a

A I R S Y M P O S I U M 2 0 0 2

S p o n s o r e d b yT h e C h i e f o f t h e A i r S t a f f

S p a c e i n t h e 2 1 s t C e n t u r y

E d i t e d b y

L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l D e n n i s M a r g u e r a t t

D e p u t y D i r e c t o r A e r o s p a c e S t u d i e s

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D r A l l a n E n g l i s h

Canadian Forces College Collège des Forces Canadiennes

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FOREWORD………………………………………………………………............ ii

UNDERSTANDING THE SPECTRUM OF ADVANCED ISR TECHNOLOGIES.... 1Syndicate 5

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR ISR………………...................................... 17Syndicate 6

AFFORDABLE ISR ALTERNATIVES FOR APPLICATION IN THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE……………….…….............. 31Syndicate 7

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE – THE OPERATION ALLIED FORCE EXPERIENCE………………....….............. 65Syndicate 8

THE DECLINE OF MEANING AND THE RISE OF LEADERSHIP?©…............ 85Joseph A. Engelbrecht Jr., Ph.D.Toffler Associates®

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL1…………........... 97

Allan English

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCES’S TRANSFORMATION VISIONAND THE AEROSPACE OPERATIONS CENTE…………………..................... 103

Colonel Peter Faber, Ph.D., USAF1

THE ROLE OF AIR OPERATIONS CENTRE IN AN ISR-DEPENDENT FORCE……………………………................................ 127Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis Margueratt, Deputy Director Aerospace Studies

THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: Is the Emperor Ready for His New Clothes?……………………………........... 131

Robert Martyn

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

“What most nations want aresmarter weapons starting with sen-sors. Such sensors would bemounted on aircraft, drones orspace vehicles, but more importantthey would be under the control oftheatre commanders who would beable to move them around as need-ed and customize the informationstreaming in from them. This near-term future would bring together orfuse different kinds of fine-graineddata, synthesize it and check itagainst many kinds of databases.The result would be better earlywarning, more refined targetingand improved damage assessments.Sensors are top priority.”1

INTRODUCTION

In war, the value of timely, relevantand continuous intelligence on the

enemy’s position, movements and vul-nerabilities is well recognized by com-manders at all echelons. An accurateimage of today’s dynamic battlespace2

leads a commander to a clear under-standing of what action needs to occur.Otherwise, planning is an unfocusedand wasteful exercise, and executionmay result in defeat.3 To accomplishtheir tasks, the commanders mustdevelop the battlespace with the inputof numerous and complementary intelli-gence, surveillance and reconnaissance(ISR) sensors with various capabilitiesthat are integrated into several differentplatforms. According to USAF doctrine

on ISR operations, “the fundamentalresponsibility of ISR is to provide intel-ligence information to decision makersat all levels of command to give themthe fullest possible understanding ofthe adversary.”4

Information operations and battle-space awareness are common termsengendered in the modern C4ISR5

vision. Realization of this vision is per-haps more problematic than manywould believe. Ensuring that Canadapursues the right technologies andmakes the right choices for the futurebegins with an understanding of whatcapabilities are available. Due to theclassified nature of ISR capabilities,nations that do not leverage new tech-nology will find themselves marginal-ized or worse, endangering forcesbecause of limited access to battlespaceinformation. It is clear that a properunderstanding of emerging and cur-rently available ISR technologies is anessential first step for any nation com-mitted to participation in future coali-tion operations.

This paper explores two areaswhich impact future choices Canadawill make regarding participation incoalition ISR activities. The first is anoverview of current and emerging ISRsensor technologies, including theircapabilities, current developments inindustry, and general limitations. Thesecond area covered is a brief synopsisof the information architecture tech-

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UNDERSTANDING THE SPECTRUM OFADVANCED ISR TECHNOLOGIESSyndicate 5: Major Richard Foster (Chair), Major Frank Costello,Major Martin Galvin, Major Darwin Gould, Lieutenant-Colonel Stan Grabstas,Major Wayne Griffin, Major Petr Mikulenka, Major Colin Murray, Major Gisèle Royer

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F O R E W O R D

Canadian technology features prominent-ly in the field of remote sensing and theuse of HSI sensors. An example is theCompact Airborne Spectrographic Imager(CASI) built by ITRES Research Ltd. CASIhas been operational since 1988 and hasprovided spatial and spectral informationon numerous geological materials. Aunique feature of CASI is the ability toselect bandwidth sets during target acqui-sition.11 The Canadian Forces’ lead agencyfor MSI/HSI research, Defence ResearchEstablishment Valcartier (DREV), hasdeveloped an imaging spectrometer forHSI capable of “simultaneous spatial andhigh spectral resolution analysis.”12

Hyperspectral systems have alsobeen flown onboard a NASA C-130 and aUS Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) P-3.The NRL project “Dark Horse” began in1997 with the aim of validating real timedata obtained from Uninhabited CombatAir Vehicles (UCAV).13 In November2000, the Earth-Orbiting (EO) NewMillennium satellite, NASA’s EO-1, waslaunched with a TRW-designed HyperionHyperspectral imager onboard. Althoughthe military aspects of the EO-1 missionare highly classified, onboard HSI sen-sors provide resolution of surface prop-erties many times greater than currentMultispectral images offering extremelyaccurate classification of surface materi-als.14 HSI is a proven technology thatwill continue to improve in capabilityand military application.

Current Multispectral andHyperspectral research and develop-ment effort focuses on system integra-tion with other information gatheringsources. Hyperspectral images, whencompared with a library of imagebanks, highlight differences in the tar-get environment. Changes, such as atank or other weapons system moving

into a given location or disturbance ofthe ground, act as a cue for furtherinvestigation. Following initial detec-tion, aerial photography, Unmanned AirVehicles (UAV), Elint and Sigint may bedirected to localise activity occurring atthe area of interest. As a result, searchand detection time may be drasticallyreduced with fewer assets required.Decision-makers gain increased confi-dence when more than one sensor isable to report on a specific item of inter-est. Dual phenomenology is a termused to describe such information orreports that are derived from multiplesensor systems and means.15

Limitations of HSI systems includebackground noise caused by atmos-pheric and stratospheric phenomena,such as thermal layering, propagationducting, and false target ranges all ofwhich affect image resolution, targetdetection, and positional accuracy.Another problem is that HSI systemscollect large volumes of data at a muchfaster rate than current systemsdesigned for the same purpose.Additional data collection increases therequirement for data storage, rate ofstorage, and requirements for greaterdownlink bandwidth. Analysis require-ments needed to optimize computeralgorithms cause critical delays in infor-mation distribution to operational com-manders. Technological developmentshould solve the computing problems inthe near future.

Notwithstanding these limitations,the range of potential uses for this tech-nology are almost limitless. MSI andHSI currently contribute directly orindirectly to the following:

• northern ice patrols, routing andnavigation;

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nologies required to enable properexploitation of advanced sensor pro-grammes.

SENSORS AND PLATFORMS

Gathering battlefield informationto support intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance often depends oncombinations of sensors and platforms.Evolving technology allows combina-tions of sensors to monitor virtually allaspects of the electromagnetic spec-trum. The most effective coverage ofthe spectrum is achieved through awell-managed suite of sensors where thesynergy of several types is able to over-come the limitations of individual sen-sors. This paper looks at a suite of sen-sor technology selected on the basis ofits ability to cover much of the electro-magnetic spectrum. As well, the tech-nology selected is based on ongoingresearch and development in the UnitedStates and to some extent in Canada.These technologies include spectralimaging, synthetic aperture radar, elec-tro-optical sensors, and IR sensors. Thepaper concludes by examining twoemerging technologies that will poten-tially impact ISR’s future on the battle-field: micro-technology and microbio-logical/chemical protocols.

Multispectral andHyperspectral Imaging

Multispectral and “hyperspectral”imaging (MSI/HSI) are passive processesthat allow multiple images of a scene orobject to be created by capturing reflect-ed energy from different parts of theelectromagnetic spectrum. Because allmaterials reflect, absorb, or emit photonsrelative to their unique molecular make-up, reflected energy from objects on theground appear to an MSI or HSI sensor

as a “spectral fingerprint” in the visible,near-infrared, and short-wave light spec-trum.6 Targets visible in a particularspectral band may not necessarilyemerge in another. All materials gener-ate unique spectral fingerprints that canbe detected and catalogued in a data-base.7 Spectral images may be used todetect military equipment such as cam-ouflaged weapons systems, vehicles, andhazardous products. In collecting datawithin two spatial dimensions and onespectral, the resulting product is essen-tially three-dimensional. Multispectraland Hyperspectral Imagery may there-fore contribute to 3-D models for battle-space simulation, air attack route plan-ning, and terrain mapping.8

Both MSI and HSI are passive tech-niques that depend on the sun or someother independent source for emissionor illumination. Over and above thecapabilities of Multispectral sensors,HSI systems are now able to collect datawithin hundreds of spectral bandsacross a broader cross-section of theelectromagnetic spectrum. Increaseddata collection is therefore possibleallowing greater sensitivity and finerresolution. The added capability of HSIallows many remote-sensing tasks to beaccomplished that are impractical orimpossible with an MSI system, includ-ing initial detection of chemical or bio-logical weapons production, assessmentof bomb damage, and detection oftroops and vehicles through forestfoliage.9 Although Hyperspectral sen-sors may not be able to detect a missilesignature, detection of the plume fromthe missile’s effect on the atmosphere ispossible permitting determination ofthe launch and flight path.10

Many HSI sensors are currently inuse in commercial and military sectors.

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in blurred images.18 ISAR exploits mod-ified algorithms to measure and evalu-ate the doppler shifts resulting fromthis rotational movement thereby allow-ing the generation of high-resolutionimages of these target types. Theseenhancements make SAR an effectivedetection and tracking tool for ISRassets in all weather conditions.

SAR systems are currently employedon various platforms including mannedaircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, andsatellites. Each platform category offersvarying performance capabilities in theareas of resolution, spatial and temporalcoverage, mission flexibility, and vulner-ability. Of the airborne SAR platforms,the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target AttackRadar System (J-STARS) and the U-2 arethe most capable.

The J-STARS is a modified Boeing707/300 that serves as an “airborne bat-tle management and C2 platform whichconducts ground surveillance to developan understanding of the enemy situationand to support attack operations and tar-geting.” Its radar suite includes SARwith MTI that can cover 50,000 squarekilometers while detecting targets out to250 kilometers. It can detect and tracknumerous ground vehicles, moving andstationary, and possesses a limited capa-bility to track helicopters, low velocityfixed-wing aircraft, and rotating anten-nae.19 This battlefield information is col-lected and transmitted in near-real timeto supporting ground stations.

The U-2’s ISR suite includes theAdvanced SAR System (ASARS-2) capa-ble of the highest resolution currentlyavailable for radar ground mapping per-mitting detection of stationary andmoving ground targets out to 180 kilo-meters.20 The collected data is format-

ted and transmitted to an EnhancedTactical Radar Corelator (ETRAC) pro-viding a new generation processing sys-tem for ASARS-2 information. TheETRAC digitizes the data, producessoftcopy imagery and, to a limitedextent, interprets this imagery for intel-ligence products that can be disseminat-ed to users via ground stations.21

Other users of SAR include theUnited Kingdom, which is planning tofulfill its Airborne Standoff Radar bat-tlefield (ASTOR) surveillance require-ment with a variant of the ASARS-2system mounted on a BombardierGlobal Express jet airframe. Expectedin-service date of ASTOR is 2005.Development is also continuing on aNATO Alliance Ground Surveillance(AGS) system. The American/Belgian/Canadian/Danish/Norwegian proposedsolution incorporates a SAR and MTI,with functionality and resolution supe-rior to that now available on J-STARS.22

Installation of the suite on an AirbusA320 airframe is projected, with an in-service date of 2008.

Augmenting the contemporarymanned aircraft options are UAVs, suchas Predator and Global Hawk. UAVsrepresent a low-cost alternative tomanned airborne ISR vehicles, and areespecially relevant to high-risk, dynam-ic missions. The Predator UAV incorpo-rates the TESAR strip-mapping SAR,which provides “continuous variable-resolution imagery from 1 meter to 0.3metre.”23 The data is translated intoimagery through on-board processingand then compressed for down link to aground control station. The radar canoperate in strip mode with swathwidths of up to 800 metres aligned witheither the aircraft track or a predeter-mined terrestrial line, or in pseudo-spot

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• monitoring of refugee migration;• arms control and verification

(WMD);• counterterrorism - threat monitor-

ing; and • counternarcotics - growing, pro-

cessing and transshipment.

Operation Allied Force offered sev-eral applications for HSI sensors at theoperational level. The potential existedto use HSI technology to identify tar-gets and follow-on bomb damage assess-ment. Battlespace hazards includingenvironmental and weapons of massdestruction might have been classifiedand highlighted in near-real time withHIS technology. Potential hazards toKFOR personnel, including land minesand chemical / biological weaponscould also have been identified withthis technology. Finally HSI sensorscould have detected regular patterns ofrecently disturbed soil making it possi-ble to isolate mass graves and determinethe location of minefields. MSI and HSIas ISR technologies are potentially avail-able for use today. Indeed, it is possiblethe US exploited these technologiesduring Operation Allied Force. MSI andHSI are examples of technologies cur-rently available for Canadian develop-ment with coalition partners. IncreasedCanadian involvement in this realmmay, therefore, improve CF opportuni-ties related to either the provision of, oraccess to, ISR on the battlefield.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)

The defining characteristic ofSynthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is itsability to detail an extremely fineazimuth resolution without the largeantennae normally required for compa-rable sharpness in beam focus. This res-olution is accomplished through a syn-

thetic array, a “single moving antennato simulate the function of all the anten-nae in a real linear antenna array.”16

The polarized radiation is transmittedalong the route of the SAR vehicleenabling received signals to be collect-ed, stored, and subsequently processed.These signals can subsequently be col-lated with other data sets to producehigh-resolution images.

SAR is an active system, whichoperates in the microwave band of theelectromagnetic spectrum. Unlike spec-tral, purely optical, or infrared systems,the longer wavelength microwave ener-gy of SAR is able to penetrate cloud, fog,mist, smoke, and rain. SAR provides allweather, day-night imaging with thecapability of spatial resolutions up toone foot making it an invaluable militaryclassification and identification system.

Recent developments and tech-niques to enhance the utility of SARinclude interferometry, moving targetindication (MTI), and inverse SAR(ISAR). Interferometry, or three-dimen-sional SAR, is another imaging tech-nique that uses triangulation of tworadars to develop very accurate high-resolution topographic maps with alevel of detail approaching the wave-length of the microwave radiationemployed.17 Techniques have also beendeveloped to allow SAR to detect thedoppler shift of received microwave sig-nals created by moving targets, includ-ing land vehicles, aircraft, and ships.By filtering background returns, mov-ing targets can be identified and catego-rized in accordance with their respec-tive velocities and size. While SAR isappropriate for imaging most types oftargets, the rotational component of air-craft, ships, and satellites tend todeflect the microwave energy resulting

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charge-coupled devices (CCDs) thatoperate in a large spectral bandwidth.As well, EO systems that have been tra-ditionally dependent on ambient lightsources are now able to operate usinglaser illumination. These modern tech-nologies provide EO systems with theability to penetrate haze, and signifi-cantly improve image resolution, albeitfor relatively short distances (threemiles). EO systems that are coupledwith new array aperture technology canprovide images of large areas with highresolution in a digital format that maybe transferred to commanders at all lev-els in near real time.28

Modern EO technology can have asignificant impact on the strategic,operational, and tactical level theatres.For strategic and operational employ-ment, modern EO technology is inte-grated into a variety of manned andunmanned airborne platforms. Space-based platforms employ EO sensors toprovide images for reconnaissance, tar-geting, and meteorology to all levels inthe command and control networks. EOsystems are also integral to the payloadof modern UAVs, such as the GlobalHawk. Manned platforms, such as theJoint Strike Fighter (JSF), will alsoemploy an EO sensor for targeting. Thissensor will have a field of regardextending above the horizon and willoperate continuously during flight tomonitor the battlespace. The digitalprocessing capabilities of these newerEO systems significantly enhance thesurvivability of the surveillance system.For example, an aircraft flying at 450knots at low-level with a traditional EOsystem would take twelve seconds tophotograph a complete 10,000 foot-longrunway for battle damage assessment.With a modern EO camera this can beachieved with two frames in 1.8 sec-

onds thus minimizing the exposure timeof the aircraft over the hostile target.29

At the tactical level, progress isbeing made to overcome EO/IR surveil-lance limitations characteristic of tradi-tional forward looking infrared (FLIR)and night vision goggle (NVG) systems.Many of the limitations inherent inFLIR and NVG technologies are over-come by a new technology called LaserRange-Gated Imaging (LRGI). LRGItechnology employs a pulsed laser and agated image-intensified camera. Theprocess begins with a short intenselaser-light pulse directed towards a tar-get of interest. As the light travels it isabsorbed and scattered by obscurantsin the atmosphere such as smoke, dust,rain or fog. The camera shutter remainsclosed, or gated, to avoid the backscat-ter caused by such obscurants. Thepulse illuminates the target and reflectsback to the image-intensified camera.The camera shutter opens at the timethe reflected laser light is calculated toreturn from the target, and remainsopen for the duration of the laser pulse.The desired range is defined by the timethe shutter remains open. The depth offield is controlled by adjusting thelength of the laser pulse and the dura-tion the shutter is to remain open.30

LRGI technology overcomes manyof the limitations of traditional NVGsand FLIR systems by using a laser togenerate its own source of illumination.This active technology gives it anadvantage over NVGs and FLIR systemsthat are dependent on external ambientlight sources or thermal contrast.Second, the range-gated technology isable to eliminate the negative effects ofbackscattering. This means LRGI can“see through” obscurants such as fog,rain or dust. Third, LRGI technology

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mode where a target area is continuous-ly imaged while the aircraft travelsthrough the region.24

Global Hawk’s SAR operates ineither strip mode, providing one-metreresolution, or spot mode providing thir-ty centimetre resolution that can sup-port GMTI on targets with speeds aslow as four knots. On a 24-hour mis-sion, Global Hawk’s SAR can providecoverage of just over 74,000 square kilo-metres in wide mode, or 1,900 two-kilo-metre square spot images.25 By 2004,the USAF plans to replace GlobalHawk’s SAR with the same ASARS-2system that is currently employed onthe U-2.26

Space-based SAR (SBSAR), in addi-tion to providing overlapping coveragewith manned and unmanned aerialvehicles, provides an effective means tomonitor remote land and oceanic areasthrough wide-area surveillance withoutthe limitations imposed by airspacerestrictions and national boundaries.Currently there are two commercial SARsatellite systems in operation: theEuropean Resource Satellites (ERS) andCanada’s RADARSAT. Because of thesimilarities, only RADARSAT will bediscussed.

Canada currently has oneRADARSAT satellite in orbit. A secondsatellite (RADARSAT-2) is planned forlaunch in 2004 and is predicted toachieve resolutions as refined as threemetres. RADARSAT can image an areaof over one million square kilometresper orbit.27 The data received byRADARSAT is digitized and encoded byon-board processors, and can be down-loaded in real time to a ground network.Originally developed to support scien-tific research, RADARSAT has been

used extensively in such fields asoceanography, including ice flow pat-terns, forestry, geology, and agriculture.RADARSAT has also been used as a mil-itary ISR asset with its imaging capabil-ity being exploited in peace supportoperations and humanitarian missions.

The major limitation of SAR is itssignificant cost and support infrastruc-ture associated with highly compleximaging technologies. SAR can beaffected by atmospheric phenomena,that may cause false targets in MTI andobscure mapping that may make real-time targeting difficult. Nevertheless,SAR offers a very capable ISR sensorthat complements HSI and other spec-tral sensors in that it provides an all-weather capability.

Electro-Optics and Infrared

Traditional electro-optical (EO) andinfrared (IR) sensors have a number oflimitations that are slowly being over-come by advances in EO/IR technology.In the case of EO sensors, the ability toprovide an image with good resolutiondepends on the availability of electro-magnetic energy or illumination fromsources such as stars or solar light. Aswell, traditional EO systems are unableto penetrate fog or clouds and workpoorly in the rain. They also providelimited resolution over long ranges. IRsystems are dependent on thermal ener-gy and are only effective if the desiredtarget exhibits thermal contrast charac-teristics. Recent advances in EO and IRtechnology have overcome or minimizedthe effects of many of these limitations.

The current fourth generation ofEO technology offers several advan-tages. New EO sensors, based on thedigital camera concept, use new digital

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Current program developmentsinclude the Aero-Vironment BlackWidow, the Sander’s MicroStar andLutronix Kolibri. The Aero-VironmentBlack Widow can travel one kilometrein twenty minutes. It is powered bylithium batteries and is launched pneu-matically from a shoulder pack withview goggles for the operator to viewlive video images. The expected flighttime is 1 hour. The Sanders’ Microstaris a fixed wing MAV with a 20-60minute range of five kilometres, and isconsidered best suited for over-the-hillreconnaissance. It is powered by anelectric motor and will cruise at alti-tudes of 50-300 ft. The Microstarshould be available in September 2001.The Lutronix Kolibri, is a rotary wingvehicle that has a vertical take-off capa-bility and an endurance of 30 minutes.It is powered by a diesel engine anddesigned to carry imaging sensors forboth day and night. It is best suited forreconnaissance and surveillance mis-sions in urban operations.37

There are many challenges to beaddressed in MAV construction andoperation such as navigation, propul-sion, energy and aerodynamics. Inaddition, concerns with battlefield con-trol, data-link capabilities and full ISRintegration need to be addressed.Nevertheless, this emerging technologycould drastically change the use of ISRon the battlefield.

Early successes of the MAV pro-grams indicate that the technology isfeasible. As stated by one engineer,“we may optimistically anticipate arapid evolution of MAVs to militarilyuseful and flexible systems in the not-too-distant future.”38 Eventually MAVswill be providing the operational com-mander with surveillance and recon-

naissance required for operationalawareness, the ability to detect biologi-cal and chemical agents, and direct com-munications to any part of the combatzone. MAVs, once perfected, could bean effective ISR technology.

Microbiological and ChemicalProtocols

One of the newest technologiesdesigned to deal with an evolvingasymmetric threat to forward-deployedair or land forces is automated detectionof nuclear, biological or chemicalagents. The field of microbiologicaland chemical protocols has developedand expanded significantly in this cen-tury, particularly in the past 15 years.This developing technology has permit-ted significant improvements in thedetection and identification of variouscompounds. The Defence ResearchEstablishment Suffield (DRES) has usedthis new technology to develop the lat-est generation detection system thatintegrates biological and chemical pro-tocols in the Canadian IntegratedBio/Chemical Agent Detection System(CIBADS). CIBADS uses two complexapplications to detect and identify bio-logical agents consisting of aFluorescence Aerodynamic ParticleSizer (FLAPS) and Chemical AgentDetection System (CADS).

Fluorescence Aerodynamic ParticleSizer technology is based on flowcytometry, and enables the measure-ment of the physical and chemical char-acteristics of individual compound cellsat high speeds. The continued develop-ment of improved signal-to-noise ratiosin new flow chambers (in the 1980s),the use of laser-based systems withclosed flow chambers (in the 1990s)plus the advanced computer processing

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reduces the “blooming effect” of artifi-cial light that degrades the image con-trast and seriously degrades the func-tionality of traditional NVGs. Unlikeconventional sensors, LRGI sensors canoperate day or night, with no ambientlight, in degraded weather conditions.31

Although EO/IR technology isimproving rapidly, it still has limitations.Good resolution over long ranges muststill be improved. Atmospheric condi-tions continue to degrade EO/IR effec-tiveness. Dense moisture, such as heavyrain or cloud will obscure the intendedimage. The sensor capability may also bereduced depending on temperature vari-ations affecting the near infrared spec-trum such as during crossover timesbetween night and day when tempera-ture contrast becomes less. As well,those systems dependent on lasers forillumination are neither covert nor eye-safe. This is a problem when conductingclandestine operations.

Despite several limitations, EOtechnology provides an excellent, low-cost sensor alternative that can be easi-ly integrated with a variety of platformsand other ISR sensors. Advances arebeing made which will further mini-mize the impact of atmospheric condi-tions on EO/IR technology. Researchand development is ongoing in an effortto minimize or perhaps eliminate theeye-safe hazard associated with LRGItechnology. EO/IR sensors will contin-ue to play a dominant role in futureoperations and will provide a highlycapable complement to the ISR equip-ment arsenal. Canadian-developed EO/IRtechnologies, such as DREV’s LRGI sen-sors, offer Canada the ability to leveragethis technology in exchange for accessto other ISR capabilities in a coalitionenvironment.

Microtechnology

The predominant ISR platform infuture military conflicts may consist oflarge numbers of smart micro-sensors car-ried on micro-air vehicles (MAV) all tiedinto a global aerospace surveillance net-work. The war zone could see tens ofthousands of flying, crawling or hoveringinsect-sized vehicles designed to seek outenemy forces and attack or designate themfor long-range precision strike weapons.32

Development of MAVs began in1997 with a US government initiative todevelop the new vehicles. Specific per-formance and environmental specifica-tions dictated that MAVs be capable oftraveling up to 20 kilometres, remainairborne for up to two hours, and becapable of vertical take-off and land-ing.33 The design parameters set bygovernment were those of a semi-inde-pendent flying vehicle not to exceed sixinches in length, width and height, andto be no heavier than fifty grams.34 Theprimary payload carried by MAVs willbe a visual imaging system consisting ofa camera and data transmitter.35

Other capabilities of MAVs mayinclude a digital datalink derived fromwireless local-area networks and animaging sensor by digital camera. Thesensor is expected to provide recogni-tion of a squad-sized target, day andnight, which would be transmitted to anotebook computer. From these con-cepts two types of missions are derived:standoff sensing to observe, and close-inoperations to fly beneath tree canopiesor inside buildings. Other potentialroles include service as a fixed, unat-tended surface sensor, detection andidentification of biological or chemicalagents, communications relay, and forplacement of lightweight weapons.36

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provide automatic detection of nuclear,biological or chemical agents.

Despite the incredible capabilityavailable in modern sensor technology,the ISR suite is only effective when theinformation it provides is distributed tothe right location at the right time. Toensure this result, technologies must beintegrated with consideration given toprotocol standardization, data fusionalgorithms, interoperable sensors andplatforms, interoperable battle manage-ment systems and security requirements.On the battlefield the effective integra-tion of a modern suite of ISR sensors willprovide commanders with critical infor-mation on the enemy’s positions, move-ments and vulnerabilities, all key featuresin establishing battlefield dominance.

“Information is the currency of vic-tory on the battlefield.”50 Eligibility toparticipate in future coalition opera-tions will be influenced by the “curren-cy,” or ISR capability, that is brought tothe conflict. Canada must leverage itslimited ISR capability and technicalexpertise to negotiate for access to criti-cal ISR information that will keep ourpersonnel safe and render Canadianswelcome partners at the battle-planningtable. An understanding of advancedISR technologies is a key component inidentifying Canada’s ISR requirement.

Endnotes

1. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century(Boston, Little, 1993): 118.

2. US Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine(Washington: Department of the Air Force,September 1997): 79. This documentdefines ‘Battlespace’ as the commander’sconceptual view of the area and factors,

which he must understand to successfullyapply combat power, protect the force, andcomplete the mission.

3. Col Gary D. Payton, USAF, ed., “TheArt of Intelligence, by the General,”AirPower Journal (Winter 1993): 19.

4. US Air Force, Intelligence, Surveillance,and Reconnaissance Operations Doctrine(Washington: US Air Force (21 April 1999): i.

5. C4ISR – Command, Control,Communications, Computers, Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

6. Edward D. Flinn, “HyperspectralImaging Reveals Fine Details,” AerospaceAmerica, (Jun 2000): 26-27

7. Flinn 26. HSI processors can auto-matically compare preexisting cataloguesof a battlespace to determine and identifythe arrival of new equipment, personnelor materials.

8. Images of the earth’s surface are collect-ed in two spatial dimensions (x and y axis)along the host platform route of travel. Themulti or hyperspectral dimension of datacollection is comprised of several, perhapshundreds of spectral slices, which identifymaterials by their reflectivity or emissivity.

9. Federation of American Scientists,“Hyperspectral Imaging,” http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/hyper.htm

10. Nahum Gat and Suresh Subramanian,“Spectral Imaging: Technology &Applications,” Hyperspectrum News Letter,Vol 3: 5.

11. R. Anderson et al. Military Utility ofMultispectral and Hyperspectral Sensors(Alexandria: Defense Technical InformationCenter, 1994): 7-5,7-6.

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prevent unwanted persons from translatinginformation received during transmissionsof data on tactical links such as Link 16.Although military systems employencryption techniques ten times strongerthan current civilian applications, the gapis narrowing as demand for electronicbanking security increases.48 As commer-cial systems become more sophisticated,the threat to military security willincrease. The second security issue is theprovision of jam-resistant transmissionsover the link to ensure that the requiredinformation is received. Space-basedtransmissions from Global PositioningSystem (GPS) satellites are likely to bejammed at the ground site where the linkoccurs. The G-STAR is an emerging tech-nology that eliminates jamming signalsprior to sending data to a satellite. Thistype of capability will eventually be avail-able for many tactical GPS systems that arelikely to be used on ISR sensor platforms.Security against electronic warfare willbecome increasingly important as modernforces become dependent on ISR links tomanage the battle.

CONCLUSION

Conflicts of the past decade accom-panied by the dynamic advances in ISRtechnologies have positioned intelli-gence, surveillance and reconnaissanceat centre stage as an instrument of com-bat in future joint and multinationalconflicts. Military success in futureconflicts will be based on the ability toacquire timely, relevant and continuousISR information and effectively inte-grate the multiple information sourcesinto the commander’s battle plan.49 Fora nation that is committed to participa-tion in future coalition operations, itwill be necessary to establish a properunderstanding of emerging and cur-rently available ISR technologies.

ISR encompasses a wide range of

Point of View, Unmanned Systems (Spring1998): 15.

34. Cathy Handley, “Tiny Planes, BigTasks,” Compressed Air Magazine Company(Jul/Aug 1998): 14.

35. “A personal eye in the sky,” TheEconomist (9 Jan 1999): 74. Technologiststoday can build a miniaturized video cameracapable of producing a picture using 72,000pixels. Pictures created from one million pix-els will be available within the next two years.

36. Mark Hewish, “A Bird in the Hand,”Jane’s International Defense Review. (Nov1999): 22.

37. Ibid: : 24. Cathy Handley, “Tiny planes,big tasks,” Compressed Air (Jul/Aug 1998): 14.

38. Cathy Handley, “Tiny planes, bigtasks,” Compressed Air (Jul/Aug 1998): 14.

39. Davey Hazel, “Flow Cytometry ofMicrorganisms,” http://144.124.112.69/thesis/tchap1.html.

40. Defence Research EstablishmentSuffield, “Canadian Integrated Bio/ ChemicalDetection System (CIBADS),” www.dres.dnd.ca/Products/RD98002/ index.html

41. “What is Chromatograpy?” http://members.kr.inter.net/guesu/gs/a_introduc-tion/chromatography.html

42. DRES CIBADS www.dres.dnd.ca/Products/RD98001/index.html.

43. U.S. Department of Defence, AirborneReconnaissance Sub-Domain Annex for theC4ISR Domain - Draft Version 2.0, from theFederation of American Scientists InternetPage (29 October 1997): 4-5.

44. Robert Wall, “Sigint Upgrades Nearing

Deployment,” Aviation Week & SpaceTechnolog, (15 November 1999): 1-2.

45. Roy, J. and E. Bossé, Dept. of NationalDefence, DREV-R-9719 : A Generic Multi-Source Data Fusion System (Ottawa :Research and Development Branch, June1998): 20.

46. Taubenberger: 28-1. “AdvancedTactical Workstation (ATW) for Windows,”Janes’s C4I Systems 1999-2000 (24 June1999).

47. “Advanced Tactical Workstation (ATW)for Windows,” Janes’s C4I Systems 1999-2000 (24 June 1999).

48. “Wireless Review,” Overland Park (Jun15, 2000) Vol. 17, No 12.

49. United States Airforce, JointWarfighting AY 2000 (Maxwell AirforceBase: Air University 2000): 16.

50. Ibid: 16.

15

12. Defence Research Establishment,Valcartier, “The DREV Infrared ImagingSpectrometer (phase II).” www.gsfc.nasa.gov/ISSSR-95/drevinfr.htm. 1

13. Wilson, H.T., “Tests Advance UCAVRole,” Aviation Week and Space Technology,Vol 149, No 3 (Jul 1998): 60.

14. Nick Speciale, Hyperion Instrument,”www.eol.gsfc.nasa.gov/Technology/Hyperion.html. 1-2.

15. A similar strategy of dual-phenomenol-ogy is employed in the detection of ballisticmissile launches. Confidence in the assess-ment increases dramatically with each new,confirming sensor / reporter.

16. Robert Trebits, “Synthetic ApertureRadar,” in Principles of Modern Radar (NewYork: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company,1987): 505.

17. George Stimson, Introduction toAirborne Radar (Mendham, New Jersey:Scitech Publishing Inc.): 515.

18. Ibid. : 435.

19. Department of the Air force, “E-8CJoint STARS Fact Sheet,” [http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/E_8C_Joint_Stars.html]. June 1999

20. Federation of American Scientists,“Advanced Synthetic Aperture RadarSystem” (ASARS-2), http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/asars-2.htm.

21. Federation of American Scientists,“Enhanced Tactical Radar Corelator”(ETRAC), March 2000. Martin Streetly,“Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2000-2001,” Jane’s Special Reports (April 2000).

22. Martin Streetly, “Radar and Electronic

Warfare Systems 2000-2001,” Jane’s SpecialReports (April 2000).

23. “TESAR Technical Description,” http://peoiews.monmouth.army.mil/aps.descr.htm.

24. Ibid. Mark Hewish, “Building a Bird’s-Eye View of the Battlefield,” Jane’sInternational Defence Review (1 Feb 1997): 49.

25. Mark Hewish, “Building a Bird’s-EyeView of the Battlefield,” Jane’s InternationalDefence Review (1 Feb 1997): 49.

26. David Fulghum, “UAV to Carry U-2 RecceUnit” in Aviation Week & Space TechnologyVol. 152, No 20 (15 May 2000): 28. CanadianSpace Agency, RADARSAT, (Minister ofSupply and Services Canada 1992): 3.

27. Nick Cook, “US Technology Will Leadthe Way to Improved ReconnaissanceSystem,” Janes Defence Weekly, Section 1C4ISR (13 May 1998): 29.

28. Canadian Space Agency, RADARSAT,(Minister of Supply and Services Canada1992): 3.

29. Hewish: 49.

30. XBION Corporation, Laser Range GatedImaging Systems (New Jersey: XYBIONCorporation, 2000): 1.

31. V. Larochelle, P. Mathieu, J.P. Simard,“Two Generations of Canadian ActiveImaging Systems: ALBEDOS and ELVISS,”(Paper presented at 25th SPIE Conference onInfrared Technology and Applications,Orlando, Florida, Apr 99): 2.

32. “MAVs and Fire Ants,” Air International(Dec 1999): 345.

33. Martyn Cowley and Matthew Keenon,“Micro air Vehicles – A System Developers

14

“The technological component of warcan never fully account for thedynamic interaction of humanbeings, thus war will remain predom-inantly an art, infused with humanwill, creativity, and judgement.”1

INTRODUCTION

Through much of recorded history,significant technological advances

have sometimes been credited withcausing Revolutions in Military Affairs(RMAs).2 Some argue that applicationof current, rapidly evolving informa-tion technologies will also result in anRMA. Whether or not this is accurate isa matter of considerable debate. Whatis generally agreed, however, is that thefuture battlespace will look very differ-ent from that which Western militaryforces trained for during the Cold War.Certainly one of its defining character-istics will be the predominance of, anddependence on, intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.

