow foothold in Central Europe and an indirect veto over NATO expansion in the Black Sea regionrdquo7 Rojansky is not alone in this opinion Recently the European Court of Human Rights ǡϐis ldquounder the effective authority or at least decisive ϐǤǳ8 Of course as a member of the former Soviet Union Moldova has long-standing connections to Moscow In the former USSR Moscow decided to switch Moldovan script to the Cyrillic alphabet The USSR also emphasized their historical differences and grievances with the rest

of Romania in an effort to justify a Soviet rule that split a culture that was essentially uniform into two countriesmdashRomania and Moldova ϐ in Moldovan affairs are often used as arguments against Transnistrian recognition A puppet state they contend is no state at all However many including the UN hold that all that is necessary for state legitimacy is a popularly supported

government If a popularly supported government is all that is necessary then Transnistriarsquos 2006 referendum where 98 percent of the population supported independence should be reason enough for legitimacy Not only was the vote found to be fair and valid but international standards would ϐ independence9 As Michael Reisman of Yale Law School wrote ldquoThe results of such elections serve as evidence of popular sovereignty and serve as the basis for international endorsements of the elected governmentrdquo10 Thus no matter what a countryrsquos ϐǡ ǡor even democratic government if it has the free and fair support of their people the state should be considered for recognition

ĔĜęčĊĆĈĐĔċēęĊėēĆęĎĔēĆđĊĈĔČēĎęĎĔēċċĊĈęĘęčĊėĆēĘēĎĘęėĎĆēĎęĎğĊē Transnistriarsquos lack of international status ϐ Moldova has affected the day-to-day lives of everyone in Transnistria This ldquoshutting-offrdquo from the rest

͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ

TRANSNISTRIAmdashTHE STATELESS STATE

Transnistriarsquos breakoff from Moldova

Source httpcommonswikimediaorgwikiFileTransnistria-map-2-itpng

of the world has exacerbated the problems that the country faces on both macro and micro ǣϐǡrestrictions are ever-present and their economy is limited since all exports must be registered with Moldovan customs11

Indeed the Transnistrian economy has greatly struggled since ldquoindependencerdquo In 2011 after the election of the new Transnistrian president the political scientist Roberta Radu ϐ ǡ corruption and severely limited foreign liquidity due to the fact the Transnistriarsquos currency is not recognized by any other country12 Furthermore Transnistria as an unrecognized state is in a precarious position where its trade may be blockaded or impeded at a momentrsquos notice by either Moldova or Ukraine In fact Transnistriarsquos trade was impeded in 2006 when Ukraine announced that it would no longer be importing goods from Transnistria unless they were registered with Moldovan customs Due to ϐ and the strain in Ukrainian-Transnistrian border dynamics many Transnistrian and Russian ϐblockade costing Transnistria $420 million for the whole of 2006 Because the entire Transnistrian economy was valued at about $800 million Transnistria was declared a ldquohumanitarian catastropherdquo13 Since then most businesses have registered with Moldovan customs The strength of the Transnistrian economy has since improved but it is estimated that the country still loses around $25 million a day due to the regulation14 Moreover without international recognition this sort of trade shock could happen again to Transnistria without a word of protest from any international organization If trade status wasnrsquot a large enough problem already Transnistriarsquos compromised international status has spurred the development of a large shadow economy rife with arms ǡ ϐǤ ϐ Ǥ ʹͲͲͷ ϐ ȋthrough WikiLeaks) sent from the US Embassy in Bucharest to the Department of State HQ the US ambassador described a meeting between Romanian president Basescu and Vladimir Putin

In the meeting Basescu asked Putin to allow him to join the negotiating table on Transnistria because it not only represented a threat to regional stability but also served as a shelter for organized crime operating there and spreading into Romania15 During the fall of the Soviet Union an estimated 40 to 50 thousand armaments were left in the area remaining largely unaccounted for Regarding arms produced after the fall of the Soviet Union the International Crisis ǲϐproduce pistols automatic weapons mortars and missile launchers exported abroad without serial numbersrdquo16ϐworried as illegal arms dealing has the propensity to destabilize tense regions of the world by fueling ϐǤ17

