Soviet Military Personnel and Air Defense Vietnam

8/18/2019 Soviet Military Personnel and Air Defense Vietnam

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INTELLIGENCE

v E vl0RANDUM

SOVIET

MILITARY

PERSONNEL AND AIR

DEFENSE

OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

,

09 OCT

1976

DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

Office

of

Current Intelligence


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.1 YNDON BAINES'

J O H N S 6 N L 1 B R


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SC

No.

10520/65

CENTRAL INtELLIGENCE

AGENCY

Off ice

of Current In t e l l i gence

21 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

Sovie t Mil i ta ry

Personnel

and Air Defense '

Op,era

t ions,i , '

Nor't)1 Vietl1amlt<

Suinmary

We

have no evidence

tha t

the number

o f

Sov ie t .

mil i t a ry personnel in North Vietnam

has

changed

appreciably

s ince

our

l a s t

assessment

i s sued

3

September.

Vietnamese

a re

p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s u r

f a c e - t o - a i r

m i s s i l ~ opera t ions

to

a

grea t e r de

gree ,

a n ~ Sovie t

mi l i t a ry personnel a r e now ap

parent ly

a c t ing

most ly

in an advisory

capac i ty

r a the r

than as d i r ec t

pa r t i c ipan t s .

We

es t ima te

t h e i ~ t o t a l number

to

be about

1,500

with 1,000

of

them concerned with s u r f a c e - t o - a i r

mi ss i l e

opera

t l o n ~

and'500

concerned with f l i g h t t ra in ingand ad_

mi n i s t r a t i ve ,

l i a i son ,

and l o g i ~ t i c a l

func t ions .

1 . New SAM s i t e s cont inue

to

be

b u i l t in

North Vietnam

in groups of a l t e r n a t e

f i r i n g pos i

t i ops fo r the SA-2 un i t s . The growing Dumber of

s i t e s and

t h e i r d i s t r ibu t ion imply t h a t 2-3 S A ~ '

r eg imen ts (8-12 f i ~ i n g

bat t a l ions)

'may be opera t iona l

now. Pre s e n te v lde nc e ind i c a t e s t ha t these a re

manned

most ly by

North Vietnamese

r e c e iv ing on

t he - job t r a in ing

from

Sovie t personnel .

2 .

The,number

of s u r f a c e - t o - a i r

mi ss i l e

s i t e s in North Vietnam

has now

grown to more

,

than 30. However,

we

have .obta ined

littl e v i

dence

of

a

commel1sura te

i nc rease in

SAM

equDpment:,

nor 'does

any

ava i l ab le ' ev idence

sugges t

t h a t t he

number

of

Sovie t

p'ersonnel

in

the'DRV

has

inc reased . '

~ P r e p a r e o r n consUlta t ion with

DIA.

DIA, however,

~ s e s

the presen t number of opera t iona l SA-2 f i r

t r a t t a l i o n s as being 6-8

r a t he r

th?n 8-12. .

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B A I ~ N F S 1 ( ) l 1 N S O ~ n

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• The pat tern

of

SAM

s i t e const tuct ion, however, ~ g e s t s that several

s i t e s

are.

prepared

for

each f i r ing uni t

in

order to

employ

a

shoot-and-scoot

mode

of operat ions.

Present

s i t e

locations

are grouped in clus ters of three or

four s i t e s within a

few

miles of each other .

4. Analysis of th is

s i t e

construct ion pat tern

and of general SAM ac t iv i ty .suggests

: that

there now

are 8 to 12

f i r ing

bat ta l ions in operation. A s l t e

i s

normally manned by

a ba t ta l ion . )

The SAM opera

t ions seen

so far in the DRV read i ly divide

in to 6 •

.

or

7

possible :operat ional

areas ,

on

a

map.

We

assume

• I·

'

tha t

each operat ional

area

has

a t leas t

one

f i r -

, ing unit except in

the

area around

Hanoi

where

there

may

be

as

many a's

four.

r

I

. .

\

here

are three

SAM

regiments in North Vietnam, IOcated

respect ively

near

Hanoi, Than Hoa, and :H irhc,., '.

Each regiment probably has

a

standard complement

of four

f i r ing

bat ta l ions .

5. In August

we

estimated tha t

there

were a t

leas t 1 0 0 0 S o ~ i e t SAM

operat ing

personnel in North

Vietnam although

we

did

not detect

when or how

they entered . Since

that

time

no l r g ~ new

cop.-

'

t i n g e ~ t

of Soviet

mili tary

has been noted act ive

in

Vie·t·nal l; t

i s

possible the Soviet

SAM

p e r s o n : ~

nel

fn the DRV have been divided in to advisory

groups and·assignedto,various·SAM i ns t a l l a t ions .

