United States Department of State

Active Measures:

A Report on the Substance andProcess of Anti-U.S. Disinformationand Propaganda Campaigns

August 1986

© by Catherine Kanner

Artwork from Los Angeles Times byCatherine Kanner

© Catherine Kanner

Department of State Publication 9630

Released August 1986

United States Department of State

Active Measures:

A Report on the Substance andProcess of Anti-U.S. Disinformationand Propaganda Campaigns

August 1986

Foreword

This document contains the principal chapters ofa report submitted in August 1986 to the US Congressby the Secre tary of Sta te . I t was prepared infulfillment of Section 1247 of H.R. 2086, passed inJu ly 1985 . The repor t was compi led by thein teragency Act ive Measures Working Group,comprised of representatives from the Departmentso f Sta te , Defense , and Jus t i ce , t he Cen t ra lIn t e l l i gence Agency, t he Arms Con t ro l andDisarmament Agency, and the US InformationAgency.

The conclusion to be drawn from this report isthat there is a massive and highly organized effortby the Soviet Union and its proxies to influenceworld opinion. This effort includes public diplomacyto enhance the Soviet image abroad and to furtherSoviet policy objectives. It also includes a persistent,widespread program of disinformation and deception

designed to discredit the US image abroad anddisrupt US foreign policy objectives. This programhas achieved successes in the past; without effectiveresponses by the US, it constitutes a threat to USnational interests.

Soviet active measures have shown no diminutionsince General Secretary Gorbachev came to power.Dur ing 1985-86 , v i r tua l ly the en t i r e Sov ie tleadership directly responsible for active measureschanged; the new leaders have a more eclectic viewof wor ld po l i t i c s and a re younger. Al so , theInternational Department of the Central Committeeof the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whichis responsible for many active measures, has beenreorganized. These changes indicate a renewedemphasis on active measures and perhaps an increasein both quantity and quali ty of such deceptiveactivities for the foreseeable future.

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Table of Contents

Page

Foreword ..................................................................................................................... iii

Chapter 1. Executive Summary ................................................................................... 1Definition ..................................................................................................... 1The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus .................................................. 2Soviet Active Measures in the United States ................................................ 2Soviet Front Organizations ........................................................................... 2Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures .............................................. 3Agents of Influence ...................................................................................... 3

Chapter 11. The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus ............................................ 5Outlets for Soviet Propaganda ..................................................................... 6The Apparatus for Propaganda Management ............................................. 13The Propaganda Process ............................................................................ 15Soviet Propaganda Techniques and Recent Improvements . . .................... 16Conclusions and Prospects ......................................................................... 17Appendix: The Soviet Campaign Against SDI ........................................... 18Footnotes .................................................................................................... 19

Chapter 111. Soviet Active Measures in the US ...........................................................21Soviet Forgery Operations ......................................................................... 22Use of Soviet Media Representatives ........................................................ 23Soviet Efforts To Influence Peace and DisarmamentMovements ................................................................................................. 25Soviet Efforts To Control the International Women�sMovement .................................................................................................. 29The Soviet Campaign To Influence Religious Organizations . .................. 29Efforts to Influence US Presidential Elections ........................................... 30The 12th World Festival of Youth and Students ......................................... 31Soviet Influence in the United Nations ...................................................... 32An Assessment of Soviet Active Measures in the US .............................. 33

Chapter IV. Soviet Front Organizations ..................................................................... 35Table A: International Communist Front Organizations, 1985 .................. 36World Peace Council (WPC) ..................................................................... 37World Federation of Trade Unions ............................................................. 38The Women�s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) ..................... 38The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) ............................... 39International Union of Students (IUS) ....................................................... 39Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) ............................. 39The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) ..................................................... 40International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) .......................................... 41International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) ........................ 41World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) ..................................... 41World Federation of Teachers Union (FISE) ............................................. 42Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace (ABCP) ........................................ 42Esperantists Movement for World Peace ................................................... 42

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Chapter V. Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures ...................................... 43Operational Aspects ................................................................................... 43Themes and Timing of Forgeries ............................................................... 44Technical Aspects ...................................................................................... 44Impact ........................................................................................................ 46Examples of Forgeries ............................................................................... 47Embassy Rome Cables .............................................................................. 47The von Damm Letter ................................................................................ 49The Defense Mapping Agency Letter ........................................................ 52The Olympic Hate Letters ......................................................................... 54The Jorgenson Letter ................................................................................. 57The Schweitzer Letter ................................................................................ 60The Tyner Letter ........................................................................................ 63AIDS in Jamaica Pamphlet ........................................................................ 65The USIA Questionnaire ........................................................................... 68The General Skantze Letter ....................................................................... 71The Kirkpatrick Speech ............................................................................. 73Footnotes ................................................................................................... 80

Chapter VI. Soviet Agents of Influence ....................................................................... 81Types of Relationships .............................................................................. 81Foreign Targets .......................................................................................... 81The Arne Treholt Case ............................................................................... 82Other High-Level Officials ........................................................................ 82Penetrating the Opposition ........................................................................ 82Targeting Journalists . ................................................................................ 83Other Influence Channels .......................................................................... 83

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Chapter I

Executive Summary

Definition

The term active measures is a literal translationfrom Russian, aktivnyye meropriyatiya, which denotescovert or deceptive operations conducted in supportof Soviet foreign policy. Active measures are distinctboth from espionage and counterintelligence and fromtraditional diplomatic and informational activities.The goal of active measures is to influence opinionsand perceptions of governments and/or publics toachieve a specific response.

Deceptiveness is the essence of active measures�disinformation and forgeries, front groups, influenceoperations, media manipulation, and clandestine radiobroadcasts. Often these measures involve covertactivity, but not necessarily so.

Covertly implemented Soviet active measures arethe responsibility of Service A of the Committee onState Security�s (KGB�s) First Chief Directorate,which works in c lose coord ina t ion wi th theIn terna t ional Depar tment ( ID) of the Cent ra lCommittee of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion (CPSU). Al l Sovie t agencies andrepresentatives abroad are potentially available tosupport or participate in Soviet active measurescampaigns. Techniques include the following:

� Disinformation and Forgeries

Disinformation, a deliberate attempt to deceivepublic or governmental opinion, can be oral orwritten. Forged documents are frequently usedin attempts to discredit individuals, institutions,or policies in such a way as to damage USforeign policy interests.

� Front Groups and Friendship Societies

The ID coordinates activities of such frontorganizations as the World Peace Council (WPC)and the World Federation of Trade Unions(WFTU), as well as local fronts and friendshipsocieties. Fronts normally present themselves asnongovernmental, nonpolitical organizationsengaged in promoting such desirable goals asworld peace.

� Nonruling Communist and Leftist Parties

The ID is also responsible for liaison withnonru l ing communis t and le f t i s t par t ies ,including socialist and social democratic parties.Contacts with these parties are usually overt, andare used to persuade the parties to carry outspeci f ic pol i t ica l ac t ion or propagandacampaigns on behalf of the USSR.

� Political Influence Operations

Agents of in f luence d isguise the i r KGBconnection while taking an active role in theirnation�s governmental, political, press, business,labor, or academic affairs. Their object is toconvert their influence in those realms into realpolicy gains for the Soviet Union. At times, theSoviets use unwitting contacts to achieve similarresults.

� Media Manipulation

The Soviets or other opponents of the UnitedStates frequently place falsely attributed ornonattributed materials in print and broadcastmedia . These mater ia l s , which conta inpropaganda and/or disinformation, may appearin a var ie ty of media , such as regularpublications, clandestine broadcasts, or speciallyprinted brochures.

Although the term active measures is taken fromRussian and we generally think of active measures asbe ing Sovie t in or ig in , ac t ive measures mayoccasionally be generated against the United Statesby other foreign powers. Yet, no state uses activemeasures techniques as extensively or as effectivelyas the USSR.

In studying active measures it is important tounders tand tha t propaganda and o ther e ffor t semployed by the Sovie t s to in f luence publ icpercept ions�such as cul tural programs, radiobroadcasting, and publications�may not be activemeasures in themselves, but may be the vehicles usedto promote and sustain active measures. For example,a forgery�definitely an active measure�mightsurface accusing the US of plotting to assassinate a

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foreign leader. Even after being exposed by the UnitedStates as a forgery, the content of the forged documentmay be repeated, for instance, by Novosti newsagency. Thus, Novosti, an official propaganda andinformation organ, is used to promote an activemeasure. For this reason, Soviet propaganda andpublic diplomacy efforts and means must be taken intoconsideration when examining active measures.

The Soviet ForeignPropaganda Apparatus

The policies for propaganda, as well as for activemeasures, are decided by the Politburo, with inputsfrom the International Department and other party andgovernment bodies. This large, highly centralizedstructure was reorganized in the spring of 1986, withthe apparent intent of streamlining decision making.The new head of the ID, former Soviet Ambassadorto the US Anatoliy Dobrynin, brings to his jobconsiderable knowledge and experience of how to dealwith open societies. With these changes, it is quitepossible that not only the quantity of active measuresand propaganda will increase, but also the quality andsophistication.

The Sovie ts devote major resources todissemination of anti-Western propaganda to aworldwide audience. The primary vehicles are radiobroadcasting (more than 2,200 hours per week in morethan 80 languages) and news services (TASS hasoffices in 126 countries, and Novosti news servicedistributes information to at least 5,000 press andinformation organs in 110 countries) . Culturalactivities, scholarships (more than 55,000 Third Worlds tudents in the USSR) , f i lm, te lev is ion , andpublication of books and magazines also play a part.

Soviet Active Measures in theUnited States

Soviet active measures in the United States aredesigned to discredit the US Government, promoteSoviet foreign policy objectives, and influence USpublic opinion against US military, economic, andpolitical programs. The primary Soviet vehicles forthis are the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA)and its front groups, the two most prominent of whichare the US Peace Council (USPQ and the NationalCouncil of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF). TheSoviets place extensive reliance on these groups tosupport active measures and propaganda campaignswithin the United States.

Soviet KGB officers responsible for covert activemeasures operations are in frequent contact withofficials of these groups. The Soviet fronts in the

United States have been particularly instructed todevote considerable at tention to the US peacemovement. CPUSA and its fronts (along with severalnoncommunist organizations) have been involved inthe organization of several mass demonstrationsagainst US Government policies, including the April20, 1985, �April Actions for Peace, Jobs and Justice.�

The KGB is also keenly interested in religiousgroups in the United States as a potential vehicle forthe exercise of political influence and, more recently,as a means of manipulating opposition against USdisarmament policies, particularly increased spendingfor SDI. Also, as part of its campaign against USsecurity policies, the KGB seeks to cultivate and targetinfluential US citizens, particularly governmentofficials, journalists, and political activists.

Soviet Front Organizations

Since the early 1920s the USSR has used frontorganizations as a means of gaining worldwidesupport for its policies. Fronts are designed to appealto a broad range of opinion and to conceal their linksto the USSR and international communism. Theyinvariably support Soviet propaganda themes, attackthe West, and never criticize the USSR.

The best known and largest front is the WorldPeace Council (WPC). Founded in Paris in 1949 asthe World Committee of Partisans for Peace, the WPChas been based in Helsinki since 1968. It now has morethan 140 affiliates including the US Peace Counciland the British Peace Assembly. The WPC maintainsextensive links to other communist fronts. Althoughit claims otherwise, most of its expenses are met bythe Soviets and their East European allies. Like all ofthe other Soviet fronts, the WPC operates under thegeneral direction of the ID.

There are several other major fronts. Virtuallyevery profession and interest group has an appropriatefront: organized labor, scientists, lawyers, Third Worldpeoples, women, youth, students, journalists. Thereare also �fronts-of-fronts,� groups established byparent fronts to address particular issues. A goodexample of this activity is the Generals for Peace, afront of the WPC.

Fronts have extensively utilized the UN systemvia consultative membership in the United Nations asnongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Elevenfronts, including the WPC, have differing types ofNGO status in one or more of the UN councils andagencies.

The Soviets have tr ied to use the fronts toinfluence the West European peace movement towardunification on an exclusively anti-US platform, butthis effort has not been successful. The fronts find it

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The effectiveness of a forgery often depends moreon the predisposition of the recipient than on thequality of the forgery. A recipient who is suspiciousof and hostile toward the United States is far morelikely to credit a forgery than one who is not. Becauseof increasingly sophisticated journalists, manyforgeries never achieve uncritical publication andappear only in communist or communist-dominatedmedia.

Agents of Influence

Agents of influence are individuals who supportand promote Soviet interests , ei ther openly orcovertly. Often, the KGB is involved, but agents ofinfluence may come from virtually any profession.Often, these individuals are recruited early in theirlives and are not called upon to represent Sovietinterests until they have achieved an influentialposition in government, business, academia, or media.

Agents of influence are motivated by a variety offactors. Some may be blackmailed, but many supportthe USSR for such other reasons as ideologicalaffinity, ego, political expediency, or financial reward.

Arne Treholt, a former Norwegian Governmentofficial, provides one of the best examples of a recentagent of influence. Recruited in his early years, hewas activated by the Soviets after he took on aresponsible government position years later. Heactively advocated Soviet policies and positions in theconduct of his responsibilities, and helped the Sovietsto receive favorable results during negotiations onseveral issues. In 1985, Treholt was convicted and jailed asa Soviet spy.

difficult to cooperate with groups who have criticizedSoviet as well as Western policies.

Forgeries: An Instrument ofActive Measures

Soviet use of forgeries has, we believe, increasedin recent years, and has become more sophisticated.Our best evidence that the Soviet Government is asource of forgeries comes from numerous KGBdefectors, but rarely can we be absolutely certain thata given forgery is Soviet. We are forced to rely oncircumstantial evidence, analysis of the documentitself, and the determination of whom the forgeryultimately benefits.

Forgeries can be easily exposed as fakes, butdenial may never entirely offset the initial damage,which can be compounded by repeated references tothe original forgery in Soviet or procommunist media,often months or years after the primary surfacing.

Forgeries are prepared by KGB specialists underthe supervision of the Active Measures Section,Service A, of the KGB�s First Chief Directorate. Incertain cases, however, where timeliness is important,the fake may be prepared by the local KGB residencyand take on an imperfect character associated with a�rush job.� But given sufficient time, virtually anytype of document can be forged. Still, even the bestforgery can be unmasked by analysis of errors thatone experienced in the mechanics and wording of USGovernment documents can detect.

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Chapter II

The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus

The Soviet Union devotes major resources toconvey Soviet views and disseminate anti-Westernpropaganda to an increasingly large and diverseaudience. Moscow�s primary instruments for attackingWestern initiatives and promoting Soviet policies ona day-to-day basis are its news agencies and radiobroadcasting, as well as reporting in the foreign media.Many other act ivi t ies that serve a propagandafunct ion--cul tural act ivi t ies , scholarships, andhigh-level visits, for example-are used in an effort toevoke in foreign audiences a positive sentimenttoward the Sovie t Union and negate Westerninfluence.

TASS, the Soviet Union�s official news agency,has offices in 126 countries. The USSR�s �unofficial�news agency, APN (Novosti), distributes informationto at least 5,000 press and information organs in 110countries. In contrast to TASS, APN places emphasison preparing propaganda tailored for individualcountries, particularly developing countries. Thiseffort includes using foreign nationals, introducing anew te le type serv ice , and re ly ing more onphotographic materials. APN also conducts a grantprogram that brings substantial numbers of foreignjournalists and public officials to the USSR. Theprogram, which in 1983 had 2,000 recipients, isdesigned to encourage recipients to speak and writefavorably about the Soviet Union upon their return.

The Soviets have the capacity to reach virtuallyevery corner of the globe with their radio broadcasts.For the past 20 years the Soviets have gradually beenincreasing their radio broadcasts. By the end of 1985they were broadcasting 2,215 hours per week in 82languages. In addition to their overt broadcasts, theSoviets run two �unofficial� stations, which purportnot to be run by the Soviet Government, and sponsorsome clandestine radio stations that support Sovietviews.

The Soviets have a number of outlets for theirtelevision broadcasts but, for the near term, Soviettelevision is unlikely to have a major propagandaimpact. All direct broadcasts are aimed primarily atthe domestic audience and are conducted in Russian.They can be picked up outside the USSR, but onlywith special, expensive receiving equipment. TheSoviets do, however, place television programs abroadt h r o u g h o f f i c i a l a g r e e m e n t s a n d b y v a r i o u sSoviet representatives abroad providing television

materials, usually at low or no cost, to commercialoutlets.

The Soviet Union carries out an extensive culturalexchange program worldwide. As of 1985 the USSRhad intergovernmental agreements or formal programswith 120 countries. For the Soviets, 11 culturalrelations� is a broad term that includes such activitiesas science, education, literature, music, sports, andtourism. The breadth and diversity of their culturalactivities enable the Soviets to appeal to a wide varietyof foreign audiences. The Soviets also providenumerous foreign scholarships, part icularly tostudents from developing countries. In December1984 more than 57,000 students from developingcountries were studying in the USSR.

International communist-front organizations,although only covertly associated with the SovietUnion, are an integral part of the foreign propagandaeffort. These organizations hold conferences, sponsordemonstrations, and produce publications which aredesigned to rally world opinion around Soviet causes.

Propaganda policy is decided by basically thesame authority that approves Soviet foreign policy-thePol i tburo-wi th inputs f rom the CPSU Centra lCommittee�s International Department and other partyand government bodies. A large, highly centralizedorganization ensures that propaganda supports policyand that the propaganda is flexible enough to meetpolicy changes. The coordination of the propagandaeffort with the Soviet media organs is largely the jobof the ID.

Credibility of its news and information is a seriousproblem for the Soviet Union. One means to combatthis problem is repetition. A particular theme ischanneled through a number of outlets, both overt andcovert, on the assumption that multiple appearanceswill add to that theme�s credibility. Increasingly, theUSSR is using the foreign media as a vehicle for itspropaganda. Soviet commentators, particularly sinceMikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, havebeen appearing regularly in the foreign media topresent the Soviet version of issues and events.

Timeliness is also a problem. Various incidentshave shown that the propaganda effort breaks downquickly when instructions from the top are notforthcoming or when bureaucratic interests areconflicting. Close party controls and inflexiblebureaucratic procedures also contribute to inertia

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and delays. Soviet leaders have acknowledged thatthese delays mean that their interpretation of eventsis not the first one heard by foreign audiences andthus loses some of its impact. The presence of a strongleader may reduce some of those delays. Additionally,Gorbachev has reorganized the propaganda apparatusby merging the now-defunct International InformationDepar tment wi th o ther Cent ra l Commit teedepartments. This change is unlikely to resolve theconflicting bureaucratic interests that have causedproblems in the past on issues of major importance.

Outlets for Soviet Propaganda

Press AgenciesThe Soviet news agencies occupy a central

position in most of the Soviet Union�s foreignpropaganda endeavors. A number of Soviet papers andnews services have representatives abroad,1 but themost active foreign propaganda vehicles are the pressagencies-TASS (Telegraph Agency of the SovietUnion) and APN (Agentstvo Pechati Novosti). Theprimary role of these agencies is to respond to worldevents, particularly actions by the United States, andto publicize Soviet policies.

TASS, the oldest of the Soviet news agencies, isthe official news service of the Soviet Governmentand party and the acknowledged authoritative voicefor the Soviet political bureaucracy and leadership inaffairs of state. TASS�s responsibilities are quitebroad; it collects and disseminates information fordomest ic and fore ign audiences and providescommentaries to explain the official Soviet viewpoint.

TASS a lso has a subs tant ia l overseasrepresentation more than 400 staff (Soviet nationals),including correspondents, engineers, and typists. Ithas correspondents accredited in 126 countries nearlyevery country that has relations with the USSR. Inmost major capitals of the world there are severalTASS correspondents and often several locally hiredoffice personnel and stringers.

TASS provides copy to foreign news agencies,newspapers, radio and television networks, andministries of information. In the past 20 years thenumber of countries receiving TASS has almostdoubled to 115. And, as of 1985, its information wentto more than 600 networks, agencies, newspapers, andradio stations.

A major selling point for TASS service is its lowcost. At full price it is substantially cheaper thanWestern news services, a major advantage forInformation agencies in developing countries that areshort on the hard currency needed to buy the services

of foreign press agencies. Moreover, the Soviets haveprovided it free of charge to some countries.

From the standpoint of many recipients, the chiefdrawback of TASS service has been the failure of theSoviets to tailor it to meet the needs of specific foreignconsumers; hence, most national agencies, particularlyin developing countries, have found only a smallportion of the service usable.

Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (APN) purports to bean unofficial, nongovernmental organ. It was formedin 1961 by a group of ostensible Soviet �publicorganizations.�2 Like all Soviet information agencies,however, it is controlled by the Communist Party. APNprovides �supplementary� material on all aspects ofthe political, economic, and cultural life of the USSRnot normally covered by TASS, and occasionallyduplicates TASS reporting on issues, It has a widervariety of methods and uses a less stilted writing stylethan TASS to deliver Moscow�s message to foreignaudiences.

As of 1983, APN provided products to 5,000information organs in 110 countries. Its productsinclude books, articles, press releases, interviews,surveys, and photo- illustrations to be distributed tothe foreign press, information agencies, publishinghouses, and radio and television organizations. TheAPN publishing house produces books, guides, andbooklets in more than 50 languages with combined eedit ions of around 17 mill ion copies annually.Additionally, APN publishes both abroad and a homea number of journals, newspapers, and pamphlets forforeign audiences, some of which are:

� Sovie t Weekly�publ i shed in the Uni tedKingdom and disseminated weekly to more than70 countries.

� Soviet Life�published monthly in the UnitedStates for the American public.

� Soviet Land�published biweekly in 13 nativelanguages of India.

� Moscow News�weekly newspaper in Russian,English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, with atotal circulation of about I million in 140countries.

� Sputnik�a monthly illustrated digest journaldisseminated in several languages in 100countries.

In the late 1970s APN headquarters in Moscowhad about 2,100 personnel of whom 1,100 werejournalists and approximately 1,000 were technicaland administrative personnel.

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APN places grea t emphas is on prepar ingpropaganda ta i lored for indiv idual count r ies ,particularly developing countries. APN is increasinglyusing foreign nationals in its foreign activities,because the Soviets believe that local personnelunderstand their audience better and are able tooperate more freely and more effectively than Sovietcitizens. The introduction in July 1983 of a newteletype service called APN Press Information forNews Agencies of the Developing Countries wasanother effort to attract the developing countries.Additionally, APN places a high priority on providingphotographic and other illustrative materials to theforeign press because, in developing countries withpopulations at a basically low level of literacy, thepeople are frequently influenced more convincinglyby photo-information.

An important propaganda and active measuresactivity of the USSR is the APN grant program forvisits to the USSR. As of late 1983, the grant programhad about 2,000 recipients annually, includingjournalists, writers, and public figures from more than80 countries. During their trips to the Soviet Union,the selected foreigners travel around the country tosightsee and meet with Soviet political leaders,academics, and others. Upon returning from theUSSR, the foreign guests annually publish as manyas 3,500 articles devoted to the Soviet Union.

TASS positions are useful to the intelligenceservices for a variety of reasons. TASS offices areusually located outside the diplomatic installation,facilitating clandestine movements. Also, TASScorrespondents do not usually put bylines on theirregular news articles (although they do on theircommentaries), thus making it difficult to ascertainhow much writing a journalist is doing. APN is also avaluable cover for the Soviet intelligence services,especially because many of its products are writtenin the Soviet Union, leaving lit t le work for itscorrespondents abroad.

Soviet journalists-whether intelligence officers ornot-can play a major role in political influenceactivities. Journalists have better access to a widerange of individuals than do Soviet diplomats andtrade off icials . Through frequent contact overextended periods of time, these journalists try to buildrapport and influence the views and reporting of theircolleagues.

Publications

The Soviet Union is one of the world�s largestexporters of printed material. In 1982 the SovietUnion officially exported about 50,000 titles andmore than 70 million copies of books and pamphlets,a figure that does not include those disseminated

through means other than direct sales-the sale ofrights, free distribution, copublishing, publicationabroad, and book exchanges with libraries and otherinstitutions. According to a Soviet book trade official,in the period between 1973 and 1982 the Soviet Unionincreased its book exports more than 2.5 times. Sovietofficial statistics on the ruble value of Soviet exportsof pr in ted mat ter ( inc luding books , journa ls ,newspapers, and other material) indicate that themonetary value has more than tripled in the pastdecade. In 1973 the value of printed-matter exportswas 23.5 million rubles, whereas by 1984 it hadincreased to 74 million rubles.

Soviet publications have the advantages of lowprices and ready availability. They appear to havelarge readerships mainly in countries where Westernpublications are expensive or are difficult to obtain.

