1:<'fER:.\ATlONAL ACA/)EMY OF COMPAR....T1vE LAW

ACAIIF:Mm INTERNATlONAU, VE OROIT COMP .... R~::

Standing

to raise eonstitutional issues :

eomparative perspeetives

EDITEV BY

Richard S. KAyG~,ORGE AND HEL~:N EKGLAKD

PROFESROR 01<' LAW

UNIVJ<:RSlTY OF COKN~;CTI('UT

SCHOOL o!" LA W

EXTRAIT

BRUYLANTBAUXELLES2 o o 5

CHAPTER 3

STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUESIN VENEZUELA

ALLAN R BREWER-CARÍAS 1

1 - Introduction

In order to analyze the legal capacity to litigate befare the "Con­stitutional .Iurisdictíon'' 01' to litigate oonetitutlonal issues regardingat.at.utes in judicial proceedlnge. it ia essential to identify the systemof judicial review of eonstitutionality that exiets in a country.

For that purpose. it is e.lways useful to follow t.he classical di s­tinction of judicial reviev\' systems in comparative constitutionallaw proposed a few decades ago by Mauro Cappellett.i , ~ who distín­guished between the diffuse (North American model) and t.he con­cent.rated (European model) methods of judicial review. Based ont.hat, dichotomy. the matter of standing to ra.ise conetitutione.l ques­tiene has to be determined according to t.he particular characteris­tics of t.he judicial rcview systems.·1

ThOfW standing rules turn out to be more complicat.ed and vanedwhen t.hc system of judicial review doea not respond to just one ofthose two claseical methods. but to a mixture, cornbination, 01'

overlapping of the same. 1t. is the case of many Latín Americancountríee, which have developed a mixed 01' oomprehenaive system

I I{""i,ed "N'in" 01' th~ Y~nl'z\wla" ~"tiüna.1 ftappor'l p..~par~d fOl' thb XVI {"I",,,,.Iio,,,,¡e¡",'I"""" '1 ("""I",,,,lil" '-'''l'. Int"' .."tiuual .-\(·MI~m.v 01' ('úmpamti,'n La'" Bri,hmw. Au"t.l'I\lia,.Iulv i(I():l

;. ,';~~ Ma,,,,,, (·.'I'I'''LI,WI'I'I. J",lici,,¡ 1I".. iCl'" i" 1/" (''''''''''POI'Ofy !forM, Indiau"p"li'. 1971,"I'~I <'(Hlt ..,,1d~ la.'>o,,,t\t,,~ionalid,,d ,k I"s I~,.~, ~n ~I dc""dlo "<lmp,,,,·ado". R''''i,'la de la. ~'a;""U,,4

¡J, ¡¡",,·r/u, ,1<: ,U,.rico, L':-;A}f :-;0 111 ~l~,i,.'n 1!l(¡¡\." fiff ..\11"" It. BUFII'",,-C'''¡A", . .{",¡¡<'inl HI"·i,,,· i'" (''''''I''''ali,,'' [,""'. ('a",ln'idg" {-ni\'I"";t."

1''-'.'''. (\u"h)'idg" llJ~!I Th~ ""mp1o)k \,,,..,;,,,, "f ti", "Our"'" ,,1' Ipet"""" ",hieh "ri¡¡:inMed tloi; ¡'""k.i, l'"hli,l,..d ill AI",n R. IlIll;W~~H-('.'''; ..\~. ~;I"d'5 de dmil enm¡mri A<'3<kmi<' I"t~"nati()n"¡" ,h·!),,,it ('i)Illl''''''~, [-\1'"."[,,,,( I3ru,,~I,. tOOI. [JI'. ;;2;;-\139

68 ALL.'I.N R BREWF;R-CAHíAS

of judicial review." as is the case ofVenezueia, where the two met.h­

ods of judicial revlew have been oombiued sínce the nineteenth oen­t.ury.

On ene hand, there is ehe diffuse method of judicial review ofconet.itutione.lity. According to t.hia mcdel all [udges have thepower to decide not to apply a statute when i t is considered to beagainst the Constitut.lon. They thus apply the Constitution inpreference to t.he st.atute to decide the speciñc case subjected tothe¡r judgment. This is a power that they are entit.led t.o exerciseex ofJicio.

On the other hand, eince 1858 Venezuela has developed t.he con­oent.rated method of judicial review of constitutionality of stat.utesand ot.her normative acts. The Supreme Tribunal of Juetice (eince2000. ita Conetitutional Chamber) possesses the power to declarenull and void statutes and normativo acta 01' similar status contraryto the Constitutíon. 'l'he Supreme Tribunal exercises t.his powerwhen a conetltutional issue regarding stetutes is raised t.hroughpopular actions of uncousut.utíonality."

Moreover. other methode of judicial review have been developedin Venezuela. For exam ple , there are specific act.ions for t.hc pro­tection of human rights and oonstit.utional guarantfes tomparo,habeas corpus, and habeas data), In addit.ion , [udgee in oharge ofjudicial review of administrative aot.ion may decide upon t.heuneonst.itu tionalit.y of adminiet.rative acte, includíng executive by­l awa.

Therefore. in Venezuela it can be said that rhe rules related tostanding in cases of judicial review of the conetitutionality of stat­utea and other norrne.t.ive state acts are not uníform. and that theyvar}' accordlng to the different methods of judicial review. II

, :-le,' Al!',,, R HI":\\'EH-(·~IIi.,~_ 1.11 jurisdi""iú.. r""""tuá,,,,,1 ,." ,\máit,,, L"t",,," l1l))m"illgo (¡,,,-,,¡,, H,;uf':<,,>: a"d ~'mn"i~"o F~rn¡i",¡,,? S~;r".'J>". La jiUi,<I/i,.,.ióJi "",-<lilll"",,,,1 "~

/I)e({>"",.:,icII, ¡'~J. l)iki,,",jll. ~hJr;d IfI!)'. pp_ 117 lijl-, S"l' Alhn Il l\uE\l'f:n-C,lni"s_ 1l'1 ,"8re"", ¡¡';.rlo () in/i'rlm/ de c",¡¡ml de la c,,¡¡,,li/,,ci,,,,,,lid,,,1

"JI ('olomb;" JI r'nl·o,,"ln, \Tniv~rsiJad 'Extel'lIad" de Colombia, ROl'o,a 1911;, ~",,,"~I (la",,,,,(',,''/., -'r':1 ""!ltl'ol de la ..."",ti!lH'ionalida,J rlf' lo" ,tet," ju"¡dio'''~" ('ol"'!lbi" a"t~ ,,1 l)(.l'~{'ho

(\''''l'al'",I,,' ('" Archir/J d" D.,-_oho PUM;M!J ('i",á~., de 1" AI/mini.,lm('Ú;n \'oi. \'11 IHll"-lllHt>.Derc,",,!) PUb/iNI en 1-'('I,.,~"eI" -" I.',)/,,,,,/'ia. lrh<titllto d,' I)HPd,,) Pllhli"", ll ni" " I'l'ida o1 (',,"tl'al ,lE,VeIlM.lleh. ('al'ae"" 1981L pp, 3\l-11~_

"S~~ in l!:"n~ral .o\lla" R. H""w':IC-(',,"i_,~_ f;1 ú.ll'mn dI' j"sricin con"tir''''i"",,¡ en I~ 1'",,­,ril,,,,;,;,, d,· 19:1-'1. ~;,]itorial .llIl'idi,,,,. \'",wzola"a, ('anwa" ~Ot)'O,

HTANDlNG TO RAIHE CO~STITUTIONAL ISSLJES I,'il \'ENEZVELA 69

H. - General prtnciplesof the venezuelan system of judicial revíew

Article 7 of the Constdtutíon of 1999' declares, ecpreeoie verbie.t.hat its text is "t.he supreme rule and the ground of the enbire bodyof Iaws." 'I'herefore. in order t.o guarantee that supremacy and thefull effectivenese of the Constitution, it has establiehed a t.horougheystem of judicial review of ate.tutes and other st.ate ecte. by givingaH [udges t.he obligation "of gue.ranteeing the integrity of t.he Con­st.itution" (Art. 334). s Consequently. in Venezuela all judgee, notonly t.he Supreme Tribunal of Justice, II exercise judicial review. 01'

the judicial power to safeguard the integrity end supremacy of theConstitution.

Aleo, all of t.he chambers of the Bupreme Tribunal of Justíce haveexpress power te guarantee "the supremacy and eñectivenees of theconstitutíonal rules and principies." They are each "the máximum andfinal interpreter of the Constétution.' and eech has to have regard for"ita uniform lnterpretation and application'' (Art. 335). The forgoingpowere are also granted to the Constítutional Chamber of the SupremeTribunal of .Iustice in order to exercise the concentrated method ofjudicial review (Arte. 266. par. 1° and 336). In this latter case. theConstitutional Ohamber is entítled. in an exclusive way, to declarenull and void cesíain. stoie neis on the grounda of unoonstdtutíonalíty- in particular atatutes and other acts with the same status 01' iseuedin dírect and immediate execution of the Constitution. 10

Regarding t.his concentrated method of judicial review. it must benoted thnt, the (lonst.it.utional Chamber doee not. have a monopoly of

; Th~ l~,t "r th~ (',,,,,,itlltioH "r:1O D~"Ptnlwt 199tJ ",a" initially l",hlisllPd i" (J"l"i'ja Ofi";,":'\" :W.Still. di\l~d 12-;lO-1I11. :-;"h'~'luPHtl" it w,,' I'LLl¡lj,h~d, ,,-ith ('olw('\io"",, in ()~c,ja 0fi";,,¡ X"'; ..f¡;:¡ ~;,t!'l1 ......di""t." dl\t~d 03-2.f-()(), i':t'~ tht' ~'H"tn""t.~ w~ h",'~ tnR.,k in AII".n R BI<I,W,~I<­

C,ui.'s, L~ (''''"Iil'''i,¡" ,/,. /"r¡r¡, ¡¡,rN/'" (',,,,,li'Jlci,,nr" 1'''''''0';/''''''. ~;dito,'i,,1 .ru ..idi,'" \'<'!le­Z(,lanll. ('''r'''''L~ ~t~>+

