Special Reports 02

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Arctic and Antarctic: Geoeconomic opportunity- geopolitical and security dilemma Modern Diplomacy | www.moderndiplomacy.eu

Transcript of Special Reports 02

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Anis H. BajrektarevicFormer legal practitioner and thepresident of Young Lawyers Associa-tion of BiH Bar (late 1980s). FormerMFA official and career diplomat(early 1990s).Research Fellow at the Institute forModern Political-history analyses, Dr.Bruno Kreisky Foundation as well asthe Legal and Political Advisor for CEEat the Vienna-based Political Acad-emy, Dr. Karl Renner (mid 1990s).Senior Legal Officer and PermanentRepresentative to the UN Office in Vi-enna of the Intergovernmental Or-ganization ICMPD (1990s). Attached

to the IMC University of Austria as a Professor and Chairman forIntl. Law and Global Political Studies (2000s – 10s).For past 15 years, he teaches subjects of Geo-political Affairs, In-ternational Law (including Intl. Relations, Law of IOs and EU Law)and Sustainable Development (Institutions and Instruments of ).Besides, he served as a pro bono expert numerous academic in-stitutions, think-tanks and intergovernmental institutions (suchas the UN ECE, OSCE, Council of Europe, American Bar, OxfordAcademy of Total Intelligence, etc.). Professor is editor of the NY-based GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal andeditorial board member of numerous similar magazines on threecontinents. The International Institute IFIMES has recently en-trusted him as its Department Head for Strategic Studies on Asia,and its Permanent Representative to Austria and Vienna-basedIOs. Prof. Bajrektarevic is the author of dozens presentations, publi-cations, speeches, seminars, research colloquiums as well as ofnumerous public events (round tables & study trips, etc.). His writ-ings are frequently published on all five continents (in over 50countries and in 20 languages).Author of the book Is There Life After Facebook? - Geopolitics ofEnergy and other Foreign Policy Essays (Addleton Academic Pub-lishers, New York, 2013), and the forthcoming book No Asian Cen-tury.He lives in Vienna, Austria.Prof. Anis BajrektarevicProfessor and Chairperson Intl. Law & Global Political StudiesE-mail: anis[at]bajrektarevic.eu

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MODERN DIPLOMACY INTERNATIONAL EDITION www.moderndiplomacy.eu02

ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC

Between the Environmental hazard,

geo-economic opportunity,geopolitical and security

dilemmaProf. Anis H. Bajrektarevic

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08. Polar Caps at GlanceDefining the PolesPopulation of the Polar RegionsEnvironmental hazard and the impact of Global Warming

12. Legal RegimesThe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)Maritime ZonesCommission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)The Antarctic TreatyAntarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM)The Antarctic Treaty System

18. Circumpolar States – The Arctic fiveThe Russian FederationThe United StatesThe U.S. Standing on the UNCLOSPosition of the Non-party claimantCanadaDenmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands)Towards the Danish CommonwealthNorwayThe smallest by size – the biggest by expertiseSvalbard

CONTENTS

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Northwest PassageNorthern Sea RouteArctic BridgeChallenges of Shipping in the ArcticNatural Resources

54. Security challengeConclusionPost ScriptumList of ReferencesExtract from UNCLOS

30. Areas of ClaimsLomonosov RidgeMendeleev RidgeHans IslandBarents Sea – Loop HoleBeaufort SeaAntarctic Country Claims

40. Other Parties at StakeIceland, Finland and SwedenArctic CouncilOSCE, NATO, EU and the Nordic Council

46. Economic DevelopmentShipping Routes

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Arctic and Antarctica, the world’s two regionswithin the polar circles of the Northern andSouthern hemispheres, were rarely discussedin the past (be it in general literature ongeopolitics, law or international relations), butlately have gained the attention of the interna-tional community. At first glance it seems that the two oppositebut complementary polar caps have much incommon – for a general audience the differen-tiating point might be only a TV quiz-like ques-tion: “Where polar bears and where penguinslive?” However, when taking a closer look, a sig-nificant difference becomes apparent: the twoopposing poles are of a different morphologi-cal and tectonic, climatic, anthropo-biological,political and indeed of different legal standing.

The South Pole – Antarctica – is the region gov-erned by a treaty which is fully accepted by theentire international community (that includesall of the neighboring and interested states),but is, however, of a limited timeline (50 years).In the North – Arctic – on the contrary, thesetup of a special legal framework is still underdiscussion. Due to the current global warming,vast perennial ice sheets are melting, resultingnot only in an environmental threat but alsomarking an opening of certain economic op-portunities(including alternative transporta-tion and shipping routes, namely theNorthwest Passage,

the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic Bridge,but also large mineral resources exploitationprospects). A new environmental reality un-leashed a commercially–driven run on the Arc-tic, often described by the media as “land grabin the Arctic” or “new gold rush in the HighNorth” (five circumpolar states are the majorplayers striving to acquire substantial geoeco-nomic and geopolitical shares in the northernregion and by doing so, conflicting over thepossible demarcation lines).

The question arises if the absence of a definitelegal setting in the Arctic and the increasedfocus on national (geoeconomic and geopolit-ical) interests (and prides) by the five con-cerned states might trigger border tensions,domestic unrest, an open armed conflict andhence, endanger the global security. Amongthe Five there is a lot: two P-5 members andboth of them (former) superpowers, four areNATO members facing Russia on the otheredge, three European versus two American,one in the EU, three of the G–8, and all of themthe OSCE members.

What is to preserve the major powers’ balance– a change or the maintenance of the currentArctic and Antarctica status quo?

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POLAR CAPS AT GLANCE

esides the fact that the two opposite poles arepermafrost encircling the geographic andmagnetic poles of the planet within the pa-rameters of the polar circle, nearly everythingelse is different. The following lines are a briefoverview on the Arctic and Antarctica, includ-

ing their location, characteristics and environmental factors.

Defining the Poles The geographic literature defines the Arctic by the limitationof the Arctic polar circle, a line drawn at latitude 66°33’. Itmarks the area where at least one day per year the sun doesnot rise and one during which it does not set. The general lit-erature operates with other definitions, often less accuratebut more descriptive, e.g. by claiming that the Arctic regionis further north of the tree line. The name Arctic originatesfrom the old Greek word for bear (arktos) due to the stellarconstellation of Bear/Polaris overseeing the Northern Pole.On the other hand, the land mass of Antarctica is a continentlocated around the South Pole, hence representing the op-posite of the Arctic (which is the original meaning of its word:“opposite of the Arctic”). The Antarctic region is referred tothe area south of the Antarctic Convergence, includingoceanic areas as well as all of the gravitating islands.

The Arctic is often regarded as an oceanic mass completelycovered by ice. However, it holds the truth for only 2/5 of theentire Arctic region. The remaining area – dispersed landmass without continental continuity – is characterized bytundra and boreal forests (e.g. Greenland).

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Population of the Polar Regions

The Arctic region is inhabited by approximately 4million people; 10% of which are of indigenous ori-gins. The Canadian part of Arctic is the home forroughly half of the population of the indigenoustribes. In Greenland, the indigenous Inuit peoplehold the majority but in the rest of the Arctic region,the non-native settlers have already outnumberedthe natives (this demographic change coincidedwith the increased economic activity affecting mostof the Arctic during the 20th century). Basically,there are over 30 different indigenous peoples anddozens of languages (some of them on the brink ofextinction). The natives will have to adapt to the cur-rent economic development (exuberated with thenew economic possibilities) as well as to the socio-political and demographic changes going on in theregion. Traditionally bound to their own intact wayof life, the natives are additionally challenged withthe grave consequences of the compromised andunbalanced ecosystem.

The Antarctica, however, is uninhabited – no evi-dence of any human presence has ever been recov-ered. The only presence dates to the modern times– expeditions of scientists residing on a basis ofshort-term shifts in several scientific observatory sta-tions scattered throughout the continent.

Environmental hazard and the impact ofGlobal Warming

The Arctic is one of the world’s regions most affectedby climate change: average temperatures are risingtwice as fast as at any other spot on the planet. Theperennial ice sheets are melting with an unexpectedspeed coupled with the ever-shorter winter snowseason. With the shrinking snow-covered area(deglaciation), less sunlight is refracted back to theatmosphere – a pattern that further accelerates therise of temperature (due to increased sun-radiation,the absorption by the less refractable and more ab-sorptive, dark-coloured ocean) – Albedo.

The Earth’s southernmost continent(with its 14 mil. km², roughly twicethe size of Australia), Antarctica is98% permafrost. Therefore, we mayassume that the Arctic is an oceanencircled by land, whereas theAntarctica is a continent sur-rounded by ocean. Another signifi-cant difference is the annualaverage air temperature: While tem-peratures of the South Pole arearound –50°C, the North Pole’s aver-age is –17°C.

Regarding flora and fauna, the tworegions diverge as well. Probably,the most known difference, is thefact that polar bears live in theNorth and penguins can be foundon the South Pole. The Arctic is alsoa habitat to mammals like rein-deers, caribous, bears, foxes andothers. The Antarctica is not inhab-

ited by any terres-trial mammals. Inboth oceanic areasthe whales, por-poises and seals canbe observed, and inthe Arctic Oceanalso amphibiousmammals. Having alook at the fauna,the Antarctica isonly sparely popu-lated with plantsand only on itsedges and has notree line. On thecontrary, the Arctichas tundra markedby a visible tree line.

Climate changein polar regions

is expected to beamong the largest

and most rapidof any region on the Earth,

and will causemajor physical, ecological,

sociological,and economic impacts,

especially in the Arctic…(Hassol,

Impacts of a warming Arctic)

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The WMO/IPCC expect an increase of about 6to 7°C in the course of this century (surely withsome microclimatic variances).Although there is no scientific consensus onthe cause/s, the effects are undisputed; TheArctic (being more vulnerable than any otherregion on earth) is responding rather fast tothe climate change. Figure nr. 1 shows the re-treat of sea ice which had reached a recordminimum in the summer of 2007.

Based on incomplete and inconclusive scien-tific data, the belief that the Antarctic regionhas opposite trends to the global warmingrecorded all over the planet proved to be quitethe contrary. In short, it was assumed that theAntarctic would cool while the rest of theplanet would warm up. Regrettably enough,the latest satellite images are highly disturbing:the western part, the Antarctic Peninsula, isstrongly affected by climate change and hencethe local glaciers are melting faster than thoseon the rest of the continent. The thinned andpermeable ozone layer will further acceleratethe warming process in this particular area.

In addition to the fact that the polar caps arethe main stabilizers and regulators of theplanet’s climate (with all weather patterns),they are also the biggest reserves of freshwater. Through the rapid and stark deglacia-tion of Greenland and Antarctic, and the melt-ing of the Arctic ice sheets, a spill of freshwater is released. This additional water quan-tity is seriously affecting: oceanic volumes (asea level rise), their temperatures, density andsalinity which all may alter the oceans’ circula-tion system through the oceanic conveyor beltand consequently the climate all over theworld. It remains unclear what consequencesthis might have on Europe’s climate and gen-eral weather conditions.

The future scenarios are ranging from a sub-stantial warming (coupled with severedroughts and extreme weather conditions), upto a subsequent cooling.

Another consequence affecting the Arctic isthe thawing of permafrost (permanentlyfrozen land). Through the thawing of the soil,methane that was trapped for centuries is re-leased into the atmosphere, which further con-tributes to the greenhouse effect. In additionto a dangerous methane release, the very de-frosting of permafrost will cause the destruc-tion of buildings, communicationalinfrastructure such as roads and airports, aswell as deviations of industrial facilities andoil/gas pipelines within the Arctic Circle. Floraand fauna will definitely undergo significantchanges. Oceanic and terrestrial species willmove further north, some of them alreadyunder stress of extinction as their natural habi-tats of vegetation zones are affected too. TheArctic region is experiencing a profoundchange and has to face severe challenges,which are to be felt far beyond its polar param-eters.

Map 1: Ice Extension in the Arctic

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LEGAL REGIMES

s the morphological, climatic and other nat-ural characteristics of Arctic and Antarcticare in striking difference, so is the legal po-sition of the two. While the Southern Pole isgoverned by the international treaty (pro-claimed de facto as res communis), the

Northern Pole displays an absence of any such internationalstipulations. The Antarctica has a treaty system (ATS of 1961) brokered bythe 12 nations active in the Antarctica during the IGY 1957-58 (Intl. Geophysical Year). By banning any military activityon the only continent without permanent human presence,the ATS has opened the Antarctica for the pacific scientificuse to any nation – it was the very first arms control accordestablished in direct Soviet-American negotiations duringthe Cold War. Celebrated as a big success of the Cold War, theAntarctic Treaty System (ATS) was simply a virtue out of ne-cessity. To proclaim the geographically remote, irrelevant fortransportation, militarily inaccessible and economically non-viable unpopulated continent as the demilitarized zone freeto all peace loving nations was absolutely logical and one ofvery few clear-cuts of mankind.

While the Antarctica has not scored any terrestrial humanpresence before well into the 19th century, the Arctic hasbeen traditionally inhabited by indigenous peoples. Alreadyby pre-modern times, most of the Nordics as well as Russianshave established the parameters of their state territories ex-ercising their domestic jurisdiction well over the Arctic andits natives.

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Recalling the fact that the Arctic does not representa compact land mass in continuity, the Five ArcticStates by the Ilulissat Declaration have rejected thenotion of creation of a new legal regime, stating thatthe United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS) should remain as the basic appli-cable law.

The Five strongly acclaimed the UNCLOS as the onlygoverning framework for the Arctic continentalshelf, the seabed, the protection of the marine envi-ronment (including ice-covered areas), freedom ofnavigation, marine scientific research and other usesof the sea. Interestingly enough, the US as the singlemajor country in the world that has repeatedly re-jected to ratify the UNCLOS was a participatory andsignatory party of the Declaration of the Five fromIlulissat – by doing so, indirectly accepting the UN-CLOS as the main sea-related international treaty.

The United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS)

Since Hugo Grotius’s famous Mare Liberum of 1609the accessibility of the international waters (freenaval regime) has been the international custom ob-served by all (civilized) nations (in fact, an instrumen-tal tool for the European colonial expansion). Eversince, the so-called Freedom of the Seas Doctrinehas gradually elaborated on the notion of territorialwaters, continental shelf, economic zones and its de-marcation distances. As the technological break-throughs made economic exploitation possible andmilitary offences probable, the international com-munity repeatedly tried to codify the customaryrules into the text of the comprehensive universallegally binding instrument. Not before after WWII,which was extensively fought on the seas by nearlyall major belligerent parties, the critical momentumhas been built. The first two negotiation rounds havebeen conducted in 1950s leading to the successfulclosure of the UNCLOS I (1956) and UNCLOS II (1958,1960). With over 160 participatory states and afternine consecutive years of heavy negotiations, theUNCLOS III was closed in 1982 (entering into forceby 1994).

This fact, combined with the ab-sence of any comprehensive inter-national instrument on the Arctic,opened the road to the so-calledEight Arctic States to govern thepolar territory by their respectivenational legislations. Historically, amajor portion of the Arctic (espe-cially beyond the TW or EZ) has notbeen (successfully) claimed by anyexternal party, as it is practically in-accessible for any relevant humanactivity.

Besides politicalconstrains andfrictions, theharsh climaticconditions keptthe Arctic awayfrom the (ur-gency of ) estab-lishment of acomprehensivelegal frameworkfor most of the20th century.However, the cli-mate change of

the late 20th century and the rapidmelting of the ice cap currently re-vealed the prospect of an accessibleand economically exploitable Arctic– all necessitating the comprehen-sive international legal settlement. The economic, political and legalrace for the Arctic has (again)begun. Responding to this new sit-uation, the EU and the US haveopted for creation of a legal frame-work similar to the Antarctic Treaty.On the contrary, seeing the NorthPole as their own inner lake, thestates acceding the Arctic stronglyopposed any ATS-like international-ization of the Arctic.

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Maritime Zones

Without a wish to recapitulate on all detailsstipulated by the UNCLOS, let us only make abrief reference to the zones. The UNCLOS rec-ognizes the right of the states to extend thenational territory by several maritime zonesfrom their respective coastlines. Thus, the in-ternational instrument differentiates:

Internal Waters (land-coast – baseline) – nopassage prior to explicit permission;Territorial Waters (from baseline up to 12nMseawards, with the possible extension for ad-ditional 12nM of so-called Contiguous Zone) –innocent passage right; Inner Sea (archipelago states only) – innocentpassage right;Prolongation of the Continental Shelf /PCS/(territorial extension for up to 150nM seawardsfrom baseline based on a confirmed geo-mor-phological proof ) – innocent passage right;Exclusive Economic Zone /EEZ/ (from base-line up to 200nM seaward, upon the UNCLASratification) – innocent passage right;PCS and EEZ (up to 350nM seawards frombaseline approved by the CLCS 10 years afterthe UNCLAS ratification);High Seas (beyond the limits of200nM/350nM) – open for free passage andexploitation to all states.

