Special Proceedings Case Digest for Feb 6 2016

8/18/2019 Special Proceedings Case Digest for Feb 6 2016

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 1

Case DigestsPLM College of Law

NATIVIDAD V. A. JARODA, petitioner , vs. THE HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR.,

Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, and ANTONIO V. A . TAN, in his

capacity as judicial administrator of intestate estate of Carlos Villa Abrille, Special Proc. No. 1391,

Court of First Instance of Davao, respondents.

G.R. No. L-28214. July 30, 1969.

Asilo, Irish B.

FACTS:

Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate, leaving his surviving spouse, nine (9) children (among them

petitioner, NatividadJaroda), and four (4) grandsons, among them respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. The

petitioner filed the instant case for the nullity of the two orders of the court appointing Tan as a special

administrator.

Pursuant to the first order, Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB alleging that

these sums were registered in the name of Abrille but that they actually belong to, and were held in trustfor, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, and alleging as reason for the withdrawal that it would be

advantageous to the estate of Abrille. The petition was granted by the CFI.

Pursuant to the second order, Tan executed, together with the other co- owners of the Juna

Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms

and conditions as he deems wise".

NatividadJaroda moved to nullify the two orders on the ground that the CFI abused its discretion

amountinf lo lack jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI can allow the withdrawal of bank deposits and approve the power of

attorney.

HELD:

No. In the first place, said withdraw al is foreign to the powers and duties of a special

administrator, which, as Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides, are to —

"take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased

and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that

purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such

perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be

liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court."


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In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the

deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the

credits of the estate, and apparently within the powers and duties of a special administrator, but actually,

said withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate

estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly

claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in his motion. The bank deposits were in the name of

the deceased; they, therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his death.

Likewise, the order approving the power of attorney to sell the subdivision lots is void for want of

notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. An administrator is not permitted to deal

with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property.

Tan came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals: the court and the heirs of

the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in managing

and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency of respondent Tan rendered him incapable

of independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co- owners.


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MEDINA VS. CAG.R. No. L-34760

Marco Angelo E. Balleser

Facts:

Agustin Medina died intestate. He was the owner of a property known as

―BitukangManok‖. The said property was sold by Demetrio Encarnacion, then specialadministrator of Medina, to Rosalia Del Carmen, a daughter heir of the decedent. A deed of sale

was executed, and was later approved and confirmed by Judge Augusto Amores of CFI

Zambales. Uldarico Medina and Beda Gonzales opposed the sale claiming that they have an

interest over the estate because certain heirs have already sold their shares and/or interest overthe property. The opposition was denied. Gonzales’ appeal concerning the sale was still pending

with the CA. The trial court later assigned its clerk of court, Atty. Pastor De Castro, Jr. as special

administrator in lieu of Encarnacion. Later, Gonzales filed a motion to be appointed as regularadministrator of the estate. The trial court granted the appointment of Gonzales but only as a

special administrator. Del Carmen filed an urgent motion to revoke the appointment of Gonzales,

and a petition for the appointment of a regular administrator. She proposed that Serafin Medina,

heir and son and next of kin of the decedent, be appointed as he had no adverse interest in hisfavor and against the estate, and is qualified and competent. Both the motion and petition were

denied by the trial court.

The petitioners aver that Gonzales is now assuming the inconsistent positions of

administering the estate, especially the BitukangManok property, and at the same time appealing

from the order approving the sale of that property only for the purpose of enabling himself to buy

and acquire that property to the loss and prejudice of the estate contrary to law. Gonzales deniessuch personal interest arguing that no evidence or pleading of record shows that he is interested

in the acquisition of the property for himself. He further contended that having acquired the

rights of the heirs, he has stepped into their shoes, hence his interest to protect the estate asadministrator.

Issue:

Whether or not Beda Gonzales can be appointed as administrator of the estate.

Ruling:

The appointment of Gonzales as special administrator should be allowed to stand, insofar

as taking care temporarily of the other properties of the estate are concerned, TO THE

EXCLUSION of the BitukangManok Property, which the estate has sold to Rosalia Del Carmen,who is entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.


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A person with an adverse conflicting interest is unsuitable for the trust reposed in an

administrator of an estate. An administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where

his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the

estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to

preserve it for due administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts withsuch right and duly. One is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when hehas adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

In the instant case, Gonzales personally opposed the sale of the BitukangManok Propertymade by his predecessor administrator, Encarnacion. The sale was approved but he appealed the

same. A year after the approval, he was appointed special administrator of the estate. This

created a clear conflict of interest that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and

subject it to unnecessary suits. He has been placed in an unduly favored position where he mayuse his position as special administrator to favor his personal interests as one interested in teh

purchase of the property. Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by him on petitioner Del Carmen

as an heir as well as the other heirs such as petitioner Serafin Medina because of the further delay(13 years now) in their receiving their distributive shares of their father's estate (as against their

co-heirs who have sold and assigned their rights and shares in the estate to Gonzales) as well as

to Del Carmen as buyer because of Gonzales' interference with her enjoyment of the property

paid for in full by her since 1970.