ϐǡ ǡ widespread in the breakaway territory as a result of its non-recognition Organizations like the OSCE have commented on Moldovarsquos (including Transnistria) ϐǡDepartment of State has singled out Transnistria as ǲϐϐin personsrdquo18ǡϐa large part of underground activity so the more a country is able to crack down on the trade of persons ϐ ϐǦǤǯ ϐ plusmnButtin remarked in the Human Security Journal

hellip as [Transnistria] is not recognized inter nationally preventive actions on ȏ ϐȐ led by few NGOshellipthe particular situation of ϐ[Transnistrian] regime prevent NGOs to lead ϐǤthere are no structures in Tiraspol similar to those existing in Chisinau (eg shelter for ϐȌǤ19

Shut off and unrecognized by the world Transnistriarsquos problems have the potential to spill into the rest of the region destabilizing an area still recuperating from the fall of the Soviet Union Assuming that international recognition can be attained how exactly would recognition help Transnistria with its many problems Juxtaposing the stability of life in Transnistria opposed to countries like Moldova provides an answer Transnistria as an


ȁͳȁ͵ͻ

unrecognized entity with its status continually in limbo effectively ldquofends offrdquo investors because itrsquos seen as too risky an investmentmdashan investor might as well purchase junk bonds In fact while Transnistria has often been considered a puppet of the Russian government its lack of international status has likely exacerbated its dependence on the Russia since Russia remains the only country that has provided any sort of foreign direct investment20

Furthermore as was previously mentioned ϐhave a presence in a country whose existence they donrsquot acknowledge Therefore aid (monetary training structural etc) to Transnistria has been almost exclusively limited to NGOs and Russia ϐ United Nations Transnistria would be able to work closely with and advise the UNrsquos committees (such as their Committee for Disarmament or the International Labor Organization) on how to reduce and eventually eradicate the illicit arms human and drug trade Phased out and forgotten by even Moldova who ranks a solution to Transnistria ninth or tenth on their priority list Transnistria has effectively had only itself to rely upon and solve its immense problemsmdasha situation which should carry on no more21

čĊĔėđĉĜĎĉĊĆęęĊėēĔċǲęĆęĊđĊĘĘęĆęĊĘǳ Transnistria is not alone in this problem It is joined in its uncomfortable purgatory by such other stateless states as Kosovo Somaliland and Palestine all of whose admission to the UN is blocked by another countryrsquos political veto Russia continues to refuse to give Kosovo recognition by the UN Security Council due to support for its longtime ally Serbia22 The African Union refuses to recognize and trade with Somaliland because they are afraid of the trend that re-drawing borders could start on the continent23 Finally the United Statesrsquo support for its longtime ally Israel has led it to continually veto Palestinersquos membership application24 Each country is markedly different from the next and one broad solution for all their problems is decidedly impossible But as has already been illustrated for Transnistria when a state is fully autonomous but lacks recognition and regional integration its

internal problems have the propensity to ldquosnowballrdquo and impact millions of people Of course it is easy for the international community to turn their backs on these small states but in doing so they not only encourage the degradation of the isolated state but also violence in the country and surrounding region The lack of a negotiated solution has already sparked ϐ (ie Kosovo War 1999 continued Palestinian-Arab-ϐǡͳͻͻͳȌϐǡǡpropensity to cause more damage in the years to come ϐin detail by international bodies but have yet to be examined together as case studies of ldquostateless statesrdquo Therein I believe lies the solution to many of the aforementioned problems with unrecognized states Some would venture to say that because many of these countries have ldquosuch rotten governmentsrdquo the countries themselves should not be recognized But it does not even matter how corrupt or ϐǤthe international system has operated until now makes it impossible for organizations like the UN or countries like the US to solve certain regional problems When issues arise within the stateless states we have no method of communication with those in powermdashwe simply cannot talk to the right people both in and out of the country The UN does have guidelines for becoming a state developed at the 1933 Montevideo Convention they included being a peace loving country having a government and having the capacity to carry out foreign affairs25 Unfortunately these 80-year-old guidelines are clearly obsolete since almost any entity from the state of New York to Stanford University could fall under them We need not just a solution to Transnistria or Somaliland we need a broad-ranging solution for stateless states the world over

ėĔĆĉĔđĚęĎĔēǣęĘĔČĎĘęĎĈĘĆēĉėĆĜćĆĈĐĘ I believe the UN must establish new guidelines by which countries must justify their yay or nay votes regarding UN membership The new guidelines should include the aforementioned statehood criteria developed in 1933 in addition to encompassing the political scientist Batyrsquos idea of self-containment As he put it self-containment


ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ

is ldquothe existence among the people or the bulk of people of a certain mutual reliance not participated in by the outside worldrdquo26 To operationalize Batyrsquos conceptualization of the true state a guideline for statehood would have to include the following two characteristics 1) a government with a monopoly on power exemplifying the separation of a state from the outside world and 2) a sustainable economic system associated with the idea of ldquomutual Ǥǳϐϐas they can differentiate between independent states (eg Kosovo) and non-independent states (eg Texas) In reality these new criteria would bring the issue of the constitution of a state to ϐ ͳͻ͵͵ǤStateless states deserving of recognition could ǡϐguidelines legitimizing their claim to statehood on the international stage Furthermore the creation of such guidelines is feasible Standards of membership are valid for all countries since they remedy an obsolete article in the UN charter Countries will not always be comfortable justifying their nay vote but they may appreciate the requirement if they end up supporting a countryrsquos membership that others oppose In the end while I believe that the recreation of guidelines would be more than a symbolic measure at the very least it would mirror what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has done focus increased attention on certain issues and create a standard by which countries should act Creating these guidelines would be a huge step forward towards legitimizing the millions of disenfranchised people worldwide that do not have a voice on the international level As John Rawlsrsquos Second Principle of Justice states ldquoThere is an understood international standard that no matter what government does it should not make the poorest even worse offrdquo27 In a globalized world international organizations are increasingly becoming supranational governments themselves As they do so they have a responsibility to look out for the poorest countries More often than not these are newly broken away and freshly independent regions like Transnistria A change in the international system should be made not only to enfranchise the millions of people living in these

countries but also to work with their respective governments to stabilize and better the living standards of regions around the world

ēĉēĔęĊĘ1United Nations ldquoUniversal Declaration of Human Rightsrdquo 1 2Kymlicka et al ldquoCan Liberal Pluralism Be Exportedrdquo 2083European Council ldquoTransnistriardquo 24Jacobs ldquoTransnistrian Time-Sliprdquo5Ibid6Transnistria Tour Travel Agency ldquoAbout Transnistriardquo7ǡǲϐǤǳ8UNHCR ldquoIlascu amp Others vs Moldova amp Russiardquo9ldquoTransnistria for Independencerdquo10Reisman Sovereignty and Human Rights 86911Ǥǡǲʞ˓ˋˇːˈ˔˕˓ˑ˅˟ˈǡǳͳǤ12Radu ldquoAutonomous Statelessness of Transnistriardquo13Ǥǡǲʑ˃ˎˈ˓ˋˌʚˋ˙ˍ˃ˌǤǳ14RosBusinessConsulting ldquoNews Onlinerdquo15ldquoRomanian Centre for Investigative Journalismrdquo16ICG ldquoMoldovardquo 1517ǡǲϐǤǳ18Buttin ldquoA Human Security Perspectiverdquo 1919Ibid 19 20Chamberlain-Creanga and Allin ldquoAcquiring Assetsrdquo21European Council ldquoTransnistriardquo 3 22ldquoRussia Foreign Policyrdquo 1 23ICG ldquoMoldovardquo 2 24Hume ldquoPalestinian United Nations Bid Explainedrdquo25ICG ldquoMoldovardquo 226ǡǲϐǡǳͶ͵Ǥ27Rawls A Theory of Justice

ĎćđĎĔČėĆĕčĞǡ plusmnǤ ǲ

Transnistria Reassessing the Situation within the Black lsquoHole of Europersquordquo Human Security Journal 3 (February 2007)

Chamberlain-Creanga Rebecca and Lyndon K Allin ldquoAcquiring Assets Debts and Citizens Russia and the Micro-Foundations of Transnistriarsquos ϐǤǳ Demokratizatsiya 18 (Fall 2010)

ldquoCharter of the United Nationsrdquo Washington US ϐǡͳͻͶͷǤ

ldquoFailed States Index Maprdquo Foreign Policy Accessed


February 5 2013 httpwwwforeignpolicycomarticles201306242013_failed_states_interactive_map

ǡ Ǥ ǲϐ ǣ Montevideo Convention and Itrsquos Discontentsrdquo Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37 (1998-99) 403