Military commanders’ ability tocommand and control forces has beenlong crucial to their success. The archi-tecture that makes up command andcontrol (C2) can be considered underfour main elements: technology, doc-trine, organization, and human.3

Attention to all these elements is neces-sary for success, but the human elementmust remain dominant, as this paperwill attempt to illustrate. Unfortunately,the recent enthusiasm for technologicaladvances has elevated the importance of

the technological component, often atthe expense of the human one. Thisphenomenon has resulted in a situationwhere the command dimension of C2

has, in many ways, become subordinateto the control dimension.4

To rectify this situation, the opera-tional C2 architecture must be revisited,with the emphasis placed squarely onthe human dimension. Through anexamination of the various elements ofC2 architecture in the context of thefuture battlespace, this paper seeks toprovide insight into the C2 changes nec-essary to enhance the future operationalcommander’s ability to exercise com-mand and control.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCEAND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

ISR operations have been describedas “integrated capabilities to collect,process, exploit, and disseminate accu-rate and timely information that pro-vide the battlespace awareness neces-sary to successfully plan and conductoperations.”5 Although it has been thefocus of much attention of late, theimportance of ISR is not a new concept.The quest for knowledge of the enemy’sintentions, capabilities and vulnerabili-ties has been a priority of commandersthroughout history. What has changed,however, is the capability to performthis critical function. Needless to say,ISR techniques have advanced consider-ably since the days when the militarycommander would survey the battle-

1716

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR ISR

Synd ica te 6 : Ma jo r Doug las Ba i rd , Ma jo r Marc LeB lanc (Cha i r ) ,Major James Macaleese, Major Kevin McCarthy, Major Dave McComb,Major Don Mulders, Major Shir ley Neville, Major Jennifer Thompson,Major Herb Wesselman

borne and space-based ISR systems pro-vide the ability to look across thebreadth and depth of the entire battle-space. It is now not only possible to col-lect more data than ever before, but alsoto transmit it to users in real or near-realtime through digital communicationnetworks. A combination of advancedISR platforms, improved information-processing technology, and high-speed,secure communications has the potentialto provide the commander with signifi-cantly improved situational awareness.In addition, because modern communi-cations allow for the simultaneous trans-mission of this information to all levelsof command, it is now technically feasi-ble to achieve the elusive “CommonOperating Picture” across the entirestrategic, operational, and tactical envi-ronments. This level of situationalawareness, when combined with othertechnological advances that allow forrapid response, including “sensor-shooter” technology, allows the com-mander to increase the pace of activityand thus to stay inside the enemy’s deci-sion cycle. Looked at in isolation, thesetechnological advances would seeming-ly create the conditions necessary forvictory in any battlespace.9

Unfortunately, as was demonstrat-ed recently during the Kosovo conflict,the notion of information superioritymay be nothing more than a myth10 andthere is concern that the efficient col-lection of data, rather than providing asure path to victory, may actually beinterfering with the commander’s abili-ty to exercise command.11 These con-cerns are partially the result of informa-tion overload. Although some havetried to dismiss this phenomenon as“merely a function of poor presenta-tion,”12 the reality is much more com-plicated. Experience is showing that

the collection of the data is in manyways the easy part of the informationsuperiority challenge. The more diffi-cult part is efficiently analysing andconverting the vast quantities of datainto information at the right time and inthe right format for the commander tomake decisions. If this is not doneproperly, information overload can leadto a situation where the commander andhis staff wait for all the information tocome in, only to find that the informa-tion flow never stops, or that the flow isdelayed or absent.13 An additional con-sequence can be a blurring of the linebetween fiction and reality, and the lackof ability in many users to discern thedifference.14 Therefore, the inherentrisk of information overload is thatcommanders will either fail to make adecision to act when they should, orwill make a poor decision resulting ininappropriate action. In either case, themission may be compromised becausethe technology, although impressive inits own right, does not meet the basicneeds of the commander.

Continued advances in ISR technolo-gy are impressive and have led to muchspeculation on its potential impact on thefuture battlespace. It appears that, givenenough time and money, the potential onthe technology side is unlimited. Thechallenge is to not lose sight of the needto address the rest of the C2 elements.This is particularly true of the human ele-ment, which will always represent thefocus and, to some degree, the limitingdesign factor of C2 architecture.

UNDERSTANDING COMMANDAND CONTROL

Command and control is a phrasethat is so ingrained in the fabric of mil-itary consciousness that it is easy to for-

19

field from atop a nearby hill. However,this early premise of taking advantageof an elevated position has been appliedto the extreme in modern warfare, withthe advent of airborne ISR platformsand space-based assets.

As technological progress contin-ues, ISR assets will become increasinglypervasive and will influence all aspectsof the future battlespace. For the pur-pose of this paper, the term “ISR” willbe used in the context of a key compo-nent of the future battlespace that willultimately result in the collection of asignificant amount of data. This datamust be analysed, processed and con-verted into accurate and timely infor-mation if it is to provide operationalcommanders with the requisite situa-tional awareness that will allow them tomake the right decisions at the righttime. This last step will continue to becritical for success in the future battle-space environment.

FUTURE BATTLESPACE

It is clear that the application of ISRtechnology will have a significantimpact on this environment, creatingwhat is being referred to as a “singleintegrated battlespace.” But the defin-ing characteristics of this environmentwill also be influenced by political, eco-nomic, demographic, and many otherconsiderations. In consequence, thefuture battlespace is likely to be globalin scope and could involve operationsranging from the seabed to space. Theseoperations could also extend across thespectrum of conflict from peace to warand, because of the unpredictability ofthe threat,6 military forces will need tobe capable of quickly shifting up ordown this spectrum at any time duringan operation. With the increasing threat

of adversarial forces employing asym-metric strategies, which could includethe use of weapons of mass destruction,the future battlespace will be more com-plex and non-linear. Additionally, theexpanding use of cyberspace for thepassage of information will add a newdimension to the battlespace with a hostof additional threats and opportunities.7

For political and economic reasons,future conflicts will probably continueto be fought as coalition operations,with all their inherent challenges. Thecurrent aversion in the West to casual-ties and collateral damage will probablycontinue so that future conflict will beincreasingly dependent on manoeuvreand long-range precision munitions.Improved situational awareness willallow operations to be conducted at anaccelerated pace, further increasingdependence on accurate and timelyinformation. As it becomes more afford-able and accessible, advanced militarytechnology and weapon systems will bewidely available to all players, consider-ably increasing the threat posed by bothdeveloping states and non-state actors.At the same time, however, the ability tooperate against a “low-tech” threat mustalso be retained.8

In short, future commanders willbe faced with many difficult challenges.The complexity and unpredictability ofthe future battlespace, and in particularthe availability of ISR assets, willincrease the importance of informationsuperiority in seeking to attain a highlevel of battlespace awareness.

TECHNOLOGY

Technological advancements haveled to the development of a multitude ofsophisticated sensors with which toview the battlespace. In particular, air-

18

When command and control arecombined to form C2, an interestingdynamic between these two elements isrevealed. Pigeau and McCann havedefined C2 as “the establishment ofcommon intent to achieve co-ordinatedaction.”22 But a paradox exists in thatcontrol is created both “to facilitate cre-ative command and to control commandcreativity.”23 The challenge, of course,is to find the right balance between pro-moting human creativity on the onehand and using control mechanisms toeffectively manage risk on the other.This balance will necessarily be situa-tion-dependent, but for reasons alreadypresented command creativity shouldbe given primacy.

Despite the logic of this argument,the recent focus on technology mayhave compromised this important prin-ciple. The enormous enthusiasm fordeveloping more efficient and powerfulcontrol systems has reached a pointwhere these systems are being pursuedat the expense of the command dimen-sion of C2. To best meet the challengesof the future battlespace, the commandand control balance needs to berestored.

COMMAND AND CONTROL INTHE FUTURE BATTLESPACE

Thomas Czerwinski, in his article“Command and Control at theCrossroads,” outlines three methods ofcommand. Command-by-direction isthe oldest method and refers to the situ-ation where a commander personallydirects all his forces. In the mid-18thcentury, when armies became too largefor one person to direct, command-by-direction was replaced by a command-by-plan methodology that continuestoday within most modern military

forces. The command-by-plan methodis highly centralized and is character-ized by “trading flexibility for focus.”24

Czerwinski describes this method as a“futile quest to will order uponchaos.”25 The third command method-ology is referred to as command-by-influence, a method epitomized by thefamous German “Auftragstaktik,” or“mission type orders.” This is charac-terized by a decentralized approachthat begins with a clearly articulatedstatement of the commander’s intentand then relies upon the initiative andcompetence of subordinates for success-ful execution.26

Of the three command methodolo-gies, the command-by-influencemethod has been recognized as the mostappropriate command philosophy forthe complex and unpredictable futurebattlespace.27 Such a strategy wouldalign itself well with information agewarfare and conflict resolution andwould assist in refocusing commandand control on the human. With thismethodology the emphasis is placed oneducating and training a force to exer-cise initiativeand exploit opportunitiesto carry out the commander’s intent. Itallows lower echelons freedom of actionand encourages creativity. This basicchange in philosophy, coupled with anew human-centric C2 system, wouldinfuse in subordinate formations bothconfidence and competence in carryingout their mission. Ideally, a new C2 sys-tem should allow all subordinate levelsto operate semi-autonomously withnon-intrusive oversight.

It appears that the US Army, withits Force XXI and digitized battlefieldinitiative, and the US Navy, with itsnetwork-centric warfare initiative, aretrying to move in the direction of a

21

get that the elements of “command”and “control” are separate entities withvery distinct connotations and roles. Ofcourse, NATO and all Western militaryforces use official definitions to describecommand, control, and C2.15 Despitethese definitions, there remains thepotential for confusion over this impor-tant terminology.16 This motivated RossPigeau and Carol McCann to write anarticle, entitled “Putting ‘Command’Back in Command and Control: TheHuman Perspective,” where they por-tray C2 as suffering from a form ofschizophrenia, or split personality.They assert that within this relationship“C2 as control is emphasized at theexpense of C2 as Command.”17

Symptomatic of the emphasis on controland the confusion surrounding thebasic terms of C2 is the seeminglyunending extension of acronymsattempting to represent what shouldsimply be referred to as C2. Usingunwieldy acronyms such as C4ISRFTW 18

simply exacerbates the problem andfurther diminishes the most important“C” in the string – “Command”. Theseproblems, coupled with the complexityof the future battlespace and the newdigital-centric culture of the informa-tion age, emphasize the need to revisitthe way in which military forces com-mand people, control forces, and devel-op C2 systems.

Command is a uniquely humanbehaviour that is manifested throughthe structures and processes of control,not the other way around. As a cre-ative act, command is the realization ofhuman potential from which militarypower and effectiveness is derived.Pigeau and McCann emphasize thehuman and creative dimensions ofcommand; therefore, they define com-mand as “the creative expression of

human will necessary to accomplishthe mission.”19 Declaring human cre-ativity as the foundation of commandis consistent with the long history ofthe “art of war.” When applied againstthe backdrop of the complex andunpredictable future battlespace, thehuman dimension is not only desirablebut also essential.

Unlike command, control is not auniquely human activity. Rather, it isassociated with equipment, structuresand processes.20 The control functionis a tool of command that may bealtered to suit the needs of the mis-sion. Pigeau and McCann define con-trol as “those structures and processesdevised by command to manage risk.”The key tenet of this definition is thatcontrol must ultimately depend oncommand and, moreover, is incom-plete without command. 21 Controlmechanisms seek to invoke and con-trol action aimed at reducing uncer-tainty and increasing the speed ofresponse to events. The reduction ofuncertainty implies an increase inorder, and this in turn offers a ration-al basis for selecting and then optimiz-ing appropriate courses of action. Inessence, this describes the processwhere raw data is collected, processedinto information, synthesized to alevel of understanding and, finally,converted into knowledge. It isimportant to note that although con-trol mechanisms are used to carry outthe first two steps in this process, onlya commander, or human, is capable ofunderstanding and possessing knowl-edge. These final two steps are themost important because they arerequired before an informed decisioncan be taken. This reinforces the con-tention that the human command mustretain primacy over control.

20

issues thus need to be addressed as soonas possible if our military forces are tobe best prepared for the complex chal-lenges of the future battlespace. Moreimportantly, the commander, or human,leading these forces must be given spe-cial attention to ensure that he also isprepared for the future.

HUMAN

Despite “tremendous advance-ments in technology, organizations, anddoctrine, command is still very person-al.”32 Human intuition is as much a partof command today as it was in the past.It is true that new technologies mightalter the command environment, but itremains that “command potential andeffectiveness is limited by the personalattributes of the commander. In thisrespect at least, the essence of commandis unchanged.”33 For this reason, it isessential that the needs of the human beevaluated continually to ensure that heis prepared and supported to meet thechallenges ahead.

As a manifestation of command, acommander is a human who workswithin a defined military position.After some years of study, Pigeau andMcCann have articulated their defini-tion of a commander as “a position/per-son combination lying on the balancedcommand envelope with special powersto enforce discipline and put militarymembers in harm’s way.”34 This bal-anced command envelope for com-manders at any level represents theircommand capability and is defined by acombination of three independentdimensions: competency, authority andresponsibility.35 If any of these threeelements are compromised, the posi-tion/person and the designation “com-mander” are also compromised.

Defining command capability in thisfashion also further reaffirms theunique role of the human in command,as only a human can accept responsibil-ity and be held accountable.36

Commanders require four levels ofdecision support. They include datagathering, presentation of informationin a way that is easily understood,incorporation of “advice” from othersources, and support for the psycholog-ical and physiological needs of thehuman.37 If any one of these levels isneglected, the effectiveness of the com-mander will be compromised. Unfor-tunately, as previously highlighted, therecent enthusiasm for technology hasled to the development of systems with-out due regard for humans and theirimmediate needs. For a C2 system to beeffective, the needs of the human mustbe considered first. Human factorsengineering considerations, such asthose to address the man/machine inter-face, must be examined and resolved inthe early stages of the design of any sys-tem and not dealt with as an after-thought. If the vast amounts of datathat are being collected cannot be con-verted into useful information and pre-sented to the human in a way that hecan readily digest to form knowledgeand understanding, the commandprocess will not be enhanced and mayeven be hindered.

The level of decision support that isprobably the most important, butarguably has been given the least atten-tion, is that for the psychological andphysiological needs of the human. Notleast this requires an understanding ofhow a person is likely to react in anextremely high stress environment,when faced with challenges thatinclude such stressors as information

23

command-by-influence methodology.They are planning to use informationtechnology to provide a “CommonOperating Picture” to all levels ofcommand that will support a decen-tralized structure. Although theirefforts are commendable, there ismuch more to a change of commandmethodology than simply obtainingthe necessary technology.28

Indeed, it is quite possible thatinstead of laying the foundationtowards a more decentralized commandstructure, advanced information tech-nology will drive the command philoso-phy back towards the command-by-direction method. When the futurecommander’s unprecedented view ofthe entire battlespace and advancedcommunication capability is combinedwith today’s prevalent zero-fault men-tality, the temptation for micro-manage-ment may be overwhelming. Resistingthis will require no less than a funda-mental change in culture, withoutwhich command-by-influence will notwork, regardless of the available tech-nology. As noted in a recent US MarineCorps Gazette article, “complex wardefies microscopic command and con-trol and instead requires a macroscopicapproach that controls the system byinfluencing the system parameters andboundary conditions.”29

Another challenge for the com-mand-by-influence method can arisefrom difficulty in formulating a com-mander’s intent that will alone providethe necessary and sufficient direction tocarry out the mission. Ambiguouspolitical direction can hamper thiseffort, but the real challenge again liesin today’s military culture. The currentcommand-by-plan philosophy dependsmuch more on explicit intent, where

orders and briefings are passed pub-licly. In a command-by-influence sce-nario, the implicit intent, or the unspo-ken expectations, will play a much larg-er role.30 This scenario involves a com-mand climate where “trust, confidence,motivation, creativity, initiative, pride,discipline and esprit de corps are devel-oped.”31 This implicit intent is acquiredthrough years of cultural immersionand experience and cannot be taughtover a short period of time.

Although a command-by-influencephilosophy is generally best suited tothe challenges of the future battlespace,situations might well arise where a morecentralized command methodologywould be appropriate. However, theseapparently distinct command method-ologies are not mutually exclusive.With a disciplined military forcetrained to operate using a command-by-influence philosophy, it is possible torevert relatively quickly to a more cen-tralized command arrangement whenthe situation dictates. Unfortunately,the reverse does not hold. Forces accus-tomed to a centralized command struc-ture cannot easily adjust to a command-by-influence methodology. As previ-ously outlined, military forces operat-ing in the future battlespace will quitelikely require the capability to adjustquickly in a dynamic environmentwhere the intensity of operations mayfrequently vary along the spectrum ofconflict. Therefore, a level of flexibilityand adaptability will be required thatonly a command-by-influence method-ology can provide.

Clearly, re-establishing command asthe primary element of C2 and develop-ing a culture where a command-by-influence philosophy can succeed arelong-term endeavours. These important

22

joint and capable of operating effec-tively in a coalition environment. Inthis instance, joint must mean morethan simply two or more servicesworking together. Organizations mustbe truly and synergistically joint in allregards if they are going to keep upwith the demands of the single inte-grated battlespace. The need for inter-operability within a combined or coali-tion organization will pose uniquechallenges to employing a decentral-ized command philosophy unless allcontributors have emerged from a sim-ilar national culture. Such challengesmust be recognized and resolved wellin advance.

One of the greatest challenges inpreparing for the future battlespace isfostering the necessary organizationalculture. Indeed, experts in this fieldmaintain that a leader’s most importantfunction in an organization is the cre-ation, management and, sometimes, thedestruction, of organizational cul-tures.40 Preparing organizations for acommand-by-influence philosophywill not be a simple affair; it willinstead require deep cultural changes.For example, to prepare for a com-mand-by-influence methodology,organizations will need to reward cre-ativity and initiative, move away fromtoday’s zero-fault mentality, and recog-nize the value of allowing people tolearn from their mistakes. At the sametime, the current tendency to reward“micro-managers” and “workaholics”should be re-evaluated. Althoughthese deeply rooted cultural norms willtake a concerted effort over a long peri-od of time to adjust, this is the type ofchallenge that must be confronted ifmilitary forces are serious aboutpreparing for the battlespace of the21st century.

Regardless of the actions that mili-tary organizations take to prepare forthe future, flexibility and adaptabilityshould remain the fundamental tenets.For this reason, a key component of anyeffective C2 system will be its ability tolearn while it executes its missions. Todo this, staffs need to practice not somuch what to do in conflict, but how tolearn quickly what to do in conflict.41

Doctrine will play an essential part inmaintaining the fundamental organiza-tional principles of flexibility andadaptability.

DOCTRINE

Doctrine, as it applies to C2 in theISR-dominated battlespace of thefuture, should be a series of principles,theories, and policies that guide opera-tional commanders. Like the humanelement, doctrine often receives scantattention in the rush to acquire andfield new technologies. This neglectcan be a costly mistake because “absenta strong enabling doctrine, the fullpotential of any technological improve-ments will never be reached. In thecase of [C2] systems, increased speed,timeliness, and accuracy may have seri-ous detrimental consequences if inte-grating doctrine is not in place.”42

Doctrine designed for the futurebattlespace should be consistent withthe other elements that make up C2

architecture. This requires that doc-trine be truly joint, rather than simply arehashed version of individual servicedoctrine. However, a balance will haveto be found to ensure that this jointdoctrine is “authoritative enough topromote inter-service synergy, while …remaining contingent enough toencourage continual innovation.”43

Doctrine should also be compatible

25

saturation, complex technology, foreigncultures, a pervasive media, politicalinterference, and a host of other factors.Also of great importance is an under-standing of that most human character-istic, emotion. Effective emotional sup-port is required to maximize the com-mander’s command and leadership per-formance by encouraging and enhanc-ing his creativity, will, and interperson-al skills. Finally, in a world where com-puters run twenty-four hours a day, it issometimes forgotten that people cannot.Without proper attention to the physi-cal needs of the human, this key com-ponent of the C2 system will not becapable of performing at his best.

It is thus clear that proper care ofhumans during conflict is essential.Equally important, however, is theirprior training and development. Thisbegins with recruiting, where peoplewith the right technical and emotionalaptitudes for the ISR-dominant battle-space must be recruited. Throughouttheir careers, military personnel mustbe provided with education and train-ing, both mental and physical, to pre-pare them for a command-by-influencephilosophy in the setting of the com-plex and unpredictable battlespace ofthe future. As mentioned previously, avery important part of this develop-ment is the nurturing of a culture thatnot only accepts but also encouragescreativity, initiative, and the use ofimplicit intent.

If the human is to occupy his prop-er place in the middle of the C2 archi-tecture, it is critical that he not becomethe weak link in the system. Regardlessof how much technology a military hasat its disposal, if the human in the mid-dle is not capable of making the rightdecision at the right time, the technolo-

gy will count for nothing. Even ifafforded the proper priority, however,commanders cannot succeed on theirown. It is essential that they be sur-rounded by the right kind of organiza-tional structure.

ORGANIZATION

Organization is an important ele-ment of the C2 architecture because itprovides the commander with his deci-sion support framework. Ideally, anorganization should be an extension ofindividual commanders and properlyreflect their command methodology.38

With advances in information technolo-gy, this principle can be lost in the rushto obtain the latest technological inno-vation. It must not be forgotten that theorganization exists to serve the com-mander and it is the commander thatshould dictate the organizational struc-ture, not the latest technological devel-opment or other supporting influences.Respecting this priority will helpensure that the organizational structurereflects an appropriate balance betweencommand and control.

Future organizations will proba-bly require a hierarchical structuresimilar to those of today. But torespond adequately to the complexand unpredictable environment that isexpected in the future, organizationalflexibility and adaptability will bekey. These characteristics will com-plement a command-by-influence phi-losophy, one that may lead to anincreased span of control and flattenedorganizations to improve the speed ofinformation flow.39

Organizations must also reflect thecharacteristics of the most likelyfuture; that is, they should be both

24

Any successful C2 system must firstreverse this trend by placing thehuman, or command, element at thecore and surrounding it with the appro-priate control mechanisms designed tosatisfy its needs. This balance betweencommand and control should be dictat-ed by a command methodology that isbest suited to the conflict environment.In the battlespace of the future, flexibil-ity and adaptability will be critical anda command-by-influence philosophywould thus provide the commanderwith the best chance for success.However, technology alone cannotbring about such a far-reaching changein command philosophy. Instead, itwill require a long-term effort that willfundamentally alter the current mili-tary culture.

Regardless of the changing battle-space and continuing technologicaladvancements, command will remain auniquely human behaviour. For thisreason, any evaluation of a C2 systemmust begin with the human, or thecommander. If commanders’ needs arenot given the appropriate priority, theirability to exercise command and controlwill be compromised and no amount oftechnology will be able to overcome thisfailure. The commander’s vision andcommand methodology must be sup-ported by an appropriate organizationalculture and structure, and be properlyreflected in the operational doctrine.

The future success of any militaryforce will be contingent on its under-standing of C2 and the unique relation-ship between command and control. Aswell, its ability to recognize the require-ment to take a multilateral approach inupdating their C2 structure against theanticipated threats and challenges ofthe future ISR-dominated battlespace is

equally critical. Only those militaryforces that are able to look past thedeceiving lure of technology, to clearlysee the commander, or human, as therightful nucleus of their C2 system, willbe in a position for success in the bat-tlespace of the 21st century.

Endnotes

1. Hoffman, F.G., “An Alternative to the‘System of Systems’,” Marine Corps Gazette84-1 (Jan 2000): 22.

2. The Tofflers describe an RMA in Warand Anti-War as follows: “a true revolutionchanges the game itself, rather than chang-ing elements within an existing game. Thenew changes normally occur simultaneouslyand include the rules, equipment, size,organization, training, doctrine and tactics.”By this demanding measure, the Tofflersbelieve that true military revolutions haveoccurred only twice in history and, interest-ingly, both in the last half of the 20th centu-ry. They identify first, the first manned mis-sion in space and second, when the parame-ters of range, lethality and speed reachedtheir outer limits simultaneously.

3. Although different variations anddescriptions of the elements of C2 exist, thefour elements listed are commonly used toadequately cover the dimensions of C2, aspresented in DND, Canadian Defence Beyond2010: The Way Ahead (Ottawa: RMAOperational Working Group, 31 May 1999).

4. This theme is developed in Ross Pigeau& Carol McCann, “Putting ‘Command’ BackInto Command and Control: The HumanPerspective,” Command and ControlConference, Ottawa, 25 Sep 1995.

5. US, Department of the Air Force, AirForce Doctrine Document 2-5.2, Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

27

with that of our allies to facilitate inter-operability in coalition operations.

Doctrine should also underscorethe primacy of the human in the C2

process. To support a command-by-influence philosophy, doctrine must betrue to its definition of being general innature, while leaving the necessaryroom for interpretation that is funda-mental to success in a decentralizedcommand structure. Well-written doc-trine will play a critical role in the cul-tural nurturing that is so important toprepare people for the unique chal-lenges of the future. Finally, as a resultof the rapid advancement of technolog-ical innovation, it will be necessary toemploy simulation and experimentationto not only facilitate and validate theincorporation of ISR technology into C2

doctrine, but also to continually opti-mize its in-service employment.

THE RISK OF THE STATUS QUO

The future battlespace will punishharshly any military force that does notproperly prepare in advance. Thispreparation must start with an ack-nowledgement that the current C2 struc-ture needs to be revisited. Further-more, any review must pursue a multi-lateral approach that addresses all fourelements of C2 architecture: technology,organization, doctrine, and human. Butit is the human element that must begiven the priority. If the current trendof technology dictating to the other ele-ments continues, military forces may findthemselves in a very inhospitable envi-ronment where advanced technology andexpensive equipment do not adequatelymeet the needs of commanders. This willcompromise their ability to make timelyand accurate decisions, undermining thevery essence of successful command.

Indications that military forces arestarting to move towards a command-by-influence philosophy are encourag-ing. But if the necessary culturaladjustments are not made concurrently,the reality may more closely resemble acentralized command-by-directionmethodology. Such an approach willstifle the very creativity and initiativethat will be fundamental to success inthe complex and unpredictable battle-space of the future. Because of the needfor long-term cultural redirection toproperly effect these changes, a thor-ough review of C2 architecture shouldbe conducted as soon as possible. If theobjective is to succeed in the future bat-tlespace, retention of the status quo isnot an option.

CONCLUSION

The future battlespace will in partbe shaped by a significantly increasingdependence on ISR assets, which willcreate a single integrated environmentcharacterized by speed, complexity,vast amounts of data, and unpre-dictability. To prepare for the signifi-cant and unique challenges that lieahead, military forces should examineand update the technology, organiza-tion, doctrine, and human elements oftheir current C2 architectures.

Preoccupation with scientific advance-ment has resulted in the technology ele-ment overshadowing other elements ofC2 architecture. Although all elementsare important, of greatest concern islack of attention being given to themost critical element of C2, the humandimension. This neglect has reversedthe natural order of the C2 relationshipand resulted in a situation where thecommand side of the C2 equation hasbecome subordinate to the control side.

26

24. Thomas J. Czerwinski, “Command andControl at the Crossroads,” Parameters(Autumn 1996): 124.

25. Czerwinski, 124.

26. Czerwinski, 124.

27. For example, both Czerwinski and VanCreveld recognize the command-by-influencemethodology as superior, Czerwinski, 125.

28. Concerns with the network-centricwarfare initiative are outlined by ThomasP.M. Barnett in his article “The SevenDeadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare,”United States Naval Institute (Jan 1999).The US Army’s Force XXI initiative couldbe subject to similar pitfalls.

29. Schmitt, John, “Command and (Out of)Control: The Military Implications ofComplexity Theory,” Marine Corps Gazette(Sep 1998): 57.

30. Pigeau and McCann address the differ-ence between explicit and implicit intent in“Redefining Command and Control,” in C.McCann & R. Pigeau, eds., Human inCommand, New York: Plenum Press, 2000:163-184.

31. Forgues, Pierre, Colonel, “Command ina network-centric War,” Canadian ForcesCollege, Dec 2000: 18/34.

32. Paul T. Hartig, “The Digital General:Reflections on Leadership in the Post-Information Age,” Parameters (Autumn 1996):133.

33. Forgues, 20/34.

34. Pigeau & McCann, “What is aCommander,” Human in Command Workshopand Symposium, The Netherlands, 5-8 Jun2000: 11.

35. Pigeau & McCann, “What…,”4.

36. The future possibilities of ArtificialIntelligence are beyond the scope of thispaper.

37. These four levels were discussedduring a meeting with Pigeau andMcCann at DCIEM on 24 Jan 2001. Inthis context, “advice” infers a higherlevel of information, beyond “knowl-edge” into the realm of “understanding.”

38. Bell, William F., “The Impact ofPolicies on Organizational Values andCulture,” Joint Services Conferences onProfessional Ethics (January 1999): 1 of 20.

39. David F. Bean, “Advanced Technologyand the Future of Command and Control,”diss., Department of Joint Operations, NavalWar College, Newport R.I., 1997.

40. English, Allan, “Contemporary Issuesin Command and Control,” DCDS Retreat,Ottawa, Feb 2001.

41. Mark Mandeles, et al, Managing“Command and Control” in the Persian GulfWar (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996): 6.

42. Bean, 1.

43. Czerwinski, 131.

29

(Maxwell AFB, Alabama, HQ Air ForceDoctrine Center, 21 April 1999): 1.

6. Although ISR assets are designed tohelp provide the Intelligence required tomake potential threats more predictable, thenumber and diversity of potential threats,combined with their possible range andmovement along the spectrum of conflict,make unpredictability an inevitable charac-teristic of the future battlespace.

7. Cyberspace is defined in Bob Cotton,The Cyberspace Lexicon: An IllustratedDictionary of Terms from Multimedia toVirtual Reality (London: Phaedon, 1994) as“the virtual space of computer memory andnetworks, telecommunications and digitalmedia.”

8. These characteristics of the future bat-tlespace are reflected in DND, Shaping theFuture of the CF: A Strategy for 2020(Ottawa, Jun 1999) and are consistent withthe vision of the future battlespace sharedby most Western nations.

9. The potential benefits of technology,including speed and situational awareness,along with their potential pitfalls are dis-cussed in Barnett, Thomas P.M., “The SevenDeadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare,”United States Naval Institute Proceedings(Jan 1999).

10. This theory is explained in Thomas,Timothy L., “Kosovo and the Current Mythof Information Superiority,” Parameters(Spring 2000).

11. Pigeau & McCann, “Putting…,” 3.

12. Branstetter, Terry L., “The Realities ofInformation Overload”, Marine CorpsGazette (Sep 1999): 101.

13. Henderson, Steve, “Attack! (send):

Computer Overdependence in CombatUnits”, Journal of Electronic Defense (Jan2000): 46.

14. Ackerman, Robert K., “IntelligenceFunding Lags Growth of Global Menace”,Signal (Dec 2000): 34.

15. CF Operations, B-GG-005-004/AF-000(Ottawa, Oct 2000) defines command as “theauthority vested in an individual of thearmed forces for the direction, coordinationand control of military forces.” Control isdefined as “the authority exercised by aCommander over part of the activities ofsubordinate organizations, which encom-passes the responsibility for implementingorders or directions.” C2 is defined as “theprocess by which Commanders plan, direct,control and monitor any operation for whichthey are responsible.”

16. Pigeau & McCann, “Putting…,” 2-3.

17. Pigeau & McCann, “Putting …,” 2.

18. C4ISRFTW stands for command, con-trol, communication, computers, intelli-gence, surveillance, reconnaissance, for thewarfighter.

19. Ross Pigeau & Carol McCann,“Clarifying the Concepts of Control and ofCommand,” Command and Control Researchand Technology Symposium, Newport, RI,29 Jun-1 Jul 1999: 4.

20. Pigeau & McCann, “Clarifying…,” 3-4.

21. Pigeau & McCann, “Clarifying…,” 4.

22. Pigeau & McCann, “Clarifying…,” 1.

23. Pigeau & McCann, “A ConceptualFramework for Discussing Command andControl,” DCDS Retreat, Ottawa, Feb 2001: 4.

28

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Forces’ (CF) success inconducting operations will contin-

ue to depend on its ability to exploitand benefit from the emerging capabili-ties being developed and fielded in thearea of Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance (ISR). ISR develop-ments are considered a critical aspect ofthe ongoing Revolution in MilitaryAffairs (RMA), where current andfuture military commanders are expect-ed to exercise information dominance intheir assigned battlespace and thusshorten decision-action cycles to moreeffectively apply combat power. Somestrategic direction with respect to ISRdevelopment has been provided for theCF as a whole; however, there is littleevidence of a comprehensive approachto guide the air force in terms of anoverarching vision, or capability defi-ciencies and/or requirements identifica-tion. This will increasingly put the airforce at risk in terms of interoperabilityand operational relevance as the CF’sother services and closest allies contin-ue to plan, develop, implement andexploit ISR capabilities.

This paper does not propose an airforce capability deficiency in a direct ormethodical sense; however, it doesbriefly provide the RMA context andgeneral ISR background prior to explor-ing and analysing selected “affordable”options that would enhance the CF airforce capability to exploit ISR in sup-

port of CF operations. Given thebreadth of the subject area, the scopefor options is limited to mature sensortechnologies that will promise “goodvalue” for air force mission performanceat the operational level. “Affordable”will be defined as those options requir-ing an initial capital expenditure ofbetween 3 and 100 million dollars inCanadian funds, fitting into the catego-ry of “Non-Strategic Capital.”1 Tomaintain military operational relevanceand improve situational awareness inthe increasingly complex battlespace ofthe 21st century, the Canadian air forcemust exploit affordable ISR alternativesincluding sensors which can be inte-grated with the existing air force inven-tory, on unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), and on commercial earth obser-vation satellites.

THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARYAFFAIRS

Reduced to its simplest, an RMA isa “major change in the nature of warfarebrought about by the innovative appli-cation of new technologies, which whencombined with dramatic changes in mil-itary doctrine and operational andorganisational concepts, fundamentallyalters the character and conduct of mili-tary operations.”2 The enabling elementof the RMA has been the current infor-mation revolution along with majoradvances in sensor technologies andavionics. “The current RMA includesachieving enhanced battlespace aware-

3130

AFFORDABLE ISR ALTERNATIVES FOR APPLICATION IN THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE

Syndicate 7: Major S. Allan, Major W. Barlow, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Boland,Major S. Doyle, Major P. Keddy (Chair), Squadron Leader R. Keir (RAAF),Major G. Loos, Lieutenant-Colonel M. Moore, Major A. Vogler (GAF)

Today, EO imagery is generally ofhigh resolution and is suitable for awide range of military purposes such astarget intelligence, technical intelli-gence, and battle damage assessment.EO imagery may only be collected dur-ing daylight hours in good weather. IRimagery allows the collection ofimagery at night; however, poor weath-er negates its effectiveness. IR imageryis useful for intelligence analysis ofactivity such as thermal emissions fromengines and power plants, and thermaldifferentials between tarmacs with andwithout aircraft. SAR imagery may becollected by day and night in all weath-er conditions. SAR imagery is useful forwide area surveillance, indicators andwarnings and camouflage detection.

SIGINT falls under the broadumbrella of electronic reconnaissance,which is defined as “the detection, iden-

tification, evaluation and location of for-eign electromagnetic radiation emanat-ing from other than nuclear detonationsor radioactive sources.”9 SIGINT is fur-ther divided into electronic intelligence(ELINT) and Communications Intelligence(COMINT). ELINT is the “technical andintelligence information derived fromforeign, non-communication electro-magnetic radiation emanating fromother than nuclear detonations orradioactive sources.”10 COMINT is “the

technical and intelligence informationderived from foreign communicationsby other than the intended recipient.”11

As ISR assets each have strengthsand weaknesses, the key to their effec-tive use is to ensure that the strengths ofone capability overcome the weaknessesof another. As a general rule, active sen-sors normally detect and locate, whilepassive sensors normally locate and iden-tify.12 Passive sensors generally do notdetect, as their fields of view are inten-tionally limited to increase system reso-lution. Therefore, to satisfy the detect,locate and identify functions, both activeand passive sensors are required.Finally, the entire array of this informa-tion collected must be fused within anall-source intelligence assessmentprocess and be distributed to variouslevels of command. This process is illus-trated in Figure 1.

GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION

Strategic Guidance and Direction

The CF is mandated by the Canadiangovernment in the 1994 Defence WhitePaper to be a multi-purpose, deployable,combat-capable force with the ability torespond quickly to domestic and interna-tional crisis.14 The CF’s keystone strate-gic planning document, Shaping theFuture of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy

33

ness with advanced intelligence gather-ing, surveillance and reconnaissanceassets. These may include surveillanceaircraft, satellites and unmanned aerialvehicles.”3 These options have thepotential to grant the military almostunlimited amounts of informationacquisition, processing, storage andtransmission capability in packages thatare small and inexpensive.

“Air power’s priority for the newmillennium is the knowledge edge –exploiting information technology sowe can use our relatively small forces tomaximum effect. That means givingpriority to investments in the threeareas of intelligence, command and con-trol systems and reconnaissance.”4

Western countries are responding to theRMA in a number of ways; however, thestrongest area of technological focus ison battlespace awareness and control.“Successful operations are no longerprimarily a function of which nationputs the most personnel, equipmentand technology into the battlespace,but rather which has the best knowl-edge about that battlespace.”5 Coun-tries are therefore investing significant-ly in measures to increase their ISRcapabilities.

Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance

“Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance (ISR) is an integratedcapability to collect, process, exploitand disseminate accurate and timelyinformation that provides battlespaceawareness necessary to successfullyplan and conduct operations.”6 ISR isaerospace power’s oldest mission area,dating back to balloons used to observethe enemy during the FrenchRevolution. Today, as in the past, mil-

itaries observe and analyse the impactof a wide variety of events and conveyintelligence on the adversaries’ capabil-ities and intentions. The goal of ISRoperations is to provide precise, timelyintelligence and reduce uncertainties inthe decision making process.