, ,;"" ti", dl'aft "." t."'ol'"S(·d f",' thi, (\I'tiC'le in Allan ]{, K':I,:\\'~:u-('AHiM' lJ,hai" (',,,,,·fiju!j"'de(Apm'/'_' ~ la A",,,,blea S"e;n,,~1 ('"""W".'I"'-I"), VoL 11. (.98"1'I'f/'/"r 17 Od"b,." /999) Flln-d""i"n d" D".I"·,-h,, P"'hli~" I';dil.<, ..;al .JlI,.;di"" V('Il('wlana_ (',,,'a,,",, 1111111, 1'1'_ 2~ nnci $+

" :-;,.", .-\IJan I{ R'~';\\'~;K-('."d.". f.I> ,J""¡'iri,, ('~"jc"cio"o-Ad/"i"i"r-ra!i,.(,- Vol. VII "f {".,jil,,-­ci""n /)"/ilic~,, -'J ("Jn.<!i¡'¡¡,i",,,,/,,,_ ~;<1jt(l"i,,1 .lucidi"" \'~,w,.(lla."'._ Car"..ad'"'' Cri~t.ób,,1 1\)\1,PI' 2f¡ ff

lO' 1';"~1l thollgh i" ~;,,,-,,)W a"d in "'",,,' Lati" Ame"i"",, "-o"nt ..i~s, th~,~ PO"-l.'I'" "Tt' r~'~I'\',-,,-1

tn a ('nn"tit IIti",,,,1 Trih"",,1 Clr C(lutt IInaHY of them t·,·t'H "r¡("niz~d out~id~ tr.~ .Judirial 1-'(>", ....)j" \"'''''",,''11\, ti",.'· ha"" "1",".",, 1",... " Intl¡(~d in th~ ~"I"...tne T"ibunal 'if .l",tiee_ IW,," tlll'ollghit" t'",,,tit,,ti(>,,al ('hl\ml", ... :-;~~ .001I"H It 1-l1l~;\H;I<-('.-"<iA" La J""fiúa ('""<lil",i,,,,-,,/, Yúl. YIlnf '"-"Iirllein",,, /'"Iit;,,," !I 1'",,_,rio";'!II-"/".'. ('""""" 1!J\1ti, pp. l:ll ff

70 ,\LLA;-¡ R. BREwER-cAHiAf¡

t.he concentrated judicial review of the constitutionality of all st.ateacts, but onlv reviews cenain eíote acf8 (atatutes anrl state acte withthe same rank al' issued in direct and lmmediate execution of t heConetit.ution). 11 That is why, for instance. the organa of the "Admin­ist.rative .Iunsdlctíon" (judicial review of adminietrañve ection) areentitred. pureuent to Article 2'::i9 of t.he Constétuticn. to control tIleconstitutionality of admlniet.rative acte. both normatíve (by-Iaweand non-normative. These acts are always submitted to legielation.

As a result, the judicial review system in Venezuela allows t.heexercise of judicial review of the constitutionality of state actethrough t.he following methode: 1) t.he diffuse method of judicialrevíew of const.itu t.ionalit.y of statutes and other normativo acte: 2)t he protection of conetitutíone.l righte through actions rol' protec­t.ion (nmparo); 3) the judicial review of administraüve acts on thegrounds of unconstitutíonality tbrough adminietratíve actions ofannulment ; ami 4) the concentrated method of judicial revlew 01'the constit.utione.lity of certain etate ecte t.hat is reserved to theConstitutional Chamber of t.he Supreme Tribunal of Justice. l~

Accordinglv. in the Oonstit.ution of 1999, all the principies of themixed 01' comprehenelve syatem of judicial review are gathered.whir-h ia a feature ofthe Venezuelan t.radition. 1:1 TIle Rtanding rules,of courae. are different in each case,

Ll.l. - The diffuse methodof judicial revíew

A. - ()ONi-;TITUTIONAL PROVn,IO:-l¡..¡

One epeoific way of exercising judicial review ie, within theauthority every judge has, t.o decide upon t.he conetitutionality ofst.atutes. t.hrough t.he so-called diffuse method of judicial review

11 S"~ in g"neo-al. ,1,11"" H.., RI"""""'('.<Ili-l.', J"dici,,1 Rfl"Ú" ¡¡¡ ('()I"pamli,'" /Allr. "1'. till' I!lll, "",1 AIL~n R. H"''''·':''-('.,,,iA', n I'I>"lml cn~"fnlr"'}') <1,. la ¡,¡",,,ii1¡¡,'i()J¡,,lid~" d,' ",,< ley"_"(f:d""{i,, d,' /)er<,dw (''''''},,"'''''''I. ~;d;toru,l ,)u"¡die" V",wzu],w". Ca"".'", 1\)(I-1-.!' 111

" '1'1,;, 1"" 1)(,(", ""'''''al';z~<I hy tlo~ ('onstitut;,,,,nl Chnmloel' of thB ::il,pr~"w (:0,11-(. 01',h,"llI'~¡" d"";,;",, S" I fl-l- dHt,·<I 1I~. 1,;·2UUI i" RaiA". ,/<- lhNCh" Púb/ic" Xo. 8;;·kk. 1';<I;to,;,,1 ./",;<1;(.".\""""'."I<",a, (',,,,,,,·a.'. 2lH>] 1'1' -1-1l; ff.

1:\ Ci"" All;u' ]{, BI1""'FI'-C.'";.'\~. "La. .iuAi(';a. ('()n"t;t,,,,;,,,,,,l "n 1" huna ('onA;tu";,,n" inlI",:i.,r~ d,' /)fru¡'" (")/I",lil"'-;o",,.1 X" 1 C"-l'a'"'' S~p.·l)i,·. 1!1!lfl, 1'1'. :;;"4--\, ,'\11"" R. 1{",;I\'EI'­("",i,,", f;'1 Si,r,·"", ,¡" j".'lil'ú, f"".<lir"'-;o,,.,,1 e" 1" (-'",,,Ii'''fió,, d,· Ifl.'I.9. I-;<I;II,,-;al .)LI1'id;"" \'"".<'>,ohn". ('",,0,""" ~\"Hl

1';L\t\DIl\'G TO RAI,sE CO¡¡¡,sTITCTIONAL ISSUEi'l IN YEt\EZl:ELA 71

that has exieted since the nineteenth century.1-1- H has been pro­vided for since 1897 in Article 20 of the Civil Procedure Codeo whichstates t.hat,

In case a statutr- in fOl"'''. whosc applicat.ion is requested. conflicts wit.h any

coustitutiunal provision, judges shall apply t.he lutter with prefercncc. h-,

Based on OUI' proposal, tu t.he 1999 Conetltution consolídated t.he

diñuse method of judicial review of the conetitutionality of sta.t­utos, following. for example. countries like Colombia in 1910(Art. 4); Guatemala in 1965 [Art.. 204): Bolivia in 1994 (AI't. 228);Honduras in 1982 (Art. 315) and Peru in 1993 [Art.. 138).17 lt wasplaced in Article 334. with the following wording:

In case uf incomputibilitv bet.weeu thi .• Const.itut.ion and a stut.utc or otherlegal provisión «onst.it.utional provisicne shall he appliod. in all vourts in any(-a~(' whatsocvcr. even at tite Courts own initiative. in the pcrtinent. dccisinn

In t.his way, the diffuee met.hod of judicial review in Venezuelaacquired constitutional ranking, and can even be exercised e.r officioby all courts. IS including. 01' oourse. the different Charnbers of t.heHupreme Tribunal.

Accordlng to t his conetltutional provision , all judges at any levelare entrueted wi th the power and duty to control the oonstltutton­ality of normat.ive acts of t.he State by not applyíng a provlslon t.heyconsider unconstitutional to a specific case. iu This power is hased ont he princlple of constitut.ionnl supremacy. eccording to whioh uncen­stitutional acts are void and of no value. 'I'herefore. all judgce, whena specifio case is brought befare them (even at their own initiative)

" It w,," ("pn',"ly ""hL>Ii"I,,..d in ll,<' ('i\-jl P,.O('~tlll[,~ Cotl~ ,,1' lR!!j N~~ Allan R BI<f:\n:I:·('AI:í ..~ . ./"di"i,,1 flNiw' in ('Mnl',,,·~Ii,.., /,"".". (Ji'- "il. PI!- lt7 lf. AH"" R. BI't:w~ld','\l<i,,,. L"./""Iiei" ('¡",,,liluei"I/,,I. Yol. YI ()1' ¡I<""if""i"",:,, Poli/ie"" !f ('"".;litueion"/,,,. (JI'. 61. ('~I·It" ...,

Ilm6, pp, Xl) a",1 ft1:, Th~ I'rtI",jl'l~ ha' "I~(J h~~n ~,t,oI.>I"It~tl in a· ,imilar w,,~,- in t.h~ ("'iminal l·r"I'.~<I,"·~ Orga.ni"

('o,!<- ( ..\0'[ l~l) ..., Nt'(, tltt' draft w" I",ol"'""'¡ 1'0, ",.tid,- 7 i" AII"" R. BI1I;WEI<-C.-\Hi.,". D,/mle ('on,,¡;¡n'l,nlf.