It is noteworthy that the Court does not look with favor on such practice of clerks of court

or other court employees being appointed as administrators of estates of decedents pendingsettlement before the probate court. The objectivity and impartiality of such clerks of court or

other employees so appointed as administrators in discharging their regular functions may be

easily compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because of the administrator's

fees and compensation payable to them, it is not inconceivable that self-interest intrudes andconsciously or unconsciously, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and termination

of the proceedings in derogation of the primordial purpose of the law to strive to have the estate

settled expeditiously and promptly so that the benefits that may flow therefrom may beimmediately enjoyed by the decedent's heirs and beneficiaries. 14 Probate courts are therefore

enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their clerks of court or other court employees

as administrators or receivers of estates or the like.


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In the Matter of the Petition To Approve The Will Of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX

BALANAY JR., petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court ofFirst Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LABANAN,respondents.

G.R. No. L-39247. June 27, 1975 Faustino, Ma. Theresa G.

FACTS:

Leodegaria Julian died testate survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and six children,disposing of her husband’s one half share, and providing that the properties should not be

divided during her husband’s lifetime, but should remain intact and that legitimes should be paid

in cash to be satisfied out of the fruits of the properties. Her son Felix Balanay Jr. filed a petitionfor the probate of her will. Felix Sr. initially opposed the probate for he was preterited, but later

on conformed with the testamentary disposition and renounced his share in her estate in favor of

their six children.

The lower court gave effect to Felix Sr.’s conformity and appointed its clerk of court as special

administrator of the decedent’s estate. When a purported lawyer for Felix Balanay Jr. came andfiled a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will, the CFI declared the will void

and converted the testate proceedings into intestate proceedings and ordered the issuance of

notice to creditors. Felix Balanay Jr. asked that the lower court reconsider alleging that the

purported lawyer was terminated hence the withdrawal of the probate was unauthorized. Lower

court denied the petition.

ISSUE:

WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its

allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void?

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that in view of certain unusual provisions in the will, which are of dubious

legality and because of the motion to withdraw assumed to have been filed with authorization,

the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity before formal validitycan be established. The probate of the will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it

appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical consideration demand that the intrinsic validity

of the will be passed upon before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

But the probate court erred when it declared the will void and converted the proceedings from

testate to intestate despite the fact that it gave effect on the conformity of the widower and his


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renunciation of his hereditary rights. The rule is that the invalidity of some of the dispositions

will not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions unless it is presumed that the testator

would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.

The statement of the testatrix claiming ownership of the southern half of the conjugal lands is

contrary to law since her share as co-owner thereof was inchoate and proindiviso. Same is truewith the provision that her properties be left undivided during her husband’s lifetime. However,

these void provisions does nullify the entire will. Such may even be disregarded. But the

surviving husband’s conformity had the effect of validating the partition in the will without prejudice to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. Hence, the

lower court erred when it did not proceed with the probate. Except in extreme cases where the

will on its face is intrinsically void it is the probate court’s duty to pass first upon the formal

validity of the will.

The Court also noted two other errors of the lower court. It erred in issuing a notice to creditorsalthough no executor or regular administrator has been appointed, but only a special

administrator appointed by the lower court. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special

administrator has been appointed. The Court also pointed out that the probate court’sappointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator is not a salutary practice because

it might engender the suspicion that the probate judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots inmilking the decedent’s estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse in the course

of his administration, the probate judge might find it hard to hold him to a strict accountability. Acourt employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a

sideline the administration of a decedent’s estate.


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PCIB V. ESCOLINGr Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974Cellini Ruth G. Magabilin

FACTS:

Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA.

During their marriage, they had acquired assests in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texasin the US. The both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years. Charles

and Linnie Jane executed their respective wills conditioned that upon the death of the other, the

one survived the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is given, devised and bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of Linnie.

Linnie died first. Charles, special administrator, was allowed or authorized to continue

the business in which he was engaged which was buying and selling personal and real propertiesand to perform acts which he had been doing.

Charles was the appointed executor and upon motion in which he asserted that he was notonly part owner of the properties but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased

Linnie.

Charles continued to annually submit to the court the statements of account of account ofhis administration. Charles died and respondent Magno was appointed as Administratix of both

estates. PCIB was appointed as administrator of the estate of Charles.

At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with

each administrator acting together with the other, PCIB used to secure at the beginning the

conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter and submitted the sameto the court for approval as their joint acts so did Magno do likewise. But differences have

arisen. PCIB conducted the business and acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of

Charles belonged solely and only to his estate to the exclusion of brothers and sisters of Linnie.

Magno also made expenditures on the premise that there is such an estate that actually

correspond to the estate of Linnie.

PCIB claims that Linnie’s estate has been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication inthe orders of the lower court of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as its approval of the

annual statement s of account of Charles and that, therefore, Mago had already ceased since then

to have any estate to administer. Hence, it filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying


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that the lower court’s orders allowing respondent mago to continue acting as administratix of the

estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceesings 1307 be set aside. On the other hand, Magno denies

that the trial court’s orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finallyadjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the

court’s general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in

the due course of administration.

ISSUE: WON Magno is the legal administratix of the estate of Linnie and be distributed among

the latter’s siblings.

HELD: Yes.

SC overruled the contention of PCIB because it appears from the pertinent provisions of

the will of Linnie that any portion of said share still existing and undisposed by her husband atthe time of his death should go to brothers and sisters shareand share alike.