Hoxha Abit ldquoRussiarsquos Foreign Policy in Kosovordquo E-International Relations Accessed February 5 2013 httpwwwe-irinfo20120512russias-foreign-policy-in-kosovo

Hume Tim ldquoPalestinian United Nations Bid Explainedrdquo CNN November 30 2012

International Crisis Group ldquoMoldova Regional Tensions Over Transdniestriardquo ICG Europe Report No 157 June 17 2004

Ǥ ǲϐǤǳMarch 17 2013

International Crisis Group ldquoSomaliland Time for African Union Leadershiprdquo ICG African Report No 110 May 23 2006

Jacobs Frank ldquoTransnistrian Time-Sliprdquo New York Times May 22 2012

Jayaraman Rajshri and Ravi Kanbur ldquoInternational Public Goods and the Case for Foreign Aidrdquo Department of Agricultural Resource and Managerial Economics Cornell University (March 1999)

Kymlicka Will and Magdalena Opalski Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe New York Oxford University Press 2001

ǤǤ ǲʞ˓ˋˇːˈ˔˕˓ˑ˅˟ˈ ˑ˕ˍ˃ˊ˃ˎˑ˔˟ˑ˄˔˖ˉˇ˃˕˟ ˅˞˘ˑˇ ˋˊ ˍ˓ˋˊˋ˔˃ ˄ˈˊ ʟˑ˔˔ˋˋǤǳAccessed February 1 2013 httplentarunews20060316pridnestr

Popescu Nicu and Leonid Litra ldquoTransnistria A Bottom-Up Solutionrdquo European Council on Foreign Relations (September 2012)

Popescu Nicu ldquoDemocracy in Secessionism Transnistria and Abkhaziarsquos Domestic Policiesrdquo Open Society Institute (August 2006)

Quadir Iqbal Z ldquoForeign Aid and Bad Governmentrdquo Wall Street Journal January 30 2009

Radu Roberta ldquoThe Autonomous Statelessness of Transnistriardquo The New Wolf Accessed March 13 2013

Rawls John A Theory of Justice Cambridge MA Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1971

Reisman W Michael ldquoSovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Lawrdquo Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 872 (1990)

Council of Europe European Court of Human Rights ldquoIlascu and Others v Moldova and Russiardquo (July 8 2004) Accessed March 15 2013

ǡ Ǥ ǲǮǯ ϐBegins to Thawrdquo Accessed March 15 2013 httpwwwworldpoliticsreviewcomarticles11846ǦǦϐǦǦǦǤ

Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism ldquoRomanian Centre for Investigative Journalismrdquo Accessed March 15 2013

RosBusinessConsulting ldquoRosBusiness Consulting News Onlinerdquo Accessed March 15 2013

ldquoTransnistria for Independence Union with RussiamdashReferendumrdquo RIA Novosti Accessed March 15 2013

Transnistria Tour Travel Agency ldquoAbout Transnistriardquo Accessed March 17 2013

The United Nations ldquoThe Universal Declaration of Human Rightsrdquo 1948

ldquoWorld Countriesrdquo Travel Independent httpwwwtravelindependentinfocountries_howmanyhtm

ǲʑʏʚʔʟʗʘʚʗʥʙʏʘǣʠʗʡʢʏʥʗʮǡʑʝʖʜʗʙʧʏʮʑʟʔʖʢʚʫʡʏʡʔʞʝʚʗʡʗʙʗʓʏʑʚʔʜʗʮʗʢʒʟʝʖǡʜʔ ʛʝʕʔʡ ʠʦʗʡʏʡʫʠʮ ʐʚʏʒʝʞʟʗʮʡʜʝʘʓʚʮʑʝʖʝʐʜʝʑʚʔʜʗʮʙʝʜʡʏʙʡʝʑǤǳMarch 15 2013 httpidknetcom


ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ

Multilateral TreatiesThe Forgotten Instrument of Foreign Policy

When Secretary of State John Kerry signed the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) last September half of the US Senate made it immediately and painfully clear the treaty was ldquodead in the waterrdquo before it even had the chance to grow sea legs1 ȄͶͷ ϐDemocratsmdashresponded with a letter to President Barack Obama asserting that they ldquopledge to ϐǡǥregard the US as bound to uphold its object and purposerdquo2 That object is to better regulate the $70 billion international arms trade industry in which the Unites States is the largest player And the purpose To contribute to ldquointernational and regional peace security and stabilityrdquo3 Yet the opposition which includes the powerful US gun


