Specpro Case Digest Compilation.docx

8/11/2019 Specpro Case Digest Compilation.docx

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[CASE TITLE] Patricia Natcher vs. Hon. Court of Appeals

[CASE #] G.R. No. 133000

[DATE] October 2, 2001

[PONENTE] Buena, J.

[NATURE] Petition for review on certiorari

Doctrine:

Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fallwithin the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited

jurisdiction.

Facts:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of aland in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his 6children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's adjudicating anddividing among themselves the said land. Under the agreement, Graciano received8/14 share while each of the children received 1/14 share of the said property.Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, TCTs were issued in the name ofGraciano and the children.

Further, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-

Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdividedamong themselves the land into several lots. Graciano then donated to hischildren, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land leaving only447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name. Subsequently, the saidland was further subdivided into 2 lots where the 1 stwith an area of 80.90 sqm.and the 2ndlot with an area of 396.70 sqm. Eventually, Graciano sold the 1 stlot toa 3rdperson but retained ownership over the 2ndlot.

On 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During theirmarriage, Graciano sold the (2nd) land to his wife Patricia to which a TCT wasissued in her name. On 1985,Graciano died leaving his 2 ndwife Patricia and hischildren by his 1stmarriage, as heirs.

In a complaint, private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, Natcherthrough fraud, misrepresentation and forgery acquired the TCT making it appearthat Graciano executed a Deed of Sale. And, that their legitimes have beenimpaired.

Petitioners Allegations: She was legally married to Graciano in 1980. Thus,under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Thatduring Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to

his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim againstGraciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

RTC (Manila): Deed of sale is void being contrary to law. No evidence ofseparation of property or a decree of judicial separation of property between them,the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale; Prohibiteddonation; Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, itmay however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia

Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.

CA: Reversed and set aside RTCs ruling. (It is the probate court that hasexclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate Thus the

court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. Whatthe court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of the sale and leavethe issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted forthat purpose.)

Issue:Whether or not the RTC (in an action for reconveyance) may adjudicate mattersrelating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly onquestions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to his heirs.

Held:

No, the RTC trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, wentbeyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a specialproceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. (PetitionDISMISSED)

A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement orprotection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action mayeither be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civilactions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A specialproceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to e stablish a status, a right or aparticular fact.

There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. Anaction is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the mannerprescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remediesaccording to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may bedefined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party,or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings arerequired unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, theremedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.


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Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title withdamages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of adeceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partakeof the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires theapplication of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of thedecedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise ofits limited jurisdiction.

Under Sec. 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made oralleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard anddetermined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the finalorder of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions andon the heir.

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement inCoca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter shouldbe resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limitedprobate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure.In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may bewaived".

We do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch asthe children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the RTC, acting in itsgeneral jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by thedecedent.

This Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that althoughgenerally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet ifthe interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation oradvancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by theprobate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probatecourt is competent to decide the question of ownership.


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[CASE TITLE] FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA

RIVERA, AND EUTIQUIO DICO, JR. VS PETER ENRIQUEZ, ET. AL.

[CASE #] G.R. No. 162956

[DATE] April 10, 2008

[PONENTE] Puno, C.J.

[NATURE] Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court

Doctrine: If there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under thecircumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among

other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said specialproceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finallyclosed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to havehimself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask forits re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heirin order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution oradjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

Facts:Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned thesubject parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu, with Anacleto Cabrera. On theother hand respondents, claim to be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as husband anddaughter of Anacleto's daughter.

On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez, sold 200 sq. m.out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and CatalinaFernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in this case. WhenSpouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, theydiscovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit byAnacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, thesubject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyesdated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned byNicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico.

Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed acomplaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and fordamages. They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of thesubject property.The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed, hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determinetheir status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civilaction to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.

Held:

Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must bemade in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for

reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action forreconveyance. The respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legalheirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed toprosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is the one whostands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled tothe avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be onewhich is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or afuture, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. A plaintiff is a real partyin interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, while adefendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a correlative legalobligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants actor omission which had violated the legal right of the former. The purpose of the

rule is to protect persons against undue and unnecessary litigation. It likewiseensures that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverseparties in the consideration of a case. Thus, a plaintiffs right to institute an

ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property wasregistered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinarycivil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition, or nullification oftransfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto, thisCourt has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in anordinary civil action since the matter is within the exclusive competence of thecourt in a special proceeding.

