Soviet war in Afghanistan

The Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted nine years fromDecember 1979 to February 1989. Part of the Cold War,it was fought between Soviet-led Afghan forces againstmulti-national insurgent groups called the Mujahideen,mostly composed of two alliances – the Peshawar Sevenand the Tehran Eight. The Peshawar Seven insurgentsreceived military training in neighboring Pakistan andChina,[9] as well as weapons and billions of dollarsfrom the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia,and other countries.[3][4][5][9][26] The Shia groups of theTehran Eight alliance received support from the IslamicRepublic of Iran. Early in the rule of the PDPA gov-ernment, the Maoist Afghanistan Liberation Organiza-tion also played a significant role in opposition, but itsmajor force was defeated by late 1979, prior to the Sovietintervention. The decade-long war resulted in the deathof 850,000–1.5 million civilians[23][24] as well as causingmillions of Afghans to flee the country, mostly to Pakistanand Iran.In June 1975, militants from the Jamiat Islami partyattempted to overthrow the government. In 1978, theTaraki government initiated a series of reforms, includ-ing a radical modernization of the traditional Islamic civilsociety.[27] Between April 1978 and the Soviet Interven-tion of December 1979, thousands of prisoners, perhapsas many as 27,000, were executed. Large parts of thecountry went into open rebellion. The Afghan govern-ment, having secured a treaty in December 1978 that al-lowed them to call on Soviet forces, repeatedly requestedthe introduction of troops in Afghanistan in the springand summer of 1979. They requested Soviet troopsto provide security and to assist in the fight against themujahideen rebels. Foreign ministers from 34 Islamicnations adopted a resolution which condemned the So-viet intervention and demanded “the immediate, urgentand unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops” from theMuslim nation of Afghanistan.[28] The UN General As-sembly passed a resolution protesting the Soviet interven-tion in Afghanistan by a vote of 104–18.[29]

The initial Soviet deployment of the 40th Army inAfghanistan began on December 24, 1979, under So-viet leader Leonid Brezhnev.[30] The first phase beganwith the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and their firstbattles with various opposition groups.[28] The war de-veloped into a new pattern: the Soviets occupied thecities and main axis of communication, while the mu-jahideen, (which the Soviet Army soldiers called 'Dush-man,' meaning 'enemy')[31] divided into small groups,waged a guerrilla war. Almost 80 percent of the country

escaped government control.[32] In 1985, the size of theLCOSF (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces) was in-creased to 108,800 and fighting increased throughout thecountry, making 1985 the bloodiest year of the war. Inthe mid-1980s, the Afghan resistance movement, assistedby the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UnitedKingdom, Egypt,[10] the People’s Republic of China andothers, contributed to Moscow’s high military costs andstrained international relations. Contingents of so-calledAfghan Arabs, foreign fighters who wished to wage jihadagainst the atheist communists. Notable among them wasa young Saudi named Osama bin Laden, whose Arabgroup eventually evolved into al-Qaeda.[33][34][35]

By mid 1987 the Soviet Union announced it would startwithdrawing its forces. The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachevon the scene in 1985 and his 'new thinking' on foreign anddomestic policy was probably the most important factorin the Soviets’ decision to leave. The final troop with-drawal started on May 15, 1988, and ended on February15, 1989. Due to the interminable nature of the war, theconflict in Afghanistan has sometimes been referred to asthe “Soviet Union’s Vietnam War" or the “Bear Trap” bythe Western media.[36][37][38]

1 Background

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was formed af-ter the Saur Revolution on April 27, 1978. The govern-ment was one with a pro-poor, pro-farmer and socialis-tic agenda. It had close relations with the Soviet Union.On December 5, 1978, a friendship treaty was signedbetween the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. On July 3,1979, United States President Jimmy Carter signed thefirst directive for covert financial aid to the opponents ofthe pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.[39]

Russian military involvement in Afghanistan has a longhistory, going back to Tsarist expansions in the so-called"Great Game" between Russia and Britain. This beganin the 19th century with such events as the Panjdeh In-cident, a military skirmish that occurred in 1885 whenRussian forces seized Afghan territory south of the OxusRiver around an oasis at Panjdeh. This interest in the re-gion continued on through the Soviet era, with billions ineconomic and military aid sent to Afghanistan between1955 and 1978.[40]

In February 1979 the United States Ambassador toAfghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped by Setami

1

2 1 BACKGROUND

Milli militants and was later killed during an assault car-ried out by the Afghan police, assisted by Soviet advisers.The death of the U.S. Ambassador led to a major degra-dation in Afghanistan–United States relations.[41]

In theMiddle East drastic changes were taking place con-current with the upheavals in Afghanistan caused by theSaur Revolution. In February 1979, the Islamic Revolu-tion ousted the American-backed Shah from Iran, mak-ing the U.S. lose one of its most powerful allies.[42] TheUnited States then deployed twenty ships to the PersianGulf and the Arabian Sea including two aircraft carri-ers, and there was a constant stream of threats of war-fare between the US and Iran.[43] March 1979 markedthe signing of the U.S.-backed peace agreement betweenIsrael and Egypt. The Soviet leadership saw the agree-ment as a major advantage for the United States. OneSoviet newspaper stated that Egypt and Israel were now"gendarmes of the Pentagon". The Soviets viewed thetreaty not only as a peace agreement between their erst-while allies in Egypt and the U.S.-supported Israelis butalso as a military pact.[44] In addition, the U.S. sold morethan 5,000 missiles to Saudi Arabia and also supplied theRoyalist rebels in the North Yemen Civil War against theNasserist government. Also, the Soviet Union’s previ-ously strong relations with Iraq had recently soured. InJune 1978, Iraq began entering into friendlier relationswith the Western world and buying French and Italian-made weapons, though the vast majority still came fromthe Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and China.

1.1 The Saur Revolution

Main article: Saur Revolution

King Mohammed Zahir Shah ascended to the throne andreigned from 1933 to 1973. Zahir’s cousin, MohammadDaoud Khan, served as Prime Minister from 1954to 1963. The Marxist People’s Democratic Party ofAfghanistan's (PDPA’s) strength grew considerably inthese years. In 1967, the PDPA split into two rival fac-tions, the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by NurMuham-mad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and the Parcham (Flag)faction led by Babrak Karmal.[45]

Former Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a militarycoup on July 17, 1973, after allegations of corruption andpoor economic conditions against the King’s government.Daoud put an end to the monarchy, and his time in powerwas widely popular amongst the general populace but un-popular amongst PDPA supporters.Intense opposition from factions of the PDPA wassparked by the repression imposed on them by Daoud’sregime and the death of a leading PDPA member, MirAkbar Khyber.[46] Themysterious circumstances of Khy-ber’s death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrationsin Kabul, which resulted in the arrest of several promi-nent PDPA leaders.[47]

On April 27, 1978, the Afghan army, which had beensympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and exe-cuted Daoud along with members of his family.[48] NurMuhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, be-came President of the Revolutionary Council and PrimeMinister of the newly established Democratic Republicof Afghanistan.

1.2 Factions inside the PDPA

After the revolution, Taraki assumed the Presidency,Prime Ministership and General Secretaryship of thePDPA. The government was divided along factionallines, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime MinisterHafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parchamleaders such as Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibul-lah. Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted in exiles, purgesand executions of Parcham members.[49]

During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applieda Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, manyof which were viewed by conservatives as opposingIslam.[50] Decrees setting forth changes in marriage cus-toms and land reform were not received well by a pop-ulation deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particu-larly by the powerful land owners who were harmed eco-nomically by the abolition of usury (though usury is pro-hibited in Islam) and the cancellation of farmers’ debts.By mid-1978, a rebellion started with rebels attackingthe local military garrison in the Nuristan region of east-ern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughoutthe country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minis-ter Hafizullah Amin seized power, arresting and killingPresident Taraki. Over two months of instability over-whelmed Amin’s regime as he moved against his oppo-nents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion.

1.3 Soviet–Afghan relations

Main articles: Kabul International Airport, Soyuz TM-6, Abdul Ahad Mohmand, Interkosmos, Bagram Airfieldand Naghlu DamThe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) hadbeen a major power broker and influential mentor inAfghan politics, ranging from civil-military infrastruc-ture to Afghan society.[51] In the 1980s, many Afghanswere proficient in the Russian language.[51] Since 1947,Afghanistan had been under the influence of the Sovietgovernment and received large amounts of aid, economicassistance, military equipment training and military hard-ware from the Soviet Union.The economic assistance and aid had been provided toAfghanistan as early as 1919, shortly after the RussianRevolution and when the regime was facing the RussianCivil War. Provisions were given in the form of smallarms, ammunition, a few aircraft, and (according to de-bated Soviet sources) a million gold rubles to support

1.4 Initiation of the insurgency 3

Afghanistan Scout Association in 1950s.

the resistance during the Third Anglo-Afghan War. In1942, the USSR again moved to strengthen the AfghanArmed Forces, by providing small arms and aircraft, andestablishing training centers in Tashkent (Uzbek SovietSocialist Republic). Soviet-Afghan military cooperationbegan on a regular basis in 1956, and further agreementswere made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send ad-visers and specialists. The Soviet Union built an exten-sive amount of infrastructure, notably giving assistancebuilding the Kabul University, Polytechnical institutes,hospitals, civilian infrastructure, power plants, and lo-cal schools. During the 1980s, Soviets established theuniversities in Blakhe, Herate, Takhar, Nangarhar andFariyab provinces. Russian faculty soon joined the uni-versities, teaching Afghan students in Russian languageproficiency.In 1978, after witnessing India's nuclear test, SmilingBuddha, President Daud Khan initiated a militarybuildup to counter Pakistan’s armed forces and Iranianmilitary influence in Afghan politics. A final pre-wartreaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the PDPA tocall upon the Soviet Union for military support.[52]

Following the Herat uprising, President Taraki contactedAlexei Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Min-isters, and asked for “practical and technical assistancewith men and armament”. Kosygin was unfavorable tothe proposal on the basis of the negative political reper-cussions such an action would have for his country, andhe rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Sovietmilitary aid in Afghanistan.[54] Following Kosygin’s re-jection Taraki requested aid from Leonid Brezhnev, thegeneral secretary of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion and Soviet head of state, who warned Taraki thatfull Soviet intervention “would only play into the hands ofour enemies – both yours and ours”. Brezhnev also ad-vised Taraki to ease up on the drastic social reforms andto seek broader support for his regime.[55]

In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Cuba. On his way back,he stopped in Moscow on March 20 and met with Brezh-nev, foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and other Sovietofficials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at the

meeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki’s Khalq factionand the Parcham against Amin and his followers. At themeeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some So-viet support, including the redeployment of two Sovietarmed divisions at the Soviet-Afghan border, the sendingof 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists andthe immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at25 percent below the original price; however, the Sovietswere not pleased about the developments in Afghanistanand Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for partyunity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, theSoviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further inAfghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military in-tervention within Afghan borders during Taraki’s rule aswell as later during Amin’s short rule.[56]

1.4 Initiation of the insurgency

Main articles: Soviet Union–United States relations andPakistan–Soviet Union relationsSee also: Kidnapping and assassination of U.S. Ambas-sador Adolph DubsAfghanistan cemented regional problems with Pakistan,

Soviet infantry at the time of deployment.

after Daoud pressed his hard-line Pashtunistan policiesto Pakistan.[57] Pakistan retaliated, and Prime ministerZulfikar Ali Bhutto authorized a covert operation un-der M.I.'s Major-General Naseerullah Babar.[57] In 1974,Bhutto authorized another secret operation in Kabulwhere the ISI and the AI extradited Burhanuddin Rab-bani and Gulbadin Hekmatyar to Peshawar, amid fearthat Rabbani and Hekmatyar might be assassinated byDaoud.[57] According to Baber, Bhutto’s operation wasan excellent idea and it had hard-hitting impact on Daoudand his government which forced Daoud to increase hisdesire to make peace with Bhutto.[57] Another part ofthis operation was to train hard-line Jamiat-e Islami mil-itants against the Daoud’s secular government.[57] How-ever, this operation went into cold-storage after Bhuttowas removed from power.[57]

In June 1975, militants from the Jamiat Islami party at-tempted to overthrow the government. They started their

4 1 BACKGROUND

rebellion in the Panjshir valley (a part of the greaterParwan province), in the present day Panjshir province,some 100 kilometers north of Kabul, and in a numberof other provinces of the country. However, governmentforces easily defeated the insurgency and a sizable por-tion of the insurgents sought refuge in Pakistan wherethey enjoyed the support of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's govern-ment, which had been alarmed by Daoud’s revival of thePashtunistan issue.[58]

Soviet forces after capturing some Mujahideen.

40th Army headquarters, Tajbeg Palace, 1986.

Soviet soldiers conducting training.

