Special Proceedings Digest

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JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School Claims against the estate Stronghold Insurance Company Incorporated v Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (6/22/2006) D: death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Justice Panganiban Facts: 1. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (REPUBLIC- ASAHI) entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in REPUBLIC- ASAHI’S compound in Pasig City. 2. REPUBLIC-ASAHI was to pay JDS P5.3M which was supposed to be completed within a 240 days. To guarantee performance, JDS with STRONGHOLD Insurance executed a bond worth P795k. 3. REPUBLIC ASAHI paid JDS P 795k by way of downpayment. Subsequently, 2 progress billings worth P 274k were paid to account for only 7.301% of the work supposed to be undertaken by JDS 4. Eventually, REPUBLIC-ASAHI’s engineers called the attention of JDS re the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS. 5. Dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken, REPUBLIC-ASAHI extrajudicially rescinded the contract. Pursuant to the contract, such recission shall not be construed as a waiver of REPUBLIC-ASAHI’s right to recover damages from JDS and the latter’s sureties. 6. REPUBLIC-ASAHI had to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an additional expense of P 3M 7. Thus, REPUBLIC-ASAHI filed a claim for the bond in the amount of P795k. But this was unheeded. 8. A formal complaint in court was then filed by REPUBLIC_ASAHI against JDS and STRINGHOLD. It sought from payment of 3M from JDS and another 750k from JDS and SICI, jointly and severally 9. Sheriff’s Return showed that summons were duly served on STRONGHOLD. However JDS Construction was no longer at its address at 2nd Floor, Room 208-A, San Buena Bldg. Cor. 1 Ad astra per alia fideles

description

Digest for Special Proceedings

Transcript of Special Proceedings Digest

Page 1: Special Proceedings Digest

JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

Claims against the estate

Stronghold Insurance Company Incorporated v Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (6/22/2006)

D: death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are

transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations

of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the

persons themselves are extinguished by death.Justice Panganiban

Facts:1. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (REPUBLIC-ASAHI)

entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in REPUBLIC-ASAHI’S compound in Pasig City.

2. REPUBLIC-ASAHI was to pay JDS P5.3M which was supposed to be completed within a 240 days. To guarantee performance, JDS with STRONGHOLD Insurance executed a bond worth P795k.

3. REPUBLIC ASAHI paid JDS P795k by way of downpayment. Subsequently, 2 progress billings worth P274k were paid to account for only 7.301% of the work supposed to be undertaken by JDS

4. Eventually, REPUBLIC-ASAHI’s engineers called the attention of JDS re the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS.

5. Dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken, REPUBLIC-ASAHI extrajudicially rescinded the contract. Pursuant to the contract, such recission shall not be construed as a waiver of REPUBLIC-ASAHI’s right to recover damages from JDS and the latter’s sureties.

6. REPUBLIC-ASAHI had to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an additional expense of P3M

7. Thus, REPUBLIC-ASAHI filed a claim for the bond in the amount of P795k. But this was unheeded.

8. A formal complaint in court was then filed by REPUBLIC_ASAHI against JDS and STRINGHOLD. It sought from payment of 3M from JDS and another 750k from JDS and SICI, jointly and severally

9. Sheriff’s Return showed that summons were duly served on STRONGHOLD. However JDS Construction was no longer at its address at 2nd Floor, Room 208-A, San Buena Bldg. Cor. Pioneer St., Pasig, Metro Manila, and its whereabouts were unknown.

10.STRONGHOLD: money claims have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if this were not the case, STRONGHOLD had been released from its liability under the performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or involvement, pursuant to procedural due process, of herein surety and contractor Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence, there was no ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond. At this point in time, said liquidation was impossible because of the death of Santos, who as such can no longer participate in any liquidation.

11.LC: dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of its sole proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr.

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JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

12.LC: via MR, court gave due course to the complaint against STRONGHOLD but not against deceased Jose D. Santos.

13.CA: ruled that a) STRONGHOLD’s obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond; b) lower court had erred in pronouncing that the performance of the Contract in question had become impossible by ASAHI’s act of rescission. The Contract was rescinded because of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow pace of work and pursuant to Article XIII of its Contract with JDS and c) pursuant to the surety contract, STRONGHOLD is liable for the non-performance of said [C]ontract on the part of JDS Construction

Issue: whether surety’s liability is extinguished because of death?Held: No, Ratio:

1. GENERAL RULE: death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.

2. Section 5 of Rule 86: expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.

3. CASE, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.A. Hence, his death did not result in the

extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

B. liability of STRONGHOLD is contractual in nature because it executed a performance bond

4. As a surety, STRONGHOLD is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code, which provides as follows:A. "Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the

guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.

5. Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor and the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the latter’s liability under the performance bond.

Gabriel v. Bilon (02/07/2007)

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JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

Justice AzcunaRefer to the RATIO for the DOCTRINES

Petition for Review of Certiorari

Facts:1. Petitioner Melencio Gabriel, represented by his surviving

spouse, Flordeliza V. Gabriel, was the owner-operator of a public transport business, "Gabriel Jeepney," with a fleet of 54 jeepneys plying the Baclaran-Divisoria-Tondo route. Petitioner had a pool of drivers, which included respondents Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil, and Ernesto Pagaygay, operating under a "boundary system" of P400 per day.