(A/)(¡r/l·"" 1" A.,~",¡'¡,'~ .\'"ciol/"I ('""slif"!!'''ff) \'01. 11 ~p eif 1'1' 14·34," "t'l' AII,,,, H. 1>111'''''':1< ('.'''¡.,s. f),·b"l, ('uII..,fil,,'I"'¡" (Al",rl', " la A,,,,,,IJI,,, .\'~til}"IJ/ (',"'­

.<li('''I''"II'). r(Jl. /11 ~:di[<>l'i~1 ..I"ridi(.~ Vl'n,'",L~n~, ('~ml'''" Hf9!l pp. 94-105l' Thi, 1"" ¡'"n a t"ntll"~ ,,1'tlt~ V~n~•.II~htll "",tem. Nee AII"n R. B""W""'('~I<i,\~, La ,/",..

ficú, ('''I<"lill<e;'"",I. \'<.>1. \' ,,1' {",Id"cil},,,·, P(Jldi'''''!f i'ufIOfilllú"f!"/',,·. Editori,,1 ,Jul'itli~a Y~IW'

"."Im"o.. ('a.c,,,'''' 199(•. l' HH,,, N~~ ti", ~"l'r~lIl~ ('""rl "f .""til'~ in P"liti",t1-.-\<Irnini,tmti"e Cltamher rI<"oi<ion t\" 121:\

d"(,,,1 Ot,-:lti-~f)f)f) (1'"", (\,eh'8 l' (Iareia l' ",;. ('Ul'rjW 'J'¡!¡-¡úeo 41' [a ¡'olil'in J"dil'ial). in H""¡.<ln

d, /I",rcho /',¡I,/;',o, "''', 1'2. ~:r1itol'inl J"ri<!il'a \-'''n'''."lan", C"m,'a, ~i}O\). pp. 40~ 1'1',

72 ALLAN R. BRE\vER-CARÍAS

are entitled to decide "pon the unccnetitutionality of the st.atutethey ahall apply for the reeclution of the case as an incidental issue.The decisión of the judge has only iruer portee effecte in t.he specifiocase. The decision taken, therefore. has declarative effecte. ~H

Standing to raise a constitutionai iasue in a proceeding belonge inthe first place to the parties, based 00 the concrete interest theyhold in the t.rial.

This procedural interest is, in general. t.he one set forth in theCivil Procedure Oode, whioh requlres that the plaintiff picad hisown exist.ing personal right 01' interest against a defendant {Art.. 340CPC). 'I'herefore the ple.intíff and the defendant are t.he parties enti­tled to raise eonstitutional ieeuee in the proceedíng. Third-partiesare entitled to raíse t.hese íssuee as well. as long as they have anactual intereet. in supporting the reasons of one party , 01', in otbercases, are authorized by the Civil Prooedure Code (Art. 370).

C. - STANDING DJ 'fHE CASE

O~' COLLECTIVE OR DIFFLJíiE INTERESTS

The Constitution of 1999 eetablished the right to acceas judicialorgans not only to enforce epecífic pereonal rights and intereste, butaleo to enforce "collective 01' díffuse interests'' (Art. 26); the permla­sibilit.y al' actions raised on behalf of such interests was set fort.h inthe Constitut.ion.

The Constitutionai Chamber has indicated t.hat, "wit.h collect.ive 01'

diffuee rights 01' intereste, the intention ir; not protecting socialclesses, buf- a number of individuals who can be ooneidered as rep­resenting t.he entire 01' an important part of a society, who areaffected in const.it.utional rights and guarantees meant to protect t.hopublic welfare by an attack on t heir quallty of life." In particular,tho Chamber has eaid, diffuse intereats represent injuries to the envi­ronment 01' to consumera. These injuries "have expaneive effectst.hat harm le.rge sectore of t he count.ry and even t.he world. Orantingstanding based on such intereete responde to the undetermlned obJi­gation of protecting the environment 01' consumera." 'l'hat kind ofdamage affecte everyone to a greater 01' lesser degree. It is differentfrom damage suffered by varioue groups t.hat can be determined as

STANDING 1'0 RAI."iE CO~~TITUTIONAL ISSUES I~ VF.NF.ZUF.LA 73

euch , even if this damage is noto quantifiable 01' individuallzed, aswould be the case of t.he inhabitente of an area of the count.ryaffected by an illegal oonstruction that creares problems wif.h t.hepublíc ser-vices in t.he area. These lat.ter. more focused specific inter­este are t.he coüeawe ones. They refer t.o a determined and identifiedsector of t.he population (even though not quantified), and thereexiste 01' might exist a legal bond uniting the members of t.he group.Thie is the case with damages to professional groups, to gl'Oups ofneíghbors, to labor unione, to t.he inhabitants of a determined area,etc. These focused intereste differ from t.hose t.hat affect evervonewithout dlstlnction, 01' wide categoriee of the population, eventhough the majority is uot aware of the damage. sínce the collediveculture is t.he one in charge of rea!izing it., and it might fail in doingso. The diffuse intereste are t.he wider ones, where t.he damaged goodis t.he most general good, sinoe it conoems the entire population and,contrary to collective intereets or rights, t.hey arise from an obliga­tion of undetermined scope: while in the collective ones, the obliga­tion may be concrete, yet owing to individual persons. 21

Consequently. if there is a trial to enforce collectíve 01' diffuseinterests. whoever acts on behalf of those ínterests at the beginning.01' is a party, may also raise the constitutional issue so t.hat t.hojudge may exerclse diffuse judicial review. In t.hese cases, as indi­cated by the Constitutional Chamber. "t.he plaintiff sues based notonly on his personal right 01' interest , hut aleo on a oommon 01' col­lectivo right 01' intereat." and the beeía of the claim is "t.he generaldamage to the qualit.y of !ife of all the inhabitants of the country01' parte 01' it, since the legal situation of all t.he members of thesociety 01' ita groups has been damaged when their common qualit.y01' !ife was unprotected.' ea

D, - THE Ex OFFJC1O POWER OF THE JUDGES

As we have aleo said in the Venezuelan eyst.em. pursuant to t.heConstitution (Art :·t~4), t.he judge himself ex oJJicio, may mise t.he

;¡ See de";,i",, 01' lhe ('"""tit.lIt;or,,,1 Cha",lwr ~o ¡¡:-.¡¡ 01' tlt;·:}O·tll «'Me /),/"" .."" "d ¡'",MoV". ('"m,,,io" L"yi.,/al,...,. .\'"ci~"a/i ~,.(, t.he ,'Ct<.'t"'\ü' in lhe d<'('i"iOll t,1' lhe "arne "h"",her ~()

4~7 "fH4·(j6·~tltll in [(""i,III d" [),r",,/'" /'¡i/,/,,:o. :\0. Ri¡·¡¡¡;. ~:ditol·j,,1 ,.I"ddi"" \'('''''''01;"\,,. (''U'"ca, tOO1. Jll!. ~;j3 ff

"T.h",i"ion X" 1.04R "1'11,,, ('o,,,tillltiollal Chnmher fhted tI~·17-0H (·a,,· Willi"", IJj,'d" 1:.'

Cons,jo N~~i",,,,/ 8/_010",1) in He)';.,·/" de /)Ntdlt¡ ¡'ú!>lit¡¡. ~o. !n. Editorial.luridi"". Venez<Jlana.Caraca., 20(jU, ¡W :ln ft'.

74 A LLAN R BREWER·CARÍA8

iseue of the conetitutionallty of a stetute determinative of thecase. Prom thís, it can be inferred that t.he judges ha.ve standingto mise conet.ltutdone.í issuee in cases they are to decide. However.in t.hoee cases. the judge shal l hear the part.ies on any issue of con­stitutionatity they have raieed before decídíng in order to guarán­tee the right t.o due process and in defenee of the parties(Art.49.e).

E. - THE STANDING OF THE PVHLIC PROSECCTOR

AND THE DEFEl'fDER OJ<' THE PEOPLE

The Public Prosecutor. when choosíng to intervene , in both civil(Art. 129 ami ff CCP) and criminal (Art. ~8.'), Art. 105 Penal PI'O­cedural Organlc Cede¡ procodures, ia entitled as well to mise coneti­tutional issues to the ordinary judge so it will be decided in the spe­cific case.

Additionally, the Constltution of 1999 has created a new organ oft.he Stete: the Defender of the People. The Defender of the Peoplehea widc capacit.y tú enforce respect for and the guarantee ofhuman righte and to protect t.he legitimate, collective. and diffuserights and íntereste of persona againat ilIegal aotions, power devia­t.íone, and mlstakes medo in t.he managing of public services. It iscntitled to sue and Ele ter remedies. In those prccedures, of ccurse ,the Defender of the People and the other parties are entitled toraise constitutional íssues.

:1<'. - THE K\:TRAORDINARY POWER (JI<' RE\'ISlO:\I

OF 'l'HE CO!\STITUTlONAL CHAMBER

With regard to t.he diffuse method of judicial review, it muet hepointed out t.hat until t.he Constitution of ]999 became effectdve.review was a power exciusively exercieed before t.he ordinaryoourt.s. The issue generally terminated in t.he two levels of adjudi­cation that ruled t.he judicial procedure. However, it was also pos­sihle to bring cases before the Cassatíon Chamhers of t.he SupremeTribunal. Ir so, t.he prior judicial resolut.ion of the issue of consti­tutionality might be reviewed by thoee Chambere (Art. 312 and ff.,Civil Procedure Code. CCP).

The Constitution of 1999 lntroduced a corrective to deal with t.hepossible multiplieity of judicial decieione following from the diffuse

:,;TANDING TO RAloSE CO:-¡¡';TITUTIO:-¡AL I:';:,;UE:,; IN VE:-IEZUELA 75

method of judicial revíew. The Constitutional Chamber of t.heSupreme Tribunal of .Iustice was granted power to:

revicw final dcciaions issued b,v tlJe «ourt.s of t.he Repuhlic on (,OIlRtitutionnlproteotion (llmpllm) and un judieild review of statut.es or legal rules, in tlJe termsost.abllshed b,v tho l'eRppdivC' organ¡« law (Art. 336,10 ('on"t.itutiofl).

It must be said t.hat., of COllI'Se, thie review is neither an appealnor a general second 01' third procedural instance. It is an excep­tíonal faculty of t.he Constitutional Chamber to exercise upon it.ajudgment and dlscret.ion. lt provides an extraordinary remedy thatmuy be applied t.o decisions of last instance in which conetitutlonalíasuee are decided by judicial review 01' declared in asn.poro t.rials. Inany case, it is a reviewlng faculty. which is not obligatory. ami itma'y be exercised at t.he optíon of the Chamber.?"

IV - The judicial review oí constitutionalitythrough the actíon oí amparo (action for protection)

of constitutional rfghts and guarantees

A. - AJJI'AHO AH A CONSTlTUTIO:-IAL RWHT

As with the p revious Conatitution of 1961, the Conetitution of1999 seta forth as the aot.ion for protection (amparo) as a conetitu­

tionai rigltt. 2+ Conaequently, it is an obligation of all courte t.o pro­tect. withiu the scope of their juriedictions, personfl in t.he exerciseof t heir constitutional rlghts and guarantees.