In 1978, the Taraki government initiated a series of re-forms, including a radical modernization of the tradi-tional Islamic civil and especially marriage law, aimedat “uprooting feudalism" in Afghan society.[27] The gov-

ernment brooked no opposition to the reforms[49] and re-sponded with violence to unrest. Between April 1978and the Soviet Intervention of December 1979, thou-sands of prisoners, perhaps as many as 27,000, were ex-ecuted at the notorious[59] Pul-e-Charkhi prison, includ-ing many village mullahs and headmen.[60] Other mem-bers of the traditional elite, the religious establishmentand intelligentsia fled the country.[60]

Large parts of the country went into open rebellion.The Parcham Government claimed that 11,000 were ex-ecuted during the Amin/Taraki period in response tothe revolts.[61] The revolt began in October among theNuristani tribes of the Kunar Valley in the northeast-ern part of the country near the border with Pakistan,and rapidly spread among the other ethnic groups. Bythe spring of 1979, 24 of the 28 provinces had sufferedoutbreaks of violence.[62][63] The rebellion began to takehold in the cities: in March 1979 in Herat, rebels led byIsmail Khan revolted. Between 3,000 and 5,000 peoplewere killed and wounded during the Herat revolt. Some100 Soviet citizens and their families were killed.[64][65]In 1979, the contentious law and order situation led to aserious diplomatic incident involving United States, So-viet Union and Afghanistan when U.S. Ambassador toAfghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs was kidnapped by fourmilitants belonging to radical communist faction, Settam-e-Melli (lit. National Oppression).[66] The National Op-eration demanded the release of their communist leaderBadruddin Bahes, which the Afghan government deniedholding and refused categorically to negotiate with themilitants, in spite of the U.S. embassy’s demands.[66] TheU.S. increased pressure on the Afghan government andthe Soviet Union forcefully demanding for peaceful ne-gotiations for the release of their ambassador.[67]

Dubs was held in Room 117 of the Kabul Hotel (nowcalled Kabul Serena Hotel), the United States sent itsembassy and diplomatic staff at the Kabul Serena Ho-tel where the negotiation with the communist faction andthe U.S. was started.[66] During this time, the Afghansecurity forces, accompanied by the Russian advisersswarmed the hallway and surrounding rooftops, but ne-gotiations stalled, leading to an intense exchange of crossfire, after Russian advisers ordered an assault.[67] Doc-uments released from the Soviet KGB bureau archivesby Vasily Mitrokhin in the early 1990s clearly showedthat the Afghan government clearly authorized the as-sault and that theKGB adviser on scene, Sergei Batrukihn,may have recommended the assault, as well as the execu-tion of a kidnapper before U.S. experts could interrogatehim.[68] All attempts were failed, and U.S. AmbassadorAdolph Dubs was caught between the cross fire leading tohis death.[67] Afterwards the United States formally ex-pressed to Soviet Union its disapproval of the assault bythe security forces, putting more stress on U.S.-Soviet re-lations.[69]

Despite these drastic measures, by the end of 1980, outof the 80,000 soldiers strong Afghan Army, more than

5

half had either deserted or joined the rebels.[62]

2 1979: Soviet deployment

The headquarters of the Soviet 40th Army in Kabul, 1987. Beforethe Soviet intervention, the building was Tajbeg Palace, whereHafizullah Amin was killed.

The Afghan government, having secured a treaty inDecember 1978 that allowed them to call on Sovietforces, repeatedly requested the introduction of troopsin Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 1979. Theyrequested Soviet troops to provide security and to assistin the fight against the mujahideen rebels. On April 14,1979, the Afghan government requested that the USSRsend 15 to 20 helicopters with their crews to Afghanistan,and on June 16, the Soviet government responded andsent a detachment of tanks, BMPs, and crews to guardthe government in Kabul and to secure the Bagram andShindand airfields. In response to this request, an air-borne battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.Lomakin, arrived at the BagramAir Base on July 7. Theyarrived without their combat gear, disguised as technicalspecialists. They were the personal bodyguards for Pres-ident Taraki. The paratroopers were directly subordinateto the senior Soviet military advisor and did not interferein Afghan politics. Several leading politicians at the timesuch as Alexei Kosygin andAndrei Gromykowere againstintervention.After a month, the Afghan requests were no longer for in-dividual crews and subunits, but for regiments and largerunits. In July, the Afghan government requested that twomotorized rifle divisions be sent to Afghanistan. The fol-lowing day, they requested an airborne division in addi-tion to the earlier requests. They repeated these requestsand variants to these requests over the following monthsright up to December 1979. However, the Soviet govern-ment was in no hurry to grant them.Based on information from the KGB, Soviet leaders feltthat Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin's actions had desta-bilized the situation in Afghanistan. Following his ini-tial coup against and killing of President Taraki, the KGBstation in Kabul warned Moscow that Amin’s leadership

Soviet ground forces in action while conducting an offensive op-eration against the Islamist resistance, the Mujahideen.

would lead to “harsh repressions, and as a result, the ac-tivation and consolidation of the opposition.”[71]

The Soviets established a special commission onAfghanistan, comprising KGB chairman Yuri Andropov,Boris Ponomarev from the Central Committee andDmitriy Ustinov, the Minister of Defence. In late April1978, the committee reported that Amin was purging hisopponents, including Soviet loyalists, that his loyalty toMoscow was in question and that he was seeking diplo-matic links with Pakistan and possibly the People’s Re-public of China (which at the time had poor relationswith the Soviet Union). Of specific concern were Amin’ssecret meetings with the U.S. chargé d'affaires, J. BruceAmstutz, which, while never amounting to any agreementbetween Amin and the United States, sowed suspicion inthe Kremlin.[72]

Information obtained by theKGB from its agents in Kabulprovided the last arguments to eliminate Amin. Suppos-edly, two of Amin’s guards killed the former presidentNurMuhammad Taraki with a pillow, and Amin was sus-pected to be a CIA agent. The latter, however, is stilldisputed: Amin repeatedly demonstrated official friendli-ness to the Soviet Union. Soviet General Vasily Zaplatin,a political advisor at that time, claimed that four of Pres-ident Taraki’s ministers were responsible for the desta-bilization. However, Zaplatin failed to emphasize this

6 3 1979: SOVIET INTERVENTION

enough.[73]

Also during the 1970s, the Soviet Union reached the peakof its political influence in comparison to the U.S. as theSALT I treaty was created to cooperate in matters of nu-clear weapons and technology between the two nations.A second round of talks between Soviet premier Brezh-nev and President Carter yielded the SALT II treaty inJune 1979. (The United States Senate failed to ratify thetreaty). This process would eventually culminate and leadup to the buildup and intervention in Afghanistan in De-cember 1979 to preserve, stabilize and militarily inter-vene on behalf of the communist regime there.

3 1979: Soviet intervention

The Soviet intervention

On October 31, 1979 Soviet informants to the AfghanArmed Forces who were under orders from the innercircle of advisors under Soviet premier Brezhnev, re-layed information for them to undergo maintenance cy-cles for their tanks and other crucial equipment. Mean-while, telecommunications links to areas outside of Kabulwere severed, isolating the capital. With a deteriorat-ing security situation, large numbers of Soviet AirborneForces joined stationed ground troops and began to landin Kabul on December 25. Simultaneously, Amin movedthe offices of the president to the Tajbeg Palace, believ-ing this location to be more secure from possible threats.According to Colonel General Tukharinov and Merim-sky, Amin was fully informed of the military move-ments, having requested Soviet military assistance tonorthern Afghanistan on December 17.[74][75] His brotherand General Dmitry Chiangov met with the commanderof the 40th Army before Soviet troops entered the coun-try, to work out initial routes and locations for Soviettroops.[74]

On December 27, 1979, 700 Soviet troops dressed inAfghan uniforms, including KGB andGRU special forcesofficers from the Alpha Group and Zenith Group, occu-pied major governmental, military and media buildings inKabul, including their primary target – the Tajbeg Presi-dential Palace.

Soviet paratroopers aboard a BMD-1 in Kabul

That operation began at 19:00 hr., when the KGB-ledSoviet Zenith Group destroyed Kabul’s communicationshub, paralyzing Afghan military command. At 19:15,the assault on Tajbeg Palace began; as planned, presidentHafizullah Amin was killed. Simultaneously, other ob-jectives were occupied (e.g., the Ministry of Interior at19:15). The operation was fully complete by the morningof December 28, 1979.The Soviet military command at Termez, Uzbek SSR,announced on Radio Kabul that Afghanistan had beenliberated from Amin’s rule. According to the SovietPolitburo they were complying with the 1978 Treaty ofFriendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness andAmin had been “executed by a tribunal for his crimes”by the Afghan Revolutionary Central Committee. Thatcommittee then elected as head of government formerDeputy Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, who had beendemoted to the relatively insignificant post of ambas-sador to Czechoslovakia following the Khalq takeover,and announced that it had requested Soviet militaryassistance.[76]

Soviet ground forces, under the command of MarshalSergei Sokolov, entered Afghanistan from the northon December 27. In the morning, the 103rd Guards'Vitebsk' Airborne Division landed at the airport atBagram and the deployment of Soviet troops inAfghanistan was underway. The force that enteredAfghanistan, in addition to the 103rd Guards AirborneDivision, was under command of the 40th Army and con-sisted of the 108th and 5th Guards Motor Rifle Divisions,the 860th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment, the 56th Sepa-rate AirborneAssault Brigade, the 36thMixedAir Corps.Later on the 201st and 58th Motor Rifle Divisions alsoentered the country, along with other smaller units.[77]In all, the initial Soviet force was around 1,800 tanks,80,000 soldiers and 2,000 AFVs. In the second weekalone, Soviet aircraft had made a total of 4,000 flightsinto Kabul.[78] With the arrival of the two later divisions,the total Soviet force rose to over 100,000 personnel.

7

4 International positions on Sovietintervention

Foreign ministers from 34 Islamic nations adopted a res-olution which condemned the Soviet intervention and de-manded “the immediate, urgent and unconditional with-drawal of Soviet troops” from the Muslim nation ofAfghanistan.[28] The UN General Assembly passed a res-olution protesting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistanby a vote of 104–18.[29]

Weapons supplies were made available through numerouscountries; the United States purchased all of Israel’s cap-tured Soviet weapons clandestinely, and then funnelledthe weapons to the Mujahideen, while Egypt upgradedtheir own army’s weapons, and sent the older weaponsto the militants, Turkey sold their World War II stock-piles to the warlords, and the British and Swiss pro-vided Blowpipe missiles and Oerlikon anti-aircraft gunsrespectively, after they were found to be poor modelsfor their own forces.[26] China provided the most rele-vant weapons, likely due to their own experience withguerrilla warfare, and kept meticulous record of all theshipments.[26]

5 December 1979 – February 1980:Occupation

The first phase began with the Soviet intervention inAfghanistan and their first battles with various opposi-tion groups.[28] Soviet troops entered Afghanistan alongtwo ground routes and one air corridor, quickly takingcontrol of the major urban centers, military bases andstrategic installations. However, the presence of Soviettroops did not have the desired effect of pacifying thecountry. On the contrary, it exacerbated a nationalisticfeeling, causing the rebellion to spread further.[79] BabrakKarmal, Afghanistan’s new president, charged the Sovi-ets with causing an increase in the unrest, and demandedthat the 40th Army step in and quell the rebellion, ashis own army had proved untrustworthy.[80] Thus, Soviettroops found themselves drawn into fighting against ur-ban uprisings, tribal armies (called lashkar), and some-times against mutinyingAfghanArmy units. These forcesmostly fought in the open, and Soviet airpower and ar-tillery made short work of them.[81]

6 March 1980 – April 1985: Sovietoffensives

Main article: Panjshir offensivesThe war now developed into a new pattern: the Sovi-ets occupied the cities and main axis of communication,while the mujahideen, (which the Soviet Army soldiers

A mujahideen fighter in Kunar uses a communications receiver.

called 'Dushman,' meaning 'enemy')[31] divided into smallgroups, waged a guerrilla war. Almost 80 percent ofthe country escaped government control.[32] Soviet troopswere deployed in strategic areas in the northeast, espe-cially along the road from Termez to Kabul. In the west, astrong Soviet presence was maintained to counter Iranianinfluence. Incidentally, special Soviet units would havealso performed secret attacks on Iranian territory to de-stroy suspected mujahideen bases, and their helicoptersthen got engaged in shootings with Iranian jets.[82] Con-versely, some regions such as Nuristan, in the northeast,and Hazarajat, in the central mountains of Afghanistan,were virtually untouched by the fighting, and lived in al-most complete independence.

Mujahideen with two captured artillery field guns in Jaji, 1984.