2. On November 15, 1995, respondents filed their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and separation pay against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). These were consolidated and docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-07420-95.

3. On December 15, 1995, the complaint was amended, impleading as party respondent the Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, Inc., as both parties are members of the cooperative.

4. Respondents alleged that they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney, under a boundary system of P400 per day; they were forced to pay additional P55.00 per day for police protection, washing, deposit and garage fees; that there is no law providing the operator to require the drivers to pay the said fees; that petitioner told them not to drive anymore, and when they went to the garage to report for work the next day, they were not given a unit to drive; and that the boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys are considered regular employees of the jeepney operators thereby entitling the former to security of tenure.

5. The petitioner, on the other hand, contended that he does not remember if the respondents were ever under his employ as drivers of his passenger jeepneys. As a matter of fact, some of his former drivers just stopped reporting for work, either because they found some other employment or drove for other operators, and like the respondents, the next time he heard from them was when they started fabricating unfounded complaints against him. Petitioner's practice was to establish a pool of drivers, so he made sure none of the jeepneys would stay idle even for a day. He disclaims the contention that the drivers were made to pay certain amounts as fees, since the said amounts were collected as payments for advances made by said drivers.

6. On the other hand, Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, Inc. (BTSCI) declared that it should not be made a party to the case because: it has nothing to do with the employment of its member-drivers, the matter is between the member-operator and their respective member-drivers; and the amount allegedly deducted from respondents and the purpose for which they were applied were matters that the cooperative was not aware of, and much less imposed on them.

7. On November 8, 1996, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora, to whom the case was re-raffled, ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within ten days, after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

8. On March 17, 1997, the Labor Arbiter (Hon. Ricardo C. Nora) handed down his decision declaring the illegality of respondents’ dismissal and ordering petitioner Gabriel to pay the respondent the total amount of P1,034,000 representing respondents’ backwages and separation pay.

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PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

9. Incidentally, on April 4, 1997, petitioner passed away. On April 18, 1997, a copy of the above decision was delivered personally to petitioner’s house. According to respondents, petitioner’s surviving spouse, Flordeliza Gabriel, and their daughter, after reading the contents of the decision and after they had spoken to their counsel, refused to receive the same. Nevertheless, Bailiff Alfredo V. Estonactoc left a copy of the decision with petitioner’s wife and her daughter but they both refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the decision.

10.The labor arbiter’s decision was subsequently served by registered mail at petitioner’s residence and the same was received on May 28, 1997.

11.On May 16, 1997, counsel for petitioner filed an entry of appearance with motion to dismiss the case for the reason that petitioner passed away last April 4, 1997.

12.On June 5, 1997, petitioner appealed the labor arbiter’s decision to the National Labor Relations Commission, First Division.

13.On July 3, 1997, respondents filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the "surety bond is defective" and the appeal was "filed out of time," which move was opposed by petitioner.

14.Subsequently, on April 28, 1998, the NLRC promulgated its first decision which reversed and set aside the appealed decision. The case was dismissed for lack of employer-employee relationship.

15.Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a petition for certiorari.

16.On August 4, 2000, the CA reversed the decisions of the NLRC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the

same was denied by the CA in a resolution dated February 7, 2001.

Issue: 1. Whether the petitioner's appeal was filed out of time.2. Whether the claim survives.

Held:1. No. The petitioner's appeal was filed within the

reglementary period. 2. Yes. The claim survives.

Ratio:1. As regards the first issue, the Court considers the service

of copy of the decision of the labor arbiter to have been validly made on May 28, 1997 when it was received through registered mail. As correctly pointed out by petitioner’s wife, service of a copy of the decision could not have been validly effected on April 18, 1997 because petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997.

2. Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:

SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. – (a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided, That where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative; Provided further, That in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel ….

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JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record.(b) The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case. If no service was effected, the serving officer shall state the reason therefore in the return.

3. Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the NLRC Rules of Procedure states that: "[s]ervice of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein."

4. The foregoing provisions contemplate a situation wherein the party to the action is alive upon the delivery of a copy of the tribunal’s decision. In the present case, however, petitioner died before a copy of the labor arbiter’s decision was served upon him. Hence, the above provisions do not apply. As aptly stated by the NLRC, "the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to party respondent."

5. Thus, the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5, 1997 after receipt of a copy of the decision via registered mail on May 28, 1997 was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 223 of the Labor Code.

6. On the question whether petitioner’s surety bond was defective, Section 6, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:

SEC. 6. Bond. – In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter … involves monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. (As amended on Nov. 5, 1993).

The Court believes that petitioner was able to comply substantially with the requirements of the above Rule.

7. On the other hand, with regard to the substantive aspect of the case, the Court agrees with the CA that an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents. In Martinez v. National Labor Relations Commission, citing National Labor Union v. Dinglasan, the Court ruled that:

[T]he relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the

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JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee because in the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercises supervision and control over the latter. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" [that] they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. Thus, private respondents were employees … because they had been engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.

8. The Court also agrees with the labor arbiter and the CA that respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner. Respondents were not accorded due process. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that the cause for termination falls under any of the grounds enumerated in Article 282 (then Article 283) of the Labor Code. Consequently, respondents are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to their full backwages computed from the date of dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code.