The Soviets participate in a number of domesticand foreign book exhibits annually. The Moscow BookFair, which has been held every 2 years since 1977, isof major importance to the Soviets. Publishers fromaround the world display their books there in the hopeof boos t ing sa les . The Sovie t book agencyMezhdunarodnaya Kniga (MK) did more than 100million rubles worth of business in the 1985 fair. Morethan 100 publishers participated, compared with 94publishers in 1983. The number of companies andorganizations represented increased from 1,535 in1977 to 3,300 in 1985.

There are six major Soviet publishing housesinvolved in the export of books: Aurora, Mir, APN,Progress, Raduga, and Russkiy Yazyk. Soviet bookshave a number of outlets abroad, including bookshopsowned by local communist parties or friendshipsocieties, book fairs, Soviet embassies, and culturaland �friendship� organizations.

MK, an all-union association under the Ministryof Foreign Trade, is the conduit for the selling andbuying of publications abroad. It handles all foreigntrade in books, newspapers, magazines, music,phonographic records, tape recordings, illustrations,postage stamps, and foreign �rights� to Sovietpublications. MK has ties with more than 1,000 firmsin 140 countries.

MK does most of its work with the communistparties of various countries and with their bookstoresand publishing house outlets. It uses these outlets tofund the activities of the local communist parties andto get out propaganda materials, mostly in the nativelanguage. MK tends to emphasize materials of apoli t ical nature targeted to influence the localpopulation.

Periodicals

According to official Soviet statistics, in 1981 theSoviet Union produced 245 journals and periodicalsfor foreign readers. Many of these were printed

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outside the Soviet Union, probably because of the poorquality of Soviet printing and the legal advantage ofc i rcumvent ing loca l l aws aga ins t impor t ingcommunist literature. Some periodicals are printed inother communist countries, on foreign presses undercontractual arrangements, by certain internationalorganizations and other groups under communistinfluence or by Soviet embassies in local languages.Some foreign-language periodicals include:

� Soviet Literature�monthly distributed in 10languages to more than 100 countries.

� Sovie t Woman�month ly publ i shed in 14languages.

� Culture and Life�monthly published in 5languages.

� New Times�weekly published in 9 languages.

� Sovie t Union�month ly publ i shed in 20languages.

� Asia and Africa Today�monthly published inRussian, English, French, Arabic, Persian, andPortuguese.

Radio Broadcasting

The Soviets have long recognized the propagandavalue of radio as a medium unrestricted by geopoliticalboundaries; Lenin stated that radio would be �anewspaper without paper and without distances.� TheSoviets have had for some time the capability to reachvirtually all parts of the globe with their radiobroadcasts, and in the past few years have beenintensifying their effort by adding more broadcastsin a variety of languages. By the end of 1985, totalSoviet international broadcasting exceeded 2,215hours per week in 82 languages.

Many union-republic radio centers located nearthe southern Soviet border have been given foreignbroadcast ing responsibi l i t ies . Somet imes theybroadcast in the native languages of their republicsto audiences across the border that speak the same orsimilar languages, as in the case of Radio Yerevan�sArmenian service . They a lso broadcast in thelanguages of non-Soviet target audiences, such astransmission from Baku and Tashkent in Persian.Other republic radio centers that have foreignresponsibilities are the ones in Dushanbe, Kiev, Riga,Tbilisi, Vilnius, Alma-Ata, Tallinn, Vladivostok, andMinsk. Together, they broadcast almost 400 hours perweek.

The focus of Soviet radio broadcasts has changedlittle in the past 14 years. Europe and Asia are still

high in Soviet broadcasting priorities, while Africaand North America appear to have moved up slightly.Broadcasts to Latin America probably would begreater were it not for the role of Cuban broadcasts inthe area. In 1985, Cuba was the leading communistbroadcaster to Latin America with about 235 hoursper week of transmissions.

Radio programming cons is t s o f news ,commentary, and features (the subjects of which rangefrom political, economic, and trade affairs to science,culture, education, and sports), interspersed withmusic. The structure and style of the programmingare repetitive; many programs are played two or moretimes in a day or a week. Moreover, official policylines are set forth in authoritative statements whichin turn form the basis for lower level commentary,which reinforces the theme. The broadcasts to specifictarget audiences discuss local and regional topics, inan effort to create listener interest.

In the past few years the Soviets have improvedtheir radio broadcasts both quant i ta t ively andqualitatively. These improvements have included:

� Introducing a new English-language service in1978, called the Radio Moscow World Service, nowbroadcast continuously throughout the world.

� Increasing the total external broadcasts by 75program hours per week in 1980, the largestincrease in more than 10 years.

� Revamping and increasing Radio Moscow�s Frenchbroadcasts to form a new service called RadioMoscow International in 1983�on the air 46 hoursper week and beamed to both Europe and Africa.

In addition to programs emanating from RadioMoscow and the union republics, a special foreignradio service known as Radio Peace and Progress(RPP) was initiated in 1964. Analogous to APN, RPPwas establ ished as a s tat ion of Soviet �publicorganizations� which claims to be a nongovernmentalbroadcasting station. Its self-defined task is to 11promote mutual understanding and trust among thepeople of all countries,� but in practice it seems toconcentrate on the continents of Asia and Africa. RPPuses the technical facil i t ies of Radio Moscow,although the Soviet Government disclaims anyresponsibility for the content of the transmissions.

In 1985 RPP produced 141 hours per week in 12languages. Although the themes addressed arestandard ones that follow the official line, RPPbroadcasts are sometimes notably more tendentiousand ou t spoken than those o f Rad io Moscow,purveying propaganda lines for which the SovietGovernment might wish to disclaim responsibility.RPP programming i s cus tomar i ly t a i lo red toindividual target audiences. The propaganda is often

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directed at countries with which the Soviet Unionmaintains friendly relations. In the late 1960s, forexample, RPP�s commentaries on Indian politicscaused i r r i ta t ion in and protes ts f rom India�sgovernment and press.

Radio Magallanes was a Chilean radio station thatoperated in Santiago until the fall of SalvadorAllende. Radio Peace and Progress offered it airtimeand it has broadcast from the USSR since January1977. The station broadcasts in Spanish to Chile 7hours per week, and is hostile toward the Pinochetregime.

The USSR has engaged in extensive clandestineradio broadcast ing 3 s ince World War I l . Mostclandestine radio stations disseminate anti-regimematerial to target countries. Many of them work forthe cause of a local, pro-Soviet communist party.Over the past two decades, new stat ions haveappeared and old ones disappeared, as politicalchanges have occurred. Two clandest ine radiostations currently operate from Soviet territory:Radio Ba Yi (or 1 August), and the National Voiceof Iran.

Since its initiation in April 1979, Ba Yi has castits commentaries so as to suggest that it is presentingthe views of dissidents in the Chinese armed forces.Technical observations, however, indicate that thetransmitter is located in the Soviet Far East. Ba Yiattempts to foment disaffection with policies of thePeople�s Republic of China (PRC) and indirectlyencourages suppor t fo r Sov ie t pos i t ions . I t sbroadcasts are irregular and in the past have beensuspended for varying lengths of time for technicaland, possibly, political reasons. For example, duringthe summer of 1985, Ba Yi shut down briefly duringa period when negative commentary on the PRC inSovie t media was subs tant ia l ly reduced. Thisshutdown, apparently a polit ical gesture to theChinese, lasted only about 6 weeks.

Founded in 1959, the National Voice of Iran(NVOI) began broadcasting in Persian; since at least1967 it has also broadcast in Azerbaijani. NVOI�sbroadcasts , 9 hours per week, are vehementlyantiKhomeini and sometimes promote the communistTudeh Party.

The Soviets apparently also support at least oneand possibly two other clandestine radio stations thatbegan broadcasting in Persian to Iran in 1984. TheRadio of Iranian Toilers broadcasts 10-1/2 hours perweek from a location in northwest Afghanistan, nearHerat. The program is designed to convey to Tudehmembers in Iran that the party is still functioning.The Sov ie t s p robab ly a l so suppor t ano the rclandestine broadcast�the Voice of the IranianCommunist Party�which is on the air 21 hours perweek.

The USSR also supports the two clandestine radiostations broadcasting to Turkey and the Middle East

from Eastern Europe�Our Radio (Bizirn Radyo) andthe Voice of the Turkish Communist Party. The twostations portray themselves as voices of the Turkishpeople and working class. The stations strike at theEvren regime and at Turkey�s ties to the West, anddefend Soviet policies. In 1985 Our Radio broadcastabout 72 hours per week, and the Voice of the TurkishCommunist Party about 58 hours per week.

Television

The potential of television as a medium has longbeen recognized by Soviet propagandists. They havestated that �public opinion is, in our day, having anever greater influence on world affairs. In view of this,great efforts are being made by states to shape publicopinion on a worldwide scale, and the mass media�especially television�are being used for this purposewith increasing sophistication.�

There are five means through which the Sovietscan get television programs broadcast abroad:Intersputnik, a communications exchange with EastEuropean and a few other countries; Intervision, aprogram exchange run by the In te rna t iona lOrganization for Radio and Television; officialagreements between Goste leradio and fore igninformation agencies; Soviet domestic broadcaststransmitted via communications satellite; and theplacement of Soviet programming abroad by Sovietrepresentatives.

Intersputnik 4 is an organizat ion that leasescapacity on Soviet satellites for the exchange oftelevision programs and other communications amongits member and user countries. The programming is acombination of that provided by Intervision; Sovietdomestic programming; programming from theindiv idual user and member count r ies ; and ,occasionally, West European programs and somematerial from Western news organizations.

Intersputnik provides the USSR with a number ofpolitical and propaganda advantages. The organizationcoordinates radio and television news, as well asbroader political information and cultural policies,among Warsaw Pact broadcasters and their allies. AllIntersputnik communicat ions must go throughMoscow, which ensures Soviet control over thesystem.

Intervision is a program exchange network underthe auspices of the International Organization forRadio and Television. 5 I t coordinates the dailyexchange of television programs among memberstations, and the USSR supplies about one-third ofits programming. It disseminates programming abroadthrough daily exchanges with its West Europeancounterpart, Eurovision. This exchange is unequal,however; in 1984 Eurovision took only 388 news

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items from Intervision, compared with more than7 ,000 news i tems tha t In te rv is ion took f romEurovision.

Many Soviet television programs are currentlyshown abroad within the framework of bilateralagreements worked out by Gosteleradio, which hasjurisdiction over radio and television operations andfore ign broadcas t ing organs . For example ,Gosteleradio and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Informationsigned an agreement this year whereby both partieswi l l send each o ther te lev is ion fea tures anddocumentaries about their own countries as well asradio programs and recordings of music. Similaragreements recently have been signed with Finland,the Turner Broadcasting Company in the UnitedStates, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

In the i r a t tempts to expand broadcas t ingcapabilities to cover the USSR, the Soviets havecreated the technical infrastructure needed to sendtheir domestic television beyond their borders. Theycan beam television signals to virtually any place onearth via their satellites. However, special expensiveequipment must be used to receive the signals fromall of their satellites. Even with the newer Ekranseries, special antennas and signal converters arenecessary.

With the proper equipment, s tat ions and/orreceivers beyond the borders of the USSR can pickup Soviet television �live.� The legality of individualreceiving installations is in question in most Europeancountries; they are illegal in the Federal Republic ofGermany and the Netherlands and are heavi lyrestricted in most other countries. There appears tobe a market, however, for Soviet television on cableand subscription TV systems; government approvalis granted in most countries. Some cable televisionsystems in Europe carry a limited amount of Sovietprogramming.

The Soviets have had some success in placing theirtelevision programs abroad when they have movedoutside official agreements. Representatives fromAPN, Gosteleradio, and the Soviet Embassy play amajor ro le in provid ing te lev is ion mater ia l s ,particularly to commercial outlets. The type ofprogramming provided varies from country to country.It almost always includes cultural films and programs,and of ten inc ludes ch i ldren�s programs,documentaries, and international news items. Sovietefforts in the early 1980s were l imited by theunattractiveness of Soviet material in competition withthe outside world�a frequent complaint was that itwas too propagandistic�and a scarcity or lack oftelevision sets and/or television equipment andnetworks in the developing countries. As with thenews services, however, Soviet television broadcastsare often provided at low or no cost, and the media insome developing countries have few alternatives.

The Soviets recently have made great progress inimproving the quality of their television broadcasts,which have been widely known for dull format, poorsound and photography, and �talking heads� newswith no live footage. They have been improving theformat, presentation, technical quality, and programmix of their broadcasts. News broadcasts in particularappear to have been modeled after Western televisionand have included some US footage of US troopstraining in Central America. Despite these changes,however, Soviet television remains well below thestandard of Western broadcasts.

Aside from the format and content shortcomings,Soviet television broadcasting suffers from a majorproblem for foreign audiences�it is in Russian. TheSoviets may begin to tailor television broadcasts toforeign audiences in the future, but there are currentlyno indications that they intend to do so. The Sovietsmay feel that the expense of improving their televisionbroadcas ts and ta i lor ing to fore ign audiencesoutweighs the benefits of such an effort. Televisionequipment is still scarce in most developing countries,a major target of Soviet propaganda. Moreover, tocompete effectively with the West in the area, theSoviets would have to make substantial improvementsin both their broadcasting capabilities and theirprogramming. More likely, the Soviets will continuetheir efforts to access foreign television, rather thanrevise their own for foreign broadcasting.

Cultural Activities

The Soviet Union undoubtedly leads the world in the scaleand scope of its cultural exchanges. This is no coincidence:one of the most important principles of the Soviet state�scultural policies has always been to encourage and supportcultural exchanges between countries and nations. It is ourbelief that cultural exchange between nations is important forcreation of the new society�s culture.

�Soviet journalist V. Popov

The Soviet Union maintains cultural relationswith 140 countries worldwide. Unlike other formsof propaganda, Soviet cultural activities do notusually contain a specific political message. Mostseek to instill in the viewer or participant a generalfeeling of admiration or good will for the SovietUnion. For the Soviets, �cultural relations� are abroad concept that includes such activities as science,education, literature, the graphic arts, music, publichealth, sports, tourism, and disaster relief.

Soviet cultural contacts are extensive in scopeand diversity, and they are growing. In 1975 theywere two and one-half t imes their 1965 level ,according to Soviet statements. The Soviets offersomething for just about everyone, from sports to thefine arts, and there is virtually no aspect of culture or

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art that has not been utilized by the Soviets forpurposes of international contacts. The Soviets expecttheir cultural relations �to influence the audience�smind, to direct it in a certain direction.�

The Soviet Union prefers to conduct its culturalre la t ions on a p lanned bas is through cul tura lagreements. As of this year, it has intergovernmentalagreements and programs with 120 countries. Culturalagreements are negotiated and directed by the CulturalRelations Department of the Foreign Ministry, headedby Yuriy Kirichenko since 1982. Bilateral culturalagreements often provide for such activities as thosedetailed below.

In 1984 more than 100 artistic collectives, over400 soloists, and 40 exhibitions were sent by theUSSR Ministry of Culture to West European countriesalone. Soviet cultural presentations worldwide consistof Soviet artistic touring groups, such as balletcompanies, symphonies, dance groups, and smallermusical groups; exhibits of photographs, books, andart; and the circus. Although the quality and renownof a touring group often depend on the competitionappearing in a country and the potential commercialrewards for the Soviets, they manage to send them toall the countries that want or agree to have them.

According to a study by USIA in 1983, Sovietcultural presentations, even those in the developingcountries where the Soviets normally send �lesser�artistic groups and companies, were well receivedworldwide. This was particularly true in Latin Americaand Western Europe, where the companies performedfor often large and diverse crowds. Cultural exhibits,including those of art, books, and photographs, alsowere often popular but normally drew smaller crowds.Contrary to the purpose of most cul tura l andinformation activities, some of those exhibits focusedon political themes, with emphasis on such topics asthe arms race. In Nicaragua, Soviet books and photosemphas ized propaganda aga ins t capi ta l i sm,imperialism, and US �interventionist� activities.

Through their participation in trade exhibits, theSoviets seek to portray their industrial achievements,progress, and power; to present the USSR as a modelfor economic and industrial development; to displaySoviet industrial items, machinery, and tools forexport; and to provide an opportunity to pass outliterature and show films. Soviet participation in tradeand technical exhibits is a minor effort when comparedwith other cultural and information activities�theSoviets participated in or sponsored fairs in only 42countries in 1983. However, as the fairs and exhibitsundoubtedly reach a different audience than mostcultural activities, they provide a good complement.

When Soviet participation in trade exhibits is notpart of bilateral cultural agreements, participation is

coordinated by the USSR Chamber of Commerce,which also manages the Soviet exhibits. In the early1980s there was no noticeable increase in Sovietparticipation in trade fairs worldwide except in LatinAmerica where, between 1982 and 1983, the Sovietsincreased their participation in fairs and exhibits fromfive to nine countries.

The Soviets utilize cultural and informationcenters, libraries, and reading rooms abroad as centersfor short- and long-range programs to disseminateMarxist-Leninist ideology; to expose urban audiencesto selected aspects of Soviet culture and achievements;and to induce sympathy, understanding, and supportfor Soviet policies and programs. Russian-languagetraining is usually provided at these centers becauseof the potential utility of local citizens trained inRussian for Soviet aid projects and the long-termpotent ia l o f such t ra in ing as a vehic le forindoctrination.

The cultural facilities of the USSR abroad rangefrom small reading rooms to multistory centers thatmay contain a library, a theater, an exhibit area, andclassrooms. They may be part of the diplomaticmission, separate from the mission but run bydiplomatic �cultural� officers, or they may be run bylocal Soviet friendship societies or sympatheticpolitical parties. As of 1983 the Soviets supported insome fashion at least 97 facilities in 56 countries.

Operational responsibility for stocking Sovietlibraries abroad, and probably for the overall physicalarrangements of the center, rests in the Ministry ofCulture. The activities of the facilities usually includeseminars, lectures, films, exhibitions, languageinstruction, and cultural programs. Many havelibraries stocked with books in Russian and the locallanguage or languages. The target audiences areprimarily students, younger members of the workingclass, and dissatisfied members of the intelligentsia.The degree to which polemical literature is stockeddepends upon local conditions.

The library-cultural center is a point at which thedirect dissemination of Soviet propaganda andinformation can be accomplished, questions can beanswered, and attitudes favorable to the Soviet Unioncan be fostered. Where authorized, these centersprovide legal public meetingplaces where like-mindedindividuals and groups can get together. Although acultural center is too public and too obvious to be usedfor clandestine meetings, it can help identify potentialsympathizers. In short, although the audiences of somecenters may well be small, the assets that the centersprovide the Soviets far outweigh the sometimes smallnumber of individuals who use them.

Between the late 1960s and 1983 the number offoreign students in the USSR more than quadrupled.The management of the program and the studentswithin the USSR is the responsibility of the Minister

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of Higher and Secondary Special Education. Sovietforeign educational activities sponsored by thisministry are concentrated in the developing countries.As of December 1984, there were approximately57,485 students from developing countries studyingin the USSR, and an additional 3,000 technical traineesleft their countries in 1984 for training in the USSR.The Soviets hope that many in this group will returnhome as potential leaders sympathetic to Soviet causes.Educational exchanges with the developed countries,on the other hand, are used by the Soviets primarilyto collect scientific and industrial information. Thenumber of students in the Soviet Union from the Westis less than 8,000.

Most s tudent exchanges with the USSR arearranged through bilateral cultural agreements.However, some scholarships are provided throughSoviet embassies and consulates, foreign communistparties, and such �public� organizations as friendshipsocieties and front groups. The Soviets have beenknown to recruit students without the permission ofthe local government. For example, according to anarticle that appeared in the Thai daily The Nation in1979 the Soviet Embassy staff in Bangkok decided torecruit Thai students itself, without the approval ofthe Thai authorities. The article also stated that theThai Foreign Ministry estimated that about 200students had left, undetected, for the USSR.

The extent and impact of educational exchangesvary from region to region. As of 1983, Sovieteducational exchanges were virtually nonexistent inEast Asian and Pacific countries, and limited to a smallnumber of countries in Western Europe. However,educational exchanges are now one of the mostsignificant of the Soviets� cultural and informationalactivities in Latin America, the Near East, and Africa.In the period from 1979 to 1983, they increased morethan 40 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and more thandoubled in the other two regions.

For undergraduates, the scholarships generallycover expenses for 4-6 years� study plus transportation.(There are no tuition fees for higher education in theUSSR.) Additionally, students were receiving a stipendof 90 rubles per month in 1984. Similar arrangementsare made for graduate students and technical trainees.

Although the Soviets place a great deal of emphasison their program, it is not without its flaws. A majorproblem is nonrecognition of Soviet degrees in manycountries, which in effect deprives or severely limitsgraduates in finding employment upon returning home.In many countries where the degrees are accepted, theyare often not highly regarded. Many students do notfind their experiences in the USSR rewarding andreturn with a dislike for the country, bitter complaintsof racial discrimination (by Africans in particular)

resentment at having to learn Russian and sit throughtiresome Soviet propaganda sessions, and a growingunderstanding of the limitations of the Soviet system.Thus it is not surprising that in some countries not allavailable Soviet scholarships are taken.

On the other hand, many foreign students find theexperience a positive one. Soviet-trained graduatesprovide a large contingent of doctors, engineers, andagronomists in some African countries, and a few haveeven risen to high government posts. Moreover, theSoviets have recently made attempts to organize their�alumni� in some African countries, a program thatcould be of propaganda value to them.

Like trade fairs, Soviet sports activities attractforeign audiences that may not be drawn by otherforms of Soviet propaganda, and they often get widemedia coverage. The Soviets send a wide variety ofteams abroad, including basketball, gymnastic, soccer,and ice hockey. They also send coaches and trainersfor training teams in other countries, and theyoccasionally donate sports equipment. Moscow valuesthese activities because they provide exposure, helpbui ld good wi l l and contac ts , and supply theopportunities to create audiences more favorable tothe USSR, particularly among the young.

The USSR Committee of Physical Culture andSport has control over athletes and athletics in theSoviet Union, and supervises their participation ininternational and binational competitions and otheractivities.

Front Organizations

The Soviet Union directs and heavily subsidizes13 major international front organizations and severalhundred minor front and friendship organizations.Al though the organiza t ions s t r ive to appearindependent and democratic, they are widely knownto be instruments of Soviet foreign policy Frontorganizations are commonly grouped with Sovietactive measures because their association with theUSSR is not acknowledged by the Soviet UnionHowever, they are controlled propaganda organs thatstrive to rally world opinion to Soviet causes. Amongtheir numerous activities, most of which get widemedia coverage, are meetings, rallies, conferences, anddemonstrations. Additionally, all of the major frontorganizations issue a regular publication as well as adhoc writings which tout the Soviet line.

The major front organizations were created toappeal to a var ie ty of audiences . The la rges torganization is the World Peace Council, and othersinclude the Women�s Internat ional Democrat icFederation, the World Federation of Trade Unions, andthe Chr is t ian Peace Conference . 6 One f ront

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organization of particular value to the USSR in itsmedia activit ies worldwide is the InternationalOrganization of Journalists, which has five schools inthe Eastern bloc and Cuba that i t uses to trainjournalists from developing countries.

The Apparatus for PropagandaManagement

The Soviet propaganda management apparatus isa large, highly centralized structure. Propaganda policyis formulated by the same bodies that create Sovietforeign policy, thus ensuring that propaganda supportspolicy. Moreover, the centralization of the apparatusmeans that propaganda can be flexible-lines can bechanged whenever policy requires it. However, anotherconsequence of tha t cent ra l iza t ion i s tha t thepropaganda e ffor t b reaks down quick ly wheninstructions from the top are slow or nonexistent.

The ultimate authority for propaganda policy is theCPSU Politburo, presided over by General SecretaryGorbachev. Additionally, there are three CPSUsecretaries with responsibility for propaganda issues:senior secretary Yegor Ligachev and junior secretariesAleksandr Yakovlev and Mikhail Zimyanin. Theresponsibility for developing, coordinating, andimplement ing fore ign propaganda wi th in theframework established by the Politburo rests largelyin the international, Propaganda, and Bloc RelationsDepartments of the CPSU Central Committee, and withthe Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of StateSecurity. Some of the leading personalities involvedin the propaganda apparatus are profiled below.

� Mikhail Vasil�yevich ZIMYANIN

Party secretary since 1976 ... responsible forin terna l ideology, propaganda , andcounterpropaganda-an increasingly importantarea as Soviets try to �neutralize� Westerneffects on Soviet society . . . spent early careerin Belorussian party ranks ... moved to foreignservice after Stalin�s and Beria�s deaths in 1953. . . served as ambassador to North Vietnam andCzechoslovakia and briefly as deputy foreignminister ... in 1965 became chief editor ofPravda and a full member of CPSU CentralCommittee ... age 71.

� Yegor Kuz�mich LIGACHEV

Member, Politburo, since April 1985, andSecretary, CPS Central Commit tee , s ince

December 1983 . . . age 64 . . . chief partyideologue wi th genera l overs ight forpropaganda-related activities . . . also supervisescadres policy . . . engineer by training ... firstsecretary of Tomsk Obkom during 1965-83.

