Soviet/Russian American Cooperation on Negotiating ... · Only UK backed the Russian initiative....

Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968),

and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

Special Advisor, PIR Center (Moscow)Director, Centre russe d’etudes politiques (Geneva)

Head, Center for Global Trends and International Organizations, the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

@Orlov_PIRCenter [email protected]

1. Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1968) and Signing (1968) the NPT (1)

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

• 1963, July. John Kennedy’s secret message to Nikita Khruschev on apossible joint actions, including military ones, by US and USSR, to limitor prevent nuclear capability of China. Declined by USSR

• 1964, January 28. Soviet Memorandum to the Eighteen-Nation Committeon Disarmament (ENCD) Committee of 18 on “measures aimed atreducing of arms race and softening of international tensions” (item 6:achieving of international agreement on nonproliferation”. US reaction:skeptical (because of NATO Nuclear Forces issue)

• 1965, June 15. India proposes “integrated approach” towardsnonproliferation, including disarmament and security assurances at UNDisarmament Commission. Resolution adopted. US, USSR: against any“linkages”, “packages”, or pre-conditions to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons


• 1965, January 21. The Roswell Gilpatric Committee (Committee on Nuclear Proliferation)secret Report to President Johnson. Main conclusions:

(1) US should recognize importance of working jointly with the USSR on proliferationprevention

(2) It is unlikely that it would be possible to persuade other nations to abstain from developingnuclear weapons unless US, USSR stop their arms race

(3) US should work together with the USSR cooperatively on regional nonproliferation issues,particularly in the Middle East (to keep Israel-Egypt confrontation on non-nuclear level

“We must acknowledge the importance of participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop proliferation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain

indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and

the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to

prevent nuclear proliferation”.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1965, September 24. Soviet Union introduces agenda item“On nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to the 20th UNGAsession and its own draft of the future Treaty

• 1966, January 11. Soviet PM Kosygin sends a confidentialmessage to President Johnson fully devoted to nuclearnonproliferation and invites United States on practical[деловые] talks to prepare the treaty.

• 1966, January 27. Johnson’s address to the ENCDsupporting work on the treaty. No concessions to the SovietUnion on NATO nuclear forces.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1966, September. Confidential US-Soviet talks on the nuclearnonproliferation treaty start in New York. Issues of “transfer ofnuclear weapons” and “groups of states” key. Gromyko and Ruskgenerally come to an agreement on the issue of “transfer” ofnuclear weapons and on “groups/blocks of states”. Also agreedthat existing measures on nuclear arms within the military blocks,including nuclear planning, will not be banned by the treaty.

• 1966, September. FM Gromyko is under instructions to speed-uptalks with Americans to prevent further proliferation. SovietMFA’s memo to the CPSU Central Committee warns that, in theabsence of such a treaty “India, Canada, Italy, Japan, Belgium,Sweden, the Netherlands, Israel, Czechoslovakia, and the FRGwould launch production of nuclear weapons soon”

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1966, September -1968, June. Consensus on major principles of thefuture nuclear nonproliferation regime among Soviet key players:

1) CPSU Central Committee2) MFA3) MOD4) Minsredmash5) VPK (Military-Industrial Commission under the Council of Ministers)6) KGB

• 1966, September – 1968, June. Soviet Union is successful inconvincing all its allies (except Romania) to support its position andthe future Treaty. US convinces its allies, too (having difficulty withFRG)

Prevention of further nuclear proliferation in the world is considered as central task to address vital national interests of

the USSR

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1967, October 10. Gromyko meets Johnson in the White House.The Roshin-Rusk working group intensifies its efforts to findcompromise on Art.1.