The recognition of the Exclusive EconomicZone (EEZ) and PCS (prolongation of the con-tinental shelf ) by the UNCLOS surely obligesthe Arctic states to grant innocent passageright to all foreign vessels. However, it firmlyawards the Five since both zones are exclusivebelts for any economic activity, be it seabed ex-ploitation (ore, gas, oil, other minerals, and thelike) or exclusivity in the fishing rights (marinebiota).

Commission on the Limits of the Conti-nental Shelf (CLCS)

The UNCLOS established the CLCS (Commis-sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ) asthe standing (scientific) panel of the instru-ment to deal with the claims beyond the200nM parameter. The CLCS is mandated to ex-amine the maritime claims per individual staterequests. Recommended deliberations of theCLCS are becoming final and binding if no con-tradictory claim is lodged (art.76). In case ofdisputes, the final settlement is subjected ei-ther to the Hague-based ICJ or to the Intl. Tri-bunal for the Law of the Sea.

After this brief elaboration on rather technicaldetails, it becomes clear why the Arctic Fivereaffirm the UNCLOS. Any Antarctica-like treatywould deprive the Five from their exclusiveeconomic rights in the Arctic region, whichthey would like to preserve as their own “innerlake” and eventually maximize the partitionamong them. Despite the fact that some of theFive suffer considerable geomorphologic dis-advantages (as lacking the continental shelfextension or credible proof of it), none of themwants the international instrument whichwould ultimately turn the Arctic to res commu-nis. No matter how tedious the extension ver-ification process is or how cost-intensive thedevelopment of specific technologies for theArctic exploitation is, the Five remain dismis-sive and assertive.

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The Antarctic Treaty

The Antarctica Treaty and to it acceding instrumentsgenerally referred to in literature as the AntarcticTreaty System (ATS) form the comprehensive inter-national regime on the Antarctica. The AntarcticTreaty (main instrument) was negotiated in the late1950s by the twelve parties – all of them also its orig-inal signatories (1959). The main treaty entered intoforce in 1961 with 47 participatory states. Declaringthe Pole as res communis free of any military activity,this instrument further stipulates the freedom of sci-entific investigation, enhances cooperation and dataexchange. The important notion is a prohibition of nuclear test-ing as well as of the nuclear waste disposal (markingit the first Nuclear Arms Agreement and to some ex-tend the first environmental accord). Any territorialclaim on land or ice shelves south of 60°S latitude isnot recognized while the treaty is in force. For thestationary scientific personnel the treaty suggeststheir respective national jurisdiction as the applica-ble one.

The very strategy of the Five dis-plays some striking similarities withthe so-called Eastern DiplomaticQuestion of the late 19th century(and to it related the British 2+3 for-mula);1.DismissiveSlow down the process of dissolu-tion of the Ottoman Empire and ofthe external parties interference –erode the efforts of internationalcommunity for creation of theAntarctica-like treaty (by keepingthe UNCLOS referential);2.AssertiveMaximize the shares of the spoils ofpartition – extend the EEZ and con-tinental shelf as to divide most if notthe entire Arctic only among theFive;3.ReconciliatoryPrevent any direct confrontationamong the European powers overthe spoils – pass the claims withoutarbitration of the III parties (prefer-ably CLCS).

By 2009, the deadline for numerousstates ran out to hand in theirclaims on an extended continentalshelf. With the present number ofclaims and several UNCLOS articlesof the imprecise wording (which doleave room to states for different in-terpretations of the continentalshelf extension as well as modalitiesof EEZ), it is estimated that the com-prehensive evaluation of the CLCSwill not be successfully completedin the next 15 to 20 years. Notingthese difficulties some voices calledupon the creation of a special (sub-) commission to deal exclusivelywith the Arctic claims.

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Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings(ATCM)

The governing body to the treaty (a sort ofmonitoring of compliance but also legislativemachinery) is situated with the Antarctic TreatyConsultative Meetings (ATCM) – a clearinghouse that meets annually. The decision-mak-ing powers in administering and managing theAntarctica are unevenly distributed by differ-entiating among current 47 parties: the signa-tory states, the consultative and other partiesto the treaty. Based on the explicit scientific in-terest and active research presence in Antarc-tica, only 28 states are having decisive say inthe decision-making process; besides the orig-inal 12, these are another 16 states that joinedthe treaty system in the last decades of the20th century. (Scientific Committee on Antarc-tic Research, 2008)

On its monitoring of a compliance role, theATCM oversees that no activities contrary tothe treaty are taking place in the Antarcticaand that any eventual dispute between theparties is resolved peacefully (or as the last ar-bitrary resort by the International Court of Justicedeliberations). Necessitatingthe explicit prior consent of allcontracting parties, any even-tual amendments or modifica-tions to the treaty are to bedirected through the ATCM.The accession of the new mem-bers is also channelled via theATCM.

Serving also as the principallegislative machinery, theATCM has brokered over 200recommendations, of whichmany have turned into thelegally binding instrumentsthat gradually brought into ex-istence the comprehensiveAntarctica Treaty System.

The Antarctic Treaty System

Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the origi-nal treaty in Washington in early December2009, the ATS parties have organized theAntarctic Treaty Summit “Science-Policy Inter-actions in International Governance” as a brain-storming framework for scientists, politicians,scholars and other interested stakeholders todiscuss the existing regulations and future de-velopments of the Antarctic Treaty System. As stated before, the International Regime onAntarctica (ATS) is composed of the maintreaty (1961) and of additional instruments,namely the Convention for the Conservationof Antarctic Seals (1972), the Convention forthe Conservation of Antarctic Marine LivingResources (1982), the Convention on the Reg-ulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities(singed 1988, not in force yet), and finally theProtocol on Environmental Protection (1998).(Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2009)

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The Antarctic Treaty is often re-ferred to as one of the most out-standing, fair and transparentagreements ever concluded. Still,the dismissive notion of the ATSparticipatory parties towards therest of international community isnearly identical to the dismissivelypositioned five Arctic states.Hereby, the supporting argument:Pre-empting the large-scale ex-ploitation of natural resources, theAntarctic Treaty consultative partieshave formulated the Convention forthe Conservation of Antarctic Seals(CRAMRA). It is the text by whichthe signatories basically declaredthat no commercial activity shouldbe done on the expenses of the en-vironment. However, the conven-tion was never ratified as it lacks thehigh-standard environmental regu-lations as demanded by manymembers (especially France andAustralia).

Consequently, another agreement was required andthe Protocol on Environmental Protection to theAntarctic Treaty, also known as the Madrid Protocol,was brokered. It prohibits any commercial activityfor 50 years (until 2048) and describes the Antarcticaas a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.”Additionally, the instrument provides guidelines andprinciples for other activities as tourism or the con-struction and maintenance of the Antarctic researchbases.

In order to monitor the compliance with the proto-col, the Committee for Environmental Protection(CEP) was founded. The consultative parties may callfor a review of the Protocol within the set timeframeof 50 years but amendments need a unanimousvote. The ban on mineral resource activities cannotbe declared void unless another binding instrumentis in place.

It is apparent that beyond declared (but not fol-lowed by many parties all over planet) environmen-tal consideration, the ATS parties meant to use theProtocol as an operative tool to discourage andalienate externals (dismissive stance), and most im-portantly to maintain and prolong their own exclu-sivity on the Antarctica with all its scientific andcommercial benefits (assertive stance).

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CIRCUMPOLAR STATESTHE ARCTIC FIVE

ne of the climaxes of the Cold War (and itslogics of total geostrategic confrontation)has been surely reached at the North Pole;concentration of submarines and intercon-tinental missiles all over the Pole turned theArctic into the world’s most militarized mar-

itime space. Nowadays, with the melting of the sea ice, theArctic Ocean is in the very focus of the world’s interest again.The Arctic is physically surrounded by five littoral circumpolarstates. Demonstrating their geographic proximity, power andpresence, the Five are steadily handing in competing claimson the northwards territorial extension aiming to reduce theportion of international waters on the Arctic and to maximizethe national rights of navigation and the effective controlover resources in the area (EEZ).

At the southern edge of the planet,the Antarctic Treaty is restrainingthe neighbouring states and inter-ested parties from any territorialclaims, marking it as the legalisti-cally less contested Pole but equallyattractive as the last dividablegeoeconomic and geopoliticalshares of the planet. The followingpages will elaborate on the five lit-toral states and their increasinglyassertive positions.

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The Russian Federation

By its size the largest country of theworld (17,075,200 km², or 1/8 of theworld’s land surface, with roughly142 million inhabitants), Russia hasnearly one-third of its territory lo-cated on the Arctic and sub-Arctic.Just a quick look at the map will in-dicate that roughly half of the entirecircumpolar territory is of Russia.The Russophones has penetratedthe Arctic as early as in the 11thcentury but the systematic explo-ration starts only in the 16th cen-tury.

Late Tsarist and early Soviet Russiahave settled nearly 2 million peopleto the polar circle marking the largescale systematic research, economicand military activity which withsome oscillation lasts uninterrupteduntil the very day. Thus, in thecourse of subsequent centuries,Russia (besides Denmark and Nor-way) has acquired enormousknowledge and uncontested ex-pertise in polar exploration. React-ing to the current climate changeeffects, which are simultaneouslyrevealing economic (and geopoliti-cal) opportunities, the Putin cabinetwas the first government of the fiveArctic states to lodge the official re-quests for the northwards territorialextensions. Continued with theMedvedev cabinet, Russia clearlyconducts a very assertive and boldArctic policy.

Consequently, the Russian territorial claim is ratherambitious: extending to an area of about 1.2 millionsquare kilometres of the Arctic seabed with the (ge-ographic) North Pole as the outermost point. In2001, Russia submitted as the first nation of the Arc-tic Five its prolongation of the continental shelfclaim to the CLCS, which includes parts of the Bar-ents Sea as well as the Lomonosov and MendeleevRidge. The claimed area shows a triangular shapedform (with the arches closing the eastern and west-ern flank of Russia’s northern border), topping at theNorth Pole. (Górski, 2009)

However, only one year later the Commission in-formed Russia that it should further engage in re-search activities as the information provided wasinsufficient (lacking important concussive data) formaking the Commission’s final recommendations.The revised version has been submitted in 2009, andthe Commission is examining it.

Russia’s economy heavily depends on the cash-flowsmaintained by the gas and oil exports to Europe andother parts of the world. Its Arctic region plays al-ready a significant role in the national economy as itaccounts for 11% of the country’s GDP and for 22%of all export earnings.

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With the northwards territorial extension thesefigures are nearly sure to surge, as additionalhydrocarbon, ore and other mineral fieldslocked in the Arctic seabed are very probable.

Despite promising offshore and costal mineraldeposits, Russia will depend on foreign coop-eration regarding the high-tech know-how inexploitation under harsh Arctic conditions.(E.g. Russian state-holdings of Gazprom andRosneft are already planning joint explorationsites, like Shtokman field, with the NorwegianStatoilHydro and French Total.) Visibly demonstrating the capability to patrol,secure and defend its territory has also highpriority for the Kremlin’s policy–makers. There-fore, the Federation (like some other Arcticstates) has been lately allocating considerablefunds into the development and constructionof new (generation of ) ice breakers, sub-marines and polar patrol ships. To better mon-itor the vast area, the government has recentlyordered three additional nuclear ice breakersto the already large and well-equipped fleet.Clearly, Russia has increased its military budgetand has retaken its assertive patrolling activi-ties by water and air – the largest ever since thecollapse of the Soviet Union.

One of the geographichandicaps that Russia hassuffered throughout its his-tory was impossibility toconnect its 5 fleets: theBaltic, Northern, Pacific,Black Sea and Caspian. Asits military establishmentwell knew that who rules theoceans rules the world, eversince the Peter the Great,Russia has pressed west-wards and southwards in adesperate attempt to con-nect its fleets: the warm-seas quest. It was the samereason which drove the So-viet Russia into the develop-ment of impressivesubmarine fleets. Suddenlyand rather unexpectedly,the opportunity to connectmay arise in the rapidlymelting north.

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The United States

Ironically enough, it was Russiawhich brought the US to the Arctic.Being a huge country with wideopen access to both Atlantic andPacific, it is no wonder that the USby gradually articulating its mightwas the only (successful) successorof the old British geostrategic im-perative “who rules the oceans rulesthe world”. Directly facing two most importantoceans and controlling otheroceans and seas with its numerousfleets (as the predominant navalpower of the world), the US por-trays itself as a “fish of high seas”.Still, the US is primarily the “fish ofwarm seas”, and not a typical Arcticstate. Firstly, its border edge withthe polar region suffers from theterritorial discontinuity (betweenthe mainland US and Alaska there isa vast territory of central and west-ern Canada), and secondly at itsnorthern tip the US has relativelysmall circumpolar share.

Despite the fact that the US is technologically themost advanced country in the world, the hi-tech so-lutions are not focusing on utilization of Arctic re-sources, even not on an extensive maritimepatrolling (with only three aged and not alwayscombat-ready ice-breakers at disposal, the US Navyis still not considering a purchase of any new polarvessels). However, as a supreme global power, it hasto keep its own stake in the strategically and eco-nomically important region which is eventually toface the partition.

The current efforts of the U.S. are neither substantialnor verifiable enough to actually gain a considerablesay in the territorial claims dispute. Its present posi-tion is the weakest of all the Arctic Five, since the USnever ratified the UNCLOS and, therefore, cannot ac-cess the CLCS claims mechanism. As a matter of fact,only recently the US undertook the joint programwith Canada (with the lead of the second, as thepolar exploration more advanced partner) of a de-tailed mapping of America’s Arctic costal reefs, pre-cise baselines and the nearby Arctic seabed andridges. (Extended Continental Shelf Project, 2009)

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The U.S. Standing on the UNCLOS

Back in 1982 President Ronald Reagan rejectedthe ratification of the UNCLOS with the argu-ment that the instrument creates unaccept-able limitation and that, therefore, isunfavourable for the U.S. However, after thetreaty revisions in 1994, President Bill Clintonsigned the UNCLOS but the very ratificationwas rejected by the US Senate. Further at-tempts by the Bush Administration in 2004failed as well. Stacking in the congressionallabyrinth of bipartisan confrontations (the U.S.Navy high seas patrolling rights) and divergentinterest groups lobbying (deep seabed naturalresources exploitation), the final justificationwas given as that the finalized navigationrights should be compatible with the com-monly practiced international customs. In anutshell: “Might makes the right”.

Acting in the typical great power manner, theUS indeed actively participates in negotiationsof legal instruments, does support and encour-age other states to ratify them (to maintain alevel of predictability and obedience interna-tionally), but on the other hand does not liketo be constrained by many international instru-ments (reserving itself the freedom of action),be it the vital protocol to the UNFCCC, the ICC–related Rome Convention or the UNCLOS. Thegreat powers will have different justifications,but the reason will be always the same. Realizing that the U.S. is one of the few UnitedNations (UN) member states and the only oneof the Arctic Five that has repeatedly declinedto ratify the treaty (to the disadvantage of itsArctic position), the current Obama Adminis-tration has announced its objective to pass thelegislation through the Houses.

Simultaneously, an extensive Arctic coopera-tion with (its more experienced partner)Canada is underway. Having the more press-ing domestic and foreign issues on the agendalike the health-care reform, financial crises andthe military engagement in Iraq andAfghanistan, it is not very probable that thecurrent Congress will ratify the UNCLOS any-time soon.

Position of the Non-party claimant

As the non-UNCLOS party, the U.S. centres itscurrent claims on the continental shelf custom-ary law reinforcing Harry S. Truman’s presiden-tial Proclamation No.2667 that ”anyhydrocarbon or other resources discovered be-neath the U.S. continental shelf are property ofthe U.S.”. Additionally, the U.S. actively partici-pates in bilateral negotiations as well as in re-gional summits such as the Ilulissat ArcticOcean Conference.In total, the U.S.claims the rightson the continentalshelf extension innine different areasof the Arctic re-gion, in three areasoff the U.S. WestCoast (includingthe extension offthe west side ofGuam/Nor thernMariana Islands),and in two areas inthe Gulf of Mexico.(Seidler, 2009, pp.166-175)

The U.S. is the primeimporter and consumer of hydrocarbons andother natural resources and shouldtherefore expectedlytake more proactivestance towards the region which estimated holds are as much as 20% of the globally unexploited resources

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Canada

As the world’s second largest coun-try (roughly 60% of the size of thelargest, Russia), Canada has the sec-ond longest circumpolar border(about 244,000 kilometres) with theArctic theatre. While one-third ofthe total Russian territory is withinthe Arctic Circle, Canada’s share iseven larger: roughly 40% of its ter-ritory is within the Arctic Circle –equivalent to Europe’s entire landmass.