9. Reinstatement is obtainable in this case because it has not been shown that there is an ensuing "strained relations" between petitioner and respondents. This is pursuant to the principle laid down in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC.

10.With regard to respondents’ monetary claim, the same shall be governed by Section 20 (then Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. – When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (21a)

11.In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred ; exceptions. – All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, ... and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants….

12.Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of respondents must be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED but with the MODIFICATION that the money claims of respondents should be filed against the estate of Melencio Gabriel, within such

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JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

reasonable time from the finality of this Decision as the estate court may fix.

Time within which claims shall be filed EXCEPTIONS

In the matter of the estate of TELESFORO DE DIOS (03/24/13)

Justice Moreland

D: Before a motion for extension is granted, just cause must be shown in order to authorize the time extension within which claims may be presented against the estate. The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate into the hands of the persons entitled to receive it.

FACTS:1. Tomas Osmeña and Telesforo de Dios are residents of

Cebu and are well known businessmen of their municipality.

2. Osmeña filed a claim against the estate of Telesforo de Dios, but did not present the same within the six months specified by the court for the presentation of claims to the commissioners.

3. Since the time allotted for the filing of the claims has expired, Osmeña filed a motion for an extension of the time alleging that he "had not had an opportunity to formulate his claim during the period of six months fixed by the court." Later the statement was amended

and Osmeña stated therein that one of the heirs of said estate proposed for the personal payment of a debt which the said heir had against the property of said estate. Believing that that heir would pay the debt, Osmeña claimed that he could not duly formulate his claim before the commission during said period of six months. The heir did not pay the debt.

4. The CFI denied the motion for extension due to absence of just cause, which is a condition precedent, to warrant the extension. Osmeña’s appeal was denied.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in NOT granting the motion for extension

HELD: No. The lower courts were correct in denying the motion for extension

RATIO:Before a motion for extension is granted, just cause

must be shown in order to authorize the time extension within which claims may be presented against the estate. The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate into the hands of the persons entitled to receive it.

As stated in Jose McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, "it is the policy of every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and imperative reasons and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which underlie these reasons effective;" and, "it is a principle of universal acceptance

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JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

which declares that one has the instant right to occupy that which he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlines it."

It is distinctly against the interests of justice and in direct opposition to the policy of the law to extend unduly the time within which estates should be administered and thereby to keep the property from the possession and use of those who are entitled to it. Before an extension for filing their claims is granted, the person asking the privilege must present sound reasons therefor. Whether or not those reasons are sufficient and whether as a result of their presentation the time ought or ought not to be extended rests in the sound discretion of the court and are not subject to appeal EXCEPT when there is grave abuse of discretion.

The present case, Osmeña failed to establish a meritorious claim against the estate. There appears nothing in the record demonstrating what the nature of the claim is, how it was contracted, or when. There is simply a naked allegation that appellant has a claim. Osmeña also admitted full knowledge of the time within which he should have presented his claim and the date on which the time for presentation expired. Hence, there is no sufficient explanation for failure to present the claim within that period. His excuse of maintaining negotiations with one of the heirs for the payment of the claim furnishes no reason why the claim was not presented. Although the negotiations may have been pending, the claim could have been presented nevertheless and, on payment thereof by the heir, further proceedings could have been prevented. Hence, the court did not err in denying the extension.

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PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

Montinola v Villanueva (11/4/1926)D: the heir is not as such personally responsible for the debts and obligations of the deceased, in the whole or in part; and, on the other hand, the property of the deceased comes to him charged with the debts of the deceased, so that he cannot alienate or charge it free of such debts, until and unless they are extinguished either by payment, prescription, in satisfaction of one or the other of the modes recognized by law

1. During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Manuel Sejio, Gregorio Montinola presented a claim for Php 16,337.70 which he claims the deceased owed him. Said claim was approved by the Committee on appraisal and claims (of the Iloilo CFI)

2. However, it appears that while said claim was pending payment, cadastral proceedings Nos. 6 and 9, which included parcel of lots belong to Sejio were being held in the same court. These nine lots were claimed by Maria Piedad Villanueva in her own behalf and that of her minor children with her deceased husband Seijo. The court ordered the adjudication and registration of said lots in said cadastral proceedings in the name of the children of Seijo, subject to the usufructuary right of Villanueva

3. The court authorized the administrator to sell the nine lots above-mentioned for the purpose of paying the expenses of the administration and the claim of Gregorio Montinola for the amount of P16,337.70. Said administrator, however, could not make the sale for

the reason that the lots appeared to be the individual property of the heirs of Manuel Seijo in said cadastral proceedings, for which reason the administrator applied for the cancellation of said titles and the issuance of new ones in his names, which application was denied by the lower court.

4. In view of the fact that the titles to said lots were issued in the name of the heirs of the deceased Manuel Seijo, the court ordered the administrator to return the ownership of all the lots to the persons to whom they were adjudicated in the cadastral proceedings, without having paid the claim of Gregorio Montinola. Thus, Montino instituted the present action

5. Montinola prays that his claim for P16,337.70 be declared a legal alien on the lands described in certificates of title, and that the defendants be sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P16,337.70 and the costs of this action. Court rules in favour of Montinola. Hence, the present appeal

ISSUE: WON the properties adjudicated to the children of Seijo are subject to the payment of Manuel Seijo’s debtHELD: Yes

RATIO:

1. Section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure among other things, says:. . . The persons who, as heirs, have received the estate not disposed of by will, shall be liable to contribute like the devisees or legatees.