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for theDeclaration of Non-Existency, Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificatesof Title, etc., a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right beingasserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who theyclaim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth asstated in the documents the respondents sought to annul.


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[CASE TITLE] Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte,

et. al.

[CASE #] G.R. No. 198680

[DATE] July 8, 2013

[PONENTE] Perlas-Bernabe, J.

[NATURE] Petition for review on certiorari

Doctrine:

A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a

right, or a particular fact; a declaration of heirship can be made only in a specialproceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of astatus or right

Facts:

Magdaleno Ypon died intestate, leaving behind lots covered by two TCTs.Respondent, Gaudioso Ricaforte (aka Gaudioso Ypon), claimed to be the sole heirof Magdaleno and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. After which,caused the cancellation of the TCTs and had the lots transferred to his name.

The transfer led to Petitioners filing a case for Cancellation of Title andReconveyance, alleging that Magdaleno died childless; and that Gaudiosos

transfer of property is prejudicial to their rights as successors-in-interests.

The RTC held in favor of Gaudioso, being able to prove through his BirthCertificate that he is the son of Magdaleno. Petitioners also failed to show theyhad a cause of action against Gaudiso, Petitioners not having proved that they areMagdalenos compulsory heirs; albeit, being able to prove their relationship toMagdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters ofadministration.

After the motion for reconsideration of Petitioners was denied, they sought directrecourse to the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not the Petitioners had a proper cause of action against Respondent

Held:No, Petition DENIED

Petitioners allege that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno, and if proven to betrue, would warrant the cancellation and reconveyance they seek. However,jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the

deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in anordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.

The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make adeclaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration canonly be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party suesanother for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress ofa wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks toestablish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the

declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as thepetitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for thedetermination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, aswhen the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trialcourt and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and theRTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceedinghad been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannotbe re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similarnature, appear to exist.


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[CASE TITLE] Sheker v. Estate of Alice

[CASE #] G.R. No. 157912

[DATE] December 13, 2007

[PONENTE] Austria Martinez, J.

[NATURE] Petition for Review on Certiorari

DOCTRINE:

Special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings;

but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of theRules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings,as far as practicable.

Certification of Non-Forum Shopping Not Required in a Contingent Money

Claim

FACTS:

Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of VictoriaMedina. Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by theRegional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all creditorsto file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Shekerfiled a contingent money claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the

amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; andanother P275,000 as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among othersthat the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because; (1) the latter did notattach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto (2) failed to pay the necessarydocket fee (3) failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was notfiled and served personally. RTC dismissed the claim of Alan Sheker and agreedon the claim of Medina.

Petitioner now files the petition for review on certiorari and maintains that theRTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceding the rules requiring acertification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing,

and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2,Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicableto special proceedings only in a suppletory manner. Hence the case.

ISSUE:

(1) Won the rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in specialproceedings.(2) Won the claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because of non-filing of certificateof non-forum shopping and non-payment of docket fees.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial

Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court ofIligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and takeappropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of theRules of Court.

RATIO:

1) No, Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of specialprovisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court governspecial proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules providedfor in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actionsshall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable ofbeing put into practice, done or accomplished.4This means that in the absence ofspecial provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedingsas much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to saidproceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules inordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum

shoppingfor complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claimsagainst an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, theyare applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of adeceased person as in the present case.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_157912_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_157912_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_157912_2007.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_157912_2007.html#fnt4


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2) No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forumshopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the caseat bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money claim

but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers will.Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters oftestamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against thedecedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator oftheir respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certainexceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claimswhich is to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition ofthe properties of the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate newlitigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress ofthe case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right orremedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relatesto some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connectedwith and dependent upon the principal remedy.


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Pilar S. Vda De Manalo et. al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al.,

G.R. No. 129242

January 16, 2001

Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners seeking to annul theResolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Orders of the Regional TrialCourt and the Resolution which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Doctrine:

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or

proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint,or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.

It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limitedand special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters andissues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.

Facts:Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by hiswife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo,Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, OrlandoManalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.

herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late TroadioManalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, andImelda filed a petition with the respondent Trial Court for the judicial settlementof the estate of their late father, and for the appointment of their brother, RomeoManalo, as administrator.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition forhearing and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeksin a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directingservice by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition attheir respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issuedan order declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and setthe reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993.