Periodically the Soviet Army undertook multi-divisionaloffensives into mujahideen-controlled areas. Between1980 and 1985, nine offensives were launched into thestrategically important Panjshir Valley, but governmentcontrol of the area did not improve.[83] Heavy fightingalso occurred in the provinces neighbouring Pakistan,where cities and government outposts were constantly un-der siege by the mujahideen. Massive Soviet operationswould regularly break these sieges, but the mujahideenwould return as soon as the Soviets left.[36] In the west andsouth, fighting was more sporadic, except in the cities ofHerat and Kandahar, that were always partly controlledby the resistance.[84]

8 6 MARCH 1980 – APRIL 1985: SOVIET OFFENSIVES

The Soviets did not, at first, foresee taking on such anactive role in fighting the rebels and attempted to playdown their role there as giving light assistance to theAfghan army. However, the arrival of the Soviets hadthe opposite effect as it incensed instead of pacifiedthe people, causing the mujahideen to gain in strengthand numbers.[85] Originally the Soviets thought that theirforces would strengthen the backbone of the Afghan armyand provide assistance by securing major cities, lines ofcommunication and transportation.[86] The Afghan armyforces had a high desertion rate and were loath to fight,especially since the Soviet forces pushed them into in-fantry roles while they manned the armored vehicles andartillery. Themain reason though that theAfghan soldierswere so ineffective was their lack of morale as many ofthem were not truly loyal to the communist governmentbut simply collecting a paycheck. Once it became appar-ent that the Soviets would have to get their hands dirty,they followed three main strategies aimed at quelling theuprising.[87] Intimidation was the first strategy, in whichthe Soviets would use airborne attacks as well as armoredground attacks to destroy villages, livestock and cropsin trouble areas. The Soviets would bomb villages thatwere near sites of guerrilla attacks on Soviet convoys orknown to support resistance groups. Local peoples wereforced to either flee their homes or die as daily Sovietattacks made it impossible to live in these areas. By forc-ing the people of Afghanistan to flee their homes, theSoviets hoped to deprive the guerillas of resources andsafe havens. The second strategy consisted of subversionwhich entailed sending spies to join resistance groups andreport information as well as bribing local tribes or guer-rilla leaders into ceasing operations. Finally, the Sovi-ets used military forays into contested territories in aneffort to root out the guerillas and limit their options.Classic search and destroy operations were implementedusing Mil Mi-24 helicopter gunships that would providecover for ground forces in armored vehicles. Once thevillages were occupied by Soviet forces, inhabitants whoremained were frequently interrogated and tortured forinformation or killed.[88]

The Afghan village left in ruins after being destroyed by Sovietforces.

To complement their brute force approach to weeding outthe insurgency, the Soviets used KHAD (Afghan secretpolice) to gather intelligence, infiltrate the mujahideen,spread false information, bribe tribal militias into fight-ing and organize a government militia. While it is im-possible to know exactly how successful the KHAD wasin infiltrating mujahideen groups, it is thought that theysucceeded in penetrating a good many resistance groupsbased in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.[89] KHAD isthought to have had particular success in igniting inter-nal rivalries and political divisions amongst the resis-tance groups, rendering some of them completely use-less because of infighting.[90] The KHAD had some suc-cess in securing tribal loyalties but many of these rela-tionships were fickle and temporary. Often KHAD se-cured neutrality agreements rather than committed po-litical alignment.[91] The Sarandoy, a KHAD controlledgovernment militia, had mixed success in the war. Largesalaries and proper weapons attracted a good number ofrecruits to the cause, even if they were not necessarily“pro-communist”. The problem was that many of the re-cruits they attracted were in fact mujahideen who wouldjoin up to procure arms, ammunition and money whilealso gathering information about forthcoming militaryoperations.[90]

In 1985, the size of the LCOSF (Limited Contingent ofSoviet Forces) was increased to 108,800 and fighting in-creased throughout the country, making 1985 the blood-iest year of the war. However, despite suffering heavily,the mujahideen were able to remain in the field, mostlybecause they received thousands of new volunteers daily,and continue resisting the Soviets.

A Soviet Spetsnaz (special operations) group prepares for a mis-sion in Afghanistan, 1988.

6.1 1980s: Insurrection

In the mid-1980s, the Afghan resistance movement, as-sisted by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, theUnited Kingdom, Egypt,[10] the People’s Republic ofChina and others, contributed to Moscow’s high mili-tary costs and strained international relations. The U.S.viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as an integral ColdWar struggle, and the CIA provided assistance to anti-

6.1 1980s: Insurrection 9

Soviet forces through the Pakistani intelligence services,in a program called Operation Cyclone.[92]

A similar movement occurred in other Muslim countries,bringing contingents of so-called Afghan Arabs, foreignfighters who wished to wage jihad against the atheist com-munists. Notable among them was a young Saudi namedOsama bin Laden, whose Arab group eventually evolvedinto al-Qaeda.[33][34][35]

In the course of the guerrilla war, leadership came to bedistinctively associated with the title of “commander”. Itapplied to independent leaders, eschewing identificationwith elaborate military bureaucracy associated with suchranks as general. As the war produced leaders of reputa-tion, “commander” was conferred on leaders of fightingunits of all sizes, signifying pride in independence, self-sufficiency, and distinct ties to local communities. Thetitle epitomized Afghan pride in their struggle against apowerful foe. Segmentation of power and religious lead-ership were the two values evoked by nomenclature gen-erated in the war. Neither had been favored in the ideol-ogy of the former Afghan state.Afghanistan’s resistance movement was born in chaos,spread and triumphed chaotically, and did not find a wayto govern differently. Virtually all of its war was wagedlocally by regional warlords. As warfare became moresophisticated, outside support and regional coordinationgrew. Even so, the basic units of mujahideen organiza-tion and action continued to reflect the highly segmentednature of Afghan society.[93]

Olivier Roy estimates that after four years of war, therewere at least 4,000 bases from which mujahideen unitsoperated. Most of these were affiliated with the seven ex-patriate parties headquartered in Pakistan, which servedas sources of supply and varying degrees of supervision.Significant commanders typically led 300 or more men,controlled several bases and dominated a district or a sub-division of a province. Hierarchies of organization abovethe bases were attempted. Their operations varied greatlyin scope, the most ambitious being achieved by AhmadShah Massoud of the Panjshir valley north of Kabul. Heled at least 10,000 trained troopers at the end of the So-viet war and had expanded his political control of Tajik-dominated areas to Afghanistan’s northeastern provincesunder the Supervisory Council of the North.[93]

Roy also describes regional, ethnic and sectarian varia-tions in mujahideen organization. In the Pashtun areasof the east, south and southwest, tribal structure, withits many rival sub-divisions, provided the basis for mil-itary organization and leadership. Mobilization could bereadily linked to traditional fighting allegiances of thetribal lashkar (fighting force). In favorable circumstancessuch formations could quickly reach more than 10,000,as happened when large Soviet assaults were launched inthe eastern provinces, or when the mujahideen besiegedtowns, such as Khost in Paktia province in July 1983.[94]But in campaigns of the latter type the traditional ex-

plosions of manpower—customarily common immedi-ately after the completion of harvest—proved obsoletewhen confronted by well dug-in defenders with modernweapons. Lashkar durability was notoriously short; fewsieges succeeded.[93]

Mujahideen mobilization in non-Pashtun regions facedvery different obstacles. Prior to the intervention, fewnon-Pashtuns possessed firearms. Early in the warthey were most readily available from army troops orgendarmerie who defected or were ambushed. The inter-national arms market and foreign military support tendedto reach the minority areas last. In the northern re-gions, little military tradition had survived upon whichto build an armed resistance. Mobilization mostly camefrom political leadership closely tied to Islam. Royconvincingly contrasts the social leadership of religiousfigures in the Persian- and Turkic-speaking regions ofAfghanistan with that of the Pashtuns. Lacking a strongpolitical representation in a state dominated by Pash-tuns, minority communities commonly looked to piouslearned or charismatically revered pirs (saints) for lead-ership. Extensive Sufi and maraboutic networks werespread through the minority communities, readily avail-able as foundations for leadership, organization, commu-nication and indoctrination. These networks also pro-vided for political mobilization, which led to some ofthe most effective of the resistance operations during thewar.[93]

The mujahideen favoured sabotage operations. The morecommon types of sabotage included damaging powerlines, knocking out pipelines and radio stations, blow-ing up government office buildings, air terminals, hotels,cinemas, and so on. In the border region with Pakistan,the mujahideen would often launch 800 rockets per day.Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried outover 23,500 shelling attacks on government targets. Themujahideen surveyed firing positions that they normallylocated near villages within the range of Soviet artilleryposts, putting the villagers in danger of death from Sovietretaliation. The mujahideen used land mines heavily. Of-ten, they would enlist the services of the local inhabitants,even children.

Mujahideen praying in Shultan Valley, 1987.

They concentrated on both civilian and military targets,knocking out bridges, closing major roads, attacking

10 6 MARCH 1980 – APRIL 1985: SOVIET OFFENSIVES

convoys, disrupting the electric power system and indus-trial production, and attacking police stations and So-viet military installations and air bases. They assassi-nated government officials and PDPA members, and laidsiege to small rural outposts. In March 1982, a bombexploded at the Ministry of Education, damaging severalbuildings. In the same month, a widespread power fail-ure darkened Kabul when a pylon on the transmission linefrom the Naghlu power station was blown up. In June1982 a column of about 1,000 young communist partymembers sent out to work in the Panjshir valley were am-bushed within 30 km of Kabul, with heavy loss of life.On September 4, 1985, insurgents shot down a domes-tic Bakhtar Airlines plane as it took off from Kandaharairport, killing all 52 people aboard.Mujahideen groups used for assassination had three tofive men in each. After they received their mission tokill certain government officials, they busied themselveswith studying his pattern of life and its details and thenselecting the method of fulfilling their established mis-sion. They practiced shooting at automobiles, shootingout of automobiles, laying mines in government accom-modation or houses, using poison, and rigging explosivecharges in transport.

The areas where the different mujahideen forces operated in1985.

In May 1985, the seven principal rebel organizationsformed the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance to coor-dinate their military operations against the Soviet army.Late in 1985, the groups were active in and aroundKabul, unleashing rocket attacks and conducting opera-tions against the communist government.

6.2 1986: Stinger Missile and perceivedimpact

ManyWestern military analysts credit the introduction ofthe Stinger as the turning point in the war but many Rus-sian military analysts tend to be dismissive of the impactto the Stinger. With a kill ratio of about 70% and withover 350 aircraft and helicopters downed in the last two

The image of Afghan fighters shouldering STINGER missiles andshooting down Soviet helicopters became an icon of the latteryears of the War in Afghanistan.

years of the war, most directly attributed to the Stingers,the effect of the Stinger was at least notable. In a 2011article commemorating several Mujahideen fighters, theWall Street Journal celebrated the Stinger as “TheMissilethat Made History.” [95] A Foreign Policy article about theStinger used in Afghanistan called it so much a “gamechanger” in the Afghanistan war, that military analystshad coined the term “Stinger effect”.[96]

In reality, the weapons’ effectiveness even by western re-ports, were considerably less, closer to 40 percent, andeven as low as 20 percent. Also, during the first six, sevenmonths, only about 20 STINGERS per month were sentto the war torn area, making a prolonged rate of morethan one aircraft downed per day impossible, even withan improbable success rate of 100 percent.[97]

6.3 Stinger effect

According to American analysts, the introduction of theStinger changed the battlefield and the Soviet aircraftturned from being the hunter to being the hunted. The SU25 and Mi 24 were particularly vulnerable as they tendedto fly low and thus remained for a long time within therange of a Stinger missile. After the Stinger was intro-duced to the war, the Mujahideen shot down on averagemore than one aircraft per day. The suddenly escalatingcosts of aircraft losses became a major additional drainon the costs of the war and many analysts believe the un-sustainable aircraft losses caused by the Stinger was theprimary catalyst to cause the Soviet Union to withdrawfrom the war. US Congressman Charlie Wilson who wasinstrumental in funding the Stingers for the Mujahideensaid that before the Stinger the Mujahideen never won aset piece battle with the Soviets but after it was intro-duced, the Mujahideen never again lost one. Throughmost of the war, the Soviet air force was able to con-trol the skies and fly sorties at will. With the introduc-tion of the Su-25 ground-attack jet and the Mi-24 attackhelicopter, the Soviets had aircraft that were imperviousto Mujahideen attacks, as both aircraft were armored to

11

withstand even large calibre machine gun fire. This meantthat whenever the Soviet army would find itself in trou-ble, all it needed was to call air support and either the SU25 or Mi 24 would arrive shortly to disperse any maraud-ing Mujahideen units. Through an increasing project ofmilitary assistance via the US CIA and partly funded bySaudi Arabia, the USA started to supply the Mujahideenwith its man-portable anti-aircraft missile system calledthe Stinger. The US supplied at least 250 launcher sys-tems and at least 500 individual Stinger missiles to theMujahideen as well as the training needed to operate thesystem.

6.4 Endwar

By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced it would startwithdrawing its forces. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi wasselected as the head of the Interim Islamic State ofAfghanistan, in an attempt to reassert its legitimacyagainst the Moscow-sponsored Kabul regime. Mo-jaddedi, as head of the Interim Afghan Government, metwith then Vice President of the United States George H.W. Bush, achieving a critical diplomatic victory for theAfghan resistance. Defeat of the Kabul government wastheir solution for peace. This confidence, sharpened bytheir distrust of the United Nations, virtually guaranteedtheir refusal to accept a political compromise.