The tenor of said orders furnish no basis for PCIB’s conclusion, and wat is more, at thetime said orders were issued the proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final

distribution and adjudication could be made.Moreover, the interested parties were not duly

notified that such disposition of the estate ould be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely

allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance I advance of final adjudication, which isimplicitly permitted under Sec 2 of Rule 1009, there being no possible prejudice to third parties,

inasmuch as Linnie had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.


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TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VENTURA vs. VENTURA

G.R. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988

Marydale C. Manato

FACTS:

Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees. In the

said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator

to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. In due course, said will was admitted to

probate on January 14,1954. Gregorio Ventura died. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the

corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her favor.

On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. Said

account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and by

ExequielVictorio and Gregoria Ventura. Both oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting

the true income of the estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.

The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura are: (1) that she is grossly

incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the

inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the

appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the

Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963 ;

and (5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently performing her duties as an

executrix.


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On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finds that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of

the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of

presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate. Hence, this

appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

HELD:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or

executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be

granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,

or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as

such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of

kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as

those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It is generally said

that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of

administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance

of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the

legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of

kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura,

namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78,


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the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes

and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion

of the Court, in order to represent both interests.


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TAYAG vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.

G.R. No. L-23145, November, 29, 1988

Marydale C. Manato

FACTS:

In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left behind properties here and abroad. One

property she left behind were two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of stocks of the Benguet

Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock certificates were in the possession of the Country Trust Company of

New York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the domiciliary administrator of the estate of Perkins (obviously in

the USA). Meanwhile, in 1963, Renato Tayag was appointed as the ancillary administrator (of the

properties of Perkins she left behind in the Philippines).

A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between them is entitled to possess the stock

certificates. A case ensued and eventually, the trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn over the stock

certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then filed with the court a petition to have said stock

certificates be declared lost and to compel BCI to issue new stock certificates in replacement thereof. The

trial court granted Tayag’s petition.

BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot possibly issue new stock certificates because the

two stock certificates declared lost are not actually lost; that the trial court as well Tayag acknowledged

that the stock certificates exists and that they are with CTC- NY; that according to BCI’s by laws, it can

only issue new stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or destroyed certificates of stocks, only after court

of law has issued a final and executory order as to who really owns a certificate of stock.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. are correct.

HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its existence to Philippine laws. It has beengiven rights and privileges under the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under the law and one of those

is to follow valid legal court orders. It is not immune from judicial control because it is domiciled here in

the Philippines. BCI is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted

jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from

lawful court orders. Further, to allow BCI’s opposition is to render the court order against CTC -NY a


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mere scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag without any remedy simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity

refuses to comply with a valid court order. The final recourse then is for our local courts to create a legal

fiction such that the stock certificates in issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist in the

hands of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions which the law may rely upon in the

pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in its development.

Further still, the argument invoked by BCI that it can only issue new stock certificates in accordance

with its bylaws is misplaced. It is worth noting that CTC-NY did not appeal the order of the court – it

simply refused to turn over the stock certificates hence ownership can be said to have been settled in favor

of estate of Perkins here. Also, assuming that there really is a conflict between BCI’s bylaws and the court

order, what should prevail is the lawful court order. It would be highly irregular if court orders would

yield to the bylaws of a corporation. Again, a corporation is not immune from judicial orders.


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CIRILO LIM vs BASILISA DIAZ-MILLAREZG.R. No. L-17633 October 19, 1966

Aicel Joy J. Mayor

FACTS:>Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died intestate filed with the

CFI a petition for his appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased. It

alleged that the deceased left no relatives such as descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse,except collaterals.

>Basilisa Diaz-Millarez on the other hand, claiming to be a widow of the deceased, filed an

opposition on two grounds: that the petitioner has an adverse interest in the estate; and that the

properties of the estate are the subject matter of a litigation between her as plaintiff and Lim asdefendant.

> Both parties manifested the existence of a litigation between them over the properties of theestate. Hence, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the expediente. Lim, brought the case to the

CA but that court has certified the appeal to the SC for the reason that there is no question of fact

involved.

> Meanwhile, the civil case between the parties which was also elevated to the CA whereinBasilisa sought to recover from Cirilo one-half of the total amount of P22,000 allegedly

delivered to him by her and the deceased on various occasions and to declare her as the owner of

½ of the profits and gains derived therefrom, on the ground that Millarez and she used to live ashusband and wife for about 23 years and as such she is entitled to ½ of the property held in

common by them.> In answer, Lim alleged that the money he received from Millarez on various occasions was

handed to one Tan Suaco for investment in the tobacco business. While the trial court, afterhearing, ordered Lim to make an accounting of the P22,000 invested in the tobacco business to

be submitted to court, the CA, on the other hand, remanded the case to the court a quo to render

a judgment anew based on the admission of additional evidence as the court may considermaterial and relevant and based on the examination of the documentary evidence by a qualified

certified public accountant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cirilo Lim can be appointed as judicial administrator of the estate of thedeceased Jose Millarez.