However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motionof herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which tofile their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel,culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) toset aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 whichdenied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set forpreliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of thecase; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the personsof the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order which resolved, thus:A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on

July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of theiraffirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, saidaffirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue ofthe present proceeding;C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of theoppositors;D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this PresidingJudge;E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regularadministrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing onSeptember 9, 1993 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.

A motion for reconsideration is filed but denied the trial court.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt, In their petition for certiorariwith the appellate court, they contend that:(1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial courtdid not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the survivingspouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnestefforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) nocertification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition forcertiorari.

Issue:Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questionedorders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outrightdismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of thepetitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involvingmembers of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition butthat the same have failed.


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Held:The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

According to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismissa complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing theclaim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to averin the petition in special proceeding, that earnest efforts toward a compromisehave been made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of thepetition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action orproceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint,or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.

The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition forthe settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the lateTroadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City ofManila at the time of his said death.

The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country arefoundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administrationof the estate rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an

enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of theproperties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probateproceedings

It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has limitedand special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters andissues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 wereto be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceasedperson, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of theCivil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for thedismissal, The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take

refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justifythe invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissalof the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manaloinasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the samefamily unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have beenmade, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.This is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or

persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiffpursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or theenforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued inSP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant wasimpleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special

proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek toestablish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (privaterespondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father andsubsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so thatthey can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidationof the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction ofthe probate court.


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THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHIU GUIMCO, defendant-

appellant.

G.R. No. 12184

September 27, 1917

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; COMMITMENT FOR FAILURETO PRODUCE WILL.A court cannot make a valid order committing a personto jail for failure to produce the will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629of the Code of Civil Procedure, except when acting in the exercise of itsjurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons.

Facts:

Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the municipality ofGingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting China. Before his departurefrom the Philippines he had executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, a notarypublic, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. ChiuGuimco is Joaquin Cruzs brother.

Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his deceased brother,entered into an agreement with his brothers Filipina wife, whereby she

relinquished her claims to the estate for a consideration. He also entered into anagreement with Uy Cuan, his brothers Chinese wife, for the distribution of the

estate and for the payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate. Nopayments have, however, been made by Guimco.

Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to Guimco urginghim to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful proceedings inaccordance therewith. Guimco replied that the will in question had never been inhis possession and that he had never seen it.

A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure chargingGuimco with the failure to produce the will within the time required by law. Thecourt found the accused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800.Subsequently, the court, believing that the will was in his possession, ordered himto produce it but Guimco still failed to do so. The court ordered the confinement

of Guimco in the provincial jail.

Issue:Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered the commitmentof Guimco to the provincial jail?

Held:

No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of Rule 75), whichallows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver a will after the death ofthe testator without reasonable cause, can only be applied when a court is acting inthe exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceasedpersons. Where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court,before taking action under this section, should require that there be before it somepetition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the courtunder this section appropriate.

The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is clearly a totallydifferent remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628 (nowsection 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 tosuperimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty ofimprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.

To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec. 628would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of thewill by him would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in thecriminal complaint. This would constitute an infringement of the provision of lawwhich says that in a criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifyingagainst himself.


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[CASE TITLE] In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA

INGEBORG JOHNSON

[CASE #] G.R. No. L-12767

[DATE] November 16, 1918

[PONENTE] STREET, J.

[NATURE]

Doctrine: One cannot acquire a new (or lose his) citizenship by the mere changeof domicile.

Facts:Biographical facts:

Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country heemigrated to the US and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898.

May 9, 1898: Chicago he married to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediatelythereafter embarked for the PH as a soldier in the Army of the US. Ebba Ingeborg(daughter) was born a few months after their marriage.

After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the US he continuedto live in the PH.

November 20, 1902: Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce from him

in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion.

January 10, 1903: he procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago.

From Chicago he went to Sweden, where a photograph was taken in which heappeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter, EbbaIngeborg, who was then living with her grandparents in Sweden.

Deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in business and continued tolive until his death.

In this city he to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibaez, bywhom he had three children, to wit, Mercedes Encarnacion and Victor.

The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased bySimeona Ibaez.

February 4, 1916: Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizenof the US, died in the city of Manila, left a holographic will, dated September 9,1915, by which he disposed of an estate worth P231,800.