2. In accordance with these statutory provisions, this court, in the case of Pavia vs. De la Rosa held: In accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act No.

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PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

190, it is understood that testate or the intestate succession is always accepted with benefit of inventory, and the heirs, even after taking possession of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of the deceased with their own property, but solely with that property coming from the testate or intestate succession of the deceased.

3. Said doctrine was confirmed in the Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio Taysan in which it was said: Under the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure, the heir is not as such personally responsible for the debts and obligations of the deceased, in the whole or in part; and, on the other hand, the property of the deceased comes to him charged with the debts of the deceased, so that he cannot alienate or charge it free of such debts, until and unless they are extinguished either by payment, prescription, in satisfaction of one or the other of the modes recognized by law

4. Art 696 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: When a creditor against whom the deceased has claims present a claim to the committee, the executor or the administrator shall exhibit the claims of the deceased in offset to the claims of the creditor, and the committee shall ascertain and allow the balance for or against the estate, as they find the same to be. Claims in favor of the estate and against the creditor who presents the claim for allowance against the estate shall be barred, unless so presented by the executor or administrator as an offset; but the committee shall have no jurisdiction over claims in favor of

the estate, except as offsets to claims presented against the estate.

5. As such, the Court held that in this case, the indebtedness of the intestate estate claimed in the proceeding must be held to be a legal lien on the property described in certificates of title. Consequently, the amount claimed by the plaintiff must be paid out of the property but only to the extent of the value of the same

Guevarra vs del Rosario

ACTIONS THAT MAY BE BROUGHT AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS

Phil Trust Co. v. Luzon Surety Co. (5/30/1961)D: Whatever may be the rule prevailing in other

jurisdictions, in ours probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an

administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part

and incident of the administration proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have

said bond executed in the same probate proceeding

D: According to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of an

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PROCEEDINGSDIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon application, be admitted as a party to such

accounting." The import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the

executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time

Facts:1. On Feb 14, 1946, CFI of Manila appointed Francis R.

Picard Sr. as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased James R. Burt upon a bond of 1k

2. The court approved the said bond with appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety

3. For reasons that do not fully appear on record, on May 1,1948, CFI dismissed Picard as administrator and appointed Phil. Trust Co in his place. After qualifying for the position, Phil Trust submitted an inventory-report showing that the only asset left and had come to its possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of the checking account of the deceased with PNB

4. In view thereof, on July 26, 1948, CFI issued an order for Picard to deliver within 48 hours the receipt of order the difference of P7,0638.58. The order reads:

A review, however, of the record of the case reveals that former Administrator Francis Picard, filed on February 6, 1941, an inventory of the estate of the deceased, from which it appears that the sole property he found was the amount of P8,873.73 in current account with the Philippine National Bank. This amount was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom his expenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him in his petition filed on June 8, 1948, the

further expenses in the amount of P865.20 were deducted, thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33 as of May 27, 1948.

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders said Francis Picard, to deliver within forty-eight hours (48) from the receipt of a copy of the order the difference of P7,063.58 to the present Administrator, Philippine Trust Company; otherwise he will be ordered committed to prison for contempt until he shall have complied with this order.

5. In compliance with the above order, Picard, submitted an itemized statement of disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, showing that:a) as of February 6, 1947 the estate funds amounted

to P7,986.53b) that on June 8, 1948 he reported to the Court

additional expenses incurred amounting to P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33

c) that thereafter he disbursed the sum of P250.00 to defray the burial expenses of the deceased, thus leaving a balance of P6,871.33

d) that on several occasions during the period from February 22, 1946 to May 14, 1947, he had delivered to Feliciano Burt adoptive son of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of money totalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33

6. After considering the above statements, CFI referred the matter to the city fiscal of Manila for investigation. The result of this was the prosecution of Picard for estafa to which he pleaded guilty and a judgment of conviction was rendered. Also, he was held civilly liable in the sum of P8k

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7. Thus, on July 8, 1957, CFI issued an order requiring appellant Luzon Surety Co., to show cause why the administrator’s bond filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated

8. Appellant filed a motion to set aside order on the ff. ground:a) that the court cannot order the confiscation of the

administrator’s bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt and;

b) that the probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond

9. On August 3, 1957, court denied appellant’s motion and ordered the confiscation of the bond. Appellant’s MR being denied, it filed the present appeal

Issue: Whether or not the probate court, ex propio motu, can order the confiscatino or forfeiture of an administrator’s bondHeld: YeeeeeessssRatio:

1. Whatever may be the rule prevailing in other jurisdictions, in ours, probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond

2. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond executed in the same probate proceeding

3. Moreover, the condition of the administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he

did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound upon the terms of their bond

4. Appellant also contends that it was not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation of its bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir or other interested person has been proved. This is also without merits. According to the record, the claims against the estate filed by Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00 and P3,205.00, respectively, were approved by the probate court but the same have remained unpaid because of lack of funds

5. Finally, appellant claims that it had been released from liability as surety because it received no notice of the proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the administrator. This contention we also find to be untenable

6. From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's bond — which makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal — he is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party to the proceeding

7. In the case of De Mendoza v. Pacheco, the sureties on the administrator’s bond were held liable thereon although they were not parties to the proceeding against the administrator nor were they notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the confiscation fo the bond

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8. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting." The import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.