7 April 1985 – January 1987: Exitstrategy

Awards ceremony for the 9th Company

Soviet soldier in Afghanistan, 1988.

The first step of the Soviet Union’s exit strategy was totransfer the burden of fighting the mujahideen to theAfghan armed forces, with the aim of preparing them tooperate without Soviet help. During this phase, the Sovietcontingent was restricted to supporting theDRA forces byproviding artillery, air support and technical assistance,though some large-scale operations were still carried outby Soviet troops.Under Soviet guidance, the DRA armed forces were builtup to an official strength of 302,000 in 1986. To min-imize the risk of a coup d'état, they were divided intodifferent branches, each modeled on its Soviet counter-part. The ministry of defence forces numbered 132,000,the ministry of interior 70,000 and the ministry of statesecurity (KHAD) 80,000. However, these were theo-retical figures: in reality each service was plagued withdesertions, the army alone suffering 32,000 per year.The decision to engage primarily Afghan forces wastaken by the Soviets, but was resented by the PDPA,who viewed the departure of their protectors withoutenthusiasm. In May 1987 a DRA force attacked well-entrenched mujahideen positions in the Arghandab Dis-trict, but the mujahideen held their ground, and the at-tackers suffered heavy casualties.[98] In the spring of1986, an offensive into Paktia Province briefly occupiedthe mujahideen base at Zhawar only at the cost of heavylosses.[99] Meanwhile, the mujahideen benefited from ex-panded foreign military support from the United States,Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Muslim nations. TheUS tended to favor the Afghan resistance forces led byAhmed Shah Massoud, and US support for Massoud’sforces increased considerably during the Reagan adminis-tration in what US military and intelligence forces called"Operation Cyclone". Primary advocates for supportingMassoud included two Heritage Foundation foreign pol-icy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, bothof whom championed Massoud as the Afghan resistanceleader most worthy of US support under the Reagan Doc-trine.[100][101][102]

8 January 1987 – February 1989:Withdrawal

Main article: Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan

The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the scene in 1985and his 'new thinking' on foreign and domestic policy wasprobably the most important factor in the Soviets’ deci-sion to leave. Gorbachev was attempting to change thestagnant years of Brezhnev and reform the Soviet Union’seconomy and image across the board with Glasnost andPerestroika. Gorbachev was also trying to ease coldwar tensions by signing the Intermediate-Range NuclearForces Treaty in 1987 with the U.S. and withdrawing thetroops from Afghanistan whose presence had garnered so

12 8 JANUARY 1987 – FEBRUARY 1989: WITHDRAWAL

Soviet T-62M main battle tank withdraws from Afghanistan

much international condemnation. Gorbachev regardedconfrontation with China and resulting military build upson that border as one of Brezhnev’s biggest mistakes.Beijing had stipulated that a normalization of relationswould have to wait until Moscow withdrew its army fromAfghanistan (among other things) and in 1989 the firstSino-Soviet summit in 30 years took place.[103] At thesame time, Gorbachev pressured his Cuban allies in An-gola to scale down activities and withdraw even thoughSoviet allies were faring somewhat better there.[104] TheSoviets also pulled many of their troops out of Mongo-lia in 1987 where they were also having a far easier timethan in Afghanistan and restrained the Vietnamese inva-sion of Kampuchea to the point of an all out withdrawalin 1988.[105] This mass withdrawal of Soviet forces fromcontested areas shows that the Soviet government’s deci-sion to leave Afghanistan was based on a general changeover in Soviet foreign policy.In the last phase, Soviet troops prepared and executedtheir withdrawal from Afghanistan. They limited offen-sive operations.In September 1988, Soviet MiG-23 fighters shot downone Pakistani F-16 and two Iranian AH-1J Cobra, whointruded in Afghan airspace.[106]

The one exception was Operation Magistral, a successfulsweep that cleared the road between Gardez and Khost.This operation did not have any lasting effect, but it al-lowed the Soviets to symbolically end their presence witha victory.[107]

The first half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawnfrom May 15 to August 16, 1988 and the second fromNovember 15 to February 15, 1989. In order to ensure asafe passage the Soviets had negotiated ceasefires with lo-cal mujahideen commanders, so the withdrawal was gen-erally executed peacefully,[108] except for the operation“Typhoon”.General Yazov, the Defense Minister of Soviet Union,ordered the 40th Army to violate the agreement withAhmed Shah Masood, who commanded a large force inthe Panjshir Valley, and attack his relaxed and exposedforces. The Soviet attack was initiated to protect Na-

Soviet troops withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1988

CGen of 40th Army, Boris Gromov, announcing the withdrawalof Soviet contingent forces.

jibullah, who did not have a cease fire in effect with Ma-sood, and who rightly feared an offensive by Masood’sforces after the Soviet withdrawal.[109] General Gromov,the 40th Army Commander, objected to the operation,but reluctantly obeyed the order. “Typhoon” began onJanuary 23 and continued for three days. To minimizetheir own losses the Soviets abstained from close-rangefight, instead they used long-range artillery, surface-to-surface and air-to-surfacemissiles. Numerous civilian ca-sualties were reported. Masood had not threatened thewithdrawal to this point, and did not attack Soviet forcesafter they breached the agreement.[110] Overall, the So-viet attack represented a defeat for Masood’s forces, wholost 600 fighters killed and wounded.[109]

After the withdrawal of the Soviets the DRA forces wereleft fighting alone and had to abandon some provincialcapitals, and it was widely believed that they would notbe able to resist the mujahideen for long. However, in thespring of 1989 DRA forces inflicted a sharp defeat on themujahideen at Jalalabad.The government of President Karmal, a puppet regime,was largely ineffective. It was weakened by divisionswithin the PDPA and the Parcham faction, and theregime’s efforts to expand its base of support proved fu-tile. Moscow came to regard Karmal as a failure andblamed him for the problems. Years later, when Karmal’s

13

inability to consolidate his government had become ob-vious, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of theSoviet Communist Party, said:

“The main reason that there has been nonational consolidation so far is that ComradeKarmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabulwith our help”.

In November 1986, Mohammad Najibullah, former chiefof the Afghan secret police (KHAD), was elected presi-dent and a new constitution was adopted. He also intro-duced in 1987 a policy of “national reconciliation,” de-vised by experts of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion, and later used in other regions of the world. De-spite high expectations, the new policy neither made theMoscow-backed Kabul regime more popular, nor did itconvince the insurgents to negotiate with the ruling gov-ernment.

A column of Soviet BTR armored personnel carriers departingfrom Afghanistan.

Informal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal fromAfghanistan had been underway since 1982. In 1988,the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with theUnited States and Soviet Union serving as guarantors,signed an agreement settling the major differences be-tween them known as the Geneva Accords. The UnitedNations set up a special Mission to oversee the process.In this way, Najibullah had stabilized his political posi-tion enough to begin matching Moscow’s moves towardwithdrawal. On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviettroops from the country was announced. The withdrawalof Soviet forces was planned out by Lt. Gen. Boris Gro-mov, who, at the time, was the commander of the 40thArmy.Among other things the Geneva accords identified theUS and Soviet non-intervention in the internal affairs ofPakistan and Afghanistan and a timetable for full Sovietwithdrawal. The agreement on withdrawal held, and onFebruary 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops departed onschedule from Afghanistan.

9 Consequences of the war

9.1 International reaction

Carter placed a trade embargo against the Soviet Unionon shipments of commodities such as grain and weapons.The increased tensions, as well as the anxiety in the Westabout tens of thousands of Soviet troops being in suchproximity to oil-rich regions in the Persian Gulf, effec-tively brought about the end of détente.The international diplomatic response was severe, rang-ing from stern warnings to a US-led boycott of the 1980Summer Olympics in Moscow (in which Afghanistancompeted). The intervention, along with other events,such as the Iranian revolution and the US hostage stand-off that accompanied it, the Iran–Iraq War, the 1982Lebanon War, the escalating tensions between Pakistanand India, contributed to making the Middle East andSouth Asia extremely violent and turbulent regions duringthe 1980s. The Non-Aligned Movement was sharply di-vided between those who believed the Soviet deploymentto be legal and others who considered the deploymentan illegal invasion. Among the Warsaw Pact countries,the intervention was condemned only by Romania.[113]India, a close ally of the Soviet Union, refused to sup-port the Afghan war,[114] though by the end of the hostili-ties offered to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghangovernment.[115][116]

9.1.1 Foreign involvement and aid to the mu-jahideen

U.S. President Reagan supportively meeting with Afghan Mu-jahideen at the White House, to highlight Soviet atrocities inAfghanistan.

The Afghan Mujahideen were supported by a number ofother countries, with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia offeringthe greatest financial support.[3][4][5][11][118] United StatesPresident Carter insisted that what he termed “Soviet ag-gression” could not be viewed as an isolated event of lim-ited geographical importance but had to be contested asa potential threat to US influence in the Persian Gulf re-gion. The US was also worried about the USSR gaining

14 9 CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

access to the Indian Ocean by coming to an arrangementwith Pakistan.National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, knownfor his hardline policies on the Soviet Union, initiatedin 1979 a campaign supporting mujaheddin in Pakistanand Afghanistan, which was run by Pakistani securityservices with financial support from the Central Intelli-gence Agency and Britain’s MI6.[4] Years later, in a 1997CNN/National Security Archive interview, Brzezinskidetailed the strategy taken by the Carter administrationagainst the Soviets in 1979:

We immediately launched a twofold pro-cess when we heard that the Soviets had en-tered Afghanistan. The first involved directreactions and sanctions focused on the SovietUnion, and both the State Department and theNational Security Council prepared long listsof sanctions to be adopted, of steps to be takento increase the international costs to the SovietUnion of their actions. And the second courseof action led to my going to Pakistan a monthor so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,for the purpose of coordinating with the Pak-istanis a joint response, the purpose of whichwould be to make the Soviets bleed for as muchand as long as is possible; and we engagedin that effort in a collaborative sense with theSaudis, the Egyptians, the British, the Chinese,and we started providing weapons to the Muja-heddin, from various sources again – for exam-ple, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians andthe Chinese. We even got Soviet arms from theCzechoslovak communist government, since itwas obviously susceptible to material incen-tives; and at some point we started buying armsfor the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army inAfghanistan, because that army was increas-ingly corrupt.[119]

Three mujahideen in Asmar, 1985.

The supplying of billions of dollars in arms to the Afghan

mujahideen militants was one of the CIA’s longest andmost expensive covert operations.[120] The CIA pro-vided assistance to the fundamentalist insurgents throughthe Pakistani secret services, Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI), in a program called Operation Cyclone. At least3 billion in U.S. dollars were funneled into the coun-try to train and equip troops with weapons. Togetherwith similar programs by Saudi Arabia, Britain’s MI6and SAS, Egypt, Iran, and the People’s Republic ofChina,[7] the arms included FIM-43 Redeye, shoulder-fired, antiaircraft weapons that they used against Soviethelicopters. Pakistan’s secret service, Inter-Services In-telligence (ISI), was used as an intermediary for most ofthese activities to disguise the sources of support for theresistance.No Americans trained or had direct contact with themujahideen.[121] The skittish CIA had fewer than 10 oper-atives in the region because it “feared it would be blamed,like in Guatemala.”[122] Civilian personnel from the U.S.Department of State and the CIA frequently visited theAfghanistan-Pakistan border area during this time.Shortly after the intervention, Pakistan’s military rulerGeneral Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq called for a meeting ofsenior military members and technocrats of his militarygovernment.[123] At this meeting, General Zia-ul-Haqasked the Chief of Army Staff General Khalid MahmudArif and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admi-ral Muhammad Shariff to lead a specialized civil-militaryteam to formulate a geo-strategy to counter the Sovietaggression.[123] At this meeting, the Director-General ofthe ISI at that time, Lieutenant-General Akhtar AbdurRahman advocated for an idea of covert operation inAfghanistan by arming the Islamic extremist, and wasloudly heard saying: "Kabul must burn! Kabul mustburn!".[123] As for Pakistan, the Soviet war with Is-lamist mujaheddin was viewed as retaliation for the So-viet Union’s long unconditional support of regional rival,India, notably during the 1965 and the 1971 wars, whichled the loss of East Pakistan.[123]

After the Soviet deployment, Pakistan’s military rulerGeneral Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq started acceptingfinancial aid from the Western powers to aid the mu-jahideen. In 1981, following the election of US PresidentRonald Reagan, aid for the mujahideen through Zia’sPakistan significantly increased, mostly due to the effortsof Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson and CIA officerGust Avrakotos.[124][125]

The early foundations of al-Qaeda were allegedly builtin part on relationships and weaponry that came fromthe billions of dollars in U.S. support for the Afghanmujahideen during the war to expel Soviet forces fromthat country.[126] However, scholars such as Jason Burke,Steve Coll, Peter Bergen, Christopher Andrew, andVasily Mitrokhin have argued that Osama Bin Laden was“outside of CIA eyesight” and that there is “no support” inany “reliable source” for “the claim that the CIA funded