It was written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and twowitnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code ofCivil Procedure.

February 9, 1916: a petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate ofthis will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of theState of Illinois, USA; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the lawsof that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636(Will made here by alien) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The hearing was set for March 6, 1916, and 3 weeks publication of notice wasordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." (Due publication was made.)

March 16, 1916: Document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T.Pickett as administrators of the estate. (Pickett signified his desire not to serve,and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.)

In the will, the testator gives to his:brother Victor 100 shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett RopeCompany;father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000;daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000;

wife, Alejandra Ibaez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single;Simeona Ibaez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single.

The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children Mercedes,Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.

After the will had been probated, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson moved to vacate theorder of March 16 and also various other orders in the case (purpose: to annul thedecree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparingthe way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimateheir of her father.)DENIED!

The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are:

Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of theState of Illinois at the time the will in ques tion was executed;The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the Stateof Illinois;The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner;andThe order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.


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Issue:

Whether judgment should be set aside because the testator was not a resident ofthe State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State.

Held:

No, Petition DENIED.

The probate of the will was regular and that the publication was sufficient to give

the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to beprobated.

No law in force which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalizedcitizen of the PH; and it was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even if he hadso desired, to expatriate himself from the US and change his political status from acitizen of the US to a citizen of these Islands.

PRESUMPTION: He retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with hisstatus as a citizen of the United States. (It would be novel doctrine to Americansliving in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose theircitizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.)

A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another stateor country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country ofwhich he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by thelaw of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in thePhilippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to thelaws of these Islands the state, being not capitalized, does not mean that UnitedStates is excluded from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was stilla territory of the US).

Also, with regard to the alleged impaired legitime, the Court ruled that: theprobate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decreeof probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will.

The issue as to the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will must bedetermined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, bythe general provisions here in the PH.

Article 10 (2) of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentarysuccessions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of thesuccessional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall beregulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question,whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may besituate."


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[CASE TITLE] ERNESTO M. GUEVARA v. ROSARIO GUEVARA and

her husband PEDRO BUISON

[CASE #] G.R. No. L-48840

[DATE] December 29, 1943

[PONENTE] Ozaeta, J.

[NATURE] Petition for Certiorari

Doctrine:

The presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and

distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, isagainst the law and public policy.

Facts:

On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara, a resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan,executed a will (Exhibit A), distributing assorted movables and a residential lotamong his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren, Vivencio,Eduvigis, Dionista, Candida, and Pio Guevara. To his second wife AugustiaPosadas, the testator bequeathed, in addition to various movables, a portion of 25hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd hectare parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618,plus another five (5) hectares in settlement of her widows usufruct. The balanceof the 259 odd hectares he distributed as follows:

100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testators lifetime and for paymentof his debts and family expenses;108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein43.2342 hectares by way of mejora;21.6171 hectares to mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara.

Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond.On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of ErnestoGuevara, conveying to the latter the southern half of the 259-hectare lot heretoforementioned, and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northernhalf.Prior to this sale, on November 1, 1932, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointlyapplied for registration of the big parcel (case No. 15174), but in view of the sale

from the former to the latter, the decree was issued in the name of ErnestoGuevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a certificate of title being issued inhis sole name on October 12, 1933.

On September 27, 1933, Victorino Guevara died, but his will was not filed forprobate. About four years later, Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognizednatural child of the deceased Victorino, and on the assumption that he had diedintestate, brought suit against Ernesto Guevara (legitimate son) to recover 423,492

square meters of the tract covered by certificate of title No. 51691 as the portionthat should correspond to her (Rosario) by way of legitime.

Rosario presented the will to the court not for the purpose of having it probatedbut only to prove that the deceased Victirino had acknowledged her as his naturaldaughter. She claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory orassumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated. Thistheory was upheld by both the trial court and Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals said that a will, unless probated, is ineffective. They relied

upon Section 1 of Rule 74 and sanctioned the procedure adopted by the Ernesto.The filing of testate proceedings would cause injustice, incovenience, delay, andmuch expense to the parties. It is preferable to leave them in the very status whichthey themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all,since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same criterion(Leao vs.Leao), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rulesof Court.

CA also cited Sec. 6 of Rule 124 which provides that if the procedure which thecourt ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointedout by the Rules of Court, any suitable process for mode of proceeding may beadopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said Rules.

