Spot the Hazard! A CulturalExtension of HazardIdentification TrainingRobert F. WasileskiNOVA Chemicals, Inc., U.S. Operating Center, 1550 Coraopolis Heights Road, Moon Township, PA 15108;wasiler@novachem.com (for correspondence)

Published online 8 December 2008 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.10280

Hazard identification training (HIT) programshave been used in the chemical processing industryto raise awareness with employees on what constitutesa process hazard and techniques for identifying thesehazards. Quite often these HIT programs will deliverthe course material to the participants as classroominstruction, computer-based training, organized fieldreviews, or a combination of these formats. These pre-sentations tend to be one-time efforts or cyclic pro-grams that reach the target audience on some peri-odic basis (e.g., triennially). Although the content ofthe course material may be educational, these pro-grams often have limited success because of theirinability to make a lasting impression with the partic-ipants. Organizational and personnel changes, em-ployee turnover, vanishing corporate memory, andshifting priorities can all have an undermining effecton the well-intended efforts of traditional HITprograms. The challenge thus becomes finding waysto keep the knowledge both relevant and current,to effect lasting cultural change in a dynamicenvironment.

This article presents a unique HIT program knownas ‘‘Spot the Hazard,’’ which uses the facility’s intra-net to reinforce the concepts taught in the classroom.Spot the Hazard blends photographic examples andtechnical knowledge with aspects of behavior modifi-cation. The photographs that are presented have notbeen staged and thus are germane to the employees.The inherent on-going nature of the program ensuresthe knowledge remains current, while at the sametime it provides a platform for making a positive cul-tural change.

The concepts of Spot the Hazard are explained ingreater detail in the current article, along with a

representative number of actual examples. � 2008American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process SafProg 28: 200–206, 2009

Keywords: culture, leadership, hazard, training

INTRODUCTIONThis article presents a creative and unique cultural

extension to hazard identification training (HIT)known as ‘‘Spot the Hazard!’’ The Spot the Hazard!Program (hereafter also referred to simply as the‘‘Program’’) is a web-based monthly contest that isoperated on the facility’s intranet.

The Program began following a 2-year HIT initia-tive to educate operating, maintenance and technicalstaff on hazard awareness and identification [1]. Thisinitiative covered 12 operating facilities within theCorporation. Senior process safety and loss preven-tion professionals delivered the course material in aninteractive session lasting 6–7 h. The curriculumincluded subject matter on fire science: sources offlammables and combustibles; sources of ignition;principles of toxic releases; and principles of pre-vention and protection. Employees were taught thescience of combustion and technical concepts thatinfluence the combustion process (e.g., flash pointtemperature, auto-ignition temperature, inert atmos-pheres, etc.). In addition, photographs were taken ateach operating facility and incorporated into the cur-riculum to illustrate where combustibles are found,where ignition sources may be found, and examplesof prevention and protection facilities.

CONCEPTS AND APPROACHThe focus of the aforementioned HIT initiative was

oriented towards fire science and preventing uncon-trolled process fires in the operating facilities. How-� 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers

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ever, the fundamental objective of the course wascommon to any other HIT program used in similarindustries: to modify the thought processes andbehavior of the course participants.

It is necessary to comment on the differencebetween education and training. The name ‘‘Hazardidentification training’’ is actually a misnomer, yet it isroutinely used in the chemical processing industriesto describe this type of initiative. Training aims ‘‘toimpart a set of established facts and skills and toobtain a uniform predictable behavior from the train-ees without the necessity of their understanding whythey should act in the prescribed manner’’ [2]. Educa-tion, on the other hand, ‘‘seeks to have the studentlearn skills and to understand why actions are takenor not,’’ [2] and to ‘‘observe, analyze and question, toformulate hypotheses and make conclusions andthen to act, live and modify their actions according tothese conclusions’’ [2].

