Space Security or Anti-Satellite Weapons

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Space Security or Anti-Satellite Weapons? 1

Space Security or

Anti-satellite Weapons?

By Michael Krepon andSamuel Black

Space Security ProjectMay 2009


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Stimson1111 19th Street,NW , 12th Floor | Washington, DC 20036p 202.223.5956| f 202.238.9604

2009, Te Henry L. Stimson Center


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Satellites save lives, strengthen our economy, and support nationalsecurity. Without the assured use o satellites, police, re ghters and

rst responders would be hampered, nancial transactions would be

disrupted, and US troops in harms way would be less able to de endthemselves.

Satellites are vulnerable as well as invaluable because nations thatdepend heavily on satellites also have the means to damage them. Nonation bene ts more rom space or has more to lose i space becomesa shooting gallery than the United States. What, then, is the most ap-propriate strategy to ensure that essential satellites will be available oruse when needed?

Because o Americas great dependency on satellites, some have advo-cated the testing o anti-satellite (ASA ) weapons and their use duringcrises or war are. In this view, the United States needs to dominatespace to deter the use o space weapons by potential oes and to winwars decisively on the ground. Advocates o space dominance believe

in two underlying assumptions: that war are in the heavens is inevi-table and that the United States can succeed in dominating space withASA weapons. Te desire by some to seize the high ground o space by testing anddeploying weapons in space has outlasted the Cold War. But condi-tions have changed radically since the Soviet Union dissolved. Old-

ashioned arms races have been replaced by asymmetric war are.

Washingtons space budgets will continue to dwar those o Beijingand Moscow, but China and Russia do not have to be Americas equalto nulli y US attempts to dominate space. Even a ew ASA weaponscan do great damage to essential satellites, as was evident when Chinatested an ASA weapon in January 2007. Tis irresponsible test cre-ated a large, lethal debris eld that will last or perhaps a century inlow earth orbit, placing manned space ight and hundreds o satellitesat risk including those belonging to China.


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2 Stimson

An alternative approach to space security holds that the uniquely hos-tile and ragile nature o outer space makes cooperation not only pos-sible, but mandatory. Tis view rests on the assumptions that attempts

to dominate space will back re, and that a war in space between majorpowers cannot be won and must not be ought. Presidents RonaldReagan and Mikhail Gorbachev reached exactly the same conclusionabout nuclear war are, and then reached path-breaking threat reduc-tion agreements. Troughout the Cold War, the United States and theSoviet Union reached tacit agreements and treaties protective o satel-lites. Tis track record o restraint can be extended because satellitesare more essential than ever be ore and because major powers haveless to ght about than in previous decades. US advantages in space and global security can best be enhanced by seeking to stop debris-producing ASA tests and, more broadly, by establishing stronger protections against acts o purpose ul, harm-

ul inter erence against satellites. Te most clear cut way to establishagreed protections o satellites is by means o a treaty and the most

veri able treaty is one that bans the testing and use o destructivemethods against space objects. But treaties can entail lengthy and di -cult negotiations. In addition, the consent o two-thirds o the United

States Senate is required or treaty rati cation, which means that thePentagon must strongly advocate a ban o destructive ASA tests.

Another approach to increase space security would be or the UnitedStates to join with its European allies and other countries to negoti-

ate a Code o Conduct or responsible space- aring nations. Ruleso the road exist or ships, planes, and military activities. A Code o Conduct could also be negotiated or activities in space, clari ying ir-responsible actions and acilitating appropriate responses against rulebreakers. One key element in a Code o Conduct would be a pledgenot to engage in harm ul inter erence against satellites.


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Te George W. Bush administration re used to engage in any negotia-tion that would curtail US military options in space including thetesting and use o debris-producing ASA s. And yet every space- aring

nation loses reedom o action in space as the debris population in lowearth orbit grows. Te three worst man-made debris-creating eventsin the history o the Space Age have occurred since 2007: the ChineseASA test, a collision between US and Russian satellites, and thebreak-up o a Russian rocket stage.

Because o the growth o debris and ASA capabilities, the absence o space diplomacy during the Bush administration had the practical e -

ect o diminishing US reedom o action in space. Te timing is rightor Washington, Beijing, and Moscow to reconsider their approaches

to ASA tests and space security. Te United States has more agenda-setting powers than any other country, but no single nation can createconditions or success ul space diplomacy. Space security requires wisechoices by the United States, China, Russia, and other major space-

aring nations.

Te Stimson Center hopes that readers will nd this booklet help-ul. For more on Stimsons work in this eld, please visit our website,

www.stimson.org, and our Space Security Project page, http://www.stimson.org/space. Stimsons Space Security Project is made possibleby support rom the John D. and Catherine . MacArthur Foundation,the Ploughshares Fund, the New-Land Foundation, the Secure WorldFoundation, and the One Earth Future Foundation.

Te One Earth Future Foundation has provided unding or this pam-phlet. Stimson is also grate ul to Laura Grego or reviewing this text.