Issue:A) Was the procedure adopted by Rosario legal?B) What is the efficacy of the deed of sale and the effect of the issuance of acertificate of title to Ernesto?

Held:

CA partially affirmed. Action instituted by Rosario was not in accordance withlaw.The awarding of relief in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent mustdepend on the custodians duty of complying with the probate of the will.

(A) Presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance

by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compelthe probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it tothe court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in notpresenting it, he may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers thewill.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to theauthenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for thepartition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its


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allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that"no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed inthe proper court"

It was wrong for Ernesto to claim that the will has been superseded by the deed ofsale and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title in his favor.

Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court applies. The proceeding for the probate of awill is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and withpersonal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator

(Rule 77).

Although not contested (sec. 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the factthat the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind andnot acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved tothe satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and giveneffect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attestedby the seal of the court.

Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of theestate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not say thatin case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate amongthemselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate.

Leao vs. Leao (25 Phil., 180) like section 1 of Rule 74, sanctions theextrajudicial partition by the heirs of the properties left by a decedent, but not thenonpresentation of a will for probate.

Riosa vs. Rocha(1926), 48 Phil. 737, departed from the procedure sanctioned bythe trial court and impliedly approved by this Court in the Leao case, by holdingthat an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession. The propertymust not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicialpartition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by the court.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to theauthenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the

partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing itsallowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that"no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed inthe proper court"

(B) There was a valid and efficacious conveyance of the southern half of thehacienda to Ernesto in consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation topay all the debts of the deceased. He had to alienate considerable portions of theland to fulfil the obligation. There was no alienation.

The registration of land under the Torrens system does not have the effect ofaltering the laws of succession, or the rights of partition between coparceners,joint tenants, and other cotenants nor does it change or affect in any other way anyother rights and liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec.70, Land Registration Law).

Rosario is not in estoppel, nor can the doctrine of res judicatabe invoked againsther claim. She has the right to compel the defendant to deliver her correspondingshare in the estate left by the deceased, Victorino.

Affirmed CA that the land still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino.Ernesto is under obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent portionfrom the southern half of said land that has not yet been sold in case of alienation.

Rosario Guevara and the parties are ordered to present the document Exhibit A

to the proper court for probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to suchaction as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsibleparty or parties under section 4 of Rule 76.

Separate Opinions:BOCOBO,J.,concurring:There is extrajudicial settlement by agreement among the heirs is authorized bysection 1 of Rule 74. only "if the decedent left no debts." There being debts when

the father died, section 1 of Rule 74 is not applicable.

Ernesto M. Guevara, in consideration of the conveyance to him of the southernhalf of the hacienda, assumed all the debts of the deceased; but this agreement isbinding only upon the parties to the contract but not upon the creditors who didnot consent thereto. (Art. 1205, Civil Code.)

MORAN,J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part:The situation is not one contemplated by section 1 of Rule 74. Thus, plaintiff maynot invoke its provisions.

The phrase "extrajudicial settlement" unquestionably means liquidation anddistribution of the estate without judicial proceeding.

If the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will,the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate ina different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.


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Uy Kiao Eng vs Nixon Lee

GR 176831

January 15, 2010

Doctrine: Generally, mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractualobligations. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for theredress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. The writ is notappropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against

his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compelpetitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedingsfor the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requestedhis mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legalheirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without anyjustifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the originalholographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case.After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitionerdemurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody theoriginal holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.However, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the

appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondentmoved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside itsearlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and thepayment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show bytestimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitionerbrought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition formandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by theappellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

Issue:Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

Held:The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, inthe name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, orboard, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particularduty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party towhom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the

public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may beresorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which thepublic has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek toenforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, mostespecially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As thequoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the lawenjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do

anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give tothe applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamusissue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantialdoubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will bedisregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamuswill not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglectedthe performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resultingfrom office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person hasunlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right oroffice to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to theissuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thingdemanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act

required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot beused to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie toenforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unlesssome obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writis not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ ofmandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice wouldbe obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to thegovernment; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogativecharacter, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only inmatters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that thereshould be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of lawother than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamuscan be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms ofremedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy,mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled byequitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sounddiscretion of the court.