Jessie Brunner is earning her masterrsquos degree in International Policy Studies at Stanford University where she also works as a research assistant at the Program on Human Rights at the Center on Democracy Development and the Rule of Law She has called the Golden State home for most of her life including her time as an undergraduate studying Journalism and Spanish at UC Berkeley Exceptions include semesters abroad in Salamanca Spain and Santiago Chile where she worked with anti-poverty NGO Accioacuten Emprendedora Activism has long been an important aspect of her life from human rights advocacy with Amnesty International to encouraging environmentalism in the workplace to TVSQSXMRKTIEGIJYPGSRAcircMGXVIWSPYXMSRSRGSPPIKIcampuses across the country She has recently returned to Stanford after a term at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna where she focused on gaining better understanding of the European perspective SR LYQER VMKLXW ERH VIWIEVGLIH TSWXGSRAcircMGXreconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

ϐǡinsists the treaty violates national sovereignty ϐǲof any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory pursuant to its own legal or constitutional systemrdquo4 To have ϐǡ for leadership As so aptly illustrated by the debate over the ATT the United States in recent years has decidedly not taken the lead when it comes to international treaties instead it has chosen a path of unilateralism and exceptionalism at its ϐǤ ever-growing tension between the executive and legislative branches as further illustrated by the two-week government shutdown in October 2013 is contributing to the deterioration of the US position as a leader on the world stage While recognizing the seemingly Sisyphean nature of contending with a very dividedmdashand divisivemdashCongress more energy must be devoted to persuading what in many cases will be a dozen sensible Republicans to support agreements that promote US interests As President Obama shifts focus in his second term it is worth investing political capital in multilateral treaties a much-neglected tool in the foreign policy toolbox Seventy years ago such monumental efforts were not needed to generate support for a new world order based on multilateral cooperation The United States was at the frontlines of a movement calling for universal recognition and defense of human rights while working to strengthenmdashnot severmdashinternational ties Going back further the nationrsquos founders had the foresight to understand that it might be in the interest of the US to join international agreements bestowing power to the President to commit the US to treaties ldquoby and with the Advice and Consent of the Senatehellipprovided two thirds of the Senators present concurrdquo5 Currently there are more than 30 treaties lying dormant in the Senate representing such varied and essential issues as labor standards economic social and cultural

ȁͳȁͶ͵

rights non-discrimination against women bilateral negotiations and environmental issues6 ϐ ǡ United States has often waited so long to ratify that it loses the opportunity to demonstrate any sort of leadership Or consent comes in the form ǲǳϐǡstipulated so many reservations understandings and declarations as to obviate any real bite the treaty may have had7 The Senatersquos refusal last December to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities precisely and unfortunately illustrates the notion that the US as a nation derive false sovereignty from compliance without ϐǤϐϐcomprehensive legislation enshrining the rights of people with disabilities Furthermore the treaty was modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act and would require not a single alteration to US law Lastly it stands to reason that US citizens serving living and working abroad only stand to ϐ standard set by the US And yet conservative opposition in the Senate successfully wielded the ϐǡ grounds that the treaty could potentially create new abortion rights and limit the ability of people to homeschool children with disabilities8 True ratifying the treaty would be largely symbolic for the aforementioned reasonsmdashUS policy would not be altered by the treatymdashbut the act of not ratifying is damaging to the USrsquos global reputation as a nation that protects the rights of its citizens Given that the US already complies with the provisions of the treaty why not avoid these troubling consequences when it is so easy to do so Renowned international law expert Louis Henkin so rightly equates this approach with ǲϐ ǳǣ willing to stand outside the structure supporting it but unwilling to subject itself to the critical examination and rules of that structure9 A less imaginative description of this conduct might be simply hypocrisy Protecting the sovereignty of nations is crucial but international institutions like the United Nations would not exist if states were not willing to cede a limited amount of power in

pursuit of the greater good Moreover arguments of sovereignty were used in the 1800s to justify exemption from treaties to end the slave trade even though the United States had stopped slave imports and was even maintaining an anti-slavery regiment that captured and brought to trial illegal slave ships in US courts Questions of sovereignty ϐ ͳͻͶͺConvention which did not happen until 40 years after signature This begs the question of why the US would not want to gain international legitimacy