1'0 that end art.icle 27 of the Constitution of 1999 provided:Every individual i, ~lIlillf(l lo b... protccted by thc court.s in the onjoymout

und «xcrcisc uf rights, even t.hosc which derivo from t.he nat.nre 01'man and are

not. eXI'I'Psgl,Y sct fort.h in t.his Conat.it.utiou 01' in intcruet.ional t rea.tics on hUlIlánrighlo.

B. ,hTDH'IAL ATTRIBITTIO:-lI';

A':-<D THIi; ¡';IMl'LH'[Ii;D PROCE[)l:RE

Now. in the oaee of the act.ion of atnpa,ro, the Oonstitution eddí.tíonally expresely est.a.hlishes t hat the procedure shall he oral, pub-

,,, In u (,,,"(,,in "''',\' 110 .. r<'nwdy i" '¡",ilar to thl' ""'il '1 crrlio",ri uf tlw Km'l-h A"'~ri""n 'Y"'t~m Sl'<' Alla" R. lJH,·"n:,,·I'.'''¡.'s, J""lici,,1 (In';",," ¡" ('r)''''IJUmli''f I,~".'. "p. (·il..1'. 1+1, H(", tlw('PI"",,,nl' 01' .1<-.",., ~r"l'¡'t t'.-\~,"" ('""xlii1,i'i,j", '1 J"",lii'in ('nn,<iil"";m,,,l. (:",1'1"-"" :!()()I). p. \Ji

" ,;('(' '-\11.,,, It. lI,n;\H:n·t',,,¡.,.,. 1.'1 ¡¡,,'CI"'!J la Acc.;Ón ,¡" ,ú"l',un. \'(,1. \' {JI' 1,,__<Ur-aciOIl-l','P"li¡ic"~!1 ('",,·,·I¡laci"n(¡lc~ .. }o~(ljl''''i,,1 ,)L",',(]'t('''' V<,,,<,,o\an,,, ("'I'u."u,>-,;"" t~-r"I·i>b"1. 1\1\)>, pp. Hl If

76 AtLAN R. BREWER-CARíAS

lic, brief, and free and without any formality. The [udge is entitledimmediately to restare t.he former legal situation OI' a similar situ.at.ion. Therefore, every single day wilJ be a working day, and thecourt wiII ieeue such decieions in preference to others.

Coneequently. as per the Organic Law 00 Amparo of Conetitu­t.ional Rights and Guarantees of 1988,2<; courte of common appeals.which are t.he competent courte for these actlone, act as constitu­t.ional judges.

C. STANDING IN THE ACTlON OF AJfPARO.

THE PERSONAL CHARACTER.

In auy case, an outstanding feature of the Venezuelan conetitu­tianal system ie the breadth of the aot-ion of amparo. A liberal inter­pretation was thought necessary to assure legal means whereby anyindividual, affeoted in his constitut.ional righta, could claim imme.diate legal protection.

Standing t.o raise t.he action of amparo belonge to every individ­ual whose eonstitutional rights and guarantees are affected.v" Suchrights include even those not expressly listad in the Constitution orin int.ernat.ional treaties on human righte ratified by the Republicbut believed to be inherent in human beings. In Venezuela, humanrighte t.reatiea rank at the same Ievel as t he Constitutíon, and t.heyprevail even in the internal order as long as they establieh rules onthe enjoyment and exercise rights more favorable t.han those estab­lished in the Constitntion and Iaws (Art. 23, Constltunon).

Court decisiona have been oonstant in grantlng t.he actíon ofamparo a personal charecter. 'I'herefore. standing belongs firstly to"the individual direetJy affected by the infringement of constitu­tional rights and guarantees." 2i

"O, s~~ (;nccla Oflci"l Xo 33.H91 dat~<l 01-22-88, See ill gmeral .-\lIan R. Flk¡;"'~I(-(',\Ri." andCarl,,~:l-l AI·,II.A ("'H.-I'I. L" f,ey OrgánitIJ 1/, Amporo .'0/'" Dutdw·, y (ioran!ifl.' CO>l.#il"t;wI('¡"H.Cal'a,,,,, IH.sli.

'" 1,,,li"id,,al. 1'"lit.i,'"L ,,-,~iaL (,,,ltufaL ,'d"taliv~. ('tonomi". Indian and ,,,wir,,nnlPnt.al ri¡.o:ht"and tllPir ¡,(ll>tl'antN" a,.., li"t~" in a,1s. 19·1111. Con4,lution. In Ve,,~zllda, th~r~ ~x,4" no limi·tat·ion "4abli,hed i" other eouIltrie' kg. German.". nml Spain, "'Io.... h '",,"u~e' 01<' a.etion of".mil''''') to ¡Jn>t<'(,t jllst "j'"".-lament.,d l'ight,' See Allan R. B''';W~;'''('A''i.~,,-, HI Amparo (J 108I/"red"", !I giJ'ranlín" wli-$/illtcional", Iltlw opmú""'áÓJI r"'''I-''''''li''''¡ Editorial .'",·idira Vene­",Ia"a, e,na"a, 19\1:\.

" ....ee ro, ~xaml'le. dc~i"i"n ofthc Con,titllt.;onal f"hamher dat ..d 03·1,,·2000. 1(",,,1,, d, nfre­,'ho "ÚMiNJ. F.dit,.".ial .IHl'idira Venezolana :-lo ::>1. 2()(k1, pp. 322·:12:1

STANDING 1'0 RAlSE CONSTI1'LTTlONAL ISSUES IN VENEZUELA 77

In Venezuela, actions of nmpnro are instituted against st.ateorgans, against corporations, and even against individuals beceuseof the lnfríngement 01' threat of violation of the constitutícnalrighte and guarantees.

D. - STA~DrNU IN CASES

OF Drn'USE OR COLLECTIVE CO~STJTUTlONALRlGHTS

Moreover, by virtue of the constitutional acknowledgment of thelegal protectíon of diffuse 01' collective interests, the ConstitutionalChamber of the Supreme Tribunal has also admitted the poesibility ofemploying the action of amparo to assure collective intereeta. Theselnclude, for example, that of vcters in their politica.i rights. The Cham­ber has aleo allowed precautíonary meaaures with erga. omlUfi effecte"for both indívíduale and corporations who have inetituted an actíonfor conetitutional protection, ami to all voters as a group.v-"

The Constitutional Chamber. similarly has decided tha.t "anyindividual is entitled to bring suit besed on diffuse 01' collectiveinterests'' and has extended "standing to companíes, ccrporatíons,foundatione. chambers. unions and other collective entities, whoseobjeot is the defense of society, as long as t.hey act within theboundaeíes of their corporate objecte, aimed at protecting t.he inter.ests of their members regarding t.hose objecte.t' "

E. - STA~DI~G OF THE DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE

lo addition, the Defender of the People has the authorit.y to pro­mote, defend. and guard constitutional rights and guarantees "asweH as the legitime.te. collective 01" díffuse interests of t.he citizens'(Arte. 280 and 281, 2C). The Constitut.ional Chamber has admittedthe standing of the Defender of the People to bring to suít in anaction of amparo on behalf of t he citizens as a whole. In one casethe Defender of t.he People acted against a threat by the National

!, De('i,ion of ti,.. Conotitutiun..1 Chamber ),;" 4H.1 of O;;·Z9·:!O(J() (('''~e "Q1<uemw /I'ltg;," !Jo/ro'l. lIais/" ,¡, lInerhn I'Iibliru. Ed¡t.<>ri~.1 J"ridi"" Venezolana., ~o S~. ~O\~I. ~;,IV PI' 489·491In t)w 'ame "ells~. dee;,ion nI' the ""me C'hamber ;-';" ¡J.l- 01' 1:\·07·:!OOO (C",,, APR[.-'J['¡. inH""i.~r" dp [h:rpch" 1',;b1iw. :\0. H~. Edi!Ol'i ..1 ·juridi(,,, \'enezolana. ('!ir.."", ~l)(m. "l'. 319 tl.

!" I'('f' de(,¡,ioll ,,1' th~ ('on,tit."t.iomtl ('ham bel' .\lo656 01'()ll·O,;-2i~11 ICa,,' J)efe"-'M dd P",.hI(},'s Comiúú" Lp¡ris/aUm Saci(}nal). in 1I"'iol". </_ /)"""'0 Públim. ;-';0. >13. Editorial.Jul·ídiea Vell',.""<>l"n,,. (:ura""~ ~0Il\1. pp. ;\19 ff

78 ALLA.'< R. BREWF,R-í'ARÍA8

Leglslat.ive Commlssion to appoint Electoral National Councd mem­bers without fulfilling conetitutional requiremente.

In that case, the Conetitutional Chamber. declded that "t.heDefender has standing to bring ectiona aimed at. enforcing diffuseand col lective right.s 01' interests'' without rcquirlng t.he acquiea­cence of the societ.y Oll wbose behalf he acta. but thie provisión doeenot ex elude 01' prevent citizens aceces to the judicial syetem indefense of diffusc and oollectlve rights and intereste. sínce article 26of t.he Constitution in force provides acceaa to the judicial systemto everv person, whereby indívíduals are entitled to bring suit aswell. unlees a la.w dentes t.hem that actíon. :10

F. - EXTRAORDI)lARY PmvRR OF REYlEW:

THE CO)lSTITLTTIO:'>IAL CHAMBER

In order t.o secure uniformity of appllcation ami interpretation ofthe Conat.itution. artide 336 of t.he Conat.itntion aleo grants theConetitutione.l Chamber the right. on mat.ters of amparo, to reviewdefinitíve and final decieíons Issued by the courts. The aame prin­cíples that, can be raised againet decisione oí" ordinary courts. inwhich the diffusc met.hod of judicial review of a law hnd been exer­cised. are applicablc to t.his extraordinary remedy. The exerclae oft.h¡s review is e.t the discret.ion of the Chamber.