Michael KreponCo- ounder

Te Henry L. Stimson Center;Director

Space Security Project


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4 Stimson

What is outer space?Outer space is the region beyond the earths atmosphere, where satel-lites in orbit monitor the weather, assist in military and humanitarian

operations, and help rst responders provide emergency assistance.Satellites save many lives every day. Tey have become indispensabletools or personal, national, and international security. Outer spaceis a global commons. It is also a hostileenvironment that mandates internationalcooperation. Building and launching sat-ellites can be very expensive, which alsoencourages collaboration and burden-

sharing. For example, over 15 countrieshave a stake in the International SpaceStation. At least 10 nations can launchsatellites into orbit and more than 40 na-tions now operate satellites.

Has there ever been warfare in space?Space has long been militarized, but has not yet become weap-onized. Tis means that many satellites are used to support military operations, but no weapons have ever been used in or rom space incombat or during crises. Te sanctuary o space was maintained dur-ing the Cold War, even though the United States and the Soviet Uniontested anti-satellite weapons a total o 54 times. (By comparison, theUnited States and the Soviet Union tested nuclear weapons 1,769times.) Both superpowers deployed crude ground-based ASA s or

brie periods during the Cold War, a er which they were mothballed.Te last ASA test during the Cold War was carried out by the Reaganadministration in 1985. A 22-year test moratorium on destructive testsagainst satellites ollowed, which was broken by China in 2007, andthen by the Bush administration in 2008.

Introduction to

Outer Space

CALIPSO: Gathers data for weather andclimate forecasts (Photo: NASA) .


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Defense Support Program: Provides early warning ofmissile launches (Photo: US Air Force).

Why hasntspace becomea shootinggallery?Every US President sinceDwight D. Eisenhower hasrecognized the value o satellites and has cham-pioned the peace ul useso space. Consequently,

ASA tests have beenrare. Another reason orrestraint is that satellites serve as the eyes and ears o nations thathave nuclear weapons. An attack on satellites could there ore trigger anuclear war. Tird, major powers that start a war in space would havegreat di culty protecting their own satellites. Fourth, space war arecould cause massive amounts o debris, which would indiscriminately endanger essential satellite operations and manned space ight. Fi h,

major space powers have interlinked economies. A war in space coulddo great harm to their nancial transactions and international com-merce. Sixth, space is widely viewed as a global commons that shouldremain a sanctuary blessedly ree rom the disputes that plague us onEarth. Because all major powers could be seriously disadvantaged by awar in space, none have wished to open this Pandoras Box.

How can we best preserveour space sanctuary?One way would be a veri able treaty banning destructive ASA tests.Pending the negotiation o this treaty, space- aring nations could, at aminimum, pledge not to carry out such tests. Another approach wouldbe or space- aring nations to agree to a Code o Conduct to promotethe peace ul uses o outer space and to prevent purpose ul, harm ulinter erence against satellites.


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6 Stimson

Some Weapons are Already Banned

Above-ground nuclear tests created radiation hazards to humanity.They also interfered with edgling satellite operations and threat -ened the health of astronauts and cosmonauts. A single high-yieldUS nuclear test in 1962 damaged or destroyed four American,one British, and one Russian satellite. The 1963 Limited Test BanTreaty bans nuclear testing in space and in the atmosphere. The1967 Outer Space Treaty bans all weapons of mass destruction inspace. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty banned space-based

weapons of all kinds used for missile defenses. The Bush adminis-tration withdrew from this treaty in 2001.

Q What kind o weapons can be used to disruptor destroy satellites?

A Many weapons designed or other purposes can be adapted oruse against satellites, such as ballistic missiles and the missilesdesigned to intercept them. China used a ballistic missile tolaunch a satellite-killer in 2007, and the United States used aballistic missile de ense interceptor or an ASA test in 2008.Lasers and jammers that can disrupt electronic transmissionscan also inter ere with satellite operations. Alternatively, statescan design weapons speci cally or the purpose o harming

satellites, as the Soviet Union and United States did during theCold War.

Banning Weapons

In Space


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Q What weapons are not banned or use in space?

A Te weapons that are most likely to be used those that dont rely on nuclear detonations or other weapons o mass destruction including ASA weapons designed to collide into satellites.

Q Is it possible to ban all space weapons?

A For all practical purposes, no. Many military capabilities can bedirected against satellites. In addition, many peace ul uses o tech-nology would also have to be banned because they could be usedas ASA weapons.

Q Now that China and the United States havetested ASAT weapons and blown up satellites,can the weaponization o space be stopped?

A Yes, because all o the old reasons against space weapons re-main valid. Every space- aring nation will be worse of i weap-ons are deployed or used in space. As the unquestioned leaderin space, the United States not only has more to lose, but alsohas more leverage than any other state to call or a moratoriumon urther ASA testing.

Q Are other ASAT tests likely?

A Yes unless the United States champions new diplomaticinitiatives to prevent urther testing.


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8 Stimson

Satellites save uncounted lives every day. They provide directionsand road maps for police, re- ghters, and rst responders duringemergencies. Satellites track hurricanes and provide early warning

of landfall. They pinpoint areas for disaster relief. Military satellitesprovide early warning of threatening troop build-ups and missilelaunches. Intelligence satellites help prevent surprise attacks andsupport US military operations.