“The information derived from sur-veillance and reconnaissance, convertedinto intelligence by analysis, is used toformulate strategy, policy, and militaryplans; to develop and conduct cam-paigns; and to carry out military opera-tions.”7 In general, ISR supports opera-tions by providing information andintelligence to a variety of commandlevels ranging from national to unitlevel decision-makers. Additionally, inorder to facilitate decision-makingprocesses, key adversary targets andcapabilities must be detected, locatedand identified by ISR assets.

In general terms, there are threemain ISR capabilities: airborne earlywarning and control (AEW&C), signalsintelligence (SIGINT), and imageryintelligence (IMINT). These capabilitiesmay operate within the entire spectrumof the levels of war and conflict and beaccommodated in virtually all types ofaircraft or space-based vehicles. Thesensors on these platforms may includeIMINT (electro-optical [EO], infrared[IR], or synthetic aperture radar [SAR]),SIGINT, radar with air and surfacesearch modes, or even visual observa-tion by aircrew or human intelligencecollectors. ISR sensors may thus beactive (that is, they emit energy whichis reflected off the target) such asAEW&C or SAR, or passive (that is,they rely on electromagnetic emissionsproduced by the target such as elec-tronic signals or light), for exampleSIGINT or EO imagery.8

32

Figure 1. The ISR Model 13

Detect

Fusion

Locate Identify

ACTIVE SENSOR PASSIVE SENSOR

initiatives such as the LF Intelligence,Surveillance, Target Acquisition andReconnaissance Capability (ISTAR)19

and the Unmanned Aerial Surveillanceand Target Acquisition System (UAS-TAS).20 Similarly, the Navy hasapproached their ISR needs from a top-down, holistic perspective by generat-ing a high level blueprint and movingto combine related projects and defi-ciencies into an omnibus ISR project.21

Given the absence of specific airforce direction, this paper’s explorationof affordable options will necessarily takea “capability-based” planning approachthat will both examine some of theemerging ISR technologies and capabili-ties that are affordable, and that might fitwell into an overall air force and CF plan.The focus has been narrowed to informa-tion sensing and/or collecting, fully recog-nising that other affordable optionsmight exist in the larger contributing ISRprocesses of direction, analysis, fusionand dissemination. In order to gauge rel-ative merit in terms of operational bene-fit, the options considered should be castagainst the requirements identified in theCJTL. Annex B highlights those opera-tional level tasks one might expect to bebetter accomplished with improved ISR.

Air force ISR initiatives should con-form to the national guidance withrespect to scenario based planning, andalso contribute to the relevant Defenceand Change Objectives in DPG 2001.Annex C provides a summary of theForce Planning Scenarios, and Annex Doutlines the relevant DPG 2001 objec-tives. The obvious national goal is tohave a complementary, pan-servicebased approach to CF ISR requirementsand capabilities. Notwithstanding thefocus here on air force operational levelcapabilities, it must be understood that

they would likely be employed in eithera joint or combined scenario, where airpower would serve the Joint orCombined Force Commander in theaccomplishment of campaign objectives.

REVIEW OF SELECTED ISRCAPABILITIES

Having examined briefly thechanging military environment, theresulting impetus for ISR advancementand the current state of strategic guid-ance available to air force planners, itremains to review some of the affordableISR sensor alternatives currently avail-able. CF aerospace doctrine, Out of theSun, states that Aerospace Surveillanceand Reconnaissance (ASR) involves thecompilation of information on the assetsand behaviour of an enemy or potentialenemy by airborne, ground-based andspace-based sensors.22 This review con-siders options for manned aircraft,UAVs, and commercial observation satel-lites. For manned aircraft, capabilitiesalready planned but unfunded are con-sidered with other potential options.Two representative and relativelymature UAV options, the Global Hawkand the Predator systems, are examinedfor applicability in the CF context.Finally, exploitation of commercial satel-lite possibilities is presented as a poten-tial complementary capability to mili-tary satellite system initiatives such asPolar Star whose cost, classification, andstrategic nature are beyond the scope ofthis analysis. Similarly, AEW&C part-nering possibilities with the US orNATO are not considered.

Existing Air Force Aircraft ISRCapability

At present the CF air force operatesa number of platforms with limited ISR

35

for 2020 (Strategy 2020) expands on the1994 White Paper guidance and providesthe strategic vision for the military intothe 21st Century. Strategic ObjectiveThree of Strategy 2020 highlights theneed for the exploitation of leading-edgedoctrine and technologies to accomplishour roles as an innovative, relevant,knowledge-based institution.15 Futuremilitary operations will be conducted atan accelerated pace, requiring rapid co-ordination of political and military objec-tives and increasing dependence uponinformation. Therefore, technologicalimprovements contributing to the RMAshould be evaluated and, where appro-priate, introduced within the CF.

In light of this, the CF has beendirected to develop ways to improve itsability to conduct ISR both nationallyand in support of deployed operations.The current Defence Planning Guidance2001 (DPG 2001) draws from Strategy2020, providing broad yet clear guidancefor CF modernisation and ISR develop-ment. One major goal of DPG 2001 is tofield a viable and affordable force struc-ture trained and equipped to generateadvanced combat capabilities. In concertwith this, the Canadian Joint Task List(CJTL) describes and relates the types ofcapabilities that may be required, togreater or lesser degrees, by the CF. Thearea of “Information and Intelligence”ranks “medium” in the CJTL, indicatinga medium degree of desired capability inthese areas at the operational and strate-gic level. Consequently, the DCDS hasbeen instructed to develop a co-ordinat-ed ISR plan to support operations byMarch 2002.16

Air Force Guidance

In the context of the rapidly chang-ing military environment in general,

and the national impetus to chart acoherent course for ISR development inparticular, the Canadian Air Force isperilously at risk of “following” in asphere where it has traditionally “led”from the earliest inception of air power.No overarching air force policy has beenformulated to date that might assist airstaffs to better identify requirementsand thus more prudently focus scarceair force dollars on those technologieswhich both ascribe to the vision andoffer good operational value. TheADGA Group, a think tank companyhired for various tasks by the variousdefence directorates, was commissionedby the Directorate of Space Develop-ment (D Space D) to determine CF ISRrequirements and comment on currentISR capabilities within the CF. ADGAhas stated that “The Canadian Air Forcehas virtually no organic ISR ability todetect, classify, and identify groundtargets,” “ Canadian aircraft do not havethe most current data link equipmentused by allies…. that will increasinglymarginalise the utility of these aircraftin future mid-intensity conflict situa-tions” and “The Air Force is almostentirely dependent on national levelISR or allies for almost all of its opera-tions outside of Canada.”17

Although ISR discussions continueat many levels, the potential for the airforce to contribute meaningful “pieces”to the larger CF ISR “picture” will con-tinue to be constrained without a coher-ent and orchestrated service approach.This approach must at once recogniseboth the unique advantages of airpower as well as the complex and com-plementary nature of the ISR environ-ment. 18 By way of comparison, otherservices are moving more swiftly in ISRdevelopment. The land force (LF) issponsoring and articulating capability

34

ing capability. This FLIR has been oper-ationally evaluated and found to be defi-cient regarding its vulnerability in athreat environment, functionality indetection, recognition or identificationof targets at an acceptable stand-off, andsystem integration with other aircraftsub-systems. The ISR capability of theCH146 crew is augmented by the use ofstabilised binoculars, and hand heldcamera and video equipment.

Future Planned ISR Acquisitions

The following are current DNDproposals to upgrade or replace existingcapabilities:

CF-18 Hornet. The CF-18 IncrementalModernisation Project (IMP) willimprove avionics supportability andprovide interoperability, survivabilityand operational capability throughoutthe now extended lifetime of the CF-18.Although not necessarily initiated withISR capability specifically in mind, theas yet unfunded sub-projects 0583 CF-18 Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)583, 1816 CF-18 Datalink Project and0273 Advanced Multi-Role InfraredSensor (AMIRS) Project will improvethe overall ISR posture of the platform.The ECP 583 will integrate the majorcomponents and most complicated sys-tems of the IMP into the CF-18, includ-ing the replacement of the APG-65 pri-mary radar sensor with the APG-73.The latter will have improved radarmodes for ground mapping. TheDatalink project will procure, integrateand install Link 16 compatible equip-ment into the CF-18 to achieve com-monality, interoperability and employa-bility with major coalition participants.The ISR benefit will be the ability toshare sensor information with other air-craft, AEW&C platforms, and ground-

based receiving stations. Althoughdesigned principally to improve target-ing capability, the AMIRS project aimsto acquire a new IR sensor that will besupportable, interoperable and moreoperationally capable.

CP-140 Aurora. The CP-140 AuroraIncremental Modernisation Project(AIMP) includes a number of ISR sensorsand capabilities. These include an up-grade to the EO system which “will beaugmented with multi-spectral sensorssuch as Active-Gated TV and Low LightLevel TV to meet the requirement forshort and long range all-weather capabil-ity.”27 The ESM system will be upgrad-ed to include a modern systems libraryand accuracy. The radar modernisationprogramme calls for a Spotlight SARwhich must maintain a small targetdetection (periscope) capability whileadding imaging modes to the radar. Thissystem is currently a project with ChiefResearch and Development (CRAD) andshould be incorporated in the AIMP. Forcommunications a “Tactical CommonData Link (TCDL) capability will beimplemented to maintain national andinternational data/imagery transferinteroperability.”28

CH-146 Griffon. The electro-opticalreconnaissance, surveillance and targetacquisition system (ERSTA) is currentlyunder development for use on theCH146. The ERSTA system will bedesigned in a modular fashion to facili-tate the ease and rapidity of installationto either current or modified hardpoints. The ERSTA system will consistof a sensor package, an airborne controlstation with integrated display, anantenna assembly, and the accou-trement bracket, cables and electronicsto optimise functionality. The sensorpackage will have the following optical

37

capabilities. These aircraft include theCF-18 Hornet jet fighter, the CP-140Aurora maritime patrol aircraft, the CH-146 Griffon battlefield utility helicopterand the CH-124 Sea King maritime heli-copter. Each of these aircraft is capableof collecting ISR-related information tosome degree. Each, however, suffersfrom critical weaknesses or deficienciesthat affect their overall varying capabil-ity to perform the ISR mission.

CF-18 Hornet. After two decades inservice, the CF-18 is experiencing signif-icant deficiencies related to avionics andsensors, which have markedly degradedits operational capability. Many ofCanada’s allies have updated, or are inthe process of updating, their fighter air-craft with systems that render the CF-18non-interoperable. With respect to ISR,the CF-18 lacks a secure jam resistantdatalink and the APG-65 radar is readilyjammed and is deficient in detection,tracking, and sorting of aircraft. TheNighthawk Forward Looking Infrared(FLIR), although primarily a targetacquisition and laser guidance system,has an ISR capability by virtue of its IRimaging and recording capability.

CP-140 Aurora. “As stated in theDPG 2000, the Aurora fleet currentlyconstitutes Canada’s only strategic air-borne surface (sea and land) surveil-lance capability.”23 The CP-140 wasdelivered in 1980 with a FLIR systemthat is “rapidly becoming operationallyineffective and increasingly difficult tomaintain.”24 This FLIR system is opera-tionally deficient because the crew isunable to identify targets at acceptablestand-off ranges at night and ininclement weather. Also, at time of pur-chase the Electronic Signals Measures(ESM) system was accepted with knowndeficiencies based on the expectation of

an upgrade in mid-1980s that did notmaterialise due to financial constraints.The current system is therefore ineffec-tive against contemporary emitters.25 Athird limiting system for ISR is theradar as it lacks an imaging capabilityand is therefore capable only of targetdetection. For close-in identificationand evidence gathering, the aircraft isfitted with a fixed 70mm camera, gyro-stabilised binoculars in the cockpit andNight Vision Goggles (NVGs). All ofthese methods require the aircraft to beflown well within the adversary’sweapon engagement zone. In summary,the ISR capabilities of the Aurora arevery limited and it has “no long rangestand-off target detection and identifi-cation capability.”26

CH-124 Sea King. Similar to the Aurora,the Sea King has a very limited ISRcapability. The Sea King’s radar was fit-ted to the aircraft as a weather avoid-ance system with no means of targetidentification. A FLIR was installed tosome aircraft when they were deployedto the 1990/1991 Persian Gulf War. TheFLIR image can only be recorded by anoperator hand-held camcorder for evi-dence gathering and post-flight analy-sis; there is no downlink capability.Again, the FLIR is very limited in rangefor vessel identification and similar tothe Aurora, this is well within the rangeof most anti-air weapon systems. Theonly secure communications means isvia a voice radio link. The ISR capabil-ity of the CH124 is marginally augment-ed by the use of stabilised binocularsand hand held digital camera. NVGequipment in the aft cabin is availablefor ship identification.

CH-146 Griffon. The CH146 is currentlyfully NVG capable and is equipped witha FLIR system with an onboard record-

36

available that may be fitted to fast jet,maritime or special mission aircraft.Three systems will be discussed.

Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance PodSystem. Perhaps the oldest pod systemstill in service is the Tactical AirborneReconnaissance Pod System (TARPS)used by the United States Navy (USN)on its F-14 fighter aircraft. TARPS con-tains wet film, optical and infra red cam-era systems which do not have a datalink capability. An update of the TARPSsystem is called TARPS – DI (DI forDigital Imagery). TARPS-DI will havean electro-optical capability with higherresolution over present TARPS pod sen-sors. The USN intends to field 24 of theTARPS-DI pods by 2003 for betweenUS$6-8 million instead of purchasingthe Advanced Tactical AirborneReconnaissance System .32

Advanced Tac t i ca l Ai rborneReconnaissance System. The US F/A-18Tactical Reconnaissance System is pri-marily comprised of the AdvancedTactical Airborne ReconnaissanceSystem (ATARS) which includes a dualband EO/IR sensor system, an interfacewith the APG-73 radar and a digital datalink pod. ATARS is designed to fit intothe nose of any post-Lot 14 F/A-18D inplace of the gun. Imagery is transmittedto a ground station via the data link podwhere it is analysed and disseminated.33

The United States Marine Corps (USMC)is at present the only ATARS operatorand they successfully employed the sys-tem during Operation ALLIED FORCE in1999. Although costs are difficult toascertain, in February 1997 a contractwas let to McDonnell Douglas for threeATARS systems, two radar upgrade/con-version kits, 12 upgrade modificationkits, test flight support, logistics, train-ing and technical publications.34

DB-110 Reconnaissance System. TheDB-110 reconnaissance system is a dualband EO and IR system that is designedfor carriage on both fast jet and mar-itime patrol aircraft, but may be fittedto other aircraft types as required.35 Itis a derivative of the imaging sensoremployed by the U-2. The Royal AirForce (RAF) has selected the system forits Tornado aircraft and the RoyalAustralian Air Force (RAAF) has con-ducted a trial of the system with its RF-111 aircraft. The RAF has adopted thepod name “RAPTOR” or ReconnaissanceAirborne Pod for Tornado. The DB-110 isa Long-Range Oblique PhotographicSystem (LOROP) capable of imaging tar-gets in a variety of mission profiles out-side the range of many threat systems.The EO and IR capabilities provide a 24-hour good weather capability in both tac-tical and strategic intelligence collectionscenarios. EO imagery can be collected oftargets at some 30 nm range and IRimagery at 15 nm.36 The collected EO andIR imagery is digital and thus allows nearreal time exploitation and dissemination.

C-130 Hercules. Lockheed Martin hasdeveloped, in support of the Open Skiesactivities, a wing mounted fuel pod con-verted to accommodate a variety of pal-letised control, display, data processingand sensors for reconnaissance and sur-veillance missions. The Special AvionicsMission Strap-On Now (SAMSON) podwas designed to facilitate ISR activitieswithout seriously degrading the primarytransportation role of the aircraft.37

The system, which a trained crewof four can install in about eight hours,was designed to flexibly meet a varietyof sensor system installations for mis-sion specific employment. The systemcan currently be fitted with combina-tions of sensors including terrain fol-

39

and electro-mechanical components:visible camera, mid wave infrared cam-era, eye-safe laser range finder, and alaser target designator.

The aircraft control station willhave a tactical computer system, with adisplay, keyboard and processor, a handcontroller for the system, and an elec-tronics system. The electronics systemwill be the information integration unitcontaining the TCDL essential in thesecure downloading of information to aground station. The omni-directionalantenna array will be within a radomeand will be the link between the TCDLand the ground station.

The present situation is that indus-try has responded to a solicitation ofinterest issued by the Department ofNational Defence (DND). The CH146operational community has identified adesire to obtain 10 ERSTA type systems.The initial replies from industry sug-gest the development and subsequentfielding of 10 systems will incur aRough-Order-Magnitude (ROM) cost of$30 to 40 million. The introduction ofthe ERSTA system will precipitate anincrease in human resources, trainingand support requirements for the oper-ational community.

Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) –Sea King Replacement. In accordancewith the MH project’s statement ofoperational requirements the MH willhave an electro-optical means to search,detect, classify, and identify contacts ofinterest in ambient light conditionsranging from direct unobscured sun-light to overcast starlight in maritimeenvironmental conditions to includefog, rain, drizzle and high humidity. Itmust be capable of detecting a vessel(approximately 20 m in length) at

approximately 15 nautical miles (nm)and identify and target at greater than 5nm (unobscured weather).29 Thiswould prove to be a considerableimprovement over the current capabili-ty. The MH radar must be optimisedfor over-water surveillance, detection,classification and tracking of surfacevessels, exposed periscope masts, liferafts, and aircraft, throughout the oper-ating range of the aircraft. As well, theradar is to be capable of displaying thetarget size characteristics when select-ed by the operator, to include relativeaspect profile with a resolution of onemetre or less, so as to enable stand-offclassification of targets by platformtype and target size.30 To aid in passivedetection and identification the MHshall have an ESM sub-system that willpermit tracking and analysis of emit-ters of interest.31

Analysis of Future ISRAcquisitions

What has not been addressed is therequirement for the air force to detect,locate and identify targets and collectgeneral military intelligence across thefull spectrum of conflict and operatingenvironments. While the Aurora IMPand Sea King replacement will rectifymany of the current ocean and littoralISR deficiencies, the Hornet and Griffonaircraft would benefit from improve-ments to ISR capabilities. Additionally,there is no evidence of the CF consider-ing the use of non-traditional ISR air-craft as ISR collectors. This paper willtherefore provide a CC-130 option.

Airborne Electro-Optical andIR Sensors

A number of pod or retrofittedreconnaissance systems are presently

38

INT activities and will not beanalysed further.

Concept of Operations

A range of ISR capabilities could beacquired for the five aircraft fleets (CF-18, CP-140, CH-146, CH-124 and CC-130) to ensure that ISR capabilities areavailable to commanders across the con-flict spectrum and levels of war.However, a comprehensive analysis ofISR capability deficiencies in the con-text of CF force planning scenarioswould have to be completed before pro-posing a meaningful concept of opera-tions, and therefore, this is beyond thescope of this paper.

Advantages/Disadvantages. The mainadvantages of modifying existing air-craft in the air force inventoryinclude: speed of procurement and ini-tial operating capability; lower costand risk than new platform and ISRtechnology, and reduced impact onexisting force structure and commandand control arrangements. Addition-ally, depending on where the CF isoperating within the conflict spec-trum, it is possible, if not likely, that aCanadian commander will have opera-tional control of manned air forceassets in his theatre and therefore cantask them according to his operationalpriorities. Further, the additions ofsome selected ISR capabilities to spe-cific platforms ensure a greater likeli-hood that some ISR capability will berelevant to the operation and availableto the commander. For example, inhigh intensity operations such asOperation ALLIED FORCE, the CF-18or CP-140 might be available. For mar-itime interdiction operations, the CH-124 and CP-140 might be available.For traditional land-oriented peace-

keeping operations, the CH-146 andCC-130 might be available.

ISR UNMANNED AERIALVEHICLES

Whether in lieu of, or complement-ing, the options for integrating ISR sen-sors onto existing CF aircraft, UAVsoffer purpose-built solutions to CF ISRdeficiencies. UAVs have many classifi-cations and perform a variety of tasks,depending on mission requirementsand the design of the UAV. Until 1993,with only some exceptions, most UAVshad “limited range, were generallyunarmed, had poor self-protection, andwere employed mainly in direct supportof surface forces.”40 Advances in bothUAV and sensor technology make it pos-sible for UAVs to perform many of theISR, electronic combat support and bat-tle damage assessment missions thathave been historically done by mannedaircraft.

UAVs come in many shapes andsizes and provide a wide range of mis-sion capability, and they may haveextensive range and endurance capabil-ities. Medium-altitude endurance(MAE) and high-altitude endurance(HAE) UAVs are suitable for the pur-poses of operational level capabilityrequirements outlined in the CJTL. 41

HAE/MAE UAV platforms are relativelylarge land-based aircraft with a widewingspan and sleek airframe.42 UAVsmay be divided into two main compo-nents: the platform (or vehicle) and thesensors (or payload).

The fundamental differencesbetween a MAE and HAE UAV arereflected in their speed and range capa-bility.43 The range of a HAE UAV sup-ports a transcontinental or global flight

41

lowing radar, moving target indicators,photographic equipment ranging fromcameras to low light television, sea-search radar and infrared systems. Thesystem was designed to accommodatefuture synthetic aperture radars. Thereal-time secure data transmission capa-bility of the system requires verifica-tion; however, Lockheed Martin has amyriad of equipment to effect the spe-cific data capture and transmissionneeds of the user. Canada has beenexposed, though Open Skies opera-tions, to the system and some CF per-sonnel may have operational knowledgeof this system, which may affordablymeet some CF ISR needs.

Airborne SAR Sensors

For a 24-hour, poor weather capa-bility, a SAR would be required asoptical and IR systems may be con-strained by obscuring weather. Atleast one such system is now availableas commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) foradapting to any airborne platform.General Atomics of San Diego and theUS Department of Energy jointlydeveloped the Lynx SAR to provide a“lightweight, user friendly systemwith extended range and much higherresolution” than older SAR technolo-gy.38 General Atomics indicate thatthe “real time, interactive nature of theradar and the innovative operatorinterface, make it a breakthrough formeeting the ease of use needs of front-line military users.”39 The Lynx SARprovides strip map, spotlight, andGround Moving Target Indicator(GMTI) modes, real-time video anddigital displays, and image resolutionfrom 0.1 to 3 metres at ranges up to 42nm. The system weighs 52 kg, hasflown onboard UAVs for extensive test-ing, and has performed as specified. If

it could be integrated into CF aircraftas easily as advertised, it would pro-vide an effective option for improvingCF ISR capability.

Airborne SIGINT Sensors

SIGINT systems consist of inte-grated subsystems of high perform-ance antennas, receivers, recordersand analysis equipment. This equip-ment, normally platform mounted, canbe installed in aerial, maritime assetsor in permanent or deployable groundstations. In aerial applications, unique-ly configured aircraft or satellite sys-tems specifically designed for a recon-naissance and surveillance role usuallysupport this equipment in operations.Many of the advanced militaries of theworld have air assets specifically dedi-cated to this role and the missions itentails. Large, long-range aircraftwith considerable endurance normallyaccommodate the requisite SIGINTequipment for such a mission. Theseplatforms must be supplemented byindependent and precise navigational,positional and attitudinal sensingequipment. Additionally, the onboardequipment must accommodate a wideband of frequency detection and becapable of recording emitter transmis-sions with a high degree of fidelity.

The SIGINT role has been con-ducted by all military elements sincethe activity has been technologicallyviable. The land and naval forces havedeveloped a number of systems thatare modular and tactically deployable.Air force SIGINT assets remain, forthe most part, integral to the spe-cialised airborne platform that con-ducts the mission. Modularisationand the development of a SIGINT podare limited for aviation-related SIG-

40

tude of 65,000 feet out of range of mostsurface-to-air and air-to-air missilethreats, and providing an outstandingslant range for its sensors. Capable ofoperating in all weather conditions dayor night, it carries SAR, EO and IR sen-sors simultaneously. Moreover, it utilis-es high-rate satellite and line-of-sightdatalink systems, and employs self-pro-tection electronic countermeasures. Ithas a wing span of more than 35 metres,a length of 13.5 metres, weighs 10,500 kgand flies at speeds in excess of 300kts.The Global Hawk can provide imagerycoverage of 137,196 square kilometres or1,900 spot targets per 24-hour period.44

Recent technological developmentsin propulsion systems and miniaturisa-tion of sensors now allow UAVs to oper-ate relatively cheaply when comparedto manned platforms. For example theGlobal Hawk costs approximatelyUS$15 million. It carries an 820 kgpackage of EO/IR and SAR sensors withimage resolutions of 0.3 metres in thespot mode and one metre in the searchmode. Sensors cued with a GPS refer-ence will be able to locate targets towithin 20 metres. Future developmentswill facilitate the employment of aGMTI radar mode also. However, withan estimated cost of $US 14.8M perplatform, the Global Hawk cannot beconsidered expendable. Notwithstand-ing this, it would still be the preferredplatform in a high-risk environmentwhere aircrew of manned aircraft wouldbe at risk.45

Concept of Ops. Unlike the Predator andmost other UAVs, Global Hawk is notcontrolled from the ground. Flight con-trol, navigation and vehicle managementare autonomous. Launch and recoveryare controlled by the Launch andRecovery Element (LRE) by using differ-

ential GPS, which is deployable to the-atre if necessary. The Mission ControlElement (MCE), which may be locatedanywhere in the world, directs the vehi-cle. The goal is to make the Global Hawkand its imagery available to commanderswhose need is immediate. Both groundunits can be transported by two C-17sand the vehicle itself can fly anywhere itis needed with a straight-line range of13,500 nautical miles.46

Global Hawk has flown several testflights and has successfully transmittedgood quality imagery from an altitudeof 56,000 feet. It has been called “thetheatre commander’s low-hanging satel-lite” by the Commander in Chief ofUnited States Joint Forces Command. 47

The USAF intends to deploy a fleet ofGlobal Hawk UAVs beginning inFinancial Year 2001. This continuouseye over the battlefield will providecommanders with near real time ISR,feeding sensor information directly tocommanders on the ground.

Advantages/Disadvantages ofUAVs

With a robust suite of sensors,either of the Predator and the GlobalHawk would greatly enhance the ISRcapability of the air force and the CF.Both reduce risk to aircrew in highthreat environments, offer low operat-ing costs, and are more flexible thanspace-based systems with respect todesired timing of image capture.

Although cheaper than the GlobalHawk, the Predator would be at greaterrisk of loss due to lower flight altitudesover the battlefield. The Global Hawkwould be comparatively more protectedagainst enemy attack due to higherflight altitudes above most missile sys-

43

capability, whereas MAE UAVs normal-ly operate within a limited radius froma supporting base. An HAE UAV couldeffectively respond to cues that wouldtake it thousands of miles from its cur-rent location within a matter of severalhours, whereas the slow cruising speedof a MAE UAV prevents any effectiveresponse capability outside of its cur-rent operating area.

The Predator and Global Hawkhave been selected for study due totheir maturity of design, relative afford-ability, interoperability with closeallies, and likely best capability matchto CF air force operational level tasks.

RQ-1A Predator

The RQ-1A Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aer-ial vehicle system. A fully operationalsystem as employed by the US costsapproximately US$32 million and con-sists of four air vehicles (with sensors), aground control station (GCS), a TROJANSPIRIT (Special Purpose IntegratedRemote Intelligence Terminal) II satellitecommunications suite, and 55 personnel.

The aircraft is equipped with acolour nose camera (generally used bythe Air Vehicle Operator [AVO] forflight control), a day variable-apertureTV camera, a variable-aperture IR cam-era (for low light/night), and SAR forlooking through smoke, clouds, or haze.The cameras produce full motion videoand still frame SAR images. The threesensors may be carried simultaneouslyon the same airframe but cannot beoperated at the same time.

Each Predator air vehicle can bedisassembled into six main componentsand loaded into one container to enable

rapid world wide deployment. Thelargest component, the GCS, is designedfor C-130 roll-on/roll-off. Two C-130swould be needed for a complete systemdeployment. Some of the key charac-teristics of the Predator are listed withthose of the Global Hawk in Annex E.

Concept of Operations. The Predator iscurrently being employed for ISR in sup-port of NATO operations in the FormerYugoslavia. The Predator is ideal for mis-sions in areas where enemy air defenceshave not been fully suppressed, openocean environments, and biologically orchemically contaminated environments.NATO deployed a broad range of surveil-lance assets to Bosnia Herzegovina,where the developing situation demand-ed continuous ground surveillance tomonitor agreements and enhance forceprotection of NATO troops. There thePredator conducted 128 ISR missions insupport of Operations DENY FLIGHTand DELIBERATE FORCE, and they wereeffectively used again for OperationALLIED FORCE.

The Predator air vehicle and sen-sors are controlled by its GCS via a C-band line-of-sight data link or a Ku-band satellite data link for beyond-line-of-sight operations. During flight oper-ations the crew complement in the GCSis one AVO and three Sensor Operators.All components must be co-located onthe same airfield, and the system needs5000 ft x 125 ft of hard surface runwaywith clear line-of-sight to each endfrom the GCS to the air vehicles.

Global Hawk

Under development since 1995, theGlobal Hawk programme goal was tocreate a vehicle that can loiter for 24hours, 3500 nm from its base, at an alti-

42

nies will deliver resolution down to onemetre. One metre defines the high-reso-lution range where it is possible to makedistinctions between cars and trucks, torecognize types of fighter aircraft, tocount vehicles in convoy, to distinguishdifferent types of tanks, or to identifybuildings for target selection. Annex Fprovides a snapshot of many of theexisting and planned commercial/civilearth observation satellites.

To meet the DPG 2001 ChangeObjective Seven for the CF to establishexternal strategic partnerships,RADARSAT-2 offers considerable poten-tial. When launched in 2003,RADARSAT-2 will be the most techno-logically advanced commercially avail-able Space-Based SAR (SBSAR) in theworld. Its main advantage overRADARSAT-1 will be improved resolu-tion: as low as three metres. This levelof SAR resolution is not normally foundin commercial satellites. To put this inperspective, RADARSAT-1’s highest res-olution of eight metres permits detec-tion of small aircraft and ships, or largemobile land targets while buildings, air-ports, runways and large aircraft arerecognizable.51 RADARSAT-2’s three-metre resolution will improve detectionand recognition significantly.

Military uses of commercially sup-plied imagery have increased dramati-cally over the past decade, but one ofthe biggest advances has been to pro-vide this information directly todeployed forces. For example, theNational Reconnaissance Office (NRO)and US Army programme, EAGLEVISION II, is a self-contained imagerydownlink and processing stationdesigned to provide military command-ers direct access to multiple imagingsatellites. The genesis of the EAGLE

VISION programme was a result of les-sons learned during the Gulf War.Tactical ground commanders lackedsufficient imagery, and nationalimagery was classified too high for it tobe easily processed by tactical air com-manders’ air planning software.52 Theaim of EAGLE VISION, therefore, is todirectly provide the warfighter withunclassified imagery products that willhelp to both visualize the battlespaceand develop precise terrain and geo-graphic data.

At a cost of approximately US$10million,53 this system is based on com-mercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) compo-nents, housed in an expandable 34-foottrailer carrying mission electronicsequipment, and provided with a 5.4metre tracking dish antenna to receivethe satellite signals. It may be loadedfor transport onboard two C-130s or oneC-17 for deployment, and requiresapproximately four hours to set up.

To ensure effectiveness, EAGLEVISION II must be located in directline-of-sight of the satellite such asRADARSAT-1 and SPOT to accept theimagery downlink. Further, there arefunded plans within this programme toprovide reception of imagery fromLANDSAT 7, OrbView 3, Quickbirdand Ikonos satellites. After receptionof raw imagery, the station’s imageryhardware and software processes it andsupplies results in minutes as unclassi-fied panchromatic (black and white),multi-spectral (colour) and radarimages for use by existing missionplanning, topographic and intelligencesystems. A separate, modular data pro-cessing van contains the tools to matchsatellite imagery with digital terrainand chart information yielding value-added products for three-dimensional

45

tems. As well the Global Hawk offersgreater coverage than the Predator andwill have a MTI mode covering 15,000square kilometres per minute, with aminimum detectable velocity of 4 ktsfor moving targets on the ground. ThePredator must be transported to thearea of operations, whereas the GlobalHawk could be flown from Canada topotentially anywhere in the world.

For the Canadian surveillance mis-sion, the Global Hawk offers greatercapability due to its greater range/cov-erage, high altitude flight profile, andall weather/day/night capability. ThePredator, would be at risk of missioncancellation due to flight restrictions ifpoor weather was encountered at itsflight altitude of between 15,000 and25,000 feet. On the other hand, thePredator is a more mature technologicaloption, having been deployed andemployed in several operational the-atres, whereas the Global Hawk will notbe in operation until at least the begin-ning of FY 2001 with the USAF.

UAVs are relevant to joint andcombined operations, and wouldtherefore offer a key niche capabilityfor the air force and the CF. One majorlesson learned from the Gulf War,Bosnia and more recently in Kosovo isthat there are never enough reconnais-sance assets for ISR, especially high-altitude platforms that can be flown inhigh threat environments.48

EXPLOITING COMMERCIALISR SATELLITES

The CF makes little use of commer-cial imaging satellites products, even asthe number of fielded and planned sys-tems continues to grow, and the qualityof their imaging capabilities is greatly

improving. For international deploy-ments, CF commanders and plannerswould normally make use of militarysatellite imagery products, relying onallies to provide it. After being request-ed and received at the strategic level,these products are then distributed viasecure means to the operational or tacti-cal level. As noted in many CF opera-tions in the past decade, this incurs thelimitations of not having independentsources, of greater operational securitydemands and restricted distribution forhandling classified information, of lim-ited communications bandwidth for dis-tribution, and of competition for prior-ity among many operational levelRequests for Information (RFIs). Ifimagery from commercial sources isused to augment military satelliteimagery, it is also normally ordered atthe national level via phone or Internet,with the products provided in a fewweeks. Dissemination then follows,with many of the same limitations ofmilitary system products mentionedabove, excepting classified handling.Advances in both commercial imagingsatellites, and in deployable ground sta-tions to access them, make it possible tocircumvent these limitations and pro-vide decision-makers with relevantimagery directly for a modest invest-ment on the order of US$10 million perground station.

In the next 5 years, nearly 20 USand other foreign organisations plan tolaunch civilian and commercial high-resolution observation satellitesattempting to benefit from the growingmarket for imagery.49 Organisations inIndia, Europe, China, Brazil, Israel andCanada all have plans to build andlaunch new remote sensing satelliteswith resolutions of 30 metres or less,50

and many new ventures from US compa-

44

Since the Gulf War, commercial satel-lite imagery has been used to support tar-geting planning and battle damage assess-ment.57 As one to two metre resolutionimagery can now be combined with digi-tal terrain data to provide effective target-ing information,58 this application contin-ues to become more effective. The trendfor future war fighting and application ofjoint fires will move toward “dominant”manoeuvre, which translates to a massingof “effect” vice “forces”. For this con-cept, space-based imagery products arekey to targeting and the subsequent mass-ing or “manoeuvre” of effects, and arethus an obvious combat multiplier.59

RADARSAT-2 imagery wouldimprove Canada’s ability to exercise sur-veillance and sovereignty over extensivecoastal waters and northern regions.Presently, Canada relies on foreignsources for almost all its coastal and arc-tic space-based radar surveillance. Thissituation is contrary to the 1994 WhitePaper which states: “Canada shouldnever find itself in a position where, as aconsequence of past decisions, thedefence (by extension, surveillance) ofour national territory has become theresponsibility of others.” 60 This is espe-cially worrisome given that the US doesnot recognize Canadian sovereignty overthe Northwest Passage. RADARSAT-2would ensure Canada’s influence in thearea of space-based radar surveillance.

Advantages. Some of the advantages ofdirect access to commercial imagerysatellites include ease of distributionand handling of unclassified material,avoidance of strategic to operationallevel bottlenecks in C2 links, andimproved timeliness/response (withlonger revisit times offset by accessingmultiple satellites). Fusing informationfrom multiple sources also creates value-

added data. As well, this might repre-sent a potential niche capability for theCF, since the imagery products of thissystem would be highly desirable forany combined force.

Disadvantages. Disadvantages for thisapproach are those typical for space-based systems. For EO sensors, imagescannot be taken at night or throughclouds or smoke. Radar imaging canovercome weather, but is more costlyand not always suitable due to lower res-olutions and active sensing, thereforepotentially disclosing intent. 61 Revisittimes are shortening with newer sys-tems, but they may still be too long toprevent acquisition of desired images asquickly as needed. By supporting andexploiting many imaging satellites usingdifferent spectra, the proposed configu-ration could mitigate this limitation to acertain extent by increasing the proba-bility of successful image capture.

Observation satellites are vulnera-ble to many kinds of countermeasure or“negation”, including avoidance strate-gies such as camouflage and masking(smoke), disinformation and deception.Avoidance strategies are becoming lesseffective due to the increasing numberof platforms, and exploiting imagesfrom many different spectra may over-come camouflage and smoke.