Romualdez vs. Tiglao (07/24/1981)Ponente: Abad Santos

DOCTRINE: Original judgment became stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years.

Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action.

FACTS:1. On March 15, 1960, Paz G. Romualdez and others sued

Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota.

2. Included in the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-5055 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

3. On May 31, 1960, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs (ROMUALDEZ) and against the defendants(TIGLAO).

4. The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it.

5. Accordingly, on May 18, 1970, Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed Civil Case No. Q-14424 in the CFI of Rizal against

Antonio Tiglao and his sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted.

6. It should be stated that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and her estate was being settled in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the CFI of Rizal.

7. Accordingly, the one who was made defendant was her estate represented by the Special Administratrix Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat

8. The administratrix questioned the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the suit to revive judgment. She invoked Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court that, "No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator.”

9. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (ROMUALDEZ) ordering the revival of the judgment of Civil Case No. 5055.

10.The Estate of Felisa Tiglao filed a separate appeal which is the present case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in its order in reviving the judgment of Civil Case No. 5055.HELD: NORATIO:

The original judgment which was rendered on May 31, 1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action.

This is precisely why the appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the

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first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Separate Opinions (Justice Aquino, Concurring) The judgment creditors had no alternative but to file

an action for revival of judgment to prevent its extinguishment by prescription. It is true that, as a general rule, "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator" because the creditor's remedy is to file the proper claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the deceased debtor's estate within the period fixed in the Statute of Non claims (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 87, Rules of Court). But the instant case, because of the singular circumstances recounted above, is an exception to that general rule.

ESCHEAT

Balais-Mabanag v Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (3/29/2010)

D:Justice Bersamin

Facts: 1. Siblings CORONELS executed a document entitled

RECEIPT OF DOWNPAYMENT stipulating that they received 50k as downpayment of the total purchase price of 1.2M from Ramona ALCARAZ

2. Receipt of downpayment contained a stipulation whereby the CORONELS bound themselves to transfer

TCT of inherited lot from father to their names upon receipt of downpayment. On the presentation of TCT in their name, they also bound themselves to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor or ALCARAZ after payment of the balance

3. RD of QC issued a TCT in the name of CORONEL siblings

4. Thereafter, the CORONELS sold the property to BALAIS-MABANAG for a higher price of 1.5M after BALAIS-MABANAG delivered 300k as downpayment

5. CORONELS then rescinded their contract with ALCARAZ by depositing 50k downpayment in a bank in trust for ALACARAZ

6. ALCARAZ the filed a complaint for damages against CORONEL and caused the annotation of a lis pendens on the TCT

7. BALAIS-MABANAG caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT

8. CORONELS then executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of BALAIS-MABANAG. A TCT was then issued in BALAIS-MABANAG’s name

9. BALAIS-MABANAG filed a motion to have her answer admitted in the complaint for damages

10.RTC: ordered CORONELS to execute a deed in favor of ALCARAZ. CRORNEL and BALAIS-MABANAG’s MR denied

11.CA: affirmed. 12.RTC’s order became final executory13.A writ of execution was issued. For failure of

CORONELS to do execute a deed in favor of ALCARAZ, court ordered the branch clerk to execute deed in lieu of CORONELS and BALAIS

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14.CORONELS and BALAIS filed in the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s orders but CA dismissed it. They then filed a MR. 

15.RTC held in abeyance the respondents’ motion reiterating previous motion to resolve respondents’ motion, whereby ALACARAZ sought an order to direct the BALAIS to surrender her TCT and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the said TCT 

16.CA: denied MR 17.BALAIS: filed a petition for review but was denied since

it was filed out of time. MR that was filed was also denied.  

18.BALAIS: filed a petition for certiorari with CA but this was- denied. MR also denied.

Issue: Whether CA erred a) in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property; and b) in sustaining the order of the RTC directing the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale without first requiring the defendants to execute the deed of absolute sale as required by the decision.Held: No, the CA is correctRatio:

1. CASE, when the final decision of the RTC is already being implemented, the BALAIS would thwart the execution by assailing the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, on the ground that ALACARAZ was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines. A. BALAIS did not raise any issue against Ramona’s

qualifications to own land in the Philippines during

the trial or, at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. She was thereby deemed to have waived the objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,

B. BALAIS cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle the question of ALCARZ’d qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. i. RULE: It is fundamental that the judgment or

final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.

C. present recourse has not been the only one taken by BALAIS and her counsel to assail the qualification of Ramona to acquire and own the subject property. In fact, the Court catalogued such recourses taken for BALAIS in case entitled Foronda v. Guerrero,[  an administrative case for disbarment commenced on June 29, 2001 by Ricardo A. Foronda (an attorney-in-fact of the ALCARAZ) against Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero, the attorney of BALAISi. recourses have had the uniform result of

sustaining the right of ALCARAZ to acquire the property, which warranted a finding against Atty. Guerrero of resorting to forum shopping, and leading to his suspension from the practice of law for two years. Such result

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fully affirms that the petitioner’s objection is now barred by res judicata.