HELD: No. The claim which Basilisa has against Cirilo in the civil case supposed to be nowagain pending in the trial court, is based on her declared right to one-half of the estate of thedeceased. It cannot, therefore, be denied that Cirilo, as a relative of the deceased, has some

interest adverse to that of Basilisa. Shown to have some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as

a whole, Cirilo cannot compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction, oneis considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of


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some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. The determination of a

person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound

judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to beinterfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL,ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATOGABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIELand FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTODINDO GABRIEL, respondents.

[G.R. No. 101512. August 7, 1992.]

Meneses, Jasper A.

FACTS: Roberto Gabriel filed with the RTC Manila a petition for letters of administrationalleging that he is the son of the decedent, Domingo Gabriel. Respondent identified the 8 petitioners as other heirs of the decedent.

The petition was set and the order was published in a newspaper of general circulation, once a

week for 3 consecutive weeks. No opposition have been filed, thus respondent was allowed to

present his evidence ex parte.

Probate court issued an order appointing respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the

late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00.

Petitioners filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters ofadministration and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the

legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors. Petitioners filed an"Opposition to the petition and Motion," alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate

daughter, should be preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting

and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother; and(4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of

ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be

administered by private respondent.

The probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners. Likewise, the Court of

Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of preference in the appointment of administrator in thesettlement of estate according to the Rules be set aside and that the appointment of anadministrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered

with unless abuse.


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HELD: NO. Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preferencein the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the nextof kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an

administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set

aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal

consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed asadministrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in

establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The

underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy

and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences ofwaste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to

administer the estate correctly. This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into

account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon

the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the

exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such

reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctlythan any other next of kin.

It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse

or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters ofadministration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered

opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the

estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow

from the administration. In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify

Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, justas the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the

mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely

provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal

creditors."

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of

the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since

that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specificallystates that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of

kin.Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all

times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing

parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where theestate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all


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interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of

the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have

another competent person associated with him in the office.

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, the Court deem it just, equitable and advisable that

there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabrieland private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel.

WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased JOSE K.C. UY, petitioner , vs . THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANASTACIO C. RUFON,As Presiding Judge of Branch 52, of the Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, sitting

at Bacolod City, and JOHNNY K. H. UY, respondents.

[G.R. No. 167979. March 16, 2006.]

Meneses, Jasper A.

FACTS: Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate and is survived by his spouse, SyIokIngUy, andhis five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia, Lilen S. Uy and Wilson

S. Uy (Petitioner).

A special proceeding was instituted and Lilia was appointed as special administrator of the estate

of the deceased. Petitioner moved to reconsider the order appointing Lilia with prayer that letters

of administration be issued to him instead which was subsequently granted. Letters ofadministration were granted to petitioner.

Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to intervene, praying that he be appointedas administrator of the estate in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor

of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that should be included in the estate.

The trial court initially denied private respondent's motion to intervene, but it reconsidered it andappointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate.

The trial court found that private respondent substantially complied with the order directing himto bring into the estate properties owned by or registered in the name of the deceased not subject

of any adverse claim or controversy when he listed the alleged properties suspected to be

concealed, embezzled or conveyed away by the persons named therein.

Petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for certiorari which was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing privaterespondent as co-administrator to the estate of the deceased; and


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HELD: NO.In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court.Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator

since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone. Infact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his administration.

A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular

administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, this Court

reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of co-administrators under certain

circumstances, to wit: Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment ofco-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their

judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and

equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate

of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing oneto settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony

for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an

estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.

Thus, petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an

administrator without removing the incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate

proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its ownorders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely applications or

motions for such modifications or revocations are made by the interested parties. In the instant

case, the estate of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case is still within the jurisdictionof the court.

The foregoing discussion renders moot the second issue raised by petitioner.


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VILLAMOR V COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988

Perez, Princess Caressa V.

Facts:Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castañeda had eight (8) children, namely: Rufino, Barbara,

Florencio, Casimira, Brigida, Braulia, Margarita and Eugenia. Of the eight children, six died

single and without issue. Barbara Cortes begot a son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes. RufinoCortes, who died on June 12, 1909 left two alleged legitimate children, Ireneo Cortes Villamor

and Paula Cortes Villamor. The last to die of the Cortes children was Eugenia Cortes. She died

on January 8, 1931.

Eustaquio Cortes, son of Barbara, married one SixtaCeniza. Born to them were five children,

namely: Dionisio, Bartolome, Nicanor, Agapita and Amancia, all surnamed Cortes. All five

remained unmarried and died without will nor forced heirs. Dionisio, Amancia and Agapita predeceased their father Eustaquio. Eustaquio died on October 20, 1932, survived by his spouse

and two sons, Bartolome and Nicanor. Bartolome who was a Catholic priest, died on November

14, 1937. Nicanor Cortes, also known as Father Gabriel Maria Cortes, died as a monk of theCarthusian Order in Barcelona, Spain on August 28, 1969. He was the last of the direct

descendants of the Barbara Cortes line.

On the other hand, Paula Villamor, alleged daughter of Rufino Cortes, died single on January 29,

1967 and without issue. In a Special Proceedings for the settlement of Bartolome’estate, Fr.

DiosdadoCamomot, a close friend of Bartolome, was named administrator.