G. - THE ACTlo", OF HABEAf, DATA

Noto. finally, that the Constituüon of 1999, expressly meMpo­rated the RCtiOO of liobeae dala; onginated in BraziJ and followed byColombia and many other Latín American countries. l t is set fort.hin article 28. as Icllowe:

EV{,l"Y pcrson has the right of accoss to infcrmation and dat.a. nbunt himself01" his pouds fii(,,1 in offi(,¡,¡] 01' privn.tv r,,(:()rd~. wit.h ¡'x(Tptions "~13l>lishcd byluw. a~ w\'11 ,t~ lo know lit" us" uf'thcm ami thcir purpuse. aml lo rcqucut. a com .pctcnt court lo makc t.hom upto-duto. lo ]"eet.ify t.hcm or dest.rov them if tlt,'ywcre orroncous 01' t.hey affcct. in a.u illegit.imate "'ay his rights. Tn the sume wav ,he rnay hnve atu,~~ t.<J document.s cf any kintl eoutaining informaliun ,,·ho~('

kllowl,'(lgt is inklT~ling to ('.otlllljul\iti,';; 01' gl"<l\lp~ uf indi,'id\li\I~. TllP sccrets cf.io\ll'llali~li{' snurces of informatiuu and other profeseions are «xceptcd as dctcr­minvd by luw

"" 1"· ..i,;,,,, ,,1' t Ion (''''''1 it.,,! ;"nal eb,,,,, IJH x' (~)(¡ ,,1' mi·O;,·eoot I( 'u,,, I),¡,."."" 1/,1 /,,,,,1,1,,"-', ('vlili,,·il;" I..fyi,;/IIliM Xllti,;nall.

RTA:.lDDW '1'0 IL\181'; CO:-lRTITU'['IO:.lAL IkRUER I~ V~:~EZUELA 79

As to t.his constitutional act.ion. the Ccnstitutíonal Chamberpointed out t.hat. it is not properly an aot.ion of amparo. indicatinghowever, t.hat "t.he individual. personally 01' in hie goods. Involved'ia entitled to bring t he action of hobeoe dala.:\1

V. - .Iudícíal reviewof the constttutíonality of by-Iaws

and administrative acts carr-ied outby the "administrative jurisdiction"

A. - THE ·'ADMI:-<I.-;TIL-\.TIVE ,JUI{18DJ('TIO~"

.'1.8 CO!\RTITUTIONAL ,JUDGE

Article 259 of t.he Constitution sete fort.h the "Administratlve.Iurisdiction'' (speclal judges for judicial review of ad ministrativeact.ion). with power:> to annul general 01' individual adminletrativeacte cont.ra.r-v to law. 01' in excess of authority: to order the pay­mcnt of money and eompensa.tion for de.mages caused by t.hoAdministration: t.o decide nlaims for fulñllrnent of publ¡c eervioee ;and to e.n-ange what is necessa.ry to rest.ore t.he legal aituat.ionimpaired by the act.ivity of the Administra.tion.

'l'herefore. pursuant to t.his rule and to t.he Constitution of 1999,judicial review of constit.utionalit.y is e.lso veeted in the courte of the"Admínistrative .Iurisdiction' when excrcising their power of annul­ment of udministrative acte. including by-laws contrarv to law onthe grounde of uuconet.itut.ionality.F'

B. - STA:.lDI:.lU R¡;LRS:

SIMPLE OIt LEGITIMA'I'F, Il\TEREST

The standing to challenge administ.ratlve acts in judicial edmin­ist.rative revicw proceedíngs on t he grounde of unconetitutéonalítyand its illegality variee dependlng on whether the case is about by­lawe (01', more generally. about normative adminiatrative act.s] 01'

administrativo acte with pe.rtlcular effecte.

" B,·"¡,¡,,,,:-;' :l:l:: nf ti", ('on8tit"ti,,,,,t1 Ch"mlH'r (J"td U:l-I-t--tlJlJl (('lO'" ¡"""t" "8. ¡¡iree/Md, /)r"~,,x -'! ('"."n':¡i..".< d,'¡ Mini.,t"i" rl,' Sa.nida,1 ti Aú.;tuu:i" Swi"I). ¡u R,'";..,·/,, ,¡" f)Nedw¡',¡Mic". x". H;,-!<!<. ~~d¡I'''''¡al .1",.idi".8 Y~TWZ()llln". C",·""", acu, 1'1'. -t-!<~ rr

,,; k~~ .'\11"" R. 1l1O':I\'f:I< ('"d·". La ./".,/i,·i" C"n/e""'''''·'¡-.-t-d",i·"i,tml¡'" Y"I. \'11 ,,1' ¡"-"til"cil""., /'"litiNl.' '1 (",,,,,/i',,eion"¡',,, I'nl. rll.ol'. <'iI.. I'p.:W ff

so ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS

Since the nineteenth «ent.ury an ection to invalidate by-Iawe andother normative administrative acts in the Venezuelan administra­tive judicial review system has been understood as he.ving the char­acter of a popular ectéon: it may be brought by any citizen. Con­sequently, it is enough for auy citizen with R· simple intereet inlegality 01' oonstitutlonality. to raíse the nulllty act.ion. ~:l A simpleIntereet 18 defined "as the general right granted by law to every cit­izen to access the competent courts t.o raise this nullity of an uncon­stitutionai 01' illegal adminiatrat.ive general act.." 34

However, as to the administrative acta with particular effecte.standing to challenge t.hem befare the courts of the AdminlstrativeJuriedicñon legally belongs only to those who have a "personal,legitimate, and direct intereat" in the annulment of the act.: that isto say. to those personally and directly damaged in their legitimaterighte and intereste. Even though the Supreme Tribunal of .Iustice,interprenng the 1999 Constitution (Art. 26, Access to Justice).decíded that "it is enough to allege a legitimate ínterest, but notthat it be personal 01' direct.:":" the recent 2004 Organic Law on theSupreme Tribunal of Justice has ineísted on a standing rule of "per­sonal, legitimate and dlrect interest" (Art 20) 36

On the other hand, in edminíst.retdve mattere, even before thenew Constitution became effect.ive in 1999, the poseibilit.y of pro·tecting collective intereete was recognized. in particular againstcity-ple.nning aete."? In any case wit.h t.he eame features díscussedon t he protection of collective 01' diffuse Intereete. the standing ofcitieens to claim annulment of adminietrative actiou appearsadmíssíble even against administrative eots of particular effecte ir,beeidee harming t.he plaintiff, they aleo harm a collective 01' dif­fuse right :lll

'U ¡'¡"m. pp. 7+ 1'.1'. Spp, for e'~.m"I~, dfti~jon nf 0'" Supreme COllrt. nf ./u~ti"p ;)) Politi(',d·Ad'rlini'trativ,-, ('hambel'. rlat~d 11·(1:)·99 (('a"e Comité I~Ur"r()fni,';()"""¡ d" "in de CIi","p"y"d.

'" ~ee ,j(,ri,iu)) uf th~ Fir>t A¡)mini~tratiw ('ourt rl"tcd 03·22-00, "~'e B""co de V""',:vl,,,,,,J" ('I'';dil" 1'. S"pninl"",¡,nria de R""co.<. in Rerisla de f!ere,/¡.o Públiro, ~>lit.()ri,,1 ./"rírlira Ven·~",I"n", ;.¡" SI ('"""ea, 2000. pp. 4,;2--l,,3

;n Scc d~,-,i"jon of tl,~ .'i"p"em~ Courl. of ,J,,"I.j,'e ¡n P"lJt.i"al-A.dm¡n¡st-,'M,i\'~ Ch"!Jlb~r (lf 14­l3-00 {('as" !In","" Fi"fne~ 1'''. J""lu de EmoGf·ltóa Fi¡¡u-,¡rúra). in H"'I,i"in. de Deru/¡" P"blieo,Erlito,ül .Ju";di ..a Vc"ezohtna. :\" ,.,2. Ca"a.ca>', ::lOOO, PI', ,;,.,2-:;83

'H' :';"" ..'111"" R I3RF.w"I(·C.'RiA", Ley ()ryúnira .Id Tri/n,,,al S¡¡prUnO de Jw;liúa Edito";»1.l"ridi"" V~nezolana, ('"""eas 2004

" S~~ AII"n H. I3l<t;W¡;"'('A"í.,~. {,,, Ju.,/icia Co-nlenú"M·.4dnú,ú"ita./il.-o, VoL Vil nf 1~I'/iiu'

cimu" Polilir".H y Con8Wucio,,,,/es, "1'. ril., pp. l30 ff" !d"".

8TA~DI~G 1'0 RAJSE CONS1'ITU1'lONAL ISSUES IN VENEZUELA 81

Moreover, decisions annulling administrative ects. both norma­tive and of particular effecte, have erga omnes effects. 39 Any differ­ence depende on whether tbe ectaon bes been raieed on behalf of aparticular right or a collective or díffuse right.

VI - The concentrated methodof judicial revíew

of the constitutionality of statutes

A. - THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTIO;"¡

OF THE CO;"¡STITUTIONAL CHAMBER

OF THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL

The Conetitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of .Iueticehas been establíshed as t.he Constitutional Jurisdiction, with powerto exercíse judicial review of st.atutes, and to invalidare them on thegrounde of unconstitutionality.e'' Pursuant to articlee 266,1, 334,and 336 of the Constltut.íon, the Constitutional Chamber has com­petence in t.he following mat.ters:

In t.he first place. in keeping with a tradition that dates from1858,41 the Constitution of 1999 epecified the conoent.rated methodof judicial review of statutes, vesting that power in the SupremeTribunal of .Iustice. Pursuant to art.icle 334 of the Constitution, itsConstitutional Chamber has the authority to :

declare the nullity of statut.cs and ct.her acte of organs exercising public poworissued in direct and immediate execut.ion of t hc Constitution or boing rankedequal to a law. [This power belongs] cxcluaively to the Constitutional Uha.mbcr01' the Supreme Tribunal al' -Iust.ice.

Precieely. as per this rule, end under article 336, the Constitu­t.ional Chamber of t.he Supreme Tribunal, as a Constitutional Juris­dictdon. when called on in a popular action, (according to Venezue­lan tradition 4-2), has the following powers of conoent.re.ted judicialrevíew:

I Decla.ring t.he total or part.ial nullity of nntional statutes and other act.a 01'rank cqua! to laws.