CONCLUSION

Advances in ISR technologies arekey enablers of the RMA and the ongo-ing efforts towards greater battlespaceawareness and information dominancefor military commanders. CF strategicguidance has provided the impetus anddirection to pursue improvement in itsISR capabilities in order to reap theoperational benefits that will accrue for

47

visualization, mission planning andrehearsal.

EAGLE VISION II is not the onlyproven capability in this area, as com-mercial industry has tested similarground station configurations with atarget market of emergency responseand other similar government organiza-tions. Examples include, MacDonaldDettwiler’s Fast TRACS,54 IOSAT’sSentry,55 and US EOSAT/ItalianTelespazio’s ground stations.56

Concept of Ops. To augment ISR capa-bility in the area of theatre reconnais-sance, targeting and Battle DamageAssessment (BDA), the CF could acquiretwo systems based on the EAGLEVISION II configuration. If acquired,this capability would be located at oneof the air force vanguard deployableunits such as No. 8 Air Communicationand Control Squadron. It could be sim-ilarly configured for rapid deployment,to support many observation satellitesoperating in different spectra, and toinclude post-processing tools for pur-poses such as intelligence, mission plan-ning, and mapping and charting.Alternatively, as the capability wouldbe primarily focused at operationallevel tasks and is inherently joint inpotential application, it may be bestsuited to be employed by the CF’s JointOperations Group (JOG). In either case,the ground station would be operatedfrom its garrison location when notemployed on operations, for trainingpurposes, to update image archives onareas of interest, and to monitor regionsof tension or crisis where the CF mightbe called upon to support.

Special attention would be paid toestablishing favourable service provi-sion in terms of cost and access for

RADARSAT-2 imagery in particular,given the potential synergy and costsavings of such a strategic partnership.The concept is a proven one, as bothIOSAT’s SENTRY system, and theEAGLE VISION II system have demon-strated the ability to receive and processRADARSAT data.

Advantages/Disadvantages. Overall,this capability is well suited for the exe-cution of CJTL tasks highlighted earlier.Given the greatly improved resolution ofnew systems, many types of informationare available from commercial earthobservation satellites giving significantoperational utility. For mission plan-ning, space-based sensors bring in acritical vertical component to battle-space visualisation – extending the com-mander’s view beyond the horizon anddeep into the enemy rear to support thedeep battle. When realistic views of thebattlespace are needed in order to planand rehearse, high-resolution imagerycould be draped over digital terrainmodels to create three-dimensional data-bases that would be useful for air andground attack planning.

For intelligence support, the capa-bility to receive data from space at auseful reception rate is a critical forcemultiplier. Imagery would add toground and air systems and othersources to provide a more comprehen-sive Intelligence Preparation of theBattlespace (IPB), and thus improve thedecision-making process. Althoughhigh-resolution imagery does not havethe wide coverage of systems designedspecifically for surveillance, it can stillprovide early warning of attack byopposing ground forces, target intelli-gence, technical intelligence on anadversary’s capabilities, and battle dam-age assessment.

46

Annex A

List of Abbreviations

ADGA ADGA Group of Companies

AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control

AIMP Aurora Incremental Modernization Project

AMIRS Advanced Multi-Role Infrared Sensor

ASR Aerospace Surveillance and Reconnaissance

ATARS Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System

AVO Air Vehicle Operator

CF Canadian Forces

CH/CP/CF Canadian Helicopter, Canadian Patrol, Canadian Fighter aircraft types

CJTL Canadian Joint Task List

COMINT Communications Intelligence

COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf

CRAD Chief Research and Development

DPG 2001 Defence Planning Guidance 2001

D Space D Directorate of Space Development

ECP Establishment Change Proposal

ECP 583 Engineering Change Proposal 583

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

EO Electro-Optical

ERSTA Electro-Optical Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition

ESM Electronic Signals Measures

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared

GCS Ground Control Station

GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator

GPS Global Positioning System

HAE UAV High-altitude Endurance UAV

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IMP Incremental Modernization Project

IPB Preparation of the Battlefield

IR Infrared

ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

49

assigned missions, roles or tasks; and toensure that it can generate viable andrelevant forces for combined operationswith allies. In this context, the air forcemust recognize the critical importanceof ISR to operations, and therefore focusefforts on producing an overall plan forair force ISR development that incorpo-rates jointness, interoperability and thetraditional strengths of air power.

Given an overarching air force ISRplanning framework, air staffs will bebetter positioned for assessing the alter-natives available to enable force devel-opment and procurement decisions thatare coherent, complementary andaffordable. This cursory review ofaffordable ISR options indicates thatsignificant operational benefit isachievable with the sensor technologycurrently available. Sensors which areadded to existing aircraft, are borne byUAVs, or already exist on commercialimaging satellites, can all aid the com-mander visualize the battlespace andtherefore enhance campaign planningand decision making. The various sen-sor systems come with a range of ISRcapabilities, advantages and disadvan-tages, and although individually afford-able, it is unlikely that the CF can affordthem all. Ultimately, the air force mustprepare its plan, decide among con-tending alternatives based on the visionand priorities in that plan, and carry onwith modernizing the force with a suffi-cient range of ISR capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following four recommenda-tions are made based on this study:

• CAS Staff generate a comprehen-sive ISR guidance document,which factors in strategic guid-

ance, state-of-the-art technologi-cal possibilities, joint and com-bined mission and interoperabili-ty requirements, budgetary con-straints and ongoing initiatives.This capstone document shouldestablish the need for a balanced,mutually-supporting ISR sensormix for maximum effectiveness incompensating for inherent weak-nesses in individual systems;

• CAS Staff initiate additional ISR-related force development andequipment acquisition consistentwith capability priorities estab-lished in the aforementioned ISRguidance document;

• CAS Staff carry on with thosecapability initiatives whichascribe to the vision and prioritiesestablished in the ISR guidancedocument and cease activity forthose that do not; and

• if ISR technologies such as UAVsor ground stations for commercialimaging satellites are embraced asnational strategic or joint initia-tives, then the air force must act tobe fully engaged in system defini-tion and conceptual developmentto ensure that air ISR require-ments are sufficiently addressed.

48

Annex B

Operational Tasks with ISR Impact from Canadian Joint Task ListTask # Task Sub-task

OP 1 Operational Command

OP 1.1 Assess situation 1.1.1. Staff branches review current situation

OP 1.2 Prepare plans and orders, 1.2.2 Conduct operational mission analysis

direct ops & training & staff the commander’s estimate

OP 1.5 Plan and direct operational 1.5.2 Posture joint forces

manoeuvre & force 1.5.3 Coordinate operations in depth

positioning 1.5.4 Coordinate Offensive Operations in

the JOA

1.5.5 Coordinate Defensive Operations in

the JOA

OP 2 Operational Information and Intelligence

OP 2.1 Plan and direct intelligence 2.1.2 Conduct JIPB & produce intelligence

activities and reports estimate & prepare collection plan

2.1.8 Provide follow-on intelligence

support to the OA planners and

decision makers

OP 2.2 Collect & share 2.2.2 Collect and share information on

information adversary’s forces and hazards

2.2.3 Collect environmental information

2.2.4 Coordinate theatre surveillance and recce

2.2.5 Directly support theatre strategic

surveillance and recce requirements

2.2.6 Collect target information

OP 2.3 Process and exploit 2.3.2 Collate and correlate information

collected information

2.3.3 Evaluate, integrate, analyse &

interpret OP information

2.3.4 Identify operational issues and threats

2.3.5 Determine adversary’s operational

capabilities, COA & intentions

51

JOG Joint Operations Group

LOROP Long-Range Oblique Photographic System

LOS Line-Of-Sight

LRE Launch and Recovery

MAE UAV Medium-Altitude Endurance UAV

MCE Mission Control Element

MHP Maritime Helicopter Project

MTI Moving Target Indicator

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NVG Night Vision Goggles

OTH Over-The-Horizon

RAPTOR Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado

RFIs Requests for Information

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

ROM Rough-Order-Magnitude

SAMSON Special Avionics Mission Strap-On Now

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SBSAR Space-Based SAR

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SPIRIT Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal

Strategy Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 2020

TARPS Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System

TCDL Tactical Common Data Link

TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence TerminalSPIRIT

UASTAS Unmanned Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition System

UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

USN United States Navy

USMC United States Marine Corps

1994 1994 Defence White Paper White Paper

50

Annex C

Summary of Force Planning Scenarios

No. Scenario Summary

1 Search and Rescue in Sub-scenarios include rescue from a ship at

Canada sea, search and rescue of an Overdue hunting

party in the North, and the rescue of survivors

from a major airliner downed in a remote area

in the North.

2 Disaster Relief in Assist in the relief of human suffering and

Canada assist authorities to re-establish the local

infrastructure after a major earthquake on the

west coast of Canada.

3 International As part of a UN operation, assist with the

Humanitarian delivery of relief supplies to refugees amassed

Assistance in a central African nation.

4 Surveillance \ Control Assist Other Government Departments and law

of Canadian Territory enforcement agencies in identifying, tracking

and Approaches and, if required, intercepting platforms

suspected of carrying contraband goods or

illegal immigrants before or after entering

Canadian territory.

5 Protection and Assist DFAIT, as part of a combined force, in

Evacuation of the protection and evacuation of Canadian

Canadians Overseas nationals in a foreign nation threatened by

imminent conflict.

6 Peace Support Participate as part of a UN peacekeeping force

Operations (Chapter 6) maintaining a cease-fire and assisting in the

creation of a stable and secure environment

where peace building can take place.

7 Aid of the Civil Power Assist civil authorities in the establishment of

law and order in an area where lawlessness has

occurred as the result of disputes over the

control of water rights in a time of severe drought.

8 National Sovereignty/ Claiming extended jurisdiction under UNCLOS

Interests Enforcement III, Canada has requested the cessation of

53

Task # Task Sub-task

OP 3 Conduct Operational Campaign

OP 3.1 Control or dominate 3.1.1 Identify and control operationally

operationally significant significant land area in the JOA

areas

3.1.4 Assist host nation in populace and

resource control

3.1.6 Plan and coordinate blockades

OP 3.2 Peacetime security 3.2.2 Deploy and coordinate geographic

meteorological, hydrographical and

oceanographical support

3.2.3 Orchestrate non-combat evacuation

operations

3.2.4 Orchestrate operations to provide

service assistance for disaster relief &

humanitarian aid outside Canada

OP 3.3 Plan & assist in national 3.3.1 Establish and coordinate a peacekeeping

and multinational infrastructure and observe and monitor

peacekeeping operations

OP 3.4 Plan & assist in national 3.4.5 Establish and supervise protected or

and multinational peace safe areas

enforcement operations

OP 3.6 Plan joint force targeting 3.6.5 Assess battle damage on operational

targets & conduct BDA

OP 3.7 Coordinate attack on 3.7.2 Plan the interdiction of operational

operational targets forces/targets

OP 5 Protect Operational Forces

OP 5.1 Provide defence against 5.1.8 Conduct tactical warning & attack

an attack by all weapons assessment in the JOA

systems

OP 5.2 Coordinate hazard removal, 5.2.5 Coordinate personnel recovery,

survival & control measures search and rescue, & escape & evasion

OP 5.4 Provide security 5.4.3 Provide counter deception operations

52

Annex D

DPG 2001 Defence and Change Objectives Impacting ISR Planning

Defence ObjectivesD01 To provide strategic defence and security advice and information to the

Government.

D02 To conduct surveillance and control of Canada’s territory, airspace and

maritime areas of jurisdiction.

D03 To respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power.

D04 To participate in bilateral and multilateral operations.

D05 To assist other government departments and other levels of Government

in achieving national goals.

D07 To provide emergency and humanitarian relief.

D08 To maximize defence capabilities through the efficient and effective use

of resources.

Change ObjectivesC01 Innovative Path.

Create an adaptive, innovative and relevant path into the future.

C03 Modernize.

Field a viable and affordable force structure trained and equipped to

generate combat capabilities that target leading-edge doctrine and

technologies relevant to the battlespace of the 21st century.

C05 Interoperable.

Strengthen our military relationships with our principal allies ensuring

interoperable forces, doctrine and C4I.

C07 Strategic partnerships.

Establish clear strategic, external partnerships to better position Defence

to achieve national objectives.

55

Summary of Force Planning Scenarios

seabed exploitation operations by a foreign

nation. The CF will assist OGDs in the

enforcement of Canadian claims.

9 Peace Support At the request of a foreign nation, as part of a

Operations (Chapter 7) UN coalition, the CF will participate in

operations to restore pre-conflict boundaries

and return control of an occupied area to the

control of the rightful country.

10 Defence of Canada/US In cooperation with US forces, the CF will defend

Territory Canada/US territory against potential threats

initiated by an emerging world power as a result

of Canadian and American support for a foreign

military operation.

54

Characteristic Predator Global HawkIR: NIIRS 5 Simultaneous Dual Carriage

Simultaneous Dual Carriage

Coverage per mission 13,000 sq NM search 40,000 sq. NM. search imagery,

imagery or 1900 spot image frames

Sensor Data Ku Band: 1.5 Mb/sec Wide band COMSAT: 20-50

Transmission Band UHF SATCOM: 16Kb/sec Mbits/sec

LOS: C-band 4.5Mb/sec LOS: X-Band Wide

(CDL): 137-275 Mbits/sec

Deployment 6 C141s or 10 C-130s Self deployable, SE requires airlift

2 C-5s or C-17s

Ground Control LOS and OTH Maximum use of GOTS/COTS

Station (LOS and OTH)

System Cost $US 3M per air vehicle $US 14.8M per air vehicle

$US 32M per system

(USAF)

57

Annex E

Key Characteristics for Predator and Global Hawk

Characteristic Predator Global HawkPrimary function Airborne surveillance Airborne surveillance

Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance and Target

Target Acquisition Acquisition

Contractor General Atomics Northrup Grumman

Aeronautical Systems

Incorporated

Power Plant Rotax 912 four cylinder AE3007 jet engine (COTS)

engine, 81 horsepower

Gross takeoff weight > 1,873 lbs (EO/IR) 25,600 lbs

Wingspan 48.7 feet 116.2

Length 27 feet 44 feet

Height 6.9 feet 15 feet

Weight 950 lbs empty, gross 10,500 kg

2,250 lbs

Fuel Capacity 665 pounds (100 gallons)

Mission Duration 24+ hours on station 24 hours on station

Operating Radius @500 NM @3000 NM

Maximum Endurance 40+ hours 42+ hours

Ferry Range N/A 15,000 NM

Payload >450lbs 2,000 lbs

True Air Speed 60-110 knots 350 knots

Loiter altitude 25,000 feet max. >66,000 feet

15,000 Feet Nominal

Survivability None Threat warning, ECM

Measures and deception.

Command and Control UHF MILSAT/ UHF MILSAT/LOS

Ku BandSATCOM/

C-band LOS

Sensors SAR: I ft IPR, Swath SAR: I ft IPR, 0.3 m spot

Width Approx. 800 m EO: NIIRS 6

EO: NIIRS 7 IR: NIIRS 5

56

Country Company Year Spectrum Resolution

Cayman West Indian Space65 2000 2 m

Islands (EROS A1 to A2, 2001 to 1m

(Israel) B1 to B6) 2005

Japan NASDA 2003 panchromatic 2.5 m

(ALOS 1) multispectral 10 m

synthetic aperture radar 7-44 m

59

Annex F

Selected Existing and Planned Commercial Imagery Satellites62

Country Company Year Spectrum Resolution

United Space Imaging Inc. 2000 panchromatic < 1 m

States (Ikonos satellite) multispectral < 4 m

Space Imaging Inc. 2003-4 panchromatic < 0.5 m

(Ikonos 3) multispectral < 2 m

Orbital Imaging Corp 2000, panchromatic 1-2 m

(Orbview 3,4) 2005 multispectral 4 m

hyperspectral

Earthwatch Inc. 2001 panchromatic 1 m

(Quickbird) multispectral 4 m

Space Imaging EOSAT 1984 multispectral 30 m

(LANDSAT 5)

Space Imaging EOSAT 1999 panchromatic 15 m

(LANDSAT 7)

Europe Eurimage 1991, synthetic aperture radar 30 m

(ERS-1, ERS-2) 1995

France Spot Image 1986, panchromatic 10 m

(SPOT 1,2) 1990 multispectral 20 m

stereographic pan 5 m

Spot Image 1998, stereographic pan 5 m

(SPOT 4,5) 2002 multispectral 10 m

short wave infrared 20 m

Helios 163 1995 panchromatic 2 m

Helios 2 2001-2 panchromatic 1 m

infrared

Canada RADARSAT I 1995 synthetic aperture radar 8-100 m

RADARSAT II64 2002 synthetic aperture radar 3-100 m

India Space Imaging EOSAT 1995, multispectral 5 m

(IRS-1C/1D) 1997

Space Imaging EOSAT 2001-2 panchromatic 1-2.5 m

(IRS-P6)

58

Endnotes

1. “Non-Strategic Capital” is defined in theDefence Services Program as capital projectsgreater than $3M but not exceeding $100M.

2. Canada, Minister of National Defenceand the Chief of the Defence Staff, Shaping theFuture of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for2020, (Ottawa: Department of NationalDefence, 1999) p. 1.

3. Elinor Sloan, “Canada and the Revolutionin Military Affairs: Current Responses andFuture Opportunities,” Canadian MilitaryJournal, (Autumn 2000) p. 7.

4. Stuart Peach and David Gates, Air Powerfor the New Millenium (Lancaster University,Great Britain: Centre for Defence andInternational Security Studies, 1999) p. 49.

5. Ibid, p. 55.

6. US, Secretary of the Air Force, AirForce Doctrine Document 2-5.2. Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations(Washington, DC: Government PrintingOffice, 1999) p. 1.

7. Ibid, p. 2.

8. W.B. Danskine, “The Time CriticalTargeting Model” (Air Command and StaffCollege, Air University, Maxwell Air ForceBase, Alabama, April 2000) p. 15.

9. J.P.R. Browne and M.T. Thurbon,Electronic Warfare (London, UK:Brassey’s,1998) p. 188.

10. Ibid, p. 188.

11. Ibid, p. 188.

12. W.B. Danskine, “The Time CriticalTargeting Model” (Air Command and StaffCollege, Air University, Maxwell Air ForceBase, Alabama, April 2000) p. 15.

13. Ibid, p. 17.

14. Canada, Minister of National Defence, 1994Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: PWGSC, 1994).

15. Canada, Minister of National Defenceand the Chief of the Defence Staff, Shapingthe Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategyfor 2020 (Ottawa: DND, 1999) pp. 7-9.

16. Canada, Deputy Minister of NationalDefence, Defence Planning Guidance 2001,(Ottawa: DND, 1999) p. 206.

17. Paige Cutland, CAS ISR CapabilityBrief, (Produced Jan 2000)

18. Unique advantages of air power arespeed, range, elevation, surprise, precision,flexibility, mobility, responsiveness andconcentration, from: Canada, Chief of theAir Staff, Out of the Sun, (Winnipeg: CraigKelman & Associates LTD, 1997).

mission times of greater than 40 hours. This,in turn, allows for long over-water surveil-lance missions – an ideal trait for a Canadiansensor platform.

42. HAE/MAE UAVs basically resemble theold U2 spy plane.

43. Currently, high-altitude UAVs are capa-ble of flying 18,000 nm (i.e. from Canada toAustralia then back to Canada). Medium-altitude UAVs are effectively limited to anoperating radius of 2,000 nm.

44. Craig McPherson, NG Review, “GlobalHawk,” www.northgrum.com/ news/rev-mag/review09-18.html, November 1999.

45. Craig McPherson, NG Review, “GlobalHawk,” www.northgrum.com/ news/rev-mag/review09-18.html, November 1999.

46. Craig McPherson, NG Review, “GlobalHawk,” www.northgrum.com/ news/rev-mag/review09-18.html, November 1999.

47. Craig McPherson, NG Review, “GlobalHawk,” www.northgrum.com/ news/rev-mag/review09-18.html, November 1999.

48. Stuart Peach, ed., Perspective on AirPower in its Wider Context (Joint ServicesCommand Staff College Bracknell, London:The Stationery Office, 1998).

49. Ann M Florini, Yahya Dehqanzada,“Commerical satellite imagery comes of age,”Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1999,pp. 45-52.

50. Dee Ann Divis, “Imaging regulationsstalled,” Geo Info Systems, July, 1999, pp. 18-22.

51. M. McKean et al, “RADARSAT: ADual Use Earth Observation Platform,”AGARD Conference Proceedings 582 (NATO,October 1996), p. 38-7.

52. Robert K. Ackerman, “Air ForcePlanners Exploit Commercial SpaceImagery,” Signal, June, 1995, p. 15.

53. Pennington Way IV, “NRO Gives ArmyOperational Control of EAGLE VISION II,”Defense Daily, October 15, 1999, p. 1.

54. MDA product publication BA-BR-MDA-50-8019 8/97 XP-8471-IR3/EM, “FastTRACS” August 1997.

55. Mark Hewish, “Military Takes a GiantLeap with Commercial Space Technology,”Jane’s International Defense Review, April 1,1999, p. 63.

56. Robert K. Ackerman, “Air ForcePlanners Exploit Commercial Space Imagery,”Signal, June, 1995, p. 19.

57. Robert K. Ackerman, “Air ForcePlanners Exploit Commercial Space Imagery,”Signal, June, 1995, p. 15.

58. Dee Ann Divis, “Imaging regula-tions stalled,” Geo Info Systems, July,1999, pp. 18-22.

59. Edward G. Anderson III, “The Army andSpace,” Field Artillery, May, 1998, pp. 7-10.

60. Canada, Department of NationalDefence, 1994 Defence White Paper, Ottawa:1994, chap 4, p. 1.

61. Bill Sweetnam, “Spy Satellites: TheNext Leap Forward,” Jane’s InternationalDefense Review, January, 1997, p. 27.

62. Except as noted, information derivedfrom David Baker, ed, Jane’s Space Directory,15th Edition, 1999-2000.

63. Bill Sweetnam, “Spy Satellites: TheNext Leap Forward,” Jane’s InternationalDefense Review, January, 1997, p. 27.

61

19. Capability Initiatives Database, Project00000276, (http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM_MDP/cdi/Details_e.asp.), 27 Feb 01.

20. Capability Initiatives Database, Project00001225, (http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM_MDP/cdi/Details_e.asp.), 27 Feb 01

21. Briefing (http:/www.mcan.marlant.hal-ifax.dnd.ca/Josic/moiscc/blueprin/.)

22. Canada, Chief of the Air Staff, Out ofthe Sun, (Winnipeg: Craig Kelman &Associates LTD, 1997).

23. Capabilities Initiative Database, Project00000140 Aurora Incremental ModernisationProject (AIMP), (http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM_MDP/cdi/Details_e.asp), 27 Feb 01.

24. Capabilities Initiative Database, Project00000317 AIMP – Electro-Optics (EO)System Replacement, (http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM_MDP/cdi/Details_e.asp), 27 Feb 01.

25. Capabilities Initiative Database, ProjectCAS 6 AIMP – Electronic Support Measures(ESM) Replacement, (http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM_MDP/cdi/Details_e.asp), 27 Feb 01.

26. Capabilities Initiative Database, Project00000140 Aurora Incremental ModernisationProject (AIMP), (http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM-MDP/cdi/Details-e.asp), 27 Feb 01.

27. Capabilities Initiative Database, ProjectCAS 15 AIMP – EO System Upgrade,(http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM_MDP/cdi/Details_e.asp), 27 Feb 01.

28. Capabilities Initiative Database, Project00000140 Aurora Incremental ModernisationProject (AIMP), (http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/IM-MDP/cdi/Details-e.asp), 27 Feb 01.

29. Canada. Minister of Public Works andGovernment Services Canada, Maritime Helicopter

Statement of Operational Requirement DSP No00002680, (Ottawa: DND, 14 Jul. 1999) p. 33.

30. Ibid, p. 33.

31. Ibid, p. 37.

32. Federation of American Scientists,“Advanced Tactical ReconnaissanceAirborne System,” (www.fas.org/irp/ pro-gram/collect/tarps.htm), 26 Feb 01.

33. Federation of American Scientists,“Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance AirborneSystem,” (www.fas.org/irp/ program/col-lect/atars.htm), 4 Feb 01.

34. Ibid.

35. DB-110 Raptor Reconnaissance System,w w w . r a y t h e o n . c o . u k / raytheon-noflashstems/isr/db_110_raptor/db_110_raptor/db_110_raptor.htm. 26 Feb 01.

36. Raython, “DB-110 ReconnaisanceSystem,” (www.raytheon.com/es/esprod-ucts/ ses110/ses110.htm) 26 Feb 01.

37. Keith Atkin, ed, Lockheed Martin SpecialAvionics Mission Strap-On-Now (SAMSON)pod (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Electro-OpticalSystems, sixth edition 2000-2001), p 571.

38. “Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar,”www.ga.com/atg/SAR/lynxSAR.html,September 1999.

39. “Sandia and General Atomics DevelopNew Synthetic Aperture Radar,” www.spacedai ly.com/news/radar-99c.html,August 1999.

40. “New Roles Emerging For UAV’s,” AsianDefence Journal, (Nov, 2000), p. 28

41. Extensive range and/or endurance areplatform characteristics that allow for long

60

63

Correll, J.T., “Signs of a Revolution,” Air Force Magazine, August 1995, p. 2.

Cutland, Paige, “CAS ISR Capability Brief,” Produced Jan 2000.

Danskine, W.B., “The Time Critical Targeting Model,” Air Command and Staff College, AirUniversity, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. April 2000.

Divis, Dee Ann “Imaging regulations stalled.” Geo Info Systems, July, 1999, pp. 18-22.

Dyer, R.D. “SMARTPOD – The United Kingdom ISR Systems Test-Bed,” Proceedings of the SPIEConference on Airborne Reconnaissance XXIII. Denver, Colorado, July 1999.

English, A., “Technology and the Future of War,” Presentation to No 27 Command and StaffCourse. Canadian Forces College, Toronto, Canada, 30 November 2000.

Federation of American Scientists “Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance Airborne System,”(www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/tarps.htm), 26 Feb 01.

Federation of American Scientists “Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance Airborne System,”(www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/atars.htm), 4 Feb 01

Florini, Ann M., Yahya Dehqanzada, “Commerical satellite imagery comes of age,” Issues inScience and Technology, Fall, 1999, pp. 45-52.

Fulghum, D.A. “New Radar Would Meld AWACS, J-STARS Roles,” Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology, 152 June 12 2000: pp. 29-30.

Fulghum, D.A. “Future UAV Sensors to Scan Vast Areas” Aviation Week & Space Technology,February 7, 2000, pp. 58-61.

Gerkin, Louis C. UAV-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. USA: Library of Congress in Publication Data, 1991.

Hewish, Mark “Military Takes a Giant Leap with Commercial Space Technology.” Jane’sInternational Defense Review, April 1, 1999, pp. 41-47.

Holler, J.P. “Royal Danish Air Force Tactical Reconnaissance System,” Proceedings of the SPIEConference on Airborne Reconnaissance XXIII. Denver, Colorado, July 1999.

Lamb, Greg S. and Stone, Tony G., “Air Combat Command Concept of Operations for EnduranceUnmanned Aerial Vehicles,” (Langley AFB): Air Combat Command, 1996.

Lax, M.R. “Per Ardua Ad Astra: Australian Air Power Post 2010,” Air War College, AirUniversity, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. April 1997.

Marsh, Bill, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Strategic Planning. Teleconversation. 29 Jan. 2001.

McKean, M. et al, “RADARSAT: A Dual Use Earth Observation Platform”, AGARD Conference

64. RADARSAT International web site,[www.rsi.ca].

65. “Satellite Pictures: Private Eyes in theSky,” The Economist, May 6, 2000, pp. 71-73.

62

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6564

[Gen Wesley] Clark’s teamimprovised a computerized,real-time target developmentand review process which pulledtogether American and NATOintelligence assets, the force com-manders in Italy, Macedoniaand Albania and the battle plan-ners and targeters at Clark’sheadquarters in Belgium. Nosuch system existed at the begin-ning of the war, and it wasn’tfully operational until lateApril. But when it had beencobbled together, it gave Clarkcontrol of his air war.

Michael Ignatieff – Virtual War1

INTRODUCTION

The Gulf War taught senior militaryplanners that massive application

of airpower from all components wouldbe instrumental in shaping the battle-field prior to committing ground troopsto an inevitable land battle. Critical tothis process was the judicious applica-tion of available intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets toensure that an accurate picture of thecurrent battlespace could be presentedand exploited in a joint and combinedfashion by coalition forces.

Operation ALLIED FORCE, like theGulf War, was an air-intensive, joint

and combined operation, which used amyriad of assets to strike targets deep inthe former Yugoslavia.2 The concept ofemploying joint assets to target mobileand time-sensitive targets on the battle-field was initially exercised duringDesert Storm and became standardpractice during ALLIED FORCE asNATO increasingly focussed air opera-tions on finding, identifying and target-ing mobile land and air defence forcesin Serbia and Kosovo. The inability ofthe JFACC to effectively use ISR assetsto develop a coherent picture of the bat-tlespace that would permit rapid target-ing of Serbian forces has focussed atten-tion on the management, collation anddissemination of ISR data.

While ALLIED FORCE was pre-dominantly an air operation, managinga coherent air picture and ISR data willbe an even more acute problem in afully joint operation comprising of largeground and naval forces. Because airpower is inherently flexible and is resi-dent among all components in varyingdegrees, a detailed, accurate, coherentand timely portrayal of the battlespace iscritical to exploiting joint capabilities.Capitalizing upon air power’s flexibilitymeans being able to adjust target alloca-tions while aircraft are airborne. It meanshaving the ability to shorten the air task-ing cycle in order to take advantage ofrapid changes in the battle situation. Itmeans being able to efficiently employ

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, ANDRECONNAISSANCE – THE OPERATIONALLIED FORCE EXPERIENCE

S y n d i c a t e 8 : W i n g C o m m a n d e r A . K . G r ov e s , L i e u t e n a n t -C o l o n e l W. M . R o b e r t s , M a j o r B . J . E l l a s c h u k , M a j o r J . B . M .L a G r a n g e , M a j o r O . N . M c D e r m i d , M a j o r C . G . N e s s , M a j o r W. M .S n e d d e n ( C h a i r ) , M a j o r M . A . P. S t o u f f e r, M a j o r W. S . W i l l i a m s

Proceedings 582 (NATO, October 1996), pp. 38-47.

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assets on a joint basis, there is no doc-trine that takes the next step of definingthe requirement and process for develop-ment of the joint battlespace picturerequired for timely joint targeting.

Similarly, NATO and CF doctrinesare very explicit with respect to tradi-tional intelligence requirements. Thesebodies of doctrine are written to sup-port IPB and traditional targetingrequirements in a more timely and accu-rate fashion using all available ISRresources. However, as with US jointdoctrine, there is no detailed require-ment for real-time, or near real-time,targeting intelligence as mandated bytoday’s threats and emerging war-fight-ing doctrine. Specifically, there is noNATO or CF doctrine that deals with therequirements of a joint integrated bat-tlespace picture required for near real-time targeting and the centralized con-trol of the ISR assets needed to producethis operationally critical picture.

This doctrine deficiency was some-what masked during ALLIED FORCEbecause of the lack of a true joint oper-ation and structure; however, it remainsan important flaw in overall joint doc-trine. Rather than being strictly anintelligence issue, ISR support to real-time operations is now an operationalissue. How specifically will CF doc-trine, NATO doctrine, and US Joint doc-trine address this issue?

Current Doctrine

Any study of ISR doctrine in gen-eral, including any doctrine outliningthe requirement for the production ofan integrated battlespace picture, mustinclude US doctrine since the US pos-sesses the bulk of ISR assets and willlikely provide the leadership for any

large-scale western operation. Thus, USJoint doctrine will usually provide theframework for an ISR organizationalstructure and utilization in future jointand combined operations. There is abody of US joint doctrine outliningrequirements for joint missions in termsof countering air and missile threats,theatre missile defense, and joint firesupport that implicitly requires jointaccess to ISR products and a system thatwill allow joint targeting in a time sen-sitive manner.

The purpose of the joint counter-air mission is to attain a desireddegree of air superiority to allowfreedom of action and protectthe joint force. To execute thismission, joint force commanders(JFCs) integrate the capabilitiesof each component to conductoffensive and defensive opera-tions. Offensive counter-air(OCA) operations seek to domi-nate the enemy’s airspace andprevent the launch of threats,while defensive counter-air(DCA) operations defeat enemyair threats after launch. Jointcounter-air missions mayemploy aircraft, surface-to-airmissiles, surface-to-surface mis-siles, artillery, special opera-tions forces, or informationoperations against a variety ofthreats. These threats includeenemy aircraft (manned orunmanned), ballistic missiles,and cruise missiles (air, land, orsea launched).5

This quote highlights the fact thatthis is a truly joint mission requiringthe support of all available forces intheatre. Implicit to the nature of thethreat (cruise and ballistic missiles),

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valuable air resources without the exces-sive risk that results from long loitertimes required to confirm targets, or hav-ing to attack targets repeatedly becauseof poor battle damage assessment.Finally, it means being able to immediate-ly task the most appropriate weapon sys-tem, regardless of component, to attacktargets within the area of operations.

The need to minimize time overtarget and maximize kill willrequire accurate and continuousknowledge and location of tar-gets, especially mobile targets,rapid battlefield damage assess-ment, and in-flight retargetingof missiles and weapons.3

To accomplish this aim, the JointForce Commander needs to have com-plete access to an integrated ISR systemthat provides a responsive, unified pic-ture upon which reliable and criticaldecision-making can be applied.According to the United States Air ForceDoctrine Document 2-52, “[i]ntelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)are integrated capabilities to collect,process, exploit, and disseminate accu-rate and timely information that pro-vides the battlespace awareness to suc-cessfully plan and conduct operations.”4

The Joint Force Commander (JFC)of Operation ALLIED FORCE – Rear-Admiral Ellis - had access to a widevariety of ISR platforms from which todraw information, including E-8JSTARS and E-3 AWACS aircraft, RC-135 Rivet Joint and U-2 reconnaissanceplatforms, Keyhole / Improved Crystaland Lacrosse / Vega satellites, and avariety of unmanned aerial vehiclessuch as the SR-UAV Hunter and MAE-UAV Predator. Simply having access toISR assets, however, is not enough to

permit acquisition of a soluble pictureof the battlespace. Such a picture canonly be achieved through centralizedcontrol of force ISR assets and informa-tion processing that permits the pro-duction of an integrated battlespacepicture for real-time joint targeting.

ISR DOCTRINE

ISR assets are required to supplydata for development of intelligence thatcovers the whole range of intelligencetasks including, Intelligence Preparationof the Battlespace (IPB), targeting, andBattle Damage Assessment (BDA).Increasingly, threats, including ballisticmissiles and Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD), and improved tar-geting capability, demands improvementin intelligence support. Specifically,there is a requirement for a near real-time target acquisition capability. AllComponent Commanders have a vestedinterest in the management of ISRresources to provide the capability ofmeeting these targeting requirements.This includes the development of a real-time battlespace picture that will permittargeting in real or near-real time.

The United States is the largestholder of ISR assets and the largest con-sumer of intelligence in the world. Itsjoint doctrine reflects the interests of allcomponents and the importance of ISRin support of operations. All compo-nents are tasked for time sensitive mis-sions including Theatre Missile Defence(TMD) and Joint Targeting. The doctrinein these areas crosses all componentboundaries highlighting the need for ajoint approach to these tasks and mis-sions. While joint doctrine on Recon-naissance, Surveillance, and TargetAcquisition (RSTA) outlines the processfor management and control of these

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An integrated battlespace picture willenhance the application of all principlesneeded for the fire support planningand coordination function in joint firesupport. Essential to the application ofthese principles is an integrated real-time picture. Examples of these princi-ples include:

a. ensuring a continuous flow of tar-geting information;

b. accessing all available lethal andnon-lethal means (including assetsfrom supporting components);

c. using the most effective fire supportmeans available (including assetsfrom supporting components); and

d. avoiding unnecessary duplication.

It is impossible to effectively applythese principles without an effectivemeans to target using all appropriateforces quickly and seamlessly. All com-ponents require a means to pass target-ing information with sufficient fidelityto permit precision tasking. The currentconcept of operations for all componentsincludes a level of automation thatrequires quality-targeting information tobe passed in a coherent fashion amonginformation networks throughout thebattlefield. Different systems producedifferent battlespace pictures. The resultis different track numbers assigned tothe same target, which in turn confusesthe targeting process by not matchingthe principles of joint fire support.

The efficient production of thistargeting picture will be a very highpriority for the JFC because of missionsthat this capability will support.Failure due to component emphasis onindependence and control of resourceswill place the success of the mission atrisk. To produce this picture, a singletask element must have access and

indeed control of the requiredresources. Other tasking requirementsfor these critical resources must flowthrough this single task element.Tasking priorities will be establishedby the JFC following consultation withthe component commanders.