� Anatoliy Fedorovich DOBRYNIN

Chief, International Department, CPSU CentralCommittee, since March 1986 ... age 66 ...served as ambassador to the US during 1962-86... will bring extensive expertise in US-Sovietrelations to the ID.

The International Department

The ID plays a major role in the formulation ofSoviet foreign policy. It coordinates and reviews inputson Soviet foreign policy matters from the ForeignMinistry, the KGB, the military, and the variousresearch institutes, and apparently develops from thoseinputs policy proposals that go to the Politburo. It hasspecial responsibility for overseeing CPSU relationswith nonruling communist parties and other foreignleftists and front groups.

The ID plays a major role in the propagandaprocess. Ideas for propaganda and active measurescampaigns originate in the ID, as well as in thePolitburo and the KGB. In addition to its role in theformula t ion and coordina t ion of propagandacampaigns, the ID contributes to the propaganda effortby working with the groups it oversees, particularlyfront organizations, to promote, coordinate, and fundpropaganda campaigns.

The ID is also responsible for the publication ofthe monthly journal , Problems of Peace andSocialism, known in English as the World MarxistReview. Although ostensibly the Review is aninternational publication and edited in Prague, theeditorial board is controlled by the ID. Through thispublication the ID openly communicates policy linesto foreign groups.

The ID was headed by Boris Ponomarev from itsinception until the 27th CPSU Congress in March1986, when Ponomarev was replaced by Dobrynin.

The Propaganda Department

Before 1978 the Propaganda Department was theprincipal CPSU organ overseeing media operationsboth at home and abroad. The foreign aspect of thePropaganda Department�s job was assumed by theInternational Information Department (IID) untilMarch 1986 when it was disbanded. As noted, the

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Propaganda Department probably shares responsibilityfor propaganda on international subjects going to thedomestic audience, with the other Central Committeedepartments having foreign affairs and propagandaresponsibi l i t ies- the ID and the Bloc Relat ionsDepartment. With the aboli t ion of the IID, thePropaganda Department�s responsibilities could bebroadened once again to entail some aspects of foreignpropaganda.

� Aleksandr Nikolayevich YAKOVLEV

Chief, Propaganda Department, CPSU CentralCommittee, since March 1986 ... age 62 ... veteranpropagandist and international affairs specialist . . .responsible for promoting ideology in all party,government, and other Soviet organizations . . .defines and communicates the leadership�s mainpolicies and concerns to the Soviet public ... haswritten some harsh anti-US propaganda in recent years. . . studied at Columbia University 1959-60 . . . deputychief and then-chief of the Propaganda Departmentduring the early years of the Brezhnev regime ...ambassador to Canada 1973-83 ... director of Instituteof World Economic and International Relations during1983-85.

The Committee for State Security

The KGB can affect decisions on propagandacampaigns through its chief, Viktor Chebrikov-aPolitburo member. The KGB is always involved in theimplementation of Soviet active measures. Accordingto Stanislaw Levchenko, Service A (the KGB�s ActiveMeasures component) worked with the ID and the III)(before i t was d isbanded in March 1986) informula t ing and coordina t ing ac t ive measurescampaigns. The KGB�s covert activities often paralleland support the objectives of Soviet overt propaganda.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The MFA can play a role in the key decisions onpropaganda campaigns through its head, EduardShevardnadze-a member of the Politburo. At a lowerlevel, the MFA has a role in the coordination ofpropaganda. Major articles and books on foreignaffairs, particularly those on diplomatic affairs, requireForeign Ministry clearance. The Press Departmentreads the articles; the regional and area departmentsclear book manuscripts in their specialties.

The MFA also has a prominent ro le in theimplementation of propaganda campaigns. The PressDepartment in Moscow serves as a major outlet forpropaganda on international issues. In 1984 it starteda regular press briefing, usually conducted by PressDepartment chief Vladimir Lomeyko, using a

�Western format� with Lomeyko fielding questionsfrom both Soviet and Western reporters. In addition,the press departments of Soviet embassies overseasoften issue written policy statements and, morerecently, have been conducting their own pressbriefings.

The Foreign Ministry�s Department for ForeignCultural Relations negotiates and directs Sovietcultural agreements. Moreover, through its embassiesand consulates abroad, the ministry organizes andsupervises many cultural and information activitiesabroad.

State Committees

Four state committees are heavily involved in thepropaganda appara tus : Goskomizdat , Glavl i t ,Goste leradio , and Goskino. Al though they areostensibly independent organizations, they effectivelyoperate as extensions of the party apparatus inadministering the day-to-day affairs of many of thepropaganda outlets.

All publication activities in the Soviet Union,including those affecting foreign dissemination, arecontrolled by Goskomizdat-the State Committee forPublishing Houses, the Printing Industry, and the BookTrade. Goskomizdat , es tabl ished in 1972 as acontinuation of the Committee on the Press, supervisesthe publishing and printing industry and exercisesnational control over the thematic trend and contentof literature. A �superconglomerate,� as of 1978Goskomizdat supervised 200 publishers, 60,000bookshops and kiosks, 360,000 libraries, and allprinting establishments in all Soviet republics. It isresponsible for the employment of 350,000 workersin those establishments.

Official ly at tached to the USSR Council ofMinisters, Glavlit, or the Main Administration forSafeguarding State Secrets in the Press, is in practicesubordinate to the KGB and the Central Committee.Glavlit maintains a countrywide network of censors,estimated to number at least 70,000. Its responsibilitiesinclude radio and television broadcasts as well asprinted media. Located at printing plants, editorialoffices, and broadcasting studios, Glavlit censorsscrutinize all media material before stamping it forpublic release. I ts mission is to ensure that noinformation affecting the security of the Soviet stateappears in public communications. The KGB andGlavlit jointly prepare the censor�s Index, a classifiedhandbook on �state secrets� that may not be disclosedin the media. The Index also incorporates DefenseMinistry instructions.

In 1957, radio and television operations wereremoved from the Ministry of Culture�s jurisdictionand established as a separate entity. It was formallyestablished as a Committee of the USSR CouncilMinisters in 1962 and elevated to State Committee

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in 1970. Now, the State Committee for Television andRadio broadcasting, known in the Soviet Union as�Gostele radio,� is responsible for organizing theinternal and external broadcasting activities of theSoviet Union and directing all domestic recordingac t iv i t ies in the count ry. The Minis t ry ofCommunications is responsible for the facilities andpersonnel used to transmit, relay, and broadcast radioand television signals.

The Sta te Commit tee for Cinematography,Goskino, headed by Filipp Yermash since 1972, plansand directs all activities concerning the making anddistribution of Soviet films. It is also responsible forinternational contacts in the area of cinematography.

The Propaganda Process

The party maintains control of the propagandaapparatus by issuing general policy guidance andappointing personnel to key positions. Broad policyguidance on the direction of Soviet propaganda isgiven in the occasional speeches or messages by partyoff ic ia l s wi th respons ib i l i ty for ideology andpropaganda-Genera l Secre tary Gorbachev andSecretaries Ligachev, Yakovlev, and Zimyanin.

Ideas for propaganda campaigns in support ofSoviet policies can originate in the Politburo, the KGB,or the ID. The Politburo votes on campaigns and thenissues a directive to the organizations involved whichcalls for them to take whatever measures are neededto carry out the campaigns.

There are regular meetings of the heads of the majormedia organs and representatives from the ID, MFA,and KGB where guidance is given, apparently basedon directives from the Central Committee. Themeetings once were chaired by Zimyanin, but haveprobably been chaired by Ligachev since he assumedresponsibility for propaganda. The coordination offoreign propaganda campaigns outside the planningmeetings is largely the responsibility of the IID,working on instructions from the ideology secretariesand the Politburo.

Delays in Propaganda Responses

The Soviet propaganda apparatus has been unableto handle a number of major foreign policy issuesquickly. Such delays probably have been caused bythe absence of strong leadership in the Politburo aswell as by bureaucratic coordination and logisticalrequirements. In some crises it has taken 7 to 10 daysfor guidance from Moscow to reach the offices abroadthat need it. Similar delays in responses have beenevident in the improvised reporting on Afghanistan,

the Korean Airl ines (KAL) shootdown, and thegrounding of a Soviet submarine off the Swedish coast.

Leadership Dissatisfaction

The Soviet propaganda apparatus has long beenthe subject of leadership concern and criticism becauseof its perceived inability to compete effectively withother foreign media. In the early 1970s the Brezhnevregime resor ted to a ser ies of personnel andorganizational changes in an effort to improve theperformance of Soviet media organizations. In spiteof those efforts, the various media services continuedthrough the 1970s to demonstrate serious coordinationproblems and failed to tailor their output for maximumeffect on foreign and domestic audiences.

Evidently because of leadership concern aboutSovie t fore ign propaganda , the In terna t ionalInformation Department was established in early 1978.The III) publicly received its charter at the next CentralCommittee plenum in November 1978. Then-GeneralSecretary Brezhnev told the Central Committee thatthe propaganda media had been ineffective in dealingwith economic and social life and in the treatment ofinternational events and called for reports that weremore timely, factual, and better analyzed. He indicatedthe seriousness of Soviet concern by announcing thatthe Politburo had set up a special commission to studyways to analyze the problems he had outlined and toimprove �ideological, mass-political work.�

Brezhnev�s criticisms were apparently directed atthe Propaganda and International Departments, whichhad borne most of the responsibility for internationalpropaganda before the formation of the IID. Hischarges were probably intended to clear the way forZamyatin to take control of foreign propaganda.

Criticism of the apparatus continued in 1979, whenthe Central Committee issued a decree calling for theincrease of �party-minded zealousness� of media. Inthe decree, foreign policy information was found tobe particularly derelict in melding �persuasiveness andconcrete analysis with a forthright attitude toward theideological enemy.� This decree, in part icular,highlights the central dilemma facing the Sovietpropaganda apparatus: establishing credibility as asource of information while support ing Sovietinterests.

Leadership cri t icism of foreign propagandaunderwent a subtle change in 1983. In addition to thenow-standard calls for more substance and promptness,the leadership appeared concerned about the style ofSoviet propaganda. In June 1983, Chernenko attackedthe �cliche dispatches and commentaries� appearingin Soviet media and criticized Moscow�s �foreignpolicy propaganda� as not sufficiently �active and

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masterful� in combating the West�s �antisocialist bias.�Without enhancing the �appeal and journalisticqualities� of material addressed to foreign audiences,Chernenko said, the USSR �cannot hope for successin foreign policy propaganda in the long term.�

Gorbachev, whose active role in Soviet propagandahas been apparent in the stream of propagandainitiatives from the Kremlin since he took office,apparently is taking a more activist role in Sovietpropaganda activities than his predecessors. He hasmade major revisions of Soviet propaganda activitiesand policy, and restructured the entire apparatus,beginning with the abolition of the IID.

Soviet Propaganda Techniques andRecent Improvements

In the past few years, and particularly sinceGorbachev�s appointment as General Secretary, theSoviets have developed a variety of methods forgetting their ideas across. Although the methods differ,the purpose seems to be the same: to keep worldattention focused on Soviet proposals, policies, andreactions.

Press Conferences

The practice of press conferences is not new in theSoviet Union-Soviet leader Khrushchev gave a few inhis time-but what is new is their frequency and form.With regularity, Soviet spokesmen and the GeneralSecretary are fielding questions from reporters beforea battery of television cameras. The Soviets value pressconferences as a chance to s ta te pos i t ions tointernational audiences with hopes that the pressconferences can promote the Soviet position.

Gorbachev�s news conferences in Geneva and Parishighlight this trend. In addition, since mid1984 pressbriefings have been held in the Soviet Foreign Ministryat least once a month. Their increased frequencyappears to be related to Moscow�s evident dismay atthe public relations debacle it suffered after the KALincident and the intermediate-range nuclear forces(INF) reduction talks walkout, which coincided withincreasing concern on the part of the Soviet leadershipover Moscow�s �counterpropaganda� capabilities.

No small factor in the leadership�s appreciation ofthe news conference is the credibility of the institution,achieved from its similarity to its Western counterpart.There are, however, some notable differences betweenthe Foreign Ministry press briefings and those in theWest. Although some questions are received orally,many are submitted in writing and deposited in smallboxes at either side of the stage, where they areperiodically picked up by Soviet officials. Thisprocedure assures the briefers that the questions they

want to answer will get asked, and in a mannerfavorable to them. Additionally, it gives officials achance to consider an answer before speaking or,perhaps more to the point, not to answer the questionat all.

Access to Foreign Media

The Soviets are getting better at using the Westernmedia to their advantage. With increasing frequency,the Soviet view of an international event or someaspect of Soviet foreign policy is being presentedabroad by Soviet spokesmen. It is now common to seesuch Soviet officials as Georgiy Arbatov, LeonidZamyatin, or Vladimir Pozner being interviewed byWestern TV commentators or press correspondents.

A recent example of the new accessibility of Sovietspokesmen was the performance of Soviet officials inGeneva in November 1985. Arriving well before thesummit, the Soviets deluged journalists with a seriesof briefings, stacks of translated press releases andGorbachev speeches, and a press luncheon. A Westernjournalist noted that the information curtain thatseparates normally tightlipped Soviet officials fromWestern journalists in Moscow parted in Geneva, andthe Sovie t spokesmen seemed eager to makethemselves available.

Another Soviet method for gaining access to theforeign media has been through the cooptation of someforeign journalists stationed in Moscow. For manyforeign journalists, reporting in a Soviet-biased orpro-Soviet manner can result in gaining access tootherwise inaccessible Soviet officials or receiving�inside information.� Moreover, if foreign journalistsrefuse to cooperate, they may be the target ofprovocations, and some journalists have been chargedwith �hooliganism,� espionage, or illicit behavior andhave been deported.

When the Soviets have been unsuccessful in gettingforeign journalists to write their stories, they havefound another means of getting foreign coverage:purchasing advertising space in newspapers. Theadvert isements almost always carry a pol i t icalmessage, and are usually purchased by the SovietEmbassy.

Controlled Leaks

Approved government leaks from official andunofficial sources help the Soviet Union gain accessto the foreign media with �hot news� items. Soviet orSovie t -backed sources occas ional ly provideinformation to the Western press or Western officialson Soviet affairs, particularly leadership issues. Oneexample of this is Viktor Louis, a major source ofinformation on Soviet dissident Andrey Sakharov. Heprovided Western correspondents with a film of

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Sakharov in 1985 that was intended to show Sakharovas healthy and well-cared-for. Sakharov�s wife, HelenaBonner, has since stated that the film ,was made up ofclips taken by the KGB before Sakharov�s illness andmisrepresented the state of his health at the time itwas released.

The New General Secretary

The primary architect of the more open Sovietapproach to public diplomacy has undoubtedly beenGorbachev. His flair for public relations was firstrevealed to the West during his December 1984 visitto the United Kingdom several months before hisascension to power. Observers there were struck byhis openness, candor, and willingness to discuss toughissues. His performance no doubt reflected hispreferred personal style, a style he has since usedeffectively with domestic Soviet audiences. But it alsoreflected his keen appreciation of the importance ofopenness in dealing with Western audiences.

Since becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev hascontinued this more open style and translated it to theres t of the Soviet bureaucracy. His own pressconferences and personal interviews have beenmatched by Soviet spokesmen at lower levels. Sovietofficials are now willing to discuss issues, such ashuman r ights , which were shunned in the pre-Gorbachev era as �interference� in internal Sovietaffairs. The initial Soviet reaction to the Chernobylnuclear accident demonstrates that there are limits tothis new Gorbachev style, but there is no question thathis approach has increased the effectiveness of Sovietpublic diplomacy in the West.

Exploitation of UN Information Organs

The USSR became directly interested in developingthe United Nations as a propaganda vehicle in 1954when it saw some hope of winning the vote on certaininternational issues. In recent years it has beensuccessful on many occasions in using the UnitedNations to support USSR propaganda activitiesworldwide.

The Soviets have tried to gain control of the UNSecretariat�s news service-the Political Informationand News Service (PINS). PINS was established bythe United Nations to provide the UN Secretariat staffand member states with synopses of media reports. ASoviet national, Vyacheslav Ustinov, heads the officethat supervises PINS. He has delegated editorialresponsibilities to his special assistant, another Soviet.A review of PINS products indicates an anti-US biasand an absence of unfavorable coverage of the USSR.

The UN Department of Public Information (DPI)plays a crucial role in the government�s propagandaefforts, despite the fact that the resolution which

established the DPI decreed that it should not engagein propaganda. The DPI arranges for national andinternational media coverage of UN activities. Theinfluence of Soviet officials working in the departmentfrequently results in the presentation of a selective anddistorted image of the UN�s activities, and the DPIoccasionally issues pamphlets, such as one issued inlate 1984 on colonialism, which are grossly biasedagainst Western countries.

Soviets in the UN Secretariat are instructed toarrange for the UN Secretary-General to makefavorable references to the statements of Soviet leadersor announcements of the Central Committee. TheSoviets circulate these statements as well as SovietGovernment announcements in UN documents. As amat ter of prac t ice , the Uni ted Nat ions a l lowsdocuments of any delegation to be entered in the recordand circulated as official UN documents. The fact thatthey have been circulated in the United Nations is usedby the Soviet press and other media in a way that givesthe propaganda placement more credibility.

Conclusions and Prospects

There are no objective means for measuring theovera l l e ffec t iveness of Sovie t propaganda ininfluencing policies abroad, but the huge investmentthe Sovie t Union has made in i t s propagandaeffort-radio broadcasting, news agencies, publications,and cultural and information activities-attest to its highregard for propaganda instruments as political tools.

In spite of this massive effort, Soviet leaders havecontinually voiced concerns about the quality of theirforeign propaganda. Improving the credibility of theirnews and information is the most serious problem forthe Soviets. They combat this shortcoming in partthrough repetition-presenting their propaganda on aparticular theme through various media outlets, hopingthat each will add to the credibility of the other toproduce a convincing story. They also use the foreignmedia as vehicles for their propaganda, in the hopethat their ideas wi l l gain the Western media�scredibility. Soviet commentators, particularly sinceGorbachev became General Secretary, appear regularlyin the Western media to present the Soviet views onissues or events.

Timeliness is also a serious problem that, on majorissues, will not be solved easily by the Soviets. Variousincidents have shown that their propaganda effortbreaks down quickly when instructions from the topare not forthcoming or when bureaucratic interestsconflict. Close party controls and inflexible proceduresalso contribute to inertia and delays. Soviet leadershave acknowledged that those delays mean that theirinterpretation of events will not be the first one heardby foreign audiences, thus reducing its impact. Thepresence of a strong leader may reduce some of those

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delays. Even a reorganization of the apparatus,however, is unlikely to resolve the confl ict ingbureaucratic interests that have caused problems in thepast on issues of major importance.

The Soviets are currently undertaking a massivenew effort to educate people around the world aboutSoviet policies and proposals because they feel thattheir ideas are not being heard. The Soviets are likelyto initiate the following propaganda developments inthe near future:

- Increase the use of radio and television;

- Improve the supply of publications, especiallybooks, with most of the increase probablygoing to developing countries;

- Further tai lor propaganda for individualcountries and regions.

In addition, TASS and APN will almost certainlycontinue to increase the number of subscribers to theirservices, offering them at low or no cost; and Sovietcommentators will make increasing use of the foreignmedia as a propaganda outlet.

Appendix: The Soviet CampaignAgainst SDI

The Soviet Union is orchestrating a worldwide campaign toundermine domestic and foreign support for the US StrategicDefense Initiative. The USSR has been hostile to SDI since it wasfirst announced by President Reagan in March 1983. Moscow�sefforts began to coalesce into an organized campaign in 1984 whenthe Soviets proposed to hold talks on �preventing the militarizationof space.�

The Soviet program against SDI has consisted of a combinationof diplomacy (particularly arms negotiations), propaganda, andactive measures. The Soviets have previously launched similarcampaigns against several US/NATO strategic programs: the 1950campaign to ban the atom bomb, which culminated in the StockholmPeace Appeal; activities against the US development of anantiballistic missile (ABM) system, which began in the late 1960s;the campaign against the NATO deployment of the enhancedradiation weapon, or neutron bomb, in 1977 and 1978; and theongoing effort to undermine NATO�s 1979 decision to modernizei ts intermediate -range nuclear forces and the subsequentdeployment of those forces. In contrast to those campaigns, theprogram against SDI appears to have broader appeal; the focus ison audiences not only in industrialized countries but also indeveloping countries.

Political Influence Operations

Moscow has extensively employed various forms of politicalinfluence operations as a means of discrediting SDI. Using Sovietfront and other �nonpolitical� groups, Moscow has attempted tomanipulate such professional groups as journalists, scientists,

businessmen, academics, and physicians. Through contacts withsuch groups, the Soviets seek to generate pressure against SDIamong influential individuals who ordinarily would probably avoidassociation with Soviet propaganda.

A month after SDI was proposed in 1983, General SecretaryAndropov suggested that Soviet and US scientists should meet andexplore the consequences of SDI. Since then, Moscow has used itsown scientists and scientific institutions, including those not directlyassociated with space research, as a means of insinuating Sovietviews into Western scientific and political forums. A popular themeis that SDI is technically unachieveable, can be easily countered,and is exorbitantly expensive.

Front Organizations

The Soviet Union has used front organizations to mobilizegrassroots support for its policies-an effort similar to the anti-INFcampaign. In particular, Moscow seeks to influence the significantantinuclear sentiment that exists in Western Europe by employingfront-inspired activity against SDI.

In early 1985, Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of the Soviet Committeefor the Defense of Peace, which helps coordinate many activitiesof front organizations, declared that �peace campaigners cannotabort their efforts� because supporters of SDI �have once againstepped up their activity.� In addition, Pravda claimed that �mass��opposition to SDI could infuse a �new scope to the antiwarmovement� if it merged with existing peace sentiment in WesternEurope. Soviet front activities aimed at undermining SDI include:

� World Peace Council (WPC)

A WPC Presidium meeting was held in Moscow in March1985. An appeal that called on �the world�s peoples to raisetheir voices in a powerful campaign against themilitarization of space� was adopted.

The International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF),a WPC front organization, held a conference in earlyDecember 1985 in Vienna which issued the followingdeclaration: �The object now is to stop the arms race andprevent Star Wars.�

The Generals for Peace and Disarmament, an organizationlinked to the WPC, held its fourth meeting in Vienna inMay 1986. Representatives from 14 countries reportedly�sharply denounced the US SDI plan that destabilizes themilitarypolitical situation in the world and whips up thearms race.�

� World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

During the 37th session of the WFTU, held in Moscow inOctober 1985, the trade union movement was urged to take�resolute action� against �Star Wars.� The WFTU alsoadopted a resolution denouncing SDI at the conclusion ofthis session.

A trade union seminar of Asian and Pacific countriessponsored by the Vietnamese affiliate of WFTU was heldin Hanoi in May 1986. A seminar press release declaredthat the struggle against �plans for space militarization�was an important task of trade unions in all countries.

� Women�s International Democratic Federation(WIDF)

WIDF supported an antiwar month in March 1986 under the slogan �Preventing the Militarization of Outer

Space�Peace on Earth and in Space.�

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� World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

Gorbachev, in a statement to the WFSW Congress in Moscow in1986, declared that �Peaceful space is an important preconditionfor banishing the war danger from the life of the people.�

� Afro-Asian People�s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

An AAPSO-sponsored conference on �Bandung and the Present,�held in Tanzania in July 1985, concentrated criticism on theUnited States, particularly SDI. Its final communique stated that�outer space belongs to mankind in general and it should not beturned into an arena of nuclear confrontation.�Dobrynin addressed the 14th session of the AAPSO Council inMay 1986, criticizing the �creation of new types of�superweapons,� above all space weapons,� and declared that �thestruggle against the threat of nuclear war is also the struggle forthe development of the liberated countries and peoples.�

� Christian Peace Conference (CPQ

The �Karlovy Vary Consultation,� held in Czechoslovakia andorganized by the CPC in December 1984, focused on the�Movement Toward the Militarization of Outer Space Glamorizedby the �Star Wars� mentality.�The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists,affiliated with the CPC, held a plenary session in Moscow duringApril 1986. A resolution was adopted that urged �the Christiansof the whole world� to treat with �particular censure� thedevelopment of �Star Wars.�

� International Association of Democratic Lawyers(IADL)

The Association of Soviet Lawyers, a Soviet disarmament groupapparently under the auspices of the Academy of Science�s LawInstitute and an affiliate of the IADL, participated in an armscontrol conference in Moscow during March 1985. Sovietparticipants wanted to focus strictly on space matters, especiallySDI.