in support of actions it is already taking while serving as a reminder that many of the policies it was resisting likely appear unquestionable and indispensable now The timing of this call is not simply motivated by a desire to return to a past stature as a leader on human rights and international justice it is also based on the fervent belief that these treaties have the power to present long-neglected diplomatic solutions to urgent foreign policy concerns With this in mind there are three key treaties the United States can and should ratify These ϐwhile demonstrating a willingness to commit our nation to the same obligations and scrutiny as other signatories Additionally these treaties are increasingly apt to achieve bipartisan support as past hurdles have been overcome by new information Moreover the United States played a central role in their conception and drafting yet Ǧϐǡchance to reap the rewards of our efforts

MULTILATERAL TREATIES

ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ

To Promote True International Cooperation The US must reconsider its position on a variety of treaties

6RXUFHKWWSZZZLOQWRGDFRPILOHVL6WRFNB6PDOOMSJ

ȁͳȁͶͷ

ǤēĎęĊĉĆęĎĔēĘĔēěĊēęĎĔēĔēęčĊĆĜĔċęčĊĊĆȋȌ Negotiated 30 years ago this treaty outlines member nationsrsquo economic commercial and environmental rights and responsibilities in using the worldrsquos oceans With unique access to ϐǡof miles of coastline and the largest exclusive economic zone (the coastal water and seabed to which the state has special rights over exploration and resources) in the world the United States has a ϐǤof Senate Republicans led by Jim DeMint (R-SC) ϐup in 2012 fearful that the United States would cede its ability to control its commercial activities to an international organization the International Seabed Authority The government has long recognized the importance of maritime issues Preserving navigational freedom drew the US into two ϐǡ ͳͺͳʹ War I President Trumanrsquos understanding of ldquothe long range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other mineralsrdquo motivated a proclamation 70 years ago regarding the resources of the outer continental shelf which led Chile and a couple dozen other coastal states across the globe to follow suit10 UNCLOS would simply be a continuation of this legacy With support from The White House (former Secretary of State Hillary ϐhearing)11 Joint Chiefs the US Chamber of Commerce the military (including former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta who called the treaty ldquoa bedrock legal instrument underpinning public order across the maritime domainrdquo)12 and former Presidents Clinton and Bush it is an ideal place ǦϐǤprotects critical national interests related to naval mobility commercial shipping oil and gas production deep-sea minerals underwater Ǥ ϐ of US military and commercial vessels to transit through international waters while recognizing US territorial expansion above all other nations Moreover the 1994 renegotiation guarantees the United Statesrsquo veto power over how the International Seabed Authority may distribute funds from the collection of resources thereby

defying the oppositionrsquos argument Furthermore UNCLOS is one of the most widely adopted conventions in history In fact the United States already honors all of its provisionsmdashthe initially contentious Part XI covering deep-sea mining was amended to its satisfactionmdashand the treaty has thus become customary law meaning states are essentially bound by its rules whether or ǯ ϐǤ ϐ US does not have a seat at the table when it comes to shaping the treatyrsquos application moving forward including the important tasks of mapping the continental shelf and negotiating the economic and security interests related to the Arctic Becoming party to UNCLOS is especially pressing as tensions in the South China Sea rise The disputes in that area could be better mediated ϐǤ ϐǯwhile providing legal backing to defend our freedom to navigate the area13 If the US loses its position as guarantor of regional security the potential for ϐresolve

ǤĔĒĕėĊčĊēĘĎěĊĚĈđĊĆėĊĘęĆēėĊĆęĞȋȌ Under President Clinton the United States ϐ ǡ Congress consistently refuses to ratify despite the fact that the US has not carried out a nuclear weapons test for more than 20 years President Obama has voiced his dedication to a nuclear free world but how is the US ever going to achieve this goal if Congress cannot even agree to ban testing of these hazardous weapons Opposition has long hinged upon the idea that the treaty could damage the viability of our nuclear arsenal but a report released in 2012 from an independent panel of the National Academy of Sciences asserted clearly that the ldquoUnited States has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe secure and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testingrdquo14 Moreover through constant improvements in the International Monitoring System and Communications Infrastructure which detects nuclear tests through auxiliary seismic monitoring hydro-acoustics and radioactive particle ǡϐdetect cheating In response to these developments