There is well-established andcoherent US Joint Doctrine for ISR assetmanagement (JP 3-55 Doctrine forReconnaissance, Surveillance and TargetAcquisition (RSTA) Support for JointOperations). Recognizing that therewill never be enough RSTA assets, thisdoctrine establishes procedures andauthorities for the establishment ofintelligence priorities and the tasking ofTheatre RSTA assets. Unity of com-mand and centralized control are guid-ing principles within this doctrine.

Essentially the J2 establishes theintelligence collection plan in accor-dance with priorities set by the JointForce Commander (JFC). The JointReconnaissance Center (JRC) under theJ3 coordinates the RSTA assets to meetthe RSTA requirements of the JFC.The J3 tasks assigned Theatre-RSTAassets to meet the collection planneeds of the J2 and the Joint Force AirComponent Commander (JFACC) con-trols the airborne RSTA assets onbehalf of the J3.11

The JFACC’s responsibilitiesnormally include planning, coor-dinating, allocating, and taskingof appropriate airborne RSTAassets made available, based onthe JFC’s apportionment deci-sion. Following the JFC’s guid-ance, and in coordination withother Service component com-manders and other assigned orsupported commanders, the

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and the joint nature and importance ofthe air and missile threat defensiveoperation, is the requirement for real-time intelligence and targeting datathat will permit formatting and distri-bution of ISR information that permitstimely joint targeting.

Immediate [OCA] missions areconducted against unexpectedmobile and time sensitive tar-gets and require rapid action.Minutes often define the time-line when these targets are vul-nerable to attack.6

The counter-air and missile threatmission is a joint mission requiring thesupport of all deployed forces toemploy, within minutes of detection,appropriate weapons to neutralize timecritical targets such as ballistic missilesand/or their launchers. Detecting thesethreats is a high priority mission. Theconsequences of failure could be cata-strophic for a coalition or host nationsupport.7 Implicit in this mission is theneed to continuously survey the battle-space and target adversarial weaponssystems using a common target num-bering system that allows targetinginformation transfer to the most appro-priate weapon system in a timely fash-ion (single-digit minutes).

Joint doctrine for the theatre mis-sile defence mission is the JP 3-01.5Doctrine for Joint Theater MissileDefense, which characterizes this mis-sion as inherently a joint responsibility.

TMD is inherently a joint mis-sion. During the planning stage,TMD forces, requirements, andcapabilities must be integratedinto all phases of the operationand mission areas early on.8

To integrate all TMD forcesrequires the ability to target all theatremissile threats with any availableweapon system. As well, targeting mustbe done with precision and in real-time.There is no time for manual resolutionof target tracks. Theatre missile weaponsystems must be attacked before theyare employed or before their missilesimpact if detected after launch.Providing effective missile defenseassets is a critical mission for allComponent Commanders.

US Doctrine for Joint Fire Supportimplies the need for an integrated bat-tlespace picture that permits joint tar-geting in a seamless and timely manner.This doctrine states that the Land andthe Maritime Force ComponentCommander will be supported com-manders in their areas of operation.They will support each other and besupported by the Air ComponentCommander for the attack on targetsdetected within the theatre of opera-tions. As the doctrine states:

Within the joint force Theatreand/or JOA, all missions mustcontribute to the accomplish-ment of the overall objective.Synchronization of efforts with-in land or naval AOs withTheatre- and/or JOA-wideoperations is of particularimportance.9

The supported commander will notexecute his mission without the supportof the other components. The support-ing commanders must be capable ofcomplementing the operations plan,including contributing fires, and firesupport.10 The principles that underliejoint fire support highlight the need foran integrated approach to the mission.

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the Sun, specifics on how this acquisi-tion should be accomplished, includingcommand and control of ISR resources,are not detailed in Out of the Sun.13

While Canadian Forces Operations,Canada’s keystone manual for CF doc-trine, acknowledges that timely andaccurate intelligence is a prerequisite forthe conduct of effective operations, itdoes not mention the importance of anintegrated battlespace picture nor thebest means to produce this picture.

The essential problem is that real-time collection and dissemination, andthe use of ISR assets to produce the inte-grated battlespace picture, is an opera-tional issue as well as an intelligenceissue. Intelligence is just one part of theprocess. And while the intelligenceprinciples of employing all necessaryISR assets and the requirement for a cen-tralized process for intelligence supportare valuable, the nature of these opera-tions requires direct operational controlof the process. In particular, B-GG-005-004/AF-008 Intelligence Doctrine andProcedures for Canadian ForcesOperations emphasizes an all sourceintelligence approach to the support ofoperations. According to this docu-ment, “the intelligence system shouldstrive to provide for holistic views, notintelligence discipline views.”14 Thesame principles are required to supportreal-time operations through the pro-duction of an integrated battlespace pic-ture using all required ISR assets undercontrol of a single officer.

NATO doctrine in this area canfirst be found in AJP -01, Allied JointDoctrine, which is the capstone docu-ment for the planning, execution, andsupport of allied joint operations.Similar to the Canadian Forces’ Out ofthe Sun, AJP-01 provides a summary of

ISR operations. More importantly,AJP-01 identifies the requirement to“establish an intelligence architecturelinking NATO and national intelligencecentres with All Source Analysis Cells(ASAC) at the various headquarters.This is to provide the CommanderAllied Joint Force (COMAJF) with acommon, timely and accurate pictureof the situation during all phases of thecampaign.”15 Chapter 12 of AJP-01,which is dedicated to Intelligence, goesfurther with respect to ASAC by stat-ing that “the role of an ASAC is to fusethe information and intelligence col-lected by various sources and agencies,including intelligence input fromstrategic sources through nationalintelligence cells.”16 Therefore, whileit appears that NATO has recognized inits high level doctrinal manual therequirement for an integrated intelli-gence picture, it must be emphasizedthat NATO doctrine does not addressthe importance of an integrated battle-field picture with a link to real-time ornear real-time targeting.

AJP-3.3 Joint Air and SpaceOperations Doctrine is the key documentfor joint aerospace operations withinNATO. Although it provides funda-mental principals for the conduct ofjoint and combined aerospace opera-tions, AJP-3.3 provides very little interms of ISR doctrine. However, AJP-3.3 does provide a summary of the tar-geting process, which identifies therequirement for timely intelligenceinput. Furthermore, AJP-3.3 recognizesthe Command and Control (C2) difficul-ties inherent with the employment ofnational ISR assets in a coalition opera-tion. Specifically, it recognizes that theJoint Force Commander will not haveoperational control of the entire pool ofcoalition ISR assets.17 This omission

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JFACC will recommend to theJFC apportionment of air sor-ties to various missions and geo-graphical areas.

JP 3-55 (III-4)

This doctrine is very logical withrespect to intelligence collection and tar-geting done in traditional timelines withfixed targets and a three-day ATO cycleor normal operational planning cycle.However, it only obliquely refers to timesensitive operations when it states: “[t]obe effective, targeting must identify thebest weapon for the intended target withappropriate timing to meet the objectivesestablished by the commander.”12

There is no outline process fordeveloping real-time targeting intelli-gence to support time sensitive jointoperations such as TMD or joint target-ing. Nor is there a process identified forthe production of a joint integrated bat-tlespace picture that can support thesetargeting requirements including thelogical requirement for centralized con-trol of ISR assets to permit the effectiveproduction of this coherent battlespacepicture. This may explain the fact thatthe targeting requirements are onlyfound in doctrine published since theRSTA doctrine was promulgated.However, it remains that current RSTAdoctrine does not support current tar-geting requirements. The centralizedcontrol of ISR assets in support of tradi-tional intelligence requirements, there-fore, provides a framework for the estab-lishment of doctrine that will detail howISR assets will be utilized for the pro-duction of an integrated battlespace pic-ture in support of real-time operations.

Implicit in US Joint doctrine is therequirement for an integrated battle-

space picture. Nevertheless, thisrequirement is not addressed directlyby the doctrine, nor does it include thecritical supporting issue of commandand control of ISR assets to supportreal-time targeting. It does, however,provide good guidance for the manage-ment of ISR assets in support of tradi-tional intelligence functions. This doc-trine establishes the principle of cen-tralized control of critical ISR assets andshould be adopted for the support ofreal-time operations through the pro-duction of an integrated battlespacepicture. While there is no explicit doc-trine for real-time targeting support, theUS is not alone in this deficiency.Canada and NATO have similar doctri-nal shortcomings.

Although Canada does not possessan ISR doctrine, intelligence doctrinecan be found in several manuals includ-ing B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CanadianForces Operations and B-GG-005-004/AF-008 Intelligence Doctrine andProcedures for Canadian ForcesOperations. The principles of using allavailable resources to produce the mostaccurate intelligence possible, and therequirement to use all available collec-tion resources to produce intelligenceproducts in the most expeditious man-ner possible, permeate CF doctrine inthe same manner as the US Joint doc-trine. Similarly, the principle of cen-tralized management of intelligenceresources to support this effort is foundin CF doctrine to the same extent as it isin US doctrine.

However, as with US Joint doctrine,CF doctrine does not to address therequirement for intelligence support toreal-time or near real-time operations.While target acquisition is identified asa primary role for ISR resources in Out of

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ISR AND ALLIED FORCE

Operation ALLIED FORCE intro-duced an explosion of new technologyonto the battlefield, particularly in thearea of ISR. The analysis of the opera-tion continues and additional conclu-sions will be reached as a result; how-ever, lessons are not learned untilimprovements are made to correct ana-lyzed weaknesses. Therefore, it will notbe until the next operation that lessonslearned from Operation ALLIED FORCEwill be truly verified. For example,many of the ISR shortfalls that wereidentified during the Gulf War weresuccessfully overcome in OperationALLIED FORCE.18 Although it is stilltoo early to assess whether all OperationALLIED FORCE ISR deficiencies havebeen determined, many deficiencies arein the process of being addressed.

Operation ALLIED FORCE presentsan excellent study for examining cur-rent ISR doctrine by assessing how welldoctrine was implemented during thisconflict. ISR assets used duringOperation ALLIED FORCE wereunprecedented in terms of capabilityand variety. Space ISR assets providedthe capability for wide area electro-opti-cal and infrared surveillance that wasrelatively impervious to the effects ofterrain masking as compared to otherISR assets.19 E-8 Joint SurveillanceTarget Attack Radar System (JSTARS)aircraft provided near-real time radarimagery through synthetic apertureradar and ground movement target indi-cator systems (GMTI), that enableddetection of stationary and mobile vehi-cles plus the production of detailedmaps. E-3 Airborne Warning andControl System (AWACS) aircraft pro-vided surveillance, control, electronicsupport measures (ESM) and radio relay

capabilities. Photographic and radarimagery was provided by the U-2.Additionally, the U-2 and the RC-135Rivet Joint electronically monitoredenemy communications and locatedtheir transmission source while the SR-UAV Hunter supplied near-real timevideo imagery intelligence. Thoughemployed primarily in a surveillancerole, four MAE-UAV Predators were fit-ted with an AN/AAS-44(V) spaceinfrared laser detecting ranging track-ing set. This multi-purpose thermal-imaging sensor provided long-rangesurveillance, target acquisition, track-ing, range-finding and laser designationfor tri-service and NATO laser-guidedmunitions including attacks by AH-64Apache helicopters carrying Hellfire airto surface missiles.20

Though successful in some areas,Command, Control, Communicationsand Computers (C4) infrastructureproved to be a key limitation for theeffective use of ISR assets. The ability togather intelligence was compromised bythe coalition’s inability to effectivelydisseminate appropriate data in a timelymanner. In part, this was caused by thesharing of bandwidth amongst C4

assets; the lack of C4 network integra-tion standards at the combined andjoint task force level; spectrum manage-ment challenges; network security diffi-culties; and the lack of timely compli-ance with NATO standardization agree-ments, as identified in the US KosovoAfter Action Report.21

Another major problem was thelack of interoperability between variousreceivers and transmitters of data. Someagencies that required specific informa-tion could not accept the data evenwhen it was available. This inability toexchange high-fidelity digital data was

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presents significant challenges for thesupport of real-time targeting operationsrequiring centralized control of ISRresources. In addition to the challengesof providing centralized control of ISRassets in a joint operation, there will bechallenges to mission accomplishment ina combined operation. The combinationof these challenges will be more acute inthe future as the threat levels and theconsequences of failure increase withthe proliferation of WMD technologyand weapons.

Threats such as theatre ballisticmissiles and WMD combined with newprecision targeting capabilities require achange to traditional intelligence sup-port doctrine. The requirements forreal-time target acquisition and target-ing capability is implicit in US Jointdoctrine. TMD and other critical mis-sions are not achievable without a real-time targeting capability that integratesall joint targeting assets. To enable jointtargeting, there must be a single inte-grated battlespace picture. The produc-tion of this picture must be centralizedusing all contributing ISR resourcesavailable to the joint force commander.Implicit to this requirement is thenecessity for centralized control of therequired ISR assets.

There is a wide body of ISR orRSTA doctrine that identifies the needfor timely intelligence producedthrough diffusion and analysis of awide range of data from the full com-plement of ISR assets available to com-mander. While this doctrine addressesthe critical nature of timely collection,analysis, and dissemination of ISR data,real-time target acquisition require-ments are not specifically addressed.This doctrine is written with the tradi-tional intelligence preparation of the

battlefield mission in mind and seeks tospeed up the intelligence process to pro-vide more timely and accurate intelli-gence for traditional targeting. A newapproach is required that not only rec-ognizes a continuing need to improvetraditional intelligence capabilities, butalso addresses the emerging operationalrequirement to conduct targeting insupport of new missions such as TMD.This new approach must allow for thefull exploitation of improved targetingtechnology under the principle of unityof command and centralized control ofISR assets.

Given the importance of therequirement for an integrated battle-space picture that will allow joint tar-geting during real-time, or near real-time operations, it is recommendedthat the CF develop Joint Doctrinethat addresses the doctrine deficiencyfor the integration process. This doc-trine should:

a. define the operational requirementfor an integrated battlespace picture;

b. identify the process as largely anoperational issue rather than anintelligence issue;

c. identify the requirement for accessto all required ISR assets by theofficer responsible for the produc-tion of the battlespace picture; and

d. be based on the principles of unityof command and centralized con-trol of the process found in intelli-gence doctrine for the managementof the intelligence productionprocess.

Finally the CF should ensure thatthese doctrinal issues are dealt with in atruly joint and combined fashion whenco-operating with our allies in interna-tional ISR projects.

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requirements of ROE in operationsother than war.28 Unfortunately, thelack of a single common integrated airpicture limited the optimum exploita-tion of ISR resources and data.

There are not lessons learnedfrom Kosovo. There are lessons.…[W]hether we are able to act onthose lessons will be an issue ofresources and political will. Ibelieve the jury is still out on that.

Lt Gen Michael C Short

It was recognized that technolo-gies, which can provide real-timeimagery and target location directly tofighter and bomber crews, must bedeveloped and introduced. Targetingdata must be completely integratedbetween all available air and space sen-sors and be readily available to opera-tional commanders with the final goalof reducing target identification to tar-get destruction time from hours anddays to minutes.29

The Joint Worldwide IntelligenceCommunication System (JWICS) was avaluable force multiplier duringOperation ALLIED FORCE and was inte-gral to the success of the federatedintelligence process.30 In particular, theuse of a secure video-teleconferencingsystem – Secure Internet ProtocolRouting Network (SIPRNET) – provedinvaluable and demonstrated a consid-erable breakthrough in technology.ALLIED FORCE was for the most partplanned and directed using securevideo-teleconference, secure telephoneand e-mail. This new technology gaveoperational commanders a commonoperational perspective and allowedinformation to be drawn from aroundthe world across national, service and

organizational boundaries. Althoughjoint doctrine prior to ALLIED FORCEstressed the need for component com-manders to be collocated with the JointForce Commander, in reality none were.For the first time, modern technologyallowed component commanders to bestationed wherever it made the best tac-tical sense.31

It became clear during OperationALLIED FORCE that there was a grow-ing technology gap between the UnitedStates and her NATO allies. The “AfterAction Report” to Congress on theKosovo campaign has suggested that atop priority should be to coordinatewith NATO member nations to seekimproved secure telephone and PC/net-work based information systems.Programmes, such as the DefenceCapabilities Initiative, will help toaddress NATO interoperability chal-lenges. The Defence CapabilitiesInitiative seeks to enhance allied mili-tary capabilities in five key areasincluding command control and infor-mation systems.32

The United States recognizes thekey role of ISR and has committed sub-stantial funding to ISR related develop-ment as a result of lessons learned fromKosovo. The United States Congressprovided $37 million in the FY2000 sup-plemental budget to replace andenhance UAVs, $111 million for addi-tional EP-3 aircraft and enhancementsand $30 million for other related ISRresearch. some of these projects are aresult of the positive contribution seenas a result of the unprecedented use ofunmanned aerial vehicles. Funding isalso being used to replace Predator UAVlosses, to repair or replace damaged andlost Hunter UAVs, for repairs to mainte-nance facilities and to add a laser desig-

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identified as a shortfall at every stage ofOperation ALLIED FORCE. Enabling asuccessful strike against a time-sensitivetarget requires the continuous timelytransfer of precise target information.Lack of interoperability duringOperation ALLIED FORCE strikes meantreaction times were slow thereby com-promising the force’s ability to engagetime-sensitive targets.

Although a joint data network wasestablished, the various tactical digitalsystems, multiple transmission systems,and message formats resulted in the ISRcomponents being unable to properlyinteract with one another. To circum-vent the inherent barriers of thesestovepipe systems, liaison personnelwere required to manually pass infor-mation – a function that automatedinterfaces should perform more effi-ciently and effectively. This manualinterface increased the operationsworkload and the potential for error.22

A singular integrated data network wasnever achieved and as a result, a com-mon operational picture was never gen-erated.23

As the capabilities of ISR assetshave increased, so too have command-ers’ demands for information generatedby these assets. As identified in the UKand US “After Action Reports,” ISRavailability, in terms of limited resourcesfor critical missions, was classified aslow-density high demand (LD/HD). TheUS had to re-allocate non-theatre assets,such as additional JSTARS, AWACS, U2,and UAVs, from other CinCs in order tomeet the requirements of the ALLIEDFORCE campaign.24

ISR capabilities were an integralpart of the success of ALLIED FORCE.However, the extensive and unprece-

dented utilization of ISR assets broughtto light serious shortfalls in the abilityto use this intelligence effectively.Commanders at all levels were inundat-ed with information.25 Data shortfallsand incompatibilities meant much ofthe ISR information had to be integrat-ed manually and relayed in less thanideal modes, decreasing both the timeli-ness and accuracy of the data.Commanders’ decision-making cycleand the potential for error were thusincreased commensurately.

At the tactical level, integration ofinformation is essential, particularlywhen the attacking system isunmanned as in the case of TomahawkLand Attack Missiles. Campaign con-straints required visual identification ofthe target and correlation with othertargeting intelligence.

During Operation ALLIEDFORCE, our precision intelli-gence capability played a signif-icant role in the employment ofprecision munitions to systemat-ically degrade importantSerbian military targets. 26

Sufficient background informationis required to allow accurate assessmentof operations impact and to ascertainthe adversaries’ remaining capability.Limited collation of valuable BDAinformation degraded this assessmentdiminishing the value of the assessmentto the commander and potentially com-promising some missions while increas-ing the potential for the redundancy ofothers.27

Overall, ISR capabilities providedthe JFC with a greatly improved abilityto pursue his operational plan while atthe same time meeting the restrictive

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The J2 CIP would be responsiblefor the coordination of the data streamspopulating the CIP. The CIP is similar tothe Common Operating Picture (COP)but also includes associated intelligencedata such as sensor data, imagery, RFIs,RFI history, and intelligence databases.This provides the centralization of ISRdata that is critical to the effective coor-dination of ISR assets. More important-ly, much of the airborne sensor datawould be collated in near real-time – acapability critical to the success of rapidtargeting. The J3 would be able to usethis technology to maintain an accuratepicture of the battlespace thereby bet-ter facilitating dynamic tasking of avail-able assets.

The following is a representativelist of assets that would provide inputto the CIP:

• Strategic assets such as satellites• Special Operations Forces• Tactical Air Recce• AWACS

• JSTARS• UAVs• EP3• U2• Tactical Unit Situation Reports• Human Intelligence (HUMINT)• National Intelligence Centres• Recognized Air Picture (RAP)• Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP)• Recognized Land Picture Common

Operating Picture

The output is the CIP, a digital com-pendium of all available informationapplicable to the theatre of operations,which would be immediately accessibleby all supporting and supported units.

Figure 2 shows the conceptual flowof the CIP process. It displays bothhow requests for information andreplies are processed. The J2 CIPwould produce and maintain the CIPbased on inputs from the assets listedin Figure 3. Any and all units/userswill then draw on the CIP to extract ISRdata as required.

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nator capability to Predator. The FY 01-05 budget also calls for an additional$918 million for a new JSTARS aircraft,$260 million additional funding for theGlobal Hawk program, and $390 millionfor other ISR enhancements. In addi-tion the FY01-05 budget also includes$1.5 billion increased investment in thetasking, production, exploitation anddissemination (TPED) of intelligenceassets. These investments will be usedto address many of the shortcomingsidentified in ISR integration in theALLIED FORCE operation.33 This largeinflux of cash to replace and expandISR capabilities highlights the necessityto ensure that all of these assets canoperate in a unified manner.

THE IDEAL ISR SITUATION

Comprehensive employment of ISRassets is essential to the effectiveexploitation of the modern battlefield.While Operation ALLIED FORCE pro-vided a glimpse into the future poten-tial of ISR operations, there werenumerous problems with respect to alack of centralized command and con-trol of ISR assets. In order to fullyexploit the modern capabilities of vari-ous ISR assets it is essential that a cen-tralized command and control organi-zation employing common processes,and equipped with the attendantresources be developed around anorganization that is responsible forthese tasks.

Within the context of current tech-nology, intelligence products must stillbe processed by the base component ofthe applicable asset (for example theground station for the Pioneer UAV) dueto the numerous unique data formatsthat are utilized by various ISR assets.Data fusion technologies must be devel-

oped that can manage a variety ofunique data streams for collation at acentral location. Additionally, seriousefforts must be made to standardizedata products that could then be feddirectly into a common intelligence pic-ture (CIP) from the source – in a mannersimilar to the AWACS and Link-16.

As identified in the US after actionreport, a “…joint, secure, tactical datalink capability such as Link-16 is need-ed across all strike platforms to allowreal-time data exchange and precisiontarget processing between sensor andshooter, and to establish a robust com-mon tactical picture.”34 This capabilityis fundamental to the establishment of asingle integrated battlespace picture.All data streams must be automaticallyfused into the common picture whilemaintaining data integrity at all times.Data must be timed stamped andprocessed to ensure the most currentdata is used and a data reliability assess-ment is assigned. These two featuresare vital for practical engagement of tar-gets by tactical forces. Unique assigna-tion and identification of all friendlyand enemy assets is key to the battlecommander’s situational awareness andultimate success.

To achieve data synergy from inte-grated ISR assets, it is essential that ISRproducts be fed to an ISR coordinator.This coordinator – termed the J2Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) –would be an element of the J2 organiza-tion responsible for initial informationconflict resolution and immediate replyto RFIs (Figure 1). This organizationmust have adequate personnel resourcesin order to effectively compile the CIPto include intelligence experts, informa-tion systems experts, and knowledgemanagement experts.

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Figure 1 - J2 CIP Organization

J1PERS

J2INT

J3OPS

...

JCF

JPCIMIC

MCC LCC ACC

J2Plans

J2Ops

J2CIP

N1PERS

N2INT

...

N9CIMIC

G2PERS

G2INT

...

G9CIMIC

A1PERS

A2INT

...

A9CIMIC

In addition to near real-time func-tionality, the CIP will highlight the lat-est information inputs for all users.Alternatively, users may view newinformation via a search tool that allowsthe user to design the search based ontime, type of information, or source ofinformation. This search tool allowscustomized searches based on the users’needs thus providing the user with thenecessary ISR information in the mostexpeditious manner.

To fulfill the mandate of central-ized ISR data management and control,the J2 CIP would require a robust infor-mation management capability that isfully connected via a secure networkwith all ISR sources, analysts and prod-uct users. A comprehensive softwaretool is necessary to compile, index, andpresent all available ISR information.Additionally, this same tool must pro-vide access to RFI information consist-ing of RFIs satisfied, RFIs pending, andRFIs submitted and awaiting prioritiza-tion. Embedded within the CIP will beadditional ISR databases as generatedby the various strategic and nationalISR assets.

The proposed J2 CIP process wouldoffer the following advantages:

a. the overall theatre strategy wouldbe supported by the harmonizedapportionment of ISR assets indirect correspondence to the JFC’spriorities;

b. ISR and targeting assets are con-trolled at the same level, whichwould result in an effective coordi-nated strategy and allocation; i.e.,the ISR can support the targeting interms of providing pre-strike intelli-gence and post-strike assessment;

c. the J3 would have immediate

access to a near real-time portrayalof the battlespace to provide timelydecision-making ability – particu-larly when conducting operationsagainst mobile or “pop-up” targets;

d. centralized control would eliminateduplication of effort with scarceISR assets potentially freeing upassets to hold standby/alert. Thismay help reduce the operationaltempo while at the same time pro-viding a quick reaction capability;

e. centralized control allows for theassignment of the most appropriateavailable asset to each target;

f. the process would allow users tocustomize their portal (cus-tomized view) to selectively dis-play the information they require;

g. simultaneous access by users withdiverse security clearances to acommon pool of ISR data could beprogrammed;

h. the information and decision cyclewould be much shorter for com-manders and staff in thoseinstances when information hasbeen previously compiled andavailable;

i. decision-makers could potentiallysatisfy an ISR requirement immedi-ately (assuming the information isreadily available on the CIP); and

j. it would avoid duplication of sim-ilar RFIs and CCIRs from the vari-ous component commanders. Ifthe data has been requested theresult is either in the system or therequirement is in the process ofbeing satisfied.

The J2 CIP Process may suffer fromthe following disadvantages:

a. ISR asset owners may be reluctantto release assets to a centralizedauthority;

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There are three options availablewhen accessing the CIP. The firstoption is where the information hasbeen “pushed” in order to be readilyavailable on the CIP without the needfor further interaction.35 For the J3 ina joint force, this method of data pres-entation is vital for rapid assimilationof information. In the secondinstance, the information having beenpreviously requested via RFI is nowavailable on the CIP. In this case theuser has the option of accessing theinformation directly from the CIP orvia the RFI Reply database containinghyperlinks to the appropriate data. Inthe third approach, the informationhas been requested, but has not yetbeen satisfied. The request for infor-mation has been registered and therequester has been informed of whenthe data will be available.

Within the daily operations plan-ning cycle the J2 CIP will forward all

unsatisfied RFIs to the J2 who will rec-ommend priority and asset allocation.The J2 will create a list of locally taskedCCIRs in addition to strategic-levelCCIRs that will be forwarded to the JFC.The JFC will then authorize/amend thetwo prioritized lists thereby providingdirection to the J3 for subsequent task-ing of the various ISR assets.

Strategic CCIRs will be sent to thesuperior HQ (NATO or multi-nationalHQ) for resolution. Once the strategic-level reply is received by the JFC, theinformation will be passed to the J2who in turn will pass the reply to the J2CIP for inclusion in the CIP. The J2 CIPthen informs the RFI originator that thereply is available. Any operational mis-sions generated by the J3 to satisfy alocal CCIR will automatically forwardthe acquired information to the J2 CIP,who will compile the information andinform the request originator that theinformation is now available.

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J3

STRATIGIC JFC CCIRREQUEST/REPLY CCIR-TASKINGs

IAW JFC Apportionment

RFI-INTEL REQUESTSLOCAL CCIR-REPLIES

J2 PRI REPLY

(Strategic)

LOCAL CCIRs

RFI INTEL REPLIES

J2 PRI REQ(Local/Strategic)

J2 RFI REPLY

(Strategic)

RFI’soutstanding

J2

JFC

ACC LCC MCC

A2 G2 N2

J2-CIP

Figure 2 - Joint ISR RFI / Tasking Flow

challenge in the initial confusing stagesof a conflict similar to OperationALLIED FORCE.

Once ISR assets have been placedunder the centralized control of theappropriate commander then the intel-ligence requirements can be collatedby a centralized agency such as the J2CIP. The data collection process willprevent overlapping of parallelprocesses allowing information to beeasily transmitted using existing tech-nology to all users in near real time sothat all commanders and associatedstaffs have the same understanding ofthe battle situation.

Initiating the centralized controland processing of ISR assets and prod-ucts will not be easy as many com-manders will want to protect theirinterests and maintain influence overcollection of what they feel is criticalinformation. In fact, for some com-manders there may be a loss of respon-siveness to data collection. This, how-ever, should be a minor concern whenconsidering the “big” picture. Despitethe rapidity, quality, and accuracy ofany ISR product, political demands maystill require a human visual confirma-tion of politically sensitive targets,which no integrated picture can pro-vide quickly. This too is of minor con-cern and should be considered an iso-lated problem.

The role of ISR in the targetingprocess cannot be understated.Modern, mobile weapon systems,diverse operational theatres, andintense scrutiny by politicians and pub-lic alike, demand that targeting be con-ducted rapidly with accurate anddetailed information which will providefor the necessary level of destructionwithout unacceptable collateral dam-

age. A lack of centralized control overISR assets will produce a fragmented,confusing, and a potentially destabiliz-ing battlespace picture while sacrificingcritical timeliness.

It is clear that future application ofISR in both joint and combined opera-tions must be centralized and that pri-oritization and processing of intelli-gence information must be handled by adedicated organization that can quicklyproduce a single accurate portrayal ofthe battlespace. As ISR platformsbecome more capable, and data trans-mission faster and more reliable, thiscomprehensive approach to ISR willbecome all the more important.

Endnotes

1. Michael Ignatiaff, Virtual War –Kosovo and Beyond (Toronto, ON: PenguinBooks, 2000), 99.

2. Operation ALLIED FORCE was a limit-ed joint operation due to the lack of a largepresence of land and naval assets other thanthe integral air and aviation assets they pro-vided to the campaign.

3. United States, Department of Defense,Military Critical Technologies: Part III,Developing Critical Technologies, Section 16 –Positioning, Navigation, and Time Technology(Dulles, Virginia: Defense Threat ReductionAgency, 2000) III-16-1.

4. United States, Department of Defense,Air Force Doctrine Document 2-52Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceOperations (Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama: Headquarters Air Force DoctrineCenter, 21 April 1999)

5. United States, Department of Defense,JP 3-01 Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and

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b. there may be concerns over thesensitivity of releasing specificinformation to coalition partners.The requirement for multi-levelsecure access creates the require-ment to efficiently sanitize theproduct to the appropriate levelwhile ensuring maximum useful-ness of the CIP;

c. dynamic targeting, while improved,may remain problematic with cur-rent technology until such time asall ISR assets are capable of feedingcompatible real-time data formatsinto the CIP;

d. this system may not be as respon-sive to subordinate commander ISRdemands due to a lack of asset own-ership. To alleviate this, select ISRassets may be assigned to units uti-lizing TACOM/TACON C2 relation-ships to support specific short-termrequirements; and

e. national expectations and/or securi-ty concerns may preclude optimuminformation sharing and access tonational ISR assets for JFC tasking.

The J2 CIP system facilitates thecentralized control of ISR assets andinformation – a problem noted duringOperation ALLIED FORCE. Uniquelyformatted data streams translated into astandardized protocol for the CIP is thepredominate hurdle to be surmountedin realizing the ideal solution. The J3must have immediate access to near real-time data to effectively prosecute tar-gets on the modern battlefield; there-fore, efforts to completely integrate ISRassets and their subsequent data prod-ucts must progress quickly.

CONCLUSION

The Gulf War built the foundationupon which current ISR doctrine has

been constructed. GeneralSchwarzkopf required timely and accu-rate information in order to maintainconfidence in the critical decision-mak-ing process. Rapid target informationwas essential in minimizing the threatfrom Iraqi mobile missile launchers andother mobile targets. These Gulf Warlessons were known prior to OperationALLIED FORCE, but the solutions werenot well implemented in the early stagesof the conflict.

ALLIED FORCE ISR assets were notimmediately integrated into a singleproduct - perhaps as a result of the con-fidence in the anticipated short dura-tion of the conflict – which resulted ina slow target identification and selec-tion process. By March 1998, GeneralClark had only 100 approved targetsavailable and desperately needed sever-al hundred more. Identifying these tar-gets was a daunting task. Lacking suf-ficient troops on the ground to visuallyconfirm targets, General Clark wasforced to rely on airborne Forward AirControllers (FAC) providing modestreaction times.36 The execution of afully integrated ISR system under cen-tralized control with centralized infor-mation processing would have pro-duced a clear and comprehensive bat-tlespace picture.

The US doctrinal framework forthe employment of ISR assets is welldocumented. Control of ISR assets restswith the J3 within the joint force struc-ture. The J2 is responsible for produc-ing the intelligence picture; however, alack of guidance on the managementand production of that integrated pic-ture detracts from a near-future solu-tion to the problem. Additionally, alack of combined operations doctrinewill make future coalition operations a

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This report represents the views ofthe author and does not represent theviews of Toffler Associates® or individ-uals or organizations who participatedor supported its development.

Introduction

This essay imagines a future inwhich strategy, initiative, and lead-

ership compensate for an emergingworld characterized by the decline ofmeaning and the rise of mystery.Elsewhere, others and I have positedthat the world around will be increas-ingly transparent. Yet, despite suchtransparency, we may be inundatedwith data that lacks focus and whichappears meaningless. In addition, as weunveil and unwrap the world aroundus, we will discover new mysteries thatseem to defy explanation. This essaybriefly repaints this future, examinesrecent efforts to offer us an informationadvantage, and suggests that leadershipand initiative must inevitably emerge tolead us from this “chaos.”

The Decline of Meaning and the Riseof Mystery©

Imagine a world in which technol-ogy promises us vast amounts of data.Already, there are nearly half a billionPCs on the planet – one for every 13human beings. By 2005, forecastersexpect 1 billion Internet users. Sixty-two percent are expected to access theInternet with wireless devices.Commercial satellite revenues are

expected to climb from $30 billion in2000 to $115 billion in 2007. Highcapacity Ka band broadband satelliteservices are expected to dominate amarket, composed of mid and smallbusiness, small office – home office(SOHO) and consumers, which willdrive down prices for everyone.

Some scientists expect that technol-ogy may drive changes too complex forus to process. They note the humanmind has evolved over 10,000 years to aprocessing capability of about 106 mil-lion instructions per second or MIPS.The mind is thought to have memoryaccessing capabilities in the range ofthree to five terabits. These technolo-gists anticipate that in three decadesnon-human processing speeds will bebeyond 1024 MIPS and note that trans-port speeds already exist with informa-tion inputs at speeds from forty terabitsto one or more petabits per second. Thescientists see raw processing power thatis simply beyond human comprehen-sion.1 Given exploding telecommunica-tions interconnectivity and processingpower, we should expect tremendousamounts of data and information to beavailable.

Yet, increased data does not meanmore meaning. Consider the movies.Our Hollywood friends tell us that mak-ing movies is about telling stories.Telling stories is all about advancing theplot. Vivid characters enrich the story,but the critical dynamic is moving theplot. So when the camera captures the

The Decline of Meaning and the Rise ofLeadership?©

J o s e p h A . E n g e l b r e c h t J r . , P h . D .T o f f l e r A s s o c i a t e s ®

among high technology organizations,DARPA, the U.S. Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency, USAF, andNRO allied to create Discoverer II, a lowearth orbiting system that promised theability to detect moving targets. Whilethe U.S. Congress reduced funding forDiscover II, it seems likely that futurespace-based systems will bridge the gapbetween strategic intelligence for nation-al users and intelligence products andservices tailored for military activities.In addition, the U.S. military is replacingcommunications satellites with a “wide-band gapfiller” until their advancedcommunications systems and commercialservices fill an exploding need for broad-band voice and data telecommunications.

Learning to assimilate and act onricher data will not await new space sys-tems. Airborne systems are increasinglybeing augmented by UAVs – uninhabitedaerial vehicles. During Kosovo’sOperation Allied Force, unmanned aerialvehicles were used at unprecedented lev-els. The U.S. Air Force Predator, the U.S.Army Hunter, and the U.S. Navy Pioneerprovided general surveillance and recon-naissance, real-time targeting, and cueingof other ISR systems.8 These C4ISR ini-tiatives are increasing. For example theU.S. Army is developing the Organic AirVehicle (OAV), which is designed to pro-vide real-time “over-the-hill” reconnais-sance and surveillance to small unitsequipped with the Future CombatSystem. It builds on existing technolo-gies developed as part of DARPA’s MicroAir Vehicle program.9 While militaryforces are learning to operate with richerdata, some are calling for even moreleverage from information.

The U.S. JCS Chairman’s JointVision 2020 now tops the quest forinformation superiority with decision

superiority. Military commanders arestating that an information advantage isnot enough; we must have decisionadvantage. Said another way, knowingmore than the adversary knows aboutthe situation, the condition of friendlyforces, and the capabilities of enemyforces is important. But, commandersshould have information about patternsof behavior, alternative options, andpotential consequences of choices in aform and time that permits better deci-sions to be made than the adversary’s.These decisions could also be fasterthan the adversary can assess the cir-cumstance and decide on a new course.