� World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

The Twelfth World Festival of Youth and Students, sponsoredby the WFDY, met in Moscow in July 1985. In his address to thefestival participants, Gorbachev stated: �And everyone shouldask himself. What has he done to prevent nuclear weapons fromever being used again, either on earth or in space, to eliminatethose weapons completely and for good.�

� International Union of Students (IUS)

Youth from countries of Asia and the Pacific participated in ameeting in Hanoi on Peace, Security, Development, andCooperation, sponsored by the IUS, WFDY, and the WPC, inMay 1986. Participants from 13 countries expressed support forSoviet arms control initiatives, including �preventing the spreadof the arms race into outer space.�

Nonruling Communist Parties

The Soviet Union has sought to mobilize nonruling communistparties in opposition to SDI and in favor of Soviet policies. TheInternational Department, which exercises influence over more than70 communist parties, has infused local communist groups with theimportance of initiating actions against SDI. For example, TASSreported in October 1985 that Vadirn Zagladin, then first deputychief of the ID, declared that �all communist parties now consideri t their main task to s t ruggle for avert ing the threat to athermonuclear war and for preventing militarization of outer space.�Activities against SDI by pro-Soviet nonruling communist partiesinclude:

�The Argentine Communist Party organized a meeting in BuenosAires in August 1985 which emphasized opposition to the armsrace in space.

�Local communists urged the Belgian Government inApril 1985 to �reject participation in the implementationof President Reagan�s notorious Strategic DefenseInitiative.�

�The Canadian Communist Party congress was held inApril 1985 with the theme �Peace-Stop Star Wars.�

�A joint communique issued during September 1985 byGorbachev and French Communist Party leader GeorgesMarchais declared that the �Star Wars� project, �far fromending the arms race, spreads it to outer space.�

�The �Star Wars� program was criticized during the 39thcongress of the British Communist Party in London inMay 1985.

�In a speech at the 27th CPSU congress in March 1986Rene Theodore, secretary general of the HaitianCommunist Party, mentioned �Star Wars� as a symptomof the �destructive madness inherent in imperialism.�

�A statement by the Central Committee of the CommunistParty of India in January 1986 accused the �US and theStar Wars program� of �unleashing the arms race.�

�Gorbachev and Italian Communist Party GeneralSecretary Natta met at Chernenko�s funeral in March1985 and agreed that their two parties would strivejointly to end the arms race �both on earth and in outerspace.�

�The Communist Youth Federation of Sri Lanka, in anarticle published in Problems of Peace and Socialism inMarch 1986, criticized �US plans for the militarization ofspace.�2

Footnotes

1Among the Soviet newspapers that have representativesabroad are Pravda, Izvestiya, Trud, Komsomolskaya Pravda,Novoye Vremya, Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, Selskaya Zhizn�,Literaturnaya Gazeta, Krasnaya Zvezda, Sovetskaya Kultura, andSovetskaya Rossiya.

2APN�s founding organizations were the Union of Journalists,Union of Writers, Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship andCultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and National Union forthe Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.

3Clandestine broadcasting is defined as that which does notadmit to, or attempts to mislead listeners about, the origin oftransmission.

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4The members and users of Intersputnik include the USSR,Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, theDemocratic People�s Republic of Korea, the German DemocraticRepublic, Hungary, Iraq, Laos, Libya, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland,Romania, Syria, the People�s Democratic Republic of Yemen, andVietnam.

50IRT members include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria,Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, the GermanDemocratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, the Democratic People�s

Republic of Korea, Laos, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland,Romania, Sudan, the USSR, Vietnam, and the People�s DemocraticRepublic of Yemen.

60ther major international communist front organizations are:the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Afro-Asian People�sSolidarity Organization, the International Association of DemocraticLawyers, the International Union of Journalists, the Women�sInternational League for Peace and Freedom, the World Federationof Scientific Workers, the World Federation of Teachers� Unions,and the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace.

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The Soviets use the term active measures, a literalt rans la t ion of the Russ ian phrase akt ivnyyemeropriyatiya, to describe covert or deceptiveintelligence operations aimed at promoting Sovietforeign policy goals. Soviet active measures may covera wide range of activities, including the following:

- Written or oral disinformation.- Use of forged documents.- Covert influence of foreign media through

controlled assets and press placements.- Use of foreign communist parties and front

organizations.- Manipula t ion of in te rna t iona l f ront

organizations.- Clandestine radio broadcasting.- Covert political and economic support for

insurgents, separatist movements, oppositiongroups, and political parties.

- Political influence operations utilizing agentsof in f luence , manipula t ion or pr iva tecommunication channels, deception, andexploitation of willing and unwilling contacts.

The Soviet leadership takes a long-term view ofits active measures operations directed at the UnitedStates. These operations are designed to discredit theUS Government and promote a favorable climate forSoviet foreign policy objectives. Their objectivesinclude the following: to influence both world and USpublic opinion against certain US military, economic,and political programs; to disrupt relations betweenthe United States and its allies; and to demonstratethat the policies and goals of the United States areincompatible with the ambitions of Third Worldcountries.

The Soviet leadership views active measures as animportant instrument to carry out its foreign policygoals and objectives. The highest level of the SovietGovernment, the Politburo of the Central Committee,ultimately approves the major themes of Soviet foreignpolicy and active measures operations. Under thePolitburo�s general direction, a large and complexbureaucracy designs and implements specific activemeasures campaigns . These campaigns areimplemented and controlled by a powerful CPSUCentral Committee department, the International

Department, and the Committee for State Security.The ID is responsible for the overall supervision

of active measures operations and designs many of thespecific active measures operations and campaigns.The ID also implements active measures operationsthrough its mandate to control and direct pro-Sovietcommunist parties, international front organizations,and such Soviet friendship societies as the NationalCouncil of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF).These organiza t ions are la rge ly f inanced andcontrolled by the Soviet Union, and their campaignsare principally directed at the policies of the UnitedStates and other NATO countries. Because they pretendto be nonaligned, independent organizations thatpromote such causes as peace and disarmament, thesefront organizations often attract broader public supportand are usually more effective than openly pro-Sovietcommunist parties and organizations.

Communist front organizations have also played aprominent role in Soviet efforts to establish reliablechannels of influence in the United Nations and inThird World countries. The Soviets� commitment to�anti-imperialism� often establishes a common focalpoint of interest for independent organizations ofwomen, peace groups, youth, and students. Some ThirdWorld organizations, normally under financial stressand lacking organizational expertise, see benefits inconducting joint programs with well organized Sovietcontrolled front groups.

The KGB is primarily responsible for covert activemeasures operations throughout the world. Service Ais the main headquarters component of the KGBrespons ib le for the overa l l superv is ion andmanagement of KGB active measures. In the UnitedStates, those KGB officers responsible for politicalintelligence collection provide support to the ID byhandling many of the monitoring and liaison functionsin connection with the Soviet front organizations.Several KGB officers currently assigned to the UnitedStates are in regular contact with officials from theCPUSA, the NCASF, and other front groups. Inaddition, the KGB is responsible for developing agentsof influence, planting media stories, and surfacingforgeries in support of active measures campaigns.

It is important to note that many active measuresoperations utilize overt or semi-overt elements as wellas clandestine or covert ones. Many active measures

Chapter III

Soviet Active Measures in the US

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are planned and executed by intelligence officers (10s),but CPSU and government officials, journalists,academicians, representatives of other Soviet publicorganizations, and a network of proSoviet internationalf ron t organiza t ions , communis t par t ies , andindividuals are also used to implement these activemeasures operations. Thus, active measures involvevirtually every element of the Soviet party, state, andprivate sector, and they are closely integrated andcoordinated with traditional diplomatic activities andlong-term Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Soviet Forgery Operations

The Soviet Union conducts forgery operations todiscredit the United States and its allies, influencepolitical action and public opinion in the United Statesand abroad, and promote worldwide Soviet foreignpolicy goals. These forgeries are often designed tosupply the �factual evidence� needed to prove thedisinformation that Moscow has already advancedthrough o ther ac t ive measures opera t ions andpropaganda. Many of the Soviet forgeries are aimedat influencing Third World countries as well as theUnited States. The Soviets try to get forgeries anddisinformation stories printed in the noncommunistmedia. If successful in their efforts, they usually willreprint these news accounts in their own media. Evenwhen the US Government issues prompt denials of theauthenticity of a forged document, the Soviets believethat the denial will never entirely offset the damagecaused by the initial release of the news story basedupon the forgery.

Many US Government officials and organizationshave been targets of Soviet disinformation and forgeryoperations. Although most forgeries surface overseas,the in format ion and documents used in theseoperations are often acquired in the United States.Through defector sources and FBI investigation ofKGB operations in the United States, the FBI hasdetermined that KGB residencies collect the types ofdocuments and information that subsequently surface,in al tered form, in forgery and dis informationoperations.

Forged KKK Letters to OlympicCommittees

In an effort to discredit the 1984 Los AngelesOlympic games and bolster support for their boycottof them, the Soviet Union began a widespreaddisinformation campaign during July 1984. It featuredthree forged documents, two of which allegedly wereproduced by the Ku Klux Klan, threatening ThirdWorld athletes with bodily harm if they participated

in the Olympic games. Based upon FBI investigationsand analysis of the letters, the conclusion is that theyfit the pattern of other Soviet forgery operations andwere part of the overall Soviet active measurescampaign to discredit the Reagan administration andits handling of US-USSR relations.

The first two versions of the Olympic hate leafletswere mailed from the United States to various nationalOlympic committees in more than 20 countries. Oneversion, sent to 10 African states, was directed againstblacks only, while a second flyer sent to Asian nationswas directed against blacks and Asians. Both leafletsallegedly were sent by the KKK and threatened thephysical security of athletes from Africa and Asia ifthey participated in the Los Angeles games. This themedovetailed with the Soviet justification for their ownnonparticipation in the event; i.e., that the UnitedStates was unable to guarantee the security of theirathletes.

Attorney General William French Smith announcedshortly after the letters� discovery that they were KGBforgeries and part of a major Soviet disinformationeffort. Linguistic analysis revealed that the leafletswere not written in colloquial American English, andcontained errors likely to have been made by a Russianspeaker. Both envelopes containing the leaflets werepostmarked from the Washington, D.C. area, wellwithin the 25mile restricted area for Soviet diplomats.The forgeries received considerable publicity in theworld press, but not one recipient on the Olympiccommittee withdrew its team from the games, perhapsbecause of the swift response by US officials inpublicizing the origin of the letters.

In addition, the timing of the KKK letter tocoincide with the visit of Secretary of State Shultz toMalaysia is indicative of a desire to make the most ofthese circumstances for propaganda purposes. Duringthis visit, TASS published an article saying that theKKK had �expressed in an extremely base mannerwhat the architects of American policy have intheir minds.� The article said that the Reaganadministration �has mounted such ferociouslyantisocialist activities as has made participationof sportsmen from Socialist countries in the LosAngeles Olympics impossible.�

The th i rd forgery was a somewhat lesssophisticated Olympic hate leaflet, containing aphotomontage of lynchings, etc., encompassed withinthe Olympic rings. It also contained the printedmessage �Welcome to Los Angeles� and �WhiteSociety.� The leaflet was originally mailed fromAlgeria to the chairman of an African NationalOlympic Committee, but identical copies weresubsequently distributed to other African and Asiandelegations at the Olympic Village in Los Angeles.

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Forgeries of FBI Documents

Two forgeries that surfaced in the United Stateswere designed to discredit the FBI and ultimately theReagan administration. Although the FBI has notdefinitely determined that these forgeries wereperpetrated by the KGB, the forgeries are comparableto those produced in past operations by the KGB.

In June 1983 an unsigned letter from a �practicingCatholic from a Latin American country� was sent toH. E. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, the archbishop ofChicago. Attached to the letter was a documentallegedly from Edward J. O�Malley, the then-assistantdirector of the FBI�s Intelligence Division, to Mr.Edward D. Hegarty, special agent in charge of theFBI�s Chicago Field Office. The document dated May18, 1983, and written on Department of Justicestationery, ordered FBI agents in Chicago to conduct�complete surveillance� of Cardinal Bernardin tosecure in format ion d iscredi t ing h im. Marked�confidential,� the letter also recommended thatspecial agents conduct �full operational surveillance�of especially active Roman Catholic bishops andaddi t iona l �counterac t ions� to undermine theinitiatives of peace education courses conducted underthe auspices of the Roman Catholic Church in schoolsand parishes.

The letter came to the attention of the FBI in July1983 when a member of the Cardinal�s office calledthe Chicago Field Office about the matter. Thedocument is a complete fraud, and the FBI publiclydenounced the document in the media as a �crudeforgery.�

The document was designed to discredit the FBIand the Reagan administration by alleging that theFBI was involved in a campaign to monitor theactivit ies of the Catholic Church in the peacemovement and to discredit Cardinal Bernardin.Cardinal Bernardin was chairman of the committeethat drafted the pastoral letter denouncing nuclearwar, which was approved by the Roman Catholicbishops in early May 1983.

The second forgery surfaced in the United Statesin January 1984. An anonymous cover le t te rpurporting to reveal a 1947 letter to the HouseUnAmerican Activities Committee from FBI DirectorJ. Edgar Hoover was sent to reporters and other peoplein the Washington, D.C. area. Attached to the coverletter was a copy of the alleged �Hoover letter� datedOctober 15, 1947. It concerned House Committeeinvestigations of political activists in Hollywood andexpected testimony before the committee by thePresident of the Screen Actors Guild, who at that timewas Ronald Reagan. The letter implies that Mr.

Reagan was working in collusion with the FBI andthe Committee on Un-American Activities concerningcommunist infiltration into the Hollywood film world.

The FBI denounced the forgery in the news mediaand stated that the letter contained stylistic touchesthat Mr. Hoover would never have tolerated, some inviolation of the rules for FBI correspondence. Theforgery was obviously designed to discredit the FBIand Pres ident Reagan by ra i s ing the i ssue of�McCarthyism.�

Use of Soviet MediaRepresentatives

Soviet communications media are controlled by theSoviet Government or the CPSU. All Soviet media,including radio and television stations, news agencies,and printing facilities, are state-owned and thereforeare subordinate to Soviet political and intelligencegoals. News is frequently suppressed and oftendistorted and manipulated.

The Novosti Press Agency was established in 1961to d isseminate news and fea ture a r t ic les ,commentaries, and photographs about Soviet life toforeign countries. It also publishes books, brochures,magazines, and a variety of other materials in manyforeign languages. Novosti claims to be commercialand unofficial, but is under Soviet Governmentcontrol. The leading Soviet newspapers are Pravda,the official organ of the CPSU, and Izvestiya, theofficial newspaper of the Soviet Government.

TASS, the official news agency of the SovietGovernment, is administered by the USSR Council ofMinisters. Both TASS and Novosti send large numbersof correspondents on foreign assignments around theworld; however, Pravda, Izvestiya, Radio Moscow, andother Soviet media organizations also have limitednumbers of correspondents in many countries. TASSprepares special classified background reports onforeign countries and their leaders, as well as digestsof the uncensored fore ign media , for use byhigh-ranking Soviet officials.

Because TASS assists the news agencies ofdeveloping countries by providing free or minimallypr iced news serv ice , Moscow has achieved asubstantial and growing media presence in the ThirdWorld. By contrast, private wire services from theUnited States usually offer no subsidies and are fiscallyconstrained from providing services to developingcountries that lack sound financial standing. Moscowhas also lent its support to regional news agencies inAsia, Africa, and Latin America.

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Intelligence Officers in Media Positions

The Soviet intelligence services frequently utilizemedia positions in the United States as an overt covefor their intelligence officers (IOs). For example, onknown Soviet IO-who, until his recent departure wasa correspondent for Soviet Radio and Television in theUnited States--aggressively cultivate contacts in aneffort to explain the rationale for Soviet policies, andgathered information on an subject which showed thenegative side of life1 America. Soviet correspondentsare especially encouraged to cover such topics as laborunres t pover ty, unemployment , and nuc leardisarmament.

TASS Coverage of the Olympics

The same Soviet 10 mentioned above and another10 who also uses a correspondent position as his coverprepared reports on the 1984 Olympic games in LosAngeles. Their reporting included articles on theforged KKK hate letters that were sent to African andAsian nat ions. Later, the tact ics of the Sovietjournalists switched to one of attempting to �shock�the world over the materialistic nature of the games.

On May 14, 1984, Marat Gramov, chairman of theUSSR National Olympic Committee, declared in astatement distributed by TASS: �Our nonparticipationis on the conscience of the Reagan administrationwhich . . . did everything possible to thwart ourparticipation.� Gramov alleged that the US securityservices had planted representatives of terrorist andextremist organizations in the Organizing Committee,had devised methods for kidnapping Soviet citizensand for persuading them to defect, and were evenprepared to use �psychotropic preparations whichupset the nervous system.�

One of the more blatant items of disinformationdirected against the Olympics was reported by TASSon June 28, 1984. This TASS report is reprinted below:

The Israeli intelligence service �Mosad,� which specialized inpolitical assassinations and maintains close ties with the USCentral Intelligence Agency, has taken under its direct controlat the request of US special services the so-called �securitydepartment� of the Los Angeles Olympics and is preparing touse it for staging all kinds of provocations and for mass spyingon �unreliable elements.� This follows from the results of thestudy of the situation in the host city of the 1984 Olympicscarried out by a group of journalists on the assignment of theJapanese publishing company �Shueisha.� According to thedata obtained, a high-ranking official of �Mosad� has takenover the special �Department for AntiTerroristic Struggle�under the organizing committee of the Olympics with theblessing of the FBI and the US police. The Department ismanned with professionals from the Israeli intelligence serviceand with so-called �private� agents. It is feared that under thepretext of combating terrorism, the �security department� canstage repressions against the �unreliable elements� on the eveof the Olympics. These include, in the first place, activists ofprogressive public organizations and fighters against racial

discrimination an the oppression of the national minorities inthe United State by shifting on to the �Mosad� men the majorpart of the functions connected with the carrying out of thesedubious operations. Washington obviously tries to shirkresponsibility for possible provocations or terroristic actionsduring the 1984 Olympics.

The report of journalists stresses that the system of total spyingon the population unprecedented in the history of the UnitedStates is now in effect in Los Angeles. It practically reduces tonaught the right to private life and other basic civil freedomsof Americans. This spying is of clearly political nature andhas nothing to do with ensuring true security in Los Angeleswhere dozens of murders and bandit attacks take place everyday. The report stresses that residents of the host city of the1984 Olympics have actually been turned into to hostages ofthe Reagan administration and special services which are tryingto use international sports competitions for furthering theirsinister aims.

The above account, although not widely publicizedin the United States, was wired to TASS offices aroundthe world.

Soviet Media: Alleged US PoliticalPrisoner

On July 5, 1984, a correspondent for Novosti,Vladimir A. Simonov, interviewed Leonard Peltier atthe US Medical Center for Federal Prisoners inSpringfield, Missouri. Peltier was convicted of the1975 shooting deaths of two FBI agents on the PineRidge Indian Reservation in South Dakota andcurrently is serving two life sentences. The Sovietssingled out Peltier, a leader of the American IndianMovement (AIM), as a US �political prisoner� andvictim of American injustice.

After Peltier staged a protest fast that becamepublic in June 1984, the Soviet press printed severalstories charging that he was starving himself to protesthuman rights violations and alleged lack of freedomto practice his American Indian religious rites. In July,Simonov interviewed Peltier for about 50 minutes andheld a short press conference to tell local reportersthat Pel t ier appeared to be suffer ing from theaftereffects of his fast. Simonov said of Peltier�scondition: �He is weak and extremely depressed.�However, Medical Center spokesman Paul Taylor saidPeltier had been eating regularly since his arrival andwas not being treated for any medical or healthproblems.

This sudden interest in Peltier was almost certainlya carefully organized attempt by the Soviet Union todivert attention from the treatment of Andrei Sakharov,the well-known Soviet dissident. At the time, Sakharovreportedly� was on a hunger strike in protest of theunwillingness of Soviet officials to allow his wife,Yelena Bonner, to leave the USSR to seek medicaltreatment. To counter the US scientists and others whosent letters to Moscow protesting the Sakharovs� treatment,a number of noted Soviet sc ient is ts sent le t ters to

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Washington protesting Peltier�s condition. There appearsto be a concerted effort by the Soviet Government to conveythe impression to its own citizens and to the world thatPeltier is a �political prisoner.�

Soviet Efforts To Influence Peaceand Disarmament Movements

The Soviet Union continues to devote manpowerand resources in overt and covert attempts to influenceUS peace and disarmament movements. The KGB hascovertly requested its contacts in the peace and nucleardisarmament movements to continue to report onmeetings, participate in upcoming conferences, andobtain information on individuals who are activewithin the movement. Several KGB officers currentlyassigned to the United States have been in regularcontac t wi th the leaders of Sovie t -cont ro l ledorganizations such as the CPUSA, the US PeaceCouncil, and the National Council of American-SovietFriendship. In addition, the KGB is particularlyinterested in information concerning the US peacemovement�s plans for conferences or demonstrations,its organizations and leaders, and its relations withEuropean antiwar groups.

Communist Party of the USA

The CPUSA has historically been one of the mostloyal, pro-Soviet communist parties in the world andcontinues to receive substantial financial supportfrom the Soviet Union. Although relatively small andpolitically weak, the CPUSA continues systematicallyto promote Soviet views on arms control proposalsand the peace movement through i t s over tpublications and party operations, and through anetwork of front organizations in the United States.

Since the late 1970s, the ID has provided directionto international front organizations, the CPUSA, andCPUSA front organizations concerning the issues ofarms control and disarmament. The Soviets haveurged these organizations to mount campaigns againstthe neutron bomb, NATO theater nuclear forcemodernization, administration defense policies, andmore recently the SDI. The CPUSA has sponsoredand participated in demonstrations and rallies, formedcoali t ions with other peace organizat ions andsponsored seminars and workshops to promote Sovietviews and to influence the US peace movement.

Henry Winston, national chairman of the CPtraveled to Moscow in early 1984 to meet with thePeace Commission of the USSR. This commissionhas contact with various peace activists and groups

in the United States.The CPUSA has d i rec ted i t s major f ront

organizations to support Soviet arms control anddisarmament initiatives. The FBI has determined thatthere are several groups in which CPUSA membershave leadership roles or take an active part. Some ofthese groups are spinoffs from traditional CPUSAfronts, and some deal with arms control and peace.These organizations are often more effective than theCPUSA in reaching and forming coalitions with otherorganizations because they are not always easilyident i f ied as CPUSA-control led or pro-Sovie torganizations.

The CPUSA and its front organizations wereinvolved in organizing a coalition of more than 80organizations which sponsored a series of massdemonst ra t ions on Apr i l 20 , 1985. Thesedemonstrations were part of a carefully planned 4-dayprotest called the �April Actions for Peace, Jobs andJustice� that was held April 19-22, 1985. Also includedas sponsors were a large number of noncommunistgroups from the following areas: peace, antinuclear,civil rights, labor, religious, environmental, veteran,and minority groups,

The April Actions group organized individuals inWashington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle,Denver, Tucson, and Miami to oppose US foreign anddomestic policies. Specifically, they joined togetherto oppose US intervention in Central America,domestic budget cuts, apartheid in South Africa, andthe nuclear arms buildup.

National Council of American-SovietFriendship

The NCASF, originally formed in 1943 by theCPUSA, currently consists of approximately 24 activeUS chapters. Future plans call for at least one chapterin each of the 50 states. The NCASF claims to be anindependent and impartial organization that dependsentirely on legitimate contributions for financialsupport. In actuality, the Soviet Union, through theCPUSA, provides funding for NCASF operations.

Publicly, the NCASF continues to state that itspurpose is to promote friendship and understandingbetween Soviets and Americans through cultural andeducational programs as well as travel exchangeprograms. In practice, however, the NCASF works toadvance the foreign policy and propaganda objectivesof the USSR. The NCASF operates as a CPUSA frontgroup which provides the Soviets with an excellentconduit to promote the active measures campaigns,meet with US persons of influence, spot and assessUS persons for recruitment operations, and influencecertain groups of activists in the US peace movement.

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The NCASF is used by the Soviets as a bridge to reachpeople who would be reluctant to participate in anopenly pro-Soviet disarmament organization.

Soviet direction of the NCASF is channeledthrough the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendshipand Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SOD),with ultimate authority resting with the InternationalDepartment. Soviet representatives of SOD are inregular contact with NCASF officials and direct theNCASF to conduct activities to support Soviet activemeasure campaigns.

The NCASF is currently sponsoring more visitsby Soviet groups to the United States. These groupsare generally referred to as �Goodwill Tours� and arecomposed of culturally oriented Soviets travelingunder B-2 tourist visas. Many of these tours have been�peace� oriented and illustrate a Soviet attempt topresent themselves as friendly, peace-loving people.One KGB officer expressed a clear and strong interestin having more Soviet entertainment groups visit inorder to encourage more contact with larger USaudiences and with persons in the US entertainmentbusiness. The recent increase in local NCASF chaptersin various cities affords these Soviet groups anexpanded geographic range within the United States.