The significant difference between the two terms,therefore, lies in the concept of understanding.Understanding the principles presented in any educa-tional program is absolutely necessary for applicationof the knowledge. In particular with hazard recogni-tion, it is not sufficient to simply train employees torecognize the same hazards in the field as those pre-sented in the classroom. Employees must understandthe principles being presented, and then be able totranslate that knowledge to the field to identify haz-ards in new and unique situations based on thelearned principles. It is only when employees under-stand the fundamental principles that they can beginto apply the knowledge to different situations [3]. Inturn, the behaviors and thought processes of theemployees begin to change. When the collective or-ganization inherits this knowledge and consistentlyapplies it to identifying and evaluating hazards, truecultural change can occur.

SAFETY CULTURETwo sources frequently cited for definitions of

‘‘safety culture’’ are the UK Health and Safety Execu-tive and the Center for Chemical Process Safety(CCPS). The UK Health and Safety Executive defini-tion is ‘‘. . . the product of the individual and groupvalues, attitudes, competencies and patterns ofbehavior that determine the commitment to, and thestyle and proficiency of, an organization’s health andsafety programs’’ [4]. The CCPS suggests a direct andmore succinct definition: ‘‘Safety culture is how theorganization behaves when no one is watching’’ [5].These definitions are specific to safety culture, andwhile they are somewhat different, they share thecommon notion that organizational culture is a reflec-tion of the shared common values that drive organi-zational performance [6]. In effect, the process safetyperformance of an organization is a function of thedegree to which the collective organization embracesthe process safety policies and programs.

Leadership is an essential component of managingculture, and plays a significant role in influencing cul-tural change. The CCPS [5] recognizes that leadershipcannot effect cultural change with mandates and

edicts. Rather, positive movement comes from leader-ship by example, where the desired values andbehaviors are advanced from being vision and setinto action when leaders model the vision. Successfulleaders inspire, enable and challenge the organizationtowards improvement. It is no coincidence that themodel for transformational leadership [6] includesthese concepts in its four dimensions: charisma, inspi-ration, individual attention, and intellectual challenge.Transformational leadership applies these characteris-tics consistently and frequently to gradually move thevalues of the collective whole in a positive direction.

The key contributors to successful transformationalleadership lie in consistency and frequency. The visionand the message must be consistent. The communica-tion and positive reinforcement must be frequent. Thiscombination yields change. In the context of HIT, thisframework translates to a curriculum of hazard identifi-cation principles and techniques that are consistentlycommunicated, and reinforced on a frequent basis withemployees. However, this is often where traditionalHIT programs fall short in their ability to effect culturalchange. HIT tends to be either a one-time initiative, orone of many required training courses that is scheduledon a periodic basis (e.g., triennially) for employees.The course material is normally delivered too infre-quently to keep the organization focused. Furthermore,the effectiveness of HIT programs can be compromisedby organizational and personnel changes, employeeturnover, vanishing corporate memory and shiftingbusiness priorities. These factors create significant chal-lenges for process safety professionals, and often limitthe success of HIT programs in terms of shifting the cul-ture of the organization.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONSpot the Hazard! places photographs of actual haz-

ardous conditions found in the process on a web pageof the intranet (Figure 1). Employees are given the op-portunity to spot the hazard in the photograph, andsubmit their answers electronically through the inte-grated e-mail system. At the end of the contest period,one winner is randomly selected from among the cor-rect responses to receive a reward. The winner isannounced to the entire facility through e-mail, alongwith a detailed explanation of the process hazard, thereason why it is a hazard, and recommended actionsto correct the concern. Every employee that submitteda correct response is also recognized in a positive man-ner in the winning e-mail announcement.

The previously discussed HIT initiative forms thefoundation for the Spot the Hazard! Program. Thephotographs generally aim to capture potential sour-ces of combustible materials, ignition, hazardousexposures and the like. The e-mail communicationsare used to announce the contest winner, but moreimportantly reiterate the technical principles andknowledge that support the identification and evalua-tion of process hazards.

With each new contest, there is an opportunity toconsistently demonstrate how the knowledge hasbeen applied to yet another unique and different sit-uation. Furthermore, the key principles and relevant

Process Safety Progress (Vol.28, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2009 201

knowledge are frequently reinforced with employees,to maintain a collective focus on hazard identificationand risk assessment (HIRA).