Satellites Protect US Armed Forces Satellites save the lives o US soldiers inharms way. Tey help troops to travelsa ely through trackless deserts anddangerous neighborhoods. Satellites areessential or communication, navigation,intelligence-gathering, and targeting. Tey

help US orces win quickly, decisively, andwith a minimum o casualties. No nationgains more military bene t rom the useo satellites than the United States.

Satellites Save Lives

GRAB: collected electronic intelligence dataduring Cold War (Photo: Smithsonian).


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Satellites provided images ofwild res in California in 2007(Photo: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency).

Illustration of a GlobalPositioning System satellite(Photo: Wikipedia).

Image taken by a weather satellite of a cyclone in the IndianOcean, April 16, 2009 (Photo: NOAA).

Everyone Relies On Satellites

Satellites provide these li e-saving services:Police/Fire/Emergency Management Navigation

Search and Rescue Operations

Natural Disaster Damage Assessment

Disease racking

Hurricane, Cyclone, and ornado Prediction

Parolee Monitoring

Remote Diagnosis and Surgery Assistance

Earthquake and Volcano Monitoring

Emergency Communication

Airplane Navigation

Precise Marine Vessel Navigation

rain Control and Collision Avoidance


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10 Stimson

Satellites alert us to planetary threatssuch as ozone depletion, rising tem-peratures, receding glaciers and polar

ice caps, soil erosion, and deforesta-tion. The Nimbus satellites track ozonedepletion. Radar satellite imagesrevealed the connection betweenclimate change and rising sea lev-els. Satellite images of environmentspredict famines and help with disasterrelief. In developing countries, satel-lites help manage agricultural produc-tion and increase crop yields. Indiaand other countries use satellites forlong-distance education and for medi-cal treatment in remoteareas. Malaysia uses sat-ellites to help detect and

prevent illegal logging.

Satellites And

Planetary Health

NASAs Nimbus 7 satellite tracked ozonedepletion over the South Pole (Photo: NASA).

Satellite images show the effects of logging operations

in Papua New Guinea between 1988 and 2002(Photo: University of Papua New Guinea).


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Satellites Help Relief OperationsA er natural disasters, relie teams rely on picture-taking and globalpositioning satellites to plan supply, airli , rescue, and medical opera-tions. Satellite images were essential li e-saving tools or the massiveearthquakes that struck China in May 2008 and Pakistan in October2005, as well as the December 2004 tsunami that battered India, Indo-nesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Tailand.

Satellite photos of Aceh, Indonesia before and after the 2004 tsunami(Photo: National University of Singapore).

Satellite Reliance: Quick Facts

Number of emergency GPS beaconsin the United States 300,000

Estimated value of property and personaldamage averted by hurricane warnings $3 billion

US households reliant on satellite-based weather forecasting 105 million

Average number of lives saved bysearch and rescue satellites annually 900


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12 Stimson

The US economy and international commerce rely on satellitesthat enable nancial markets and investors to make transactionsquickly and securely. Credit card users at gas pumps sometimes

use satellites. War in space could disrupt nancial markets andcreate havoc in stock exchanges. Businesses such as deliveryservices that use satellite communication and tracking devicescould be badly disrupted. The use of weapons inspace could place these and other services, the rev-enues they generate, stock markets, and thousandsof jobs at risk.

Investments in Space

From 1959 to 2007, US taxpayers invested over one and a hal trilliondollars in space. Tese sunk costs could be nulli ed i the use o weap-ons in space trashes the orbits used by essential satellites.

Investments in Space: A Sampler

Global Positioning System~ $45 Million per Satellite~ $26 Billion through 2016

Weather Satellite ~ $450 Million

US Spy Satellites $1$10 Billion

Space Shuttle $1.7 Billion

International Space Station NASA: ~ $25 BillionTotal: ~ $100 Billion

Satellite Launch Costs $10$150 Million per Satellite

Apollo Program $125 Billion

Space and

Economic Security

ASATs are badfor business.


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0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

R e v e n u e

i n B i l l i o n s

U S $

Year

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Space By The Numbers

Space Industry Revenue (2007) $123 Billion

Revenue From GPS Equipment (2007) $56 Billion

Number of US Jobs Supported by Space Industry 729,000

GPS-related Patents Issued in 2006 800+

US Satellite Radio Subscribers 13.65 Million

World Space Industry Revenues


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14 Stimson

US advantages in outer space cannot be questioned. Today, theUnited States spends approximately $40 billion a year for activitiesin outer space more than two-thirds of all global space expenditures.

The US share of global military space expenditures is even greater.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a signi cant competitorin outer space, typically launching over 70 space missions annu-ally. The Russian space program has contracted greatly, launching28 space missions in 2008.

The Chinese space program is making signi cant gains, but it stilllags signi cantly behind the United States. Beijing has launched100 satellites since 1970, compared to 850 for the United States.Beijings rst manned space mission was in 2003, and since thenit has successfully conducted two other manned space missions.The United States has conducted 150 manned space ights with784 astronauts since 1961.