9.1 International reaction 15

Spetsnaz troops interrogate a captured mujahideen with Westernweapons in the background, 1986

bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteers who cameto support the mujahideen.”[127]

A German database showing the channeling of the money andweapons, provided by ISI officer Mohammad Yousaf in his book:Afghanistan – The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower

Pakistan’s ISI and Special Service Group (SSG) were ac-tively involved in the conflict. The SSG are widely sus-pected of participating in Operation Hill 3234, near thePakistani border where nearly 200 suspected SSG per-sonnel were killed in a futile attempt to assault the Sovietheld hill.The theft of large sums of aid spurred Pakistan’s eco-nomic growth, but along with the war in general haddevastating side effects for that country. The siphon-

ing off of aid weapons, in which the weapons logisticsand coordination were put under the Pakistan Navy inthe port city of Karachi, contributed to disorder and vi-olence there, while heroin entering from Afghanistan topay for arms contributed to addiction problems.[128] TheNavy went into covert war and coordinated the foreignweapons into Afghanistan, while some of its high-rankingadmirals were responsible for storing the weapons in theNavy depot, later coordinated the weapons supply to mu-jahideen.In retaliation for Pakistan’s assistance to the insur-gents, the KHAD Afghan security service, under leaderMohammad Najibullah, carried out (according to theMitrokhin archives and other sources) a large number ofoperations against Pakistan. In 1987, 127 incidents re-sulted in 234 deaths in Pakistan. In April 1988, an am-munition depot outside the Pakistani capital of Islamabadwas blown up killing 100 and injuring more than 1000people. The KHAD and KGB were suspected in the per-petration of these acts.[129] Soviet andAfghan fighters andbombers occasionally bombed Pakistani villages alongthe Pakistani-Afghan border. These attacks are knownto have caused at least 300 civilian deaths and extensivedamage. Sometimes they got involved in shootings withthe Pakistani jets defending the airspace.[130]

Pakistan took in millions of Afghan refugees (mostlyPashtun) fleeing the Soviet occupation. Althoughthe refugees were controlled within Pakistan’s largestprovince, Balochistan under then-martial law ruler Gen-eral Rahimuddin Khan, the influx of so many refugees– believed to be the largest refugee population in theworld[131] – spread into several other regions.All of this had a heavy impact on Pakistan and its effectscontinue to this day. Pakistan, through its support for themujahideen, played a significant role in the eventual with-drawal of Soviet military personnel from Afghanistan.During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations betweenChina and Soviet Russia resulted in bloody border clashesand mutual backing for the opponent’s enemies. Chinaand Afghanistan had neutral relations with each otherduring the King’s rule. When the pro Soviet AfghanCommunists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, rela-tions between China and the Afghan communists quicklyturned hostile. The Afghan pro Soviet communists sup-ported China’s enemies in Vietnam and blamed China forsupporting Afghan anti communist militants. China re-sponded to the Soviet war in Afghanistan by supportingthe Afghan mujahideen and ramping up their militarypresence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang. China acquiredmilitary equipment from America to defend itself fromSoviet attack.[132]

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army trained and sup-ported the Afghan mujahideen during the war. Thetraining camps were moved from Pakistan into China it-self. Anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and machineguns, valued at hundreds of millions, were given to the

16 9 CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

mujahideen by the Chinese. Chinese military advisorsand army troops were present with the Mujahidin duringtraining.[133]

9.2 Soviet personnel strengths and casual-ties

Soviet soldiers return from Afghanistan, October 1986

Afghans commemorating Mujahideen Victory Day.

Between December 25, 1979, and February 15, 1989,a total of 620,000 soldiers served with the forces inAfghanistan (though there were only 80,000–104,000serving at one time): 525,000 in the Army, 90,000 withborder troops and other KGB sub-units, 5,000 in inde-pendent formations of MVD Internal Troops, and policeforces. A further 21,000 personnel were with the So-viet troop contingent over the same period doing variouswhite collar and blue collar jobs.The total irrecoverable personnel losses of the SovietArmed Forces, frontier, and internal security troops cameto 14,453. Soviet Army formations, units, and HQ ele-ments lost 13,833, KGB sub-units lost 572, MVD forma-tions lost 28, and other ministries and departments lost 20men. During this period 312 servicemen were missing inaction or taken prisoner; 119 were later freed, of whom97 returned to the USSR and 22 went to other countries.Of the troops deployed, 53,753 were wounded, injured,or sustained concussion and 415,932 fell sick. A high

proportion of casualties were those who fell ill. This wasbecause of local climatic and sanitary conditions, whichwere such that acute infections spread rapidly among thetroops. There were 115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis,31,080 of typhoid fever, and 140,665 of other diseases.Of the 11,654 who were discharged from the army afterbeing wounded, maimed, or contracting serious diseases,10,751 men, were left disabled.[134]

Material losses were as follows:[17]{not in the sourcegiven}

• 451 aircraft (includes 333 helicopters)

• 147 tanks

• 1,314 IFV/APCs

• 433 artillery guns and mortars

• 11,369 cargo and fuel tanker trucks.

9.3 Destruction in Afghanistan

Estimates of Afghan civilian deaths vary from 850,000 to1,500,000.[23][24] 5–10 million Afghans fled to Pakistanand Iran, 1/3 of the prewar population of the country,and another 2 million were displaced within the coun-try. In the 1980s, half of all refugees in the world wereAfghan.[135]

Felix Ermacora, the UN Special Rapporteur toAfghanistan, said that heavy fighting in combat ar-eas cost the lives of more than 35,000 civilians in 1985,15,000 in 1986, and around 14,000 in 1987. Ermacoraalso noted that armed attacks by anti-government forces,such as rocket attacks on Kabul’s residential areas,caused more than 4000 civilian deaths in 1987.[136] R.J.Rummel, an analyst of political killings, estimated thatSoviet forces were responsible for 250,000 democidalkillings during the war and that the government ofAfghanistan was responsible for 178,000 democidalkillings.[137] There were also a number of reports oflarge scale executions of hundreds of civilians by Sovietand DRA soldiers.[138][139][140]

Along with fatalities were 1.2 million Afghans dis-abled (mujahideen, government soldiers and noncom-batants) and 3 million maimed or wounded (primarilynoncombatants).[141]

Irrigation systems, crucial to agriculture in Afghanistan’sarid climate, were destroyed by aerial bombing andstrafing by Soviet or government forces. In the worstyear of the war, 1985, well over half of all the farmerswho remained in Afghanistan had their fields bombed,and over one quarter had their irrigation systems de-stroyed and their livestock shot by Soviet or governmenttroops, according to a survey conducted by Swedish reliefexperts[135]

9.3 Destruction in Afghanistan 17

U.S. military personnel (with civilian far right, in suit) at RheinMain Air Base, Frankfurt, Germany. A civilian volunteer withan Afghan NGO in Germany assists a blinded Afghan Mujahidoff the air stair.

Charlie Wilson (D-TX), 2nd from the left, dressing in Afghanclothing (armed withAK-47) with the local Afghan mujahideen.

The population of Afghanistan’s second largest city, Kan-dahar, was reduced from 200,000 before the war to nomore than 25,000 inhabitants, following a months-longcampaign of carpet bombing and bulldozing by the So-viets and Afghan communist soldiers in 1987.[142] Landmines had killed 25,000 Afghans during the war and an-other 10–15 million land mines, most planted by Sovietand government forces, were left scattered throughout thecountryside.[143] The International Committee of the RedCross estimated in 1994 that it would take 4,300 years to

remove all the Soviet land mines in Afghanistan.[144]

A PFM-1 mine, often mistaken for a toy by children. The mine’sshape was dictated by aerodynamics.[145]

A great deal of damage was done to the civilian childrenpopulation by land mines.[146] A 2005 report estimated3–4% of the Afghan population were disabled due to So-viet and government land mines. In the city of Quetta, asurvey of refugee women and children taken shortly afterthe Soviet withdrawal found child mortality at 31%, andover 80% of the children refugees to be unregistered. Ofchildren who survived, 67% were severely malnourished,with malnutrition increasing with age.[147]

Critics of Soviet and Afghan government forces describetheir effect on Afghan culture as working in three stages:first, the center of customary Afghan culture, Islam, waspushed aside; second, Soviet patterns of life, especiallyamongst the young, were imported; third, shared Afghancultural characteristics were destroyed by the emphasis onso-called nationalities, with the outcome that the countrywas split into different ethnic groups, with no language,religion, or culture in common.[148]

The Geneva Accords of 1988, which ultimately led to thewithdrawal of the Soviet forces in early 1989, left theAfghan government in ruins. The accords had failed toaddress adequately the issue of the post-occupation pe-riod and the future governance of Afghanistan. The as-sumption among most Western diplomats was that theSoviet-backed government in Kabul would soon collapse;however, this was not to happen for another three years.During this time the Interim Islamic Government ofAfghanistan (IIGA) was established in exile. The exclu-sion of key groups such as refugees and Shias, combinedwith major disagreements between the different muja-heddin factions, meant that the IIGA never succeeded inacting as a functional government.[149]

Before the war, Afghanistan was already one of theworld’s poorest nations. The prolonged conflict leftAfghanistan ranked 170 out of 174 in the UNDP’s Hu-man Development Index, making Afghanistan one of the

18 9 CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

Afghan guerrillas that were chosen to receive medical treatmentin the United States, Norton Air Force Base, California, 1986.

least developed countries in the world.[150]

Once the Soviets withdrew, US interest in Afghanistanslowly decreased over the following four years, much ofit administered through the DoD Office of HumanitarianAssistance, under the then Director of HA, George M.Dykes III. With the first years of the Clinton Adminis-tration in Washington, DC, all aid ceased. The US de-cided not to help with reconstruction of the country, in-stead handing the interests of the country over to US alliesSaudi Arabia and Pakistan. Pakistan quickly took advan-tage of this opportunity and forged relations with warlordsand later the Taliban, to secure trade interests and routes.Fromwiping out the country’s trees through logging prac-tices, which has destroyed all but 2% of forest covercountry-wide, to substantial uprooting of wild pistachiotrees for the exportation of their roots for therapeuticuses, to opium agriculture, the ten years following the warsaw much ecological and agrarian destruction.[151]

Captain Tarlan Eyvazov, a soldier in the Soviet forcesduring the war, stated that the Afghan children’s futureis destined for war. Eyvazov said, “Children born inAfghanistan at the start of the war... have been brought upin war conditions, this is their way of life.” Eyvazov’s the-ory was later strengthened when the Taliban movementdeveloped and formed from orphans or refugee childrenwho were forced by the Soviets to flee their homes andrelocate their lives in Pakistan. The swift rise to power,from the young Taliban in 1996, was the result of the dis-order and civil war that had warlords running wild be-cause of the complete breakdown of law and order inAfghanistan after the departure of the Soviets.[152]

The CIA World Fact Book reported that as of 2004,Afghanistan still owed $8 billion in bilateral debt, mostlyto Russia,[153] however, in 2007 Russia agreed to cancelmost of the debt.[154]

9.4 Use of chemical weapons

There have also been numerous reports of chemicalweapons being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, of-

ten indiscriminately against civilians.[88][155][156] A de-classified CIA report from 1982 states that between 1979and 1982 there were 43 separate chemical weapons at-tacks which caused more than 3000 deaths.[157] By spring1980, attacks with chemical weapons were reported in“all areas with concentrated resistance activity”.[157]

9.5 Refugees

Main articles: Afghan refugees and Afghans in Pakistan

A massive total of 3.3 million Afghan refugees werehoused in Pakistan by 1988, some whom continue tolive in the country up until today. Of this total, about100,000 were based in the city of Peshawar, while morethan 2 million were located in other parts of the north-western province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then knownas the North-West Frontier Province).[158][159] At thesame time, close to two million Afghans were livingin Iran. Over the years Pakistan and Iran has put ontighter controls for refugees that has resulted in numer-ous returnees.[160][161] In 2012 Pakistan banned exten-sion of visas to foreigners.[159][162] Afghan refugees havealso settled in India and became Indian citizens overtime.[163][164][165] Some also made their way into NorthAmerica, the European Union, Australia, and other partsof the world.[166] The photo of Sharbat Gula placed onNational Geographic cover in 1985 became a symbol bothof the 1980s Afghan conflict and of the refugee situation.

9.6 Civil war

Two Soviet T55 tanks left by the Soviet army during their with-drawal lie rusting in a field near Bagram Airfield, in 2002.