Senator John McCain originally a vocal critic of the treaty has rescinded his opposition Furthermore through the Stockpile Stewardship Program federal funding for maintaining the health of our arsenal has increased in recent years ϐ nuclear advantagemdashbetween 1945 and its last test in 1992 the United States conducted more than 1000 nuclear tests as many as all other nuclear weapons states combinedmdashit would enable the US to ratchet up pressure on states like North Korea It would also help induce Israel ʹϐǡbringing the treaty one important step closer to international effectuation

ǤĔēěĊēęĎĔēĔēęčĊĎČčęĘĔċęčĊčĎđĉ If being one of only two United Nations member states not to ratify the treaty is not enough ϐǡalso the most widely and rapidly adopted human rights treaty in history President Obama has been Ǧϐ ldquoembarrassingrdquo while committing to its review It ϐǢthe type of exemptionalism the US needs to move away from Using the nationrsquos exceptional power and wealth to promote a double standard ultimately keeps it from moving up the ladder instead moving it down to a lower rung with the most notorious of bedfellows Moreover non-ϐ ϐ ϐ United States does extend to childrenrsquos rights while generally enervating its moral authority Again opponents argue that the treaty challenges the US Constitution and will somehow chip away at rights but the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Reid v Covert (1957) clearly stated that ldquono agreement with a foreign nation can confer on Congress or any other branch of the Government power which is free from the restraints of the Constitutionrdquo Moreover arguments by death penalty supporters who resist the treatyrsquos ban on execution of juvenile offenders (including in this case Iran Nigeria and Saudi Arabia) have been obviated by a Supreme Court decision Roper v Simmons (2005) which found juvenile execution unconstitutional as ldquocruel and unusual punishmentrdquo The United Statesrsquo

conspicuous absenteeism with regards to childrenrsquos rights emasculates its commitment to what is touted time and again in political speeches as the greatest ǣ Ǥ Ǧϐ challenges the USrsquos supposed role as leader of the free world

ĔēĈđĚĘĎĔēĘ These three treaties offer the United States an opportunity to build bilateral and multilateral support around policy issues which are vital to our national security and identity And from there as the treaty mechanism regains traction it can forge ahead to reconsider such issues as the International Criminal Court through ratifying the Rome Statute which the United States ldquounsignedrdquo in 2002 or perhaps The Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Discrimination against Women ϐ Convention on the Law of the Sea the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Rights of the Child let the United States begin to retake US exceptionalism for power borne out of a steadfast commitment to human rights and the rule of law is much more compelling than brute force Let the US dedicate capital and energy to forging a better system that protects the values it holds dear Instead of claiming exemption from the Law of Nations or advancing notions of superiority let the US be truly exceptional as a leader on the world stage drawing on all the qualities that make it a great nationmdash


ͶȁʹͲͳͶ

The US should eschew its propensity toward unilateral force

6RXUFHKWWSROXPLGHLGRZXEORJFRPiquestOHVZRUOGSHDFHMSJ

ȁͳȁͶ

commitment to innovation passion for liberty and fervent belief in democracy

ēĉēĔęĊĘ1Pecquet ldquoKerry to Sign UN Arms Treatyrdquo2Jerry Moran et al Letter to President Obama3UN General Assembly ldquoArms Trade Treatyrdquo4Ibid5US Constitution art II sect 2 cl 26ldquoTreaties Pending in the Senaterdquo US Department of State7Koh ldquoJekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalismrdquo 1158Cox and Pecquet ldquoSenate Rejects UN Treatyrdquo9Koh ldquoOn American Exceptionalismrdquo10US President ldquoPolicy With Respect to Natural Resourcesrdquo11ǲϐǣǤǳ12Panetta ldquoLaw of the Sea Symposiumrdquo13Panetta ldquoLaw of the Sea Conventionrdquo14ldquoUS Stockpile Security and International Monitoring Capabilities Strengthenedrdquo

ĎćđĎĔČėĆĕčĞPecquet Julian ldquoKerry to Sign UN Arms Treatyrdquo

The Hill September 24 2013Moran Jerry et al Jerry Moran to President Barack

Obama Washington DC October 15 2013 httpwwwmoransenategovpublicindexȀϐȀǫαͺͷͻͷǦʹ͵ǦͶͳ͵ʹǦ8566-18f5a62e76bf