• 1967, November 10. Soviet leadership approves Gromyko’sposition to accept US formula on “… to any recipientwhatsoever” as it prevents any case of potential transfers, tothird countries or blocks; comes to a conclusion that issue of a“Federation of Europe” with independent nuclear arsenal is nomore than a utopia

• 1968, July 1. NPT opened for signature. “In the situation ofarms races NPT has been highly important. It has demonstratedthat we are able to resolve an important problem with US andUK, two NATO pillars. Brezhnev, all Politburo was sohappy…” (Andrey Gromyko)

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

2. NPT Indefinite Extension (1995) (1)

ARTICLE X

Twenty-five years after theentry into force of the Treaty,a conference shall beconvened to decide whetherthe Treaty shall continue inforce indefinitely, or shall beextended for an additionalfixed period or periods. Thisdecision shall be taken by amajority of the Parties to theTreaty.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

2. NPT Indefinite Extension (1995) (2)

• 1994, Winter US and Russian diplomats began to prepare

for the Conference and were eager to achieve maximal

results: indefinite extension of the treaty with minimal

concessions to the NAM. The preparation was carried out

in Geneva (CD), in Vienna (IAEA HQ), and in New York.

First, Russia, the U.S. and the UK were conducting trilateral

meetings and then, all three parties discussed their plan with

the French diplomats. China did not take part in these

consultations and, as one of the participants put it, pretended

to be "a non-nuclear weapon developing state, which has

acquired some nuclear weapons by chance.“

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

2. NPT Indefinite Extension (3)

Four key and most probably controversial issues identified:

1) the term of extension

2) Article IV (the right of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to access

peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination);

3) Article VI;

4) Security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states

Russia proposed initially to discuss the problem of extension and to put it to a

vote immediately, on the first day of the Conference, before the actual review of

the treaty's implementation (the five-year review is an integral part of the

Conference). Russia believed that the issue of extension should be solved

deliberately by all participants, without arms-twisting and fuss; hence, it ought

not to be put at the bottom of the agenda. However, this position was not

endorsed, since the U.S. did not predict that indefinite extension or even long-

term extension would be agreed upon easily. They preferred to obtain a clear

vision of the positions at the beginning of the Conference and to use this forum to

influence the heads of hesitating delegations.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1994, December, Geneva. Russia set forth a two-fold initiative. The resolution on the

term of the treaty would have been a short document, without preamble (which

would have inevitably lead to long debate) and stating only the indefinite extension.

Only UK backed the Russian initiative. The U.S. was concerned that the NAM might

issue a collective resolution in response and put it to a vote first. Canada was against

the proposal, naming the Russian draft a "high quality, high risk" idea. Canada stood

for cautious and gradual actions before and during the Conference, to increase step

by step the number of states supporting indefinite extension.

Russia strongly opposed this approach:

(1) it feared a low turnout at such meetings, which might look like the NWS policy was

failing.

(2) it believed that there was a split in the ranks of the NAM and, hence, did not expect

a single unified resolution from all the opponents of indefinite extension.

Russian diplomats advocated the benefits of lobbying, although they admitted that the

U.S. had more capabilities in this area.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1995, January. The most probable candidate to preside over the

Conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), visited

Moscow. In the course of his meeting with the Russian FM Kozyrev he

expressed the opinion that the most favorable outcome of the Conference

would be to take the decision without voting. He proposed his wording for

the resolution: "As a majority exists among States Parties to the Treaty for

its indefinite extension, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely."

Russian diplomats appreciated this formula, calling it elegant but doubting

at that time that the Conference would be able to avoid voting.

• 1995, Spring Russia and U.S. attached special importance to the intentions

of the South African leadership to set forth its own initiative at the

Conference. To assure South Africa of their intentions, Russian FM Andrei

Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent letters to

South African FM Alfred Nzo on the eve of the Conference.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1995, March. The NPT. Problems of Extension White Paper presented

by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

• 1995, March. The National Security Council of Russia met to make

decision on NPT extension to provide instructions to the Russian

delegation. Agreed that Russia should strive to achieve indefinite

extension of the NPT, and to regard the option of 25-year rolling

periods with conferences in between, as an alternative.

"[...] If it is not possible to achieve indefinite extension, there will be

a danger that [...] a group of states will oppose this. If these positions

clash - either indefinite or nothing - we cannot agree to this.

Responsible approach will be to prevent proliferation [...] on any

fundamental principles. This is why it will be possible to offer 25-

year extension with the possibility of further extension [...]