;<,. Id"'n .

•" Arts. 266.1; 334 !lnd 336 of th~ COMt.itutlOn." S.... Alla." R. BRF-WER,CARíA", La .justicia Cor¡.iil;I,,~ional, V,,1. VI of ¡IIslituóonn; Poli¡.¡cus

!I Cunó/ilurioMh•. '-'p. di., pp. 131 ff.•e Idem, 1'1" 137 ff.

82 ALLAN R. ImE\VER-CARÍAR

" Decla.riug tlw total 01" part.iul nullity (jf JlembN »tote« (uf Ihe Frrlera/ion)('IJ.,,~/illlti(¡/I..' ,mtl ~[(JIU/r8, 01' muuicipr,[ ocdinonce«: and other act.s "f t.he dt'.lih­

orativv bodies of 8tate~ and Muuicipahties issucd in dául (md imm"r/i,,/.i' exec«­liulI "f t.he Const.itution and in "-,,,,fli!'! wlt h it

::l. lkdHl'ing the !obtl or parttal nullity of aa» wilh J"fmk eooa! {o 81"1,,1~,,

iS~llP(IIJY t.hc Nnttonal E¡;(",utive in conflict wit.h t.his Uonst.itut.ion.

4. Decluring the total 01" partial nullit.y of or[8 ndopted ill dirat ami illlmrdilllreeecetion. or thc Const.itut.ion. issucd hy any üUWI' et etc organ <"M'J'"i~illg Pub[¡,·[>0\\'('1"

As can be deduccd from these at.t.ribu tes, t.he Constit.utlonal(jhamher is not granted concentrated control of the coneütutional­it.y oj aU »tote cae, hut just as to certain: specijic suue 0</8: thoseissued by the organs of the State called etatutes. 01' ranked equallvto a st at.ute 01' ieaued in direct and immediate exeeu t.ion of tho Con­etitution. Article 35 st.ates ,

Th., iutorpret at.iou» marlc by t.hc ('on~titlJtional Chumbcr on thc contont orlile ~"0l'(' <JI' ti .... const.it.utionnl rules are hinding on t.he other chambcrs 01' t hcSupreme Trihuual and ot hvr eoiu-t.s 01' ti", Ropuhlic.

B. - THE POPULAR ArTIo~

The most ímportant feature of the Venezuelan system of ooncen­t.rated judicial review of statutes ami other state acts egual tú stat­lites 01' issued in direct execution of t.he Oonstitution. exercised bytite Constitutional Chambcr as Constitutíone.l .Iurisdiction. is t.hatthc etandlng t.o ra.ise t.he actions belongs to any individual. It is anodio popclarie.

In t.hat senee , eccording tú che 2004 Organic Lnw of t.he SupremeTribunal of .Iustice, H every individual 01' oorporation having legalcapacity. "affected in their rlghte 01' intereste'' by a statute lssuedby any of t.he natlonal, etate. 01' municipal deliberatíng bodiee 01'wit.h the sume rank and effects by the National Execut.ive, is ent.i­tled to mise t.he nullity of same before the Tribunal, 00 the groundsof unconst.it.ut.ionalit.y 01' illegality .. ," The Organic Law ecceptedt he doctrine of t.he popular aot.ion regarding etendlng t.c mise t.heremedy that is given not only to cit.izens. hut aleo to "every indi­vidual 01' corporation with legal capacity.' H

'" fo;,.,. AII>", Il .. BI<~:\I'EI<-C."<i.", L,y Or'I';"';'" d,,1 Tril"",,,1 Su/,eN'''' d" .Iu"/i";,, Editorial,llI,¡di<'a \' ~n<'zol"n". (:""'~a' ~O(l--\

u :-:,.,. ,\11"" It. Bll~;"I>I<·('."<i,,,. Lo )us/i,,,, con.,¡'¡uci",,,,I. \',,1. \'1 of r/l.'lir""i"n.".' 1'"ldiN'"!I ('"¡¡.,¡i/¡¡ci,,,,,,k,. "p. ril. pp. 1-1--\ n.

STANDING 1'0 RAlfoIE CONSTlTUTlONAL ISSL'ES I~ VENEZUELA 83

However. regarding the popular character of the ection. theOrganic Law establishes a slight restrict.lon, requiring that the con­tested stat.ute affecte. in sorne way, the "righte 01' Interests" of t.heplaintiff. +;¡ For ínetance, in a challenge to a municipal ordinance , itcan be required. at least . that the plaintiff be a resident of the rel­evant rnunlcipality. 01', for example, has property in it , so his righte01' simple interest may be ha.rmed. However. if it is ahout a nationallaw, any inhabitant of the country with legal capacity might con­test the law, eince his simple intereet in constitutionality would beharmed by the unconst.itutional law.

Any doubte about t.he scope of thie rest.riction +1; were cleared upby the former Supremo Court. cf Justice Itself The requirement ofthe Organ¡c Law that the challenged law affects the plaintlff'srighte and Intereate does not mean that the popular action has beeneliminated 01' that a special requirement of standing existe toinvoke the Supreme Court's exereise of judicial review. The objec­tive of the popular ect.íon. t.he Court asserted. le the "object.ivedefense of the Constitution's majesty and supremacy " Ir it Is truet.hat the Organic Law of the Supreme Tribunal requires that theplaintiff be affected in hie "rights and intereete.' thls expressionshall be interpreted in a "rigorously restrictive'' way."?

More recent.ly, t.he Constitutional Chamber of the Supremo Tri­bunal, in decision N° 1077 dated 08·22-01. specified the followingregardlng the standing to bring a popular action:

On the ot!wI" hand. in uur legal ordcr. the popular act.ion uf unconstit.ntion­alit.y exists. ...hO'l'eby ¡'IlY indi~ir!IH,1 having capaeity to sue has a proccduralundlegal interest to raise it.. wit.hout requiring a concrete historicai fact t.hnt hnrmstlw plaint.iff s private legal sphcro. The claimant is a guardián 01' «onst.itut.ion­alit,v and that guardianship ent.it.lea him to aot., whet.her or not. 11\' suffercd aharrn cnming from the unconstit.utionalitv of a la" 4"

,;, ('fr. .-\lIa" R 13"" ... ",,,·C"I1í"H. ["S (I",,,,di,,.' ",,,,,Iilm';''''''/'·.' df lo., d""",J¡,J-' dd h",,""",P.dítu,-ial .¡",.¡dira Ve",·wl"na. ('ama, HJ7(1. p. ,;;1

'" S"e i"H. F"Hi" ~1.I'1'A. "¡ ~;lími""da 1" A""ii>n I"op"hn d"l 1)"redw P,,"itivü Yt',w1.oL~IlO.'"

in R"";.<¡,, d,' ¡¡n,,"') l'úb/itt). Editorial ')"I'i<iíe" Yenezolana. ~o 11. ('an"",,, 198:!. pp. ;;·11;" Ik"i'ioll 01' ti", ¡'lena",," éie"ion Jalt'd O{l-3U·s:!. in Rui.,/" ti" lJE-r('Cho P,i/¡/¡co. ~;dit""i,,1

.h"'í,li"" Ven"zola,,",;\" 11 {'ame'a" lOS:!.!,. 131;. ;\('""O"(ling tú t.llÍ" rrih'ri,)n, t1L"re1'''rt'. ," 1.1".""I""<'lll" ('o""t in Pknary "C'",ian 1"" 'I,id. tlle popular *,tion ··llla.l' Iw t'X",·,·;,nd 1,... ''''Y ,,"dall "ilizen" wil1L I~gal ""l'lIeily" Deei"ion dllted 11-1\l·1l5. in Rfn'.,/~ d, /h,w/w PúMi,.". Edil""'i"l,Iurídí,.-" Yenezolan", "'0 ~;), Caraea" 198(\, p. 131

" n",,;;<i,)n ~o l(17' r1at"r1 (iO.:!2-1I1. (''''''tituti(,nal Ch",n),e,' (C...'«, .'In,.;" Tu/i" lA'';''H'ic",¡.u). in IINif<l" ti, rhnd", PÚU¡,,,. ~;dilol'ial ,¡Urirli~1I \',·"e7.olun,,- XO 113. ('"ca",,", ~OfIO.

lWt+. ff

84 ALLAN R. BREWER-CARíAS

In any case, the same standing is allowed to aoy individual thatmlght be harmed in hie rights and interests. Such a person may partíc­ipate in the t.rial. as a party. contestíng 01' defending the challenged acto

VII. - Preven ti ve judicial revíewof the constitutionality of sorne state acts

In t.he traditional systern of judicial review in Venezuela, the solemechanism of preventive judicial review of st.atutes wus the powerof t.he Supreme Tribunal of Justice, deciding the unconstítutionalítyof an approved law not yet promulgated on the occasion of thepresldentun veto of the same. ~'J

The Constitution of 1999 now provídes expresely for another pre­vent.ive control of constitutionality regarding internatíonal treatiesand organlc laws. It aleo sepe.rated the control of constitutionalityby the Presldent'e init.iative from t he presidential veto of laws.

A. - PREV6NTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW

OF INTER1'ilATIONAL TREATIEK

In the Frst place, art.icle 336, paragraph 5° of the Conetitution.regarding insemasional treasiee, grante the Constitutional Chamberaut.horit.y to:

vcrify, at tlw President 01' t.he Repubhc's 01' t.hc Nat.ional A~semhl.v's request.the ccnforrnity with the Constitulion of intcrnn.nonal t.roaties subsenbed by theRepublic before t.hcir ra.tifieation.