UN General Assembly ldquoArms Trade Treatyrdquo April 2 2013

US Constitution art 2 sec 2 cl 2US Department of State ldquoTreaties Pending in the

Senaterdquo US Department of State httpwwwstategovsltreatypendingindexhtm

Cox Ramsey and Julian Pecquet ldquoSenate Rejects United Nations Treaty for Disabled Rights in a 61-38 Voterdquo The Hill December 4 2012

Koh Harold ldquoJekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalismrdquo In American Exceptionalism and Human Rights edited by Michael Ignatieff 111-144 Princeton Princeton University Press 2005

Koh Harold ldquoOn American Exceptionalismrdquo Stanford Law Review 55 1480-1527

US President Proclamation ldquoPolicy Of The United States With Respect To The Natural Resources Of The Subsoil And Sea Bed Of The Continental

Shelf 1945 Proclamation 2667rdquo Federal Register 12 no 305 (September 28 1945) httpwwwgcnoaagovdocumentsgcil_proc_2667pdf

Panetta Leon ldquoLaw of the Sea Symposiumrdquo Secretary of Defense httpwwwdefensegovspeechesspeechaspxspeechid=1669

Panetta Leon ldquoLaw of the Sea ConventionmdashSubmitted Statementrdquo Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 23 2012

ǲϐǣǤǳNew York Times January 13 2009

ldquoUS Stockpile Security and International Monitoring Capabilities Strengthened Says New Report on Technical Issues Behind the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treatyrdquo The National Academies httpwww8nationalacademiesorgonpinewsnewsitemaspxRecordID=12849


ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

Cover Illustration Designed by Lawrence RogersSource Photo httpcommonswikimediaorgwikiFileRousseff_UN_General_Debatejpg7KH6WDQIRUG-RXUQDORIQWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQVDQDIiquestOLDWHRIWKHHSDUWPHQWRIQWHUQDWLRQDO5HOD-tions at Stanford University is published twice yearly

Copyright copy 2014 No material may be reproduced without the consent of the journal

ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



Ariella Axler

Pepito Escarce

ϐRaven Jiang

Alina Utrata






Issue One

ȁͳȁ͵










ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ϐ





p 6

p 15

p 44

p 38

p 32

p 22


ȁͳȁͷ




ȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁ












ͺȁʹͲͳͶ




ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ



Ariella Axler

Pepito Escarce

ϐRaven Jiang

Alina Utrata






Issue One

ȁͳȁ͵










ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ϐ





p 6

p 15

p 44

p 38

p 32

p 22


ȁͳȁͷ




ȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁ












ͺȁʹͲͳͶ




ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ










ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ϐ





p 6

p 15

p 44

p 38

p 32

p 22


ȁͳȁͷ




ȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁ












ͺȁʹͲͳͶ




ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ


ϐ





p 6

p 15

p 44

p 38

p 32

p 22


ȁͳȁͷ




ȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁ












ͺȁʹͲͳͶ




ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ




ȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁ












ͺȁʹͲͳͶ




ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁ












ͺȁʹͲͳͶ




ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





ͺȁʹͲͳͶ




ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ



ȁͳȁͻ











ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ






ͳͲȁʹͲͳͶ





ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ




ȁͳȁͳͳ







ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ




ͳʹȁʹͲͳͶ

















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ
















ȁͳȁͳ͵







ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ






ͳͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁͳͷ
















ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ








ͳȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁͳ













ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ







ͳͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁͳͻ

thin24






























ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ















ʹͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁʹͳ












ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





ʹʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁʹ͵










ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





ʹͶȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁʹͷ









ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ




ʹȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁʹ








ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





ʹͺȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁʹͻ


























͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





















͵ͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁ͵ͳ











͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





͵ʹȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁ͵͵












͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ








͵ͶȁʹͲͳͶ


ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁ͵ͷ





















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ















͵ȁʹͲͳͶ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ







ȁͳȁ͵






͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





͵ͺȁʹͲͳͶ











ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ








ȁͳȁ͵ͻ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ







ͶͲȁʹͲͳͶ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁͶͳ





































ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ




























ͶʹȁʹͲͳͶ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ






ȁͳȁͶ͵





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ





ͶͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁͶͷ











ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ







ͶȁʹͲͳͶ



ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ȁͳȁͶ



















ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

ǡ13

Ǥ

ǤǤǤ

Stanford Journal of International Relations Spring 2014

Documents

Transcript of Stanford Journal of International Relations Spring 2014