Core ComponentsThe core elements of the Spot the Hazard! Pro-

gram include:

1. Hazard Identification: Photographs of processhazards identified at the facility form the founda-tion of the Program. The photographs are never‘‘staged’’ or simulated. Actual conditions are photo-graphed as they are found. Generally the site proc-ess safety engineer will identify these conditionsduring planned general inspections (PGI) or ad-hoc surveys. However, all employees are encour-aged to submit findings for future contests, andthe submitted findings must be from the site.

2. Risk Assessment: Once a hazardous condition hasbeen identified, OPERATION is consulted for asimple risk assessment. This serves two purposes.First, the risk assessment determines if the concern

is legitimate and acceptable or unacceptable. Sec-ond, it ensures buy-in from the asset owner andkey stakeholders before the photograph is usedon the intranet.

3. Problem Solving: The risk assessment discussionwill, quite often, prompt recommendations to cor-rect the deficiency. The asset owner is responsiblefor implementing corrective action(s), and givenenough time to do so before the photograph isused on the intranet.

4. Employee Participation: Employee Participation isone of the fundamental elements of any processsafety program, and the Spot the Hazard! webpage provides an additional means to accomplish-ing this. The web page is accessible to all siteemployees, and everyone is encouraged to submita response through the integrated e-mail system. Asimple risk matrix can also be easily attached withthe picture and distributed to the employees. Inaddition to spotting the hazard in the picture,employees could also be requested to rank therisk associated with the identified hazard.

Figure 1. Example screen shot of Spot the Hazard! Web page. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]

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5. Process Safety Education: At the end of eachmonthly contest, the winner is announced in asite-wide e-mail. This communication is the vehi-cle for continuing education. Here, details are pro-vided to employees regarding what the processhazard is, why it is a hazard, and how the hazardcan be eliminated or how the risk can be miti-gated. This stage provides the educational compo-nent to the Program, to consistently and frequentlyconnect with employees.

Leadership and Cultural ParallelsAside from the obvious benefits, such as gains in

employee participation and education on hazardidentification, the Program has progressively demon-strated a number of soft benefits. These less tangible,but equally important, benefits include an increase insocial capital, new leadership platforms, and positivecultural shift.

1. Social Capital: The term ‘‘social capital’’ refers to acore concept in organizational behavior, and maybe described as the existence of a specific set ofinformal values or norms shared among membersof a group that permits cooperation among them.Social capital is indicated by consensus, collectiveaction, and the amount of trust demonstrated in acommunity or among individuals. Unlike otherforms of capital that are depleted by use, socialcapital is depleted by nonuse. Harvard politicalscientist Putnam [7] describes two types of socialcapital: ‘‘bonding social capital’’ and ‘‘bridgingsocial capital.’’ Bonding social capital refers to thevalue of social networks within homogenousgroups, whereas bridging social capital refers tothat value between socially heterogeneous groups.Bonding social capital explains why some groupsbecome isolated and disenfranchised from the restof society (or an organization). Bridging socialcapital, on the other hand, works across horizontalnetworks of individuals and groups to enhanceproductivity and consensus, and thus is seen as apositive asset. The Spot the Hazard! Program fos-ters development of these horizontal networks bycommunicating with teams across the organizationand allowing process safety professionals the op-portunity to become engaged with the rest of thefacility in a meaningful fashion.

2. Leadership Platforms: Seven definable leadershippractices have been connected to the developmentand support of high-performing cultures [6]: vision,credibility, collaboration, feedback and recogni-tion, accountability, communication, and action-orientation. The Spot the Hazard! Program applieseach of these practices in the following ways:a. Vision: For every hazardous condition shown,

employees are provided with recommendationsto correct the deficiency or mitigate the risk. Inother words, a vision is provided for the desiredstate of operation.

b. Credibility and Collaboration: These two prac-tices work in tandem, and are accomplished by

discussing the hazards with the asset owners.Buy-in from the asset owners ensures credibilitywith the various stakeholders, and satisfies theneed for collaboration.

c. Feedback and Recognition: Participants whosubmit a correct response to the monthly con-test are recognized in the winning e-mailannouncement and given positive feedback fortheir accomplishment. Furthermore, the contestwinner is recognized with a reward.

d. Accountability: The Program uses photographstaken from all areas of the facility. No singleoperating area is either excluded from beingused in the Program or specifically selected foruse. This has the effect of reminding employeesthat process safety is the responsibility of everyemployee at each level of the organization.

e. Communication and Action Orientation: TheProgram intends to be proactive, by identifyinghazardous conditions before they result inundesirable consequences. These conditions arecommunicated to the asset owners and resolvedin a timely manner. By its very nature, the proc-ess is tuned towards timely communication andresults-oriented action.