2.  BALAIS was not the proper party to challenge ALACARAZ qualifications to acquire landA. RULE: Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185:  the

Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators. i. Although the law does not categorically state

that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship.

ii. This limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or any other individual.

3. Deed of Absoulte Sale executed by Branch clerk is validA. BALAIS: RTC did not see to it that the writ of

execution be first served on her, and a demand for her compliance be first made; hence, the deed of absolute sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court to implement the judgment was void. 

B. SC: he fact that the petitioner and her counsel maneuvered to thwart, or, at least, to delay the inevitable execution of the judgment warranted

the RTC’s directing the Branch Clerk of Court execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the judgment. The RTC’s effort to implement the judgment could not be stymied by the petitioner’s deliberate refusal to comply with the judgment. Such deliberate refusal called for the RTC to order the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona, which move of the trial court was precisely authorized by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:i. Section 10. Execution of judgments for

specific act. — (a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting title. — If a judgment directs a party who execute a conveyance of land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may be an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. 

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RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OVER MINORS

Hernandez et al. v. San Juan-Santos (08/07/2009)Justice Corona

DOCTRINE: Persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar

causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as

incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.

Petition for Review on Certiorari

Facts:1. Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on

February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.

2. On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.

3. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).

4. Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.

5. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. Nevertheless, because

Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.

6. During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various "projects" involving Lulu’s real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400. Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal.

7. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.

8. Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical

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examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.

9. Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulu’s estate from petitioners. However, the demand was ignored.

10.On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.

11.During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious" lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle.

12.Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications, she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.

13.In a decision dated September 25, 2001, the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian

over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond.

14.Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient to secure Lulu’s P50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation. The motion, however, was denied.

15.Upon appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.

16.Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police. The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.

17.On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal.

18.On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody.

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Issue: Whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property.

Held: Yes. The person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property.

Ratio:1. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an

ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.

2. Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.

3. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a

reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.

4. Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts’ finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.

5. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulu’s legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.

People v. Isisdro Flores (08/25/10)Justice Perez

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D: The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of

judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally

deters him from violating its objectives.D: The guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may

be established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal

guardian).

FACTS:

1. AAA is a minor of less than 15 years of age.2. Flores is the guardian of AAA. Flores and his wife, BBB,

have been in custody and care of AAA since she was 1 ½ years old. BBB is AAA’s adoptive mother.

3. Flores started raping AAA when she was 11 years old. When she was already 14 years old, she told Marvin, a friend, the horrendous things that Flores was doing to her. The matter was reported to the barangay.

4. The RTC convicted Flores of 181 counts of rape. On appeal, the CA found Flores guilty of only 2 counts of rape. The CA took congnizance of the qualifying circumstance of minority AND relationship stipulated in the pre-trialconference thereby imposing a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in taking cognizance of the qualifying circumstance of relationshipHELD: YesRATIO:

Although it was stipulated during the pre-trial

conference that Flores is the guardian of AAA, such admission cannot be simply invoked in order to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. REASON: "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender."

According to jurisprudence, a guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People v. De la Cruz. In this case, the court held that the word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In the case of Garcia the court held that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the

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death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.

Although the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point were not definitive on the concept of "guardian,” the Court held that the law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. The husband of an aunt, as in the case of Flores, or any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property cannot be considered as a guardian contemplated under Art. 335 of the RPC. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, the court refrained from imposing the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.

People v. De la Cuesta adhered to Garcia when it ruled

that the mere fact that the mother asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.

Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar where it was held that the "guardian" envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. The Court held that the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship.

Therefore, the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Flores is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. Hence, the CA erred in taking cognizance of the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

UY V. CA (11/29/2000)

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D: Consequently, a spouse who desires  to  sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal

property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under

Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

1. Dr. Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose, thus depriving him of his mental and physical capacity. Upon learning that there are several real properties that are about to be sold (all of which are owned by Dr. Jardeleza), his son Teodoro filed a petition for the issuance of the letter of guardianship of his father. He prayed for the issuance of the letters of guardianship in favour of his mother, Gilda

2. Gilda also filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Jardeleza, administration of conjugal properties, and authority to sell the properties. She averred that the court should grant her petition in order for her to pay the increasing hospital bills of her husband (who is confied in the ICU of Iloilo Doctos Hospital)

3. The RTC issued a notice for hearing, heard the witness presented by Gilda, and granted the petition. As such, a property was sold to Teodoro’s sister and her husband (petitioner Uy) for 8 million pesos. Upon learning that the petition has been granted, Teodoro filed an opposition. He said that here is no need to sell the said properties since the balance in the hospital can be subject of an “off set” because Dr. Jardeleza is a stock owner of the said hospital. Further, 2 of the

doctors treating him are his sons and do not charge for their services

4. Teodoro also filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the proper remedy in this case is for a petition for guardianship proceedings and not a petition for administration of conjugal properties. As such, the case cannot be heard under the rules of summary proceeding as stated in Art 253 of the Family Code. Teodoro also contended that the provision that his mother was invoking (Art 124) comes under Chapter 2 of the Family Code which is under the heading “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” which contemplates a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, Teodoro argues that if one spouse is under a comatose, the said provision DO NOT apply

5. The RTC ruled in favour of Gilda. The CA reversed this decision and ruled in favour of Teodoro stating that Art 124 of the family code cannot be applied in the said case

ISSUE: WON Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements with the approval of the court, which approval was obtained in a summary proceedingsHELD: No, the SC  RATIO:

1. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

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“ART. 124.  The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.  In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

“In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.  In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.     However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a).”