US Preeminence Without

Weapons in Space


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Space Budgets of Major World Powers

Global Space Expenditures

US: $39.5 billion

China: $2.2 billion (upper estimate)

Russia: $1.32 billion

Other International Expenditures:$14.7 billion

China Is Far Behind the United States

US ChinaFirst Satellite 1958 1970

First Astronaut 1961 2003

First Anti-Satellite Weapon Test 1959 2007

Number of Satellites Launched 1,141 100

Launch Sites 8 3

Russias Space Program Has Shrunk

USSR1962-1982

USSR/Russia1983-2003

Russia2004-2008

Average LaunchesPer Year

73 55 25

Military LaunchesPer Year 48 31 7

Total Anti-Satellite Tests

20 0 0

US69%

Rest ofWorld25%

China4%

Russia2%


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16 Stimson

Crude ASAT weapons are far less expensive to build than sophis-ticated and vulnerable satellites that usually travel in predictablepaths and that are hard to hide. Consequently, major space-faringnations that rely on satellites also have the means to target them.

Improved armor can help protect US troops operating in harmsway, but heavily-armored satellites are impractical, and armor stillcannot protect against high-speed collisions in space.

Space Debris KillsSpace debris is deadly. Space debris trav-els at ten times the speed o a ri e bullet

in low earth orbit, where a piece o debristhe size o a marble could strike a satellitewith approximately the same energy asa one-ton sa e dropped rom a ve-story building. Te worst debris elds in spacecan be caused by ASA tests that pulver-ize satellites. Te Reagan administrationcarried out a destructive ASA test in1985 that generated 300 pieces o track-able debris, one o which came within one mile o the newly launchedInternational Space Station 14 years later. It took 19 years or thedebris rom the 1985 ASA test to burn out o the earths atmosphere. China created the worst-ever man-made debris eld in space by test-ing an ASA in 2007. Tis test generated approximately 40,000 pieceso lethal debris, and an estimated two million debris ragments overall.

Because the Chinese ASA test was conducted at such a high altitude,its lethal, mutating debris eld is likely to remain in low earth orbit orover a century. Even small pieces o debris can be worrisome becausethey cant be tracked but can still penetrate the thin outer skin thatprotects satellites . Te windows on the US Space Shuttle have neededto be changed more than 70 times because o tiny debris hits. TeUnited States now tracks more than 18,000 pieces o space debris.

Reducing Vulnerabilities

In Space

The front window of the Space Shuttleafter a collision with a small paint chip

(Photo: NASA).


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Debris MitigationSpace debris doesnt recognize US preeminence in space. Because theUnited States carries out the most space ights and operates as many satellites as the rest o the world combined, it is most likely to be vic-timized by space debris. Major space- aring nations have belatedly rec-ognized that debris threatens this global commons. A consortium o space- aring nations began discussing voluntary guidelines or debrismitigation in 1992. Voluntary guidelines or debris mitigation were

nally endorsed by the United Nations in December 2007. AdditionalASA tests that create debriselds would make a mockery o

these guidelines.

Orbital debris doesnot recognize USpreeminence in space.

Size ofDebris

Object ofSimilar Size

Amountof Debris

Is itDetectable?

Is itTrackable?

DamagePotential

< 1 cm Staple Tens of

millions

No No Minor

Degradation1 cm 10 cm

Tennis ball(mid-range)

200,000 300,000

Yes No PossibleImpairment

>10 cm Grapefruit 18,000 19,000

Yes Yes AssuredDestruction

A Near MissOn March 12, 2009 three astronauts aboard the International Space Stationquickly scrambled into their escape module. The reason: a ve inch piece ofdebris from a GPS satellite launch in 1993 came perilously close to striking thestation. More close calls can be expected.


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18 Stimson

Source: European Space Agency

14000

Payloads Debris

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

1 9 9 0

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 8

N U M B E R O F O

B J E C T S

Large Objects in Orbit

Illustration of the debris from Chinas ASAT test (red) and theorbit of the International Space Station (green) (Image: Dr. T.S.Kelso, Celestrak.com).


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Heads Up:

Collision in Space

On February 10, 2009, a communications satellite operated byIridium, an American corporation, collided with a satellite launchedby Russia in 1993 that ceased functioning two years later. The

collision produced more than 800 pieces of debris larger than 10cm in diameter. As shown by the graph below, most of these debrisfragments will be in orbit for decades, endangering more than 200satellites. This collision serves as a wake-up call for two importantrules of the road for space: providing timely warning of likely satellitecollisions, and refraining from debris-producing ASAT weapon tests.

The fraction of debris from the satellite collision that is expected to remain in orbitas a function of time (Graph: Union of Concerned Scientists).

100

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 9

2 0 2 9

2 0 3 9

2 0 4 9

2 0 5 9

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

P E R C E N T A G E O F D E B R I S R E M A I N I N G

I N O R B I T

>10 cm

110 cm


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20 Stimson

The military and intelligence advantages the United States enjoysin space would be threatened by the use of weapons in space.Washingtons most serious potential competitors, Beijing and

Moscow, say they oppose weapons in space and call for a treatyto prevent them. At the same time, they have tested ASAT weap-ons in the past and are presumably improving their capabilities toimpair and destroy satellites. Maintaining US advantages in spacerequires improved satellite survivability.