Valery Manilov, then Deputy Secretary of the RF Security Council

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

2. NPT Indefinite Extension (7)• 1995, January-May. “Sticks-n-carrots” combo used by Russia, US in building international

support of indefinite extension of the NPT prior and during the conference

Russia worked primarily with

(1) CIS countries. Normally, meets with positive reaction and support. Exerts some pressure on the

Moldavian and Azerbaijani delegations at different stages of the Conference. Surprised with presence of

US “advisor” in delegation of at least one of the CIS states but chooses not to raise this issue.

(2) Ukraine more specifically: until the last days of the Conference, the Ukrainian delegation was not

ready to sign the final resolution on extension of the NPT. Kiyv demanded that some provisions

concerning security assurances be included in the succinct text of the resolution. If these demands were

accepted, other states would have immediately begun to propose new amendments. The Russian

delegation worked closely with the Ukrainian diplomats and finally succeeded.

(3) Iran. When President Clinton announced during the conference that sanctions against Iran would be

tightened, the leadership of the Russian delegation had to make an extra effort in order to prevent the

Iranian delegation from taking steps with uncontrollable consequences: “The decision on sanctions

deteriorated the situation [...] At first, Iran did not react, then its tone became more defiant [...] and the

Russian delegation had to take some measures to mitigate Iranian concerns".

In Russia’s assessment, “level of activities by the US was unprecedented, including substantial pressure

on such states as Mexico and Egypt. US sent ambassadors at large to the majority of allied and friendly

countries and counted every new vote for the resolution”.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1995, April-May. During the Conference, Russia and US worked jointly and

cooperatively on preparation of the final “package”:

"Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons“

"Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty",

"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament“

Resolution on the Middle East proved to be the only major irritator in US-Russian

approaches during this Conference. However, Russia agreed to mostly US-drafted

language of the Middle East resolution even though Israel was not even mentioned

there. Russia looked at this resolution as a compromise that would allow to avoid the

vote and/or walk-outs at the end of the conference. Russia and the US (together with

the UK) agreed to co-sponsor the resolution

Dr. Vladimir Orlov


• 1995, May 11. "We achieved a high level of honest and good interaction. I mean

cooperation among those who wanted indefinite extension of the NPT and

cooperation with other countries. The Conference was marked with high degree

of cooperation.“

Sergei Kislyak, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation,

in his interview to Vladimir Orlov.

• 1995, May 12. "This conference can be regarded as a certain referendum with

respect to U.S.-Russian disarmament activities. The referendum yielded sound

results, efforts of the recent years [...] were approved by the international

community. [...] The United States played an important part in the adoption of

the final decision on indefinite extension - it used all its power, all its influence

in different regions of the world [...]. The cooperation between Russia and the

United States, as far as the major goal was concerned, was very good."

Gen. Gennady Evstafiev, member of the Russian delegation, to Vladimir Orlov

• 1995, May 12. "There are no differences here between US and Russia, our

interests [on major NPT-related issues] coincide… This result [NPT indefinite

extension] would not have been achieved without the high level of coordination

between Russian and U.S. diplomats“

A senior member of the Russian delegation to Vladimir Orlov, New York

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

3. Lessons Learned & Conclusions(1) The signing of the NPT became possible only thanks to close joint work and readiness to

compromise between United States and the USSR. It has become their mutual grand success.

(2) With concluding the NPT, United States and the Soviet Union established a condominium in

nuclear nonproliferation (Amb. Roland Timerbaev), sharing privileges and special

responsibilities

(3) Since 1968, nuclear nonproliferation has always been an island in US-Soviet turbulent

relations not affected by major storms and mostly immune from clashes. Information exchange

and coordination in nuclear nonproliferation have been unprecedented. Even in the worst times of

the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation remained “ the only silk string connecting the two

superpowers” (Andrey Gromyko)

(4) In 1995, both United States and Russia worked closely, cooperatively, and successfully on

achieving indefinite extension of the NPT without a vote because it met their national interests

and strategic visions.

(5) Currently, both United States and Russia continue to “share joint responsibility of

strengthening nonproliferation regimes” (Vladimir Putin, December 1, 2016)

(6) Failure of the NPT RevCon in 2020 will be a joint failure of United States and Russia,

regardless of specific circumstances. Blame game will not be an option. Failure will not be an

option. We need to start building foundations for the 2020 RevCon success now and together.

Dr. Vladimir Orlov

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