On September 27, 1938, Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor, claiming to be the

legitimate children of Rufino Cortes, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Rufino

Cortes, under Special Proceedings No. 343-C.

On April 14, 1948, Judge S. C. Moscoso approved the project of partition, and on September 30,

1948, the administrators delivered the seven parcels of land to Ireneo and Paula Villamor.


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The period of prescription commenced to run from August 18, 1955. However, from said date up

to his death on August 28, 1969, Fr. Nicanor Cortes remained silent and failed to assert his right.

He even conveyed at least three lands which were among those apportioned to SixtaCeniza in theProject of Partition to several persons. Her predecessor-in-interest, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, not

having filed any action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period provided by law, neither

could private respondent do so now, for her right cannot rise higher than its source.

Finally, it is well-settled that the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time

warrants not only a presumption that the party entitled to assert it, either had abandoned it or

declined to assert it, but also casts doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglectto assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other

circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.

ISSUE #2: WHETHER OR NOT A STRANGER MAY BE APPOINTED ASADMINISTRATOR

Ruling:

Yes. The Court do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and concurred

in by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the administratorsappointed were complete strangers to the decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this

an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the courts.

Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and

administrators. It provides that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be

appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such

other person as the court may appoint.


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SILVERIO SR. V COURT OF APPEALS[G.R. No. 109979. March 11, 1999]

By: Perez, Princess Caressa V.

Facts:

In 1987, Beatriz Silverio died intestate, survived by her husband, Ricardo Silverio; sons,Edmundo, Edgardo and Ricardo, Jr., and daughters, Nelia and Ligaya. In 1990, Edgardo filed a

Petition for Letters of Administration and Urgent Petition for Appointment of Special

Administrator which the trial court granted in his favor.

Ricardo, Sr. opposed the Petition for Letters of Administration, but he was declared to have

waived his right to present evidence when he failed to appear and adduce evidence during the

dates scheduled for its reception, hence, Edgardo was appointed as regular Administrator. Hismotion for reconsideration having been denied, Ricardo, Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari before

the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Before the Supreme Court,

Ricardo, Sr. contended that he was denied due process of law when the respondent judge

considered his failure to be present on the dates scheduled for reception of evidence on his behalfas a waiver of his right to adduce the same.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the order of preference in Rule 78, § 6 was violated.

2. Whether or not respondent court is not vested with the power to order the special administrator

to sell real properties of the estate pending determination of the validity of the regular

administrators

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held, citing the rulings in a long line of cases, that the essence of due

process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one

may have in support of ones defense. In the case at bar and as appearing from the records,


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petitioners were amply afforded the opportunity to present his evidence which he, however,

waived. The Court also found no ground to disregard the finding of the trial court and the

appellate court on the competence of the decedents son, Edgardo S. Silverio, to act asadministrator. His appointment as special, and later, as the regular administrator, was sanctioned

by law.

The observance of the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on theattendant facts and circumstances. A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential

rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of a deceased person. However,

when the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of suitability rests on the sound judgment of the appointing court.

Meanwhile, unsuitableness may consist of adverse interest of some kind, or hostility to those

immediately interested in the estate. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the appointment shall not

be revoked on appeal

2. No. The respondent court is not vested with the power to order the special administrator to sellreal properties of the estate pending determination of the validity of the regular administrators

appointment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased

and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that

purpose may commence and maintains suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be

liable to pay any debt of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

With the exception of the case provided for in section 717 regarding the sale of the entire personalty or part thereof for the purpose of preserving the other property of the deceased, and of

that provided for in section 720 with reference to the sale of realty acquired by the executor or

administrator by virtue of the execution of a judgment or the foreclosure of a mortgage the legal provisions above referred to, only recognize as a ground for the court to authorize the sale of the

estate of a deceased person subject to administration, the application of its proceeds to the

payment of the debts or expenses of administration or the settlement of any legacy


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Vda. Dela Rosa V Heirs OfRustiaGR. NO. 155733, [January, 27, 2006]

Perez, Princess Charisma V.FACTS:

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado and Lucio Campo, both ofwhom were never married. Five other children were born to the couple who are full-blood

siblings of Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had another son with another man(Ramon Osorio) named Luis Delgado. Josefa Delgado died on September 1972 without a will.She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives.

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife

but were never married. Petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in

the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of thesponsors referred to her as an unmarried woman. They never had any children but took into their

home Guillermina and Nanie. They were never legally adopted but was known in the local

dialect as ampun-ampunan. Guillermina was alleged to be the illegitimate child of Guillermo

with another woman.

Luisa Delgado, the daughter of Luis Delgado filed the original letters of administration of theintestate estates of Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia.

It was opposed by (1) sisters of Guillermo Rustia (2) heirs of Guillermo Rustia (3) the ampun-

ampunan, GuillerminaRustia on the ground the Luisa Delgado and other claimants are barredfrom inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.

GuillermaRustia filed a motion to intervene claiming that she was the only surviivng descendant

in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Motion was granted.

Carlota Delgado substituted Luisa Delgado who died. RTC appointed Carlota Delgado as

administratix of both estates.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the letters of administration is proper


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HELD:

NO.

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the

decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in theappointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will,

or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person

dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion

of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have

appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects forthirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the

administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal

creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of

the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-

administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties orfactions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado

vda. dede la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the

next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa

Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among theheirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the

requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.