These NCASF local chapters act as sponsors,handle such logis t ica l requi rements as hote lreservations, and arrange various forums and functionswith a variety of domestic groups. During these visits,the NCASF is in a position to assist the KGB inconducting its operations in the United States. TheNCASF provides a mechanism that allows KGBpersonnel the freedom to travel to various US citieswhere they previously had limited access or to travelin areas closed to Soviet diplomats assigned in theUni ted Sta tes . The NCASF can a lso provideassessments of Americans for possible targeting andrecruitment by the KGB.

A appears that since late 1984 the role of theNCASF has been expanded with the establishment ofdirect links with the Committee of Youth Organizations(CYO). Soviet officials directed the NCASF to play asignificant role in the 12th World Youth Festival inMoscow and in the newly formed Soviet-AmericanYouth Conference (SAYC). This latter organization hasreplaced the now-defunct Forum for US-SovietDialogue, which allegedly had not followed the Sovietline and had tried to run itself independently. The firstSAYC was scheduled to be held in the United Statesin August 1986.

NCASF is involved in some areas of the UnitedStates in pairing similar American and Soviet cities inorder to promote peace and friendship between them.It is through this type of activity that the Sovietsestablish ties with the local political arena in variousUS cities and also attempt to exploit US citizens andorganizations who have a genuine desire for world

peace and nuclear disarmament.Other independent pairing projects, not controlled

by Soviet front organizations, do attempt to gainsupport for bilateral nuclear arms control by creatingbetter understanding between the citizens of bothcountries. Soviet authorities find these programsobjectionable because they interfere with the SovietUnion�s own efforts to control the pairing projects inthe United States. The independent pairing projectsalso present an interesting logistical problem for theSoviet Union. It reportedly is increasingly difficult forthe Soviet Government to screen the large amounts ofUS mail sent to Soviet citizens and communities.

World Peace Council and US PeaceCouncil

The WPC is the largest and most active Sovietinternational front organization, with affiliates inapproximately 141 countries. It is one of the SovietUnion�s major instruments for political action andpropaganda in the nuclear disarmament movement andits current campaign is clearly directed at US defenseand arms control policies.

WPC activities in the United States are coordinatedby its affiliate organization, the USPC. Key leadershippositions in the USPC have always been held bytrusted CPUSA members who carefully guide theirorganization along Soviet lines.

The USPC, founded in November 1979, hasconsistently worked to promote the causes of the WPCand has regularly espoused the policies of the SovietUnion. Because the USPC increasingly suffers frombeing exposed as a communist front, it has becomeless open about its communist affiliations. Early USPCletterheads openly showed affiliation with the WPC,yet a 1985 letterhead no longer shows it. By examiningsome of the organization�s activities, the links betweenthe USPC, the WPC, and Soviet interests are revealed.

A prime example of pro-Soviet activities carriedout by the USPC on behalf of the CPUSA is itsparticipation in the organization and direction of ademonstration on June 12, 1982, coinciding with theUN Second Special Session on Disarmament. Twoleaders of the USPC and CPUSA were ac t iveparticipants in the executive meetings that planned thedemonst ra t ion . Both representa t ives ac t ive lycampaigned to direct the focus of the demonstrationexclusively against US nuclear weapons systems andaway from Soviet weapons systems.

Additionally, one of the CPUSA officials, in aspeech to a CPUSA conference, linked the �peace�activity with support for terrorist and insurgent groupsin South Africa, El Salvador, and the Middle East. Hereaffirmed the �inseparability of the struggle fordisarmament and support for the liberation movements

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such as the African National Congress of South Africa,South-West Africa People�s Organization of Namibia,FMLN-FDR of El Salvador, and the Pales t ineLibera t ion Organiza t ion ;� and aff i rmed tha t�anti- interventionism movements gaining greats trength in churches, unions, communit ies andcampuses represent an inseparable par t of theanti-Reagan all-people�s front.�

According to articles in several non-communistpublications, there were substantial internal problemsin the planning committee as a result of the insistenceof USPC/CPUSA representatives that the rally shouldfocus exclusively on US arms control and disarmamentpolicies. An article by Ronald Radosh in The NewRepublic, January 31, 1983, recounts the USPC�scampaign to �tone down the official rally call so thatit was not equally addressed to the United States andthe Soviet Union.�

These revelations are consistent with the publicstatements of the USPC/CPUSA, which claim asignificant communist impact on the committeeproceedings. In a brochure titled The New Red Scare:An Open Letter, the USPC defends communis tparticipation in the peace movement, stating thatcommunists �also bring to the movements in whichthey work a sometimes-missing sense of organization,d i rec t ion and ideologica l cohes iveness .� Thisbrochure, which the USPC has distributed to nearlyall major US peace organizations, claims that theUSPC played �a key role in the development of theJune 12 demonstrations.�

The June 12 committee�s official declarationswere specifically directed against the United States,as demonstrated by this statement:

The demonstration addresses all governments which havedeveloped nuclear arms and which compete in the internationalarms race, but its primary focus is on the US Government.Possessing more nuclear bombs than all other countriescombined and leading the technological, first-strike weaponsrace, the US Government is least willing to stop its nuclearinsanity.

The Soviets were satisfied that the USPC/CPUSAwas successful in directing the focus of the rallyagainst US arms control and defense policies and laterboasted in a propaganda booklet:

... it is a fact, said Pravda�s special correspondent A. Vasilyev,who was in New York City on June 12, that during the sevenhours of the demonstration and rally attended by a millionpeople on the day I did not see a single anti-Soviet placard. Iasked my acquaintances and friends about it t, and some ofthem said that there had been some small groups, maybe oneor two placards in a thousand.

The CPUSA also claimed that the party and theUSPC played a major role at the rally at the United

Nations on June 12. According to a June 1982 CPUSAmemorandum:

The Party was extremely active in working to make the June12th Demonstration an outstanding success. The Partycontingent itself was historic, with many districts participatingin the distribution of the special edition of the Daily World. TheParty was represented in the National June 12th Coalition (thecommittee planning the ral ly) and some districts wererepresented in local coalitions.

But we still have much to do. This is a critical period for thepeace movement.... We can�t let the unity and enthusiasm thatbrought over a million people to New York City and another

million throughout the country dissipate ....

It is important for us to join with others who are building localpeace councils. The Peace Council plays a special role in thepeace movement. It is the only peace organization whichconsistently links the struggle for peace with the struggleagainst US military intervention, and it takes principledpositions with respect to anti-Soviet propaganda of the Reaganadministration. Every new peace council which comes intoexistence improves the ideological health of the peacemovement.

The close ideological and operational links sbetween the WPC and the USPC are enhanced byoverlaps in personnel and use of mutual symbols. Forexample, USPC activists regularly serve on the WPCsecretariat based in Helsinki, Finland.

The USPC logo is one that has been used byEuropean communists for a number of years.. Itconsists of a dove of peace and a clenched fist. TheEast German communist party used the logo on a 1978pamphlet titled What Does Peace Have To Do WithStruggle? It indicated that the logo had first been usedby the Finnish Delegation to the 1973 CommunistYouth Festival in East Berlin. The West Germanyaffiliate of the international Soviet front, Afro-AsianPeople�s Solidarity Organization, has also used thelogo.

The WPC held a major international conference inToronto, Canada, on November 23-25, 1984. Themeet ing was ca l led a World Dia logue for thePrevention of Nuclear War for Disarmament and Peace.It was attended by numerous leaders of national peacemovements from around the world, including a USDelegation. The USPC coordinated and controlled theUS Delegation by discreetly asking only selected peacemovement leaders, trade unionists, elected officials,and leaders of other proSoviet front organizations toattend.

In addition, the USPC lobbies for specific Sovietarms control proposals and initiatives in its contactswith US Government officials and activists in thepeace movement. The USPC recently disseminated ahistory of Soviet arms control proposals in an effortto show the USSR as more active than the UnitedStates in promoting arms control and disarmament.

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World Federation of Trade Unions

The WFTU, currently headquartered in Prague,Czechoslovakia, is a pro-Soviet international tradeunion organization that claims a total membership of206 million. Of this number, 130 million members arefrom the Soviet Union, and about 90 percent of thetotal membership is from communist-controlledcountries. The WFTU is controlled and directed bythe International Department of the All Union CentralCouncil of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), which in turn isd i rec ted by the CPSU Cent ra l Commit tee�sInternational Department.

Since 1949, when i t came under communistcont ro l , the WFTU has been a major Sovie tpropaganda arm, its ultimate aim being to set up auni f ied , wor ldwide communis t t rade un ionorganization and to support Soviet foreign policy. Inthe 1950s, the WFTU was expelled from France andAustria for its subversive activities.

One of the major priorities of the WFTU and theCPUSA is to mobilize trade unions in the United Statesto jo in the pro-Sovie t peace and disarmamentmovements. The Soviets emphasized to US tradedelegates the importance of mobilizing the tradeunions to join the huge peace and disarmament rallyin New York City in June 1982 and, more recently,the numerous smaller rallies held in various citiesacross the nation in April 1985.

US labor unions for the most part do not supportthe WFTU. Consequently, many of the activities onbehalf of the WFTU in the United States are conductedby the CPUSA and its front organizations. CPUSAnational headquarters has tasked its chapters to focuson the infiltration of labor and trade unions. CPUSAmembers have been able to join the locals of such tradeunions as the Uni ted Auto Workers , Uni tedSteelworkers, and the International Longshoremen�sAssociation.

The WFTU and the CPUSA believe that this is anideal time to influence trade unions, because of theReagan administration�s economic policies and budgetcuts and the unemployment problems in the USindustrial sector. These topics and others are routinelydiscussed in such monthly CPUSA sponsored laborpublications as Labor Today and Economic Notes.

At least two issues will receive attention from theWFTU during the next year. The first issue will dealwith Soviet efforts to denounce and neutralize the SDIprogram. The second, closely associated with the first,will concentrate on �Economic Conversion.� Thisconcept, to divert funds from military hardware todomestic spending, has been utilized in the past bySoviet-controlled organizations as a means to combatWestern military development, by emphasizing thetremendous cost of defense programs. The highlypublicized cost of SDI has provided the necessary

impetus to rev ive the v iab i l i ty of EconomicConversion in Soviet active measures operations thatwill be directed against SDI and the military budgetprogram of the Reagan administration.

US-USSR People�s Peace Treaty

The US-USSR People�s Peace Treaty is one of themore recent Soviet efforts to influence US publicopinion in favor of current Soviet foreign policypriorities and to exert pressure on US Governmentofficials to effect changes that are favorable toMoscow. Through the US-USSR People�s Peace TreatyOrganization, the Soviets hope to enhance theirposition in the following active measures campaignsdirected at the United States: opposition to the SDIprogram, support for the �nuclear freeze� concept, thepledge of no first-use of nuclear weapons, andinfluence in the ongoing Geneva arms talks.

The principal control and direction for thisprogram come from the Soviet Committee for theDefense of Peace in Moscow, which in turn worksclosely with the NCASF and the USPC. Essentially,the operation is a petition campaign to collect millionsof signatures on a �People�s Peace Treaty� addressedto the President of the United States, the GeneralSecretary of the CPSU, and the SecretaryGeneral ofthe United Nations. The stated aim of this program is�to influence the negotiations in Geneva to speedy andsubstantial arms reductions.� The campaign willfollow the model of the Stockholm Peace Appeal,launched in 1950 by the WPC and regarded by thecommunists as a considerable success. Organizeddecades ago, this Soviet-controlled disarmamentoperation sought an absolute ban on atomic weaponsat a time when the Soviet Union�s nuclear capabilitywas limited.

Exerting public pressure on the United States insuch a way as to strengthen the Soviet hand in theGeneva negotiations appears to be the principalimmediate objective of this project. Playing on the fearof nuclear war through the use of simplistic formulasand slogans while presenting Soviet policy in its usual�peace-loving� guise is a tried, tested, and sometimeseffective method of achieving this objective.

Soviet Efforts To Control theInternational Women�s Movement

The Women�s International Democratic Federation(WIDF) is the principal worldwide Soviet frontorganization dealing with the women�s movement. TheEast Berlin-based WIDF claims to have 135 affiliatedorganizations in 117 countries. Estimates in 1966claimed a total membership of more than 200 million;

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however, mos t members a re f rom communis tcountries.

WIDF�s avowed a ims a re to un i te womenregardless of race, nationality, religion, or politicalopinion so that they may win and defend their rightsas citizens, mothers, and workers. Its stated goals areto establish friendship and solidarity among all womenand to ensure worldwide peace.

In actuality, the WIDF is carefully controlled anddi rec ted by the Sovie t Union and i t s f rontorganizations. The WIDF has close relations with otherSoviet front organizations, particularly the WPC. Thepresident of the WIDF, Freda Brown of Australia, andthe secre tary genera l of the WIDF, Mir jamVire-Tuominen of Finland, are members of the WPCPresidential Committee and work closely with thatSoviet front organization.

The Soviet Union launched an intense campaignto exploit the UN women�s conference in Nairobi,Kenya, in 1985. This campaign was a continuation ofa longstanding attempt to control and manipulate thewomen�s movement. The Soviets started targetingthese conferences in 1975 when the United Nationsdeclared the beginning of the UN�s Decade for Women(1976-85) and 1985 as the International Women�s Year.The UN General Assembly accepted the World Planof Action adopted at the first UN World Conferenceon Women, held in Mexico City in 1975. The plan set5-year minimum goals for the advancement of womenin such areas as education, employment, and politicalparticipation. The second UN World Conference onWomen was held in Copenhagen in 1980. Theinternational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)in consultative status with the UN Economic andSocial Council (ECOSOC) helped organize andparticipated in the conference.

The third UN conference, officially titled �TheWorld Conference to Review and Appraise theAchievement of the UN Decade for Women: Equality,Development, and Peace,� was held July 15-26, 1985,in Nairobi, Kenya. Only governmental delegates,representatives of intergovernmental agencies, andofficial observers attended the conference. Theconference reviewed and appraised the achievementsof the UN Decade for Women, identified obstacles anddeveloped strategies for improving the situation ofwomen, and made recommendations for action to theUN General Assembly.

There was a parallel meeting for NGOs called�Forum �85,� This convention was held July 8-17,1985, in Nairobi and was officially open to �everyoneconcerned with the status and condition of women.��Forum �85" used the same themes as the UNconference: �Equality, Development and Peace.� Theachievements of the Decade for Women were reviewed,and strategies were proposed to overcome obstaclesfor attaining the goals of the World Plan of Action bythe year 2000.

A wide range of international organizations wererepresented at these two events . All the majorinternational Soviet front organizations and many oftheir national and local affiliates were represented atthe forum and the conference. Moscow�s objectiveswere to have representatives from its front groupsintroduce issues that clearly indicated that the UnitedStates was the principal threat to world peace and themain supporter of the apartheid policies of SouthAfrica. Efforts were also made to show that USimperialism was the cause of the economic oppressionof women in Third World countries. These Sovietthemes were advanced under the general heading of�the effects of racism and militarism.�

The US affiliate of WIDF is known as Women forRacial and Economic Equality (WREE). This CPUSAfront organization did its part to advance the Sovietline at the Nairobi conference. WREE was a mainparticipant in the �Women�s Coalition for Nairobi1985" which organized a national seminar on �TheEffects of Racism and Mil i tar ism on Women�sEquality.� This event took place in New York in lateMay 1985 and was supported by a number of CPUSAfronts and independent organizations. The seminardocumented the status of women in the United States,and plans were made to distribute the document at theworld conference and forum in Nairobi. This documentpresented the condition of women in the United Statesin such a way as to reflect unfavorably on both theforeign and the domestic policies of the United States.For example, they depicted women as suffering fromracism and economic oppression resulting from thedomestic budget cuts and military spending increasesby the Reagan administration. This theme is constantlyrepeated in the CPUSA�s newspaper The Daily Worldand numerous other communist publications.

The Soviet Campaign To InfluenceReligious Organizations

It is clear from developments within the past 2years that the Soviet Union is increasingly interestedin influencing and/or manipulating US churches, andrel igious organizat ions and their leaders . Thiscampaign represents Soviet appreciation that churchesand religious institutions are an important factor inthe formation of US public opinion. The objectiveappears to be to generate a solid block of oppositionagainst increased US military spending for newweapons systems, specifically SDI, and to enhance thepeace and nuclear weapons freeze movement.

Previous Soviet efforts were directed more atlimited elements within the Christian community. Thisnew campaign has targeted the members and leaders

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of a broad range of religious institutions in the UnitedStates. In an effort to neutralize perceived anti-Sovietfeelings, the Soviets have directed increased effortsagainst the more conservative religious groups andleaders in the United States. One example of this newactive measures campaign is the Soviet use ofdisinformation about the degree of religious freedomin the Soviet Union. West European churches are alsotargets of this campaign, especially in the FederalRepublic of Germany.

Christian Peace Conference

The CPC is a major Soviet-backed internationalfront organization that has, since its founding in 1958,sought to influence opinion within church relatedgroups on a variety of topics. The CPC has itsheadquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and alwayshas been directed by a prominent Soviet or EastEuropean theologian or religious figure.

The current president of the CPC is Bishop KarolyToth of Hungary, who is also a member of thePresidential Committee of the WPC. Bishop Toth isespecially adroit at presenting Soviet policies andactions in such a way that they will be viewedfavorably by US and other Western church officials,clergy, and laymen. Toth has many contacts in the USreligious community, and enlarging and developingthose contacts is a principal reason for his visits tothe United States. Toth is known to be an unfailingand consistent defender of all Soviet actions, thoughhis methods are less crude than those of most Sovietpropagandists. In international religious circles he hasdefended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, martiallaw in Poland, and the shooting down of KoreanAirlines Flight 007.

During the 1970s, the CPC focused on promotingSoviet interests in the Third World, but in the 1980s ithas focused its attention on disarmament and securityissues. Soviet organizational and financial controlwithin the CPC is well documented.

The CPC is quick to advance its own �theology ofliberation� when it discusses communist nationalliberation movements in Third World nations. This� theology� recommends suppor t ing thoserevolutionary movements and demanding that Westernchurches rid themselves of their bourgeois values.Thus, the basic Marxist theories of confrontationbetween the proletariat and bourgeoisie appear as partof the CPC doctrine. In a 1975 publication the CPCstated:

The churches of these countries must free themselvesof the bourgeois social ties. The churches existing inWestern society need liberation at least as urgently asthe proletarian masses.

The Sixth All-Christian Assembly convened inPrague, Czechoslovakia, on July 2-3, 1985, and wasattended by nearly 800 representatives from at least90 countries, including the United States. Theseassemblies have taken place in Prague every 3-7 years:1961, 1964, 1968, 1971, and 1978. Moscow viewsthem as an opportunity to influence religious opinionagainst Western foreign and defense policies.

During the sixth CPC assembly, the Sovietsattempted to intensify their efforts to unify the peacemovement under their control, enhance the influenceof the Soviet Union within international religiouscircles, and align themselves with a significantsegment of the international religious community.

Other Soviet Fronts and the ReligiousMovement

Front organizations in the United States are alsobeing mobil ized to further the Soviet effort toinfluence US churches. In April 1984 the executivedirector of the NCASF, Reverend Alan Thomson,issued a three-page memorandum to all NCASFaffiliates titled �The Churches in the Struggle forDisarmament.� Thomson urged that coalitions beformed with the churches to oppose the policies andactions of the US Government on military, armscontrol, and other issues. He pointed out that thechurches a re the la rges t and most in f luent ia lnongovernmenta l ins t i tu t ions in th i s count ry.Thomson�s memorandum is directed, in part, atovercoming the prejudice that exists among NCASFmembers against working with religious leaders.

Recently, the WPC and the USPC are activelyparticipating in the Soviet effort to manipulate the USreligious community. The USPC has begun to developa Religious Circles Committee (RCC) to help theUSPC work more effectively among religious orientedpeace activists. To further this goal, the USPC is urginglocal chapters to identify members who could help inthe formation of RCC in an interfaith manner.

Efforts To Influence USPresidential Elections

The CPUSA helped to sponsor a �Vote Peace in�84" rally at the Democratic National Convention inSan Francisco on July 16, 1984. According to CPUSAestimates, the rally was expected to draw as many as250,000 labor, peace, and human rights demonstrators.Although the rally was held, the turnout was extremelysmall and had little publicity.

The Soviet efforts to influence the US Presidentialelection of 1984 included numerous attacks on theRepublican platform and on President Reagan.Moscow utilized its media network vehemently to

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attack the Republican platform as extreme rightist andpathologically anti-Soviet. Early in 1984, the SovietUnion initiated a series of active measures operationsdirected against the Reagan reelection campaign. Oraland written disinformation was used extensively topurvey false or misleading information about theReagan campaign.

The FBI publicly denounced a probable Sovietforgery that surfaced in the United States in January1984. This forgery, dated 1947, purported that RonaldReagan was working in collusion with the FBI andthe House Committee on Un-American Activitiesconcerning communist infiltration into the Hollywoodfilm world. The forgery was designed to discreditPres ident Reagan by ra i s ing the i ssue of�McCarthyism� during an election year.

The CPUSA announced in 1984 that nothing wasmore important than the defeat of President Reagan.It used its front organizations and publications toattempt to convince the US public that the reelectionof President Reagan would be a grave mistake and havesignificant political and economic ramifications.

The 12th World Festival of Youthand Students

The World Federat ion of Democrat ic Youth(WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS)are two Soviet front organizations which have jointlysponsored a series of 12 World Youth Festivals since1947. The 12th World Festival of Youth and Studentswas held in Moscow from July 27 to August 3, 1985.Recent estimates indicate that 20,000 delegates from157 countries took part in the activities, which mixedpolitics with sports, entertainment, and internationalfriendship. The US National Preparatory Committee(USNPC), which was staffed by high-ranking CPUSAand NCASF members, sponsored 300 delegates and250 observers to attend the 1985 festival.

The Soviets used this festival as a political stagefor the USSR to a t tack Pres ident Reagan, US�imperialism,� and the US military buildup, and totempt to influence world opinion on peace issues andnuclear disarmament. Such Soviet organizations asSoviet Friendship Societies, the Committee of YouthOrganizations of the USSR, and the Rodina Societywere directed to commit their resources and personnelto the festival and the theme of nuclear attemptdisarmament. The Rodina Society, a Moscow-basedorganization that develops and maintains culturalrelations with Soviet emigres worldwide, is known tobe dominated by the KGB, which utilizes these culturalexchanges as a cover for its illicit operation. Thefestival brought the Soviets into close contact withnumerous influential political, academic, religious, and

media leaders, as well as thousands of politically activeyouths from around the world.

Through CPUSA and the CPUSA front organizationrepresentat ives in the USNPC, Soviet off icialscarefully screened the Americans who applied toparticipate in the World Youth Festival. It is knownthat the KGB exploits such events to spot and assessyouth who appear to be sympathetic to communismor the USSR. The ultimate KGB goal is to recruitindividuals who may eventually acquire sensitivepos i t ions and be able to col lec t in te l l igenceinformation or support Soviet intelligence operations.In addition, several reports indicated that Sovietoff ic ia l s d id not want d is rupt ions or ser iousdisagreements to arise during the conference andtherefore carefu l ly screened US appl icants todetermine their attitudes toward the USSR.

The International Preparatory Committee (IPC) forthe 12th World Youth Festival announced that the issueof preventing nuclear war was one of the main themesof the festival. This action by the IPC furthers themajor Soviet active measures campaigns directedagains t the SDI research program and NATOdeployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces inEurope. Other themes of the festival were the �FortiethAnniversary of the Defeat of Fascism� and the decisiverole of the Soviet Union in defeating Nazi Germany.The festival also attempted to link the struggle againstapartheid with the antiwar struggle. US Delegationmembers were instructed to show that the United Stateswas the principal cause of both evils and told that theymust bring the people involved in the anti-apartheidmovement into more general opposition to US policy.

The USNPC for the 12th World Youth Festivaldetermined that the Soviet slogan for the festival, �ForAnti-Imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship,�was not suitable for use in the United States becausethe obviously biased language might negatively affectpublic opinion and endorsements. Thus, the USNPCdecided to use the slogan �The Friendship of YoungGenerations Can Bring Peace Among Nations.�Festival posters received from the WFDY and the IPCcontaining the �anti-imperialist� slogan were not usedby the USNPC. Other NPCs, such as Portugal�s, didthe same thing in order to make the festival moreacceptable to noncommunists, from whom support wassought. The IPC position was that the local NPCs couldformulate their own slogans in keeping with localpolitical conditions.

The CPUSA and its front groups held many of theleadership positions in the USNPC and played a majorrole in determining who attended the festival asrepresentatives of the United States. The USNPCattempted to secure as many endorsements for thefestival as possible from local governments, publicofficials, and prominent citizens. USNPC organizers

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also made a special effort to get trade and labor unionsto offer their support.