Q Is there a solution to the satellite vulnerability problem?

A Tere is no simple or complete solution to the satellite vulner-ability problem. A combination o initiatives, however, cangreatly reduce the likelihood that satellites will be attacked.

Q What role can diplomacy play?

A Te absence o diplomacy detracts rom space security, as hasbeen evident rom ASA tests in recent years. Efective diplo-macy can establish treaty obligations or rules o the road that

clari y responsible and irresponsible activities in space. Butdiplomacy alone cant solve the satellite vulnerability problem.Diplomatic agreements can be broken, and besides, satelliteswill remain vulnerable to man-made debris as well as to otherenvironmental hazards in space, such as solar ares, radiation,and corrosion.

Maintaining US

Advantages in Space


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Q Is deterrence part o the answer to the satellite vulnerability problem? A Because satellites are so vulnerable and because so many exist-ing weapons can be adapted or use as ASA weapons, deter-

rence helps explain why no satellites have been attacked incrises or war are. But deterrence based on mutual vulnerability is, at best, a partial solution.

Q Wont international agreements limit US ree-dom o action is space? A Actually, the absence o international agreements can greatly limit US reedom o action is space. Debris-producing events

can greatly constrain US reedom o action in space, and

debris-producing events can be reduced by internationalagreements.

Q Besides diplomacy and deterrence, what else

can be done to address the vulnerability problem?

A Protection against some man-made and natural hazards canbe marginally improved when projected bene ts exceed costs.In addition, the United States can choose to deploy largernumbers o less capable intelligence-gathering satellites, ratherthan investing in a small number o hugely expensive satel-lites. Wise, diversi ed investments in space can make surprise

attacks against US satellites a space Pearl Harbor lesslikely. Maintaining the worlds strongest military can also helpdissuade other countries rom attacking US satellites.


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22 Stimson

The United StatesDuring the Cold War, the United States tested ASA weapons 34times. A er the Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy ap-proved o the deployment o one Nike Zeus and three Tor missilesdesigned or use as ASA weapons. Tese missiles took many hours toprepare or launch and carried nuclear warheads that, i used, wouldhave damaged US satellites, as well. Tese ASA s were mothballedbecause they were impractical. During the Reagan administration,the Pentagon avored a hit to kill ASA carried under the wing o an F-15 ghter aircra . Tis ASA was used to destroy an aging US

weather satellite in 1985. Now the Pentagon has shi ed its inter-est away rom ASA s that cause debris elds to those that employ temporary and reversible efects, such as jammers and lasers. It hasnot, however, oreclosed destructive ASA testing. In February 2008,the Pentagon used a sea-based missile de ense interceptor to destroy a dead intelligence-gathering satellite, ostensibly to avoid a potentialpublic health hazard posed by the satellites unused uel. Tis ASAtest was designed to minimize space debris.

Anti-Satellite Weapons

The ASM-135, the missile used by the United States for its1985 ASAT test (Photo: Wikipedia).


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Despite the 2008 ASA test, the Bush administration was unable orunwilling to implement the Air Forces ambitious plans or eldingofensive counterspace capabilities. Tese programs have not ranked

high on the Pentagons budget priorities, and they have been strongly opposed on Capitol Hill. During the Bush administration, the Pen-tagon ocused instead on demonstrations in space o multi-purposetechnologies that could eventually be used to harm satellites, but thatalso could be used or peace ul purposes. One such program is theExperimental Satellite Series (XSS), which makes close approaches tosatellites and other space objects. Such proximity operations in the

uture could be used to inspect and repair riendly satellites or to inter-ere with hostile ones. Te Air Force also operates the Star re Optical

Range in New Mexico, which is home to a number o directed-energy research programs. In addition, the Missile De ense Agency is devel-oping an airborne laser in a 747 aircra . Lasers can be used or satelliteinspections and station keeping, as well as or war- ghting purposes.

Laser testing conducted at the Star re

Optical Range (Photo: Wikipedia).

Illusration of an XSS satellite (Photo: U.S.

Air Force).


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24 Stimson

ChinaIn 2007, China succeeded in destroying one o its ownsatellites using a modi ed ballistic missile, a er havingcarried out two previous tests. China also has lasersthat could be used or peace ul or war- ghting pur-poses in space. Chinas 2008 manned space mission alsodeployed a small satellite, the BX-1, which was used orproximity operations, like those per ormed by the XSS.

RussiaTe Soviet Union tested ASA s 20 times up until 1982. During the1970s, Moscow avored a co-orbital ASA that sidled up to the targetsatellite and exploded. Tis weapon was unreliable and took over anhour to approach its target, which greatly reduced the element o surprise. Te So- viet Union also maintained ground-basedlasers that could be used against satellites.Moscow still possesses the capability andtechnology to test ASA s by using la-

sers, jammers, ballistic missiles, and airde ense interceptors.