'I'h¡s kind of provieíon originated in Europeen conetitutional sy:,;­terne. llke t he French and the Spanish. and also exleted in Colom­bia. 5o It was incorporated in t.he Venezuelan system of judicialreview, permitting preventivo judicial review of an interne.tionaltreaty subscribed by the Republic. It is important to note that it.precludee, in these cases, subsequent challenge of t.he law approvingt.he treaty before the Supreme Tribunal. 51

<>¡ f'ee Allnn R BllF.lI'l<:tl·CARíAS. Da jnsliá" wn,;/il".c;"na/, Vol. VI of In.t;1"6",,cs Puh/ita.'.'1 ('u",ü!1J),;io-na/"'. op. 61" 1'1'. l:l4 ff

;-" Id,,,,, 1" .~91l

;'01 See AlIan 1{ FhtE\n,;"-('."ü.\~. "{'''tlMítuti"nal Implíeation, ofRegíonal "eun"mí" 'nt~gra.­

tíon," in AIl,," R, Bl<I<:"'f~I\-l.'A"i.AS. Eludes <1" dmi/ p"blic t;(¡·"'p(¡rr. Acad~m¡e Int..rnatí"nale (kDrüit Cürnl'are, Ihuylant., Brussels, 2(101 p. 41l9. Al~o puhlí,hed in i'il'a.nish a, ¡mplicaúoru,,· "',n­M-i/'I1rio",,/n d, lo. pmce .•"" de ;"Ie!lmá'¡" regim",,!, F.dit-Ol'i".1 .Jurídíea V'·n~Zülar"'. ('araca' HlDIl.pp. 7" ff

f,;TANDING '1'0 RAISE (:O~f,;TITUTIO~AL 1f,;f,;UES IN \'E~EZUELA 85

Standing to initiate this preventive control by t.he Supreme Tri­bunal belongs to the Presídent of t he Republic 01' to the NationalAssembly. The review shall be ruede before the ratification of thet.reat.y and after t.he National Executive signs it. Once the 'I'reat.yis approved by statute. a popular action could normaUy be raisedagainst the st.atute. But. if the Constitutional Chember. by mea.naof a preventivo judicial review decision, has decíded that the inter­national treaty conforma 1.0 the Coustitution. a popular action ofunconstdtut.ionality against the approvíng stat.ute could not beraised.

A method of judicial revíew of this kind is very important inregional econcmic integratton processes since it. would allowapproval of the reepect.ive treaties only efter verifieation of theirconstitutionality by the Supreme Tribunal. This happened, forexample, in Venezuela in the cases of t.reaties regarding the lnte­gration Agreement of the Andean Community. ,,2

B. - PREVE~TIVE JUDICIAL REVIE\V

UF THE ORGANIC STATUTF.S

The eecond rnechanism of prevent.íve judicial revíew is that pro­vided in art.lole 203 of the Constituí.ion. Before their prornulgation.the Conetitutione.l Chamber may decide whether enact.ment.s of theNat.ional Assembly designated as Organic Statutee actualIy havet.he oonst.itutionally requíred characteristice of such st.atutee.According to artlcle 203, there are various types of Orgen¡c Stat­lites, eome specifíed in the constitutional text and others to be certífíed as such by a two thírds vote of the National Assembly beforeinit.iating the discuseíon of the draft. These statutes must osuomos­iwlly be sent. before t.heir promulgation, to t.he ConstitutionalChamber of the Tribunal of Juetice, for a decieion on the constitu­tionality of their organic character.

There existe, in this case, no standing veeted in a apecífic organ01' individual to raiee this control slnce it is automatic. The Coneti­tutional Chamber muet decide the case within ten (10) days counted

,., s~~ f.lw deei'¡<>n ,,1 t.lw rol"tn~r :';up'~m~ en"rt al' .J,,;ti,'p dat~d ijj-]()-!HI and tlw ,.on""~nt~

in Allan R. H""Wt;I~·('AIÜA.'_ "~;I control d~ la con,tit"ejonalidad de las l~y~' ap,n!Jnto,ias deTrau"ln" ;llte,-na"i"'Htle" y la <.,,,,"tión eon'tit""ioll,,1 de 1" integra"i"n htinoanwl'''''''''··. 1(",;"1"'¡e lJ"echo (',;(¡[,o'), ~;dit.,,,-ia.1 .¡",-idi"" Ven~wlan". X" 44_ Camq", 1990. 1'1' 225-2211

86 ALLAK R. BR]i;WER-('ARíAS

as of the date it. receíves the communication. Should the Chamberdeclare t.hat, the law is not organic. it then loses t.hat che.racter.

C. ,hTDICIAL RE\'IEW 01" ApPROVEll STA TUTES

REFüRE THEIR PRO.\WLGATIO~

Tho third mechanism of p revent.ive control of constit.ut.iona.lit.y leprovided in article 214 of t.he Conet.itution. It applies in cases wherethe President of the Republic mises a const.itutional issue duringthe daye he has to promulgare the statute. Pursuant to t.his rule,the Constitutional Chamber shall decide the constitut.lonality of thest.at.ute 01' sorne of ita a.rñcles. The President of the Republic. there­fore. has standing to raise the issue of const.ltutione.llty in thisr-asa. ,",:l

'I'hus. this provisión sete fort.h a oont.rol of the coueut.utíone.lltyof st.at.ut.es that have been approved but not promulge.ted, whieh isdistinet from t.he eo-called "president.ial veto" of st.atutes. whiehalwaye involvea their rcsubmissíon to the Nat.íonal Assemhly.

VIII. - The obllgatory concentrated methodof judicial review

of state-of-emergency decrees

Pursuant to artíclee 336 and 339 of t.he Constitut.ion. all Execu­t.ive Decrece declaring a state of emergency shall be raised by thePresident of t.he Republic before the Conetitutional Chamber of theSupreme TribunaL so it may decide on their constitutionality.

Thía instance of obligatory judicial review is a novelt.y introducedby the Const.it.ution of 1999 following the precedent of Colombia(Art. 241. paragraph 7j. In Venezuela, such power of review is t.heonly conetitutional case in whioh the Chamber is entltled to act. exoffiero.

By exercising this oonstitutional judicial rcview Pvwe". t he Con­etltut.ional Chamber may decide nct only on the constitutíonality ofdecrees declaring atetes of exceptíon. but aleo OIl the constitutlon-

'0' '1')", ('""stitlltion,,¡ ('h ..",hcr ("""8i<ic"cd lh"t thi" ,lalltli"¡( h~long' exei""il"(·I." to thc Pl'~"'

i,klll o) Ih~ I-1t'l'"hl;('. K"t, de"i,io" XO 1\)4- of o:!·);; 2001 i" {/Ni,ln 1/, ¡¡"¡,echo 1',;',I,eo Xo ;,;¡,.;';S. Editn,.j,l-i .Jurídi,"]. \·'·ll~wla"a. ('11,.",.,," 2001 1'1', ~I(; ff.

STA:-/DINU TO RAlSE CONSTITVTIONAL I¡-{StTES IN VE:'-lEZUELA 87

alit.y of the content of such decrees pursuant to t.he provisione ofart.icles 337 and following 01' the Constitution. In particular. theChamber ehall verify whether t.he decree conte.ins a sufficient et.ate­ment of t he character 01' t.he regulation of the righte tbe decreereetricte (Art. 339),

IX, - Judicial revtewof the par-líament's omlsstons

The so-called judicial review 01' legislaf.ive omissions>' is anotherIH'W inat.itution of judicial review established by the Constitutíou of1099. In that regare). art.icle :336 grante the Constitutional Chamberthe competence to:

Doc-larlc] thc unoonstitut.ionalit.y of tille nmission of t.he municipal. «tate. o!'

nntionllllegiHlali"e power in failing to i~~ne indispensable rules 01' lll('aHUre" to

gucrent cc t.hr- enfurccmnnt. 01' the Constitut.ion. 01' issuing rhcm in an incompletoway. und esteblishing the term.•• and if neeeHHary. t.hc guidelines for t.hcir cur­rect.ion.

This provisión grante a wide power to the Conetttutional Cham­ber which strrpasses the initial Portugueee anteeedent. Indeed. inthe case of t.he Portuguese Constitution. standing for invoking thispower is given to the President of the Republic, t he Ombudsman,01' t.he Presidenta of the Autonomous Regions. ;J;; In contrasto theConstitution 01' 1099 does not eet.ablieh any condition whatsoeverfor standing so normative omíssione?" may be challenged as pupnlaracticne.

X. - .Judgment of constitutional controversiesbetween the organs of public power

The Supreme Tribunal, in Constitutíonal Chamber, purauant toarticle 336, also has the power 01' "[udging conetitutional controver­eíes arising between any organs of public power. "

_" Thi, in.,titutioll h", its t\t'igin" i" lhe Po,tu¡(ue'e 'y'tem, ".,. AII"" R, Hlu':\\'I·~I<.('AI,i ..",

b,di";II.' I(",¡rll' ¡II ("m'l",mfil'r 1."''-,1)'" "il, l' 269,e,:, 1'(,(, ,-\11"" R. .I>""\\'E"'('.'l<i.-\s. Judiri,,1 I(""i,,,. in C(ilJlJ'l1m!i", f"w,- o)'. ";1.. p. 2fi!L:,n TI". ('o",til."tion~1 ('hamhrl' ha., ~alletl it "legi'lati\'c ,ile"ee anrl r""dionin¡( De";,io,,

X" IHIl~ of OIl·OIl·2000 01't.I,~ P"liti~"l·:\dmiui"t .."l¡v~ ('hAmb~l' I(:""€ Rene ,110[;"" "s. Com;.<I';"1~~y;4"i;"" Nllc'¡o""I). i" H""·i,,'" ti, I!Nfdu¡ PúMi"I), ;":0. 8:;. "diIO..i,,1 .lmidh'>I. Ve"<,,,,,I,,n,,.. ('>l.r"­,.,,, eooo pp. 2lH rr

88 ALLAloJ R. BREViER-CARíAS

This constitntionaJ judicial review power is íntended to resolveconfliots between State organs, both in t.heir vertical 01' territorialdistribution (Republic, etatee. and municipalitiee), and in t.heir hor­izontal distribution at the nationai (Legisletive, Executive, .Iudi­cial. Cltizens, and Electoral Powers) and átate and municipal Ievele(Legielative and Executive Powere).