Different Futures for InformationLeverage

Information superiority may notevolve as some expect. The circumstancesmay deviate. The players may vary. Thefull range of capabilities may not bebrought to bear. Support may wane.And, the information may be faulty.

Americans, who believe they arethe leaders in information technologyand advantage, are the natural case toexamine, but many others are on a sim-ilar heading. American military energyis focused on attaining some form ofinformation superiority, “full spectrumdominance,” and “net centric warfare”advantage in a theater conventionalwar. The U.S. Defense Report summa-rizes information superiority.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Information superiority is allabout getting the right infor-mation to the right people atthe right time in the right for-mat while denying adversariesthe same advantages. The

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action, the objective is not to reproducethe exact details of the scene, but toreproduce those details that convey thedevelopment of the story. In fact, thecamera obscures details that wouldinterfere with the audience’s attentionto the meaning of the story’s twists andturns. So, when we see a close up of acouple kissing, we may be seeing itthrough a filter, cheesecloth of sorts,which softens the pores, hairs andblemishes on the actors’ face to keep themood romantic. If the story element isclear, in this case romance, then itbecomes a metric for the appropriatelevel of detail. More detail would dis-tract from the meaning. Our movieexperience reminds us that elicitingmeaning is not simply a function of thedata available, but more importantly amatter of achieving the right focus.

The meaning of “meaning,” thephilosophers tell us, is rather ambigu-ous. Meaning can have at least fourmeanings.2 Meaning can mean inten-tion or purpose. It can mean designa-tion or reference. A third meaning isthat of definition or translation. And afinal meaning for meaning relates to thecausal antecedents or consequences of athing or of things in motion. The word“mystery” has a rich etymology, deriv-ing from the Greek múein, meaning “toclose one’s eyes and mouth” or to “keepsecret.”3 Hence “mystery” means some-thing that is beyond understanding. Aswe enter the Third Wave more deeply,we must consider the possibility thatcompetition and warfare in the ThirdWave are characterized by an environ-ment wherein meaning is less easilyacquired, and a number of mysteriescould arise to supplant it. Said anotherway, we wonder aloud whether weshould prepare ourselves for a futurewhen the much-prized transparent bat-

tlespace could become the domain ofmystery and realm of apparent mean-inglessness. When compared to yester-day, transparent it may be, but under-standable it may not be.4

Modern ISR and InformationSuperiority

Does the future we suggest contrastwith that envisioned by senior govern-ment and military officials? The U.S.envisions modern intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systemsthat will deliver information superiori-ty. The U.S. Joint Vision 2010, for exam-ple, called for information superiority,which it defined as “the capability tocollect, process, and disseminate anuninterrupted flow of informationwhile exploiting or denying an adver-sary’s ability to do the same.”5

The U.S. military and intelligencecommunity are planning on moderniza-tions of space-based systems to producemore intelligence and important data. Infact, the Future Imagery Architecturebeing developed for the U.S. NationalReconnaissance Office (NRO) is such animprovement that some believe that itand other proposed systems will gener-ate more data and images than can beanalyzed.6 To ensure a balance betweencollection capability and analytic capa-bility, the U.S. Congress allocated multi-ple billions of dollars to the U.S. NationalImaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA)to handle the new analytic volumes inthe tasking, processing, exploitation,and dissemination or TPED process.7 Inaddition to the Future ImageryArchitecture, the NRO has set its visionto create a revolution in global recon-naissance and has reportedly increasedR&D funding to achieve it. Further, inan example of growing partnerships

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Indeed, American aspirations for domi-nance, which in fairness are aimed atadversaries, are frequently articulatedand received as claims to be able to actwith minimal regard to the informationbehaviors of friends and allies.Achieving allied information collabora-tion, at a speed and fidelity that enablesa collective action consistent with thefuture operations Americans describe,remains a future feat.

In the wide range of futureimbroglios that Americans and friendsmay face, the full complement of C4ISRassets may not even make an appear-ance at the garden party. Space basedsensors and communications promise tobe ever-present, but can be limited byhigher priority tasking, insufficient orincompatible equipment on the groundor temporarily masked by topographicalfeatures, which reduce effectiveness.Information collection and connectabil-ity are becoming integrated withground, sea, and air equipment andunits in ways that make one believe thatmost units who deploy for future oper-ations will bring some inherent capabil-ity for information-rich operations. Forevery deployment, however, non-inher-ent forces will be scrutinized and oftenminimized. For example, will airborneISR assets be deployed for the nextSomalia operation, for the nextMozambique relief, or for the nextBalkans’ monitoring? When informa-tion assets are omitted, the way infor-mation superiority is achieved will haveto vary from the normal model. Saidanother way, allied operations withoutAWACs, JSTARS, and the UAVs that fol-low the Predator and Global Hawk arehighly plausible and present an alter-nate to the JV2020 future. The diverseinformation assets of non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) or global busi-

nesses may play critical roles in suchalternate futures.

Choosing what air, land, and seainformation assets to commit to futureengagements can produce unanticipat-ed consequences. In one circumstance,allies may decide to deploy a full com-plement of C4ISR capabilities to enhanceour effectiveness. Allies might contendthat bringing all information assetsreflects the way our forces train and ismost likely to quickly achieve results.Some at home may loyally support mili-tary thoroughness. Others might chal-lenge a “one size fits all” approach, andquestion the military’s stewardship ofscarce tax resources. To respond to thiscritique, in another circumstance, alliesmay deploy selective information assets.But customizing information assets tothe particular situation could haveother consequences. Commentators athome are frequently quick to critiquehigh cost units that are being left out.Thus, future decisions to deploy or notto deploy enabling information assetscould shape the future and affect thetransparency that current visions advo-cate. Further, on the one hand, weexpect information capabilities tobecome embedded in normal operationsand to become more ubiquitous so thatphysical deployment of special plat-forms becomes less likely. On the otherhand, as in these two examples, supportfor expensive C4ISR assets can wane ifthey are not employed optimally.Consistent support will be needed togrow the robust information superioritycapabilities that advocates envision.

The e-risk of unreliable or disrupt-ed information may also be climbingfaster than efforts to assure our informa-tion. Although computer securitybreeches are often underreported, the

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United States enjoys a compet-itive advantage in many of thetechnical components of infor-mation superiority, but theU.S. also has vulnerabilitiesstemming from its increasingdependence on high technolo-gy. Experiences from Somaliato the Balkans have shown thatlow technology adversariesalso can wage effective informa-tion campaigns, especially inurban environments. Giventhat DoD information can beadequately assured, and theopponents’ capabilities areappreciated, U.S. strengths inthe information domain can betranslated directly into compet-itive advantages by emergingnetwork-centric concepts thatare designed to leverage high-quality shared awareness….

IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATIONSUPERIORITY

In the Information Age theopportunities and obstacles toachieving national securityobjectives will often be infor-mational in nature. Informationsuperiority is a principal com-ponent of the transformation ofthe Department. The results ofresearch, analyses, and experi-ments, reinforced by experi-ences in Kosovo, demonstratethat the availability of informa-tion and the ability to share itsignificantly enhances missioneffectiveness and improves effi-ciencies. Benefits include:increased speed of command, ahigher tempo of operations,greater lethality, less fratricideand collateral damage, increased

survivability, streamlined com-bat support, and more effectiveforce synchronization. Kosovoalso highlighted the shortage ofassets for intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance andthe need for more secure inter-operability and informationprotection, especially withincoalitions. 10

To obtain an information edge incircumstances that they consider themost stressful, American militaryleaders expect a multi-dimensionalarray of assets to be available. Space-based reconnaissance will be supple-mented with manned and UAV sensorsand communications links. Airbornebattle management platforms likeAWACS and JSTARS, or potentiallywide-bodied replacements,11 willdirect forces and augment ground-based operations centers. Surfaceunits will be netted together as well asbe informed by local sensors andtransponders. The natural questionis, absent a theater conventional war,will this rich array of assets still beavailable? In lesser circumstances,will coalition and American leaders’information be less superior?

Accurate, timely informationshould give allied forces a distinctadvantage over an adversary handi-capped by key information gaps andlags. Such an advantage could be real-ized across a whole coalition if alliesinvest in command and control andinformation assets at a rate similar tothe United States. The collaborationwould be dependent on Americans’opening their networks and intelligenceflows to allies. While each ingredient ofdecision superiority is plausible in thenext twenty years, all are not apparent.

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Few would postulate we will see noconventional fighting in interstate warsor that modern style C4ISR assets willnot be employed in interstate war in thefuture. But most agree that the situa-tion will be infrequent. Some sayextremely rare.17 If the circumstanceswhen C4ISR can be employed are quitedifferent from the international warsthat form the setting for most of theconcepts in Joint Vision 2020, how dif-ferently should we expect informationassets and concepts to evolve?

Initially, modern ISR may seemmore like chaos

If the futures posited by GlobalTrends 2015 and New World Comingarrive, they will pose “chaotic” situa-tions near the bifurcation point wherechance matters and where proactive ISRmay be key to adaptation and success.But, successful ISR will likely be quitedifferent from the traditional hierarchi-cal, stove piped model and differentfrom the one-sided dominance model.

Traditionally, ISR systems werebased on the assumption that informa-tion was scarce, difficult to acquire,valuable, doled out to select few.Listening to or imaging an adversarywas technically difficult. Sensing thesignatures and actions of his weaponssystems was hard. Intelligence officersbecame experts in one discipline; sel-dom in more than one. Intelligence wascollected, processed, and then distrib-uted by these specialized experts toonly those with a “need to know.”Need was most frequently predeter-mined by position – often by positionin the government or military hierarchy.

Slowly ISR systems are opening toeach other and to end-users. The Gulf

War demonstrated the value of knowl-edge enabled military forces and begana move to make intelligence moreresponsive to military users. Manyusers were given access to informationthat had previously been restricted.And users’ expectations increased.They demanded more. In addition towanting more information from space-based systems, military users increasedtheir use of airborne assets. U.S.AWACS aircraft and crews, for example,are deployed for more days per yearthan nearly any other USAF unit.

During the same period, the WorldWide Web appeared. The 1993 graphi-cal user interface (GUI) enabled individ-uals to access networks of informationwithout prior computer training. TheWeb made creating information thatwas accessible to others easy. Theamount and availability of thisincreased information changed the per-ception of end users about informationitself. Rather than information beingscarce, it could be abundant. Sources ofinformation increased and were lessdependent on specialized intelligencesystems and personnel.

As end users, such as military com-manders, value abundant informationand knowledge more, they propose touse it to dominate their adversaries. Yet,the same pull for more and better infor-mation invites the flood of extra data.Much of the data will be without mean-ing and appear chaotic.

The new science of chaos and com-plexity suggests that what appears to bechaotic and without order, can be quiteorderly.18 The new science suggests thatthe ISR of the future might need to oper-ate under different principles than thetraditional models of C4ISR and informa-

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number of acknowledged incidents isrising.12 A recent analysis of over onehundred executives concluded that con-cern among business leaders and securi-ty specialists is increasing. Several sen-ior business executives labeled informa-tion security as a “hot button” issue.13

An information security industry isspringing up to address these concernsand governments are calling for specialefforts to protect critical electronicinfrastructures.14 Some technologistsbelieve that security fixes such as fire-walls that attempt to construct a moatand fortress around networks will beinsufficient and that many existingsecurity technologies cannot be scaledto dispersed, mobile computing andcommunications. Such concerns raiseimportant issues for military electronicand communications systems that areincreasingly dependent on commerciallybased technologies and often ride oncommercial electronic infrastructures.

Even if C4ISR evolves more closelyto the images that some officials project,the settings for using these assets willlikely be different.

Conflicts won’t be like they usedto be

Two extensive explorations of futuresecurity issues have recently concludedthat traditional interstate wars foughtwith conventional forces will be muchless likely in the coming decades. TheU.S. National Intelligence Councilassessed global trends through 2015 withthe assistance of an array of non-govern-mental experts. The NIC concluded:

Through 2015, internal con-flicts will pose the most fre-quent threat to stabilityaround the world. Interstate

wars, though less frequent,will grow in lethality due tothe availability of moredestructive technologies. Theinternational community willhave to deal with the military,political, and economic dimen-sions of the rise of China andIndia and the continueddecline of Russia.15

The U.S. Commission on NationalSecurity in the 21st Century’s NewWorld Coming elevated concerns forinternal conflict and for threats fromnon-state actors.

As with most periods of rapidchange, both the actors andthe means by which violence isused in pursuit of politicalgoals may shift abruptly. Non-state actors, individuals as wellas groups, will gain power andinfluence, and many will haveat their disposal alarmingmeans of destruction. Evenin a world in which major warsare less frequent… Interstatewars will not disappear overthe next 25 years…. Violencewithin states, on the otherhand, could reach unprece-dented levels…. There willalso be a greater probability ofa far more insidious kind ofviolence in the next millenni-um: catastrophic terrorism….

Non-state actors will also usethese weapons [weapons ofmass destruction] in directattacks…. Missile threats willalso continue to proliferate….Outer space, as well as cyber-space, will become a warfareenvironment.16

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the previous agricultural and industrialeconomies and societies, but that fea-tures of past civilizations will persist.

In the Third Wave future we arebeginning, knowledge becomes a new,more powerful economic resource alongwith land, labor, and capital. Unlikeother resources, however, knowledge isreusable and can be shared. As a resultof this new appreciation of knowledge,especially when enabled by informationtechnology, activities can be efficientlyaccomplished on small scales and insmall units. In the Third Wave, massedproduction and activities are increas-ingly replaced by demassified units anddispersed behaviors. In a Third Waveworld, we also expect ISR to be demas-sified rather than centralized or hierar-chical. ISR will include NGOs, theInternet, and personal wireless devices.This means that the decision on specificmilitary actions can be pushed downever further to the “user” level, whilegenerally remaining within the process-es and rules of engagement – the plot —set by senior leaders.

Some, inspired in part by theTofflers,21 have begun to consider theknowledge strategies that future leadersand commanders will need to bringorder and script the “plot” for the spe-cific situation.22 In a series of wargames,dubbed Forward Focus, the NationalReconnaissance Office and the Office ofthe U.S. Secretary of Defense for NetAssessment elicited the value of “know-ing” in different situations. Handpicked warriors and operators used afuture value analysis model to attributethe importance of knowing specific bitsof information in a particular scenario.Forward Focus revealed how warriorsvalue knowing at the “detect” level ofcognition for agile attack forces with

high lethal range, high mobility, andlow signature. Operators seek wide areacoverage with very short timelines todetect agile attack forces which canthreaten quickly. For other types ofobjects or forces with high mobility buthigh signatures, warrior leaders advisethat knowledge gathering should “rec-ognize” such objects and distinguishthem from non-targets and that longerperiods of collection are acceptable.

Leaders can devise knowledgestrategies. Will they?

In sum, this essay has tried todescribe a plausible future and makefour simple points.

First, increased information in thefuture may be meaningless.

Second, different situations we willface in the future may make it more dif-ficult to apply our information assetsthan we expect.

Third, chaos suggests that order ispossible at a higher state of complexityif communication is increased.

And fourth, leaders can create aframework for increased complexityand communications and must attributemeaning to enable successful action.

The United States is not the onlygroup thinking about the role of knowl-edge and knowledge assets in thefuture. Americans call for leveragingknowledge against adversaries to gaininformation and decision superiority.They and their allies are quickly addingISR assets to enable this goal, andimportantly beginning to develop con-cepts to bring the goal closer to reality.This essay suggests that the vector is

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tion superiority. Chaos and complexitygive us new insights into how difficult“knowing” might be. Future securitychallenges with other players, other con-cerns, other methods, megacities, migra-tions, and democracies with internal con-flicts appear chaotic in one sense of theword – random and unpredictable. Thenew science counters a reductionist viewthat tried to isolate a few key variables tohelp explain or predict. During the ColdWar, for example, nuclear theorists iso-lated the throwweight of ballistic missilesas a key indicator of nuclear deliverycapabilities. In the Gulf War, alliesfocused on Scud launchers as a keythreat. In many security situations of thefuture, key threats may not be neatlyorganized into military units. Instead,ISR will need to monitor many variables,potentially too many for serial processingand dissemination through intelligencechannels down to operational players.

Chaos theory advises that our abili-ty to operate depends on increasing theinformation flowing through boundarylayers of the organism or organization.19

Becoming highly adaptive to the unpre-dictable situations we will face entailscreating organizations and systems thatoperate at a high-energy state. ClassicISR systems with a slow state of energyand established information flows willmiss changes in the environment.

Chaos and complexity scienceexplain that there is an underlyingattractor that provides order to appar-ent chaos. The central figure in makingorder out of the potential ISR chaos ofdata inundation could be the leader ormilitary commander at the operationalor perhaps even the tactical level.

Learning from chaos, leaders andmilitary commanders could operate at

the edge between stasis and disorder.The edge is the source of innovation.Leaders who operate on the edge willlikely be the most highly adaptive tochanging situations.20 This alternatefuture suggests leaders must adapt ISRand knowledge assets to their particularsituation. Leaders must figure out “theplot” and apply meaning to the swellsof data. Such thinking and acting can-not be a function of staffs, or systems,or equipment for a long time to come,whatever the advances in processingpower. Operating in knowledge-enabled ways will not be a function ofthe toys of ISR, but could be a functionof the behaviors leaders create.

How do we prepare future leadersfor this alternate future of ISR? Leadersmust capitalize on the non linearity tocreate new order out of apparent chaos.We will almost certainly keep makingISR systems more info rich, and willprovide decision support software toease the burden somewhat. We need tohelp leaders learn to operate withgreater information, communication,and complexity, becoming more adap-tive and not suited for just one kind ofinformation or environment.

In the Third Wave, ISR may beopen and demassified—creatingnew challenges and opportuni-ties for leadership

A potential logic for understandingthe ISR chaos of the future is the ThirdWave framework. Years ago, Alvin andHeidi Toffler described a new knowl-edge era emerging that is swelling withrevolutionary change sufficient to dis-place the industrial civilizations aroundthe planet. The Tofflers used themetaphor of a giant wave to illustratethat the new phenomena will overtake

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Century – Supporting Research and Analysis.The Phase I Report on the Emerging GlobalSecurity Environment for the First Quarter ofthe 21st Century, September 15, 1999, pp. 46-48.

17. See, for example, Martin Van Creveld,The Transformation of War, New York: TheFree Press, 1991.

18. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a NewScience. New York: Penguin Group, 1987.

19. Frank Masterpasqua and Phyllis A.Perna, eds. The Phychological Meaning ofChaos: Translating Theory into Practice.Washington, D.C. American PsychologicalAssociation, 1997.

20. Ralph D. Stacey, Managing theUnknowable: Strategic Boundaries betweenOrder and Chaos in Organizations. SanFrancisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992.

21. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century. Boston: Little, Brown andCompany, 1993.

22. Frank B. Strickland, Jr., “It’s Not AboutMousetrapsMeasuring the Value ofKnowledge for Operators,” Joint ForceQuarterly, No. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 90-96.

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very important, but that the course toachieving it will be challenging in partbecause so many other variables arechanging in these revolutionary times.In the meantime before informationleverage becomes integral to operations,we wonder if creating actionableknowledge and discerning the plot willbe dependent on leadership.

Endnotes

1. Michael Loescher and John W.Peterson, “A Technology based Alternativeto ‘Warfare Beyond Boundaries,” LucentTechnologies draft paper, January 17, 2001.

2. Lester E. Denonn and Alonzo Church inDagobert D. Runes, ed., Dictionary ofPhilosophy (Totowa NJ: Littlefield, Adams andCompany, 1967), pp. 193-194.

3. John Ayato, Dictionary of Word Origins(New York: Little, Brown and Company,1990), p. 359.

4. This passage is derived from RichardSzafranski, Frank Strickland, and, Joseph A.Engelbrecht Jr, “The Decline in Meaningand the Rise of Mystery,” presented to theInfoOps Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 29-30September 1998.

5. General John Shalikashvili, Joint Vision2010, (Washington, D.C.: Office of theChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), p. 16.

6. “In September, the NRO awardedBoeing a contract worth potentially $4.5 bil-lion over the coming decades for the FutureImagery Architecture (FIA) satellites…. TheFIA satellites are to enter service between2005 and 2010.” Armed Forces NewswireService, February 4, 2000.

7. Vernon Loeb. “Mapping Agency GetsBoost From Critique,” Washington Post,

January 15, 20001, p. A19. “US NIMA jug-gles modernisation needs and goals,” Jane’sDefense Weekly, January 17, 2001.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Report toCongress: Kosovo/Operation Allied ForceAfter-Action Report, 31 January 2000, p. 56.

9. Inside the Army, July 25, 2000 12:00am.

10. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense,Annual Report to the President and Congress,2001, p. 107.

11. General Jumper, remarks to the UnitedAerospace Power Conference, 8 February2001.

12. For example, in 1990, the U.S. CERTCoordination Center reported 252 incidents.In 2000, they reported 21,756. CarnegieMellon University Software EngineeringInstitute, “CERT Coordination CenterStatistics 1988-2000,” athttp://www.cert.org/stats/ cert_stats.html.CERT counts broadly infectious viruses like“I LOVE YOU” as one incident. Other coun-tries are also reporting intrusions or damageat varying rates.

13. Toffler Associates, E-Risk: Exposed inthe Information Age, A Toffler AssociatesReport on Risks in an Intangible World,September 2000.

14. See, for example, the U.S. NationalInfrastructure Protection Center, athttp://www.nipc.gov/

15. Nation Intelligence Council. GlobalTrends 2015: A Dialogue About the Futurewith Nongovernment Experts. NIC 2000-02,December 2000, p. 49.

16. The U.S. Commission on NationalSecurity in the 21st Century’s New WorldComing: American Security in the 21st

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Intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance (ISR), the focus of this Air

Symposium, is a topic that has generat-ed a great deal of interest recently inCanadian defence circles. However, inthe bigger picture, ISR is just one inputinto the command and control (C2) sys-tem that helps to provide the command-er with situational awareness. BeforeISR systems are acquired, thoseinvolved in the acquisition process needto understand what the C2 system, andespecially the commander, needs fromISR to achieve situational awareness.This essay will summarize the funda-mental C2 issues that must be graspedbefore committing resources to any par-ticular ISR technology.

Command and control has beenconceptualized by Western armedforces for most of the 20th century interms of technical systems to transmitand receive information or an exercisein designing organization charts thatattempt to explain command relation-ships. The importance of the humanelement of command has been recog-nized and studied systematically onlyin the past decade. Nevertheless, con-siderable knowledge in this field isnow available to assist modern com-manders and their staffs in creatingeffective C2 models.

Certain elements of the CF havedemonstrated increasing interest in theeffects of human factors on commandbecause many recent problems in CFoperations have been attributed to aneglect of these factors. Comments

from the Debrief the Leader projectreflect several of these problems fromthe perspective of those deployed onoperations. Their perceptions, summa-rized as follows, were described as per-vasive: “Many of the problems facedrelate to perceived problems with sen-ior leadership and senior nationalheadquarters. These problems wereidentified as lack of capability, lack ofcompetency, careerism, over sensitivi-ty to media influence, passing thebuck and lack of willingness to sup-port commanders in the field and trustthem to do their job.” Some more spe-cific comments from leaders in the fieldindicated that higher headquarterswere not organized in such a way as tobe able to understand “actual missionrequirements in theatre,” and thatthere was a “general lack of confidenceand trust between junior and seniorofficers, including a major disconnectbetween commanders and troops intheatre and senior headquarters inCanada, especially NDHQ.” In additionto these personal comments, as part ofthe project data was collected and ana-lyzed that showed that superiors atNDHQ were rated significantly lowerthan other groups on such factors asmoral courage, accountability, and loy-alty to subordinates.2 It should benoted that similar perceptions areshared by members of other armedforces today3 and are consistent withthe findings of the recently published“Ethics and Operations ProjectReport” and the “First Baseline Surveyon Ethical Values in the Department ofNational Defence.”4

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN COMMANDAND CONTROL1

A l l a n E n g l i s h

tric systems may lead to a change incommand relationships based on a flat-ter and shorter chain of commandimplies that this change may also ampli-fy the information overload problem.9

Critics of the RMA-driven rush toacquire technology without consider-ing its effect on the human beings in theC2 system point to human factors thatconstrain organizations from embracingtechnological change. These factorsinclude a zero-defects mentality thatleads to an aversion to prudent risk-tak-ing; poorly designed war fightingexperiments featuring an overemphasison technological prototypes and anunderemphasis on organizational pro-totypes; a leadership that does notappear to welcome decentralized inno-vation and initiative; and widespreadsatisfaction with current systemsdespite their failings.10

The current debate on commandand control has examined the subjectfrom many different perspectives.Thomas Czerwinski proposes a frame-work based on three types of commandstyle that summarizes many of the con-cepts in the current debate. Hedescribes the first command style, cur-rently used in the US Army’s ForceXXI/digitized battlefield concept, as“command-by-direction.” This form ofcommand has been used since thebeginning of organized warfare, and it isbased on commanders attempting todirect all of their forces all of the time.This form of command fell into dis-favour in the middle of the 18th centuryas the increase in the size of armed forcesmade it increasingly difficult to exercise.Czerwinski argues that “command-by-direction” has been resurrected by theUS Army because it believes that tech-nology can provide the commander withthe ability to exercise this type of com-

mand again; however, he asserts that,because of the size and complexity ofthe technical support required to sup-port this command style, it will be inad-equate and self-defeating if applied to21st century conflict.

Czerwinski’s second style, “com-mand-by-plan,” was created byFrederick the Great 250 years ago toovercome the limitations of “command-by-direction.” “Command-by-plan”emphasizes adherence to a pre-deter-mined design and it has evolved as thenorm for modern military forces in theWest. The US Air Force’s air campaigndoctrine is cited as an example of thistype of command system which is char-acterized by trading flexibility for focusin order to concentrate on identifyingand neutralizing an opponent’s centresof gravity. Czerwinski claims that “com-mand-by-plan” is useful only at thestrategic and operational levels of war,but if too much emphasis is put onadhering to the plan, this method willbe ineffective because of its inability tocope with unforeseen or rapid change.

Czerwinski advocates the adoptionof a third type of style, “command-by-influence,” to deal with the chaos ofwar and the complexity of modernoperations. This command styleattempts to deal with uncertainty bymoving decision thresholds to lowercommand levels, thereby allowingsmaller units to carry out missionsbounded by the concept of operationsderived from the commander’s intent.The emphasis in this method of com-mand is on training and educatingtroops to have the ability to exercise ini-tiative and to exploit opportunitiesguided by the commander’s intent.Czerwinski’s contention that only“command-by-influence” systems are

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It is clear from the preceding per-ceptions that the critical issues in com-mand and control today are “peopleproblems.” The human factors of com-mand have been the subject of researchconducted by Ross Pigeau and CarolMcCann of the Defence and CivilInstitute for Environmental Medicineover the past six years. Their findingshave been acknowledged as groundbreaking by the international militaryresearch community and are summa-rized in a recent essay.5

The emphasis now being placed onthe human elements in command doesnot ignore technology, but stresses thattechnology must be responsive tohuman needs. In the past, manyWestern armed forces have purchasedC2 technology without considering howit would serve the commander. Thisoften resulted in ineffective C2 systemsthat focussed on what the technologycould do rather than what outputs thecommander needed from the technolo-gy to be effective. Another weakness inthe creation of C2 systems in the pastcan be found in complex organizationcharts intended to represent relation-ships in “the chain of command” whichactually existed only on paper. Theexample of the Gulf War is instructive.Once thought by some to be the epito-me of a successful C2 system, the actualCoalition C2 system is now known tohave had numerous shortcomings. Forexample, the formal air component C2

system in that war was circumventedwhen it was perceived by some to beunresponsive to the air componentcommander’s needs. Most of its organi-zation charts became largely meaning-less as informal networks were formed,aided by new technology, outside theformal chain of command. These infor-mal networks eventually usurped many

of the functions of the formal chain ofcommand in the conduct of the air war.6

Some commentators have suggestedthat the C2 shortcomings of the GulfWar can be overcome in the future byinformation superiority or dominance.But lessons from Operation AlliedForce, the air war over Kosovo andSerbia in 1999, challenge the belief thatinformation superiority will make thecommander’s job easier. While theattacking forces had tremendousamounts of data, the data was often notexploited because it could not be inter-preted in a timely fashion and trans-formed into knowledge that the com-mander could use in his campaign plan-ning and execution. As Admiral JamesEllis, C-in-C NATO Allied ForcesSouthern Europe noted, “too muchinformation has the potential to reducea military leader’s awareness of anunfolding situation.” If information isnot handled properly it can become “avoracious consumer of leadership andkey staff working hours.” This, accord-ing to analyst Timothy Thomas, is themost interesting and underrated les-son learned from the Kosovo cam-paign, namely that “information supe-riority overload can actually hurt mis-sion performance.”7

New C2 systems and concepts, suchas network-centric warfare, based onthe Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA) may exacerbate the informationoverload problem. These new systemsare creating a “data revolution” anddespite their capacity to collect and dis-tribute vast amounts of data, this willamount to nothing unless commandersand their staffs are able to transform thedata into knowledge which can then beused productively.8 Admiral W.J.Holland’s argument that network-cen-

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6. A detailed account of this example can befound in Mark D. Mandeles et al., Managing“Command and Control” in the Persian GulfWar (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).

7. Timothy L. Thomas, “Kosovo and theCurrent Myth of Information Superiority,”Parameters 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 13-29.

8. Mackubin Thomas Owens,“Technology, the RMA, and Future War,”Strategic Review 26, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 69.

9. Rear Admiral W.J. Holland Jr., “WhereWill All the Admirals Go?” US Naval InstituteProceedings 125, no. 5 (May 1999), 36-40.

10. William K. Lescher, “Network-Centric:Is It Worth the Risk?” US Naval InstituteProceedings 125, no. 7 (July 1999), 58-63.

11. Thomas J. Czerwinski, “Command andControl at the Crossroads,” Parameters 26,no. 3 (Autumn 1996), 121-32.

12. Mandeles, 6.

13. Lescher, 60.

14. See for example William F. Bell, “TheImpact of Policies on Organizational Valuesand Culture,” paper presented at the JointServices Conference on Professional Ethics(January 1999) http://www.usafa. af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE99/Bell99.html; Paul Johnston, “Doctrineis not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on theBehavior of Armies,” Parameters 30, no. 3(Autumn 2000), 30-9; and Walter F. Ulmer, Jr.et al., American Military Culture in theTwenty-First Century (Washington, DC: CSISPress, 2000).

15. “Mutabilis in Mobili: Leading andManaging Strategic Change in DND and theCF.” (In reading package).

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Note: In the wake of the “9-11” precisionair attacks against the World TradeCenter and Pentagon, there were immedi-ate calls to redirect the focus of the USmilitary. American forces now need toconcentrate on “twilight wars,” punditsargued, where “end states” and “exitstrategies,” “signaling resolve,” and “pro-portionate responses” meant little. Inmaking this argument, however, the crit-ics offered up a false either-or dilemma.They suggested that a burgeoning counter-terrorism campaign conducted by the USDepartment of Defense (DoD) would leadto a zero-sum game. DoD would have toturn its back on existing (i.e., irrelevant)roles and missions to prosecute anunprecedented “shadow war.”

In reality, nothing could be further fromthe truth. The US military will not pursuea single future against a single hostile“ism.” Its fight against terrorism willmerely add new responsibilities to thosethat already exist. The United States, inshort, will continue much of the militaryactivism that helped define its internation-al behavior in the 1990s. Its military willfulfill its global responsibilities — includ-ing “constabulary” ones — across a broadspectrum of potential conflicts. Given thisexpansive, proactive approach, the follow-ing article has not been overcome byevents. Recent United States Air Force(USAF) leaders have designed their trans-formation efforts to deal with myriadthreats, including asymmetric ones. One oftheir most ambitious efforts has been tointegrate their command and control struc-

ture into a “weapon system” — theAerospace Operations Center (AOC) —that will direct air campaigns and/or oper-ations across the spectrum of conflict.]

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of an influential 1997report issued by the reform-minded

National Defense Panel (NDP), militarytransformation became an increasinglyprevalent theme in Washington, DC.There remains, however, some ambi-guity over just what transformationmeans. Is it a destination or a process?Is it a near-, mid-, or long-term activi-ty? Is it open-ended, or does it have abeginning, middle, and end?2 Shouldit merely expand upon existing organ-izations, technologies, and doctrines,or should it “leap ahead” and funda-mentally break with the past, as theNDP and Defense Science Boardargued?3 Regardless of how othersmay answer these questions, the USAF— as an institution — believes thereare three “truths” that define militarytransformations.

First, it believes that authentictransformations require sustained anddetermined conceptual, organizational,and technological innovations overtime. These innovations, when com-bined together, then lead to fundamen-tal, order-of-magnitude improvementsin aerospace power that may or may notappear as sudden and dramatic “90-degree turns” in USAF capabilities.

The United States Air Force’sTransformation Vision and theAerospace Operations Center

C o l o n e l P e t e r F a b e r , P h . D . , U S A F 1

satellite data links to operate thePredator “over the horizon,” andthey can receive back combat-relat-ed imagery through the same links.Additionally, its ground stationscan use precision satellite imageryto identify the locations of potentialground targets in near real-time.

• In Desert Storm the USAF’s pri-mary air superiority fighter was theF-15C. While superb in air-to-aircombat, the F-15C had no air-to-ground capability. It depended onafterburners for supersonic cruiseand had a high radar signature.Today, we are developing itsreplacement, the F-22. The F-22combines stealth design withsupersonic cruise. It will have thehighly maneuverable, dual-engine,long-range requirements of an air-to-air fighter, plus an inherent air-to-ground capability. This will giveus a more flexible, lethal and sur-vivable weapon system.

• Finally, in Desert Storm we had avery limited ability to strike hard-ened underground targets. Nowwe have conventional warheadsthat can penetrate granite and usesmart fuses to explode at pre-pro-grammed depths.

Thirdly, the USAF believes thatwhen it comes to resolving political andmilitary conflicts, aerospace power hasbecome a critical American asymmetricadvantage. The USAF will continue toimprove this advantage – as it has in thepast – by exploring new operational,organizational, and technological con-cepts, including developing theAerospace Operations Center as a“weapon system.” The Air Force willthen identify which of these conceptsoffer the greatest potential for revolu-tionary improvements in its capabilities,

especially by testing the conceptsthrough planned experimentation andby formalized innovation in Service-level battle labs. The result will be aninstitution that innovates and adaptsrather than merely modernizes.

Now in order to “flesh out” theabove transformation theme (and itsthree “truths”), this deliberately aero-space-centric article will attempt thefollowing: First, it will highlight sixworking propositions or assumptionsabout the post-Cold War world thathave bounded and directed US militarytransformation since 1989. Second, itwill highlight what is old and what isnew in modern warfare, while also sin-gling out some of the salient capabilitiesthat define aerospace power. (Again,counter-terrorism is just one of a host ofcapabilities the USAF must have inorder to deal with a wide assortment ofchallenges in an uncertain future.)Finally, the article will explore a specif-ic transformation area — e.g., given thebasic theme of this particular volume, itwill explore how the USAF developednew operational concepts in the late-1980s and 1990s, how these strategy-related changes significantly improvedour intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, andhow the latter improvements make theAerospace Operations Center a neces-sary “weapon system” for the future.

The Post-Cold War World — SixWorking Propositions andAssumptions

Proposition #1: The 1990s andbeyond represent a clear departure fromthe bipolar world of the past. Thestrategic environment has changed,among other reasons, because of grow-ing worldwide economic integration,

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Given the above definition, theUSAF also believes that it has alwaysbeen a transformation force. Perpetualinnovation and adaptation have alwaysbeen part of its creed, but over the last10-15 years in particular the USAF hasaccelerated the pace of its self-transfor-mation. It significantly improved andexpanded its fundamental capabilities,and then put them on full display in thePersian Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

To illustrate the point, here is asmall sampling of just how far US aero-space power has come from the 286-computer world of Desert Storm to thegigabyte realities of today.

• In Desert Storm the USAF hadapproximately 150 aircraft capableof delivering laser-guided muni-tions.4 Today it has approximately1,000 aircraft with this capability.

• In Desert Storm the Air Force had avery limited number of aircraft thatcould precisely attack multiple tar-gets per sortie. B-2s can now simul-taneously assault 16 targets per sor-tie with all-weather Joint DirectAttack Munitions (JDAMs). Thisnumber will increase further as theUSAF fields smaller, more preciseweapons across its entire bomberfleet. (The B-2, for example, willbe able to carry over 300 SmallDiameter Bombs.)

• In Desert Storm American airmenused a limited number of handheldGlobal Positioning Satellite (GPS)receivers. Some pilots literallytaped them to their cockpits.Today, GPS is an integral compo-nent of almost all USAF aircraft,and GPS receivers guide Americanbombs. (The latter adaptation ispossible because the GPS system –which has doubled in size since

1991 – provides redundant, world-wide navigation and timing stan-dards that improve both US weaponsystems and everyday lives.)