Canada is one of the most dispro-portionate countries when it comesto the relation between size(9,093.507 km²) and number (33,5million) of inhabitants (as well as itsconcentration). The entire northernand central portions of this hugefederation are practically empty, ei-ther inhospitable or extremely un-derpopulated. Over 90% of Canadians essentiallylive on the borderline to the U.S.,mostly centred in larger cities likeVancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Ot-tawa and Montreal. AlthoughCanada should be regarded as atypical Arctic state, in reality it haslittle resources and domestic popu-lar support to effectively exercise itsmilitary or/and economic presencein the Arctic. In response to the re-newed Russian assertiveness overthe Pole, Canada is lately trying togain the popular support from itstraditionally non–Arctic mindedpopulation and gradually mobilizethe government, business and re-search community as well as thecivil sector.

Like the Russian moves, the Canadian ones are alsosymbolic and practical. They range from the selec-tion of location for the early 2010 summit of the G–7 Finance Ministers, through the orders of newpolar-patrolling planes and vessels including theice–breakers for its armed forces, up to the joint US-Canada mapping project, e.g. the 2009 ExtendedContinental Shelf Project.

One of the main security concerns of Canada is toprotect the northern shipping route and the entireArctic and sub-Arctic territory against environmentaldisasters through increased transportation and ex-ploitation of natural resources. Canada’s environ-mental provisions the so-called Arctic WatersPollution Prevention Act defines a (environmentallycontagious) zone of 100 nM seawards from its coast-line to be an environmental protection area. (De LaFayette, 2008, p. 544) In conformity with that provi-sion Canada persistently claims its sovereignty onthe Northwest Passage justifying it with its environ-mental concerns (increased transport, especially ofvessels inadequately equipped to meet the environ-mental or/and special polar standards as well as thefrequency and severity of accidents occurred). Sens-ing that behind the cover of environmental concern,Canada might have the geopolitical and geoeco-nomic reasons to deter; both the U.S. and the EU re-peatedly protested the treatment of the Passage asterritorial waters of Canada.

Since 2008, Canada requires prior notification (reg-istration) for all vessels flying foreign flags that aresailing the Northwest Passage. However, it remainsunclear how Canada will enforce its requirements (orpenalties for those who failed to register), having inmind its relatively modest surveillance and pa-trolling capabilities.

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In this shuffle of the contested national pride,defence-driven advancements (security con-cerns), geopolitical ambitions and geoeco-nomic greed, Canada’s position is gettingweaker as the Northwest Passage becomes amore attractive international shipping route asa result of the ice-melting. In this matter, nei-ther the International customary law not theUNCLOS, nor the domestic enforcement capa-bilities are on the Canadian side.

Concerning the Commission on the Limits ofthe Continental Shelf (CLCS), Canada as a partyto the UNCLOS, can lodge its continental shelfextension claims until the year 2013. Canadaaims at the extension of the continental shelfon its North/North-East Coast as well as exten-sion in the central and western portion of theArctic (an area of about 1.75 million km²). Cur-rently, Canada is investing considerable fundsin the geomorphology and related areal re-search.

In addition to it, the tripartite expeditions to-gether with the U.S. and Denmark are workingon several Arctic assignments. One of the as-signments is bringing about conflicting resultsthat the Lomonosov Ridge is connectedwith/extended from Greenland and the North-ern American continent, and not as the Russianside vocally claims that the Ridge is an exten-sion of the Eurasian continent. Further claimsof Canada are at the Alpha Ridge next to theEllesmere Island, at the Beaufort Sea, and overthe Mackenzie River Delta, where allegedlyriverine sediments are pouring into the Arcticseabed well to the far north. Canada has a standing dispute over the HansIsland (located in the Nares Strait between theEllesmere Island and Greenland) with Den-mark. Acting pragmatically, the two Arcticstates have reached an agreement on the de-limitation of the continental shelf (in forcesince 1974, with the amendments of 1994).This accord clarifies fishing zones and definesterritorial borders between the two over alength of 1,450 nM. However, the Hans Islandis excluded from the agreement as still of un-solved status. (Potts & Schofield, 2008, p.160)

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Denmark (Greenland andFaroe Islands)

Although a look at the geographicmap would never imply that a tinycountry located nearly in the mid-dle of Europe would be a circumpo-lar state, Denmark owes it to itscolonial past. The Kingdom of a fa-mous Shakespeare’s quotation wasonce upon a time a great Europeanand naval power with land posses-sions deep in the south and farnorth/northwest-wards overseas. Ifany landmass were contested toplay an equivalent role to theAntarctica of the North, it wouldsurely be the geomorphologic ‘fugi-tive‘, the island of Greenland (theworld’s largest and the least popu-lated island). Thus, Denmarkthrough its (increasingly formal)overseas possessions of Greenlandand Faroe Islands is entitled to theArctic claims. Both territories weregranted the so-called home rule,with the reservation on the foreignpolicy and defence, which Copen-hagen keeps under its prerogatives.

Towards the Danish Commonwealth

Denmark is the only EU member state of the ArcticFive, but it is additionally curios that its overseas ter-ritories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not.Both overseas territories are predominantly inhab-ited by indigenous peoples, and while Greenland isa large territory (2,166,086 km²) with a tiny and dis-proportionately situated population (57,600 resi-dents, or 0.025 inhabitants per km², with 88% of Inuitor mixed Inuit-Danish origin), the Faroe Islands are aconsiderably small territory (18 major islands to-talling 1,399 km²) and evenly populated (48,000 in-habitants, roughly 92% Faroese). Although neitherterritory is officially part of the EU, the Faroe Is-landers may choose between the Danish or Faroecitizenship while the Greenlanders are all Danish na-tionals.

Gradual moves towards the full independence (in-duced primarily from the Danish side) are gainingmomentum: On Greenland’s consultative referen-dum conducted in November 2008, as many as75.5% of Greenlanders voted for an extended au-tonomous status granting those more powers tocontrol the justice and home affairs as well as sub-jecting them to the international law. Furthermore,the Danish subsidies are now linked proportionallyto the revenues Greenland earns, which besides fish-ery is mainly through the exploitation of natural re-sources. Two sides also agreed that at any event ofGreenland’s independence the entire investedmoney would be paid back to Denmark mostly fromthe forthcoming revenues originating in exploita-tion of minerals. (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,2009)

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For the time being, Greenland remains finan-cially dependent on Denmark, and even if theclear econimic prospects due to rapid ice-melt-ing are wide open, the Greenland infrastruc-ture would need a steady capital inflow to turnthis economic opportunity into a commericalprobability. The needed economic emancipa-tion and administrative capacitation of theFaroe Islands is of better standing than onGreenland, and therefore the Faroese indipen-dence (if it ever comes) would be earlier thanthe Greenlandic one. Finally, common to theindigineous peoples in all the Five Arctic states,the Danish indigenous are also suffering se-vere social integration problems (change fromthe traditional, isolated, fishery-related life tothe modernized and urban life), reflected inthe high rates in alcoholism, suicide, homicideand other forms of violence, etc.

As already mentioned, Greenland’s future willvery much depend on its economic emancipa-tion. Huge deposits of resources which are al-legedly dozing under the island’s massive icesheets or at its seabed offshore need furtherinvestigation and expensive preparation for vi-able exploitation. Even rich and stable Den-mark cannot do it alone. Therefore, there arealready several oil and mining companies atthe spot (e.g. the Scottish oil company CairnEnergy together with the Malaysian Petronasplanning to invest € 310 million in the explo-ration off Greenland’s coast). It is estimatedthat there are oil deposits ranging from 16 bil-lion to 47 billion barrels offshore, as well asminerals like gold, zinc and lead onshore. Fur-thermore, the substantial investments aremade in the exploration of the seabed andGreenland’s continental shelf as to file a credi-ble and scientifically proven claim with theCLCS rule, as the Danish submission is due in2014.

Like the rest of the Arctic Five, Denmark isstrengthening and renewing its Northern mil-itary capabilities. Its defence plan for 2010-2014 is calling for a formation of a specialArctic (joint) force which should be patrollingbeyond the parameters of a single state terri-tory. As one of the NATO founding members,Denmark was steadily and actively contribut-ing to this collective security system. Beyondthe mainland, Greenland is hosting the mostnorthern bases of NATO for decades, which atthe peaks of the Cold War were crucial for thesurveillance and deterrence of the Soviets. Thecurrent increased patrolling and armament ofthe Arctic by each of the Five is not an encour-aging signal that gives comfort and security as-surances to either of them.

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Norway

The Kingdom of Norway (385.252km² out of which – like in case ofCanada – around 40% is situatedwithin the Arctic Circle, with total of4,8 million inhabitants) is the small-est country of the Five, having alsothe smallest Arctic share amongthem. However, the homeland ofthe legendary Viking seafarers –Norway is the most advanced of allthe Five, when it comes to lodgingthe claims before the CLCS. Alreadyby 2006, the Norwegian govern-ment has filed its clams on the Arc-tic borders. The claimed areaamounts to over 248,000 km²(which, if proven and confirmed,would be a territorial gain equal to2/3 of the present state territory) in-cluding the areas of the BananaHole in the Norwegian Sea, theLoop Hole in the Barents Sea as wellas the Western Nansen Basin in theArctic Ocean. (Seidler, 2009, pp.199-213)

In March 2009 the CLCS positivelyresponded to the part of Norwe-gian Arctic claims, which makesNorway the very first of the ArcticFive to obtain recommendations.The government is preparing na-tional legislation to domesticate theCLCS deliberations (promulgatingthe legally binding text on the re-newed/extended border limitsthrough its constituency). However,there are several Arctic areas withoverlapping claims and confrontingclaimants where the final settle-ment is pending. (Van Pay, 2009)

The smallest by size – the biggest by expertise

Beyond the national pride or geopolitical aspirations(which no state is deprived of), the prime Norwegiandrive in the deep Arctic is to secure and maintain itscurrent prosperity which is heavily based on oil. Theoil industry presents the main pillar of the nation’seconomy. However, Norway’s current oil fields aredrawing to a close, faster than those of any other oilproducing country. Latest estimations are predictingthat the known Norwegian reserves will be ex-hausted until 2030. For the oil-driven economy, thealarm bells to find alternatives are ringing. Reformu-lating its economic policy in response to this press-ing issue, the government aims to achieve two goals:decouple and further diversify (to support and stim-ulate innovations in other economic fields) as wellas to divert/expand its ‘oil know-how’ (off-shore andjoint-venture oil exploration in the Arctic waters).

To prove that Norway is not only assertive but alsoshift-capable, the government allocates consider-able funds in the development of state-of-the-arttechnology for all-season presence. Norway is mod-ernizing and quantifying its commercial and armedcapabilities, be it for the off-shore exploitation, deepsea exploration and research of environmental ef-fects, or the patrolling and surveillance of its out-most Arctic limits (to stop pirate fishing and otherintruders). Norway is one of the founding members of NATO,traditionally occupying a vital controlling and deter-ring function on the outmost eastern end of theblock (same like Turkey on the southern flank). Moreimportantly, Norway has unsurpassed historical ex-perience and knowledge in polar exploration (even-tually in the same league with the know-how ofDenmark and Russia), which if coupled with the spe-cific technological advancements makes this coun-try to be the expertise leader among the Arctic Five.By compensating the modest size of territory withits huge share of historical knowledge and modernexperience, Norway enjoys an undisputed paritywith the rest of the Arctic Five.

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Svalbard

The Svalbard Islands (formally Spitsbergen) aresituated to the north of the European main-land, far in the Arctic Ocean, about halfway be-tween Norway and the geographic North Pole.The archipelago (61,000 km², inhabited bysome 2,200 settlers, out of which 55% are Nor-wegian and 45% Russian citizens) consisting ofnine main islands is a formal mandate given toNorway. Svalbard has rather a unique position,which is determined by the Svalbard Treaty, inforce since 1925 by the so-called Svalbard Act.

The Svalbard proper has been an object of spo-radic interest for several littoral and non-littoralstates, but neither of them was ever declaringthe archipelago its own national territory priorto the treaty. Only commercial and military ad-vancements (including a discovery of promis-ing coal deposits), coupled with theconfrontational course between the post WWIEurope and the early Bolshevik Russia, broughtup the need for a comprehensive legal frame-work regulating the ownership of deposits andclarifying the territorial claims.

In the Svalbard Treaty (original name: Treatyconcerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen),signed in Paris in 1920, the nine original signa-tories have recognized the formal mandate ofNorway. It has been also agreed that every(bonae fidei) nation has equal rights to inhabitthe islands and to exploit natural resources, in-cluding the right to fish and to hunt under thelegislation of Norway. (Nordischer Minister-rat, Governor of Svalbard, 2008) As the Svalbard Treaty was not decisive on thefull set of territorial/souverign rights, there arecertain calls to reopen and renegotiate theterms of the Treaty. Needless to say that the ar-chipelago is strategically important for bothRussia and Norway (NATO), but any possibleterritorial extension (meritime zones, continen-tal shelf ) via Svalbard is of direct concern foreach of the Arcic Five, too. The archipelago issimply a far too big geoeconomic promise andgeopolitical imperative to leave any state neu-tral.

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AREAS OF CLAIMS

ar too often in history the territorial disputestriggered the open and tragic conflicts or keptthe rhetoric on confrontational course, or atleast hindered any closer cooperation amongstates and their societies at large. Still, some-times the territorial disputes bring or even

hold states together. Both scenarios are highly probable be-tween the two disputed states. But, what happens when theinteraction is between five parties?

The first thing that the five unconstrained subjects would doin any (human) interaction (especially, if they have somethinglucrative to share or/and divide) is to agree to deny access tothe 6th, or 7th party. This would remain an underlying com-mon denominator, which invisibly holds them together. Oncethese 5 are secured from an external intrusion, the secondthing to do would be an attempt of 4 joining together as toeliminate the 5th one, aimed at reducing the number of par-ticipants and optimizing the shares of forthcoming spoils. 4are selecting 1 on either a basis of opportunity (weakest) oron a basis of fear (strongest). At this stage, the action of thesecond weakest (or second most likely to be the attackednext) is critical: Either he is (for right or wrong) assured byother 3 that he is not the next to be eliminated, or the 5thconvinces the 4th that he will be the second for elimination.The very outcome heavily depends on two things: (i) thesense of judgment of the 4th (access to information andanalysis of it), and (ii) the ability of both the first 3 and of the5th to convince the 4th.

F

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If the argument is won by the first 3,it is most likely that the 5th will beeliminated, and constrains will soonarise among the remaining ones.After short euphoria that every vic-tory holds, the remaining 4 willreact double-fold: each of them willcontemplate further maximizationof spoils (by reducing number ofplayers) but will also trap them-selves into residual (but not openlycommunicated) fears that each ofthem might be the next one. In thecourse of subsequent development(phase with more contemplationand less action), a lot of energy willbe spent on suspiciously observingdynamics of others and demandsfor clear assurances from each andevery one of them that no hostilitywill be conducted, while publicly(and seemingly confident) offeringpacific assurances to others.

Once these 5 have eliminated onefrom their own ranks, the appetitesof those remaining are up, but theirmutual trust is down. The prospectof the possible (final) gain will be apowerful centripetal force to assert,but an equally strong (negative)charge will be a centrifugal force torefrain and defend oneself. The onlyway out of this deadlock for the re-maining 4, is a formation of twoblocks each having 2 members. Only that move tranquilizes residualfears for each of the 4, offering aclear perspective at the same timeto all of them to turn the possibilityinto probability.

The block of 2 is formed on either the basis of avail-ability (willing) or on a mixed basis of fear-opportu-nity (strongest). Everybody wants to win, but isafraid that his action brings defeat. Being inside theblock, undeniably gives more security, but reducesflexibility (internally and externally). Sooner or later,intentionally or not, such block-formation takes par-ties onto the inevitable confrontational course. Fourfacing one is a victory as 2 facing 2 results in victory,the considerable difference here is a prize paid for avictory. The two victorious (the last ones remaining of the 5)are sharing the spoils alone, but are too weak to fighteach other to the end, or to prevent the 6th partiesfrom intrusion. Let us go back for the moment andelaborate on the second possible scenario when the5 are still together. If the 5th wins the argument withthe 4th, we will witness the formation of an implicitor explicit block of 3 vs. 2. As a basic principle ofphysics teaches, the stronger magnetic field willmore likely attract the nearby particle than theweaker magnetic field. Ergo, if 4 select 1 on basis offear, it is more probable that the 5th will win the ar-gument with the 4th. The ‘3 vs. 2’ scenario has twopossible outcomes: less likely (but not impossible) isthat 2 win over 3. In this case, the winning duo is overly exhausted andtoo weak to face each other in a final countdown(rather unintentionally, they remain the co-sharingwinners by force of event). If the more likely scenariooccurs, by which 3 win over 2, the winners wouldface the so-called triangle dynamics. The triangularequidistance, even if possible, cannot be maintainedin the longer run (e.g. that spot A, B and C are facingeach other from the same, equidistant proximity).The party which by his actions or actions of theother two allows the sharpening of its angel belowthe threshold of 60°, is most likely the next victim ofthe remaining duo (as the simple geometry equa-tion implies: when point C distances itself from theother two, point A and B inevitably get closer to eachother).