In other words, it ie about the judgment of controversies concern­ing consiituiicmal competenciee between conetitutional organs of theStete. Theee cases are different from administrl),tive controvereleethat can erise between the Republ¡c, the Stetes, municipa!ities 01'

other publíc entitiea. 'I'he iatter are decided by the Political-Admin­ist.rat.ive Chamber of the Suprema Tribunal (Art. 266, pe.ragrapb 4°)as an "Administrative Juriedictíon." "?

In any case, standing to seek a remedy to settle a constitutionalcontroverey belongs to the State conetltutional organ involved.

X'l. Actíon for eonstitutional interpretation

Fínally. among the competencíee of the Constitutional Chamberas "Constit.utione.l Jurisdiction." mention must be made of t hepower it has to decide abst.ract requeste for interpretetlon of t.heConstitution. The Constitutionai Chamber iteelf created this author­ity from ite interpretation of article 335 of t.he Oonsttt.ution. H hasrecently been formalized in the 2004 Organic Law of the SupremeTribunal 01' .Iuetice.

The purpose of such an ectiou of constitutional interpretation isto secure a certain declaration by the Constitutional Ohamber onthe scope and content 01' a constitutionaJ provisión. It has heenregarded as a form of citizen particípation.:« etep prior to an ectionof unconstitutionality. Providlng the conetitutional interpretationmay cleal' doubte and ambiguities about the supposed confhct. ;;1\

The Conetitutional Chamber. in creatlng t.he cction, in decislonNo. 1077 dated 09-22-2000, relied on article 26 of the Constitution.which establiahee the right of access to just.ice. From t.h¡s t.he Cham-

IlNi,ion of the P"liti,·"I-.;l.tlmir'¡~t'·ativf Chamhel' »" l;;llf uf 1);;-0;;·2001) "f tl,~ Politir,t1·Arlmini,tl'ati",' Cha",h~r ¡C¡;;¡o:,: R,,,,, .l/oh,,,, "o. l'omi"iJ" ',cgi.,¡,,¡ú,, .vnciom'/I

,'" Dcci,ion );' 1077 dutccl 09-22·01, Constituti"nal ('hamh~r {Ca'~ ,','urio Tu./i,) I.,';nRricn'IJ). in H,ú';iu di' ¡¡",e/,,) l'ú/,¡iw, l'i:o 83, Editori,.1 .fUl'idie.a V~rwzolana, C"m",., 2(l()(l.1'1':!+7 ff.

STA)¡OINU TO RAISE CO::-J"HTITUTIO.:-<AL ISSVES 1':-< VENEZCELA 89

ber deduced that although this actíon was not set forth in the legalorder, it was not forbídden either and, therefore:

Whoovr-r having a lega! interest. muy mise t.hc intcrpreta.tion of a law as por

t hc legal provisions. aml also the interpret.ation of t.he Const.it.ution. in ordor toobt.ain a decision of plain ccrtaimy on tuc seope and cont.ent. of constitutiune¡rulos. this act.ion wOllld be equs l in nuture t.o onc of interpretation uf law ,',,,

Regarding the standing to bring this action for constltutíonalint.erpretat.ion before the Supreme Tribunal, the ConetitutionalChamber consldered t.hat a particular interest must exist in t.heplaintiff:

A puhlic 01' prívate pl'r~OIl ~hall havo a cncrent, legitimate legal int.er<'st.grounded in his own concrete end specific legal situation. which neccssarilyroquires the interpretation 01' constit.utional rules applicable to the aítuation. inord,,1' to end t.he uncortainty impoding the development ami offccts of said I('galsituation. ,",

For the action for interpret.ation to be allowed. the petiñon mustapecífy the nature of the obscurity, ambiguity. 01' contradiction ofthe provisions of the constitutional text, 01' within one of them inparticular, 01' with respect to the nature and scope of applícableprincipies.

As mentioned, t.he action has reet.ricted standing. but the effecteof the decisión are general. 111

XII - Concluslon

From the aboye, it le olear that in order to determine the stand­ing rules to mise oonst.it.u tional íssues in a judicial process, the 8yS­

tem of judicial review exieting in t.he country muet first he deter­mined.

In t he Venezuelan case, with ite mlxed 01' compreheneíve systemof judicial review. we have analyzed the following general rules onstanding t.hat can be deduced, depending 00 which judicial methodis used to exerciee judicial review :

."., Id,..,,,1;0 /lkm.';1 The Con'tituti"H!d Cloamh<"r in deei"i"" :-';0 13+7 d"teJ 11·09·;!OOO. úutlined th.' bi"Ji,,¡.o;

d,,"'''d~r <>f il., in(.erpr<"tllti<>ns, by púinting out that "Thp int~rp,dat;on'of th;" ('o",tit.utional(,hnmber. in gf.•wraL Or t.ho<<" iesucd in proneedings of inte,vretat.;vn l-erned~... <hall he unde"tooda" loincling l'('gal'd;n¡,: the eorf of the ,tuJied "a~n, in Rc"',<¡'" d, I)"ccho Públir". No. 8+. ~;ditOl'ial

,Iul'idi"a \"'ue7.0hna. Cara."as 2lHH'l, 1'1' 26+ rr'

90 ALLA~ R. BREWER-CARiAR

1 In order to exercíse judicial review of st.atutes through the dif­fuse method, standing to ra.ise t.he const.itutional issue in the spe­cific case belongs to t.he parties to the same, even when they acton behalf of diffuse and collect.ive íntereste. J udgee in Venezuelaalgo have the power and duty of raísing ex afficta, by themselves.and in the proceeding, conatit.utional issues regarding st.atutes inorder to decide the specíflc case. Additionally, the Pubiic Prose­cut.or ami t.he Defender of the People , according to their author­ity. may mise constitutional íssues in proceedings in which theyi nt.ervene.

2. In Venezuela, t.he right of every individual to be Iegally PI'O­tected in the enjoyment and exercise of his conetitutional rightsand guarantees is established. For t.hat purpose, tho aot.ion ofamparo is also a legal met.hod of judicial review. H roa)' be raisedby t.he holder of the infrlnged conetitutíonal right 01' guarantee.The aot.ion of amparo can also be raised on behalf of diffuee 01'

collective constitutional rights and by the Defender of the Peo­ple on behalf of t.he same.

3. Regarding judicial review of oonsnt.ut.ionaht.y end Illegallty ofby-Iaws and other general 01' individual edministrattve acts. thecourte of the Administratíve Jurisdíction are entttled t.o declaretheir nullity. Any individual has st.anding to re.ise the action ofnullity ugainet norme.tive admlnistratlve acte A simple interest,in legaJíty is enough to have standing. Therefore. i t is a popularaotion.

But in case>; of administrative acts of particular effect. standingto raise the aet.ion of nullity belongs onIy te thoee individualawho have a legit.imate interest in t.he annulment of the act.According to the Organic Law of the Supreme Tribunal of Ju¡:.;"tice. the interest must also be personal and directo The act.ion ofnullit.y against adminístrative acts can aleo be exercísed 011

hehalf of diffuse ami collectíve intereste.

4. In eddiüon to the diffusc method of judicial review. the concen­trated mcthod of judicial revlew has exieted in Venezuela sjneethe ninet eent.h century. Current.ly, the Constitutional Chamberof t.he Supreme Tribunal of Justice. as the Conetitutional .Iuris­díction, has t.he exclusive right to declare t.he nullit.y of stat.utesand ot.her aeta of a similar leve! on the grounde of unconetitu­tionality. Standing to bring a direct action of unconst.it.ut.ionafit.y

STA:-.JDI:-.lU TO RAI:'>E ('OKSTITllTIOl.\AL I:';SUES I:-.J VEl\EZUELA 91

beforo the Conat.itutional Chamber belongs te anv individualwitb a simple interest in constitutionalitv. It, is aleo, therefore.an ocuo popularie for judicial review of statutes ami other Stateact,; of similar rank and effect.

5. 'I'he Const.ltutional .Iurisdiction has other competenoies in mat­ters of judicial revlew. and correspondingly different standingrules. Standing to ratee preventlve judicial review of Interna­tional t.ree.t.ies before the Constitutional Chamber belongs to thePresident of t.he Republic 01' to t.he National Assembly. In the(:ase of organic sta.t.utea. p revent.ive review by t he ConstitutionalChamber is automatic ami obligatory. Standing for a deciaion ofprevent.ive review of statutes apprcved by the National Aesem­bly, but not yet promulgated. belongs to Hit' Preeident of t.heRelJUblie.

6. Decrees declaring st.at.es of except.lou must. be subject.ed to [udi­cie.l review by the Constitutional Chamber. When isauing thosedecrece. the Presldent of t.he Republic shall semi t.hem to theChamber. However. in thla case, t he Constitut.ional Chamber isalso expreasly given the power to revlew aaid decrees ex officio.and it t-an do so from t.hf' rnoment t.hey are publlehed in Üfflcia.lGezet.te.

7. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of .Iusticealee has the power to declare the unconstitutionality of omis­eione of nat.ional. state, 01' municipal legielative bodíes in failingto issue rules needed fOI" the enforcement of the Conentution.This action of unoonetitu t.ione.lit.y fOI" omission of the Legislatorhas the aame standing rules as the action of unoonstitut.ionalit yof etatutes, as a popular action. Therefore. it belonge te each andevery individual, a simple intereat in constitutionality being «uf­flcient..

8. The Constitutional Chamber hea the power to decide e.nd judgeconst.it.utional oontroversies arieing between different conatitu­t.ional organs of t.he State, resuiting from the vertical division ofpower (Republic, Ste.tes, 01' Munlcípe.lities) and from the horizon­tal separat.ion of power (Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen ,and Electoral). In t.hese cases, standing to ruiee t.he constitu.t.ional issue belongs to t.hose holding office In said orgam;.

9. Pinally. regarding the ection for constitutional interpretationt.hat can be brought befo re t he Constitutional Chamber , standing

92 ALLA:'l H,. BREWER-CARíAS

belonge to individuals with an actual and legitimate legal ínter­est based on a specific legal situat.ion that requires constitutionalinterpretation in arder t.o end the uncertainty impedíng it.sdevelopment.

'I'he foregoing is, in short, the current situation of standing túraise conatitutional humes in judicial proceedings in a mixed 01' inte­gral system of judicial review such as the Venezuelan eyetem.