• In Desert Storm the US Air Forcehad no conventional B-1 capabili-ties, no B-2s, and no operationalJSTARS aircraft. Today, all threeare operational, and all three havebeen extensively improved fromtheir original configurations. B-1s,for example, can now carry 84 gen-eral-purpose bombs (Mk82) or1,200 Sensor Fused Weapon sub-munitions designed to kill columnsof vehicles.

• In Desert Storm a limited numberof American F-15Es were LAN-TIRN-capable with laser guidedbomb precision5. Today, all F-15Esand over 450 F-16s are LANTIRN-capable; soon a total of 720 F-16swill have this capability.6 As aresult, a serious limitation the USonce experienced in night opera-tions is rapidly disappearing. TheUSAF’s large fighter-bomber forcecan now routinely bomb with pre-cision around the clock. Whenconfigured to drop JDAMs, thesefighter-bombers will be all-weathercapable as well.

• In Desert Storm the US Air Forcehad “stovepiped” intelligence fromthe theater to Washington, DC, andthen back to the “shooter.” Nowthe Air Force is aggressively intro-ducing near real-time targeting tothe cockpit through direct, shoot-er-in-the-loop data distributionnetworks.

• In Desert Storm the USAF foughtwithout the systematic use ofUnmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs).Now, for example, it deploys themedium altitude Predator UAV in avariety of missions. Airmen can use

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ticular, the USAF should not trap itselfin the fossilized amber of dated doc-trines or ideas (including the idea thataerospace power merely provides sup-porting or preparatory fires — “airfires” — to other forms of militarypower).

Proposition #4: As briefly suggest-ed earlier, genuine transformations arealways comprehensive. They requiremajor conceptual, organizational, andtechnological changes to be effective.In the 1990s, the USAF redefined itselfin all three areas, and therefore — onecould argue — was the transformationforce in the US Department of Defenseduring the decade.

However, two caveats on terminol-ogy and technological change areappropriate here. In the first case, thereare still those who confuse militarytransformation – either wittingly orunwittingly – with mere moderniza-tion. From the USAF’s perspective,transformation is not about moderniz-ing forces to support legacy concepts ofoperation. Instead, it is about theorganic and timely combination ofadvanced weapon systems, new mili-tary theoretical guidelines, and suitableforce structures to yield a qualitativechange in the use of military power.

In the case of technological change,it is important to note that the USAF isnot consumed with “technolust,” assome of its critics have claimed. Its air-men are not unrealistically enthralledwith the technologies of informationdominance. They are not involved in anillusory quest to impose certainty onthe battlefield. They do not believetechnology is a panacea or a “silver bul-let.” They do recognize the decisiveimportance of well-trained, highly

motivated combatants who are capableof creative thought. They know that anunskilled military is more dangerousand less effective than one with less-advanced technologies. Having saidthat, however, they also believe in thetransformative role of technology inhuman conflicts. Technology is not amere garnish or supplement to tradi-tional warfighting methods. It does notmerely change things at the margins. Itdoes not merely increase the pace ofevolutionary change. Instead, mostAmerican airmen believe that technolo-gy can significantly change the natureof war and that these changes can berevolutionary rather than evolutionary.In other words, technology can intro-duce abrupt 45-degree turns in how weuse force. Over the last 10-15 years, theUSAF has been in one of these “abrupt”transitional periods in history. Itsgrowing C4ISR capabilities; its increasedcapacity to conduct over-the-horizonwarfare; and its burgeoning ability tointegrate air and space operations seam-lessly together (to find, fix, and attackany target of significance in the world,for example), are only a few proofs thatwe live in a revolutionary age.

Proposition #5: In attempting totransform themselves, the four majorServices that make up the US militaryhave gone “vertical.” Aerospace powerhas become a key strategic, operational,and/or tactical capability desired byeach and every Service. Even the USArmy focuses not only on reconfiguringits infantry units and armor, but also ondeveloping long-range weapons and airmobility options. Its wish list ofdesired military systems includes bat-tlefield missiles, attack helicopters,fixed-wing attackers, and remotelylaunched cruise missiles. (Despite thistelling trend, however, no one should

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the internationalization of domestic pol-itics, the networking of informationresources, the increased frequency oftechnological cycles, and the relativedecline of nation-state power. Consider,for example, the following contrastsbetween the world of 1988 and theworld of today.

The Geopolitical Environment – Oldand NewBipolar (Rigid) vs. Multipolar (Complex)Predictable vs. UncertainCommunism vs. Hyper-Nationalism,Religious Intolerance and EthnicRivalriesUS as Disputed #1 vs. US as the Sole(but Fettered) SuperpowerPermanent Alliances vs. IncreasinglyTemporary/Ad Hoc/Single-Issue Alliances

Threats Faced by the US – Old andNewOvert vs. Covert/Difficult to TraceSingle vs. Diverse (to US Survival)Clear vs. Unclear (to US Interests)Deterrable vs. Non-or Semi-DeterrableEurope-Centered vs. Growing Impor-tance of other RegionsHigh vs. Low Risk of MilitaryEscalationStrategic Nuclear Attack vs. Asym-metric Attacks

Proposition #2: Among Americanpolitical leaders of either major party,any disputes about a proactive or“internationalist” foreign policy willoccur largely at the margins (for exam-ple, “are humanitarian wars appropri-ate?”). However, the National SecurityStrategy that supports a proactive poli-cy will continue to rely on militarypower as a major vehicle for US involve-ment. The United States will use thispower to assure allies and friends, par-ticularly by helping create favorable

balances of military strength in criticalareas of the world. It will dissuadefuture military competition by main-taining or enhancing advantages in keyareas of military capability. It will deterthreats to US interests, particularly byhaving a wider range of militaryoptions to discourage aggression or anyform of coercion. Lastly, the US willdecisively defeat aggression if deter-rence fails.7 In other words, it will seekto reduce the prospects and sources ofinternational conflict, to keep localproblems local, to ensure its enemies arebusy imploding rather than exploding,and to continue preparing now for pos-sible problems in the future.

Proposition #3: In order to engagewith the world and sustain Americaninfluence properly, the US military mustmeet its day-to-day readiness require-ments AND transform or innovate itselfas much as possible. There are, however,true and false forms of innovation. Trueinnovation involves altering and adapt-ing our forces for knowledge-centric,data-intensive warfare. False innovationmerely seeks to preserve Industrial AgeWarfare, but with new “bells and whis-tles” added at the margins.

The latter approach is obviouslywrong. We cannot tolerate “realitylockout” in our planning and prepara-tions for the future, as the terroristattacks against New York andWashington sadly illustrated. (Onecould argue that the success of theattacks was attributable, at least in part,to a lack of US imagination about whatcould happen in a homeland attack.) Atthe same time, the US military servicescannot appease/straitjacket the futureby bolting technological odds and endsonto yesterday’s equipment, organiza-tions, or concepts of operation. In par-

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ever assume that there are four airforces in the US military. As in the past,it continues to have three air arms andonly one full-service, full-spectrum AirForce – a malleable Air Force thatemploys air and space power in wide-ranging ways.)

Proposition #6: Everyone in DoDhas gone “vertical” because aerospacepower finally closed a long-standingpromise-reality gap in the 1990s.8 In anumber of ways, it can work now asoriginally advertised. And because itcan work as advertised, the correlationof forces among the US military serviceshas made a dramatic shift from the pre-dominance of land forces facing offacross borders to special operationsforces and air and space forces operatingacross the spectrum of conflict today.

This shifting correlation of forcesconfirms that there is something decid-edly new in modern, “post-heroic” war-fare and that aerospace power —because it is a quick and wide-rangingmilitary option — now plays a criticalrole in a New American Way of War.

Modern Conflicts — Comparingthe Old with the New: Conflictand the Rise of Aerospace Power.

When comparing the old and thenew in modern conflicts, the followingpoints are well worth consideringand/or remembering.

• In the old world, the US focused onnational defense. In the new world,it focuses on national security(which emphasizes a broader,multi-agency approach to satisfyour defense needs).

• In the old world, the dominantthreat was a readily identifiable and

specific foe — the hulking, 10-foot-tall “Russian bear.” In the newworld, our dominant threat is,despite recent events, an abstraction— e.g., a spectrum of conflict thatchallenges us to handle a variety ofcontingencies effectively. (Withinthis spectrum there are foes likeSaddam Hussein and Osama binLaden that pose specific threats.)

• In the old world, our fundamentalobjective was to contain a virulent“ism” (communism). In the newworld, we have at least a twofoldobjective — to protect theAmerican homeland from another“ism” (terrorism), and to ensureregional bullies or hegemonsremain merely a “local” problem.

• In the old world, we basicallyrelied on three traditional instru-ments of war — the political, eco-nomic, and military — to meet ournational goals and objectives. Inthe new world, we (and opponentslike Osama bin Laden) now prac-tice “Combination Warfare,”which seeks to exploit above-mili-tary, military, and non-militaryforms of war together. Theseforms of war, in turn, include atleast 27 sub-categories, which canmigrate from one list to another.In other words, strategists can mixand match these forms of warfarein unprecedented, constantlyevolving ways. “Combat” canthus occur in virtually any majorsphere of human activity, andpurely military options make uponly a shifting part of a broaderwhole (in terms of its scope andimportance).

In the case of Osama bin Laden, forexample, the United States has useddiplomatic warfare + network warfare

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+ intelligence warfare + psychologicalwarfare + technological warfare +financial warfare, etc., to disrupt hisoperations. In the case of Iraq, US hascombined diplomatic warfare + psycho-logical warfare + intelligence warfare +conventional warfare + sanctions war-fare + legal warfare + media warfare toquarantine a hostile police state.

• In the old world, nation-states ulti-mately changed an opponent’spolitical strategy, processes, orobjectives by relying on indirectmeans (e.g., by damaging or evendefeating military forces interposedbetween them and the sources ofnational power). In the new world,nations or groups can still rely onthis labour-intensive, time-consum-ing method, but aerospace powerscan also change an opponent’sbehavior directly (by threateningthe critical centers of gravity ofother systems or states).

• In the old world, military opera-tions occurred either in overlap-ping or isolated “local times.”These local times were actual ANDsubjective. When they overrode,collided, or failed to coincide witheach other, they added to the “fog

and friction” experienced by com-batants. In the new world, howev-er, US military operations areincreasingly occurring in “univer-sal time” (because of an increasingamount of near-simultaneous datafusion and information processing,and because of GPS-based position-ing capabilities). As a result, wide-ly dispersed combatants can lever-age an unprecedented level of“instantaneity.” They can share acommon operating picture at thesame time while coordinating wide-ly dispersed operations.

• In the old world, the US faced con-ventionally armed militaries. In thenew world, it faces “hybrid” mili-taries or groups that have multi-dimensional capabilities (i.e., industri-al age/late-Cold War equipment; bal-listic missiles and WMD capabilities;limited stocks of precision weapons;advanced air defense and anti-accesscapabilities; and the capacity to con-duct global information operations).As suggested earlier, these hybridcapabilities can then serveCombination Warfare strategies.

• In the old world, the United Statesoften put its military forces intooverdrive to overkill. Even in

Combination Warfare — “10,000 methods Used as One”“A better means used alone will not prevail over multiple means used together”9

Above-Military Forms of WarCultural warfare Diplomatic warfareNetwork warfareIntelligence warfarePsychological warfareTechnological warfareSmuggling warfareDrug warfareDeception/fabrication warfareInformation warfare

Military Forms of WarNuclear warfareConventional warfareBio/chemical warfareEcological warfareSpace warfareElectronic warfareGuerrilla warfareTerrorist warfareConcussion warfare

Non-Military Forms of WarFinancial warfareTrade warfareResources warfareEconomic aid warfareLegal/moral warfareSanctions warfareMedia/marketing warfareIdeological warfare

• In the old world, time and spacewere equally important in militaryoperations. Seizing and controllingterritory was often the arbiter ofvictory. In the new world, manip-ulating time effectively may oftenbe more important than controllingspace. Military success, after all,may not necessarily rely on the tak-ing and holding of territory.Controlling an opponent’s process-es and strategies may yield broaderand more immediate successes, par-ticularly in increasingly importantman-made “territories” (cyber-space, etc.).

• In the old world, military successdepended on the day-in and day-out support of a military-industrialcomplex. In the new world, an air-man’s “instantaneous subjugationpotential” will depend on a mili-tary-information complex thatimproves his or her ability to “read”large areas on a “24/7” basis (andtherefore find, fix, track, and per-haps attack terrorist targets, etc.).

• In the old world, specialized mili-tary services (including airpower)merely supplemented or supportedtraditional military methods. Theywere mere “garnish on a plate.” Inthe new world, these specializedservices have come of age. Theynow sit as equal partners at thejoint table. They can provide inde-pendent and broad-based supportto joint operations. And as a result,they legitimize one approach tojoint operations — e.g., use theright tool at the right place at theright time.

• In the old world, the US reliedmore on overseas presence than onpower projection to meet its securi-ty obligations. In the new world,advanced conventional munitions

and long-range systems permit it torely increasingly on power projec-tion. This possibility poses a prob-lem for the US, however. In the oldworld its adversaries focused ondefeating US forces already in the-ater. In the new world, their aim isto slow, disrupt, or outright pre-vent theater access by Americanunits. (Asymmetric strategies;threats of protracted conflict; andfait accompli strategies, where anopponent changes the stakes of alocal confrontation before the USactually intervenes, are ways he orshe can undermine America’s abili-ty to project power.)

To summarize the above sectionproperly, all we need to stress is that the“post-heroic” warfare of today repre-sents a departure from the past. Whereonce the United States concentrated onnational defense, today it worries aboutnational security. Where once it faced aconcrete, readily identifiable foe, todayit faces foes within an overarchingabstraction (the spectrum of conflict).And where it once sought to contain ahostile global “ism,” today it attemptsto keep troublemakers “in a box,” whilealso promoting an international orderthat is not overtly hostile to Americaninterests. The US performs these func-tions by relying on traditional militarymethods, but it also relies on new toolssuch as Combination and KnowledgeWarfare. In confronting increasingly“hybrid” foes, these nontraditionalmethods often combine a variety ofmeans in novel ways. They often focuson manipulating an opponent’s knowl-edge and perception instead of seizinghis or her territory. They use “instanta-neity” to try and rapidly halt aggres-sion, to induce entropy or paralysis inothers, and to adapt to what remains a

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maneuver warfare, ultimate successdepended on massed forces and/orfirepower, and on the ability toattrit, destroy, or even annihilatean opponent. In the new world,the US military can still rely on thisblunt method, but it can also relyon a method that has various names— Concussion Warfare, also knownas Knowledge Warfare, Hyperwar,Perception Management, DecisionCycle Dominance, etc.

The basic assumption behind thisalternative method — regardless ofwhat you call it — is that time is yourenemy. The longer any conflict lasts, themessier it gets. “Fog and friction” pro-gressively eat into rational planning.The hatreds, passions, and fears trig-gered by human conflicts only grow inintensity. Murphy’s Law increasinglyholds sway. And yet, these byproductsof human conflict are not brute forces ofnature. We are not — by definition —powerless in their wake. We can miti-gate or possibly modulate their effects(as one turns down a rheostat). The wayto do this, however, is not to rely on theMastodon warfare of the past. Instead,the US military needs to rely on decisiveforce rather than overwhelming force.It needs, for example, to be able toconduct wide-ranging, simultaneousstrikes against dozens upon dozens oftargets in a radically compressed peri-od of time. In doing so, we then trig-ger in our opponents a choking of thesenses; a disturbance in perception; amental stroke; a loss or unwantedmanipulation of one’s situationalawareness; a sense of isolation – physi-cally, mentally, morally – from theexternal world; and feelings of uncer-tainty, doubt, confusion, self-deceit,indecision, fear, panic, discourage-ment, or perhaps even despair.

Therefore by being the “firstestwith the mostest,” and by deliberatelyintroducing continuous and unpre-dictable change into conflicts, militaryforces can so befuddle, disorient, andconfuse an opponent that they may wellfree themselves from the tired practicesof the past. Friendly forces act whiletheir opponents increasingly fail to act.As a result, “fog and friction” may notdisappear, even in what should beincreasingly unequal struggles, buttheir scope and duration may welldecrease. And if that occurs, politicaland military leaders may have moredecision options available to them thanthey might have otherwise. (Let’s neverforget that after four years of attritionwarfare in World War II, the UnitesStates essentially had only one politicaloption remaining — the unconditionalsurrender of Germany and Japan.)

A warfighting strategy character-ized by Combination Warfare, directeffects, universal time, and “firstestwith the mostest” operations representsa fundamental departure from the past.There are, however, five additionalpoints we need to make in relation tothis strategy.

• In the old world, speed and thedeliberate compression of militaryoperations in time were a liability.The nuclear menace loomed so largethat any emphasis on speed raisedthe inherently destabilizing specterof preemptive attack or launch onwarning. In the new “hybrid” con-flicts of today, speed is of the essence,and technology is the essence ofspeed. Without immediate, real-timeoperations — which special opera-tions forces and aerospace power canprovide — “rapid halt” activities arenot really possible.

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power harassed enemy forces andenfeebled them, but basically itjust prepared them to experience afinal and decisive blow at thehands of ground forces. In the1990s, however, we saw aerospaceand ground power routinelyreverse roles. The air weaponadministered the killing strokewhile ground forces (including theKosovo Liberation Army) acted asthe “bird dog.” This “yin-yang”dynamic, where aerospace andground power alternatingly act asdecisive agents or as preparatory,supplementary, or follow-on forces,is an important advantage that USairmen and special forces units willincreasingly exploit in their waragainst organized terrorism.

The above advantage, in turn,points to several other truths about 21stcentury aerospace power.

• It is the only military tool that holdsall other forms of military power atrisk. (By increasingly denying anopponent the use of darkness andbad weather to close with friendlyforces, for example; by providing atop down perspective that is simul-taneously global, regional, and localin scope; by providing rapid targetrecognition and re-strike capabili-ties; and by seizing the initiativeand massing effects.)

• In higher and even smaller-scalecontingencies, aerospace powercan attrit or neutralize surfaceforces faster than they can accumu-late mass, which still matters incurrent conflicts. (Precision guid-ed weapons, however, can createtheir own mass, and with excep-tional effects.)

• As suggested earlier, “borderless”

aerospace power has become mal-leable enough — could any otherform of military power have adapt-ed to the political fits and starts ofOperation Allied Force as effective-ly?10 — to operate routinely inmultiple strategic directions atonce, and thereby menace enemyassets either through “remote grap-pling” operations, or throughclose-in “yin-yang” activities withground units. (They are also capa-ble of consistently generatingstrategic-level effects while operat-ing at the tactical level; or viceversa, as the Berlin and 1973 YomKippur airlifts illustrated.)

Lastly, it’s important to note thatmodern aerospace power provides sec-ondary benefits that often go unappre-ciated. To cite but a few examples, itcan make upper- and middle-tier con-flicts more predictable (see the previousdiscussion of Knowledge Warfare), andthus possibly more “rational”; it canreduce the amount of hardware and per-sonnel needed in an operation; it canreduce the amount of casualties anddamage suffered by both sides in a con-flict; it can lessen the number of strikesand re-strikes needed to neutralize tar-gets, and much more.

To support its overall“Transformation” theme, this articlehas now accomplished two of its threestated goals. First, it highlighted sixworking assumptions about the post-Cold War world that have bounded anddirected the USAF’s self-transformationas a military service since the late-1980s. Second, it highlighted what isold and what is new in modern conflict,and what are some of the more salientfeatures of modern aerospace power.With these goals accomplished, the

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casualty sensitive world. Additionally,they rely on the benefits provided by“universal time,” effects-based target-ing, and the ability to assault an oppo-nent’s strategies or objectives directly.In this world — a world that continues,despite fears of terrorism, to be charac-terized by limited wars by limitedmeans for limited ends — large-scaleground combat is an option, not aninevitability, and the focus of the USmilitary’s “Joint Team” is now dividedbetween homeland defense, forwardpresence, and power projection mis-sions. To succeed in this brave newworld, however, the US military mustdevelop a military-information complexthat fuses its collective efforts together.Aerospace Operations Centers are partof this process.

The above changes are significant.The context of human conflict haschanged in the last 10-15 years, as hasits means and ends (including aerospacepower). But what is actually new aboutmodern aerospace power? Well, consid-er the following.

• As a specialized service, Americanairpower was once mere “parsley on aplate.” It prepared battlefields for othermilitary forces and then supportedthese forces in follow-on engagements.Its contributions to “victory” wereperipheral and uncertain at best.Today, however, aerospace power canestablish the preconditions for success.Depending on the circumstances, itshapes, determines, and on occasioneven defines environments. As a result,military operations that follow in itswake can be less costly than they wouldbe otherwise. (They may be less oner-ous in terms of lives squandered,opportunities lost, time spent, andtreasure wasted.)

One obvious example of airpower’senvironment-shaping and/or outcome-determining capabilities was the “sani-tizing” of northern France by Americanbombers in 1944. By seriously curtailingthe German war machine’s freedom ofmovement, American airpower isolatedcoastal defenders from desperately need-ed supplies and reinforcements duringthe D-Day invasion. It also ensured thatthe Luftwaffe did not rain bombs on theheads of Allied troops landing inNormandy. Omaha and Utah Beachesmay have been bloody, but they wouldhave been much bloodier without theenvironment-determining role played by8th and 15th Air Force bombers prior to,during, and after D-Day.

Desert Storm is another instancewhere aerospace power determined thecourse and outcome of events. In thiswar, Allied air forces destroyed thecommand and control system of anenemy state; closed down its lines ofcommunication, neutralized anddemoralized the 6th largest air force inthe world; allowed only two significantmoves by the Iraqi Army (Al Khafji andthe withdrawal from Kuwait); des-troyed two-thirds of Iraq’s armoredforces; and ensured a successful four-day ground operation against the 4thlargest army in the world, all at the costof 615 Allied deaths. In short, aero-space power systematically neutralizedan opponent’s instruments of powerand enabled other military forces toperform their remaining tasks withminimum losses or difficulties.

• Desert Storm and most recentlyKosovo illustrate yet another virtueof modern aerospace power. In thepast, the air weapon was merely the“bird dog” for the true force ofdecision — ground power. Yes, air-

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advocated attriting these targets when-ever and wherever possible.11

With varying degrees of accept-ance, these three targeting schools arestill with us today (although massivelyattacking populations is not a viablelegal or moral option when conductinglimited wars by limited means for limit-ed ends). By the mid- to late-1980s,however, some airmen became increas-ingly troubled by what they saw as theUSAF’s outdated concepts of opera-tions. They understood, for example,that dividing air attacks into threetypes — strategic, operational, and tac-tical — was now passé. The effects orconsequences of future operationswould not be necessarily defined by thenature of the target struck, the methodof attack, or the platform used. As aresult of this particular concern andmany others, the Service’s forward-looking thinkers initiated a conceptualtransformation that one can break down— for purposes of illustration — intofive “waves.” Each wave, in turn, creat-ed a demand for ISR-related capabilitiesthat now comprise the transformationalgoal for DoD — e.g., a networked, real-time “24/7/365” Global InformationGrid that can detect and respond to“windows of opportunity” that fleet-ingly last for a matter of minutes.12

The first conceptual wave began inthe mid- to late-1980s and included pro-gressive airmen who drew their inspira-tion, at least in part, from Soviet think-ing on Reconnaissance StrikeComplexes. By the time Desert Stormarrived, first wave thinkers such asColonel John Warden had popularizedthe following ideas.

• Airmen should use conventionalairpower in independent air cam-

paigns directly against strategicand theater-levels centers of gravi-ty (COGs). (Astonishingly, the“nuclear shadow” that existed inthe Cold War was so pervasive thatJohn Warden’s 1986 National WarCollege thesis — The Air Campaign— was the first major text to arguethis point in the nuclear age!)13

• Airmen should conduct “hyper-war” (also known as “ParallelWarfare”) against their opponents.In other words, they should radi-cally compress the pace of theiroperations to create “shock andawe” in an opponent, particularlythrough the simultaneous applica-tion of force in time, space, and ateach level of conflict, and against asmany target sets as possible.

These target sets include centers ofgravity (a metaphor borrowed from thelinear, Newtonian physics of the 18th

century) and/or key nodes that — ifstruck properly — would create wide-ranging and cascading effects through-out entire systems. (These systemscould include almost any organizedactivity — telecommunications, trans-portation, energy grids, and even —John Warden argued — terrorist net-works.) Some of the benefits of thesetypes of effects include tactical-levelsurprise, a larger span of influence,fewer casualties, enemy paralysis orentropy, and a shorter amount of timerequired to impose effective controlover fast-moving events.

Despite identifying and pursuingthese very real benefits, “first wavers”were not above promoting contradicto-ry beliefs. They recognized that thevalue of a key node or COG waxes andwanes. Its value may depend on time(should we strike it early or later?); its

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range planners developed a new ServiceVision — America’s Air Force: GlobalVigilance, Reach, and Power (2000) —that insisted on dominant situationalawareness that was not geographicallybound, and that would permit expedi-tionary forces to find, fix, track, andengage any target of significance withinminutes rather than hours.Additionally, the planners identified 14desired “Critical Future Capabilities”for the Air Force that are now are part ofits Strategic Plan, Volume 3. TheseCritical Capabilities deliberately “fleshout” the six Core Competencies andthree additional support areas. In thecase of Information Superiority, theStrategic Plan commits the USAF to . . .

• Provide continuous, tailored infor-mation within minutes of taskingwith sufficient accuracy to engageany target in any battlespaceworldwide;

• And, in conjunction with joint andnational capabilities, to ensure ourunhindered use of the informationdomain from all attempts to deny,disrupt, destroy, or corrupt it andexploit or neutralize any adver-sary’s ability to use the informationdomain.

Ultimately, theories or concepts ofaerospace power, whether simple orcomplex, require a firm foundationmade up — at a minimum — of twofundamental ingredients — clearlyarticulated assumptions/beliefs andappropriately defined capabilities.Without these ingredients, airmen can’tknow who they are, and they certainlycan’t conceptualize further about thepreferred attributes of aerospace power(including ISR). Fortunately, the USAFhas defined its most fundamentalbeliefs and capabilities in the past and it

will continue to do so in the future. Thesame holds true for its higher-levelthinking about aerospace power.

New Thoughts on How to UseAerospace Power and theAerospace Operations Center —Part 2: Theories of Airpower andtheir Impact on ISR Development.

With codified beliefs and preferredUSAF capabilities now identified (includ-ing the desire for global situationalawareness, dominant battlespace knowl-edge, etc.), we can next consider evolv-ing theories of aerospace power and —given the overall theme of this volume —the impact they had on the developmentof our ISR-related capabilities. Prior toDesert Storm these theories almost alwaysfell into one of three broad categories.

Category # 1 argued that airmenneeded to attack and terrorize popula-tions to the point that they openlyrebelled against their own govern-ment. Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell(in his later, post-1930 writings), andArthur “Bomber” Harris advocatedthis approach.

Category #2 argued that long-rangeaircraft needed to attack economies orinfrastructures and cause them to col-lapse (ideally by disrupting or destroy-ing key nodes). The US Army Air CorpsTactical School’s “Bomber Mafia” mostnotably articulated this approach in the1920s and 1930s.

Category #3 argued that fielded mil-itary forces, and the war materiel facto-ries that immediately supported them,were the preferred targets. GianniCaproni, Nino Salveneschi, John Slessorand the London-based Committee ofOperations Analysts (in World War II)

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Joint Forces Command’s evolving RapidDecisive Operations concept.)

If first wave thinkers created anenduring ISR-related need to identifypotential COGs and/or key nodes, thenBoyd’s second wave insistence on deci-sion cycle dominance required a com-plementary set of capabilities — inte-grated command and control and battlemanagement.

The third conceptual wave, whichappeared in the mid- to late-1990s,included Ben Lambeth, a respectedRAND Corporation analyst.15 As pre-figured in our previous discussion ofwhat is old and new in aerospace powerthinking, Lambeth argues that the airweapon is no longer a mere supplementto traditional methods. Although it cando what it has always done — prepareconflict areas for other military forcesand then support them in follow-onoperations — it can also have a govern-ing influence on events from the veryoutset. It can, in other words, establishthe preconditions for subsequent mili-tary success. Depending on the circum-stances, Lambeth argues, aerospacepower can shape, determine, and onoccasion even define environments. Asa result, military operations that followin its wake can be less costly than theywould he otherwise, as illustrated notonly by the sanitizing of NorthernFrance for the D-Day invasion and thepsychological devastation of Iraqitroops in Operation Desert Storm,16 butalso by the Battle of France (May-June1940), the Battle of Britain (August-September 1940), Anzio (January-February 1944), the Pusan Perimeter(July-September 1940), Linebacker I(March-June 1972), the Battle of Khafji(January 1991), and Bosnia (September1995), to name just a few.

Third wave thinking on aerospacepower is “joint friendly.” Few Americanground power enthusiasts — regardlessof how troubled they might be over therepeated and preferred use in the 1990s ofonce “peripheral” US Air and Navalforces — deny the utility of shaping envi-ronments in modern conflicts. However,using aerospace power to accomplish thisanticipatory and even preemptive goalspurred the need for yet another set ofISR-related tools. Not only must theUSAF be able to catalog critical COGs ornodes effectively, and integrate its C2 andbattle management capabilities together, itmust also be able to dynamically assess,plan, and execute its missions.

The fourth conceptual wave appearedin 1997 and originated with MajorGeneral Charles Link, who spearheadedthe USAF’s Quadrennial Defense Reviewefforts at the time. As part of his respon-sibilities, Maj Gen Link reviewed existingUS warfighting strategies and plans, andhe was disturbed by what he saw. Theexisting “legacy constructs” required USforces to respond to aggression, but asthey continued to defend against it, theyalso had to pause and build up combatpower. Only after sufficient ground forceswere finally in place would they mount adecisive counteroffensive and achievetheir war aims. What disturbed GeneralLink about this three-step process wasthat it was sequential and not particularlytime-urgent. The first two steps — “halt”and “build up” — were mere “warm ups”to the counteroffensive, and the “decisivepoint” in the process was nestled some-where between the second and third steps(that is to say, weeks or even months afterthe aggression began).

General Link responded that todelay the decisive or culminating pointuntil ground forces were ready to stage a

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range (do we need to strike targets onlywithin range of aerospace power?); itsposition in space; its vulnerability toattack; and/or its potential for collateraldamage. And yet, John Warden alsoargued that the value of a COG is notnecessarily situational. First amongequals, he insisted, is the leadership(single or plural) of a state or organiza-tion. By “decapitating” or isolatingleaders from their own sources of resist-ance or power, we may well be able toparalyze them from the “inside out”.Attriting or destroying their forces, incontrast, is a highly inefficient “outsidein” way to fulfill one’s goals, or so firstwavers like Warden argued.

Nevertheless, when it came to thedevelopment of US ISR-related capabil-ities, squabbles about the relativeimportance of one COG over otherswere ultimately irrelevant. By advo-cating Parallel or Hyper Warfare, firstwave thinkers like John Wardenhelped focus US intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance needs. Inparticular, they created an enduringneed to identify potential COGs and/orkey nodes, both systematically andcomprehensively.

The infamous John Boyd, other-wise known — depending on the exas-perated source — as “Genghis John,” orthe “Mad Colonel,” single-handedlyinspired the second wave of USAF con-ceptual innovations. (Boyd’s ideas actu-ally came first chronologically, but theirimpact on USAF thinking became wide-spread — and largely from the bottomup — after Desert Storm.)

According to the “Mad Colonel,”the success or failure of human conflictsdo not automatically turn on death ordestruction, or even on seizing territo-ry. What ultimately matters in these

conflicts is “decision cycle dominance”— e.g., the ability to make appropriatedecisions more expeditiously than youropponents do.14 As Boyd observed,when combatants make decisions, theydo four things — they observe, orient,decide, and act. The combatants thenloop around and repeat this decision-making process — now familiar tomany as the “OODA Loop” — again andagain. But what if you work throughyour OODA Loops faster than youropponent? What if you are on you fif-teenth decision cycle and your slowermoving nemeses are on their fifth itera-tion? Do they — at least in relation toyour actions — increasingly becomedisoriented, befuddled, and confused?Have their situational awareness orsense of reality collapsed? According toBoyd and his many supporters, theanswers to these questions are aresounding “yes.”

What the above possibilities illus-trate, or so Boyd argues, is that you candeliberately disrupt or incapacitate anadversary’s ability to cope with chang-ing events, particularly if you “fasttransition” from one operational stateor condition to another. “Fast transi-tioning,” in other words, forces youropponents to operate at tempos thatstress their ability to respond effective-ly to continuous, unpredictable change.Either their decision cycles remain tooslow, or they become increasingly unco-ordinated and/or fragmented. (It’s allabout “dumping and pumping energy,”Boyd famously said.) In either case, youincreasingly exercise decision cycledominance over others through deliber-ate perception management techniques.(See the previous discussion ofKnowledge Warfare, which is heavilyindebted to Boyd’s ideas, as are multipleUS Joint Doctrine publications and

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counterattack was an example of “oldthink.” Today’s conflicts were nothing ifnot time urgent, especially in the case ofcross-border aggression. The only logi-cal response, General Link concluded,was to move the decisive point in ourwar plans earlier “to the left” — e.g., tothe initial halt phase. More specifically,US forces needed to stage rapid haltoperations in order to seize the initiative,and thereby influence, manipulate,and/or halt an adversary’s ability to actoffensively. That these requirements puta premium on control of the air, and onshock-oriented air attacks against enemysurface maneuver, soon troubled advo-cates of “boots-on-the-ground,”17 as didsome of the expected benefits of rapidhalt operations.

• The operations might constrain ordeny opposing land forces theirfreedom of action.

• They could introduce greater uni-lateralism in conflicts (by makingan opponent increasingly deaf,dumb, and blind to your ownactions).

They might allow you to regain theinitiative quickly, and thereby mini-mize the amount of territory you eitherhave to control or — even more impor-tantly — recover.

• They could maximize the numberof choices available to you (in con-trast to the increasingly narrowoptions available to those whoseculminating point is chronological-ly too far “to the right”).

• In fact, rapid halt operations pro-vide several gifts of time, or so itsadvocates argued. Not only wouldthey give you more choices, theymight also afford you sufficienttime to spin up and deploy reserve

ground forces (instead of more cost-ly active duty units). Finally, rapidhalt operations would almost cer-tainly minimize the politico-mili-tary tensions (or outright divisions)in your alliances or coalitions(again, by securing early successesand thereby avoiding the cumula-tive costs of Murphy’s Law, “fogand friction,” and/or shifting polit-ical circumstances).

While the benefits of rapid haltoperations remain questionable to mili-tary traditionalists, no one disputes thatthe concept intensified the need for ISR-related capabilities in the USAF. Rapidhalt forces not only required focusedISR, integrated C2/battle management,and dynamic assessment, planning andexecution capabilities, they alsodemanded unprecedented sensor fusionand sensor-to-shooter links, particularlyif they were to establish a new “culmi-nating point” in modern conflicts.

The conceptual waves representedby John Warden, John Boyd, BenLambeth, and Chuck Link played animportant role in the transformation ofthe United States Air Force. The varyingtechniques and approaches they repre-sent not only complicate enemy plan-ning, they also provide important vec-tors for the development of innovativeISR-related capabilities. Having saidthat, the fifth and most current conceptualwave is ultimately the most important.

New Thoughts on How to UseAerospace Power and theAerospace Operations Center —Part 3: Providing a “Brain” forUSAF Capabilities.

According to influential individualssuch as General James McCarthy, USAF

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(Ret.),18 and seminal texts such as JointVision 2020, the ideal way for US forces tostay one military-technical revolutionahead of their nearest rivals is throughInformation Superiority, which unavoid-ably depends on dominant C2ISR capabili-ties. These capabilities will increasinglyprovide a fused and correlated “CommonRelevant Operating Picture” (CROP) forjoint and coalition forces. (Depending onthe source, the CROP is also characterizedas a “Global Information Grid” or even asa “Family of Interoperable Pictures.”19) Inany case, the capabilities will link spaceand airborne ISR to the homeland and thecockpit. They will tap a new generation ofmulti-mission satellites with markedlyimproved loiter times and area coverage.They will provide enhanced opportunitiesfor nodal attacks, particularly againstweapons of mass disruption, and exploit agrowing number of unmanned platformsto provide unprecedented levels of persist-ence. Information Superiority, in short,will permit US forces to exploit a set ofcapabilities — global coverage, freedom ofaccess, continuous presence, global per-spective, improved reachback, etc. — to

establish decision cycle dominance overothers, to anticipate events rather thanmerely react to them, and to transitionfrom “knowing to doing” in nimble-footedways. 20 Lastly, and perhaps most impor-tantly for the United States Air Force,Information Superiority will improve itsability to conduct precise, real-time target-ing against mobile and fixed targets.