: This was done in

Cuba,·

where the SAM training · of

Cubans required approximately

one

year • While

the. s t a t e of our evidence

does

not· permit

us

to

exclude

larger

Soviet

SAM

forces being present or

introduced, especia l ly i f more equipment i s brought

in ,

it

now

appears more

l ike ly tha t the number of

Soviet

SAM

personnel wil l

remain

a t a level

close

to

1,000;

The

number

may even be

reduced as

more Vietnamese

are t ra ined to man the

SA-2 s i t e s .

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8 .

The su r f ace - to -a i r

miss i l es

committed

aga ins t US a i r c r a f t s ince l a t e August, al though

grea t e r in number, have been much l e s s e f f e c t i v e

than

those launched ea r l i e r . For ins tance , seven

miss i l e s

f i r ed

between

24

Ju ly

and

24

August r e

su l t ed

in the downing

of

four

US

a i r c r a f t ;

t he

same number

launched

between 25 August and 14 Sep-

tember did

not produce

any damage.

On 20 septem-

ber

a t l e a s t t en S Ms

were

committed

agains t

US

a i r c ra f t

dur ing two a i r s t r i k e s along t he

r il

l i nk with

China;

a l l

missed. Miss i le s a re still

being

launched

a t US

a i r c r a f t

a t an

acce l e ra t ed

r a t e ,

but

re su l t s cont inue to

be

poor .

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9. The apparent ineffectiveness of the sur face

to-a i r missi les

can

pe

explained

by such factors as

the high maneuverabil i ty of US t ac t ica l

a i r c ra f t im

proved

t ac t ics and use of elect ronic

countermeasures

on

the par t

of

US pi lo ts .

and degradatfon of S M

.

equipment

because

of

humid

weather

condit ions

or ex

tensi ve

mobile

use. However, lack of.

c ire'ct

Soviet

particip.ation ' in the f i r ings and poor f i r ing tech ';;

niques by

North

Vietnamese crews could be a.major

factor .

10.

The

number

of. Soviet

mil i ta ry

personnel

in

North Vietnam not

engaged

in S M ac t iv i ty - - i . e .

those' concerned

with f l ight t ra in ing

communications,

and

admin:).strative

and logis t ic

support ac t iv i t i e s -

has

apparently

remained s ta t i c . Although

these

mil i

ta ry

perl?.onnel

possibly

number less than 500, there .

i s

simply

not

enough

evidence to do

more than. guess

how many

there

are at th is

point . No

Soviet t roop

t ransport

ships have cal led a t North Vietnam

p o r t s ~

lilnd

the

a i r t ransport act iv i ty between

the DRV and

the Soviet

Union

has

'not

been extensive enough

to

allow a

large

troop

movement.

11. In para l le l with the apparent

assumption

of

S M re spons ib i l i t i e s by the

North

Vietnamese, DRV

pi lo t s may

soon

take

an act ive

role in the

a i r d e ~

fense

of North Vietnam. They have

recent ly

begun

operat ing

from a

second

a i r f ie ld

located

a t Kep.

They

have great ly

extended the i r t ra ining a r e a possibly

' f lying

over the

Gulf 'of

Tonkin,

arid

have

scheduled

f l ights

as

dis tant

as

130

miles

southeast

of Hanoi.

All

types 'of f l igh t

t ra in ing in par t i cu la r

night

combat

t ra in ing

have become more extensive and

ad

vanced

l a t e l ~ w h i c h indicates

that

the

t ra in ing cycle.

for the'DRV

f ighter

pi lo t s

i s

nearly

complete. The

Soviet

f l igh t

inst ructors may

remain

to t ra in more

Nor.th

Vietnamese pi lo t s or re turn to

the

USSR. (Map

and

Chart) .

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PROBABLE

S M OPER TION L RE S IN NORTH VIETN M

""

101

I

CIlINA

"'''.

" Cossibly Two re S

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20

19

THA1

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10

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TOSK N

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Probable SAM

Operational Area

•

Confirmed

surface Io air missile

SAM) site

o Probable surface Io air missile

SAM) site


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SAM

LAUNOliNGS

VS US AIRCRAH AND

[HWNl S S ~ 1 0 T DOWN

APR

MAY

JUNE

JUL AUG SEPT OCT

LAUNCHES

I

0

0

0

5

6

29 28

AIRCRAFT DOWNED

0 0

0

1 2

1

1

DRONES

DOWNED

0 0

0

1 0

1

2

SAM

SITES

IDENTIFIED

1

2

1

3

11

4

1

TOTAL

68

5

4

32

l,

21 OCTOBER 965

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Soviet Military Personnel and Air Defense Vietnam

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