Most of the 20,000 delegates who attended the 12thWorld Youth Festival were well screened by the SovietUnion and its front organizations prior to theirselection as delegates or observers. Thus, manydelegates were strongly predisposed toward Sovietpol ic ies ; th i s Moscow event re inforced the i rpreexisting positions on Soviet programs. Thesedelegates and the Soviet Union therefore view the 12thWorld Youth Festival as a huge success.

But to some delegates the 12th World YouthFestival was only a propaganda show of the SovietUnion. These delegates were disillusioned over thelack of genuine debate on such issues as human rights,Afghanistan, Poland, and the Soviet buildup of nuclearweapons. In some cases, the Soviet authorities evenconfiscated �offensive� pol i t ical and rel igiouspublications. Because of the strict Soviet dominationand control of the festival events, Moscow�s politicals tanding among previously sympathet ic youth,particularly from Western Europe, was damaged.

Soviet Influence in theUnited Nations

The Soviet Union is effectively utilizing the UnitedNations and its specialized agencies to further Sovietforeign policy goals and intel l igence-gatheringobjectives. At UN Headquarters in New York, theSoviets have intelligence officers under diplomaticcover not only in the Soviet mission to the UnitedNations, but also in the UN Secretariat . Everyindividual employed by the UN Secretariat must takean oath to carry out his/her duties and responsibilitiesas an �international civil servant of the UnitedNations� and not accept instruction or guidance fromany government. In actuality, the Soviets assigned tothe UN Secretariat report directly to the Soviet missionand thus are part of the Soviet bureaucracy which iscontrolled by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Sovietintelligence services, and the CPSU Central Committeein Moscow.

The Soviet intelligence services use their UN staffassignments to support worldwide intelligence andactive measures operations; monitor and manipulateUN act iv i t ies ; col lec t sc ient i f ic and technicalinformation of value to the Soviet Union; and spot,assess, and recruit intelligence sources and agents ofinfluence.

Soviet active measures in the United Nations havefocused considerable attention on the issues of nucleararms control and disarmament. In 1978, the UnitedNations proclaimed the week beginning on October24 as Disarmament Week, a week devoted to �fostering

the objectives of disarmament.� Disarmament Weekhas now become an integral part of the WorldDisarmament Campaign, which was launched from theSecond Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.Although the stated ideals of the World DisarmamentCampaign are commendable , a var ie ty ofSoviet-sponsored front organizations and agencies arein a position to exploit these ideals and influence ormanipulate the campaign.

The Soviet Union has effectively exploited thesystem of NGOs at the United Nations for activemeasures objectives. Although NGO representativescannot vote at the United Nations, they may attendconferences, sessions, and meetings as observers,submit papers which become part of the official record,and at times speak at meetings. The NGOs are primetargets for Soviet penetration and/or control becauseof their potential to influence voting members in theUnited Nations, worldwide public opinion, and theinternal politics of their own countries.

NGOs may become affiliated with the UN systemin a variety of ways. For example, an NGO may begranted a ff i l i a t ion by a commit tee wi th in theSecretariat and �listed� with the UN Department ofPublic Information at the UN headquarters in NewYork. NGOs can be given some form of consultativestatus with a particular UN Headquarters in New Yorkor with a particular UN agency, such as the UNEducational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) or the Department of Disarmament Affairs.The form of affiliation that is the most desirable andcarries the highest degree of recognition throughoutthe UN system is Category I consultative status withthe Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The Conference of Non-Governmenta lOrganizations (CONGO), which has consultatives ta tus wi th ECOSOC, i s the la rges t and mostinfluential nongovernmental institution within the UNsystem and is officially recognized as such by theUnited Nations, its Secretariat, and various agencies.It is the spokesman for about 200 internationalorganizations associated with the United Nations. Mostof these organizations belonging to CONGO areneutral, nonpolitical groups representing a wide rangeof viewpoints. Religious organizations, professionalsocieties, and public service associations form the bulkof CONGO�s membership. However, the followingmajor international Soviet fronts are also members:

Afro-Asian People�s Solidarity Organization(AAPSO)

Christian Peace Conference (CPC)International Association of Democratic Lawyers

(IADL)International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

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International Union of Students (IUS)World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)World Federation of Teachers Unions (FISE)World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)Women�s International Democratic Federation

(WIDF)World Peace Council (WPC)

CONGO�s executive body is called the board. The20-member CONGO board currently includes fiveSoviet front organizations: AAPSO, CPC, IADL,WIDF, and WFTU. These organizations constitute adominant force on the board because they operate andvote as a coordinated and disciplined bloc.

At the very least, the Soviet fronts on the Boardwill be able effectively to influence the planning,organization, and agendas for a number of importantCONGO meetings and conferences and for NGOparticipation in many UN-sponsored events. The majorCONGO conference on the International Year of Peace,held under CONGO and UN auspices in January 1986,was only one of many events which the fronts wereable to control through their leadership of CONGO.

The Soviets have considerable control over thePolitical Information and News Service (PINS) whichwas established by the United Nations to provideSecretariat staff and member states with summariesof media reports. Supervision of PINS was assignedto the office of UN Secretariat, Under SecretaryGeneral Viacheslav Ustinov.

The Soviets have used their influence over PINSto select and edit press items which are used on a dailybasis by UN members and employees. A review ofPINS articles indicates an anti-US bias and an absenceof unfavorable coverage of the Soviet Union.

An Assessment of Soviet ActiveMeasures in the US

In the United States, Soviet intelligence officersactively target and seek to cultivate influential UScitizens, government officials, journalists, and politicalactivists. Much of this activity is overt in nature,although Soviet intelligence officers are always alertfor the opportunity to recruit Americans who are inpositions to facilitate or assist Soviet active measuresoperations. In addition, Soviet intelligence officers inthe United States are responsible for the collection ofinformation, documents, and stationery which are usedin disinformation and forgery operations, and foroperations to surface disinformation and forgeries inthis country. The CPSU�s ID, with the assistance of

the KGB, directs and clandestinely funds a networkof international Communist front organizations and theCPUSA and i t s f ront organiza t ions . Theseorganizations, in turn, are used by the Soviets topromote Soviet foreign policy views and to spreadSoviet propaganda and disinformation to influence theUS Government.

The Soviet Union relies extensively on the CPUSAand its front organizations to support Soviet activemeasures campaigns in the United States. Frontorganizations of the CPUSA tend to be more effectivethan the Communist Party because they are not aseas i ly ident i f ied as pro-Sovie t or communis tdominated organizations.

One of the major Soviet active measures campaignscurrently underway in the United States and Europeis the Soviet campaign to undermine the SDI researchprogram. The Soviets are specifically interested inexploiting disagreements and creating divisivenessbetween the United States and its NATO allies on thisissue. In the United States, the CPUSA and its frontorganizat ions have been directed to undertakeoperations to influence the activities of independentpeace organizations. One objective of the Sovietcampaign is to influence US and European peace anddisarmament organizations to focus only on theAmerican SDI program, whi le ignoring Sovietstrategic defense programs.

One of the most frequently used Soviet activemeasures techniques is the surfacing of forgeddocuments. Although most forged documents surfaceoverseas, there have been some recent forgeries whichhave first appeared in the United States, such as theforgeries relating to the 1984 Summer Olympic Gamesin Los Angeles. Soviet forgeries have been particularlyeffective in Europe and Third World countries. TheSoviets believe that even when the US Governmentissues prompt denials of the authenticity of a forgeddocument, the denial will never entirely offset thedamage caused by the initial release.

Sovie t ac t ive measures in th i s count ry docontribute to worldwide active measures campaignsagainst the United States. It is often difficult to judgethe e ffec t iveness of spec i f ic ac t ive measuresoperations. However, the Soviets believe theseoperations have a cumulative effect and are detrimentalto US foreign policy and national security interests.Furthermore, the Soviets believe that their activemeasures operations in the United States do contributeto their overall strategy to advance Soviet foreignpolicy interests, influence US Government policies,and in general discredit the United States.

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Traditionally, the term front has referred to anumbrella organization that unites a variety of groups.Since World War II, the te rm has been usedincreasingly to refer also to organizations which arenot independent, but are controlled directly orindirectly by the Soviet Union. Both definitions applyin this paper. Soviet control of front groups isordinarily concealed; for example, Soviet citizensrarely occupy the positions of president or secretarygeneral, and Soviet affiliates claim merely to be equalsof those from other countries. Soviet fronts unitedifferent groups in support of USSR pol ic ies :communists , social is ts , � l iberat ion movement�members, and any others who will cooperate. Table A(page 36) lists the major Soviet front organizations,where they are headquartered, their size, and whenthey were founded.

Many of the current Soviet international fronts hadless effective counterparts in the interwar period. TheComintern ran the pre-World War II fronts from amul t ina t iona l bureaucracy in Moscow, t igh t lycontrolled by the CPSU.

The CPSU�s International Department directs allfront activity through the appropriate Soviet nationalaffiliate of that particular front. A Soviet representativeon the secre tar ia t a t the headquar ters of theinternational front usually is the general manager ofthe organization and takes direct orders from Moscow.If there is no Soviet secretary, the senior Sovietvice-president performs this function. In addition toSoviet administrative input, funding is used to helpmaintain control. However, the Soviets pay only forthe activity they want undertaken.

Addi t ional coordinat ion between fronts isrequired to ensure that they have unified positionsin support of Soviet policies. To this end, each ofthe major fronts and some of the minor ones arerepresented on the World Peace Council-the largestand most important Soviet international front.

In addition to the interfront coordination providedby the WPC, there are periodic meetings involvingmost major fronts and some minor ones. Recently,such meetings have been stepped up from once totwice a year. Other types of joint activities are oftenundertaken; e.g., two worldwide fronts may sponsora meeting, or a worldwide front may host a meetingin conjunction with its regional affiliate and a

national affiliate.Sovie t cont ro l and coordina t ion of f ront

organizations are most evident when the fronts respondwith either silence or outright support to such eventsas the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, andAfghanistan. On rare occasions when fronts do not toethe line, there are significant repercussions. Some ofthe top leaders of the World Federation of TradeUnions, the Christian Peace Conference, and theIn terna t iona l Union of Students -a l l based inPrague-opposed the Czech invasion of 1968, whichresulted in purges in these organizations.

Some post-World War II international frontsattracted noncommunist members owing to wartimeAllied cooperation. Since that time, however, a numberof content ious issues have led to a decl ine ininternational support for the fronts. As the Cold Wardeveloped, pro-Western elements, unable or unwillingto combat Soviet domination, withdrew from manyfronts during 1948-50. Following Tito�s break with theCominform in 1948, Yugoslav affiliates were expelledfrom such organizations. Since the mid-1960s and theSino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese and Albanians haveboycotted the Soviet international fronts, althoughthey have remained members of most of theseorganizations. Finally, after some West Europeancommunist parties developed policies independent ofthe Soviet Union, the French gave up the secretarygeneralship of the World Federation of Trade Unionsand the World Federation of Democratic Youth, whilethe Italians gave up the presidency of the WFDY andwithdrew from the WFTU altogether.

With such a history and image, the fronts havefound it difficult to attract noncommunist supporters.To expand their constituency, Soviet policymakersdeveloped �fronts-of-fronts,� usually by setting upnew organizations. Most of the new fronts-of-frontsare regional extensions of existing worldwide Sovietfronts, new occupational groups established as part ofthe peace movement, or groups set up to pursue someother worthy cause. The regional groups, mostlyes tab l i shed in the Thi rd World , usua l ly haveover lapping membership wi th the o lder, moretraditional fronts. Most of these new fronts-of-frontsdo not have a Soviet directly in the secretariat oradministrative offices of the organization, and manydo not have Soviet membership.

Chapter IV

Soviet Front Organizations

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Table A: Major International Communist Front Organizations, 1985

Year ClaimedFront founded Headquarters Membership Affiliates Countries

Afro-Asian People�s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) 1957 Cairo Unknown 87 UnknownAsian Buddhist Conference for Peace 1970 Ulanbaatar Unknown 15 12Christian Peace Conference (CPC) 1958 Prague Unknown Unknown ca.80International Association of DemocraticLawyers (IADL) 1946 Brussels 25,000 Unknown ca.80International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) 1946 Prague 180,000 Unknown 120 plusInternational Union of Students (IUS) 1946 Prague 10 million 120 112Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples ofAfrica, Asia,

and Latin America (OSPAAL) 1966 Havana Unknown Unknown UnknownWomen�s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) 1945 East Berlin 2 million 135 117World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) 1945 Budapest 150 million ca.270 123World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) 1946 London 500,000 ca.40 70 plusWorld Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 1945 Prague 206 million 92 81World Peace Council (WPC) 1950 Helsinki Unknown Unknown 142 plus

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World Peace Council (WPC).

The WPC is the preeminent Soviet internationalcommunis t f ron t organiza t ion . Al though nomembership figures are published for the WPC, it isthe largest front organization in the world. It is uniquein that other fronts have slots on the WPC Counciland Presidential Committee. It has avoided some ofthe early defections that plagued other major frontorganizations, but has twice been forced to move itsheadquarters because of subversive activities-fromParis in 1951 and from Vienna in 1957. Its researcharm, the International Institute for Peace, remains inVienna.

The WPC Counci l i s theore t ica l ly theorganization�s top policyrnaking body and consists ofsome 1,500 members appointed by its constituentnational affiliates, other international fronts, and allmembers of the Presidential Committee. The Councilmeets every 3 years and elects the president, vicepresidents (50), secretary general, and members of thePresidential Committee. The latter consists of about250 members, meets once a year, elects members ofthe WPC Secretariat, and identifies countries to begiven slots on the WPC Bureau.

In 1983, the WPC Bureau had 54 membersincluding the president, vice-presidents, secretarygeneral, and representatives from selected countries,but at least 11 vice-presidents and a secretary generalwere added in 1986 when the bureau was designatedthe WPC�s main executive body. It meets as often asnecessary, but has an approximately 20membersecre tar ia t employed fu l l t ime a t i t s Hels inkiheadquarters.

At the April 1986 meeting of the WPC, SovietPeace Committee president Yuriy Zhukov led asuccessful move to reestablish the post of secretarygeneral and appoint Finnish communist JohannesPakaslahti to the position. Zhukov also proposed theexpansion of the secretariat to include more WestEuropeans, and this appears to have been adopted.

Also by April, former Soviet Peace Committeefirst vice-president Oleg Kharkhardin replaced therelatively low-ranking Tair Tairov as the principalSoviet member and the day-to-day manager of theWPC Secretariat. These moves indicate that theSoviets are exercising tighter control over WPCpresident Romesh Chandra, a Politburo-level memberof India�s Communist Party, and that East-West issuesmay be given precedence over those concerning theThird World.

The WPC is registered with several UN bodies asan NGO. In 1981, it failed to attain the highestcategory of NGO recognized by ECOSOC, althoughother Soviet fronts have achieved that premier level.

It failed owing to British and US initiatives whichdisputed the WPC contention that it received nogovernmental funding, criticized its policies for beingonesided, and noted that it often espoused policiesdiametrically opposed to the UN.

The WPC enhances its role as the executor ofSoviet front group activity through complex ties tothe other front organizations described below. Inaddition, it directs or coordinates activities of othergroups, not necessarily recognized as direct Sovietfront organizations, that consistently support Sovietpositions on geopolitical issues. Examples of thesegroups and the degree of interinvolvement include:

� International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF)

The ILFPF was founded in 1973 with WPCpresident Chandra as its president, and currentSoviet WPC secretary Oleg Kharkhardin as itsexecutive secretary. ILFPF members have beenactive in WPC triennial peace congresses.Chandra, Polish communist leader TomasTravnicek, and Edith Ballantyne, ILFPFvice-president and secretary general of theWomen�s International League for Peace andFreedom, were cochairpersons of the 1983WPC World Peace Congress in Prague.Hermod Lannung, ILFPF vice-president andchairman of the World Federation of WorldFederalists, was the organizer of the 1986 WPCWorld Peace Congress in Copenhagen. TheILFPF is considered a front for the WPC.

� International Committee for EuropeanSecurity and Cooperation (ICSCE)

ICSCE�s president, Rev. Canon RaymondGoor, has long been a WPC �observer.� Oneof the ICSCE secretaries is Yevgeniy Silin, aSoviet. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, deputy CPSU IDchief and one of three Soviets serving on theWPC Presidential Committee, also plays asignificant role in the ICSCE. The ICSCE isconsidered a regional affiliate of the WPC.

� Generals for Peace and Disarmament (GPD)

A London-based organization of ex-NATOcommanders of flag rank; at least four of the13 GPD members are double-slated on theWPC. One of these, Portugal�s Francisco daCosta Gomes, is a WPC vice-president. TheGPD is considered a WPC front.

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World Federation of Trade Unions(WFTU)

The WFTU has evolved into one of the SovietUnion�s most significant front organizations, owingin part to the importance Moscow places on tradeunions. It is one of only two fronts having a WPCvice-presidency.

The WFTU, like the WPC, was forced twice tomove its headquarters from Western capitals becauseof subversive activities, before finally settling inPrague. It initially lost membership with the onset ofthe Cold War when socialist-oriented trade unionswithdrew to form the International Confederation ofFree Trade Unions (ICFTU). It again lost credibilityin 1978 with the withdrawal of Italy�s Eurocommunisttrade union federation. The WFTU has recouped someof its losses by forging close links with regional tradeunion confederations in the Third World.

The WFTU has organized a large bureaucracyalong geographic and functional lines. It has a congresswhich meets every four years; the next meeting isscheduled for East Berlin in September 1986. TheWFTU General Council meets annually and has a fulland an alternate member from each of its 90 affiliatesrepresent ing 81 count r ies and t rade unioninternationals (TUls). The WFTU Bureau consists ofthe president (Hungarian Communist Poli tburomember Sandor Gaspar) , s ix vicepres idents , asecretary general (Sudanese Communist centralcommitteeman Ibrahim Zakhariya), and a full and analternate member from each of 34 selected nationalaffiliates and TUls.

In theory, control flows from congress to councilto bureau to president and secretary general, but inpractice it seems to emanate from Boris Averyanov,its Soviet secretary seated in Prague. Averyanovrepresents the All-Union Central Council of TradeUnions (AUCCTU), whose International Departmenthe formerly headed, and which appears to be the topof the actual WFTU chain of command.

The WFTU directs 11 TUIs which function assubsidiaries. This is significantly different from theWPC, which acknowledges only one subsidiary, theInternational Institute for Peace. Each TUI appears tohave a Soviet secretary and is a constituent part of theWFTU. They are organized according to industry, withheadquarters mostly in Soviet bloc capitals (theexception is Helsinki).

The WFTU is a t tempt ing to gain inf luencethroughout the Third World. It cooperates closely withthe Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of LatinAmerica (CPUSTAL), headquartered in Mexico City;the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions(ICATU), Damascus; the Organization of African

Trade Union Unity (OATUU), Accra; and the Asianand Oceanic Trade Union Coordinating Committee(AOTUCC), New Delhi.

Each of the above groups has a core of WFTUnational affiliates, but also has been able to en enlistnon-NFTU unions. CPUSTAL and AOTUCC are smalland communist-oriented. CPUSTAL has a slot on theWPC proper, and the new AOTUCC secretary wasformerly WFTU�s Asian secretary. The ICATU, andOATUU are the trade union organs of the Arab Leagueand Organization of African Unity, respectively, andare the sole labor federations in their regions. Eachhas a slot on the WPC Presidential Committee.

The WFTU General Council session held inMoscow last year provided insights into WFTUsubsidiary organizations and fronts. The TUIs, the fourfederat ions noted above, and other communistinternational labor organizations attended, includingthe International Trade Union Committee for Peaceand Disarmament (the �Dublin Committee�) and theInternational Organization of Miners.

The Women�s InternationalDemocratic Federation (WIDF)

The WIDF theoretically ranks third in importanceamong the Soviet front organizations. It is the onlyf ront o ther than the WFTU to have a WPCvice-presidency, although it has not been as visiblyactive as its size and WPC position would seem towarrant. It did not suffer from early defections in thepost-World War II era because it did not have anymajor noncommunist affiliates. It lost membership,however, during the Eurocommunism upheaval in the1960s when its Italian affiliate withdrew from fullmembersh ip in 1964, and i t s French a ff i l ia terelinquished its leadership slot in 1969.

The WIDF governing body is its world congresswhich meets every 3 to 6 years and was scheduled inMoscow in June 1987. The WIDF Council, elected bythe world congress, is supposed to meet annually. It,in turn, elects a bureau and fulltime secretariat. WIDFpresident Freda Brown (Australia)-al so a WPCvice-president-and secretary general Mirjam VireTuommen (Finland) are both communists. The Sovietsecretary, las t reported to be Valer ia Kalmyk,representing the Soviet Women�s Committee, isassumed to be the general manager of the front.

The WIDF, like WFTU, has de facto regionalaffiliates in Africa, the Arab world, and Latin America:the All-African Women�s Organization (AAWO),Algiers; the Arab Women�s Federation (AWF), Cairo;and the Women�s Continental Front (FCM), Managua.AAWO has a slot on the WPC Presidential Committee.The FCM�s first �coordinator� (the late Doris Tijerino)

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also served on that body, but represented Nicaraguarather than the FCM.

The World Federation ofDemocratic Youth (WFDY)

The WFDY i s a Sovie t in te rna t iona l f rontorganization which has attempted to attract the supportof students and Young people. Although it has no WPCvice-president, it is one of only three organizationswhich have two regular members on the WPCPresidential Committee.

The WFDY history and structure are similar tothose of other major Soviet fronts. The anticommunistswho left the organization in 1950 did not provide anyserious competition.

Theoretically, the WFDY is governed by anassembly which meets every two to four years and isscheduled to meet again in Budapest in November1986. The assembly elects an executive committeewhich is supposed to meet semiannually. Only 67 ofthe 270 affiliates are represented on the executivecommittee. A smaller bureau, which meets whenrequired, apparently includes the fulltime secretariatmembers as well as the president, vice-presidents (10),secretary general, treasurer, and some 13 selectedadditional country representatives.

The WFDY is unusual in that it does not have aSoviet secretary. It is assumed that the Soviet vicepresident gives on-the-spot guidance when needed.In 1980, Vesvolod Nakodkin, representing theKomsomol and/or the Commit tee on YouthOrganizations (KMO), was the Soviet vice-president.

The WFDY has been successful in attractingcommunist and socialist national organizations asaffiliates from at least nine countries, primarily fromthe Third World. The organization also cooperatesoccasionally with the Social is t International�sInternational Union of Socialist Youth.

The WFDY has three subsidiary organizations:the Internat ional Commit tee of Chi ldren�s andAdolescents� Movements (CIMEA), the InternationalBureau of Tourism and Exchanges of Youth (BITEJ),and the International Voluntary Service for Friendshipand Solidarity (SIVSAJ). It appears to have de factoregional affiliates in the Arab Youth Union, Cairo, andthe Pan African Youth Movement, Algiers. Otherorganizations with which the WFDY has cooperatedinclude: the Council of European National YouthCommittees, the Ecumenical Youth Council of Europe,the Nordic Youth Center, and the International Unionof Socialist Youth.

With its student counterpart, the Internationalunion union of Students, the WFDY cosponsors World

Youth Festivals. These festivals are held every fewyears and a t t rac t an average a t tendance of10,000-34,000 people . They are the larges tinternational front meetings held under �unofficial�Soviet auspices.

International Union of Students(IUS)

When the president of the IUS criticized the 1968USSR invasion of Czechoslovakia, both he and theorganization�s secretary general, Nuri Abd-al-RazzaqHusayn (Iraq), were replaced. Husayn, however,reemerged as the secretary general of the Afro-AsianPeople�s Solidarity Organization.

The highest IUS body is its congress, which meetsevery two to four years, and last met in April 1984 inSofia. The congress elects the executive committee,which conta ins representa t ives of 53 of theorganization�s 112 affiliates.

The secretariat includes the president, 13 vicepresidents, the secretary general, 12 secretaries, andthe treasurer. As with the WFDY, there is no Sovietsecretary and it appears to be the Soviet vice presidentwho manages the organiza t ion . Al though thesecretariat is normally a fulltime working body, it isnot known if its non-secretary members live in Prague.The current president is Josef Skala of Czechoslovakia,the secretary general is Georgio Michaelides ofCyprus, and the Soviet vice-president is SergeyChelnikov, representing the Student Council of theUSSR.

The IUS cooperates most closely with the WFDY,with which it cosponsors world youth festivals andother events. Its president sits on the WPC PresidentialCommittee and it has de facto regional affiliates inLatin America, the Arab world, and Africa: the LatinAmer ican Cont inenta l Students Organiza t ion(OCLAE), Havana; the General Union of ArabStudents (GUAS), Damascus; and the All AfricaStudents Union (AASU), Accra. The OCLAE has a sloton the WPC Presidential Committee filled by its Cubansecretary general, Angel Arzuaga Reyes, and theAASU has a slot on the WPC itself. The IUS isbelieved to also be connected to the InternationalFederation of Medical Students Associations, whichsent representatives to the WPC�s June 1983 PragueAssembly.