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IN RE: REYES V ARANZASOGR. NO. L-27657, [August 30, 1992]

Perez, Princess Charisma V.FACTS:

Juliana Reyes died intestate. The estate had only special administrators until GregoriaAranzansowho claims to be a first cousin of the decedent asked that she be appointed regular administrator.

Her motion provoked counter motions, oppositions, replies, rebuttal and rejoinder which take up

120 pages of the printed record on appeal and which demonstrate the zeal of the various counselin espousing their clients claims to the estate which as aforesaid is substantial.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by oppositors.

It was granted and declared that the oppositorsGregoriaAranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo

Pasion and Pacita Pasion have no right to intervene in this intestate estate proceeding;

The appointment of GregoriaAranzanso as regular administratrix pursuant to the order of this

Court dated January 29, 1966 is revoked and she is ordered to render a final account of heradministration within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court was justified in revoking the appointment of GregoriaAranzaso asthe administrator of the intestate of estate of Julian Reyes

HELD:

NO. An administrator need not be an heir. He may be a stranger to the deceased.

It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular administrator of the intestate

estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from her office but only for a cause or causes provided by law. What is the law on removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Courtwhich reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator.Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. — If an executor or

administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law,


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or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by

these rules, or absconds or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable

to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permithim to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the

remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the

court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executoror administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.

It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed order, thatGregoriaAranzanso,among other persons, is without right to intervene as heir in the settlement of the estate in

question is not one of the grounds provided by the Rules of Court.

Let it be recalled that in G.R. No. L-23828, Paulina Santos, et al. vs. GregoriaAranzanso, et al.,123 Phil. 160 (1966), a collateral attack on the adoption of the two girls was not allowed

The decision denied to GregoriaAranzanso the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings as

an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger tothe deceased. In fact, in one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed the appointment

of the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. (Record on Appeal, pp. 144-146.) Wehold that the intervention of GregoriaAranzanso in the settlement proceedings is not in the

capacity of heir although she might be one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls

should succeed. We have authorized such direct attack in G.R. No. L-26940.

WHEREFORE, the order of June 20, 1966, removing GregoriaAranzanso as administrator is

hereby set aside and she is reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.Cost against the appellee.


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IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF BASIL GORDON BUTLER vMANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO

G.R. No. L-3677; 29 November 1951

QUIRANTE, Reynaldo Jr. B.

Facts: Basil Gordon Butler (Butler), a former resident of the Philippines, died in Brooklyn, NewYork and the estate was duly probated in the Surrogate’s Court in the New York County,

appointing James Ross, Sr, James Madison Ross, Jr. and EwaldSeph as executors. On 17 July1947, the estate had been fully settled.

The dispute arose when a clause in the will of the testator stated that all the remaining propertiesof Butler will be given to one Mercedes de Leon but, however, since she was of unsound mind,

the former instructed the executor to handle the money in his discretion. Subsequently, the

executor bought an annuity from the Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. at its office in Toronto,

Canada which, in turn, gave Mercedes monthly allowance through the Insurance Company’sManila office.

On 4 September 1948, de Leon presented the will of Butler for probate in the CFI Manila. AdaLoggeyGhezzi accepted the appointment as administrator while the Ross and Seph declined

because the probate was already settled. In turn, the CFI Manila denied the petition for probate.

Issue: WON the will of Butler can be probated in the Philippines.

Held: No. Under the law, the general rule universally recognized is that administration extendsonly to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that anadministrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or

country.

However, in this case, it is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question areoutside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in

Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The partywhose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds thefunds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the

checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the

funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.


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Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of butler's

estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the hands of the

company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as atrust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation, which it has been

religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale

cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of theannuitant; the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliaryor ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of

these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for

annuity.

Therefore, the motion and appeal are utterly groundless and ill-advised. The appealed order

therefore is affirmed with costs against the appellants.


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TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO vMANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA

G.R. No. L-21917

29 November 1966

QUIRANTE, Reynaldo Jr. B.

Facts: In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz — hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea — and Carlos

Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her andcame, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by

whom he had two (2) children. Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his

father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June,

1960; but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality. Hence, shestayed with their son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.

Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will andtestament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea

and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted probate of said

will. Thereafter Pijuan was appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond.

Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and onePilarGurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased.

The lower court denied the motion of Mrs. Gurrea for her appointment as administratrix. Hence,an appeal was made.

Issue: WON Mrs. Gurrea, as an administrator, has a preferential right over Pijuan, as the namedexecutor.

Held: No, under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court said preference exists "if noexecutor is named in the wil l or the executor or executors are incompetent, r efuse the trust, or

fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate ."

However, in this case, the deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will,

seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again,said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is

incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also,

expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as


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special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the

preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving

spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a specialadministrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate

court,5 and is not appealable.

The appealed order therefore is affirmed with costs against the appellants.

ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner , vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZPAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO

and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents .G.R. No. L-42088. May 7, 1976.

Moses C. Rivera

Facts: SoteroBaluyut died in Manila leaving an estate estimated to be no less than Two MillionPesos (2,000,000.00). Alfredo Baluyut filed a petition for letters of administration alleging that

the Spouse who survived the deaceased (Encarnacion Lopez) was mentally incapacitated. TheCourt granted the petition of Alfredo and he was appointed Special Administrator.