Chinas DF-21 ballisticmissile was likely modi edfor use in its 2007 ASAT test(Photo: KT-1 at Encyclope-dia Astronautica, Mark Wade, 1997 2007).

Illustration of Chinas BX-1 satellite(Photo: Union of Concerned Scientists).

Illustration of the Soviet Unions co-orbitalASAT (Photo: Defense Intelligence Agency).


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Q Given Russian and Chinese ASAT capabilities,why shouldnt the United States protect its investments in space with repower? I not, wont

US military superiority be impaired?

A ASA s can be ruinous to satellite operations, but they wontchange the outcome o a war: the United States will still win.But the costs o war will be greater or everyone. Te burdenson US ground orces, which are already very severe, wouldbecome much heavier. Without the assured use o satellites, UScasualties would mount. Since US attacks will be less precisewithout satellites, civilians will sufer more too. Everybody loses i ASA weapons are used.

Q Doesnt the United States need ASATs to punishstates that inter ere with American satellites?

A Te United States has many ways to punish wrongdoers wherethey live. I absolutely necessary, the United States can retaliateagainst satellite attacks by punishing bad actors in space, usingweapons designed or other purposes.

Q I weapons designed or other purposes can beused to attack satellites, why not go ahead withnew anti-satellite weapons?

A Weapons designed or other purposes that can be used againstsatellites serve as a deterrent as well as an insurance policy.Tis insurance policy makes the testing and deployment o new ASA weapons unwise and unnecessary.


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26 Stimson

Te United States is the worlds most power ul standard setter. UnwiseUS initiatives are there ore likely to result in bad choices elsewhere.I Washington seeks space dominance, others can be expected to take

blocking action, including the tests o ASA weapons. Immediately be ore becoming Secretary o De ense, Donald H. Rums eld chaireda commission that called on the Pentagon to project power throughand rom space. Te Bush administration re used to engage in nego-tiations that might limit ASA s o any kind. In 2001, it withdrew romthe Anti-Ballistic Missile reaty which banned space weapons used ormissile de enses and which provided protections against inter eringwith intelligence-gathering satellites. A new US Air Force doctrine waspublished in 2004 that endorsed a strategy to dominate space. TeBush administration ound little support or its military space policies.In December 2008, 171 nations voted Yes on a UN resolution to prevent an arms race in outer space. One country, Israel, abstained. Only the United States registered a No. Te absence o diplomacy, plans orspace dominance, and the testing o ASA s during the Bush administra-tion resulted in less space security and more satellite vulnerability.

Space Dominance or

Space Diplomacy?

The Bush Administration and Space Diplomacy

We are paving the road of 21st century warfare now. And others will soon follow.Peter B. Teets, Undersecretary, US Air Force, 2002

Space superiority provides freedom to attack.Counterspace Operations , Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, 2004

Our vision calls for prompt global strike space systems with the capability todirectly apply force from or through space against terrestrial targets.

Strategic Master Plan, Air Force Space Command, 2003

Additional binding arms control agreements are simply not a viable tool forenhancing the long-term space security interests of the United States.

Ambassador Donald Mahley, US State Department, 2008


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The personal security of US citizens, as well as their economicand national security, requires that essential satellites be availablewhen needed. Foreign citizens and their governments have similar

requirements. The challenge facing space-faring nations is how toalign space diplomacy with these common interests, despite mistrustover motives and the capabilities major powers possess to damagesatellites. One way to serve common interests is through a veri abletreaty that bans the testing and use of destructive methods againstsatellites. Another approach is a Code of Conduct that sets normsfor responsible space-faring nations and clari es irresponsible acts,such as debris-creating ASAT tests. Either way, if Washington seeksto rule out testing ASATs, there are no guarantees of good behaviorby others. Therefore, US restraint would best be accompanied by ahedging strategy to encourage others to practice similar restraint.

A Treaty Banning Destructive ASAT TestingSince many military capabilities designed or other purposes

including ballistic missiles, missile de ense interceptors, lasers and jammers can be used against satellites, and since these technologiesserve many essential purposes, it is not possible or wise to ban themall. But a complete ban on weapons capable o serving as ASA s is notrequired to prevent space rom becoming a shooting gallery. Para-doxically, the existence o so many potential ASA weapons helps toexplain why so ew actual ASA tests have occurred during peacetime,and why no ASA s have been used to date in crises or combat betweenspace- aring nations. Nonetheless, complacency about ASA s is un-wise. As China demonstrated in 2007, only a ew ASA tests can createmassive debris elds. Te collision o US and Russian satellites inFebruary 2009 should serve as a wake-up call. Large debris elds havebeen created in low earth orbit, increasing the risk o more collisionsand dangerous chain reactions in space.

New Opportunities

for Diplomacy


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Destructive ASA tests are the hardest to hide and the easiest to veri y by national space authorities as well as by private citizens who keeptrack o satellites. Since veri able, destructive tests against satellites

pose a hazard to all space- aring nations, these irresponsible and veri-able acts might use ully be banned by a treaty. Pending this treatys

success ul negotiation and entry into orce, responsible space- aringnations could pledge not to carry out destructive ASA tests, or morebroadly, not to be the rst to carry out ASA tests o any kind.