Main articles: Conflict in Afghanistan (1978–present)and Civil war in Afghanistan (1989–1992)

The civil war continued in Afghanistan after the Sovietwithdrawal. About 400,000 Afghan civilians had losttheir lives in the chaos and civil war of the 1990s.[167]The Soviet Union left Afghanistan deep in winter, withintimations of panic among Kabul officials. The Afghan

19

mujahideen were poised to attack provincial towns andcities and eventually Kabul, if necessary.Najibullah’s government, though failing to win popularsupport, territory, or international recognition, was how-ever able to remain in power until 1992. Ironically, un-til demoralized by the defections of its senior officers,the Afghan Army had achieved a level of performanceit had never reached under direct Soviet tutelage. Kabulhad achieved a stalemate that exposed the mujahideen’sweaknesses, political and military. But for nearly threeyears, while Najibullah’s government successfully de-fended itself against mujahideen attacks, factions withinthe government had also developed connections with itsopponents.According to Russian publicist Andrey Karaulov, themain trigger for Najibullah losing power was Russia’s re-fusal to sell oil products to Afghanistan in 1992 for po-litical reasons (the new Yeltsin government did not wantto support the former communists), which effectivelytriggered an embargo. The defection of General AbdulRashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia, in March 1992,further undermined Najibullah’s control of the state. InApril, Najibullah and his communist government fell tothe mujahideen, who replaced Najibullah with a new gov-erning council for the country.Grain production declined an average of 3.5% per yearbetween 1978 and 1990 due to sustained fighting, in-stability in rural areas, prolonged drought, and dete-riorated infrastructure. Soviet efforts to disrupt pro-duction in rebel-dominated areas also contributed tothis decline. During the withdrawal of Soviet troops,Afghanistan’s natural gas fields were capped to preventsabotage. Restoration of gas production has been ham-pered by internal strife and the disruption of traditionaltrading relationships following the dissolution of the So-viet Union.

9.7 Ideological impact

The Islamists who fought believed that they were respon-sible for the fall of the Soviet Union. Osama bin Laden,for example, asserted that the credit for “the dissolutionof the Soviet Union ... goes to God and the mujahideenin Afghanistan ...”[168]

10 Media and popular culture

Main article: Soviet war in Afghanistan in popular culture

20th Anniversary of Withdrawal of Soviet Military Forces fromAfghanistan. Stamp of Belarus, 2009.

11 Perception in the former USSR

Commemorating the intervention of December 25, 1979,in December 2009, veterans of the Soviet war inAfghanistan were honoured by the Duma or Parliamentof the Russian Federation. On December 25, the lowerhouse of the parliament defended the Soviet war inAfghanistan on the 30th anniversary of its start, andpraised the veterans of the conflict. Differing assessmentsof the war “mustn't erode the Russian people’s respectfor the soldiers who honestly fulfilled their duty in im-plementing tasks to combat international terrorism andreligious extremists”.Duma member Semyon Bagdasarov (Just Russia) advo-cated that Russia had to reject Western calls for strongerassistance to the US-led ISAF-coalition in Afghanistanand also had to establish contacts with the “anti-Westernforces"; the Taliban, in case they regain power.[169][170]

11.1 Memorials

• Russian President Vladimir Putin at the memorialin Moscow to paying respect to the soldiers killed inAfghanistan.

• Speaker of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov,right, commemorate the war veterans who per-formed the international duty in Afghanistan on theday of the 15th anniversary of the Soviet troop with-drawal from that country.

• Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attending theceremony to commemorate the veterans of Afghanwar in 2010.

• Afghan War veterans celebrate 20 years since thewithdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

• A Memorial to local soldiers killed in the War inAfghanistan in Yekaterinburg

20 13 REFERENCES

12 See also• Soviet occupation zone

• Dissolution of the Soviet Union

• Military of Afghanistan

• Shuravi

• Spetsnaz (Russian Special Purpose Regiments)

• Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses

• CIA – Osama bin Laden controversy

• Terrorism and the Soviet Union

• Soviet involvement in Indo-Pakistan war of 1971

• Political philosophies and doctrines• Interventionism• Brezhnev Doctrine• Carter Doctrine• Zia Doctrine• Reagan Doctrine

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[106] “The Aviation History”, Florian Ion Petrescu, Relly Vic-toria Petrescu, 2012, p. 82

[107] Isby,War in a Distant Country, p. 47

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[109] http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Withdrawal.pdf “Breaking contact without leavingchaos: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan”, page 19

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[117] Message on the Observance of Afghanistan Day by U.S.President Ronald Reagan, March 21, 1983

[118] “Timeline: Soviet war in Afghanistan”. Retrieved Octo-ber 2, 2014.

[119] “Full Text of Interview”. Retrieved October 2, 2014.

[120] Time, May 13, 2003, “The Oily Americans,”http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-2,00.html

[121] Bergen, Peter. Holy War, Inc. New York: Free Press,2001. P. 66

[122] The New Republic, “Back to Front” by Peter Beinart, Oc-tober 8, 2001.

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[127] See Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (Penguin, 2003), p. 59;Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,Afghanistan and Bin Laden (Penguin, 2004), p. 87; PeterBergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (Free Press, 2006),pp. 60–1; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, TheMitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (Penguin,2006), p. 579n48.

[128] Kepel, Jihad, (2002), pp. 143–4

[129] Kaplan, Soldiers of God, p. 12

[130] Weisman, Steven R. (May 2, 1987). “Afghans Down APakistani F-16, Saying Fighter Jet Crossed Border”. TheNew York Times. Retrieved March 27, 2010.

[131] Amnesty International file on Afghanistan RetrievedMarch 22, 2006

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[136] Sandy Gall. Afghanistan: Agony of a Nation. BodleyHead. 1988 p. 3

[137] 20th Century Democide Rudolph Rummel

[138] 4 March 1980 AP

[139] 27 March 1985 AP

[140] 26 Feb. 1985 AP

[141] Hilali, A. (2005). US–Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Inva-sion of Afghanistan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate PublishingCo. (p. 198)

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[148] Hauner, M. (1989). Afghanistan and the Soviet Union:Collision and Transformation. Boulder, Colorado: West-view Press. (p.40)

[149] Barakat, S. (2004). Reconstructing War-Torn Societies:Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (p. 5)

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[152] Kirby, A. (2003). War 'has ruined Afghan environment.'Retrieved November 27, 2007, from , Zulfiqar AhmedBhutta, H. (2002). “Children of war: the real casualties ofthe Afghan conflict.” Retrieved December 11, 2007, from

[153] “USSR aid to Afghanistan worth $8 billion”. CIA. Re-trieved February 15, 2012.

[154]

[155] SCHWARTZSTEIN, STUART J. D. (Winter 1982–83).“Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan: An Independent As-sessment”. World Affairs. Retrieved October 21, 2014.

[156] The Story of Genocide in Afghanistan Hassan Kakar

[157] “Use of toxins and other lethal agents in Southeast Asiaand Afghanistan”. CIA. 2 February 1982. Retrieved 21October 2014.

[158] Pakistan Restricts Afghan Refugees by Donatella Lorchfor the New York Times. November 16, 1988.

[159] Visa extension to foreigners banned

[160] Iran

[161] IRIN Asia | PAKISTAN: UN cautions on Afghan refugeecamp closures | Pakistan | Migration | Refugees/IDPs

[162] No more visa extensions for foreigners in Pakistan | Pak-istan Today

[163] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Febru-ary 20, 2008). “Afghan refugee teaches Hindi to tots inIndia”. UNHCR. Retrieved February 15, 2012.

[164] “Escape from War”. The Times Of India (India).

[165] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.“Afghan refugees in India become Indian, at last”.UNHCR. Retrieved February 15, 2012.

[166] “A Thomson Reuters Foundation Service”. AlertNet. Re-trieved February 15, 2012.

[167] "Life under Taliban cuts two ways". The Christian ScienceMonitor. September 20, 2001

[168] Messages to the World, 2006, p. 50. (March 1997 inter-view with Peter Arnett)

[169] “Afghanistan: le Parlement russe rend hommage aux an-ciens combattants”

[170] “Russian parliament hails Afghan war vets”. KhaleejTimes. Retrieved July 28, 2011.

14 Further reading

• Andrew, Christopher & Mitrokhin, Vasili (1999).The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archiveand the Secret History of the KGB. New York: BasicBooks. ISBN 0-465-00310-9.

• Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An Army, its Role andRule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Indepen-dence to Kargil 1947–1999. Pittsburgh: RoseDogBooks. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3.

• Borovik, Artyom (1990). The Hidden War: ARussian Journalist’s Account of the Soviet War inAfghanistan. New York: Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-3775-X.

• Carew, Tom (2001). Jihad!: The Secret War inAfghanistan. Mainstream Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84018-495-2.

• Corera, Gordon (2011). MI6: Life and Death in theBritish Secret Service. London: Phoenix. ISBN 978-0-7538-2833-5.

• Braithwaite, Rodric (2011). Afgantsy: The Russiansin Afghanistan, 1979–89. New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press. p. 417. ISBN 978-0-19-983265-1.LCCN 2011015052. OCLC ocn709682862. LCCDS371.2 .B725 2011

• Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret Historyof the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from theSoviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York:Penguin Press. ISBN 1-59420-007-6.

• Crile, George (2003). Charlie Wilson’s War: TheExtraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Opera-tion in history. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.ISBN 0-87113-851-4.

• Feifer, Gregory (2009). The Great Gamble: The So-viet war in Afghanistan. New York: Harper. ISBN978-0-06-114318-2.

• Galeotti, Mark (1995). Afghanistan: the SovietUnion’s Last War. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-8242-X.

• Kakar, M. Hassan (1995). Afghanistan: The So-viet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982.Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-08591-4. (free online access courtesy of UCP).

• Kaplan, Robert D. (2001) [1990]. Soldiers of God:With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.New York: Vintage Books. ISBN 1-4000-3025-0.

• Lohbeck, Kurt (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory:Eyewitness to the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan.Washington: Regnery Publishing. ISBN 0-89526-499-4.

25

• Novinkov, Oleg (2011). Afghan boomerang. Hous-ton, TX: Oleg Novinkov. ISBN 978-1-4392-7451-4.

• Prados, John (1996). Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIAand Pentagon Covert Operations from World War IIthrough the Persian Gulf. Chicago: I.R. Dee. ISBN1-56663-108-4.

15 External links• Afghan-militants-trained-in-a-barn-in-rural-Sussex

• “Compound War Case Study: The Soviets inAfghanistan”

• Video on Afghan-Soviet War from the Peter KroghForeign Affairs Digital Archives

• Soviets and the Gulf War from the Dean PeterKrogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives

• J.Bruce Amstutz Afghanistan – the first five years ofSoviet occupation (1986)

• CIA Factbook on Afghanistan

• The Art of War project, dedicated to the soldiers ofthe recent wars, set up by the veterans of the Afghanwar. Has Russian and English versions

• “Afganvet” (Russian: "Афганвет") –USSR/Afghanistan war veterans community

• The Role of Afghanistan in the fall of the USSR byRameen Moshref

• Empire Museum of Military History (Spain) –USSR/Afghanistan conflict original photos

• U.N resolution A/RES/37/37 over the Interventionin the Country

• Afghanistan Country Study (details up to 1985)

• A highly detailed description of the Coup de Mainin Kabul 1979

• The Take-Down of Kabul: An Effective Coup deMain

• Primary Sources on the Invasion Compiled by TheWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

• Soviet Airborne: Equipment and Weapons used bythe Soviet Airborne (VDV) and DShB from 1979 to1991. English only.

26 16 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

16 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

16.1 Text• Soviet war in Afghanistan Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%20war%20in%20Afghanistan?oldid=639596808 Contributors:

TwoOneTwo, Derek Ross, Mav, Ed Poor, Heron, Vovkav, Hephaestos, Bobdobbs1723, Stevertigo, Rbrwr, Edward, Patrick, Infrogma-tion, Kwertii, Fred Bauder, Delirium, (, Ahoerstemeier, Williamv1138, Pjamescowie, Snoyes, Kingturtle, Andres, Jiang, Dwo, Janko,RickK, Wik, Tpbradbury, Maximus Rex, Morwen, Joy, Fvw, Cuye, Jerzy, UninvitedCompany, JessPKC, Robbot, Astronautics, ChrisO,Fredrik, RedWolf, Fifelfoo, Altenmann, Naddy, Modulatum, Lowellian, Academic Challenger, Moink, Delpino, Unyounyo, PBP, Su-perm401, Jrash, Whiskey, Dominick, DocWatson42, YAGN, Wolfkeeper, Lupin, Orangemike, Fastfission, HectorRodriguez, Everyking,CMJ, DO'Neil, Just Another Dan, Ragib, Bolo1729, Mike R, BruceR, Formeruser-81, Antandrus, Piotrus, Rattlesnake, Comandante,Ellsworth, PFHLai, Ary29, Bk0, Cynical, Gscshoyru, Neutrality, Klemen Kocjancic, Laisak, Adashiel, Esperant, Shotwell, Gazpacho,D6, Jayjg, Freakofnurture, N328KF, Random contributor, Lan56, Maestro25, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Engti, Clawed, Vsmith,Rupertslander, R6144, Berkut, Trey Stone, MarkS, Bender235, ESkog, Mashford, Neko-chan, Nabla, Brian0918, CanisRufus, Omnibus,Zscout370, Friism, MBisanz, Izalithium, El C, Kwamikagami, Kross, ThierryVignaud, Aude, Tom, RoyBoy, XerKibard, Bobo192, Vervin,Rhysn, Robotje, Smalljim, BrokenSegue, Giraffedata, SecretAgentMan00, Polylerus, Ultra megatron, Melah Hashamaim, Bharat, Phils,Jumbuck, Etrigan, Storm Rider, Alansohn, Gary, LtNOWIS, Sherurcij, Arthena, Mu5ti, Geo Swan, Mr Adequate, CR7, Ashley Pomeroy,Lectonar, Messhermit, Jhomayne, Rwendland, Snowolf, Dhartung, Benhutchings, Docboat, Mikeo, Cmapm, Dominic, BlastOButter42,Dragunova, Kusma, Axeman89, Ultramarine, Jimgeorge, Brookie, Zntrip, Dejvid, Elchup4cabra, Angr, OwenX, Woohookitty, Zealander,Kosher Fan, MrDarcy, Rtdrury, Tabletop, Lapsed Pacifist, Uris, Bbatsell, Tejastheory, Vanished user 05, SDC, Jdorney, Xiong Chiamiov,Gimboid13, Rangeley, Radiant!, Marvelvsdc, RuM, Matilda, Deltabeignet, Magister Mathematicae, Descendall, Cod, BD2412, DavidLevy, Miq, Dvyost, Jorunn, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Jivecat, Cff12345, Ghepeu, Lairor, Durin, Valip, Horseytown, Ttwaring, SNIyer12, FlaBot,SchuminWeb, Ground Zero, Ysangkok, JdforresterBot, Who, Mark83, Payo, Atrix20, Jondor, Tedder, Russavia, Le Anh-Huy, Idaltu,Chobot, Mmx1, VolatileChemical, Bgwhite, Shomat, Crosstimer, Cornellrockey, Elfguy, YurikBot, Tommyt, Osomec, SirGeneral, Russ-Bot, Kauffner, Anonymous editor, Briaboru, Lareneg, Kurt Leyman, Gaius Cornelius, Alex Bakharev, Wimt, Daveswagon, Evstafiev,NawlinWiki, Dysmorodrepanis, Joshdboz, Grafen, Voyevoda, Siddiqui, Milo99, Dijxtra, Welsh, Mmccalpin, CJK, Megapixie, VictorsMonster, Taco325i, Awiseman, Ijomer, Sfnhltb, Misza13, Amakuha, Dbfirs, Lockesdonkey, Bark, Karl Meier, Ke5crz, Black Falcon,Limetom, Tonywalton, Jkelly, Blacksand, Zello, Capt Jim, StuRat, Ali K, Fastboy, Closedmouth, Errabee, Abune, De Administrando Im-perio, Mercenary2k, Ray Chason, Jonny555, Petri Krohn, Rande M Sefowt, Vandalbot on wheels!, DaltinWentsworth, Mediatetheconflict,Peter, Cyberodin, Cartwarmark, Mais oui!, Jaranda, Mikus, Nixer, Johnpseudo, Tajik, Kungfuadam, Junglecat, Fluffythemonkey, NeilN,Nick-D, TheY4Kman, Victor falk, Wizofaus, Heaviestcat, Wai Hong, Attilios, SmackBot, YellowMonkey, Slarre, Matthew king, Moeron,Hux, Justinstroud, Impaciente, Hydrogen Iodide, Korossyl, Petercorless, Jagged 85, Esaborio, Chem Lady, ProveIt, GoOdCoNtEnT, Kin-tetsubuffalo, Jtnelson89, Edgar181, IstvanWolf, Supra90, Jkp1187, Gilliam, Brianski, Arash red, Squiddy, Anwar saadat, Chris the speller,Philosopher, Persian Poet Gal, BureX, Cattus, Jprg1966, Sadads, Baa, Robth, Incoherent fool, DHN-bot, Deckchair, A. 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Leivick, OceanWave, Odie5533, Barvinok, Tawkerbot4, DumbBOT, RottweilerCS, Asenine, Ssilvers, ObjectivityAlways, Grant76, Jguard18, ,הסרפדCieloEstrellado, Jdlyall, Thijs!bot, Barticus88, Srilina, CopperKettle, F J, Staberinde, Headbomb, Id447, Marek69, Seomann, SGGH, Ese-mono, Lexio, Dücanem, Heroeswithmetaphors, MinnesotanConfederacy, Kenmore, Escarbot, Mentifisto, KrakatoaKatie, Glistening, Hiresan editor, AntiVandalBot, The champ, Dictator Asad, Seaphoto, Rux, Lielais Rolands, Lothar76, Dbrodbeck, IrishPete, Superzohar, Dark-lilac, Killerman2, Historypre, Myanw, Kami888, Leuqarte, Giant squid, Saqib22, HanzoHattori, Fennessy, JAnDbot, Leroy65X, Ndyguy,Turgidson, MER-C, Scythian1, Hello32020, Joeb988, Pdwiki314, Buunga88, Hut 8.5, Black max, Blitzhund, Acroterion, Russianmissile,Magioladitis, WolfmanSF, Vlad Dracula, Parsecboy, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Djkeddie, Askari Mark, Dentren, Vikas Kumar Ojha, Cat-tleGirl, Puddhe, Buckshot06, Kevinmon, Charlesbaldo, Lachliggity, BrianGV, Spellmaster, Vssun, Mr A, Lost tourist, Raoulduke47, Read-eraml, Jacob Peters, MartinBot, Mark Galeotti, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Brothejr, Bentaguayre, Kentucho, Francis Tyers, RSCAMWSA,J.delanoy, Zhushuihua, Trusilver, PalestineRemembered, NightFalcon90909, Maurice Carbonaro, Spoonman.au, Day in fall, Pajfarmor,Alphalux, Hodja Nasreddin, Gabefarkas, St.daniel, It Is Me Here, Katalaveno, Bad Night, Sandjr, AKA MBG, Little Professor, CrocodilePunter, Gurchzilla, Ash sul, Dmz5, AntiSpamBot, Warrior on Terrorism, Krasniy, Ko Soi IX, EconomistBR, Kansas Bear, Dragonfae9,Olegwiki, Tiyoringo, Juliancolton, Wizzel, Bogdan, Ejército Rojo 1950, Mike V, TopGun, Wolcott, Useight, Otto Schmidt, Goyston,Edwardwe, CardinalDan, Spellcast, Wikieditor06, Thester11, Cerberus0, 28bytes, VolkovBot, Gamer112, Tourbillon, Saad64, DarthScor-cho, Orphic, Jeff G., TheQuandry, BoogaLouie, AlnoktaBOT, Sjones23, Ilya1166, Fox33, Dom Kaos, Philip Trueman, TXiKiBoT, PahariSahib, Cosmic Latte, Khutuck, Thefilmguy, Perohanych, Burpen, Thundermaker, Hissami, Chiafriend12, Ann Stouter, Anonymous Dis-sident, Charbroil, C.J. 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16.2 Images 27

Jordanp, Rio4tense, Plottruly, IAMTrust, WikHead, Borock, Harlock81, WikiDao, Kobold9, Pedro magalhaes86, Neutrino 1, Matthew-Vanitas, Corath, Dave1185, Charli 55, Amirkabir, Addbot, Alchemyst10, Tcncv, Crossy 26, Fyrael, TheNeutroniumAlchemist, Bole-gash, Ronhjones, TutterMouse, Sam white121, Fieldday-sunday, Mohamed Ouda, ΑΩ, CanadianLinuxUser, Fluffernutter, Damiens.rf,Krjhgbwriuhbg, LaaknorBot, CarsracBot, Glane23, SoloWing3844, FiriBot, AnnaFrance, Jasper Deng, Brufnus, 5 albert square, Ak-tsu, Komkom7, Berkunt, Angry Shoplifter, Tassedethe, SamB135, RTFArt, Greyhood, ,אליזבט VVPushkin, Ketabtoon, Wikifan12345,Legobot, Math Champion, Abonazzi, Luckas-bot, Yobot, WikiDan61, Jda82, Legobot II, Nirvana888, Kummel, Bradway2, THEN WHOWAS PHONE?, Murmurer, Reenem, Hinio, Inemanja, AnakngAraw, AnomieBOT, Decora, SwiftlyTilt, Bsimmons666, Grey Fox-9589,Jim1138, Tavrian, JackieBot, Piano non troppo, Qajar, Scythian77, AdjustShift, Lakerking04, Tymo77, Crystal whacker, ASMassoudPho-tos, Dicttrshp, Materialscientist, Serres, Wandering Courier, Hixteilchen, Citation bot, Vanished user zm34pq51mz, Rabastan41, GB fan,Afghanvoice, UltraBibendum, LilHelpa, Apjohns54, Xqbot, Creo11, Estlandia, Poetaris, 4twenty42o, Jeffrey Mall, Tagryn, Sportslover26,DSisyphBot, Fancy steve, AmoreMio, Tyrol5, Srich32977, Zhiva, J04n, JanDeFietser, Andres arg, Coltsfan, Anotherclown, Saalstin, Smej,HoyaProff, Mousedit, AustralianRupert, JImitinpinglo, Richard BB, Hashmore, Mughalnz, Orto, Nicolaert, Griffinofwales, Jackriter, Fres-coBot, CaptainFugu, LucienBOT, Tobby72, Dr J.D Salenger M.D, Ironboy11, Im a Socialist! What Are You, Johnniewowwow, Adilrye1467, Russian-Reaper, The red power12, HCPUNXKID, Wifione, Trust Is All You Need, Bambuway, Iqinn, A little insignificant, Discov-erYellow, OreL.D, RCPayne, Intelligentsium, Eightofnine, Threebs, Oxana879, Elockid, HRoestBot, Tomatoday, Ngeosone, KAPITAL-IST88, Jonesey95, Σ, BankiSun, RandomStringOfCharacters, Fumitol, My very best wishes, White Shadows, Tim1357, Groober, Inuit18,Libertyfortheoppressed, Nakh, Lb.at.wiki, ComradeWiki, Babbooshca, Gorbee22, Petrolokoff, RodinovJr, Rooskiey, Williamson1965,Doddegr, Nemchino, Helkinji, Zunbreshen, Do0ger234, Jervis654, Comet Tuttle, Cempin, Gardezz, Falkone3, Squro, Gary Pec, Dinamik-bot, Vrenator, Green-Halcyon, Raidon Kane, Doc Quintana, Nikola.schmidt, Reaper Eternal, Rzuwig, Propaganda328, Stroppolo, Thegrey side, Mikrobølgeovn, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, Splinter1044, AYousefzai, RjwilmsiBot, Helsned, IshmaelMarcos, Wiki id2, Jaenis1,Gameboy1947, Yuliya1974, Tpanov, Animadversio, WildBot, Lord Eastfarthing, Derim Hunt, EmausBot, John of Reading, Domesti-cenginerd, WikitanvirBot, Solopiel, Lipsio, Scalibane, Magicalpoem, Dewritech, El gato verde, Sentinel R, Minimac’s Clone, Huckamike,Rabbabodrool, Wikipeacekeeper, Slightsmile, Davelewisface, ChoraPete, Wikipelli, K6ka, Chiton magnificus, Djembayz, Steven Kevil,AltaDeSaxa, Kkm010, The Madras, Illegitimate Barrister, A2soup, W1 m2, Alcea setosa, Mar4d, Userofsite1, Dpenn89, Stemoc, AlphaQuadrant (alt), Sixteenthcause, Pakistanfanforeva, Sue.Merrit, Greyshark09, HammerFilmFan, Triplespy, Fanofnaruto2, EkoGraf, JCAla,Brandmeister, Rostz, L Kensington, VanSisean, A young communist, Quite vivid blur, Usb10, Carmichael, CGPGrey, Professor johnenistein, Mcc1789, CiriloMechas, IR393harrisonkatz, Ace of Raves, Afranelli, TRAJAN 117, Whoop whoop pull up, TitaniumCarbide,Wilson5000, Melvinpenafiel, TheTimesAreAChanging, Woolfy123, Mikhail Ryazanov, ClueBot NG, Jacsam2, Adamrce, Soviet unionstudier, Handcuffed, DamonFernandez, Timthemerciful, Wibach, Arpitbajpai, Smufforz, Themane2, Snotbot, Milad930, Gef05, Falerís-tico, SilverSoul91911, Armogamer13, Paracelzus, Jim47nm, Jaishadeen, V Debs, Writerplus, Nbeast, Milmi24, Helpful Pixie Bot, The-greatgame, Strike Eagle, DBigXray, Carachi, Lowercase sigmabot, DesiFoodie, BG19bot, Mohiobrother, Wasbeer, Machinarium, Flix11,Gorillaface12345, Scythomatian, Freddybobbitts, IiXtC, Darkness Shines, Abhay245, Adeel004, MrPenguin20, FutureTrillionaire, Luzzyfogic, Thatemooverthere, Knightserbia, Donkey 45, Base, Soerfm, Pakon111, Joseon Empire, Theotherman1, Minsbot, Klilidiplomus,SpidErxD, Novajet, Gsov6249, Rohiljkny, BattyBot, Highstakes00, Repitile1, Aginwald, Afghankera, ChrisGualtieri, Dmollison, Stu-mink, Goalisraised, Qbek16, AngryPlansMadeInHaste, Mały koleżka, R-9e=56, Kharadea, EagerToddler39, Dexbot, Tvanhare, Dadi Atte,Mogism, Pepe1x1, XXzoonamiXX, PeerBaba, Kkb2689, GrenadeF1, Mujhideen101, Solomon.shirzada, Zziccardi, Afghan1001, Spar-tans1001, Bactrianpashtun101, Solomon100001, Shirzada101, Aussie4lyf, Xwoodsterchinx, Ukrpickaxe, Lifehappens10, Justlikeyouimag-ined, Scooter1001, Modernwarfare22, Hitthelights101, Copewitit, AmericanLemming, Tom Prangnell, Dustin V. S., United Nations1x,LouisAragon, MateoTimateo, Flak155, Te og kaker, AbelM7, Chipperdude15, Krisxlowry, Afgggaaa2, Monkbot, Thehungergames191,Lugnuthemvar, Coolguy922, Nationfixer, Davidmerfield, Billyjean1001, StanTheMan87, BEARtruth89 and Anonymous: 1526