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Whatever scenario takes place, the still-stand-ing two have won it all, but are unable to main-tain and secure their spoils on a longer run. Inthe course of eliminations, the remaining twohave overextended themselves to the limits ofeither implosion or extreme external exposure(appetites of externals are arising) or both. Thelarge community remembers them hostile butlately turning weak. Finally, the external actionagainst the 2 will be just a matter of time; assuch a move will be firmly justifiable from prac-tical and from moral ground. This is how thedynamics of five plays its end game. If the pre-vious lines seemed like wasting of time on atrivial and ill-managed interpretation of math-ematics, here comes the geopolitics back.

Above elaborated ‘game of five’ is exactly whathappened with the Five European powers dur-ing the formation of the so-called EasternDiplomatic Question, WWI, dissolution of Ot-toman Empire (and division of its spoils mainlybetween the two Versailles victors, Britain andFrance), and their elimination from the club ofbig powers after WWII (by one peripheral andone external superpower). The ‘perfect bal-ancer’, Britain well knew the logics and out-come of the ‘game of five’, and thereforeformulated long before its policy of 3+2 aimedat securing its ‘splendid isolation’ from a singleprevailing country or block of countries to facealone over the La Mache.

Still, mistakes were inevitable; the UK faced itshorrors (of standing alone against the singleruler of the continental part of Europe) twice:with Napoleon, and with Hitler. Nominally vic-torious, post-WWII Britain and France sufferederosion of their empires as well as external hos-tilities (be it from superpowers or from the de-colonization movement). The triangledynamics is also a powerful reminder that theSoviets skilfully played on differences betweenDe Gaulle’s France and the U.S. (over the NATOrole and its central command in Europe), as theU.S itself masterly played on differences be-tween China and the Soviets in 1970s.

After all, it was Britain that heavily advocatedthe extension of Roosevelt’s four policemenconcept finally winning the argument and get-ting France in the privileged P–5 club of the UNSecurity Council. Losing the first of 5 is the be-ginning of process of erosion which inevitablebrings grave consequences to each of the re-maining 4. The ability to verticalize its own his-torical experience and institutionalize thecollective memories is simply a demonstrationof the state’s maturity. Naturally, there are al-ways wins and losses, but the biggest defeat iswhen the certain power feels the most content(omnipotent).

And now, let us turn back to our Arctic Five,their dynamics and memories. Although highlyspeculative, the inner dynamics of the Fivecould be a formation of two informal (de facto)blocks, each composed of two. Finally, bothblocks (by a token of the British 3+2 formula)are trying to gain the 3rd – the decisive one –on its side, and at the same time preventingthe other block from achieving the same.

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If so, the story would then followthat due to geographic proximityand shared territorial disputes, alogical but informal block would beRussia-Norway vs. Canada and theU.S., with Denmark in between.Seen from the Danish perspective,neither of the two blocks is a part ofthe EU, neither fully shares the samelinguistic or cultural background(even though there is a strong bondon the side of Canada-US); in eachblock there is at least one NATOmember. So, the Danish choicewould fall on the block with whose(at least one) member Denmark hasan unsolved territorial dispute. Be-sides the fascinating speculation ongeopolitics, let us now take a closerlook at the unsolved territorialclaims.Thus, the Arctic is a theatre offour major areas with contradictingand overlapping claims.

Each of the disputed areas is holding large resourcedeposits (be it marine biota, hydrocarbons, otherminerals and precious metals, on lands or seabedoffshore), and also has extensive geopolitical mean-ing to the parties (including the control of possibletransport routes). Generally, the Five have prelimi-nary agreed on the demarcation lines by establish-ing more than half of the potential EEZ. However, theremaining area including the geographic North Poleis still under dispute and no agreement has beenreached so far. Besides the considerable territorialgain, having the Pole within its national borders isthe intangible value and prestige symbol in itself.

On the other side, the Antarctic theatre has wit-nessed some claims back to pre-system times, butthe claimants themselves have agreed to put it onhold by the letter of the Treaty and the entire ATSsystem. However, there are some voices (still not de-cisive) that the old claims should be revisited andthe pact eventually renegotiated. The following pages are a brief overview on the dis-puted areas.

Map 2: Lomonosov Ridge and Russian Claim, Source: Global Law, 2007

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Lomonosov Ridge

The Lomonosov Ridge is a 1,800 kilometreslong seabed mountain chain stretching fromthe New Siberian Islands across the ArcticOcean and the North Pole to the Ellesmere Is-land (Canada) and Greenland – see the mapbellow. As many as three of the Arctic Five areclaimants on the Ridge, each (Canada, Den-mark and Russia) claiming that the Ridge is anextension of their respective continental shelf.Russia argues that the Ridge is simply a prolon-gation of the Eurasian continent, and that thisfact gives them a right to exploit the seabedbeyond the 200 nM limit (set for the EEZ). Al-ready in 2001, Moscow handed in its submis-sion to the CLCS including the claim on theRidge. Reacting to this submission, Canadaand Denmark objected by stating that theRidge is rather an extension of their respectivecontinental shelves. Neither approving nordisapproving the claim in 2002 the CLCS gaveRussia more time for a re-submission as to bet-ter document its claim.

Documenting claims with the well elaboratedand scientifically credible evidence for any ofthe three parties is quite a challenge, as theRidge itself is beneath thick Polar ice on aseabed of unbearably violent ocean. As previ-ously mentioned, Canada and Denmarkagreed on a joint programme regarding theexploration and mapping of the seabed. Oneof the main aims is to gather sufficient geolog-ical data as to determine which continent’sland mass prolongs onto the Ridge. Coupling their human and financial resourcesin the joint-bipartite venture was the only op-tion for Canada and Denmark, but also theirhope that the findings will be beneficial (andwill in the end pay back the enormous costs).

On the other end, the Russian decades longpatrolling beneath the Arctic ice would implythat the Soviet submarine fleets have madedetailed and precise mapping of the Pole’sseabed, its main ridges and seabed picks. So, itseems likely that the Russians have the bestdata, the only question is whether this submit-ted to the CLCS is the fair share of data.

As Map 2 clearly indicates, whoever wins theargument with the CLCS will get a ‘lion’s share’of the Lomonosov Ridge-based 150 nM exten-sion of continental shelf both geopoliticallyand geo-economically. Although scientistsargue that the main resource deposits are offthe cost (excluding the marine biota) and notnear the Pole, the evidences are not as conclu-sive as the fact that nearly all future transporta-tion routes would cross over the Ridge.Notably, if a single party gets the Ridge, thatsame party pretty much controls the NorthernPole and its affairs. Maybe that is the reasonwhy not only Canada and Denmark but alsothe U.S. and Norway would like to see theRidge co-shared and divided between thethree claimant parties.

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Mendeleev Ridge

Another sight, slightly less impres-sive by its range, heights and size,but equally important for theclaimants is the Mendeleev Ridge. Itis located in the Eastern SiberianSea area of the Siberian Shelf,stretching further to the centralportion of the Ocean. The Ridge it-self is attached to the Alpha Ridgeof the Amerasian Basin. TheMendeleev Ridge is a vital claim forthe Russians since this Ridge givesMoscow direct access to the NorthPole. Any success in the claim overthe Lomonosov Ridge (as continua-tion of the Eurasian continent)would necessitate winning in a sim-ilar argument on the MendeleevRidge first.

Hans Island

The Hans Island is an uninhabited islet betweenGreenland and Canada’s far Northeast (in the middleof the Kennedy channel on the Nares Strait), sizedonly 1.3 km² (map nr.3). The tiny islet has been the centre of a bitter territorialdispute between Canada and Denmark. Besides re-peatedly claiming it (after an unsuccessful attemptin 1980s for a joint administration), both countrieshave demonstrated symbolical and real presence(provocations) on the islet; from both displaying therespective national flag, up to the Canadian DefenceMinister visiting the islet in a military escort (2005),the move to which Denmark afterwards replied bydispatching its ice-breaker to patrol just offshore theisland. Other two nearby disputes (in the Lincoln Seato the north of the Ellesmere Island and Greenland)were resolved by the bilateral agreement reachedbetween Canada and Denmark on delimitation ofthe continental shelf. However, the Hans Island wasnot subject of this agreement, and remains off thetable, unresolved. Canada centres its territorial claim on the so-calledSector principle and Denmark fears that in case ofsuccess, the Hans Island could set a precedent onthe applicability of this principal elsewhere in the

Arctic (contradictory tothe Delimitation agree-ment). Denmark’s con-tra-claim is based oncustomary law with theargument that the islandis a traditional huntingground of WesternGreenland’s Inuit people.(Byers, Breaking the ice,2009)

Map 3: Hans Island, Source: Global Law, 2007

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Located in tight straits ofthe Kennedy channel andcontrolled by both, it is anirrelevant territorial gainfor either side. Why is itthen that the islet is sohotly debated and bitterlyclaimed by both sides?Well, the Russian authorGirshovich offers an expla-nation. It could be that the Hans Island is (mor-phologically speaking) only a surfacing tip ofthe Lomonosov Ridge. If so, then the partywho has the islet may claim a share of theRidge, and eventually count its extension ofthe continental shelf from that point seawardsfor additional 150 nM. Perhaps, this indeed ex-plains how such a little islet may trigger such abig and lasting dispute.

Barents Sea – Loop Hole

Now, from the American continent let us goback to Europe: Russo-Norwegian land bordertotals to only 193 kilometres in length, butsince never properly demarcated or defined, itcreated significant overlapping territorialclaims that reached all the sea-way long up tothe Arctic marine theatre. For over 30 years, themain and most disputed case is in the BarentsSea. The area of dispute (shown on the map nr.4) has a size of 176,000 square kilometres,going beyond the EEZ parameters of 200 nMfor both Norway and Russia. Reconfirmed geological evidences that in theexploitable and relatively warm (oil-platformsfriendly) Barents Sea, there are considerabledeposits of hydrocarbons, which bring addi-tional tension on the dispute between bothoil-driven economies. The bilateral talks on thepartition of this zone had already started by1970s without any considerable progress.

The only success was a temporary agreementon fishing rights in the Loop Hole (declaringthe so-called ‘Gray Zone’ accord of 1978, whichgrants both nations to explore the marinebiota within the Loop Hole, but also within theportions of both Russian and Norwegian EZZ)limited on extend since it requires annual re-newal. Frustrated over the deadlock in the bi-lateral talks both sides have already handed inapplications to the CLCS (including the LoopHole issue). However, it is clearly beyond theCommission’s mandate to decide on the de-marcation line. It should be the actual partiesfinding the consensus and communicating theoutcome to the CLCS.

The old Norwegian proposal was to divide thedisputed area by the so-called median line (toidentify the closest points of both countries’baseline and draw a dividing line exactly in themiddle of them, e.g. Svalbard on the Norwe-gian side and e.g. outmost tip of NovayaZemlya and Franz Josef Land’s archipelago onthe Russian side).The Russian proposal, ofcourse more favourable for the originator, wasto draw a dividing line at the meridian from theVaranger Fjord to the North Pole.

Map 5: Disputed Area in the Barents SeaSource: UNEP/GRID-ARENAL, 2007

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Map 6: Territorial Dispute in the Beaufort Sea

Russia primarily based its demarcationproposal on the fact that any acceptanceof the Norwegian proposal would meanan implicit recognition of full territorialsovereignty of Norway over Svalbard(which is incompatible with the SvalbardTreaty).However, despite all previous odds, itseems that late Russo-Norwegian talks arescoring a breakthrough. The negotiationsare now based on the following terms:Russia agrees upon Norwegian jurisdic-tion in the Svalbard fish protection area,if Norway accepts to divide the disputedarea in the Barents Sea further to the west(accepting Russia’s demarcation parame-ters). In these quid-pro-quo negotiations,Norwegians and Russians have allegedlyagreed how to divide 80% of the area, andthe discussions over remaining 20% (withpromising Fedinski-structure deposits be-neath) are soon to be closed.

Beaufort Sea

Equivalent to the dispute over the Barents Sea of thenorthern tip of Europe is the Beaufort Sea disputeon America’s continent (part of the Arctic Ocean, theSea itself is of nearly a half million km²). The U.S. andCanada are disputing on a portion of 21,436 squarekilometres north of Alaska and the Yukon (map nr.6), which – to the trouble of both – is probably richin hydrocarbon resources. The northern land demar-cation line between Canada and the U.S. is estab-lished along the 141st degree of longitude west,which leads Canada to argue that the same demar-cation line should rather be followed on sea. The U.S.disputes it by claiming that the sea border should beestablished by drawing a line under the 90° anglerelative to the cost line (diagonal to the cost line). Ifwinning the argument, the U.S. would receive awedge-shaped area of the Beaufort Sea (marked onthe map nr.6).

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Both parties are tempted by the reach deposits(marine biota and minerals), but also by thefact that the dispute has to be resolved in di-rect negotiations (since the U.S. as non-partyto the UNCLOS is hindered from the III-party/LOSC, neutral arbitrational platform). Analternative to the partition would be, of course,to declare a joint development regime (for fish-ing and exploitation of hydrocarbons) over thedisputed area. A similar, alternative approach has been inplace between e.g. Iceland and Norway on thesea portion near the Norwegian Island of JanMayen. (Norway and Russia might be finallyputting an end to their own dispute over theBarents Sea/ Loop Hole in the same fashion).So far, there has been no clear indication of thenegotiations going to that direction: Canadajustifies its stiff position by expressing the en-vironmental concerns (questioning whetherthe U.S. would put in place and enforce suit-able living marine environmental protection). The U.S. is indeed very active in oil exploitationin the western Beaufort Sea (including severalextensive searches for the oil deposits in thedisputed belt itself ). Extensive overfishing inthe belt has recently resulted in the U.S.’ self-declared fishing moratorium in the zone,which Canada repeatedly called for in the en-tire theatre of the Beaufort Sea.

At any rate, it is not (always) clear whether de-claring the protected marine zone in certainsections of the Arctic Ocean and introducingstricter environmental regulations beyond theterritorial waters is an expression of the envi-ronmental concerns or compensation for thelack of exploitation and patrolling capabilitiesof a particular state.

Antarctic Country Claims

A way before the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS)came into force several polar exploring stateshave been putting claims on particular parts ofthe Antarctica. Late 19th and early 20th cen-tury have witnessed numerous expeditions bymany nations, with the first stationery researchpersonal dating back already to the 1930s. Thiseventually led seven parties among manyother interested ones exploratory states toclaim particular portions (see: the pie-shapedsectors, map nr.7) of the southern continent.Common to all seven is a close proximity to thePole by its main or overseas territory.

When the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in1959, the territorial claims of the interestedparties on land and ice shelves south of 60°Swere put on hold, as article 4 clearly stipulates:“...treaty does not recognize, dispute, nor es-tablish territorial sovereignty claims; no newclaims shall be asserted while the treaty is inforce”. Clearly, the Antarctic Treaty neither de-nies nor recognizes existing territorial claims.However, article 10 underlines: “...treaty stateswill discourage activities by any country in theAntarctica that are contrary to the treaty”, andthe subsequent, article 11 calls upon thepeaceful settlement of any dispute, ultimatelyrecognizing the jurisdiction of the Interna-tional Court of Justice.

Recognizing the Antarctica as demilitarizedcontinent open to all mankind for pacific re-search and scientific exploration, the Treatysystem (ATS) denies the right to lodge any newterritorial claim. Despite this notion, both theRussian Federation and the U.S. (in a fashion ofnon-claimants) have already reserved theirrights to make a (future) territorial claim (thelatter declaring interest on the Marie ByrdLand).

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Promising deposits of natural resources aswell as better technological capability to ac-cess, explore and exploit the same, havecaused several countries to reconsider theirdemands which may lead to synchronizedpressures for amending the ATS/Treaty sys-tem. Even though the treaty prevents nations fromeconomic activities on land and offshore be-yond the parameter south 60°S, Britain, for ex-ample, handed in its extension of thecontinental shelf-claim (east and south of theFalklands/Malvinas). Trying to relativize theimpact, the Foreign Office spokesman in 2007stated that “...it would be a claim in name onlywe wouldn't act because doing any mineralexploitation contravenes the treaty."