Thereafter, Mrs. Baluyut, filed an opposition to the appointment of Alfredo and raised the

contention that she was unaware of the existence of a will and that the allegations of Alfredo are

libelous.

The Lower Court cancelled Alfredo’s appointment and held that Mrs. Baluyut was ―healthy and

mentally qualified‖ based on her testimony on the witness stand.

Alfredo filed for certiorari stating that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion

in cancelling his appointment and granting it to Mrs. Baluyut without proper proceedings.

Issue: The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointingMrs. Baluyut as administratrix.

Held: We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyutas survivingspouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a], Rule 78, Rules of

Court), it does not follow that she should be named as administratrix without conducting a full-

dress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.

Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as

executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to theissuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as

executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening

circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.

Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to

be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and

affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition


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WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as

administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probatecourt is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in

this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.

Matute v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-26751, L-26085, L-26106, [January 31, 1969]

Ge Ann Francia S. Rosales

Facts:

On August 20, 1965, Carlos Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of

both the petitioner and respondent, Matias Matute, filed in special proceeding (Settlement of the

Matute estate), a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and hisappointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that Matias has neglected to render a true, just and

complete account of his administration and that he is not only incompetent but also negligent in

his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas. Matias interposed an

opposition to the petition contesting that the allegations are without basis and false.

It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on December 29, 1965 by the

probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs submitted their respective lists of exhibits insupportof their motion to oust Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the

admission of the movants’ exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving,

irrelevant and/or merephotostatic copies of supposed originals which never properly identified

nor shown in court. Four days later, the Counsel for Matias filed with leave of Court a ―Motionto Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence‖ which avers that there is no sufficient evidence on

record to justify and support the motions for the removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S.

Matute.

The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator.

Hence, thecertiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed order removing him as co-administrator is apatent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the reason in

support of the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the respondent all the

opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a

motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.

Issue: W/N there is proper removal of Matias as co-administrator of the estate.

Ruling: No, the removal of the administrator is the case at bar is a nullity.


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Ratio:

In the settlement of an estate of a deceased person, the rule remains that the jurisdictional

amount is determined by the total value of the estate, not by the value of the particular property

or portion of the estate subject to administration, since the question of administration is merelyincidents to the principal proceeding for the settlement and distribution of the whole estate. It istherefore indubitable that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of CA-G.R.

37039-R which involves an estate worth more than P200,000 although the subject matter of the

case is merely the right to collect the monthly rentals due the estate in the sum of P5,000.

In the case at bar, it is indubitable that the probate judge issued the controverted order

removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his

own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduceevidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to

evidence. We are of the view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave

abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as a nullity. Even without therespondent's reservation, it was the bounden duty of the probate judge to schedule the

presentation and reception of the respondent's evidence before disposing of the case on the

merits because only the movants at that time had presented their evidence. This duty is projected

into bolder relief if we consider, which we must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as well as insubstance a demurrer to evidence allowed by Rule 35, Rules of Court, by virtue of which the

defendant does not lose his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is denied. The

application of Rule 35 in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by Section 2 ofRule 72, Rules of Court, which directs that in the "absence of special provisions, the rules

provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special

proceedings."


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BAYANI VASQUEZ v. JUDGE SEVERO MALVARA.M. No. 884-CFI. August 31, 1978

Samio, Christine Derrika P.

FACTS:This is a complaint filed against respondent Judge Malvar for serious misconduct in

handling a special proceedings action. First, he gave verbal orders to the personnel of a rural bank to allow withdrawals from the decedent’s savings account, without notice to the adverse

parties in the special proceedings and without any motion for withdrawal filed by any of the

litigants. Also, despite motions of the parties for appointment of a regular administrator, he

allowed his clerk of court to continue as a special administrator despite the ruling of the SupremeCourt in a case disallowing this kind of action. Most of all, knowing that the parties-litigants in

the special proceedings are not related to the deceased within the fifth degree of relationship in

the collateral line, he approved the amicable settlement without notifying the Provincial Fiscal orthe Solicitor General to intervene in the case for the State, much less determine who the intestate

heirs were.

For these acts, the respondent judge was sought to be sanctioned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judged erred in not notifying the State where parties-litigant are notrelated to the deceased

HELD: Yes. Where the parties-litigants in a special proceedings involving the estate of thedeceased are not related to the decedent and the so-called heirs are not within the fifth degree of

relationship in the collateral line from the decedent, the trial judge should notify the Provincial

Fiscal or the Solicitor General to intervene in the case for the State, for the State could be theonly interstate heir with respect to one-half of the estate left by the deceased. The trial judge

should first determine who are the interstate heirs of the decedent before approving the amicable

settlement. This is his clear duty in order to protect the interest of the State regarding the payment of inheritance and estate taxes as well as a possible heir in intestacy. This will avoidmultiplicity of suits, expenses and delay.


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PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP VS DUMLAO206 SCRA 40

Ma. Loren W. Sanapo

FACTS: This case involves a petition for letters of administration which was challenged because

according to the oppositor, the petition did not allege that the petitioner is an interested personand for that reason the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It contended that when

you file a petition for intestacy, or the issuance of letters, you must state that you are aninterested person because the opening sentence of section 2 of rule 79 of the rules of special

proceedings dictates that ―a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested

person‖.