16.2 Images• File:2009._Stamp_of_Belarus_02-2009-01-16-m.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/2009._Stamp_

of_Belarus_02-2009-01-16-m.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.wnsstamps.ch/en/stamps/BY003.09?lang=en Orig-inal artist: post of Belarus

• File:9thCompanyAwarded.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fd/9thCompanyAwarded.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: http://www.pravdao9rote.ru/articles/9rota.php Original artist: http://www.pravdao9rote.ru/

• File:Afgan1986Kabul_40ArmyShtab.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/Afgan1986Kabul_40ArmyShtab.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: Кувакин Е.(1986); scanned and processed by User:Vizu (2009); размещено согласно Permissions

• File:Afgan30mmAutoMinomet.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/39/Afgan30mmAutoMinomet.jpg Li-cense: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: Кувакин Е. (1986); scanned andprocessed by User:Vizu (2009); размещено согласно Permissions

• File:AfganPrisoners1985.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Afgan_prisoners_in_Vardak_1987.jpg Li-cense: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: Кувакин Е. (1985); scanned andprocessed by User:Vizu (2009); размещено согласно Permissions

• File:AfganSpecnaz2.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/45/AfganSpecnaz2.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: own scan photo E.Kuvakin by personal collection Original artist: Кувакин Е. (1987); scanned and processed by User:Vizu(2009); размещено согласно Permissions

• File:AfghanAirForce1.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2b/AfghanAirForce1.jpg License: Public do-main Contributors: [1] Original artist: David Votroubek, MC1

• File:AfghanGuerillainUS1986e.JPEG Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/AfghanGuerillainUS1986e.JPEG License: Public domain Contributors: dodmedia.osd.mil Original artist: T.Sgt. Bob Simons

• File:Afghan_Girl_Scouts_1950s.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/Afghan_Girl_Scouts_1950s.jpgLicense: Public domain Contributors: Originally published in a photobook about Afghanistan produced by the country’s planning min-istry; republished in Once Upon a Time in Afghanistan... Record stores, Mad Men furniture, and pencil skirts -- when Kabul had rock 'n' roll,not rockets by Mohammad Qayoumi, Foreign Policy, 27 May 2010. Original artist: Unknown

• File:Afghan_village_destroyed_by_the_Soviets.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Afghan_village_destroyed_by_the_Soviets.jpg License: CC BY 2.0 Contributors: Destroyed Village Original artist: Todd Huffman from Phoenix, AZ

28 16 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

• File:Afghanistan_insurgency_1985.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/Afghanistan_insurgency_1985.png License: Public domain Contributors: This map is available from the United States Library of Congress's Geography & MapDivision under the digital ID g7631r.ct001104.This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information.Original artist: Central Intelligence Agency

• File:Afghanistankrieg-Ressourcen.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Afghanistankrieg-Ressourcen.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

• File:Ambox_important.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg License: Public do-main Contributors: Own work, based off of Image:Ambox scales.svg Original artist: Dsmurat (talk · contribs)

• File:August_1984_-_captured_field_guns_in_Jaji,_Paktia.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cd/August_1984_-_captured_field_guns_in_Jaji%2C_Paktia.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Private collection; apparently a cropof this image at Flickr Original artist: Erwin Lux

• File:August_1985_Muja.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/August_1985_Muja.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Private collection; also uploaded to Flickr Original artist: Erwin Lux

• File:BMD-1_in_Afganistan.JPG Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ca/BMD-1_in_Afganistan.JPG License:Public domain Contributors: http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil/Assets/1986/DoD/DD-ST-86-06667.JPEG (this link is dead!) Original artist:?

• File:Bluetank.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Bluetank.png License: Public domain Contributors:Own work Original artist: LA2

• File:Charlie_Wilson_with_Afghan_man.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/Charlie_Wilson_with_Afghan_man.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: “I took this picture and release it to the public domain”. Transferred fromen.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Melesse using CommonsHelper. Original artist: Tripalis at en.wikipedia

• File:Coat_of_arms_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Coat_of_arms_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work from Image:Soviet Hammer and Sickle and Earth.svg and Image:Sovietcoat of arms.svg. It was then corrected and is believed to be close to official version, for example, one from the 3rd ed. of the Great SovietEncyclopedia, available online here Original artist: Madden, reworked by F l a n k e r

• File:Commons-logo.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Originalartist: ?

• File:Evstafiev-40th_army_HQ-Amin-palace-Kabul.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Evstafiev-40th_army_HQ-Amin-palace-Kabul.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Uploaded as en:Image:Evstafiev-40tharmy HQ-Amin-palace-Kabul.jpg by en:User:Evstafiev Original artist: Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

• File:Evstafiev-Soviet-soldier-Afghanistan.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a2/Evstafiev-Soviet-soldier-Afghanistan.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Mikhail Evstafiev Original artist: Photo: MikhailEvstafiev

• File:Evstafiev-afghan-apc-passes-russian.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/Evstafiev-afghan-apc-passes-russian.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Mikhail Evstafiev

• File:Evstafiev-spetsnaz-prepare-for-mission.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/Evstafiev-spetsnaz-prepare-for-mission.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

• File:Flag_of_Afghanistan.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/Flag_of_Afghanistan.svg License: CC0Contributors: http://openclipart.org/detail/24112/flag-of-afghanistan-by-anonymous-24112 Original artist:

• User:Zscout370• File:Flag_of_Afghanistan_(1980).svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/18/Flag_of_Afghanistan_

%281980%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Orange Tuesday (talk) Original artist: Orange Tuesday (talk)• File:Flag_of_Afghanistan_(1987–1992).svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/Flag_of_Afghanistan_

%281987%E2%80%931992%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work. Original artist: Orange Tuesday.• File:Flag_of_Hezbi_Islami_Gulbuddin.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ac/Flag_of_Hezbi_Islami_

Gulbuddin.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: MrPenguin20• File:Flag_of_Iran.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ca/Flag_of_Iran.svg License: Public domain Contrib-

utors: URL http://www.isiri.org/portal/files/std/1.htm and an English translation / interpretation at URL http://flagspot.net/flags/ir'.htmlOriginal artist: Various

• File:Flag_of_Jamiat-e_Islami.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f2/Flag_of_Jamiat-e_Islami.svg License:CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work, vectorization of a JPEG draw by a afghan. Original artist: Falerístico

• File:Flag_of_Jihad.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/30/Flag_of_Jihad.svg License: Public domain Con-tributors: Unknown Original artist: Unknown

• File:Flag_of_Pakistan.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Flag_of_Pakistan.svg License: Public domainContributors: The drawing and the colors were based from flagspot.net. Original artist: User:Zscout370

• File:Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg License:CC0 Contributors: the actual flag Original artist: Unknown

• File:Flag_of_the_National_Islamic_Front_of_Afghanistan.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f2/Flag_of_the_National_Islamic_Front_of_Afghanistan.svg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: MrPenguin20

• File:Flag_of_the_People’{}s_Republic_of_China.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, http://www.protocol.gov.hk/flags/eng/n_flag/design.html Original artist: Drawn by User:SKopp, redrawn by User:Denelson83 and User:Zscout370

16.2 Images 29

• File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg Li-cense: Public domain Contributors: http://pravo.levonevsky.org/ Original artist: see below

• File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1955-1980).svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_%281955-1980%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: self-made from Image:Flag of the Soviet Union.svg using back-ground color from Image:Flag of the Soviet Union 1923.svg Original artist: Cmapm

• File:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/ae/Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Li-cense: ? Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

• File:Flag_of_the_United_States.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a4/Flag_of_the_United_States.svg License: ?Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

• File:Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/48/Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg License: Cc-by-sa-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

• File:Logo_of_Hezb-e_Islami_Khalis.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/22/Logo_of_Hezb-e_Islami_Khalis.svg License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: Own work. Based on logo visible here. Original artist: MrPenguin20

• File:Mortar_attack_on_Shigal_Tarna_garrison,_Kunar_Province,_87.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6c/Mortar_attack_on_Shigal_Tarna_garrison%2C_Kunar_Province%2C_87.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors:Private collection; apparently a crop of this image at Flickr Original artist: Erwin Lux

• File:Muja_on_radio_in_Munda_Dir.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/Muja_on_radio_in_Munda_Dir.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Private collection Original artist: Erwin Lux

• File:Mujahideen_prayer_in_Shultan_Valley_Kunar,_1987.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Mujahideen_prayer_in_Shultan_Valley_Kunar%2C_1987.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Private collection; appears to be acrop of this image at Flickr Original artist: Erwin Lux

• File:Padlock-silver.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Padlock-silver.svg License: CC0 Contributors:http://openclipart.org/people/Anonymous/padlock_aj_ashton_01.svg Original artist: This image file was created by AJ Ashton. Uploadedfrom English WP by User:Eleassar. Converted by User:AzaToth to a silver color.

• File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?Original artist: ?

• File:RIAN_archive_476785_Soviet_Army_soldiers_return_from_Afghanistan.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/RIAN_archive_476785_Soviet_Army_soldiers_return_from_Afghanistan.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIANovosti archive, image #476785, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#476785 35 mm slide / 35 мм слайд Original artist: Yuriy Somov /Юрий Сомов

• File:RIAN_archive_644461_First_stage_in_the_Soviet_troop_withdrawal_from_Afghanistan.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/48/RIAN_archive_644461_First_stage_in_the_Soviet_troop_withdrawal_from_Afghanistan.jpgLicense: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: RIA Novosti archive, image #644461, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#644461 35 mm slide / 35мм слайд Original artist: Yuriy Somov / Юрий Сомов

• File:RIAN_archive_660671_Pullout_of_Soviet_troops_contingent_from_Afghanistan.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/RIAN_archive_660671_Pullout_of_Soviet_troops_contingent_from_Afghanistan.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0Contributors: RIANovosti archive, image #660671, http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#660671 35mm film / 35 мм негативOriginal artist:A. Solomonov / А. Соломонов

• File:Reagan_sitting_with_people_from_the_Afghanistan-Pakistan_region_in_February_1983.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/Reagan_sitting_with_people_from_the_Afghanistan-Pakistan_region_in_February_1983.jpgLicense: Public domain Contributors: THE PRESIDENT AT WORK/SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (file: c12820-32.jpg) Original artist:Unknown, possibly Tim Clary [1]

• File:Russische_Schmetterlingsmine_PFM-1.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8c/Russische_Schmetterlingsmine_PFM-1.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: work of Juergen Lumpp Original artist: Juergen Lumpp

• File:Shoot_down_of_Soviet_helicopter_by_Mujahedin_fighter_armed_with_Stinger_missile.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8f/Shoot_down_of_Soviet_helicopter_by_Mujahedin_fighter_armed_with_Stinger_missile.jpgLicense: Public domain Contributors: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/images/artifacts/450x360/Painting_FirstSting.jpg at https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum/experience-the-collection/index.html#!/artifact/143 Originalartist: CIA photo

• File:Shuja_Shah_Durrani_of_Afghanistan_in_1839.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Shuja_Shah_Durrani_of_Afghanistan_in_1839.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: The British Library - Online Gallery Original artist:James Rattray (1818-1854)

• File:SovietInvasionAfghanistanMap.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bf/SovietInvasionAfghanistanMap.png License: Public domain Contributors: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil Original artist: Unknown

• File:SovietafghanwarTanksHelicopters.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/SovietafghanwarTanksHelicopters.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: dodmedia.osd.mil Original artist: Undetermined (So-viet Military Power, 1984. Photo No. 130, page 116. U.S Department of Defense publication)

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• File:T-54A_and_T-55_at_Bagram_Air_Base.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/T-54A_and_T-55_at_Bagram_Air_Base.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil/DVIC_View/Still_Details.cfm?SDAN=DNSD0412785&JPGPath=/Assets/Still/2004/Navy/DN-SD-04-12785.JPG Original artist: PH1 (SW) ARLO K. ABRAHAMSON, USN

• File:T-62_withdraws_from_Afghanistan.JPEG Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/T-62_withdraws_from_Afghanistan.JPEG License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

30 16 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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