It is worth mentioning that the tiny archipelago (theFalklands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands)which is the British entrance to the Antarctica, wit-nessed a brief but brutal armed conflict of ratherlarge scale between Britain and Argentina in 1982(the so-called Falklands War)

The moratorium on mining (and other extensiveeconomic activities) in the Antarctica will be re-viewed only in 2048, as the Madrid Protocol (in forcesince 1998) prohibits the exploitation of natural re-sources for 50 years. However, some 30 years beforethe expiration of the legal regime, interested (andcapable) parties are quietly but passionately posi-tioning themselves for a future land and resourcesgrab.

Map 7: Antarctic

Territorial Claims Source:

University of Texas 1986

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OTHER PARTIES AT STAKE

n addition to the five littoral circumpolar states,other parties – be it states, international FORAsand blocks of states, or the indigenous peoples’associations – have explicit or implicit interest inthe Arctic. Even geographically distant countrieslike China or Japan have expressed their interest

in the Arctic affairs. These interests of distant states are pri-marily driven by the increasing demands for energy as wellas the need for cheaper and faster alternative transportationroutes. In the following subchapters, the major entities involved inthe matter will be discussed.

Iceland, Finland and SwedenIn the previous chapters, the author extensively elaboratedon the five Arctic, littoral and circumpolar states. In additionalto these five there are three other polar states – Iceland, Fin-land and Sweden. Neither of the three is a littoral nor a cir-cumpolar state. Iceland itself is an Arctic island state (size103.000 km², with 330.000 inhabitants); while the other twoare so-to-say land-locked countries from the Arctic side(arches of the Norwegian and Russian territories are betweenthe northern tips of Finland and Sweden on one side andwith the Arctic on the other). However, both Finland andSweden are typical costal states. Their sea access is limited tothe Baltic theater, and only by their northern land parts bothcountries are stretching well into the polar cycle (25% of Fin-ish and 15% of Swedish territory).

I

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While Iceland is predominantlypopulated by the Icelanders (mix ofCeltic and Nordic settlers), thenorthern portions of Finland andSweden (Norway too) – generallyknown as the Lapland region – arehome of the indigenous Sami(Lapp) people. Sami are the tradi-tional hunters-gatherers prone totheir nomadic life in tundra and(sub-) permafrost.

Although all three countries as wellas the indigenous peoples of bothFinland and Sweden do have theirsay in different forums (e.g. Arcticcouncil, Nordic Group, etc.), the Fivelittoral states are rather dismissivewhen it comes to any event relevantto the Arctic Ocean theatre. Thevery setting and the deliberationsof the Ilulissat summit both are thebest illustration of this. Limited inaccess to any relevant decision-making FORA, Finnish and Swedishgovernments may only voice theirenvironmental concerns (since thenomadic Sami are very dependenton reindeers whose habitat heavilydepends on the climatic oscilla-tions).

The position of Iceland is somewhat better since thisnorthern country is of a direct sea access to the wideArctic theatre. If the Arctic Five are dismissive to-wards Iceland its geography is very beneficial – theisland is strategically located on the very edge of thepolar circle between the North American and theEurasian continent. Traditionally, Icelandic economywas centred on living marine resources (fishery) andtourism. In the last decade, the financial service sec-tor was booming bringing unprecedented wealthand prosperity to this tiny nation. Nevertheless, therecent financial crisis severely hit the country bring-ing it to the verge of bankruptcy. With the end of theoffshore services euphoria, Iceland’s sobriety ismarked by looking towards less speculative, yetmore stable and long-range economic prospects.

One of them is the consideration to join the Euro-pean Union (with the precondition to firstly close thebitter negotiations over the fishery – an issue, sosensitive to Iceland) – as it is the candidate stronglysupported by the EU Nordic block (Denmark, Finlandand Sweden). The other opportunity – promising inthe sense of diversifying its economy – is comingwith the prospects of a navigable Arctic Ocean (newshipping and transportation opportunities).

It appears that the transhipment route between theNorth Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean straight overthe Central Arctic Ocean (the so-called Arctic Bridge)might be in reach earlier than expected due to cli-

mate change. If so, Iceland’s strate-gic position will dramaticallyimprove (permit its volcanic andoverall seismic activity) and will turnthe island into an economic hub – apower base for transportation-re-lated services, bringing along awhole new range of economic ac-tivities.

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As to compensate its relative geographic andeconomic size, Iceland is one of the championsof the Nordic and circumpolar cooperation. Itadvocates joint research programs and eco-nomic undertakings. One of these initiativesconcerning resource management has turnedinto a bilateral cooperation agreement in 2008.Norway and Iceland are in an extensive jointsearch for oil and gas on the continental shelfbetween the western Norwegian island of JanMayen and Iceland.

Arctic CouncilThe Arctic Council is a forum with a permanentsecretariat and a chairmanship biannually ro-tating among the eight Arctic states. Its found-ing members are states (the so-called Arctic 8)and groupings of indigenous peoples (3+3),which make it a unique International FORA –simultaneously an intergovernmental andinter-societal. As a consultative forum with acertain monitoring mechanism, the ArcticCouncil was established in 1996 by the EightArctic States and three associations of indige-nous peoples, with the three additional asso-ciations joining later

Based on the expressed interest and irrespec-tive of the geographic proximity, there are sev-eral observer countries (all together nine, withconfirmed or ad-hoc status) as well as the ob-server organizations (e.g. the Nordic Council,the EU, several UN bodies, etc.). The Council’s functional and substantive workis carried out in six working groups as well asthrough the four programs and action plans.Mandated with the monitoring and assess-ment tools, the Council mainly deals with as-pects of sustainable development, biodiversity(protection and preservation of the local floraand fauna including the marine environment),human dimension (the so-called Arctic HumanDevelopment Report) as well as the prepara-tion of emergency action plans.The findings ofthe working groups are well-documentedstudies on the effect of climate change in theArctic, the assessment on the natural resources(mainly the hydrocarbons), biodiversity andshipping issues.

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Although some of the issues areburning and pressing for the Arcticstates, like demarcation of the seaborders/delimitation, shipping orfisheries, it is clear that no legallybinding power is or will be given tothe Council as its member states donot want to see it as the powerfulinstrument. The Council itself willremain a consultative mechanism, acredible knowledge database cen-tre, still without legal personality.Besides the sporadic political decla-rations (as the main outcome of thebiannual ministerial summits) andrelatively more frequent recom-mendations, no legally binding in-strument is entitled to the Council.Interestingly enough, the US andRussia did not even want the secu-rity related matters to be part of theCouncil’s discussions. So, apart fromthe human or marine biota-relatedissues, no security is on the agendaof this Arctic forum or at any of itsworking groups and programs.

OSCE, NATO, EU and the Nordic Council

At a first glance these four entitieshave nothing in common. Still, all ofthem do share certain interest in theArctic matters. Each would be able toextend the mandate as having the in-stitutional capacity, but as the con-sensus based entities are restrainedby one or the other of the Arctic Five.Let us firstly revert to two security–based organizations among the four.

The Helsinki/Budapest-born OSCE is the only organ-ization besides the UN system to which all the ArcticFive plus three polar states are members. The OSCEis perfectly suited to address nearly all of the Arcticrelated concerns: It has the politico-military cooper-ation, economic-environmental and human dimen-sion as well as the confidence-buildingwell-established machinery. However, as a consen-sus-based organization the OSCE is not mandatedto deal with the Arctic matters. Besides few sporadicdiscussions, the polar issues were never brought tothe attention of any basket and any meeting of theOSCE.

The very same dismissive stance of the Arctic Five isevident within the NATO ranks. This security alliancegathers four of the Five, and even through the Part-nership-for-Peace machinery it has Russia around itsmany Brussels tables. Still, besides the sporadic talksabout the military bases on Greenland, the NATOSecretariat has never had the Arctic related issues onthe agenda of its meetings. Interestingly enough, the four have never even con-templated in playing Russia out (by the token of for-mula 4 against 1) through the institution of NATO, asthis would enable other NATO members to institu-tionally voice their say in the Arctic matters. So, it issafe to say that NATO is here to stay for all militarysecurity matters, but primarily as the North Atlantic(not the Arctic) Treaty Organization.

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The European Union, a 27–members strongblock, has three of the Arctic Eight within itsranks. Additionally, another two of the ArcticEight, Norway and Iceland are having tightlinks to the EU. Although formally outside theEU system, both Norway and Iceland aredeeply integrated into the EU markets throughthe (EFTA-EU) mechanism of the EuropeanEconomic Area (EEA). Hereby, the complex EUstructures differently reflect upon the Arcticissue. The decision makers vary from the pow-erful (but strictly consensus based and MS con-trolled) EU Council, that has never discussedArctic matters, up to another (co-)decisionmaker (democratic, directly elected, and not-consensus based) the EU Parliament, whichwas calling upon the creation of the ATS-likeinternational treaty for the Arctic. The EU executive branch (more consensusbased and MS-dominated), the Council repeat-edly communicated that the Arctic territorialdisputes should be resolved throughout directbilateral and multilateral talks of parties con-cerned under the established legal frameworkslike the UNCLOS.

Initiated by several communications of the lateProdi and the Barroso Commissions (“the EUand the Arctic region”), the so-called ‘EU posi-tion in the High North’ basically remains thenon-instrumented concern over the Arctic en-vironmental degradation and climate change,(security of rights of ) fishery, and position ofindigenous peoples. Implicitly, the Commis-sion reaffirms the full authority of the ArcticCouncil, although the pressure is evident in thematters related to the free waterways (the in-ternational waters status for the Northern cor-ridor), and alternatives to the external energydependence (on Russia). Following several ofits MS, the EU is observer organization to theArctic Council. Likewise the above mentioned FORAs, theNordic Council (composed of the two of theArctic Five and all three of the remaining threepolar states), is deprived from any relevant par-ticipation in the work of Arctic Five. However,the Nordic Council remains an important plat-form for the economic, social and labour intra-Nordic cooperation.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

arth caps are caught in limbo between the en-vironmental hazard triggered by globalwarming, rising economic opportunity (in-cluding the promising opening of transporta-tion routes for the shipping of general cargo),contested geopolitical aspirations – all in ab-

sence of precise and long-range legal regime. While the cli-mate change warns and cautions, the legal regime constrainsand obliges, the economic opportunities (funded or as-sumed) open and invite. No wonder that the later gives themost of dynamics to the Arctic and to the Antarctica.Deglaciation of the ice caps invites the projections on the(seemingly existing and easily accessible) vast amounts of re-sources concealed under ice and water, all to the interests ofgovernments, corporations and organizations.

The Arctic and Antarctica are the last remaining spots of theplanet to be divided. The precise demarcations of EEZ andclaims for the extension of the continental shelf are the op-erative tools to achieve this. Elsewhere on the planet, the re-sources deposits (including very much hydrocarbons andmarine biota) are consumed under the accelerated speedand will be exhausted to the point of irreversible depletionfar faster than anticipated. In near future, the possession ofnatural resources (including the control over fresh water re-serves) will add even more power to states than it does today.

E

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Clearly, the economic infrastructure inthe North is growing, be it related tofishery, energy resources, shipping ortourism. Economic opportunities in theAntarctica are still behind, as about 98%of the southern continent is covered bya perennial ice sheet and 2% are unfruit-ful rock. The harsh climate additionallydiscourages sustained economic activi-ties: the Southern Pole is the coldest,windiest and driest continent. Com-pared with the Arctic, circumvented bythe leading industrialized nations, theAntarctica is detached even from fewgravitating states (Chile, Argentina,South Africa, New Zeeland and Aus-tralia) and any local or transcontinentalcommercial activity and shippingroutes.

However, both poles have experiencedan increase in tourism. Luxury cruiseships or even ice breakers bring touristsfrequently to the area (e.g. under rela-tively affordable prize, one can book atrip on the Russian nuclear ice breaker’50 Years of Victory’ from the harbour ofMurmansk to the North Pole which in-cludes an exotic polar picnic).

Shipping Routes

With the rapid melting of the icecap, the prospectsof shortened transport waterways in the ice-freesummers are an attractive future economic aspectof the Arctic region. There are basically three possi-ble routes, each of significant importance:•the Northwest Passage connecting the AmericanContinent and Far East Asia; •the Northern Sea Route offering a shorter wayfrom Europe to Asia along the Russian Arctic coast-line; and •the Arctic Bridge connecting Canada and Russia.(For details see the map nr. 7)

There is high potential for the service industry in sav-ing distance through the opening of the shorterroutes between the continents. The high risks on al-ternative routes still keep most traffic over the tradi-tional and well-mapped transport routes like theSuez and Panama Canal. Nevertheless, the ArcticBridge is already used summer months for shippingfrom Murmansk in Russia to the Canadian port ofChurchill (service operated by the Denver-based railcompany OmniTRAX). (Cooper, 2008)On the other edge, the Antarctica can’t optimizeshipping due to its distant location and the fact thatit doesn’t offer any transpolar route to the countriesof southern hemisphere.

Map 8: Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, Source: UNEP/GRID-ARENAL, 2007

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Northwest Passage

The Northwest Passage connects the Atlanticand Pacific along the northern coast of NorthAmerica through the Arctic waters from theDavis straits and Baffin Bay all the way to theBering Sea (first time crossed by the Norwe-gian Roald Amundsen, 1903–06). This shippingroute shortens the distance between Far EastAsia and American East coast (via Panama) foraround 7,000 kilometres. The summer of 2007 was the first season inmodern times that the Northwest Passage wasfully ice-free. The latest data for the Arctic aresuggesting that the route will be crossable forthe non-ice-breaker cargo ships by the sum-mer of 2013. An opening of the Northwest Passage for reg-ular (not only sporadic) shipping has an impor-tant impact on the bilateral relationshipbetween the U.S. and Canada. While Canadaclaims the Davis straits and Baffin Bay as its ter-ritorial waters, the US considers it as the highseas, or at least as the international corridor, anargument also supported by the EU.In 1985, Canada (re-)defined internal waters,an act of domestic legislation which includedthe Northwest Passage too. When Canadaeventually acceded to the UNCLOS in 1993, anagreement with the U.S. was reached thatCanada would be notified prior any US ship-ping over the Northwest Passage. However,this domestically imposed limitation (with theright of prior consent) is hardly enforceable,since Canada has no sufficient Arctic patrollingand deterring capabilities.

Still, Canada vocally defends its decision by ex-pressed serious environmental concerns, al-though beneath it is the implied economic andpolitical interest (to control the traffic and tooffer its own shipping companies by introduc-ing the high safety standards for ships flyingthe foreign flags). As per definition, an interna-tional strait implies that there are no restric-tions on rights of usage under any conditionsto any coast, as long as international law istaken into account – a solution which is notfavoured by Canada.

Northern Sea Route

This route, also known as the North East Pas-sage, connects the Atlantic coast of Westernand Northern Europe with the Pacific coast ofthe Northeast Asia via the Russian Arctic coast-line (with Adopf Erik Nordenskiöld being thefirst seafarer to successfully close the wholeroute from the island of Novaya Zemya to theBering Sea between 1878 and 1879). Using thisroute, the distance between the edges of twocontinents could be shortened for about 40%in comparison to the traditional, warm seas,transport routes via the Suez or Panama Canal.

Late Tsarist, but especially Soviet Russia intro-duced forceful settling of its polar circle beingdriven by the geoeconomic and geopoliticalneeds. The impressive infrastructure, urbanisa-tion with many harbours along the Arcticcoastline and lively economic activity, hadbeen in place already by the end of WWII. Until1987, the Northern Sea route was practicallysealed off for any foreign flag, as this was basi-cally the only life line which connected the So-viet Baltic and Pacific fleet.

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The actual usage of the passage re-mained mostly intra-Russian (be-tween the Russian Arctic ports). It israre that any commercial vesselsaim to make a complete crossing,since the waters are regarded asvery dangerous (some parts of thepassage do not have an oceandepth to allow the traffic of heavycontainer ships) and unpredictable(limited weather warning systemsand iceberg monitoring facilities).The cross-route passage for foreignflags is allowed only after a submit-ted payment for the guidance bythe Russian ice breaker.

The Russian Federation plans to in-vest billions in the northern port ofMurmansk (with the aim to doubleits capacity by 2015) as well as inthe further development and mod-ernization of its Arctic coastline.Since the rapid degalaciation isturning the previously unhinderedpassage from distant possibility toviable probability, Russia wants tocompetitively answer the EU,Japanese and American transporta-tion needs and their respectivecommercial considerations.