Afro-Asian Peoples Sol idarityOrganization (AAPSO)

AAPSO was founded in 1957 as an extension ofthe WPC. I t s focus has been on � l ibera t ionmovements� and other specific Afro-Asian matters.

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It has two regular slots on the WPC PresidentialCommit tee , and a t leas t th ree of i t s v icepresidents-South Africa�s Alfred Nzo, Iraq�s AzizSharif, and the Congo�s Vital Balla-are also vicepresidents of the WPC. Many AAPSO nationalaffiliates are concurrently their nations� WPC affiliate(e.g., in Afghanistan, Bahrain, the Congo, Ethiopia,Ghana, India, Jordan, Libya, Malta, the Philippines,and the People�s Democratic Republic of Yemen).AAPSO and the WPC jointly run an InternationalCommit tee Agains t Apar the id , Rac ism, andColonialism in Southern Africa (ICSA).

Despite the definitive linkages, AAPSO has beenmore successful than most groups in avoiding theimage of being a Soviet front. In large part this is dueto Egypt �s ro le in the organiza t ion . AAPSOheadquarters have always been in Cairo and itspresident-currently Abd-al-Rahman Sharqawi-isalways appointed by the Egyptian Government.Egypt�s break with the Soviets, illustrated by theexpulsion of Soviet advisory personnel in 1972 andPresident Sadat�s renunciation of the Soviet FriendshipTreaty in 1976, was a setback and made Soviet controlmore obvious. No meeting of AAPSO�s highest body,its conference, took place between January 1972 andMay 1984 even though it had met every 2 or 3 yearspreviously.

Following the 1978 assassination of Ali Sabri,AAPSO�s Egyptian president/secretary general, thetwo jobs were separated. Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn,an Iraqi, became secretary general and remains sotoday. The organization has consistently followed theSoviet line and has diverged from that ofEgypt

The AAPSO Council is subordinate to the AAPSOConference and contains representatives from some 70national affil iates (approximately 15 additionalEuropean and Amer ican assoc ia te memberspresumably have a voice but do not vote). It has metirregularly. The council elects an executive committeewhich meets twice a year. A presidium-which in 1984included the president, vice-presidents (21), thesecretary general , and representat ives from 26additional countries-has met on the average of aboutonce a year since it was established in 1974. In 1985,the permanent secretariat in Cairo consisted of thesecretary general, four deputy secretaries general, atleast 10 secretaries, and a support staff.

Other organizations have close ties to AAPSO. TheAfro-Asian Writers Association (AAWA), an NGOwhich attended the 1983 Prague WPC Congress,appears to be an AAPSO subsidiary. The Havana-basedOrganization of Solidarity With the Peoples of Africa,Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL) originally was setup in 1966 to replace the AAPSO; but the Sino-Sovietdispute interfered, and OSPAAL has remained more

or less a relatively inactive regional extension ofAAPSO in Latin America.

An OSPAAL delegation�s coordination meetingwith the AAPSO leadership in October 1983 andOSPAAL�s apparent hosting of a meeting of the majorfronts in October 1985 may presage an increase in itsactivity. Secretary General Rene Anillo Capote (Cuba)represents OSPA A L on the WPC Pres ident ia lCommittee; the late secretary general of the AAWA,Alex La Guma (South Africa), was a WPC member.Another related regional organization is the Libyandominated Arab People�s Congress, headquartered inTripoli, but also having a slot on the WPC PresidentialCommittee.

The Christian PeaceConference (CPQ)

The CPC is a Soviet front organization aimed atenlisting support of the world Christian community.It has significant ties to the WPC. CPC presidentKaroly Toth sits on the WPC Presidential Committee,and CPC vice-president Richard Andriamanjato is aWPC vice-president representing Madagascar.

The All-Christian Peace Assembly meets every fiveto seven years, the last meeting being in July 1985. Itelects a continuation committee of about 100 memberswhich has met about every 18 months. It is apparentlyresponsible for electing both a working committee ofabout 50, meeting twice a year, and a separateinternational secretariat of about 25 members, meetingthree times a year.

The president, continuation committee chairman,secretary general, and vice-presidents constitute thepresidential board, which is part of the workingcommittee but not (except for the secretary general)of the international secretariat. There is a permanentoffice staff, and the newly elected Soviet deputysecretary general, Archpriest Georgiy Goncharov,representing the Russian Orthodox Church, is assumedto be the general manager. Other top officers includepresident Toth, continuation committee chairmanFilaret of the USSR, and secretary general LubomirMirejovsky of Czechoslovakia.

The CPC is unique in that its regional affiliatesare organic parts of the organization itself and maythus be considered subsidiary organizations: AfricanCPC, Dar-es-Salaam; Asian CPC, Bangalore; and CPCin Latin America and the Caribbean, Havana. The CPCdoes not represent European Catholics , who are underthe Berlin Conference of European Catholics, EastBerlin.

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International Organization ofJournalists (IOJ)

The IOJ was another front formed in the immediatepostwar era whose pro-Western e lements soonwithdrew when Soviet domination became evident. Inaddition to its normal front activities, it sponsorstraining centers for Third World journalis ts inBudapest ( for radio and TV), East Berl in (fornewspapers and magazines), Sofia (agriculture andeconomics specialty), Prague (newscasting specialty),and Havana (presumed regional center).

The IOJ congress, scheduled to meet every fouryears (in Sofia in October 1986), elects an executivecommittee and a presidium. It is not known which bodyelects the fulltime secretariat. Chief officers arepresident Kaarle Nordenstreng, Finland, and secretarygeneral Juri Kubka, Czechoslovakia; Boris Sakharovis the Soviet secretary representing the USSR Unionof Journalists.

The IOJ�s secretary general sits on the WPCPresidential Committee, and its Latin American defacto regional affiliate, the Federation of LatinAmerican Journalists (FELAP), Havana, has a slot onthe WPC proper. The IOJ also cooperates with theUnion of African Journalists and Federation of ArabJournalists (FAJ), presumed de facto regional affiliatesin those respective areas. FE LAP secretary generalLuis Suarez Lopez, Mexico, is an IOJ vice president,as is FAJ chairman Saad Qasim Hammudi, Iraq.

The Internat ional Federat ion of Social andDemocratic Press and the Prague-headquarteredInternational Radio and TV Organization also sentrepresentatives to the Prague June 1983 WPCmeeting. Little is known of the former, but the latter,which has ful l members in only four official lynoncommunis t count r ies ( the near -communis tNicaragua , Kampuchea , and Afghanis tan p lusFinland), takes part in the collective meetings of themajor fronts.

International Association ofDemocratic Lawyers (IADL)

The IADL is a Soviet front organization aimed atthe world legal and legislative communities. The IADLand the World Federation of Scientific Workers are theonly major fronts not represented directly on the WPCPresidential Committee. The IADL, however, has a sloton the WPC itself, and first vice-president GerhardStuby, Federal Republic of Germany, and vicepresident Jean Salmon, Belgium represent theirrespective countries at the WPC.

IADL congresses have met irregularly every twosix years (last in Athens in October 1984). IADL has

a council, a smaller bureau elected by the congress,and a fulltime secretariat. The main officers arepresident Joe Nordmann, France; first vice-president(and former secretary general) Gerhard Stuby, FRG;and Secretary General Amar Bentoumi, Algeria.Semyon Ivanov represents the Association of SovietJurists on the Secretariat.

The IADL has a joint working group with theWFTU Legal Commission. It also cooperates with theIOJ on an International Committee for the Defense ofJournalist Rights.

The IADL has a number of subs id iaryorganizations, mostly de facto regional affiliates,which support Soviet propaganda themes. TheAntiImperialist Tribunal of Our America (TANA),Managua, has a seat on the WPC Pres ident ia lCommittee-currently occupied by TANA presidentGuillermo Torriello Garrido, Guatemala. The IADLvice-presidents from Colombia and Cuba sit on theTANA executive committee.

The secretary general of the Arab Lawyers Union(ALU), Cairo, is Zuhayr-al-Midani, Syria, anotherIADL vice-president. The ALU formerly had a seaton the WPC Presidential Committee. The InternationalCommittee of Inquiry Into Israeli Crimes AgainstPalestinian and Lebanese Peoples, the InternationalCommission on Inquiries Into the Crimes of theMil i tary Junta in Chi le , and the In ternat ionalFedera t ion of Women in Legal Careers wererepresented at the WPC�s June 1983 Assembly andare believed to be connected to the IADL.

In other activities, the IADL has issued frequentstatements condemning noncommunist governmentsfor alleged cases against civil rights. It takes only ananti-US stand on disarmament issues, has supportedthe Afghanistan Government and the Sandinistas, andhas condemned Israel�s involvement in Lebanon.

World Federation of ScientificWorkers (WFSW)

The WFSW is a Soviet front organization in thescientific area which frequently undertakes genuinescientific related projects to attract noncommunistmembership and support. It has permanent standingcommittees on science policy, disarmament, andsocioeconomics. The WFSW supports the USSR ondisarmament issues and condemns SDI.

The WFSW General Assembly has met every twoto four years (last in July 1986 in Moscow). Theassembly elects an executive council of some 40members and a bureau consisting of the president,vice-president, secretary general, deputy secretarygeneral, assistant secretaries, and heads of regionalcenters (in Algiers, East Berlin, and New Delhi). TheJuly General Assembly reelected president Jean Marie

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Legay, France, and elected a new secretary general,Stan Davison , UK. I t i s no t known i f Sovie tvice-president 0. M. Nefedov was reelected.

The WFSW has a close relationship with the WPCand the WFTU and meets periodically with other majorfronts. It has had no direct representation to the WPCsince the 1980 death of its former president, E. H. S.Burhop of the UK, who sat on the WPC PresidentialCommittee.

World Federation of TeachersUnion (FISE)

The FISE is ac tua l ly a WFTU t rade unioninternational. It operates somewhat independentlywithin WFTU, for it takes part in the coordinationmeetings of the major fronts (the only TUI to so do).It therefore is considered a front organization forpurposes of this report.

The FISE has no direct slot on the WPC but itspresident, Lesturuge Ariyawansa, Sri Lanka, is amember of his country�s WPC delegation. DanielRetureau, France, is FISE secretary general, and theSoviet secretary is Dmitri Turchaninov, presumablyrepresenting the USSR Union of Education andScience Workers.

The FISE has a conference every two years (lastin Sof ia in 1985) which apparent ly e lec ts anadministrative committee. It has a small secretariat atits headquarters-five persons identified as members.In addition to its ties with the WFTU and WPC, itcooperates with the Confederation of AmericanEducators and the Federation of Arab Teachers.

Little is known about FISE subsidiaries andcooperating organizations. The Quito-based LatinAmerican Confederation of Associations of UniversityProfessionals has no known ties to the FISE, but itspresident, Leonidas Plaza Verduga, Ecuador, sits onthe WPC. The Paris-based International League forChild and Adult Education sent a delegate to the June1983 Assembly in Prague, but nothing further is knownof its possible connection to the FISE.

Asian Buddhists Conference forPeace (ABCP)

The ABCP is a Soviet front organization aimed atthe world�s Buddhists. It has especially close ties tothe WPC, a phenomenon shared with AAPSO andCPC, the other major fronts formed after the immediatepost-World War 11 era. It has two members on theWPC Presidential Committee and seven members onthe WPC Council. This representation is relativelyhigh for a front organization not in the mainstream.

The ABCP�s governing body is i t s GeneralAssembly (last met in Vientiane in February 1986).Its president, the Ven. Khambo Lama KharkhuoGaadan, and presumably its secretary general, LubsenTseren , a re Mongols . The key Sovie t in theorganiza t ion i s be l ieved to be Khambo LamaJimbaJamtso Erdeneer. In 1983 he was chairman ofthe Central Religious Board of Buddhists in the USSRand, as a member of ABCP Executive, one of its sevenmembers on the WPC. We have no addi t ionalinformation on the ABCP organizational structure andfunctions.

Esperantists Movement forWorld Peace

The Esperantists Movement for World Peace hadthree slots on the WPC during 1983-86, two of themoccupied by president Imre Pethes, Hungary, andsecre tary general Wil l iam Gilber t , France. I t sheadquarters location and size are unknown. It is alsoa member of the Universal Esperanto Association(UEA). The UEA is the parent organization of theWorld Organization of Young Esperantists (TEJO),which sent a delegate to the June 1983 WPC-sponsoredassembly in Prague.

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The use of forgeries to deceive an enemy or affectpublic opinion has been a staple of disinformationalmost throughout modern history, but no states haveused this tactic � c in peacetime as extensively as havethe Soviet Union and its allies. During the period1945-75, approximately three or four forgeries weredetected each year. Since 1976 the number ofdetections has more than doubled, and the rate hasincreased further in the 1980s. Old forgeries have alsobeen recycled for use with new audiences.

Forgeries can be more easily exposed than othertypes of active measures largely because carefulanalysis can often demonstrate convincingly that thedocument is a fake. The best evidence the United Stateshas that the Soviet Government is a source of forgeriesis statements by numerous KGB defectors; they havedescribed how the Soviet bloc governments useforgeries as an active measures tool. But it should benoted that in many cases we are not certain whoproduced a particular forgery. We are forced to relyon c i rcumstan t ia l ev idence un t i l we obta inconfirmation from a defector or through intelligencereporting. We can say, however, when a forgery isdesigned and released in such a way that it benefitsSoviet and/or bloc policies vis-a-vis US policyinterests, and conforms to a pattern evident in previousforgeries of Soviet origin, that the forgery may wellbe a Soviet active measure.

Forgeries are effective in at least three ways:

0 Even when unpublicized in the media, aforgery can cast aspersions on targetedgovernments and on individuals. This type offorgery, the �silent� forgery, can be the mostdamaging of all, for the victim does not knowthat the forgery is being circulated and maynever get the opportunity to refute it. Theforgery becomes an unknown factor directlyaffecting the victim�s relations with therecipient government.

0 When publicized, forgeries force the targetgovernment to spend time, effort, and fundson refutation.

0 Denial will never entirely offset the damagedone. Defectors tell us that even when thepurported author disclaims the forgery, the

Soviets calculate that people will assume�where there�s smoke there�s fire.� This doubtcan be compounded by repeated reference tothe forgery and its contents by the SovietUnion and/or its allies.

Once the initial cycle of surfacing, analysis, andexposure-denial has receded from public memory,reference to the forgery often resurfaces in Soviet orsympathetic publications. These stories repeat theforgery without mentioning the fact that the documenthas been discredited. This pattern, the �echo effect,�has been repeated almost indefinitely in many cases,including a faked US Army field manuaJ7 on US plansto destabilize foreign governments and a faked speechby former US Representat ive to the UN JeaneKirkpatrick.8

The forgeries chosen for repeated recirculation aregenerally those that deal with broad themes relatingto alleged US plots to destabilize Third World nations,or directly reinforce Soviet foreign policy goals. Forexample, the Kirkpatrick forgery-which alleged USsupport for, among other things, the breakup of Indiainto several independent nations and the exploitationof world hunger as a political weapon-has resurfacedmany times and in many varied contexts, sometimesreferred to by name, sometimes not.

Operational Aspects

Proposals for forgeries and other active measuresmay originate either in KGB headquarters or in theKGB residencies in the target country. Whatever thesource of the proposal, the local residency and Moscowcollaborate closely. Depending on the sensitivity andimportance of the document, approval of the forgerymay come from the KGB leadership, the CPSU CentralCommittee�s, or the CPSU Secretariat itself.

KGB specialists prepare the forgery under thesupervision of the Active Measures section, ServiceA, of the KGB�s First Chief Directorate. In cases whentimeliness is of overriding importance, some forgeriesprobably are prepared in the local residencies withoutmuch assistance from KGB headquarters. Theseforgeries are often characterized by a lack of technicaland linguistic expertise characteristic of a rush job.

Chapter V

Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures

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Although anyKGB agent or asset may surface aforgery, the operation is under the control of the chiefof the presidency�s active measures section.

Themes and Timing of Forgeries

Forgeries are typically used to support generalSoviet propaganda themes, including charges of.

0 US-directed subversion activities againstThird World regimes.

0 US and NATO Alliance opposition to armscontrol and disarmament, with a focus on suchissues as the installation of intermediate-rangenuclear force missiles in Western Europe andthe Strategic Defense Initiative.

0 US support for unpopular governments.

0 Inhumane practices, such as US use ofbiological and chemical weapons, particularlyin the Third World.

Often forgeries will place several of these themesin the same context, such as the Tyner letter, whichraised the theme of US-South African mil i tarycooperation along with that of chemica I/bio logicalwarfare.

Although most major forgeries, we believe, requiremonths of preparation, some credible fakes can beproduced in very short periods of time. Forgeries mostoften occur during certain circumstances or inconjunction with specific types of events, such as thoselisted below:

0 Intense anti-US propaganda campaigns.Forgeries can be used to substantiate majorthemes of a Soviet propaganda offensive.

0 Catastrophes and assassinations. After suchmajor international events as acts of terrorismor deaths of foreign leaders, forgeries or otherdisinformation efforts often surface to allegeUS responsibility. For example, after the deathsof Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, PresidentJaime Roldos of Ecuador, and General OmarTorrijos of Panama, Soviet media were repletewith stories and commentary insinuating UScomplicity in the deaths.

0 Western press criticism of the Soviet bloc.Western charges that the Bulgarians and theKGB were connected to the papalassassination attempt were probably a factor

in production of the Rome cables forgery,which described the �Bulgarian Connection�as a CIA-inspired plot. Also, Western pressreports on probable communist use ofchemical and biological weapons inAfghanistan and Cambodia may haveproduced charges of US chemical warfare inCentral America and allegations that theUnited States was breeding �killermosquitos� in Pakistan.9

0 Widely publicized incidents. The stationing offUS nuclear missiles in Western Europe set thescene for the Jorgenson letter. This forgeryattempted to exploit any negative Europeansentiment by falsely stating that NATO wasgoing to requisition homes in Denmark formilitary exercises.

Technical Aspects

Almost anything can be forged. Forgeries haveincluded entire issues of Newsweek magazine, acomplete US Army field manual, maps, classifiedcables, intelligence reports, and personal letters.

Forgeries may be complete fabrications like theKirkpatrick speech, the US Army field manual 3031B,or the Rome cables, altered versions of genuinedocuments such as the Swanepoel let ter or theNorthrop letter;10 or composites of several documents,some of which are genuine, some of which are not.

The Soviets have shown considerable technicalexpertise in fabricating US Government documents,but the quality varies greatly. Still, even the bestforgeries can usually be unmasked by analysis. Aknowledge of US policy is indispensable in detectingforgeries. Often a document may not �feel� right, ormay be at variance with clearly expressed policy.Forgeries may also contain errors that one experiencedin the wording of US documents can detect. These canbe obvious format errors, a wrong typeface, poorgrammar, or an inappropriate classification. Forgeriesoften contain statements the US Government simplywould not make , such as the le t te r f rom USAmbassador von Damm to the Austrian DefenseMinister calling on Austria to integrate its air defensesystem into that of NATO and thereby violate itsneutrality. To help determine whether a document is aforgery, several factors must be closely examined:

0 Surfacing

The document mus t reach the in tendedaudience without revealing its origin. It istypically mailed without a return address or

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with a spurious return address, or merely appears on ajournalist�s or government official�s desk. Forgeries ofalleged Soviet origin are always sent out or deliveredwithout a request for payment. There is often no directlink between the person sending the document and therecipient, ensuring that the recipient has no chance toask questions of the person delivering the document. Aforgery is most credible if it is surfaced innoncommunist�particularly Western-media, but this hasbecome more difficult over time for the Soviets toaccomplish, given the increasing awareness by journalistsof Soviet active measures. Forgeries often surface inprocommunist media with a predisposition to believe theworst about the United States or may be deliberatelyplaced in noncommunist media by a paid journalist.

0 Cover Letters

The document is often transmitted with a covering letterwhich attempts to reinforce the forgery. The cover letterusually summarizes the forgery and explains the author�smotive for transmitting it in terms of outrage over theforgery�s revelations. The letter is generally untraceableand usually unsigned or signed with an illegible signature.The major problems that the Soviets have occur insurfacing the forgeries. Anonymous cover letters andplain white envelopes are too well known to Westernjournalists. In the case of the Schweitzer letter, when theanonymous method of surfacing failed, the perpetratorswere forced to use a human contact which revealed theprobable source of the forgery. In the Skantze forgery,another forged document, a cover letter, was used to givecredence to the original forgery.

0 Format

The Soviets expend great effort to collect samples offorms, letters, stationery, and signatures as models fortheir efforts, but forgeries almost always contain smallerrors of format. Government procedures frequentlychange and their accurate duplication is almostimpossible for an outsider to achieve.

0 Language

The texts of forged documents often indicate that theyare not prepared by native speakers of current AmericanEnglish. One may find use of the British versus Americanspelling or note examples of stilted phraseology or wordchoice more appropriate to a 19th-century author. Some

expressions often appear to be literally translated fromRussian; for example, the word �concretized� in theDefense Mapping Agency letter.

0 News Value

In most cases the forgery tries to achieve uncriticalpublicity, therefore the document must be newsworthy.It may thus bear a high classification or purport to be thecorrespondence of a senior government official. Thename of every postwar US President has appeared on aforgery.

0 Timing

Forgeries are often linked to current issues. The suddenappearance of a purportedly secret document can in itselfbe a warning of fraud.

0 Photocopies

Forgeries rarely appear in an original form. (The onlyrecent exception is the von Damm letter.) They are almostalways circulated in photocopy form. This facilitatespreparation of fake documents on genuine stationery viaa �cut and paste� method in which a genuine signatureand letterhead can be juxtaposed with a fake text or, asin the case of the Northrop letter, a fake address placedon top of a genuine text.

The use of photocopies�and generally it is a photocopyof a photocopy, etc.�makes the task of analysis moredifficult. It is more difficult to disprove a document whenone does not have a paper sample of the original, atypeface capable of specific identification, or a clearletterhead.

0 Content

Forgeries tend to avoid specific allegations but mayhighlight statements that complicate US relations withanother government or exacerbate anti-US sentiments.For example, the Jorgenson letter attempts to createantiUS feeling among the Danish population, and the vonDamm letter implies US actions against Austrianneutrality.

The Soviet formula for forgery is basically that it be low keyand appear authentic. Forgeries usually refer to genuine officials,use actual letterheads and forms, follow rather logical scenarios,

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and cleverly exploit existing strains in international relations.

Impact

Behind the uncritical acceptance of forgeries often lie theprejudices of the deceived. Thus, the effectiveness of a forgerymay depend as much on the mental predisposition of the recipientas on the skills of the forger.

To some extent, the acceptance of a forgery as real dependson the credibility given it by the reporter--often, a newspaperreporter. Because of sophisticated and informed journalists, manyforgeries never achieve uncritical publication, or they appear onlyin communist or communist-dominated media.

Combating a forgery after it has surfaced is difficult. Even ifserious journalists consider it unsubstantiated, a forgery becomesnews if enough people have heard of it; the journalist has difficultyignoring it after it has been reported elsewhere. Any replay is atleast a small victory for the perpetrator, even if couched inskepticism. The only way truly to counter the technique of forgeryis to heighten awareness in target countries, particularly amongjournalists, of the possibility of active measures and their potentialfor damage.

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Examples of Forgeries

L Embassy Rome Cables

Description

The cables purported to be telegrams from the US Embassyin Rome to the State Department in August and December 1982.The August cable called for a concerted effort to draw publicattention to the Bulgarian and Soviet connections of accused papalassassin Mehmet Ali Agea. It implied the involvement of Italianintelligence, leading members of the governing Italian SocialistParty, and other leaders and political figures in the plot. TheDecember cable commended the success of this effort to link Agcawith the Bulgarians.

These forgeries are excellent. They are clearly the product ofa skilled and knowledgeable organization with great technicalresources, not the work of an isolated individual or small group.To the average reader there are no distinct flaws in the format orthe text. The discrepancies that enabled Embassy Rome to discreditthe cables were the absence of identifying numbers, such awkwardwording as �spynest Sofia� and �US services� which are not StateDepartment style, and a misuse of the TAG system (a StateDepartment information reference system) in which the forger usedthe symbol SU for the Soviet Union when it really refers to theSudan, and the fact that both cables were addressed to USIS whenit should have been USICA in August and USIA in December.

Purpose

The cables were designed to meet a current Soviet foreignpolicy need: to discredit growing suspicions of Soviet-Bulgarianinvolvement in the attempt to-, assassinate the Pope.