A Code Of Conduct ForResponsible Space-Faring NationsThe peaceful uses of outer space can also be advanced by a Code of Conduct that clari es rules of the road for responsible space-faringnations. Codes of conduct were negotiated during the Cold War toprevent dangerous military practices and accidents by the superpow-ers on the ground, in the air, and at sea. The Bush administrationendorsed some codes of conduct, including the 2003 ProliferationSecurity Initiative. This initiative began as a political compact among

eleven like-minded states that sought improved international coopera-tion to help interdict shipments of dangerous weapons and materials.An additional 80 countries have subsequently signed on to the coreprinciples of this code of conduct. The Proliferation Security Initiativehas helped to intercept illicit commerce destined for Iran, Libya, and Syria.

The United States has been wise to set standards to prevent danger-ous military practices on the sea, ground, and in the air. Space also

deserves rules of the road to help prevent incidents and dangerousmilitary activities. With the help of nongovernmental partners fromCanada, China, France, Japan, and Russia, the Stimson Center hasdrafted a model Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Na-tions, borrowing from other codes of conduct. Stimsons model Codespells out the rights and responsibilities of space-faring nations.


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Key Elements of StimsonsSpace Code of Conduct

Rights of Space-Faring States

1 Te right o access to space or exploration or otherpeace ul purposes.2 Te right o sa e and inter erence- ree space operations,including military support unctions.3 Te right o sel -de ense as enumerated in the Charter o theUnited Nations.4 Te right to be in ormed on matters pertaining to theobjectives and purposes o this Code o Conduct.

5Te right o consultation on matters o concern and the

proper implementation o this Code o Conduct.


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Responsibilities of Space-Faring States

1 Te responsibility to respect the rights o other space- aring

states and legitimate stakeholders.

2 Te responsibility to regulate stakeholders on national territory or that use national space launch services in con ormity withthe objectives and purposes o this Code o Conduct.

3 Te responsibility to regulate the behavior o nationals in

con ormity with the objectives and purposes o this Code o Conduct, wherever those actions occur.

4 Te responsibility to develop and abide by rules o sa e spaceoperation and tra c management.5 Te responsibility to share in ormation related to sa e spaceoperations and tra c management and to enhance coopera-

tion on space situational awareness.

6 Te responsibility to mitigate and minimize space debris inaccordance with the best practices established by the interna-tional community.

7 Te responsibility to re rain rom harm ul inter erence against

space objects.

8 Te responsibility to consult with other space- aring states regard-ing activities o concern in space and to enhance cooperation toadvance the objectives and purposes o this Code o Conduct.

9 Te responsibility to establish consultative procedures toaddress and resolve questions relating to compliance, and toagree upon additional measures to improve the Codes viability and efectiveness.


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The European Unions Draft Code of Conduct

In December 2007, The European Union issued a draft Code ofConduct for Outer Space Activities. The EUs draft Code stronglyaf rms the principle of no harmful interference against space ob -

jects, including

the reedom o access to, exploration and use o outer space orpeace ul purposes without inter erence, ully respecting the secu-rity, sa ety and integrity o space objects in orbit;

the responsibility o States to take all the appropriate measures and

cooperate in good aith to prevent harm ul inter erence in outerspace activities;

the responsibility to establish and implement national policies and

procedures to minimize the possibility o accidents in space, colli-sions between space objects or any orm o harm ul inter erence with

other States right to the peace ul exploration and use o outer space; the responsibility to re rain rom any intentional action that will or

might bring about, directly or indirectly, the damage or destructiono outer space objects.

Other Codes of Conduct

Incidents at Sea Agreement (1972) Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (1989) International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic

Missile Proliferation (2002) Proliferation Security Initiative (2003)


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The United States and other countries have traf c rules and penalcodes. People still speed and break laws, but the rules that mostpeople honor continue to be essential and are necessary to prose-

cute rule breakers. We expect rules to govern nancial transactionsand help stop nuclear proliferation. Military forces abide by codesof conduct in peacetime. There are even rules of warfare. Rulesprevent anarchy and save lives. Some rules of the road exist toprotect life-saving satellites from harm but not enough of them.

Agreed Rules of the Road For Outer Space

No Nuclear Weapon Tests in Outer Space Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963(118 Nations)

No Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit Outer Space Treaty, 1967(125 Nations)

No National Appropriation of Space by Any Means Outer Space Treaty, 1967(125 Nations)

Cooperate on Search and Rescue Operations In Space Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, 1968(115 Nations)

States Are Liable For Damage Caused By Their Space Objects Liability Convention, 1972(113 Nations)

Rules For

Space Security


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What E l se i s Needed?

Minimize debris in space. Avoid and reduce the risk o collisions in space. Avoid or announce in advance dangerous maneuvers in space. Create special caution areas around satellites. Re rain rom simulating attacks in space. Re rain rom using lasers to damage or blind satellites. Cooperate on space tra c management. Re rain rom ight-testing or using destructive ASA weapons.

Q Why is a Code o Conduct or space- aring na-tions needed? A Having agreed rules that de ne responsible behavior promotesnational security and global commerce.