Arctic Bridge

The Arctic Bridge is a seasonal route which shortcutsthe connection between the American and Euro-pean continent via the Arctic Ocean. The Bridge con-cept has been offered to Russia by the Canadians inthe 1990s, but the first regularized shipping startedonly in 2004. Currently, for around four summermonths, it is used for shipping grain and fertilizersfrom Canada to Europe (via Canada’s principal north-ern port of Churchill in Hudson Bay to the Russianport of Murmansk, both well connected by railroadwith the rest of respective continents). Russia is keenon further developing the concept of the Arcticbridge, and already positions the Murmansk port astransit hub for the future cross-continental shippingbetween the North America, Northwest Europe andPacific Asia.

Challenges of Shipping in the Arctic

Although the Arctic may offer shorter transhippingdistances, the time and transport costs, at present,are not automatically lowered. The navigation in thehigh northern latitudes requires special (or addition-ally equipped) vessels, long and specific trainings ofthe crew, extreme caution and relatively low speed(even for the ice-breakers) as the natural hazards arefar higher and less predictable comparing thosewithin the traditional warm-seas routes.

At present, a major barrier to the Arctic transport isthe dangerous iceberg drifting, happening unpre-dictably (in a far and wide range), rough winds andoceanic currents whose direction, severity and fre-quency is far from explored and scientifically docu-mented. Clearly the danger for the crew, cargo andenvironment is very high. (Since most of the tradi-tional cargos are not eligible for the polar climate, itis safe to assume that the Arctic shipping will bedominantly related to hydrocarbons such as crudeand liquefied natural gas.

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This would surely pose a high environmentalrisk in the event of accidents on the anywaydestabilized balance of these fragile eco-sys-tems.) Even if in the forthcoming summers thechannels’ ice-sheets might be fully melted, it isnot clear whether the old ice-sheets (heaver,denser and more compact) would expand fill-ing the gap in temporary freed pathways andblock the narrow straits. To answer it with theprecision, more observation will be needed.

A vast majority of the world’s commercial fleetsneither have pilots and crew, nor are the shipsadequately equipped for the Arctic challenges.So far, the polar circle has very few oceanic ob-servation stations, surveillance and warningsystems (grounded or in the geostationarysatellites).

In the absence of those systems, disaster reliefcapability and rapid rescue capacity, and withthe high environmental hazard, the Arctic ship-ping is, at present, mostly considered as a no-go zone for the international insurance and REcompanies (since the type, severity and fre-quency of risks are largely undocumented andtherefore incalculable). Summed up all to-gether, it increases the costs of shipping andfinally neutralizes potential gains in shorteningthe routes. Clearly, any continued rapid deglaciation isturning the Arctic into a lucrative shipping al-ternative. Yet, it is not clear how soon, howlong and how broad a context. Until then, thetraditional transport over the warm-seasroutes is to be predominantly exercised. Afterall, it took seafarers centuries to master thenavigation of high sea in the warm oceans.

Map 9: Shipping Routes in the Arctic Source: Centre Port Canada, 2008

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Natural Resources

It is largely assumed that theunique morphological and climaticcharacteristics of both poles areturning them to be the two basinsvery rich in natural resources. Sev-eral recent studies conducted in thewide Northern Pole theatre areproving the earlier finding of theU.S. Geological Survey, whichclaimed that 25% of the world’s oiland gas reserves are lie beneath theArctic (estimated at as much as 90billion barrels of oil and 1,670 tril-lion cubic feet of technically recov-erable natural gas). If proven, this would add about 22%of the undiscovered global re-sources, out of which 84% are ex-pected to lie offshore. About 70% ofthe undiscovered natural gas is es-timated to be centred in threeprovinces only, namely the WestSiberian Basin, the East BarentsBasins and Arctic Alaska. For furtherdetails, see the maps below. (U.S.Geological Survey, 2008)

To this end, the Norwegian Statoil-Hydro is already extracting in the socalled Snow White Field (some 145kilometres above the Norwegiannorthern coast). Russia’s leading gasproducer Gazprom is also undertak-ing developments in the Shtokmanfield in the Barents Sea, which is al-ready the world largest offshore gasfield.

In addition to the exploitation of hydrocarbons, theArctic holds mineral resources such as diamonds,gold, copper, nickel, and chrome. (Omestad, 2008)Canada is already one of the top three diamond pro-ducers due to its rich deposits in the Polar provinceof Nunavut.

Regions of Alaska, Polar Canada and Polar Russia arealready experiencing a sort of mining rush and thesudden lively economic activity. However, the sus-tained exploration and exploitation as well as trans-port remain a big obstacle along with the nearlyunbearable climatic conditions for the longer sta-tioned craws.

The resource exploitation in the Antarctic region ishindered due to the ATS system which prohibits anycommercial exploitation. It is known that the Antarc-tic continental shelf is holding rich natural resources(surveys have proven that it has been part of thesuper-continent Gondwanaland that back in thePalaeozoic era consisted of South America, Africaand Australia). However, exact and detailed surveyson the holdings of minerals and other resources arestill from being credibly proven. Assumedly, theAntarctica is well rich in iron ore, chrome, copper,gold, nickel and platinum as well as in gas and coal.The Arctic exhibits rich marine biota too – fishery isthe traditional activity for natives. Rising ocean tem-peratures cause fish stocks migration to the coldernorthern waters, further compromising the ecolog-ical balance.

In the uninhabited Antarctica, any occasional fishingis physically limited and legally controlled by theConvention for the Conservation of Antarctic MarineLiving Resources which sets limits to all commercialfisheries and prevents any illegal and unregulatedfishing.

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Map 10: Undiscovered Gas Deposits in the Arctic, Source: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 2008

Map 11: Undiscovered Oil Deposits in the Arctic, Source: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 2008

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SECURITY CHALLENGE

ith a climate change seriously affect-ing the entire planet, the line be-tween natural occurrences andhuman induced catastrophes will beever harder differentiated. An in-crease in the severity and frequency

of these occurrences is becoming practically incalculable forthe scientific and insurance community, but also for the tra-ditionally well-informed national intelligence. Consequently,the additional stress will be imposed on the overall equilib-rium of all our systems; be it the eco-system, political orsocio-economic system (well-routined, established systemsof how we access, extract, process, transport, distribute andconsume natural resources and manufactured products).

The compensation for unpredictable future losses, the hu-mankind can only find in competing over the available safeterritory and natural resources. Thus, clear connection be-tween environment and security is evident. Further climaticdeterioration may bring the contraction of available re-sources and habitable territories, but also dispersion (e.g.deeper into the Arctic theatre). The constancy and pre-dictability of states’ behaviours is the essential prerequisitefor any viable system of international relations.

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On the northern side, with an ab-sence of specific legal frameworkand clear demarcation/border line,the defrosting of the Arctic mayheat up the political struggle drivenby the geoeconomic and geopoliti-cal consideration. It is not far fromreality that the stiff dismissivestance of the Arctic Five towardsany external aspirant may triggerdifferent confrontations, includingmilitary. Even if successfully keep-ing others from access to the terri-tory, (specific) passage or naturalresources, any lasting balancewould need a solid inner cohesionamong the Five, which historicallynever existed.

Currently, the moves of the ArcticFive are symbolic and concrete, andboth assertive (towards the Arctic)and dismissive (towards the exter-nal aspirants) at the same time.Among the symbolic ones are theover toned statements of the polit-ical rhetoric, like: the Arctic is oursand we should manifest our pres-ence, statement made by Kremlin’sspecial representative for the ArcticArtur Nikolayevich Chilingarov, orthe Canadian Prime MinisterStephen Harper’s statement of 2008that Canada has a choice when itcomes to defending our sover-eignty in the Arctic: either we use itor we lose it. (McArdle, 2008)

In the category of the symbolic ones is also the state-ment of Admiral James G. Stavridis, the NATO’sSupreme Allied Commander for Europe: This [Arcticissue] is something we are starting to spend moretime looking at. I look at the high north and I thinkit could either be a zone of conflict, I hope not, azone of competition, probably. It could also be co-operative . . . and as an alliance we should make thisas co-operative as we possibly can. (NATO 2009)

A seemingly reconciliatory statement on the subjectcame from Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, chairman ofthe NATO Military Committee, that the allianceshould not overly focus on the Arctic issue, and thatpossible NATO–Russia confrontation could beavoided by bringing in Russia, but also other nations(non-NATO members) who expressed interest in theArctic like China or Japan. (NATO 2009) Offering theshare to the states which are not a part of the ArcticFive’s de facto system, but are on the Eastern andSouthern flank of Russia must be triggering manyconcerns within the Kremlin quarters. Containmentand encirclement is the last what the Russian Feder-ation would like to see in its quest for the polarshare. Seen from the NATO perspective, it looks thatthe North Atlantic alliance either sees Russia toopowerful and best positioned in the Arctic quest, orthat the Alliance wants to deter Russia’s aspirationsby sharing costs of it with the external players.

More concrete and less symbolic moves are theRussian frequent patrolling on and over the Arcticseas, but also the NATO interceptors several timesalerted due to the flights of Russian bombers(equipped with the long-range missiles). SincePutin’s first presidency, the Russian Federation hasopened a new defence budget line devoted to mod-ernization of the polar/sub-polar airborne and navalforces. Less dramatically but equally steady, Canadaand Norway, too allocated the funds for the Arcticmilitary and general patrolling presence.

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Besides the collective security arrangement ofNATO, other forms of cooperation are at place:a possible and also plausible alliance could beseen between Canada and the US, as to securetheir Arctic borders but also the North Amer-ica’s energy supply.

The U.S. and Denmark already run the militarycooperation as the U.S. has an important AirForce base in Thule, Greenland. Finally in Eu-rope at different FORAs, Sweden, Finland andIceland have repeatedly expressed their will-ingness to increase cooperation with Norwayand Denmark on the Arctic security issues. In the Antarctica, on the contrary, the deter-rence is still guaranteed by the AntarcticaTreaty System (ATS) will remain in force forsome decades to come.

Additionally, the Southern Pole is politically,geographically and climatically far from any se-rious and sustained geoeconomic or geopolit-ical proximity. Still, recent British offshoreactivities are bringing some of the old tensionsover the Falklands – the gate to the Antarctica– back into the spotlights. This frozen territorialdispute between Argentina and the UK mayspill over, causing the tensions among otherSouthern Pole participatory states in theirviews when and how to access the Antarctica.

China has alreadyapplied for the observer status in the Arctic Council,and is repeatedly pronouncing itsbolder naval pres-ence including the development ofice breakers – the plans still farfrom concretization,though causing the additional tension all over the warm Asian seasbut to the cold northtoo.

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CONCLUSION

immy Carter’s presidency is usually portrayed asone of the weakest in the modern American his-tory. The Iranian revolution and the US debaclewith the hostage crisis are the most quoted in thelong list of miscalculations ascribed to this presi-dency. Still, President Carter was the first one in

modern history to successfully formulate and promulgate thenon-territorial claim on the world scene of geopolitics. As known, the Cold war was a mega confrontation betweentwo superpowers and blocks organized around them. Thisconfrontation, both ideological and territorial, was essentiallydoctrineted by Monroe and Brezhnev. Permanent overexten-sion of superpowers and constant calls of Europeans for a dé-tente has finally put the US and the Soviet Union around thenegotiation table in the early 1970s – something that inHelsinki will mark the biggest Cold War victory of all. Surely, the preface of the Helsinki accord was going aroundthe same – territorial gains: Soviets were interested in mutualrecognition of borders in Europe (drawn pretty much by theirown hand in Potsdam), while the U.S. were finally ready torelax the tensions in Europe by accepting it. Further on,Moscow requested the unrestricted access to the westerntechnologies (essentially the know-how transfer as to im-prove their declining technological edge), while the US andits European allies contra-requested the joint military inspec-tion in the East.

J

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Finally, in the wake of Helsinki clo-sure, the newly elected Carterurged something non-military andnon-territorial: Human rights as anequal and non-renegotiable basketto the comprehensive Final Act ofHelsinki. Although the Soviets, andto some extent Europeans, have feltthat the Three-basket accord wastheir grand victory, the time hasshown that actually the US was thefinal winner. The non-territorial quest, e.g. a fullrespect of human rights and civicliberties, freedom of speech andmedia is a door-way for the freemarket economy which does notnecessarily bring (full-fledge)democracy, but surely domesticatesthe capitalism of such a form thatbest fits the US corporate interests.This in return, eventually and ulti-mately increases an overall Ameri-can geopolitical stake. After all, freetrade is not a virtue, but an instru-ment (as liberalism is not a state ofmind, but a well-doctrinated ideol-ogy).

Collapse of the Soviet Union andsubsequent end of the Cold Warmeant a decisive victory of the non-territorial principle. Even the postYeltsin Russia (after absorbing theshock of the loss of its historic em-pire) has turned to its strategicneighbourhood (and beyond) withthe non-territoriality as its majorquest. The only exception is the re-gion of Caucasus, but the Russianacting with Ukraine and CentralAsia as well as with the Baltic re-publics and Eastern Europe is basedon non-territoriality.

Consequently, we can safely say that the future con-tests will be predominantly driven by non-territorialclaims – decoupling the strict territorial control fromthe nation’s prosperity. However, two big exceptionsare two poles at which the territorial claims are pre-dominantly presented – both Arctic and Antarcticaare the last remaining territories to be conqueredand divided.

As noted earlier in the text, the two Poles are globalclimate stabilizers, holding by far the richest marinebiota and biggest fresh water reserves, still the re-gions without clear demarcation lines for the mili-tary and economic presence. Climate change andglobal warming will cause many uncertainties inyears and decades to come. Forthcoming climaticvariations and environmental deterioration will in-evitable stress the habitable territories, accessibleresources (including the hydrocarbons and preciousmetals, but not excluding the fresh water). As said,the viable, universal and comprehensive interna-tional system requires, maintains and aims at theconstancy and predictability of behaviour of its sub-jects. Climate change, therefore, seriously challengesand compromises the collective security mecha-nisms, and may redesign the national security prior-ities of many states. Eventual loss of lands andresources within the national territories may turninto the possibility of assertion in the larger theatreof melted Arctic and Antarctica.

The successful promulgation of the non-territorialquest presupposes that the object of such a questhas permanent population over clearly defined landparameter, constancy of the domestic administra-tion which demonstrates the legal enforcement suf-ficient enough as to maintain the basic economicactivity (including the monetary predictability), con-sumerist needs and elementary purchasing powerof residents. Essentially, each and every of the enu-merated elements are completely absent in the Arc-tic and Antarctica. Meaning, the territoriality is notthe most likely, but is the only possible scenario forthe two poles.

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However, due to the fundamentally asymmet-ric legal setup, the two Polar Regions are facingdiffering consequences. In the Antarctica, theparticipatory parties agreed to set up a firmlegal framework (comprehensive security, eco-nomic and environmental arrangement) – atreaty system to protect the unique environ-ment of the most southern continent, restrict-ing their national interests and militaryactivities, and finally focusing on the preserva-tion and scientific exploration of the SouthPole. Respective territorial claims were not set-tled but frozen, and parties to the AntarcticTreaty committed themselves to the pacificuse, refraining at the same time from any kindof commercial activities. Therefore, Antarctica’slegal position (though unsolved) could be de-scribed as well-defined – the treaty system thatleaves little to no space for conflicting territo-rial claims at least for the time being, while thetreaty is still in force. The Arctic, to the contrary, is not subject to anyspecific legal provisions.

The only exception is the island of Svalbardwhich has (though imperfect) the clearly de-fined, restraining (semi-ATS like) legal frame-work.The five littoral, circumpolar states havea desire and legal opportunity (thought theUNCLOS stipulated CLCS machinery) to lodgethe territorial claims over the Arctic. That issomething that none of the Five would like tosee changed for a new restraining interna-tional instrument whose scope would be ne-gotiated by large number of states beyond thepolar parameter.

Out of the twelve original parties to the Antarc-tica treaty, three are among the Arctic Five(Norway, Russia/SU and the US). Out of the Arc-tic Five, we can consider only three as real polarstates. Irrespectively of the size, might and thedegree of technological advancement, nocountry can close a specific polar-knowledgegap within few decades. It took Denmark, Nor-way and Russia several centuries to ‘master theice’.

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Although the US portraits itself as a‘fish of high seas’ – a supreme rulerof the world oceans, it is primarily a‘fish of warm seas’. The US suffersfrom territorial discontinuity with itsAlaska proper. After all, Alaska givesrelatively modest share of the Arctictheatre. The US presence in theAntarctica is less substantive andmore symbolic – to confirm theprestige and to observe the activi-ties of others. Likewise, the mainArctic concern for the US is to deterRussia – for the time being there isno indication of the bolder Arcticpresence. Finally, by not ratifyingthe UNCLOS, the U.S. cannot lodgethe claim, but also (equally, if notmore importantly) cannot decideon claims of others.