2. In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.  The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.3. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial

guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of

administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court

4. Consequently, a spouse who desires  to  sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted

5. The SC agreed with the CA that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.

Cabales vs. CA

ADOPTION

DSWD v. Judge Antonio Belen (7/18/1997)

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D: (See Ratio 1 & 2) In relation to Article 33 of PD 603: Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that

respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of the

special proceeding for adoption so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper

recommendation

Facts:1. Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-

Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea

2. The special proceeding for adoption was assigned to Branch 38 RTC of Lingayen Judge Antonio Belen who granted the petition finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own

3. Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent judge based his decree primarily on the “findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor.”

4. On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Said DSWD findings and recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his judgment, are contained in the “Adoptive Home Study Report” and “Child Study Report” prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña

5. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor

6. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a “Home and Child Study Report” in the case

7. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor’s adoption

8. As the adoption never passed through DSWD, this administrative complaint was initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV of DSWD against respondent Judge charging him with violating Article 33 of PD 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) which requires that petitions for adoption shall be granted only after DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents and of violating Circular No. 12

9. The complaint also charges respondent Elma P. Vedaña of disregarding the provisions of Circular No. 12 also. It was also alleged by the DSWD that respondent Elma asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the adopting parents in order to expedite the adoption case with DSWD

10.In the 1st indorsement of this complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), OCA required respondent to comment on the letter-complaint of DSWD

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11.Respondent judge, in compliance therewith, claimed that:a) He directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the

home and case study, and thereafter submit the required reports thereon, precisely because the same are among her duties under the Manual for Clerks of Court

b) Since these functions were so provided to be performed by her, there was no need for him to order said respondent social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine procedure for her to do so

c) Except only for direct coordination with the DSWD in the preparation of said reports, no approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports and it need not be furnished therewith

d) He based his adoption decree not only on the recommendations of respondent Vedaña but also upon all the other evidence submitted in the adoption proceeding

12.OCA recommended that respondent be administratively pushed for violating Circular No. 12 and Article 33 of PD603

13.Respondent Elma, on the other hand, was asked to explain her failure to coordinate with DSWD in the preparation of the pertinent reports and to comment on the allegation that she asked for money from the adopting parents

14.In her comment, respondent Vedaña pointed out that there never was any directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD concerning the adoption in question. She was only ordered to conduct the case study and submit her report thereon to the

court at least one week before the initial hearing of the case, as was also the practice in the other Regional Trial Courts. She flatly denied that she ever asked for money from the prospective adoptive parents of the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea

15.On November 27, 1996, SC referred the case to OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, said office reiterated the fact that respondent judge definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of Article 33 of PD 603 and of Circular No. 12

16.Additionally, while the act of corruption attributed to her was not proved, respondent Vedaña, on her part, likewise failed to comply with the requirement in Circular No. 12 that she should have coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of the home and case study reports

Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of violating Article 33 of PD 603 and Circular No. 12Held: YeeeeeeeesRatio:

1. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:

“No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene

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on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied.”

2. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:

"(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree x x xxxxThe Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. x x x”

3. The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of the special proceeding for adoption so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court

social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation

4. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law

5. By respondent’s failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration

6. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case

7. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act

8. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate should be the embodiment of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence. It need not be stressed here that among the prime duties to which a judge of the law must ever be faithful is that of being abreast with the law and jurisprudence, since, as has so often been advanced, the administration of justice requires the continuous study of law and

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jurisprudence.[6] Respondent judge has obviously not been able to achieve the level of this expectation

9. In like manner, respondent Elma P. Vedaña has imprudently acted beyond the bounds and strictures of her duties as a Social Welfare Officer II of the Regional Trial Court. As an employee of a court of justice, she should have been well aware not only of the scope of her duties and responsibilities but that she should have likewise been familiar with current laws, rules and regulations pertinent to her position as such social welfare officer. By her misfeasance, she has compromised the prescribed process in the administration of justice in proceedings such as the one under consideration

10.SC however found that respondent judge acted in good faith when he stated in the decision that the DWSD submitted the required reports through respondent Vedana presumably in the belief that it was standard procedure for Vedana to do so in coordination with DSWD

11.SC also agreed with OCA’s finding that there is no evidence that respondent Elma Vedaña sought to obtain any amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this is belied by the affidavit o the child’s natural mother, Loreta Ibea

12.Thus, SC were inclined to adopt a liberal view on the charges against respondent. Judge Belen is CENSURED for violating Article 33 of PD 603 and Circular No. 12 and respondent Elma P. Vedaña is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12

Anonymous v Emma Curamen (6/18/2010)

D: birth certificate, being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of filiation.   The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and

falsification of a public documentJustice Carprio

Facts: 1. This is an administrative case filed against EMMA

CURAMEN, a court interpreter in MTC Rizal in Nueva Ecija for falsification of documents

2. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint charging CURAMEN with falsification of a public document and simulation of birth. Complaint alleged that CURAMEN registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry of  Rizal, Nueva  Ecija.  And misrepresented that she (CURAMEN) was the child’s biological mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father. a. Complainant claimed CURAMEN was, in fact, the

child’s maternal grandmother. b. Complainant submitted the child’s original birth

certificate to show that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino.

c. According to complainant,   CURAMEN included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration.