Surfacing

On July 13, 1983, the cables appeared in the advance editionof the leftwing Roman news weekly Pace e Guerra (Peace andWar). Copies of the article were distributed to news agencies. Thearticle contained allegations of a US plot to implicate the Bulgariansecret police and the KGB in the plot to kill the Pope. That sameday, July 13, two members of the Italian Parliament from theDemocratic Party of Proletarian Unity, who were elected on ajoint list with the Communists, wrote US Ambassador MaxwellRabb stating that they had received these documents and that theywere calling for a parliamentary investigation. The Ambassadorin a letter to the deputies branded the documents as forgeries. TheEmbassy successfully persuaded the responsible Italian press thatthe cables were the product of an effort to disinform Italian publicopinion.

The cables have been continually resurfaced by TASS andother communist publications. The cables were repeatedly citedin a 1984 series of articles on the Bulgarian connection inLiteraturnaya Gazeta and also appear in the book, John Paul H,Antonov, Acga--The Network (La Filliere) by French communistlawyer Christian Roullette. The cables were cited continuallyduring the coverage of the 1985 Antonov trial by Soviet and otherprocommunist media.

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II. The von Damm Letter

Description

The fabricated letter is addressed to AustrianDefense Minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager from USAmbassador to Austria Helene von Damm. It proposesthe integration of Austria�s air defense radar systeminto that of NATO-a flagrant violation of Austrianneutrality. It also comments on the increased risk toEurope from the stationing of modernized US missiles.The letter is the only forgery in recent years to appearin an original, not merely photocopied version. It ison genuine embassy letterhead stationery and typedon a machine identical to that in the Ambassador�soffice. The Ambassador�s signature, however, revealsthat it was copied or traced carefully and haltingly.There are microscopically evident deposits of driedink where the forger stopped and started again to drawthe signature. The German is considered to be theproduct of a native speaker. (Ambassador von Damm,

the purported author, was born and educated inAustria.) This was clearly a highly sophisticated pieceof work.

Purpose

The letter was designed to damage US-Austrianrelations on the eve of the Austrian President�s statevisit to the United States. -Also, it might have beendesigned to affect negatively the US image amongother West Europeans who would question the seemingUS manipulation of NATO.

Surfacing

The original copy of the letter was received byDefense Minister Frischenschlager on February 15,1984. I t was ident i f ied as a forgery but noannouncement was made. A copy was later sent to theAustrian magazine Basta, which forwarded it to itsparent publication Karier. The Defense Ministryimmediately informed the newspaper that the letter wasa fake. Kurier and other Austrian newspapers printedstories identifying the letter as a forgery and as aprobable Soviet active measure.

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III. The Defense MappingAgency Letter

Description

This letter purports to be a reply from the USDefense Mapping Agency to the South AfricanDefense Force complying with a request for satellitemaps of Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. Althoughthe letter is on DMA stationery, it is replete withimproper spelling, poor punctuation, and incorrectword choice. General Dutton, to whom the letter wasaddressed, was not in South Africa at the time the lettersurfaced, but was South Africa�s Ambassador to Chile,where he had been for several years. A curious aspectof the letter was the use of the word �concretize.�While it would appear to make no sense in English, itis a direct translation of a Russian word that could beused properly in the sentence in which it appeared.

Purpose

The forgery is part of an ongoing campaigndesigned to damage the US image in Africa bydepicting a close military cooperation between theUnited States and South Africa despite a continuingUS arms embargo.

Surfacing

Early in 1984, an African newspaper provided oneof our embassies with a copy of this letter. Theembassy queried the Defense Mapping Agency, whichresponded that the letter was a fake and illustratedvarious discrepancies. The letter was never publishedand thus represents something of a success story,illustrating how US efforts to inform journalists aboutactive measures have complicated the uncriticalpublication of forgeries.

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IV. The Olympic Hate Letters

Description

The leaflets purport to be the product of the Ku Klux Klanand are designed to discourage Asian and African athletes fromparticipation in the Los Angeles Olympics, threatening them withbodily harm. One version, sent to 10 African countries, wasdirected against blacks only. Another version, sent to Asian nations,was directed against blacks and �yellows.� The leaflets are notwritten in standard American English and contain errors typicalof a Slavic-language speaker in use of the definite article. Thevocabulary seems stilted and a bit 19th century (e.g., the word�curs�). Even the Ku Klux Klan�s name was used incorrectly. Theleaflets seem to have been something of a rush job. (FollowingWestern media refutations, TASS replayed the fakes with correctedusage of the Ku Klux Klan name.)

Purpose

The leaflets were part of an effort to tarnish the Los AngelesOlympics and bolster support for a boycott of the games. Thetheme is closely related to the Soviets� justification for their ownnonparticipation in the games-that the United States was incapableof guaranteeing the security of Soviet athletes.

Surfacing

Shortly after the Soviet Union announced its boycott of the1984 Olympics, the leaflets were mailed out in unmarked envelopesto 20 national Olympic committees from US post offices in Virginiaand Maryland, both within a 30-minute drive of Washington.Attorney General William French Smith announced that the letterswere KGB forgeries and part of, a major Soviet disinformationeffort. The US denial of the letters authenticity was credible. Notone recipient Olympic committee withdrew its team from thegames.

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V. The Jorgenson Letter

Description

This letter, allegedly signed by Danish General K. Jorgenson,informs Copenhagen area residents that their homes are going tobe requisitioned by US troops participating in September 1983NATO exercises. The Danish is considered to be imperfect,according to linguistic analysts. Interestingly, the letter refers toUSCINCEUR Plan 100-1, a wellknown fake US document thathas surfaced many times since It first appeared in 1967.12

Purpose

The letter was designed to create hostility among Danes towardNATO and the United States.

Surfacing

The letter was sent to elderly and handicapped citizens in theCopenhagen area. The forgery was exposed in the Danish presswhich implicated a communist youth group as being responsiblefor distribution of the letter.

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VI. The Schweitzer Letter

Description

This letter is allegedly a communication to Chilean PresidentPinochet from Interamerican Defense Board president, US ArmyLt. Gen. Robert Schweitzer. It describes a proported movementof Chilean troops to El Salvador and Honduras. The documentappears on genuine IADB letterhead and closely adheres to IADBstyle. The Spanish is idiomatic and believed to be the work of anative speaker.

Purpose

The letter aims to link Chile with the counterinsurgency in ElSalvador and implies a close level of US-Chilean militarycooperation that does not exist in fact.

Surfacing

The document surfaced in late 1984 in Rome where it appearedon a journalist�s desk. The journalist checked with Embassy Rome,which declared the piece to be a forgery. Although the journalistdid not publish the letter, it later appeared in an Italian news servicestory originating in Mexico. When that news service was advisedof the forgery, it investigated. It determined that an inexperiencedlocal employee in Mexico had run the story without checking withthe US Embassy. He had obtained the document from arepresentative of the Cuban/Nicaraguan- supported insurgentmovement of Guatemala.

When the initial anonymous attempt at surfacing the forgeryfailed, the perpetrators were forced to use a human source, thusexposing their hand. The forgery was later replayed throughoutthe world, with emphasis particularly in the Western Hemispherebut also in European countries. The IADB and the OAS disavowedthe letter, but considerable damage probably was done, given thewide press attention the letter received.

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VII. The Tyner Letter

Description

A letter allegedly from Walter Reed physician C. F. Tyner to ahigh-ranking Defense Department official describes the upcomingvisit to the United States of a team of medical experts from theSouth African military. The team would study the effects of certaindrugs that could be used in military applications, i.e. torture,interrogations, crowd control. The inconsistencies in the forgeryincluded spelling errors and the facts that Dr. Tyner would not bereporting directly to Dr. Borsting on such a matter and that Dr.Borsting�s title is not correct.

Purpose

The letter is another attempt to imply close military linksbetween the US military and the South African Defense Force anddamage the standing of the United States among African nations.The letter also alleges US use of drugs for military purposes, anallegation that relates to previously expressed charges of chemicalwarfare,

Surfacing

The letter appeared in the media of several African countriesin the latter part of 1985, linked to bizarre charges of alleged SouthAfrican-US-Israeli research into an ethnic bomb that would affectonly nonwhites. A copy of this letter was also sent to a prominentblack legislator who alerted the Defense Department to its content.

The Soviet Army newspaper Krasnava Zvezda reported thestory on December 27, 1985, attributing it to a Malagasynewspaper. After quoting the forged letter, the Soviet publicationreferred to �the racists and their transatlantic patrons,�

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VIII. AIDS in Jamaica Pamphlet

Description

During the spring of 1985, a pamphlet titledJamaica: At tent ion AIDS, appeared in severa linternational airports and was distributed in Kingston,Jamaica. It claimed to be from the German section ofMoral Majority which does not exist. It warns travelersto Jamaica and Haiti of the dangers of AIDS. Jamaicain fact had no AIDS problem. The tract is written inpoor, normative French.

Purpose

The document is designed to discourage travel toJamaica, specif ical ly to the Western-supportedInternat ional Conference of Democrat ic Youthoccurring in Kingston at that time. The forgerycoincided with a Soviet propaganda campaign againstthe Jamaica Youth Festival, which the Soviets saw asa rival to the Moscow Youth Festival held the sameyear.

Surfacing

The pamphlet was distributed at European airports,particularly to youths who appeared that they mightbe delegates to the aforementioned conference.

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IX. The USIA Questionnaire

Description

This document purports to be a questionnaire sentby USIA to citizens of foreign countries. It asks a widevariety of highly personal and sensitive questionsregarding finances, political ideology, organizationalmemberships, political opinions, and family. TheEnglish is excellent; it is a very clever fake.

Purpose

We believe that the perpetrators hoped that therecipients of this questionnaire, which was mailed witha covering note on USIA stationery, would takeconsiderable umbrage and would denounce the UnitedStates for asking these types of questions and seekingto gather large amounts of intelligence related data.

Surfacing

The questionnaire was mailed out in severalSoutheast Asian countries in 1984, generally tointellectuals or journalists, many of whom wereconsidered to be liberal in their political ideology. TheState Department became aware of the questionnairewhen some respondents returned completed versionsto various US embassies. Journalists and governmentswere alerted, and the anticipated press stories neveroccurred.

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X. The General Skantze Letter

Description

This letter purports to be from US Air Force General LawrenceSkantze to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger; it suggeststhat the United States needs bases in Turkish-held northern Cyprusto host US soldiers and their families when they are evacuatedfrom Western Europe in the event of a nuclear war in Europe. Theletter, which is totally false, refers to �the U.S. President�s strategicschemes in Europe.�

The letter is written in a style that betrays its writer as anormative English speaker.

Purpose

To accuse the United States of planning a limited nuclear warin Europe and to cause anti-American feelings among the GreekCypriots by claiming that the United States does not have anevenhanded policy regarding Cyprus.

Surfacing

The letter was sent to the Greek Cypriot newspaperSimerini and published November 28, 1985. To lend credence,it was sent with a cover letter purportedly signed by British M.P. Sir Frederic Bennett, a strong supporter of the AtlanticAlliance. This letter too was a forgery, but it served toauthenticate the original forgery. Sir Frederic exposed theforged letter attributed to him. On January 28, 1986, the LondonDaily Telegraph reported this case and attributed the forgery tothe KGB. It also reported that the Cypriot newspaper that hadcarried the forgery now admitted that thehad been duped.

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XI. The Kirkpatrick Speech

Description

This forged USIA cable purported to report the textof a speech presented by US Ambassador to the UNJeane Kirkpatrick to the February 1982 AmericanConservative Political Action Conference. Althoughthe forgery contained numerous items that weredesigned to anger a nonaligned audience, such assuggestions that the United States planned to use foodaid as a weapon and was planning to destabilize severalThird World regimes, the point that attracted mostattention in India was the allegation that the UnitedStates supported Indian separatist movements andfavored the �Balkanization� of that country. Thespeech also included unflattering remarks about IndiraGandhi�s government. Ambassador Kirkpatrick nevermade the speech attributed to her.

Purpose

The forgery was part of a series of active measuresaimed at Ambassador Kirkpatrick and was intendedto damage US-Indian relations. We believe that thishighly sophisticated disinformation effort was alsodesigned to influence representatives attending theMarch 1983 meeting of nonaligned nations in NewDelhi.

Surfacing

The forgery first surfaced in the January 25, 26,and 28, 1983, issues of the New Delhi newspaperPatriot, which has carried many previous items ofSoviet disinformation. It was repeated in the February6, 1983, issue of Link, a leftwing weekly. Its surfacingin January was probably premature and allowed theUS Embassy in New Delhi to expose is false both thedocument and its themes A number of leading Indiannewspapers exposed the document as �Sovie tdisinformation.� Nevertheless, the forgery and the�Balkanization of India� theme have frequentlyreappeared in Soviet and bloc propaganda, as well innoncommunist publications unaware of the document�sexposure.

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Footnotes

7SOViet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings beforethe Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committeeon Intelligence of the House of Representatives. 96th Congress,Second Session, February 6, 19, 1980. US Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C., 1980, pp. 86-10 1.8SOviet Active Measures, Special Report No. 110. September, 1983,US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington,D.C., September 1983, p. 6.9Soviet Active Measures: An Update, Special Report No. 101. USDepartment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.,July 1982, p. 3.10Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive). For informationon the Swanepoel letter and the Northrop letter, see Soviet ActiveMeasures, Special Report No. 110, p. 5.11Also see the Aviation Personnel letter in Soviet Active Measures:Focus on Forgeries,� Foreign Affairs Note, US Department of State,Washington, D.C., April 1983, Fi.-ure 6. It uses the phrase�competent bodies,� a Russian euphemism for security serviceswhich has no similar meaning in American English.12Soviet Active Measures. Hearings before the Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligence, House of Representatives. 97thCongress, Second Session, July 13-14,1982, pp. 74-85.

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One of the most threatening and difficult-toidentifySoviet act ive measures is the use of agents ofinf luence- indiv iduals used cover t ly to in jec tSovietfavored views into government, political,journalistic, business, labor, and academic circles offoreign countries. While the term �agent of influence�is normally used to distinguish foreign individualsengaged in influence operations from those who collectintelligence, in some cases agents are used for both.KGB officers are usually involved in these operations,but Soviet journalists, academicians, and otherofficials may play a role as well.

Types of Relationships

The KGB uses several terms to characterizedifferent types of Soviet relationships with foreignersused in influence operations. These terms reportedlyare used loosely, and the relationships vary from caseto case in the extent of cooperation involved, thedegree of leverage or control the Soviets are able toexert, the frequency of contact, and the type of rewardreceived by the foreigner. Rewards range fromfinancial payments to such intangible benefits aspublicity of the collaborator�s accomplishments or thepromise of special channels of communication to theKremlin.

Three of the terms used by the KGB in referenceto agents of influence are:

0 A t rusted relat ionship is one between aforeigner in a high position and a Soviet whomay or may not be an intelligence officer. Theextent to which the foreigner-called a trustedcontact-cooperates with the Soviets rangesfrom very limited to complete cooperation.

0 A controlled agent of influence is a foreignerwho has actually been recruited by the KGB.Often these individuals are developed as agentsin their youth and later achieve prominence.The KGB often, but not always, providesfinancial assistance. Once the individual hasbeen recruited, he may not be contacted againuntil he has reached a position of importance.

0 A special contact i s an ind iv idua l whomaintains a relationship with the KGB in acountry that has close relations with the USSR,and where active KGB recruitment of agentsis constrained by political considerations.Although the special contact does not receivea regular salary from the KGB, the relationshipis often reinforced by gifts and other forms ofattention.

The motivations of foreigners whom Moscowregards as agents of influence or special contacts canvary widely. Some individuals cooperate with theSoviets basically because they are flattered by Sovietattention and favors. Others cooperate out of fear; at ime-honored KGB prac t ice i s to compromiseforeigners visiting the USSR so as to make themvulnerable to blackmail later. Still other individualscooperate largely because of ideological compatibilityor because their own tactical political objectivescoincide with those of the Soviets. In addition, someforeign leaders may find it convenient to maintain atie to the KGB in the belief that it serves as an effectivechannel for expressing views to Moscow.

Foreign Targets

The USSR undoubtedly puts a high priority oninfluencing government policies as directly as possibleby developing agents within the senior leadership offoreign governments and their support staffs. But theKGB also targets individuals and organizations withinleading opposition circles who may be able to exertpressure on the ruling government, or may in timebecome members of the government. In addition, theKGB targets individuals who are expected to becomeopinion leaders, such as journalists and academics.

Soviet intelligence tries to recruit individualsacross the political spectrum. While it presumably iseasier for the Soviets to establish relationships withforeigners of compatible ideological orientation,Soviet intelligence officers are encouraged to findsome common ground or interest that enables them todevelop connections with non-leftists-even politicalconservatives-as well. In noncommunist countries, theKGB places special value on relationships withforeigners who are not identified as communists,

Chapter VI

Soviet Agents of Influence

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mainly because of their greater credibil i ty andoperational freedom.

Most of the information on agents of influence hasbeen derived either from Soviet and bloc defectors orfrom investigations and arrests of suspected agents. Itis always difficult to determine just how muchinfluence the Soviets are able to exert through agents,but the following cases demonstrate the variety ofindividuals that are targeted by the Soviets and theopportunities available to Moscow to shape foreignpolicies and opinions through these agents.

The Arne Treholt Case

Arne Treholt, head of the Norwegian ForeignMinistry Press and Information Office, was convictedin June 1985 and sentenced to 20 years for working asa Soviet agent from 1974 until his arrest in January1984. Treholt reportedly had first come into contactwith the Soviets in 1967 when he was a young politicalactivist and journalist, but was not activated as anagent until he became a secretary to Jens Evensen, theNorwegian Minis te r for Trade and Shipping .Subsequently he served as an embassy counselor atNorway�s UN Delegation in New York and spent a yearas a student at Norway�s Defense College.

Treholt was convicted primarily for his espionagework for the Soviets, but he also had substantialopportunity to influence Norwegian policy. Forexample, he played an important role in the 1970snegotiations between Norway and the USSR ondelimitation of the continental shelf of the Barents Sea,and he had a hand in the gray-zone fisheries agreementbetween the two countries. While we have no specificinformation that Treholt lobbied on Moscow�s behalf,the fisheries agreement that he helped to negotiate waslater criticized as biased toward the USSR. During thisperiod, Evensen also resurrected the concept of a�Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,� a favoriteSoviet theme in arms control propaganda.

Other High-Level Officials

While the Treholt case is the most infamous recentone involving a high-level official, a number of otherSoviet agents have been in positions where they couldinfluence their governments� policies. For example:

Hirohide Ishide�a former Japanese laborminister, Liberal Democratic Party member ofthe Japanese Diet, and head of the Dietmen�sLeague for Japan-Soviet Friendship�retired in1983 after being publicly identified by formerKGB officer Stanislav Levchenko as a Soviet

agent of influence. An example of Ishide�spromotion of Soviet interests occurred whenVictor Belenko landed his Soviet MiG-25 inJapan in 1976. According to Levchenko, Ishide,under KGB instructions, lobbied the PrimeMinister and his cabinet colleagues to return theplane to the USSR without examining it.

Sidek Ghouse, political secretary to Malaysia�sDeputy Pr ime Minis te r, was ar res ted in1981-short ly before his boss became PrimeMinister-and subsequently convicted asSovietagent. The Malaysian Government also expelledthree Sovie t Embassy off icers accused ofrecruiting Ghouse. Although not known to haveengaged in active measures operations during histhree years as KGB agent, Ghouse would havebeen well positioned to do so within the PrimeMinister�s office.

The Soviets have also routinely tried to developinfluence assets in Third World countries closelyaligned with USSR. For example, according to Sovietdefector Vladimir Sakharov, the Soviets in Egypt wereinvolved with recruiting local politicians in the 1960s,and claimed to have coopted Ali Sabri, chairman ofthe Arab Socialist Union-Egypt�s ruling and sole legalparty at the time.

Another example is provided by documentscaptured in Grenada after the US rescue mission there.They suggest that Moscow, in addition to influencingPr ime Minis ter Maur ice Bishop d i rec t ly, a l soattempted to influence the policies of Bishop�sgovernment through contacts with Bernard Coard, theleader of the subsequent coup against Bishop.

Penetrating the Opposition

The KGB has also been active in recruiting agentswithin major opposition parties. One of the apparentlymore successful of these operations was its penetrationof the Japan Social is t Party (JSP), the largestopposi t ion par ty in Japan. The JSP has beenparticularly attractive to the Soviets because of itslongstanding antinuclear positions. According toLevchenko, during the 1970s the KGB had more than10 agents of influence within the JSP-including severalmembers of the Japanese Diet-and through them couldcontrol the party�s political platform. KGB influenceover the party probably has waned since then becauseof Levchenko�s revelations and the JSP�s move towardthe political center to improve its popularity. However,several individuals who were publicly identified byLevchenko as �trusted contacts� continue to participatein JSP affairs.

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The Sovie ts have a lso sought to penet ra teopposition peace and antinuclear groups-particularlyin Western Europe- to put pressure on the i rgovernments. In 1983, a Soviet second secretary wasexpelled from West Germany for trying to enlist agentsto influence the West German antinuclear movement.During the same year, the Swiss Government expelledthe director and ordered the closure of the USSR�sBern-based Novosti bureau, charging that the bureauhad been used as a center for the �political andideological indoctrination� of young members of theSwiss peace and antinuclear movements.

Targeting Journalists

The Soviets also give high priority to recruitmentof foreign journalists who can help shape the opinionsboth of elite audiences and of the general public. TheKGB uses these individuals to place articles-includingdisinformation and forgeries, to influence the editorialline of newspapers, and to publish special letters. KGBofficers normally meet with their press assets to givethem guidance on what to write, and frequently providefinancial support. The Soviets have been particularlyadept at penetrating and manipulating the media in theThird World, but they have also had some significantsuccesses in the more sophisticated press of WesternEurope and Japan:

0 One of the more celebrated cases was that ofPierre-Charles Pathe, a French journalistconvicted in 1979 of acting as a Soviet agentsince 1960. The Soviets provided funds toPathe so he could publish a private newsletter,and they reviewed his articleswhich subtlypushed the Soviet line on a wide range ofinternational issues-prior to publication. Thesubscribers to Pathe�s newsletter includedalmost 70 percent of the members of the FrenchChamber of Deputies and almost 50 percentof France�s Senators.

0 Another important agent of influence wasDanish journalist Arne Herlov Peterson, whowas arrested in 1981 and charged with carryingout illegal activities for the USSR. Althoughhe was not convicted, the Danish Governmentmade avai lab le ev idence tha t Pe tersonapparently was recruited several years earlierby the KGB. He served the Sovie ts bypubl i sh ing Sovie t - suppl ied an t iNATOpropaganda tracts, conveying funds to peaceorganiza t ions , and d issemina t ingSoviet-prepared forgeries. Peterson received

from the Soviet Embassy gifts, free travel, andcash payments.

0 Levchenko claimed that in Japan the KGB hadagents in most of the major newspapers andmedia outlets. One of them, the editor of oneof the largest newspapers in Japan, resignedin 1983 after being publicly identified as aSoviet agent. He had reportedly been involvedin a number of Soviet ac t ive measures ,including the surfacing of the forged �last willand testament of Chou En-lai�-an operationconsidered by the KGB to have been verysuccessful. Other media assets apparentlycontinue to promote Soviet interests in Japan.For instance, one journalist identified byLevchenko as a �trusted contact� published astory in 1984 supporting the Soviet version ofthe KAL shootdown.

Other Influence Channels

In addi t ion to regular agent -of - in f luenceoperations, the Soviets establish other types ofrelationships to influence foreigners. For example, theKGB-along wi th the CPSU�s In te rna t iona lDepartment-use Soviet academics to try to influencethe ideas of their Western counterparts. Both the KGBand the ID play a role in selecting Soviet participantsfor fore ign conferences , and Sovie t de legatescommonly receive guidance from the ID. Moscowdoubtless hopes that Westerners will accept Sovietsaffiliated with �think tanks�-such as the Institute ofthe USA and Canada of the USSR Academy ofScience-as bona fide nonpolitical colleagues, and thatWesterners will underestimate the extent to whichthese individuals are operating under Moscow�sinstructions.

The USSR also uses Soviet citizens as unofficialsources to leak information to foreign journalists andto spread disinformation that Moscow does not wantattributed directly. One of the most prolific of theseindividuals is Vitaliy Yevgeniyevich Lui-better knownas Victor Louis-a Soviet journalist who several KGBdefectors have independently identified as a KGBagent. In addition to his leaking such newsworthyitems as Khrushchev�s ouster, the imminent Sovietinvasion of Czechoslovakia, and the reassignment ofMarshall Ogarkov, he has been used to try to discreditthe memoirs of Stalin�s daughter Svetlana and, morerecently, to surface a videotape on the physicalcondition of Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov. Afterthe Chernobyl accident, Victor Louis was the vehiclefor publicizing distorted statements by Sakharov thatimplied he was supportive of the Soviet handling ofthe accident and critical of the Western reaction to it.

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