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In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether theobligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis inthe nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannotbe availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent hasa photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original forpurposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him frominstituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same isin his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.--Any executor, devisee, orlegatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at anytime, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to havethe will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost ordestroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for theproduction of the original holographic will. Thus--SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.--The person who has custody of a will shall,within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the willto the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.--A person named as

executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of thetestator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if heobtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to thecourt having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any othermanner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing hisacceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law forthe production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus,the Court grants the demurrer


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[CASE TITLE] Ethel Grimm Roberts, petitioner vs. Judge Tomas R.

Leonidas, Branch 38, Court of First Instance; Maxine Tate-Grimm, Edward

Miller Grimm II and Linda Grimm, respondents.

[CASE #] G.R. No. L-55509

[DATE] June 19, 1982

[PONENTE] Aquino, J.

[NATURE] Petition for Allowance of Wills

Doctrine:A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died withtwo wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is

proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It isanomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in anintestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with thetestate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding shouldcontinue hearing the two cases.

Facts:Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the MakatiMedical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife,Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II

(Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts(McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.

He executed two willsin San Francisco, California. One will disposed of hisPhilippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and hissecond wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children ofthefirst marriagewere given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estatesituated in this country.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimmand E. LaVar Tate in Utah.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manilaby Ethel in January, 1978. In its order, the Third Judicial District Courtadmitted to probate the two wills and the codicil. Two weeks later, or on April 25,1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the secondparties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered intoa compromise agreementin Utah regarding the estate.

In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would bedesignated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippineestate. It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estateshould be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus thehomes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila. The agreement indicated the computationof the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay thefees of the Angara law firm.

It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall shareequally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should

each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and maritalshare.

Intestate proceeding No. 113024 .-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days after Grimm's death, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, throughlawyers, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestateproceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named specialadministratrix.

The second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestateproceedingon the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probateof Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, Shesubmitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete andLinda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate ofGrimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved bythe intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, thatMaxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered toaccount for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine.Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to themachinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreementwas illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate andthat the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack ofmerit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or.alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20andthat the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard priorto the petition for probate.


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Issue:Whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved inanintestateproceeding byBranch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can beentertained by itsBranch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).

Held:Yes, Branch 38 can entertain the intestate proceeding in Branch 20. Therefore, theintestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judgeassigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

The Court held that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse ofdiscretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.


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CASE TITLE: Angel T. Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Pedro O Fragrante

CASE #: G.R. No. L-770

PONENTE: Hilado, J.

NATURE:

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

On May 21, 1946, Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of publicconvenience to install, maintain, and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.

The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibanez, itheld that authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant willpromote public interest and convenience; the original applicant, at the time of hisdeath is a Filipino Citizen; and his intestate estate is financially capable ofmaintaining the proposed service.

This decision overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered that under

the provisions of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended acertificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceasedPedro Fragrante, authorizing said intestate Estate through its Special or JudicialAdministrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, tomaintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to seel the ice produced from

said plant in the said municipality and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal,and in Quezon City, subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail.

The petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allowthe substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante forthe latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and insubsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to bein contravention of law.

ISSUE:WON the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a citizen of thePhilippines within the meaning of Section 16 of the Public Service Act, asamended.

HELD:Yes. Within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragranteshould be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of thesettlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during thejudicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of thoseobligations of his which survived after his death. As applied in this case, one ofthose rights was before the Public Service Commission consisting in theprosecution of said application to its final conclusion.

The term person used in section 1 (1) and (2) in the bill of rights of the

constitution, must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons. Otherwisethe latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived ofproperty without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searchesand seizures. The framers of the constitution must intend to include artificial orjuridical persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar natureand among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.


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Octavio S. Morales II v. Pacita delos Reyes,

GR No 129505 (2000)

January 31, 2000

Mendoza, J.

Doctrine:The right to intervene belongs to any interested person. "Interested person" is onewho would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claimagainst the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, notmerely incidental or contingent.

Facts:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City,filed a petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos allegedthat he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee anddevisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will hisproperties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and thatcopies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondentPacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will was annexed to the petition forprobate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch

61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.

Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996;On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for interventionclaiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and OctavioL. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. DeSantos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thusprayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance ofletters of administration in his name.

Judge Gorospe denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention.Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decisionpromulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for

intervention.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos of RTC-Makati, Branch 65 grantedpetitioner's motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for areconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed apetition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997,rendered a decision setting aside the trial court's order on the ground thatpetitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner, being the nearest of kin and a creditor of the late Dr.Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance ofletters testamentary filed by the respondent.