Q But wont bad actors break the rules?

A Laws are broken. Tat doesnt make the laws irrelevant, or un-important. Rules still matter. Agreed rules also make it easierto identi y and build coali-tions against rule breakers. Without rules in

space, there areno rule breakers.


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34 Stimson

Q Since others cant be trusted, why not launchspace weapons rst and demand that othersplay by US rules?

A By launching space weapons rst, the United States sets aprecedent that others will ollow. Tis approach would ensurewidespread testing and deployment o ASA weapons andwould make war are in space and on the ground more likely.

Q But i the United States exercises restraint, willother countries play by these rules? A Te United States doesnt depend on the good aith o others,which is why a hedging strategy is also required. America en-

joys the worlds best space monitoring capabilities and armedorces. I others insist on testing ASA s, the United States

could, too. But it is not in the economic and national security interest or the United States to open this Pandoras box.

Q Doesnt hedging send the wrong signal,prompting ASAT tests by others? A Not hedging against the use o ASA s by others could alsosend the wrong signal, inviting use without consequences. But

i the US hedges too much such as by initiating a resump-tion o ASA testing others will surely ollow. So a hedgingstrategy requires balance, such as by ight testing multi-pur-

pose technologies.


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Space assurance means that the satellites essential for personal,economic, and national security will be available when needed. Howcan the United States provide for space assurance? First, by main-

taining conventional US military superiority. The United States canthereby clarify that states interfering with satellites can suffer severeconsequences. Second, by improving US intelligence capabilities,so that threats to US satellites can be detected and perpetrators canbe identi ed. Increased situational awareness in space can alsohelp deter potential adversaries. Third, by seeking to stop tests ofASAT weapons which make satellites more vulnerable and spaceoperations more dangerous. Fourth, by hedging with research anddevelopment of technologies that have multiple end uses butwithout testing them as ASAT weapons. These hedges help clarifyto potential adversaries that the United States can and will respondeffectively if they initiate ASAT attacks. Fifth, by championing diplo-matic initiatives to promote the peaceful uses of outer space.

Key Elements of Space AssuranceMaintain the Best Armed Forces in the World

Increase Situational Awareness in Space

Promote a Ban on esting ASA s

Adopt Prudent Research & Development Hedges

Champion Diplomatic Initiatives or the Peace ul Uses o Space

The Diplomacy of

Space Assurance

The Choice for Space WithRules of the Road

International Cooperation Economic Growth Public Safety Stronger US Military

Without RulesOf the Road

Anti-Satellite Weapons Satellites at Greater Risk Less International Cooperation Greater Likelihood of Con ict


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Space Security Resources

Foundations &Non-Governmental Organizations

Center or De ense In ormationwww.cdi.org

Center or International andSecurity Studies at Marylandwww.cissm.umd.edu

Heritage Foundationwww.heritage.org

Marshall Institutewww.marshall.org

One Earth Future Foundationwww.oneearth uture.org

Secure World Foundationwww.sw ound.org

Space Policy InstituteGeorge Washington University www.gwu.edu/~spi/

Space Security Index www.spacesecurity.org

Stimson Centerwww.stimson.org

Union o Concerned Scientistswww.ucsusa.org

Commercial Groups

Futron Corporationwww. utron.com

Satellite Industry Associationwww.sia.org

Government &Inter-Government Bodies

Inter-Agency Space DebrisCoordination Committeewww.iadc-online.org

National Aeronautics andSpace Administration (NASA)www.nasa.gov

NASA Orbital Debris Program O cehttp://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov

United Nations O ce orOuter Space Afairs

www.oosa.unvienna.org

United Nations Institute orDisarmament Researchwww.unidir.org

U.S. Air Force Space Commandwww.a spc.a .mil


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Articles, Blogs, Books, and Journals

Air Force Space Almanacwww.air orce-magazine.com/Almanacs/Pages/de ault.aspx

Astropolitics: Te International Journal o Space Power and Policy http://astropolitics.org

High Frontier Journal: Te Journal or Space and Missile Pro essionalswww.a spc.a .mil/library/high rontierjournal.asp

James Clay Moltz, Te Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests , Stan ord University Press, 2008.

Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset ,Columbia University Press, 2007.

Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or SpaceDominance: Te Case Against Weaponizing Space , Te Henry L. Stim-son Center, 2003, http://www.stimson.org/pub.c m?ID=81.

Res Communis Space Law Bloghttp://rescommunis.wordpress.com

Robert Butterworth and Dr. John Sheldon, Deterrence in Space:

Responding to Challenges to the U.S. in Space, November 13, 2008,www.marshall.org.

Samuel Black, No Harm ul Inter erence with Space Objects: Te Key to Con dence-Building, Stimson Report #69, July 2008, http://www.stimson.org/pub.c m?ID=646.

Samuel Black, Components o a Space Assurance Strategy,HighFrontier 5:1 (November 2008), p. 16-20, http://www.a spc.a .mil/li-brary/high rontierjournal.asp.

U.S. Department o De ense, Space Operations, Joint Publication3-14, January 6, 2009, www.dtic.mil/doctrine.


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