3. Cultural Shift: A positive shift in the process safetyculture is clearly one of the desired outcomes ofthe Program. Technical principles are orchestratedwith concepts of leadership and education to pro-duce the desired step change. The e-mail commu-nications consistently reinforce the technicalaspects and connect them to principles of processsafety and loss prevention engineering.

ANALYSISAt the time this document was prepared, the Spot

the Hazard! Program had been in operation for�1 year. The following subjects have been featuredin the Program thus far:

• Photo contest #1: Energized abandoned conduit.• Photo contest #2: Impaired fire protection system.• Photo contest #3: Free standing compressed gascylinder.

• Photo contest #4: Disabled pressure/vacuum vent.• Photo contest #5: Unsupported abandoned piping.• Photo contest #6: Unsafe venting of pressurerelief valve.

• Photo contest #7: Dangerous hose connections.• Photo contest #8: Hydrochloric acid piping dead-leg.

• Photo contest #9: Unrestricted access to electricalsubstation.

• Photo contest #10: Unprotected combustibletrash receptacles.

• Photo contest #11: Uncontained acid pipingdrains.

• Photo contest #12: Open-ended piping system.• Photo contest #13: Horizontal hookup on flexiblehose.

• Photo contest #14: Abandoned wood pipe support.• Photo contest #15: Unsafe pipe and hose supports.

Process Safety Progress (Vol.28, No.2) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs June 2009 203

Figure 2 illustrates the total number of responsesreceived to each contest, and the correspondingnumber of correct entries. (Note: the total number ofemployees at the facility is �200 persons.)

CASE EXAMPLESSeveral examples have been selected from the Pro-

gram for presentation in the current section. Theseexamples are representative of the typical contentincluded in the e-mail communications to the facilityfollowing each contest.

Contest #7: Dangerous Hose Connections

The PhotoPhoto #7 featured a simple hose station with two

capped connections. This particular hose station islocated near the site’s barge unloading dock, andused for liquid water-treatment chemicals.

The Process HazardThis photograph showed several hazards, includ-

ing a manual block valve in the open position imme-diately upstream of the hose connection. In addition,

the locking mechanisms (sometimes referred to as‘‘dog ears’’) on the caps were not secured in place.Several other employees further noted the deterio-rated condition of the pipe support and the absenceof line labels.

The Reason this is HazardousThe potential for both loss of process containment

and personnel exposure exists in this situation. Withthe block valve in the open position, it is possiblethat liquid inventory is trapped behind the cap, andmay be under substantial pressure. This placesemployees at risk of being exposed when it comestime to remove the cap and use the hose connection.Furthermore, because the locking mechanisms arenot secured with wire or a band, they could unex-pectedly come off, especially if pressure buildsbehind the cap.

What Should be DoneThe manual block valves on this, and all hose sta-

tions, should be closed when they are not in use.The locking mechanisms on the caps should also besecured in place with Velcro bands, wire ties, or asimilar method. Quite often drain valves will also beinstalled between the block valve and end cap, sothe line can be checked for inventory and pressurebefore the cap is removed.

Contest #13: Horizontal Hookup onFlexible Hose

The PhotoContest #13 featured a photograph of a black flexi-

ble hose on the third floor of the Screening Building.

The Process HazardThe hose in the photograph was connected to the

piping on the horizontal, and the weight of the coiledhose had caused the hose to kink (partially collapse)

Figure 2. Program analysis: total responses receivedand number of correct responses.

[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]

[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]

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at the connection point. This condition is indicativeof flexure beyond the minimum bend radius of thehose assembly.

The Reason this is HazardousHoses and flexible connections are often the least

considered, least regulated component in both utilityand process applications. Yet they are expected tofunction under a wider variety of physical and chemi-cal stresses than any other mechanical component. Asa result, hose assemblies and flexible connectors arehighly susceptible to failure.