Held:

NO.Rule 79, 1 provides: Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary.Simultaneous petition for administration. Any person interested in a will maystate in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the

persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearingupon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, atthe same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one whowould be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim againstthe estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merelyincidental or contingent.

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot beconsidered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentarysuccession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of hisentire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any partof it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does notcontravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parentsand ascendants;(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect totheir legitimate children and descendants;(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.


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Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have beenpreterited in the testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in thesettlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of thedeceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it isincumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated inOzaeta v. Pecson:The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessaryconcomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It isnatural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one whocan be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailmentof this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to givebond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of thesecircumstances is present in this case.


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[CASE TITLE] VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA

[CASE #] G.R. No. L-40502

[DATE] November 29, 1976

[PONENTE] Martin, J.

[NATURE] Petition for Letters of Administration

Doctrine:

If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whethera citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,and his estate settled, in the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time ofhis death.

Facts:

Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administrationof Amando G. Garcia. The latter died intestate in Manila and leaving properties inCalamba, Laguna and in other places within the jurisdiction of the HonorableCourt.

Fule also filed a petition for appointment as a special administratix over the esta te.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia questioning theappointment of Fule as special administratix and was issued without jurisdiction.She also prayed that she be appointed and not Fule as special administratix.

The notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Fule waspublished in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation ofSouthern Luzon.

Preciosa Garcia received a Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of RegularAdministrator and she filed an opposition to the original and supplementalpetitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction , venue,lack of interest of Fule in the estate of Garcia and disqualification of Fule asspecial administratix.

Fule filed an omnibus motion praying for the authority to take possession of theproperties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons and to secure

cash advances from the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative MarketingAssociation. Preciosa Garcia opposed the motion and asking the judge to limit theauthority or power of the special administratix.

The judge issued an order denying the motion. Preciosa moved to dismiss thepetition because jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has notbeen acquired by the court; venue was improperly laid; and Fule is not a party ininterest as she is not entitled to inherit.

Issue:Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Laguna has jurisdiction to hear thecase.

Held:No, the petition of Virginia Fule was denied for lack of jurisdiction.Sec. 1 of Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that if the decedent is aninhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of hisdeath.

We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term resides connotes ex vi termini

actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. In otherwords, resides should be viewed or understand in its popular sense, meaning thepersonal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place ofabode.

On this issue, we rule that the last place of residence of the deceased AmadoGarcia was at #11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City and not atCalamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of thedecedent at the time of his death.

The death certificate of Amado Garcia was presented in evidence by Fule andPreciosa Garcia; it shows that his last place of residence was at #11 CarmelAvenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City and not at Calamba,Laguna.

The conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Fules petition for letters ofadministration was improperly laid in the CFI of Laguna. Nevertheless, the longsettled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. In the casebefore US the CA had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Fule as specialadministratix, Preciosa did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdictionor venue assumed by CFI of Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort toalternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on theenforcement of the rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the lastresidence of the decedent.


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[CASE TITLE] Remedios Bongon Viuda De Manzanero vs. The CFI of

Batangas

[CASE #] G.R. No. L-44042

[DATE] August 23, 1935

[PONENTE] Villareal, J.

[NATURE] Petition for certiorari

Doctrine:

The jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance, for the settlement of anestate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, or of the locationof his estate, cannot be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal fromthat court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on therecord.

Facts:

Esteban Manzanero, then assistant district engineer of Albay, died in theprovincial hospital on February 1935. On March 1935, his brother Fortunato filedin the CFI of Batangas a sworn application alleging that his deceased brother hadhis legal residence in Santo Tomas, Batangas; that he had left no property except alife insurance policy of P5,000 with the Filipinas Life Assurance Co., of Manila;that his deceased brother owed him P500; that he was survived by a widow, herein

petitioner, Remedios Bongon, residing in Tabaco, Albay; and praying for asummary settlement of his estate. A copy of said application was sent by ordinarymail to said widow.

The CFI of Batangas issued an order setting said application for hearing anddirecting the publication of the notice. When the application was called forhearing only the applicant Fortunato appeared through his attorney. As thevacation Judge, Eduardo Gutierrez David, was holding judicial session in Lucena,Tayabas, said applicant and his attorney requested the clerk of the CFI ofBatangas to send the record to Lucena.