All the above capabilities —whether already in place or in variousstages of development — are both con-sequences of and solutions to the fiveconceptual waves highlighted in thisarticle. As the following figure shows,the capabilities build on each other andpoint to a C2ISR architecture that willsupport “yin-yang” aerospace-groundforce operations, and ideally lead to dis-proportionate, cascading effects thateveryone can exploit.21

At this point, our transformation-centered text has accomplished all butone of its stated goals. It has highlight-ed six working assumptions about thepost-Cold War world that have bounded

required to command and control aero-space forces, and it provides a baselinefrom which programmers can buildAOC-related acquisition and modern-ization strategies. The CONOPS, how-ever, is not the only document thatdetails the principles by which anAerospace Operations Center shouldoperate. At a lower level, Air CombatCommand is also developing ProcessManual “Tactics, Techniques andProcedures” Series that focus on opera-tional-level tactics (the 2-1 series) andunclassified references (the 2-3 series).Finally, the USAF has updated the oper-ational procedures contained in AirForce Instruction, 13-1, AOC Volume 3(Operational Procedures -- AerospaceOperations Center).

Training: AOCs need to be staffedby the best and most experienced oper-ators the US Air Force can develop. Atpresent, however, the Service does nothave enough experienced C2 operatorsto satisfy its requirements — e.g., it hasa talent pool diluted across differentAOCs. To solve this problem, the USAFhas to train significant numbers of indi-viduals who will effortlessly flow backand forth between their primaryweapon system and the AOC. One solu-tion to this requirement is to send theseindividuals to a series of C2-relatedtraining courses as they progressthrough their careers.

The standardized series, as present-ly structured, begins with the captain-level Joint Aerospace Command andControl Course (JAC2C), which focuseson the C2 of joint air operations in a the-ater battle at the operational level ofwar. Mid-career officers then attendthe Command and Control WarriorAdvanced Course (C2WAC), which pre-pares selected individuals to perform

duties requiring advanced knowledge,skills and ability in the C2 processesthat support the JFACC, again at theoperational level of war. Thirdly, lieu-tenant colonels and colonels attend theJoint Air Operations Senior StaffCourse (JSSC), which provides anoverview of the planning, coordination,integration, employment and imple-mentation of air operations strategy injoint operations. Finally, general offi-cers attend the Joint Forces AirComponent Commander Course (JFACC),which prepares potential JFACCs fortheater-level responsibilities.

The above training scheme will ide-ally create a “war room” staffed by ahierarchy of experts. At the pinnaclewill be Senior Leaders who are highlyexperienced in AOC operations. Nextare Process Owners, who are the linch-pins of the AOC team. They understandthe various parts of the AOC and —most importantly — they know how touse them as parts of a “horizontal” and“vertical” system of systems. (Giventhis level of expertise, the ProcessOwners are the natural instructors andsupervisors of the AOC). Third in thehierarchy is the Core Cadre, who arepermanently assigned to the AOC andare fully certified in specific tasks andfunctions. Lastly, the AOC will haveDedicated Augmentees, who are fullyqualified individuals at specific posi-tions, and Non-dedicated Augmentees,who will most likely require additional“top-off” training to accomplish a spe-cific AOC task.

Modernization: CONOPS and well-trained personnel are critical to anAOC’s success, but so are improvedtechnological capabilities. To evolve inthis area, the USAF has adopted for theAOC the same block development con-

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and directed the USAF’s self-transfor-mation since the late-1980s. It stressedwhat is old and what is new in modernconflict, and what are some of the moresalient features of modern aerospacepower. It described the core beliefs andoperational concepts that not only vec-tored the USAF over the last decade,but also spurred the creation of a C2ISRgrid that will remain a top priority overthe next two decades. The onlyrequirement we have left is to describethe role of the Aerospace OperationsCenter (AOC) as the integrated “weaponsystem” (e.g., the “eyes, ears, hands andlegs”) that will guide expeditionaryaerospace forces in the future.

As a work-in-progress, the AOC isan integral part of how the USAF willprepare for and conduct future expedi-tionary operations. It is a weapon sys-tem — made up of people, capabilities,and equipment — through which JointForce Air Component Commanders(JFACC) exercise command and control ofaerospace forces. More specifically, theJFACC should employ the AOC “tomaneuver and mass overwhelming aero-space power through centralized controland decentralized execution to producedesired operational and strategic effectsin support of the Joint ForceCommander’s campaign.”22 The AOC, inother words, is a tailored, fixed ordeployable “war room” that does muchmore than manage Air Tasking Orders. Itserves as an aerospace operations plan-ning, execution, and assessment systemfor the JFACC. (In the first case, the AOCdevelops the aerospace operations strate-gy and planning documents needed tomeet JFACC objectives and guidance.Then it tasks and executes day-to-dayaerospace operations and provides therapid reaction and positive control need-ed to control different weapon systems.)

If a JFACC hopes to accomplish theabove ends via an AOC, he or she needscross-cued, multi-sourced, and real-timeC2ISR systems. These systems provide,among other things . . .

• Threat status awareness.• Netted command and control.• Dynamic, real-time predictive bat-

tlespace awareness.• Intelligence preparation of the bat-

tlespace.• Responsive weather forecasting.• Precise and predictive effects-

based targeting (via the ability tofind, fix, track, target, engage, andasses targets).

• En-route tasking, real-time analysisof attacks, and dynamic re-tasking,

• Retrospective and prospectiveeffects-based assessment.

However, if the United States AirForce is going to exploit its C2ISR systemsto maximum effect, it has to “baseline”key parts of the AOC. In particular, it hasto codify AOC doctrine, training, andmodernization policies for the 19 “enti-ties” the Service has identified so far.(These entities include two fixed, fourdeployable, and four support AOCs. Theyalso include four Augmentation Units andfive Operations Centers that are alldesigned -- depending on the requirement-- to operate in Southwest Asia, Korea,Europe, the United States -- as HomelandDefense Centers -- and elsewhere.)

Doctrine: The USAF has alreadymade significant progress in developingAOC-related doctrine. Air CombatCommand issued a formal AOC Conceptof Operations (CONOPS) on 9 March2001. The CONOPS provides basicguidelines on how to organize, train,and equip AOCs. Additionally, it focus-es on the operational level processes

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States Air Force, the US Department ofDefense, or any other US government agency.

2. The United States Army, for example,largely assumes the latter. Its transformationwill be complete with the appearance of itslighter and yet more lethal Objective Forcewithin the decade.

3. See Transforming Defense: NationalSecurity in the 21st Century, Report of theNational Defense Panel, Washington, D.C.,December 1997, and Report of the DefenseScience Board Task Force on DoD WarfightingTransformation, Office of the Undersecretary ofDefense for Acquisition and Technology,Washington, D.C., August 1999.

4. These aircraft were the F-117, F-111,and F-15E.

5. LANTIRN is an acronym for LowAltitude Navigation and Targeting Infraredfor Night.

6. This number refers to all USAF F-16s,Block 30 and above, cc-coded only (AC+RC):FK/52: 18+15; FJ/50: 156+0; FH/42: 0+45;FG/40: 192+15; FF/32: 0+15; FE/30: 84+180.

7. For a discussion of these four US DefensePolicy Goals, see Chapter 3 of TransformingAmerica’s Defense for the 21st Century: Reportof the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,Washington, D.C., 30 September 2001.

8. This gap was not only attributable tothe verbal bombast of early air theoristsand the limited air technologies actuallyavailable to support their claims, but also tothe constraining effects of supporting anoverarching “Fulda Gap” strategy for over40 years.

9. See Unrestricted Warfare by Qiao Liangand Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literatureand Arts Publishing House, February 1999).

10. See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E.O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War toSave Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution Press, 2000).

11. See Count Gianni Caproni, Memorandumon “Air War”, 1917, US Air Force HistoricalResearch Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB,AL, File No. 168.66-2; Nino Salvaneschi, LetUs Kill the War: Let Us Aim at the Heart of theEnemy, 1917, AFHRA File No. 168.661-129;and John C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies(London: Humphrey Milford, 1936).Salvaneschi was an Italian journalist whopopularized the theories of Douhet andCaproni in World War I. As a result, Let UsKill the War accurately reflects their thinkingat the time.

12. The “waves” are not based on when anotion or idea first appeared, but on when itactually received significant attention andrecognition.

13. See John A. Warden, III, The AirCampaign: Planning for Combat(Washington, D.C.: National DefenseUniversity Press, 1988).

14. For a discussion of Boyd’s ideas, seeGrant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: JohnBoyd and American Security (Washington, DC:Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), andMajor David S. Fadok, USAF, John Boyd andJohn Warden: Air Power’s Quest for StrategicParalysis (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama:Air University Press, February 1995).

15. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, TheTransformation of American Air Power(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).Although this volume did not appear until2000, its basic themes were familiar to a con-siderable number of US Air Forces leadersand thinkers in the 1990s. In fact, many ofthem commented on early drafts of the text,as its preface makes abundantly clear.

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cept (with intra-block increments) ituses for other weapon systems.

Block 10 improvements, for exam-ple, focus on producing and disseminat-ing coalition Air Tasking Orders, creat-ing and distributing coalition air pic-tures, disseminating intelligence prod-ucts among coalition partners, andreducing hardware footprints (past AOCshave included a hefty 28-30 servers and150-200 workstations, for example).

Block 20 enhancements, in turn, seekto provide improved crisis action plan-ning capabilities, enhanced unit-level useof the Theater Battle Management CoreSystem, and a web-enabled version of thesame system for the AOC.

Lastly, “next generation” or Block30 capabilities will support GlobalStrike Task Forces (preferably by 2006)and provide the following:

• A full and yet scaleable AOC withless than 100 people.

• Robust distributed collaborativelinks to supporting command andassessment centers.

• An integrated infrastructure thatpermits “plug & play” applica-tions.

• Self-configuring LANs and laptopworkstations.

• The ability to “publish and sub-scribe” like-type information capa-bilities.

• Automated tasking orders orappropriate en-route weapon pair-ing and control.

• The ability to perform automatedand timely effects-based assess-ments, and much more.

The “Combined AerospaceOperations Center — Experimental,”

popularly known as CAOC-X, is the pri-mary vehicle the USAF has developedto “operationalize” the AOC quickly(including the Block 10-30 improve-ments cited above). More precisely, thegoal of CAOC-X is to modernize the cur-rent collection of AOC systems into asingle integrated architecture made upof “best-of-breed” hardware, software,and processes. These technologies andprocedures will then support three dif-ferent types of AOCs — “Full” units,with complete block and coalition capa-bilities; “Training Plus” organizations,which will have less than full opera-tional options; and strictly “Training”AOCs, which will have only limitedoperational functions.

When it is all said and done, how-ever, the fundamental challengeremains money. At present, the USAFhas not adequately funded a host ofAOC requirements — e.g., unit stan-dardization, operator training, thefielding of Block 10 or Block 20 tech-nologies, maintenance equipment, andmore. The Service needs to dedicateadditional funds to support Block 20and 30 developments, particularly if itis going to ensure its commanders havethe tools they need to exploit new aero-space capabilities in support of newconcepts of employment in a new mili-tary era. When the USAF accomplishesthis last step, it will have transformeditself yet again, and it will be in largepart because of the order-of-magnitudeadvantages provided by C2ISR-basedAerospace Operations Centers.

Endnotes

1. The opinions, conclusions, and recom-mendations expressed or implied in this arti-cle are solely those of the author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the United

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16. See Stephen T. Hosmer, PsychologicalEffects of US Air Operations in Four Wars,1941-1991: Lessons for US Commanders(RAND Project Air Force, MR-576-AF, 1996).

17. See, for example, Clashes of Visions:Sizing and Shaping Our Forces in a FiscallyConstrained Environment. The Center forStrategic and International Studies (CSIS) pub-lished this 87-page edited transcript after aformal exchange between Major General Link,Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, (USMC, Ret.), and MajGen Robert Scales, USA in October, 1997.

18. General McCarthy was a member of theNational Defense Panel (1997) and subsequent-ly led two ISR-related USAF Senior AdvisoryBoard (SAB) studies — one on Building the JointBattlespace Infosphere (1998) and the other onproviding Information Management to Supportthe Warfighter (1999). (See http://www.sab.hq.af.mil/Archives/index.htm for thesereports). As head of the Transformation Panelin Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s recent DefenseReview (spring 2001), Gen McCarthy repeateda number of the themes first struck by the NDPand SAB studies, including the inescapableneed for comprehensive global awareness.

19. In an internal 22 September 1999 mem-orandum, Mr. Arthur Money, AssistantSecretary of Defense for C3I, defined the GlobalInformation Grid as “The globally intercon-nected, end-to-end set of information capabili-ties, associated processes and personnel for col-lecting, processing, storing, disseminating andmanaging information on demand to warfight-ers, policy makers, and support personnel.”Advocates of the Family of InteroperablePictures, in turn, characterize it as a multi-serv-ice effort to provide the warfighter with acoherent, consistent, tailorable, and unam-biguous view of the battlespace with action-able, decision-quality information. The resultof such a view, they argue, will be clear deci-sion-making superiority over others.

20. Naturally, the US military’s quest forInformation Superiority also poses new chal-lenges. How will the US military automate itsjoint data/imagery processing? How will itavoid being sensor rich and information poor?How will it expand and integrate its automatictarget recognition and classification methods?How will it protect its information, or manage itin networked, coalition-friendly ways? The USmilitary will have to answer these and manyother questions before Information Dominancebecomes a reality.

21. These types of effects can be psycho-logical or physical, logistically centered,infrastructure centered, cyberspace/spacecentered, or leadership oriented. They canalso focus on an opponent’s security, mobil-ity, and/or political capabilities.

22. Lt Col Richard G. White, Concept ofOperations for Aerospace Operations Center(AOC) (United States Air Force: Air CombatCommand, 9 March 2001).

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INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, the importance of intel-ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance(ISR) in providing the air commander areal-time picture of the battle space, withsufficient fidelity to ensure accuratestrategic and operational decision making,will force ISR into a position of promi-nence within the Air Operations Centre(AOC) structure. As witnessed duringoperations Deliberate Force and AlliedForce, commanders need and want to bedirectly involved in the planning and con-duct of operations to ensure issues of col-lateral damage, casualties, target legalities,and national and international interestsare addressed before weapons are released.The only way commanders can hope toachieve this level of interaction with oper-ations is through a clear, intelligible pic-ture of the battle space. In operationsother than total war, there is no longer aplace for Clausewitzian fog.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

As Figure 1 illustrates, currentUSAF doctrine places ISR at a specialtyfunction level within the AOC.

As a specialty function, ISR per-sonnel are distributed throughout thevarious divisions within the AOC toprovide advice and assess informationfor their part of operations within theirrespective division. ISR personnel areunder the direction of a team leader,but effectively work for their assigneddivision much the same as staff with aspace or information warfare specialtymight function. The difference withISR, in comparison to other specialtyteams, is the focus this organizationbrings to the commander’s battle-spaceperspective and the impact ISR derivedinformation has on the commander’sability to make time-critical decisions.For this reason, ISR must be elevated tothe level of Core Team, much as wasdone with Air Mobility, to reflect ISR’score responsibility to deliver time sensi-tive information to the commander inthe same manner as other war fightingdivisions of the AOC.

The air commander exercises“operational art” through his strategicvision designed to defeat the enemy’scentre of gravity (C of G), which hearticulates through the air campaign.2

THE ROLE OF AIR OPERATIONS CENTREIN AN ISR-DEPENDENT FORCE

L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l D e n n i s M a r g u e r a t t , D e p u t y D i r e c t o rA e r o s p a c e S t u d i e s

AOC DirectorCore Teams

Specialty Teams(ISR)

Support Teams

Strategy Div CombatPlansDiv

Combat Ops Div

Air Mobility

Div

Figure 1 – AOC Structure1

sors arrayed over the battle-space andaccess information vital to the comman-der’s decision making process. Withouta cohesive ISR team, serving not as spe-cialist advisors but as a homogeneousAOC unit, commanders will once againbe forced to adopt the Moltkian stylecommand and control structure with itspotential consequences.

CONCLUSION

Information has always been animportant commodity for the com-mander and one that has often seemedillusive. Making decisions with imper-fect information is seen as the test oftrue command genius. But modernwarfare is not a test that any command-er wishes to fail. As General MichaelRyan, the current Chief of the UnitedStates Air Force, recently observed:“[There is a] necessity to keep informa-tion flowing at lightening speed toeveryone who needs it”. He went on tonote that command and control, as wellas intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance capabilities of the force, is“something we have to pay a lot ofattention to.”6 Flowing accurate andtimely information to the commandercan only be achieved by dedicated pro-fessionals capable of synthesizing multi-source inputs into a coherent intelli-gence picture from which the com-mander can make decision crucial tooperational outcomes.

While the current AOC constructhas managed well with ISR as a special-ty function positioned principally in anadvisory capacity, the nature of modernoperations other than total war demandgreater responsibility within the AOCstructure. Information provided by theISR team will increasingly become thecentre-piece of AOC activities.

Consequently, ISR must be raised to acore level to give it the prominencerequired for Napoleonic decision mak-ing by the modern air commander.

Endnotes

1. JAOC Jumpstart Version 1.0, USAF C2Warrior School, Hurburt Field, Fl.

2. Owen, Col Robert C. Deliberate Force, ACase Study in Effective Air Campaiging AirUniversity Press, Maxwell AFB, January2000, P69.

3. Ibid, p. 352.

4. Ibid, p. 354.

5. Tirpak, John A. “Short’s View of theAir Campaign,” Air Force, www.afa.org/magazine/watch/0999watch.html.

6. Tirpak, John A. “Lessons Learned andRe-Learned,” Air Force, www.afa.org/maga-zine/watch/0899watch.html

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The “art” aspect of this action isachieved through the assessment ofstrategic outcomes determined from anaccurate picture of the effects his airoperations are having against theenemy’s C of G. Achieving this accuratepicture is the role of ISR, whichexplains its rise in prominence duringrecent operations in the Balkans.

A Return to the Days of Napoleon

In addition to ensuring defeat ofthe enemy’s C of G, a Commander mustremain cognizant of his own C of G andhow best to protect it. During opera-tion Deliberate Force, Lieutenant-General Michael Ryan quickly identi-fied his C of G as coalition unity andpublic opinion. He determined thatprotecting his C of G meant ensuringlimited collateral damage and ensuringthe legitimacy of every target identifiedfor attack. This led him to take theunusual position of personally selectingtargets for the Guidance Apportionmentand Targeting process within theCombat Plans Division. Such action onthe part of a commander was a return tothe 18th century Napoleonic Model ofwar in which the commander personal-ly directed operations. In Napoleon’sday, one individual could manage andcommand such battles, assuming he hadthe experience and genius to miss fewdetails, anticipate events at least betterthan his counterpart in the opposingarmy, and exploit the rudimentary com-mand and control systems of the time.3

Achieving the necessary level of detailneeded for this form of commanddepended heavily on the commander’sability to access timely information.Following the Napoleonic era, the com-plexity of battle and the inability toquantitatively analyze informationinputs, drove commanders to a decen-

tralized command and control structurefirst introduced by the Prussians as theMoltkian Model. The Prussians calledthis system wherein senior commandersissued broad orders to subordinateswho were responsible for and capable ofacting with independent initiativeAuftragstaktik.4 This decentralizedsystem worked extremely well in gener-al war where the consequence of errorwere unlikely to have the devastatingeffect on operations possible in today’sconstrained operational environment.

An example of constraining effectcan be found in Operation Allied Forceas the campaign’s focus turned fromattacks on fielded forces to that ofSerbian domestic infrastructure. AsLieutenant-General Michael Shortnoted following the accidental strike onthe Chinese Emabassy: “We wererestricted by enormous concern for col-lateral damage and unintended loss ofcivilian life”. During the last days of thecampaign, “that was the litmus that weused to pick a target.”5 Once again,decentralized control gave way to cen-tralization as an apparent error in tar-geting focused the mind of the com-mander on specific target generation.

Air commanders are increasinglybeing required to return to the hands-on direction of battles reminiscent ofNapoleon in order to ensure completescrutiny of every target. Modern com-manders must exhibit a level of opera-tional oversight that allows few detailsto be missed. This need for refinementis only possible with real-time, system-atically filtered information that isknown to be beyond reproach.Achieving this level of fidelity can onlyoccur at the hands of specialized staffs,working as an integrated team, who areable to reach across the spectrum of sen-

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131130

INTRODUCTION

Aquick perusal of any current mili-tary journal will provide bewil-

dering array of technological marvels. Itwould do James Bond’s R&D man proud(read “Buck Rogers” or “PowerRangers” depending upon your genera-tion). The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs (RMA) brings its own jargon,acronyms, and perhaps the occasionalsnake-oil salesmen that accompanymost miracle cures. Recent advancesand posited future capabilitiesundoubtedly leave one awestruck. Yetsomething seems missing from mostRMA discussions, including thoseoccurring at this 2001 Air Symposium.It is easy to get caught up in technologyand its astonishing promise, to thedetriment of the people, their organiza-tion and employment. This sidebarobservation to the symposium proceed-ings will therefore attempt to illuminatesome of these “missing” elements.

There are a number of “givens” asthe start-state of this message. Canada is,and will remain, a close military, econom-ic, and diplomatic partner of the UnitedStates for the foreseeable future. There isno doubt that the Americans are among avery limited number of countries at theleading edge of technology. The advancesin requisite supporting operational con-cepts, or empowering lower-levels of com-mand to exploit these advances, remainssubject to debate. Yet, if Canada wishes tooperate as a high-ranking partner in any

US-led coalition, we are obligated to movein tandem with American progress. At themost basic level, this would require tech-nologically compatible aircraft, troops,and ships. This, of course, presupposesthat, a) Canada will continue to deploy aspart of multinational coalitions, and b) ifthe US participates, it leads. I cannotimagine strenuous argument against thesepremises. This does, however, produce anumber of questions that need to beaddressed in the course of the RMAdebate. The reality remains that the US isleading in the technological aspects of theRMA. I purposely specified the technolog-ical because RMA requires more thanmere scientific, technical, or industrialadvances. As cited in the VCDS’s on-lineRMA primer, the tank did not create ablitzkrieg revolution. Rather, it required adriving technology (large armour forma-tions with tanks and personnel transportof equivalent mobility and protection), inconcert with “supporting technologies(i.e., radios), organizational changes (com-bined arms formations and tactical airsupport), new operational concepts (airsuperiority and deep, knife-like thrusts),and command changes (mission orientedtactics).”1 To provide a semblance of aframework for the comments here, I willexplain my arguments and concernswithin the VCDS outline of necessaryRMA conditions.

DRIVING TECHNOLOGY

Computers and digital connectivityinstigated today’s revolution. But, has

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Is the Emperor Ready for His NewClothes?

R o b e r t M a r t y n

sive, ordinance-carrying missions, costus this flexibility? Kosovo also pointedout the clear differences in skill setsbetween senior and junior CF-18 pilots,given budget-driven training cut-backs.6 Increasing ISR skills will likelycome at the cost of further diminished,basic war-fighting competence.

A popular expression posits “infor-mation is the ultimate high ground.” Ifone accepts this saying’s veracity, thenit begs the question, is the Air Forcewilling to forego aircrew in favour ofGlobal Hawk-type UAVs or evenRadarsat-type satellite systems? Buteven that is not a simple either/or prob-lem. While both systems have certainadvantages in acquiring information,they lack any deterrence value. Feintsand demonstrations will always havemilitary utility, to say nothing of thecapability to destroy the enemy if nec-essary. Thus we return to the require-ment to balance the shrinking numberof aircraft with the expanding roles andmissions being demanded.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY

The supporting technology toexploit the ISR RMA is rapidly becom-ing available. The communications andanalytical software to maximize infor-mation provided is increasingly appear-ing through civilian business ventures.Naturally, commercial-off-the-shelf(COTS) systems bring their own inher-ent concerns. That COTS providers areoutside of direct government controlcreates a potentially tenuous situation.Anyone with unquestioning faith inAlternate Service Delivery need onlyrecall the catastrophic results of Frenchdependency on an intermittent, con-tracted air cargo service at Dien BienPhu in 1954.7

A related problem, which is recur-ring theme in any discussion of CanadianForces wide issues, is the problem of“rice bowls.” Effective RMA demandsseamless interoperability. There can beno dotted line dividing mud, coast andsky. The information acquired throughthese technological advances must passquickly from sensor to analysis to thosecapable of acting upon the intelligence.The stated goal of sensor-to-shooter isunlikely achievable, except in the lowesttactical scenario, given political con-straints in the form of positive confirma-tion of hostile activity in most Rules ofEngagement. So, despite the presentinevitability of some degree of assess-ment, we must still get the information ina usable format to the shooter in minimaltime. The army has been fielding aTactical Command, Control andCommunications System (TCCCS – fit-tingly pronounced “Ticks,” as in“bugs”) since the early 1980s.8 As ofmid-2001, not all field units havereceived it. There remain many difficul-ties in its advertised capabilities ofencrypted frequency agility and datatransmission. I mention this within anair force symposium context due to the“rice bowl” factor. This army system isnot interoperable with any communica-tions systems in the Canadian air force ornavy, or any of our NATO allies’ servic-es. While electronic connectivity is a sinequa non of battlespace dominance, thenumber of non-compatible systems con-tinues to grow.9 Work is clearly requiredbefore we cast aside our present systemin favour of the RMA’s promises.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

The overarching reality of budget-ary constraint influences all CanadianForces discussions. Simply put, currentresources preclude maintaining our

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the driving technology come tofruition? Is Canada willing to make theinvestment? Arguably, future trends inintelligence, surveillance and recon-naissance (ISR) were made abundantlyclear, often via CNN, during the GulfWar. The capability to identify targetsand conduct precision deep-strike withalmost simultaneous battle-damageassessment was presented to mediaaudiences and potential adversariesalike. Putative foes considering lessonsfrom this conflict will likely move intwo opposite directions. One, a techni-cally advanced and economically soundenemy (for the RMA is not going tocome cheap), may attempt to match sci-entific advances – a digital arms race.This creates a prospective situationwherein technological benefit is offsetby an equally advanced countermea-sure, or else simply nullified by anopponent possessing similar capabilityto use against our forces. Conversely, aprospective belligerent may choose tostrike using asymmetrical means.

Asymmetrical attack refers, in thissimplified instance, to not conducting air-craft on aircraft battles. Rather, more sub-tle strategies are employed. Our deploy-ment of a combined-arms brigade, sup-ported by fighter-ground attack aircraftand an offshore naval blockade is metwith assassinations or terrorist attackswith biological weapons in our domesticcapital.2 In some circumstances, havingthe most technologically advanced mili-tary may provide little practical value.During the Gulf War, for example, A-10scomprised only 140 of 1,800 fighter air-craft in theatre, yet accounted for almost70 percent of the tanks claimed by the AirForce. In contrast, the $28 billion (US!)worth of B-1B bombers sat grounded,unserviceable, while almost 40 year old B-52s conducted the bombing offensive.3

The air symposium was not dedi-cated, however, to war fighting per se,but specifically to the aspects of intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnais-sance. As such, the key RMA aspectsare those dedicated to finding and fix-ing an enemy. Determining the utility ofnewly developed surveillance andreconnaissance systems in asymmetricwarfare situations is consequently ahigh priority.

For the Air Force, major systems inthis field are generally defined as a spe-cific intelligence-supporting aircraft,such as JSTARS, or the recently famous(among China-watchers), EP-3. Belowthe level of dedicated, role-specific air-craft are the capabilities provided bysystems, such as the various imagerypods, which can be fitted to a non-sur-veillance aircraft. This option tends tobe a less expensive and more flexibleoption, but comes with its own set ofnegative side effects. For example, anAN/AAS-38B FLIR pod will increasethe CF-18’s capability by expanding theoperating parameters and missiontypes. It is planned to augment theseFLIR pods with Nighthawk/Lightningpods, which include greater image mag-nification and a laser designation func-tion, thus making a more formidableISR platform.4 While these improve-ments are laudable, they produce a veryreal risk that increased specializationwill come at the expense of withdraw-ing aircraft thus fitted from their pri-mary war-fighting role, either air-to-airor bombing. In Kosovo, aircraft return-ing from bombing sorties would bediverted to investigate air activity inSerbian airspace.5 The Canadian AirForce provided added value to the forcepackage because it retained this multi-role capability. Will emphasizing an ISRrole, to the exclusion of more expen-

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context of a “three block war.”15 Thescenario envisages the requirement toprovide humanitarian assistance on oneblock, conduct traditional peacekeepingoperations on a second, while fighting avicious conventional battle in a thirdpart of the city. Many writers are posit-ing this as warfare’s future, in whichSarajevo, Grozny and Mogadishu are thenorm.16 Although the “weapon system”of choice in urban conflict is the lonesniper, a symposium participantasserted that ISR requirements couldnevertheless be met by properlyequipped CF-18s. This proposition,dubious in itself, was not so troublingas the uniform agreement within theauditorium.

Regrettably, solutions remain elu-sive since service participants in allfacets of the RMA debate are likely tosee their way as the “obvious” way out.The air force, despite truly admirabletechnical advances, has not yet devel-oped a stand-alone war-winning capa-bility. Joint operations must be support-ed enthusiastically by all of the servic-es. Syndicate discussion during theconference posited that the army andnavy would be the chief beneficiaries ofISR; therefore, they should willinglyeliminate artillery, tanks, or frigates tofund air force acquisitions. During dis-cussions concentrating on an air-recon-naissance niche, it was pointed out thatdiscerning targets without controllingassets to strike those targets was a logi-cally ineffective. Yet, having the armymothball their warfighting equipmentso that the air force could fund targetacquisition technology, supposedly forthe army’s benefit, did not elicit a simi-lar response. That no one came forwardto offer any of their service’s assets sug-gests “rice bowls” will remain a keyissue to be resolved.

Despite the best efforts of ourstrategic and doctrinal theorists, mili-taries tend to fight in accordance withtheir “corporate culture.”17 This com-mon perception tends to be bred inwartime, thus any modification is morelikely to result from operational experi-ence, than what appears in the latestdoctrine-writers’ tome. Therefore,despite much ink being spilled onRMA, the Air Force is apt to continueoperating with attitudes acquired fly-ing out of Doha and Aviano.

COMMAND CHANGES

So if written doctrine cannot bedepended upon to guide operations, wemust turn to our command structures ifwe hope to influence the way futureoperations are conducted. Perhaps thisis the weakest link in the RMA discus-sions; theorists tend to focus on thetechnology and machines, to the exclu-sion, or at best, minimization of person-nel factors. At a generalized level, aphysically fit commander who presentsa calm demeanor in adversity will natu-rally garner respect. A distant, dismis-sive commander, or one unable toaccept bad news will critically under-mine operations. The capability ofquickly grasping fundamental details,visualizing the information require-ments, and responding effectively iscritical to the leadership process. But isthis how commander’s are presentlyselected? Two Canadian DefenceScientists, Carol McCann and RossPigeau, have done stalwart work in cre-ating a useful analytical model to assesscommand abilities (see Figure 1).18 Theirmodel’s three-axis Command CapabilitySpace illustrates where commensuratelevels of competency, authority andresponsibility produce a BalancedCommand Envelope. These three factors

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“second wave” military while creating a“third wave” force.10 Does this argue forcreating a niche military? That is, hav-ing accepted that our navy cannotpatrol the northern one-third of ourcoastline, or that the army is out of theparatrooper business, can the air forcejust hang out a shingle saying “aerialreconnaissance only”? Is this not inkeeping with the government’s SoftPower approach of emphasizing moralsuasion within “temporary ‘coalitionsof the like-minded.’”?11 The Air Forcehas acquired and discontinued opera-tional roles in the past. Dedicating ourfighter aircraft to surveillance wouldlikely be more politically palatable thanthe earlier CF-104 nuclear strike role.Hopefully, any government ponderingsuch a niche option would also consid-er the full ramifications of limiting thescope of available responses by disarm-ing the air force.

Another organizational change inthe effective employment of ISR tech-nologies would be a requisite flatteningof the present hierarchical commandstructure. Technology, in the form ofMulti-functional Information Distribu-tion System (MIDS), can theoreticallyprovide the same real-time informationand target imagery to the pilot in thecockpit as to Air Command’s OperationsCentre.12 How many redundant levels ofcommand can this eliminate? Howmuch time is lost, thus degrading time-sensitive intelligence on mobile targets,by repetitive planning as the informa-tion moves through multiple headquar-ters’ staffs? Some may challenge thispremise, saying that planning is alreadydecentralized, thus eliminating theproblem. Nonetheless, there was anoverwhelming majority of air force offi-cers at the symposium holding at leastthe impression that the reins continue

being held quite tightly at higher head-quarters. Whether this is reality or justa faulty but widespread sensitivity, thishierarchic structure negates many ISRadvantages promised by the RMA.

NEW OPERATING CONCEPTS

Closely related to the layering ofcommand, is the time-honoured discon-nect between different coloured head-quarters; “light blue” and “brown”simply do not fight the same battle.This basic conceptual difference is notnew, nor is it likely to change given theconditions of human nature. Prior toWorld War I, America’s only six-stargeneral, “Black Jack” Pershing, saw air-craft as merely an “excellent and effi-cient means of getting oats to the hors-es.”13 Flyers naturally saw their rolemuch differently. Yet almost ninetyyears later, there remains disagreementon aviation’s most effective employ-ment. In the Balkans for example,AFSOUTH, through 5 Allied TacticalAir Force, decreed the anti-air threatnecessitated aircraft staying above18,000 feet. Further, Air Force informa-tion requirements took precedence overrequests coming from soldiers actuallyin-country. Consequently, air recon-naissance missions targeted surface-to-air sites or ammunition dumps in sup-port of contingency planning potentialfuture strikes, rather than seek out bel-ligerent factions surrounding UNcamps. Tactical Air Reconnaissanceremained non-responsive to theUNPROFOR Commander’s needs.14

This UN example also illustrates therelevance of what type of “war” the airforce intends to fight. With rapidlyincreasing global urbanization, USMarine Corps’ Commandant GeneralKrulak describes future warfare in the

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3. Col. (ret’d) David Hackworth, “TheLessons of the Gulf War,” Newsweek, 24June 1991, pp. 22-23.

4. Discussion with LCol (ret’d) VanceMillar, NDHQ/DAR 5-4 (CF-18 Weapons), 30May 2001.

5. LCol David Bashow, et al, Mission Ready:Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,”Canadian Military Journal, vol. 1, no. 1,(2000), p. 57.

6. Ibid., p. 57.

7. The American/French crews occasionallyrefused to fly for several days. Bernard Fall, Hellin a Very Small Place, NY: JB Lippincott, 1967,p. 169, 241. This work remains a classic on thisissue. Frédéric Lert, Wings of the CIA. Paris:Histoire & Collections, 1998, pp. 55-56, 58.

8. See www.dnd.ca/commelec/nwslettr/vol40/tcccs_e.htm.

9. Roger Beaumont, “the Paradoxes of C3,”Military Leadership. James Buck and LawrenceKorb, eds. (London: Sage, 1981), p. 127.

10. For “wave” parameters, see AlvinToffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Making Sense of Global Chaos. NY:Warner Books, 1993.

11. Dean Oliver, “Soft Power and CanadianDefence,” Strategic Datalink #76. Toronto:Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999.See also Joseph Jockel, The Canadian Forces:Hard Choices, Soft Power. Toronto: CanadianInstitute of Strategic Studies, 1999.

12. Discussion with LCol (ret’d) Vance Millar,NDHQ/DAR 5-4 (CF-18 Weapons), 30 May 2001.

13. Cited in BGen Robert Stewart, “NewTechnology: Another Way to Get Oats to theHorses?” Army, vol. 45, no. 1 (1995), p. 26.

14. Author’s experience, and discussionwith 5 ATAF Intelligence personnel.

15. General Charles Krulak, “The ThreeBlock War: Fighting in Urban Areas,” pre-sented at the National Press Club(Washington DC), 10 October 1997. VitalSpeeches of the Day, 15 Dec 97, p. 139.

16. Three better works in this area are:Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations:Remaking the World Order. NY: Simon &Schuster, 1998; Robert Kaplan, The ComingAnarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the PostCold War. NY: Random House, 2000; or morespecifically militarily, Ralph Peters, Fightingfor the Future: Will America Triumph?Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999.

17. Paul Johnston, “Doctrine is NotEnough: The Effect of Doctrine on theBehavior of Armies,” Parameters, vol. 30,no. 3 (2000), pp. 30-39.

18. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Whatis a Commander?” Unpublished paper pre-pared for “The Human in Command”Workshop, (5-8 June 2000, Breda, TheNetherlands), pp. 4-8, 11.

19. Roger Beaumont, “The Paradoxes ofC3.” Military Leadership. James Buck andLawrence Korb, eds. (London: Sage, 1981), p.131.

20. Camile Tkacz, “Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Members ProfessionalDevelopment System,” Backbone of theArmy: Non-Commissioned Officers in theFuture Army. Douglas Bland, ed., Kingston:McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000, p. 107.

21. Lt Col (ret’d) Lester W. Grau, “Bashingthe Laser Range Finder With a Rock,” MilitaryReview, vol. 77, no. 3 (1997), pp. 1-8.

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