3. In his Report,  Executive Judge Rodrigo S. CASPILLO of RTC Cabanatuan City verified: a) that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen were the same child and that b) the child was, in fact, CURAMEN’s granddaughter.  

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a. It appers that Olga (CURAMEN’s daughter) gave birth to a child named Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino. The fact of birth was registered in the Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The birth certificate indicated that the child’s parents were Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen and Jun Aquino.

b. Later on, CURAMEN executed an affidavit for delayed registration of the alleged birth of her child. CURAMEN claimed that her supposed child was born on 30 November 2005.

c. CURAMEN’s application was given due course and the supposed birth was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. This second birth certificate of the child indicated that the child’s parents were respondent and her husband.

4. CURAMEN admitted that the real parents of the child were spouses Aquino. However she claimed that the parents, being unemployed, were unable to support themselves let alone their child. She asserted that the child’s parents actually depended on her and her husband for support. According to CURAMEN it was the child’s parents themselves who proposed to register the birth of the child anew. CURAMEN insisted she had no intention to conceal the true identity of the child and justified her act as an example of a common practice among Filipinos to extend help to family members. As to the alleged falsification of her income tax return, respondent denied listing the child as additional dependent.

5. OCA: found CURAMEN guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as CURAMEN’s act created a negative impression in the minds of the public that court officials could violate the law with impunity. As for the alleged falsification of

respondent’s income tax return, the OCA found no evidence that respondent claimed the child as additional dependent. OCA recommended she be suspended from the service for 6 months and one day

Issue:  Whether OCA was correct?Held: YesRatio:

1. falsification income tax return: Court finds no evidence on record showing that CURAMEN listed the child as  additional dependent. A. CURAMEN presented a certification issued by the

Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office as well as her income tax returns for taxable years 2005 and 2006 to prove that the only dependent she claimed was her 90-year old father, Rafael Baldonado.

2. falsification of the child’s birth certificate: Court finds her guiltyA. RULE:  A birth certificate, being a public document,

serves as prima facie evidence of filiation.   The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document.

B. RULE: When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth the document proclaimsi. Hence, CURAMEN cannot escape liability by

claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to the child’s prejudice.

C. CURAMEN’s justification for her act – that the true parents of the child are unable  to support the child

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as they are fully dependent on respondent for their own support – is an affront to common sense.i. It taxes one’s imagination how concealment

of the child’s true parents, through falsification of the child’s birth certificate, will make it easier for respondent to support the child. CURAMEN can very well continue supporting the child as her own, as is the practice in Filipino families, without having to tamper with the child’s birth certificate.

3.  Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing one’s examination, appointment, or registration. Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a person’s character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary.A. dishonesty has no place in the judiciary and the

Court will not hesitate to remove from among its ranks those found to be dishonest.

B. Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and falsification of a public document are considered grave offenses punishable by dismissal for the first offense.i.  Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal,

need not be committed in the course of the performance of official duties. If a government officer is dishonest, even if the conduct is not connected with the official

function, it affects the discipline and morale of the service. The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest employee, even if official duties are performed well. CURAMEN cannot separate her private life as a registrant of the child’s false birth certificate from her public life as a court official. She is subject to discipline the moment she commits a dishonest act, whether in her private life or in her public life.

ii.  However, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed, especially where mitigating circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of penalties adopted by the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of a public document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact that this is respondent’s first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in her favor. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the proper party. But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate the mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty, even if not raised by CURAMEN

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Romualdez vs. Tiglao (07/24/1981)Ponente: Abad Santos

DOCTRINE: Original judgment became stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years.

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Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action.

FACTS:11.On March 15, 1960, Paz G. Romualdez and others sued

Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota.

12. Included in the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-5055 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

13.On May 31, 1960, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs (ROMUALDEZ) and against the defendants(TIGLAO).

14.The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it.

15.Accordingly, on May 18, 1970, Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed Civil Case No. Q-14424 in the CFI of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao and his sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted.

16.It should be stated that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and her estate was being settled in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the CFI of Rizal.

17.Accordingly, the one who was made defendant was her estate represented by the Special Administratrix Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat

18.The administratrix questioned the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the suit to revive judgment. She invoked Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court that, "No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator.”

19.The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (ROMUALDEZ) ordering the revival of the judgment of Civil Case No. 5055.

20.The Estate of Felisa Tiglao filed a separate appeal which is the present case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in its order in reviving the judgment of Civil Case No. 5055.HELD: NORATIO:

The original judgment which was rendered on May 31, 1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action.

This is precisely why the appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Separate Opinions (Justice Aquino, Concurring) The judgment creditors had no alternative but to file

an action for revival of judgment to prevent its extinguishment by prescription. It is true that, as a general rule, "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator" because the creditor's remedy is to file the proper claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the deceased debtor's estate within the period fixed in the Statute of Non claims (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 86 and sec.

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1, Rule 87, Rules of Court). But the instant case, because of the singular circumstances recounted above, is an exception to that general rule.

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