Upon petition of the applicant, and after making sure that no opposition to theapplication had been presented, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David ordered the clerk

of court of Tayabas to take the evidence in the case and to submit his report.

The clerk of the CFI of Tayabas forwarded the evidence with his report to saidcourt.

The case was set for hearing and the corresponding notice sent by registeredspecial delivery mail to herein petitioner Bongon and to Manzanero.

The case was called for hearing without the petitioner having appeared to opposethe application.

CFI: Granted. (Esteban was a resident of Batangas, with temporary residence inTabaco, Albay and directing the summary distribution of the sum of P5,000, afterpayment o f the sum of P500 which said deceased supposedly owed his brotherFortunato and after the filing of a bond of P3,500 by the alleged heirs, saiddistribution to be subject to any valid claim that might be presented within twoyears against said distribution. Required the Filipinas Assurance Company to payto the heirs of the deceased the proceeds of his insurance policy.)

**The insurance company sent the net proceeds of the policy amounting toP4,276.03 to the clerk of said court.

Having been informed that the proceeds of the policy had been distributed amongthe heirs of her deceased husband, the petitioner filed a motion praying for thereturn and delivery to her of the money.

Issue:Whether or not the question of jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of asummary settlement of the estate of a deceased person, by reason of residence,may be raised by means of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

Held:No, Petition DISMISSED.

Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:Jurisdiction, when may be contested. The jurisdiction assumed by a Court ofFirst Instance, for the settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place ofresidence of a person, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in asuit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, orwhen the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

From the pleadings before us, the want of jurisdiction of said court does notclearly appear. The communication of the municipal treasurer of Tabaco, Albay,stating that the deceased appears in the list of registered voters and the affidavit of

the municipal president stating that the deceased resided before his death inTabaco, Albay, do not form part of the record of the lower court. It not appearingfrom the orders of the lower court, as disclosed by the copies thereof attached tothe record of these certiorari proceedings, that said court lacks jurisdiction to takecognizance of the application for summary settlement by reason of the legalresidence of the deceased, certiorari does not lie, an appeal being speciallyprovided in such case by section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

F th it f d th t th i ti i th i l di


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Furthermore, it appears of record that there is a motion in the special proceedingfor the summary settlement of the estate under consideration, praying that theheirs of the deceased who received the latter's property, be ordered to return it tothe court for delivery to the herein petitioner as the only alleged beneficiarynamed in the insurance policy of her deceased husband. This motion is pendingdecision and is in accordance with the reservation made by Judge David in hisorder directing the distribution of the net proceeds of the insurance policy amongthe brothers and sisters of the deceased after payment of the only indebtedness ofP500. Said reservation is in accordance with the provision of section 598 of saidCode of Civil Procedure.

[CASE TITLE] ANGELA RODRIGUEZ MARIA RODRIGUEZ ET AL vs The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan on the other hand take the stand that the


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[CASE TITLE] ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. vs

HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,

Branch III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN

[CASE #] G.R. No. L-21993

[DATE] June 21, 1966

[PONENTE] REYES, J.B.L., J.

[NATURE]Petition for a writ of certiorariand prohibition to the Court of FirstInstance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its SpecialProceeding

Doctrine:Jurisdiction and Venue.The place of residence of the deceased is notan element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it isupon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of adeceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue"

Facts:Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila.On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to theClerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.

On March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel fileda petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will.

On March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same waswithdrawn.

On March 12, 1963, the aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr.Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident ofParaaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that MariaRodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate and on the sameday, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court (CFIof Bulacan) for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.

It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal;

that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from theyear 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque,and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition forprobate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on thesame date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that theCourt of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upondelivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that thecase in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March12, 1963.

Issue:Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction overthe settlement of Fr. Rodriguezs estate

Held:Yes, the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlementof the estate in question and the intestate proceedings in the Rizal Court should bediscontinued.

The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon thedelivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even ifno petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will beingdeposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and placefor proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what isprescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule77, of the old Rules):SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will.Notice thereof to be published.When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, theCourt having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving thewill when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shallcause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in theprovince.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate hasbeen filed by the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petitionfor the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act uponthe mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its

allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the depositof the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will wasdelivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to theCourt of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings inthe Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, theprecedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First


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The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of FirstInstance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by expressprovisions of Rule 73

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