Canada, on its own end, is neither atypical polar state nor considerablenaval power. Its, second longest,Arctic border so far is more of a bur-den than of an advantage for thegovernment in Ottawa. Canada isone of the most disproportionatestates: huge territory with a tinypopulation centred at the far southof the country – of the exposed, un-explored and literally empty centraland northern territory.

Long green and blue borders as well as the lack ofsubstantive Arctic expertise will keep the US closeto Canada in their security and geoeconomic con-siderations, still not without frictions framework.(Even the late Canadian insistence on bilingualism isnot an expression of the country’s pro-France senti-ment as much as it is a desire to differentiate the twosocieties, both being predominantly white protes-tant English speaking with Anglo-Irish roots.) If the US is a ‘fish of warm seas’ than Denmark andNorway are the ‘fish of cold seas’ and Russia is a ‘polarbear’ of permafrost.

Russia clearly has very strong position as it owns notonly the longest Arctic coastline but it also holds along history of Arctic presence. Traditionally, theHigh North has been a constant geopolitical imper-ative since Peter the Great’s times. Parallel and well-established geoeconomic drive is getting a newvigour with Putin and Medvedev’s administrations.The bold (sometimes noisy) Russian Arctic policy isanother signal that the Federation is not going todisappear into the second row of global politics andeconomy, but will increase its (non-territorial lever-age and geopolitical) projection as a major energysupplier of the world throughout the 21st century.It is hard to imagine any relevant Arctic issue to beresolved (even discussed) without an explicit Russ-ian consent.Norway, the small state with the large pool of histor-ical knowledge and advanced technologies is aloner in the political environment, a nation in be-tween the EU and the Russian Federation, and thekey northern flank NATO member. It takes in afriendly but firm position in international relationsand Arctic matters. Close proximity coupled with un-resolved Arctic territorial disputes and lucrative eco-nomic prospects of joint ventures will keep Russiaand Norway out of open confrontational course.

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Canada’s neighbour Greenland connects theEU to the Arctic. The largest world’s island andits tiny population will be contested with theenvironmental, economic and political chal-lenges in the upcoming decades. Greenland’sroad-map is gradual but decisive independ-ence, less home grown and more Danish in-duced. However, at the moment Greenland isstill highly dependent on Danish subsidies, in-cluding diplomatic ones. It is still Danish signa-ture that holds the biggest NATO Arctic baseon Greenland’s very soil.Clearly, no instrument comparable to theAntarctic Treaty System will be established inthe Arctic even if there are several advocatesdemanding it. By the Ilulissat Declaration, thelittoral states have unanimously reaffirmed theUNCLOS as the only applicable framework forthe Arctic territorial matters. This declarationof the Five clearly demonstrated their dismis-sive stance towards the larger internationalcommunity, assertiveness towards the Arcticand reconciliatory attempt among them. Thesporadic calls by which one or the other of theFive invites different FORAs (like NATO, the EU,Arctic Council, the Nordic Battle Group and thelike) or particular states (like China or Japan)for the stakes at the Arctic theatre are ratherthe tactical moves to deter the other playerswithin the Five than they are calls for the sub-stantive share in decision making. Each andevery of the Arctic Five will continue to keepany external party far away from substantiveparticipation in the polar matters.

However, it is not a guaranty for the frictionlessrelations among the Five: the North Pole wasthe most militarized region of the world at thepeaks of the Cold War (and still holds huge mil-itary arsenal), while at the same time the SouthPole was (and still is) the only demilitarizedcontinent of the planet.

In the Antarctica, a sudden change of the cur-rent legal regime is very unlikely. The year 2048might constitute a landmark, as it will dependon the parties to the treaty, whether an exten-sion or alternation of the ATS system (with allor some of its major transversals on the eco-nomic, politico-military and environmental is-sues) will take a place. Further on, the SouthernPole is far from the prime centres of the worldgravity: the US, the EU, Russia and Japan – allfour of them are situated well on the northernhemisphere. Even the rapid newcomers likeIndia, China and Brazil, that may largely influ-ence world politics and economy, will remainnearly irrelevant for the Arctic (and Antarctica)matters.

The Polar Regions, although inhabitable, ofharsh and hostile weather conditions, and dis-tant from any prominent centre of human ac-tivity, will certainly have major influence on aclimatic and environmental, political, eco-nomic and overall security matters throughoutthe 21st century, and therefore require closerconsideration as well as cautious and constantobservation.

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POST SCRIPTUM

ot long ago, dissatisfied with his interpre-tation of current affairs I played a trick onone of my students by recalling the famousChurchill saying: “There is nothing new inthe world but only history chapters youhaven’t read”. My student calmly replied:

“Professor, how wide and how far beyond should I go in orderto grasp what the newspapers write?” My young fellow definitely had a point. Most of the mediaspace and audience attention are given to the news relatedto crises. We witness a crisis every once in a while; there wasan oil crisis, hostage crisis, terrorist crisis, consumer crisis, eco-logical crisis, Stephanie of Monaco crisis, health crisis (withthe outbreaks of epidemics that are human-induced but al-ways given animal’s names: chicken, cow, bird, swine), pro-ducers crisis, Euro-currency/Greece crisis, Volcanic ashescrisis, crisis of BP oil spilled in the Gulf of Mexico, severity andfrequency of natural occurrences crisis (whereas the devas-tating killer-tsunamis, cyclones and hurricanes are givenChristian names, like Mitch, Catharina, Ivan), and finally thelasting financial crisis. Although both, international mediaand its worldwide audience tend to see crises as isolated in-cidents, the constancy of crisis state-of-the-art has a connec-tion, and eventually deeper meaning.

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Observing the archipelago from the waterline,the only shape noticeable would be a sum ofdisproportionate islands which independentlystand next to each other – no corridor to con-nect them. Only a closer look, deep beneaththe water surface would give us a clear imageof the seabed, which is eventually a single andcompact ridge with only sporadically outgoingtips visible above the waterline. Each and every crisis (whatever it is called andhow it is manifested) is primarily a crisis ofthought, a crisis of ideas on the way we pro-duce, distribute, transport, consume and planeach of them. It is undeniably a crisis ofthought on how we articulate our social, eco-nomic, cultural and political life, and interactand correlate them as individuals and societies. Witnessing the recent (and still unsettled)crises, I missed one thing – an extensive andwide debate of academia and practitioners.

This silence, I could only ascribe to either intel-lectualism in retreat or to the forces of the sta-tus quo which are overly strong. A neutralstance of ‘wait-and-see’ attitude in times ofcrises is the most frequent advice or self-assur-ance. Either occupying a position in which oneshould generate ideas (per definition the ideaquestions and challenges the system of statusquo), but failing to do so, or having the ideabut withholding it, results in the same – a deepmoral crisis. Therefore, a crisis of thought and ideas willlead inevitably to its final stage – a moral crisis!Dante gives a powerful reminder: “The hottestplace in Hell is reserved for those who remainneutral in times of great moral crisis”. Goethe ismore reconciliatory, but equally instructive:“Freedom has to be re-made and re-earned inevery generation”. Is it high time for our gener-ation to earn for its own living?!

Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic

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American Association of Petroleum Geologists. (2008, October). Geology Matters in Law of the Sea. Re-trieved May 13, 2010, from American Association of Petroleum Geologists: http://www.aapg.org/ex-plorer/2008/10oct/arctic.cfmAntarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition. (2007). The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the AntarcticTreaty. Retrieved April 25, 2010, from http://www.asoc.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Madrid_Protocol052107.pdfAntarctic Treaty Summit. (2009). Objectives:Antarctic Treaty Summit. Retrieved May 15, 2010, fromhttp://www.atsummit50.aq/about_summit/objectives.phpArctic Council. (2009). Opportunities and Challenges Created by A More Accessible Arctic. 6th MinisterialMeeting (p. Arctic Council). Tromsö: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland.Arctic Council. (2008). The Ilulissat Declaration. The Ilulissat Declaration, (p. Arctic Council). Ilulissat, Green-land.BarentsObserver. (2008, August 07). Canada to present Arctic claims in Oslo. Retrieved May 12, 2010, fromBarentsObserver: http://www.barentsobserver.com/canada-to-present-arctic-claims-in-oslo-.4500323-16149.htmlBelton, C. (2007, October 26). Gazprom gives Statoilhydro gas field stake. Financial times .Benitah, M. (2007, November 8). Russia's Claim n the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in UNCLOS. ASILInsight , 11 (27).Borg, J. (2009, March 11). Opportunties and responsibilities in the Arctic Region: the EU's perspective.Borgerson, S. G. (2009, May 25). Great Game Moves North. Foreign Affairs .Boswell, R. (2009, October 19). Canada. Retrieved November 18, 2009, from Pushing to the Pole before Arcticseabed deadline: http://www.canada.com/technology/Pushing+Pole+before+Arctic+seabed+dead-line/1606705/story.htmlBowcott, O. (2007). Argentina ready to challenge Britain's Antarctic claims. Retrieved June 09, 2010, from TheGuardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/oct/19/climatechange.fossilfuelsBritish Foreign Spokeswoman. (2007, October 7). BBC News. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from UK looks tomake Antarctica claim: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7048237.stmByers, M. (n.d.). A thaw in relations. Who owns the Arctic? Byers, M. (2009). Breaking the ice. Ottawa Citizen .Canada to Tighten Ship Registration. (2008, August 28). Wall Street Journal , p. 12.Cohen, A., Szaszdi, L. F., & Dolbow, J. (2008, October 30). The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence inthe Arctic. Retrieved May 10, 2010, from Heritage: http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnviron-ment/bg2202.cfmCommission of the European Communities. (2008). Communication from the Commission to the EuropeanParliament and the Council. Brussels.Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. (2007). General Introduction . Re-trieved June 01, 2010, from Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources:http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/gen-intro.htmCooper, J. (2008, January). Canada navigating challenging waters in exploring new arctic opportunities. CMAManagement , pp. 53-54.

LIST OF REFERENCES

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De La Fayette, L. A. (2008). Oceans Governance in the Arctic. The International Journal of Marine and CoastalLaw 23 , pp. 531-566.Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. (2010)Extended Continental Shelf Project. (2009). Extended Continental Shelf Project. Retrieved May 23, 2010,from http://continentalshelf.gov/Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2009, October 22). Greenland Referendum. Retrieved April 27, 2010, from Am-bassy of Denmark, Lisbon: http://www.amblissabon.um.dk/en/menu/InfoDenmark/GreenlandAndThe-FaroeIslands/Referendum/G-7, Finance Ministers, 2010 Iqaluit G-7, Government of Canada. Retreved June 04, 2010, fromhttp://www.g7.gc.ca/news-nouvelles-eng.html Górski, T. (2009). A note on Submarine Ridges and Elevations with Special Reference to the Russian Fed. andthe Arctic Ridges. Ocean Develooment & International Law , S. 51-60.Govenor of Svalbard. (2008, April 09). The Svalbard Treaty. Retrieved April 07, 2010, from SysselmannenSvalbard: http://www.sysselmannen.no/hovedEnkel.aspx?m=45301Hadow, P. (2007). UK looks to make Antarctica claim. Retrieved May 26, 2010, from BBC News:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7048237.stmHarper, S. (2008, August 28).Canada To Tighten Ship Reg-istration. Wall Street Journal .Hassol, S. J. (2004). Impactsof a Warming Arctic. ArcticClimate Impact Assessment.Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.Howard, R. (2009, Septem-ber 4). Cold War in the Arctic.Retrieved May 12, 2010, fromTimes Online:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/arti-cle6820907.eceInternational Polar Year.(2008, December). APECSpanel at AGU. Retrieved April18, 2010, from InternationalPolar Year:http://www.ipy.org/multime-dia

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Kraska, J. (2007). The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage. The International Journal ofMarine and Coastal Law , pp. 257-282.Marlowe, J. (2007). Report from Antarctica: countries maneuver for potential future land grab. Retrieved May19, 2010, from Wired: http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/04/antarcticland/McArdle, B. (2008). Foreign Policy Digest. Retrieved April 30, 2010, from A New Cold Conflict: Arctic ClaimDisputes: http://www.foreignpolicydigest.org/20080605129/Regional-Archive/Europe/Russia-Archive/a-new-cold-conflict-arctic-claim-disputes.htmlMcRae, D. M. (Director). (2008). Legal Status: Selected Issues Regarding the Arctic [Motion Picture].NATO (Director). (2009). NATO may compete for Arctic resources [Motion Picture].Nordischer Ministerrat. (2008). Common Concern for the Arctic. Ilulissat/Greenland.Norway. (2006). Continental Shelf Submission of Norway: Executive Summary. NZ Herald. (2005, January 7). Race is on to claim the Arctic. Retrieved May 10, 2010, from NZ Herald:http://www.nzherald.co.nz/technology/news/article.cfm?c_id=5&objectid=9005765Ocean Futures. (2005, September). Maritime Jurisdiction and Commercial Activity. Retrieved May 15, 2010,from Ocean Futures: http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Publikasjoner/Internett-tekster/Arkiv/2006/R-FN-6%20Maritime%20Jurisdiction%20&%20Commercial%20Activity.pdfOmestad, T. (2008, October 12). The Race for the Arctic: As the ice melts, nations eye oil and gas deposits andshipping routes. U.S. News & World Report , p. 53.Potts, T., & Schofield, C. (2008). Current Legal Developments. The International Journal of Marine and

and Coastal Law , S. 151-176.Prokhorov, P. How do we Divide theBarents Sea? St. Petersburg: The BalticResearch Centre.Russia: Arctic ambitions trigger neigh-bours' concerns. (11. August 2009). Ox-ford analytica Daily Brief Service , S. 1.Scientific Committee on Antarctic Re-search. (2009). Signatories to theAntarctic Treaty. Retrieved April 20, 2010,from http://www.scar.org/treaty/signa-tories.htmlSecretariat of the Antarctic Treaty.(2009). Antarctic Treaty System. Re-trieved April 21, 2010, from Secretariat ofthe Antarctic Treaty:http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htmSeidler, C. (2009). Arktisches Monopoly.München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Illustration of Oil Resource Probability in the Arctic

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The World Factbook 2002. (2002). Antarctica. Retrieved October 25, 2009, fromhttp://www.faqs.org/docs/factbook/fields/2028.html U.S. Geological Survey. (2008, July 23). U.S. Geological Survey. Retrieved April 12, 2010, from 90 Billion Bar-rels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic: http://www.usgs.gov/news-room/article.asp?ID=1980United Nations. (1998). The United Nations Convention: A Historical Perspective. The UN Press NYUnited States National Science Foundation. (1997). The United States in Antarctica. Washington: U.S. Antarc-tic Program External Panel.Van Pay, B. (2009). National Maritime Claims in the Arctic. Conference on Changes in the Arctic Environmentand the Law of the Sea . Seward, Alaska.Year, I. P. (Director). (2010). EUR-OCEANS and the International Polar Year [Motion Picture].Young, O. R. (2009). The Arctic in Play: Governance in a time of Rapid Change. The International Journal ofMarine and Coastal Law 24 , pp. 423-442

Illustration of the Northwest Passage

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ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS AMONG THE FIVE LITTORAL STATES

Canada Russia Denmark Norway USA

UNCLOS Ratifica-

tion

2003 1997 2004 1996 Has not ratified;approved by Presi-

dent Bush andSenate Foreign Re-lations Committee

UNCLOS Submis-

sion

By 2013 December 2001 By 2014 2006 No submission

Territorial Claim

Submission pend-ing; will be

roughly 1.75 mil-lion square kilo-

metres

Largest Arcticclaim: includes

North Pole, exten-sions into the Cen-tral Arctic Ocean,

the Bering Sea, theBarents Sea and

the Sea of Okhotsk UN call for more

data

Submission pend-ing

Extensions inthree parts of theArctic and north-east Atlantic: theLoop Hole in theBarents Sea; theWestern Nansen

Basin in the ArcticOcean; and the Ba-

nana Hole in theNorwegian Sea. Further submis-

sions to be made

No official UNC-LOS claim

Existingdisputes

Hans Island, Lin-coln Sea (with

Denmark)Beaufort Sea (with

U.S.) Northwest Pas-sage (with int’l

community)Lomonosov Ridge(with Russia, Den-

mark)

Lomonosov Ridgeand Mendeleev

Ridge (withCanada, Denmark) Svalbard EEZ (with

Norway) Barents Sea (with

Norway)

Lomonosov Ridgeand Mendeleev

Ridge (withCanada, Russia)

Hans Islands (withCanada)

Svalbard EEZ (withRussia)

Barents Sea claim(with Russia)

Beaufort Sea (withCanada)

Northwest Pas-sage (with

Canada)

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Extract from UNCLOS

PART IITERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONSArticle 2 - Legal status of the territorial sea, ofthe air space over the territorial sea and of itsbed and subsoil:1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends,beyond its land territory and internal watersand, in the case of an archipelagic State, itsarchipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea,described as the territorial sea.2. This sovereignty extends to the air spaceover the territorial sea as well as to its bed andsubsoil.3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is ex-ercised subject to this Convention and to otherrules of international law.