In this particular instance, the horizontal hookupof the hose has resulted in severe bending at thepipe connection, which may contribute to prematurefailure of the hose assembly. In addition, the hoseclamps do not meet specification, and the pipingtransition is not an engineered design.

What Should be DonePiping systems installed for hose connections

should have the pipe outlet directed downward, sothe hose is connected in the vertical plane. This willprotect employees from exposure in case of acciden-tal rupture, slow the aging process of the hose by‘‘straightening’’ the flow path, and reduce bend stressesat the end of the hose assembly. Also, proper engineer-ing designs should be used to connect hoses to pipingsystems, making use of the correct hose clamps.

CONCLUSIONSIn some respects the field of process safety man-

agement has taken a step change in new directionsover the last few years. NASA’s experiences with theshuttles Challenger [8] and Columbia [9] haveprompted our industry to re-examine tragic events,such as the explosion at Longford [10], the PiperAlpha oil platform accident [11], and most recentlythe BP Texas City refinery explosion [12] for contrib-uting cultural causes. Similarly, CCPS has devoted anentire chapter to the subject of safety culture in itsGuidelines for Risk Based Process Safety [13], indicat-ing the necessity of a strong safety culture for strongprocess safety performance.

CCPS and others [14] have developed guidance forcreating and fostering a strong process safety culture.This guidance typically includes the development ofstrategic plans, tools and communication devices tosustain the culture, once it has been developed. TheSpot the Hazard! Program is an illustration of how theprocess safety professional can extend a traditionalinstrument (i.e., HIT) to a new format for sustainability.

The Spot the Hazard! Program has been in opera-tion for �1 year, yet indications of its success are al-ready evident. For example, it’s quite common forparticipants to raise attention to hazards and concernsbeyond the main focus of the photograph. In fact,individual entries have often contained severalresponses, speaking to both the acceptance and com-mitment of the employees to the Program.

Another indication of the success of the Programhas been seen in the number of ideas submitted byemployees, as they look forward to the continuation

and expansion of the Program. Initially, the authorphotographed various conditions around the facilityto kickoff the Program and build momentum. Overthe course of the past year, however, specific sugges-tions have come from all levels of the organization,including plant management. This type of participa-tion is particularly interesting, in that it demonstratesan elevated level of hazard recognition among theplant population.

Perhaps the most noteworthy indication of successis in the fact that the Program is still in operation,even after the author’s departure from the facility. Af-ter moving on to another role in the company, theSpot the Hazard! Program was voluntarily adopted bya production supervisor who has committed to pro-vide the leadership necessary to maintain the Pro-gram. This is testament to the value that plant super-vision sees in the Program.

RECOMMENDATIONSThe future of the Spot the Hazard! Program lies in

integration. This begins when the Program is spreadto the other manufacturing locations throughout thecompany. By having the Program in place at all facili-ties, the benefits can be compounded many timesover, as knowledge is transferred among all facilities.

Furthermore, there is substantial opportunity tocollect and analyze data from the Program. For exam-ple, it would be beneficial to understand the typesand number of process hazards that are being identi-fied. Hazards could potentially be categorized bytype (e.g., fire/explosion, toxicity, electrical shock,etc.) and compared across the organization andwithin a facility. In addition, participation rates andincident trends may be relevant measures to assessthe effectiveness of the Program on influencing proc-ess safety culture.

The key measure of success, however, will be inte-grating the Program on a much larger scale, in such away that the impact to the organization is greatest.The maximum program benefit will only be realizedwhen all stakeholders are involved. The greatest yieldwill be when process improvement becomes theproduct of shared input by operations, maintenance,engineering, training and management. When thisoccurs, integration has blossomed and the benefitsare magnified.

On a broader scale, the Spot the Hazard! Programcan be readily adapted to similar industries, and tai-lored to the types of hazards present in that particularindustry, while still achieving the same desiredresults. A better-educated workforce with a mindsetof hazard awareness and recognition is, after all, inthe common interest of all of us.

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14. S.H. Kadri and D.W. Jones, Nurturing a strongprocess safety culture, Process Saf Progr 25 (2006),16–20.

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