According to the oppositor, failure to state that one is an interested person is tantamount

to failure to state a jurisdictional fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not an allegation that the petitioner is an interested person a jurisdictional

fact which must be stated in the petition

HELD: No, it is not a jurisdictional fact. A jurisdictional fact means that you must allege, among

others:

1. The death of the testator;2. The place of residence of the deceased at the time of his death;

3. The place, are, or territory where the probate court is sitting;

4. If he is inhabitant of the foreign country; and

5. His having left his estate in such country.

The allegation that the petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person

is not within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts.

But also, we cannot deny that an allegation that a person is an interested person is also

required and motion to dismiss will lie but not on ground of lack of jurisdiction but on the

ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceeding.


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DALTON v. GIBERSONG.R. No. L-4113. June 30, 1952.

Valiente, Micah Abijah B.

FACTS: William R. Giberson was a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States, and a residentof Cebu. William died on August 6, 1943 in the concentration camp at the University of Sto.Tomas, Manila, Philippines. On February 10, 1949, Lela G. Dalton presented an application in

the lower court calling for the legalization of a document which, it claims, is the holographic will

of William, granted on April 29, 1920 in San Francisco, California. Spring Giberson, legitimateson of William, filed a motion requesting the dismissal of the request, claiming that, before a will

made in a foreign country may be legalized in the Philippines, it must be demonstrated that the

will had been previously legalized in California and that the request of Lela does not allege thatthe will had already been legalized in California.

ISSUE: Whether or not a testament granted abroad is required to be previously legalized abroad before it can be legalized in the Philippines.

HELD: NO. A person may dispose of its assets after his death by will. The granting of a will is alegal act which can be performed in the Philippines or abroad; if it is granted in a foreign

country, it has to be in accordance with the laws of that country. This is a universally adoptedrule. Article 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure, respecting the freedom of the testator to grant

his will anywhere, provides that the will legalized in a foreign country in accordance with the

laws of that country may also be legalized in the Philippines. This provision is substantive andcreates the rights of the beneficiaries of the will since they are assured to have the same be

legalized in the Philippines. Wills made outside of the Islands, if they can be legalized in the

country in which they were granted, gives them cause of action for judicial order in compliance

with the last will of the testator irrespective of the place of execution. Article 1 of Rule 78 doesnot prevent a person to legalize in the Philippines a testament granted in a foreign country, if it

can be legalized according to the laws of that country. The will is not required to be previouslylegalized in that country. Therefore, Spring’s contention is untenable.


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PRUDENCIA CHUA TAN, ET AL., V LUCIA DEL ROSARIO, ADMINISTRATIX OFTHE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHUA TOCO

G.R. No. L-35903

Maria Carina S.J. Villarica

Facts: Prudencia Chua Tan(Plaintiff) appealed the Judgment of CFI that dismissed their

complaint and absolved Lucia Del Rosario. Prudencia alleged that CFI erred in the following: (a)in sustaining the defense of defendant of resjudicata on the ground that the case has already been

decided by SC (in 1927, instituted by Benedicta Santa Juana (administratix of Chua Piaco)

against Lucia del Rosario(administratix of Chua Toco)); (b) that the 20,000 php belonged toChua Toco (he received it from his adoptive father Chua Piaco), that is belonged to Chua Piaco

and Chua Toco; and (c) the ownership of 38, 559.30 php that was used to purchased the land in

Antonio Rivera Street that was expropriated by Manila Railroad Company.

Issue: Whether or not res judicata is present in this case

Held: YES. Res judicata, estoppel by judgment: (a) That judgment rendered by a court ofcompetent jurisdiction on the merits is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action, so long as it remains unreversed; (b) A point which was

actually and directly in issue in a former suit, and there juridicially passed upon and determined

by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be again drawn in question in any futureaction between the same parties or their privies, even when the causes of action in the two suits

are wholly different.

The SC held the following (1) there is no identity between the plaintiff in the former case and the plaintiffs in the present case, there is the relation of representation between them; (2) there is

identity of cause of action; (3) there is identity of subject matter; and (4) there is identity of issue,

upon which depends the granting or denial of the relief sought in each of said cases, and thisissue has been impliedly decided in the former case. Therefore, all the elements of res judicata in

accordance with the aforecited legal provisions are present.

In view of foregoing considerations we are of the opinion and so hold that a final judgment upon

the merits rendered against the judicial administratrix of an intestate estate, as such, in a case

where she is plaintiff and the administratrix of another intestate estate, as such is the defendant,


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in which she seeks to secure an accounting of funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the

deceased, represented by the plaintiff administratrix, to the other deceased, represented by the

defendant administratrix, constitutes res judicata in another case where the heirs of the allegeddonor are plaintiffs and the administratrix of the supposed trustee is defendant, and in which the

partition of the same funds and the products thereof is sought between the heirs of both, under

the same allegation of trust, the alleged trustee being the adopted child of the donor.

Special Proceedings Case Digest for Feb 6 2016

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Transcript of Special Proceedings Case Digest for Feb 6 2016