SECTION 2. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEAArticle 3 - Breadth of the territorial seaEvery State has the right to establish thebreadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not ex-ceeding 12 nautical miles, measured frombaselines determined in accordance with thisConvention.Article 4 - Outer limit of the territorial seaThe outer limit of the territorial sea is the lineevery point of which is at a distance from thenearest point of the baseline equal to thebreadth of the territorial sea.Article 5 - Normal baselineExcept where otherwise provided in this Con-vention, the normal baseline for measuring thebreadth of the territorial sea is the low-waterline along the coast as marked on large-scalecharts officially recognized by the coastalState.

Article 6 - ReefsIn the case of islands situated on atolls or of is-lands having fringing reefs, the baseline formeasuring the breadth of the territorial sea isthe seaward low-water line of the reef, asshown by the appropriate symbol on charts of-ficially recognized by the coastal State.

Article 7 - Straight baselines1. In localities where the coastline is deeply in-dented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of is-lands along the coast in its immediate vicinity,the method of straight baselines joining ap-propriate points may be employed in drawingthe baseline from which the breadth of the ter-ritorial sea is measured.2. Where because of the presence of a deltaand other natural conditions the coastline ishighly unstable, the appropriate points may beselected along the furthest seaward extent ofthe low-water line and, notwithstanding sub-sequent regression of the low-water line, thestraight baselines shall remain effective untilchanged by the coastal State in accordancewith this Convention.3. The drawing of straight baselines must notdepart to any appreciable extent from the gen-eral direction of the coast, and the sea areaslying within the lines must be sufficientlyclosely linked to the land domain to be subjectto the regime of internal waters.4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to andfrom low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses orsimilar installations which are permanentlyabove sea level have been built on them or ex-cept in instances where the drawing of base-lines to and from such elevations has receivedgeneral international recognition.

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5. Where the method of straight baselines isapplicable under paragraph 1, account may betaken, in determining particular baselines, ofeconomic interests peculiar to the region con-cerned, the reality and the importance ofwhich are clearly evidenced by long usage.6. The system of straight baselines may not beapplied by a State in such a manner as to cutoff the territorial sea of another State from thehigh seas or an exclusive economic zone.

Article 8 - Internal waters1. Except as provided in Part IV, waters on thelandward side of the baseline of the territorialsea form part of the internal waters of theState.2. Where the establishment of a straight base-line in accordance with the method set forthin article 7 has the effect of enclosing as inter-nal waters areas which had not previouslybeen considered as such, a right of innocentpassage as provided in this Convention shallexist in those waters.

Article 9 - Mouths of riversIf a river flows directly into the sea, the baselineshall be a straight line across the mouth of theriver between points on the low-water line ofits banks.Article 10 - Bays1. This article relates only to bays the coasts ofwhich belong to a single State.2. For the purposes of this Convention, a bay isa well-marked indentation whose penetrationis in such proportion to the width of its mouthas to contain land-locked waters and consti-tute more than a mere curvature of the coast.An indentation shall not, however, be regardedas a bay unless its area is as large as, or largerthan, that of the semi-circle whose diameter isa line drawn across the mouth of that indenta-tion.

3. For the purpose of measurement, the area ofan indentation is thatlying between the low-water mark around theshore of the indentation and a line joining thelow-water mark of its natural entrance points.Where, because of the presence of islands, anindentation has more than one mouth, thesemi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long asthe sum total of the lengths of the lines acrossthe different mouths. Islands within an inden-tation shall be included as if they were part ofthe water area of the indentation.

4. If the distance between the low-water marksof the natural entrance points of a bay doesnot exceed 24 nautical miles, a closing line maybe drawn between these two low-water marks,and the waters enclosed thereby shall be con-sidered as internal waters.

5. Where the distance between the low-watermarks of the natural entrance points of a bayexceeds 24 nautical miles, a straight baselineof 24 nautical miles shall be drawn within thebay in such a manner as to enclose the maxi-mum area of water that is possible with a lineof that length.

6. The foregoing provisions do not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any case where thesystem of straight baselines provided for in ar-ticle 7 is applied.

Article 11 - PortsFor the purpose of delimiting the territorialsea, the outermost permanent harbour workswhich form an integral part of the harbour sys-tem are regarded as forming part of the coast.Off-shore installations and artificial islandsshall not be considered as permanent harbourworks.

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Article 12 - RoadsteadsRoadsteads which are normally used for theloading, unloading and anchoring of ships,and which would otherwise be situated whollyor partly outside the outer limit of the territo-rial sea, are included in the territorial sea.Article 13 - Low-tide elevations1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formedarea of land which is surrounded by and abovewater at low tide but submerged at high tide.Where a low-tide elevation is situated whollyor partly at a distance not exceeding thebreadth of the territorial sea from the mainlandor an island, the low-water line on that eleva-tion may be used as the baseline for measuringthe breadth of the territorial sea.2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situatedat a distance exceeding the breadth of the ter-ritorial sea from the mainland or an island, ithas no territorial sea of its own.

Article 14 - Combination of methods for deter-mining baselinesThe coastal State may determine baselines inturn by any of the methods provided for in theforegoing articles to suit different conditions.Article 15 - Delimitation of the territorial seabetween States with opposite or adjacentcoastsWhere the coasts of two States are opposite oradjacent to each other, neither of the twoStates is entitled, failing agreement betweenthem to the contrary, to extend its territorialsea beyond the median line every point ofwhich is equidistant from the nearest points onthe baselines from which the breadth of theterritorial seas of each of the two States ismeasured. The above provision does notapply, however, where it is necessary by reasonof historic title or other special circumstancesto delimit the territorial seas of the two Statesin a way which is at variance therewith.

Article 16 - Charts and lists of geographical co-ordinates

1. The baselines for measuring the breadth ofthe territorial sea determined in accordancewith articles 7, 9 and 10, or the limits derivedthere from, and the lines of delimitation drawnin accordance with articles 12 and 15 shall beshown on charts of a scale or scales adequatefor ascertaining their position. Alternatively, alist of geographical coordinates of points,specifying the geodetic datum, may be substi-tuted.

2. The coastal State shall give due publicity tosuch charts or lists of geographical coordinatesand shall deposit a copy of each such chart orlist with the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations.

SECTION 3. INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA

SUBSECTION A. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL SHIPS

Article 17 - Right of innocent passageSubject to this Convention, ships of all States,whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the rightof innocent passage through the territorial sea.

Article 18 - Meaning of passage1. Passage means navigation through the ter-ritorial sea for the purpose of: (a) traversingthat sea without entering internal waters orcalling at roadstead or port facility outside in-ternal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from in-ternal waters or a call at such roadstead or portfacility.

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2. Passage shall be continuous and expedi-tious. However, passage includes stopping andanchoring, but only in so far as the same are in-cidental to ordinary navigation or are renderednecessary by force majeure or distress or forthe purpose of rendering assistance to per-sons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.

Article 19 - Meaning of innocent passage1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prej-udicial to the peace, good order or security ofthe coastal State. Such passage shall takeplace in conformity with this Convention andwith other rules of international law.

2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be consideredto be prejudicial to the peace, good order orsecurity of the coastal State if in the territorialsea it engages in any of the following activities:(a) any threat or use of force against the sover-eignty, territorial integrity or political inde-pendence of the coastal State, or in any othermanner in violation of the principles of inter-national law embodied in the Charter of theUnited Nations; (b) any exercise or practicewith weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed atcollecting information to the prejudice of thedefence or security of the coastal State; (d) anyact of propaganda aimed at affecting the de-fence or security of the coastal State; (e) thelaunching, landing or taking on board of anyaircraft;

(f ) the launching, landing or taking on boardof any military device; (g) the loading or un-loading of any commodity, currency or personcontrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration orsanitary laws and regulations of the coastalState; (h) any act of willful and serious pollutioncontrary to this Convention; (i) any fishing ac-tivities; (j) the carrying out of research or sur-vey activities;

(k) any act aimed at interfering with any sys-tems of communication or any other facilitiesor installations of the coastal State; (l) any otheractivity not having a direct bearing on pas-sage.

Article 20 - Submarines and other underwatervehiclesIn the territorial sea, submarines and other un-derwater vehicles are required to navigate onthe surface and to show their flag.

Article 21 - Laws and regulations of the coastalState relating to innocent passage1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regu-lations, in conformity with the provisions ofthis Convention and other rules of interna-tional law, relating to innocent passagethrough the territorial sea, in respect of all orany of the following: (a) the safety of naviga-tion and the regulation of maritime traffic; (b)the protection of navigational aids and facili-ties and other facilities or installations; (c) theprotection of cables and pipelines; (d) the con-servation of the living resources of the sea; (e)the prevention of infringement of the fisherieslaws and regulations of the coastal State; (f )the preservation of the environment of thecoastal State and the prevention, reductionand control of pollution thereof; (g) marine sci-entific research and hydrographic surveys; (h)the prevention of infringement of the customs,fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-tions of the coastal State.

2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply tothe design, construction, manning or equip-ment of foreign ships unless they are giving ef-fect to generally accepted international rulesor standards.3. The coastal State shall give due publicity toall such laws and regulations.

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4. Foreign ships exercising the right of inno-cent passage through the territorial sea shallcomply with all such laws and regulations andall generally accepted international regula-tions relating to the prevention of collisions atsea.Article 22 - Sea lanes and traffic separationschemes in the territorial sea1. The coastal State may, where necessary hav-ing regard to the safety of navigation, requireforeign ships exercising the right of innocentpassage through its territorial sea to use suchsea lanes and traffic separation schemes as itmay designate or prescribe for the regulationof the passage of ships.2. In particular, tankers, nuclear-powered shipsand ships carrying nuclear or other inherentlydangerous or noxious substances or materialsmaybe required to confine their passage tosuch sea lanes.3. In the designation of sea lanes and the pre-scription of traffic separation schemes underthis article, the coastal State shall take into ac-count: (a) the recommendations of the compe-tent international organization; (b) anychannels customarily used for internationalnavigation; (c) the special characteristics ofparticular ships and channels; and (d) the den-sity of traffic.4. The coastal State shall clearly indicate suchsea lanes and traffic separation schemes oncharts to which due publicity shall be given.Article 23 - Foreign nuclear-powered ships andships carrying nuclear or other inherently dan-gerous or noxious substancesForeign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear orother inherently dangerous or noxious sub-stances shall, when exercising the right of in-nocent passage through the territorial sea,carry documents and observe special precau-tionary measures established for such ships byinternational agreements.

Article 24 - Duties of the coastal State1. The coastal State shall not hamper the inno-cent passage of foreign ships through the ter-ritorial sea except in accordance with thisConvention. In particular, in the application ofthis Convention or of any laws or regulationsadopted in conformity with this Convention,the coastal State shall not: (a) impose require-ments on foreign ships which have the practi-cal effect of denying or impairing the right ofinnocent passage; or (b) discriminate in formor in fact against the ships of any State oragainst ships carrying cargoes to, from or onbehalf of any State.2. The coastal State shall give appropriate pub-licity to any danger to navigation, of which ithas knowledge, within its territorial sea.

Article 25 - Rights of protection of the coastalState1. The coastal State may take the necessarysteps in its territorial sea to prevent passagewhich is not innocent.2. In the case of ships proceeding to internalwaters or a call at a port facility outside internalwaters, the coastal State also has the right totake the necessary steps to prevent any breachof the conditions to which admission of thoseships to internal waters or such a call is subject.3. The coastal State may, without discrimina-tion in form or in fact among foreign ships, sus-pend temporarily in specified areas of itsterritorial sea the innocent passage of foreignships if such suspension is essential for the pro-tection of its security, including weapons exer-cises. Such suspension shall take effect onlyafter having been duly published.Article 26 - Charges which may be levied uponforeign ships 1. No charge may be levied upon foreign shipsby reason only of their passage through theterritorial sea.

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2. Charges may be levied upon a foreign shippassing through the territorial sea as paymentonly for specific services rendered to the ship.These charges shall be levied without discrim-ination.

SUBSECTION B. ULES APPLICABLE TO MERCHANT SHIPSAND GOVERNMENT SHIPS OPERATED FORCOMMERCIAL PURPOSES

Article 27 - Criminal jurisdiction on board a for-eign ship1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal Stateshould not be exercised on board a foreignship passing through the territorial sea to ar-rest any person or to conduct any investigationin connection with any crime committed onboard the ship during its passage, save only inthe following cases: (a) if the consequences ofthe crime extend to the coastal State; (b) if thecrime is of a kind to disturb the peace of thecountry or the good order of the territorial sea;(c) if the assistance of the local authorities hasbeen requested by the master of the ship or bya diplomatic agent or consular officer of theflag State; or (d) if such measures are necessaryfor the suppression of illicit traffic in narcoticdrugs or psychotropic substances.2. The above provisions do not affect the rightof the coastal State to take any steps author-ized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest orinvestigation on board a foreign ship passingthrough the territorial sea after leaving internalwaters.3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and2, the coastal State shall, if the master so re-quests, notify a diplomatic agent or consularofficer of the flag State before taking any steps,and shall facilitate contact between such agentor officer and the ship's crew. In cases of

emergency this notification may be communi-cated while the measures are being taken.4. In considering whether or in what manneran arrest should be made, the local authoritiesshall have due regard to the interests of navi-gation.

5. Except as provided in Part XII or with respectto violations of laws and regulations adoptedin accordance with Part V, the coastal Statemay not take any steps on board a foreign shippassing through the territorial sea to arrest anyperson or to conduct any investigation in con-nection with any crime committed before theship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, pro-ceeding from a foreign port, is only passingthrough the territorial sea without entering in-ternal waters.

Article 28 - Civil jurisdiction in relation to for-eign ships

1. The coastal State should not stop or divert aforeign ship passing through the territorial seafor the purpose of exercising civil jurisdictionin relation to a person on board the ship.

2. The coastal State may not levy executionagainst or arrest the ship for the purpose of anycivil proceedings, save only in respect of obli-gations or liabilities assumed or incurred bythe ship itself in the course or for the purposeof its voyage through the waters of the coastalState.

3. Paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the rightof the coastal State, in accordance with its laws,to levy execution against or to arrest, for thepurpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign shiplying in the territorial sea, or passing throughthe territorial sea after leaving internal waters.

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SUBSECTION C. RULES APPLICABLE TO WARSHIPS ANDOTHER GOVERNMENT SHIPSOPERATEDFOR NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

Article 29 - Definition of warshipsFor the purposes of this Convention, "warship"means a ship belonging to the armed forces ofa State bearing the external marks distinguish-ing such ships of its nationality, under the com-mand of an officer duly commissioned by thegovernment of the State and whose name ap-pears in the appropriate service list or its equiv-alent, and manned by a crew which is underregular armed forces discipline.

Article 30 - Non-compliance by warships withthe laws and regulations of the coastal StateIf any warship does not comply with the lawsand regulations of the coastal State concerningpassage through the territorial sea and disre-gards any request for compliance therewithwhich is made to it, the coastal State may re-quire it to leave the territorial sea immediately.Article 31 - Responsibility of the flag State fordamage caused by a warship or other govern-ment ship operated for non-commercial pur-posesThe flag State shall bear international respon-sibility for any loss or damage to the coastalState resulting from the non-compliance by awarship or other government ship operated

for non-commercial purposes with the lawsand regulations of the coastal State concerningpassage through the territorial sea or with theprovisions of this Convention or other rules ofinternational law.Article 32 - Immunities of warships and othergovernment ships operated for non-commer-cial purposesWith such exceptions as are contained in sub-section A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing inthis Convention affects the immunities of war-ships and other government ships operatedfor non-commercial purposes.

SECTION 4. CONTIGUOUS ZONE

Article 33 - Contiguous zone1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, de-scribed as the contiguous zone, the coastalState may exercise the control necessary to: (a)prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, im-migration or sanitary laws and regulationswithin its territory or territorial sea; (b) punishinfringement of the above laws and regula-tions committed within its territory or territo-rial sea.2. The contiguous zone may not extend be-yond 24 nautical miles from the baselines fromwhich the breadth of the territorial sea is meas-ured.

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