South Asian Strategic Stability Institute · Research Report No. 27 3 Sana Danish argued that...

US Counter Proliferation Strategies Post 9/11:Implications for Pakistan

By Sana Danish - Series Editor: Maria Sultan

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RESEARCH REPORT

2727

SEPTEMBER 2009

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US Counter Proliferation Strategies Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan

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South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)36 Alie Street, London, E1 8DA

© South Asian Strategic Stability Institute 2009

Sana Danish

SASSI Research Report 27

September 2009

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CBP Customs and Border Protection

COTS commercial-off-the-shelf

CP Counter Proliferation

CPI Counter Proliferation Initiative

CSI Container Security Initiative

GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

LAN Local Area Network

LOS Law of the Sea

MPI Mega Ports Initiative

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

RIID Radiation Isotope Identification Device

SECDIV Strategic Export Controls Division

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

CONTENTS

1. Introduction …………………………………………………………..........................…. 2

2. What are Counter Proliferation Initiatives ......................................................................... 3

2.1 CSI ………………………………………………………………............................... 4

2.2 PSI ………………………………………………………………............................... 6

2.3 UNSCR 1540 …………………………………………………..............................…. 8

2.4 GICNT …………………………………………………………............................... 10

3. CP initiatives and Pakistan ………………………………………………....................... 10

3.1 CSI and Pakistan ………………………………………………................................ 11

3.2 Pakistan's implementation of 1540 ……………………………................................ 12

3.3 Pakistan and PSI ………………………………………………................................ 13

3.4 Pakistan and GICNT ………………………………………….............................…. 14

4. Analysis …………………………………………………………………....................... 14

5. Policy Recommendations ………………………………………………...................…. 18

6. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………...................… 19


Sana Danish*

Abstract

Under Bush administration Counter Proliferation (CP) initiatives were

launched in the backdrop of 9/11. The innovation of CP strategy is that of

emphasis on use of force and interdiction as a policy. The tools of CP are

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI),

United Nations Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) and Global Initiative to

Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). These are different from non

proliferation measures such that they are United States (US) dominated and

are not treaty based, hence impinge upon the sovereignty of participating

states and do not give them any bargaining space. This paper discusses the

impact of endorsing these initiatives on Pakistan, a de facto nuclear weapon

state.

* The author is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute.

US Counter Proliferation Strategies Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan SEPTEMBER 2009

2 Sana DanishResearch Report No. 27

1. Introduction

he non proliferation norm was set into Tpractice by the US in leadership role in late

1960's by the establishment of a multilateral

treaty, the NPT. As a consequence US became

the greatest proponent of the non proliferation

policy. The US pursued non proliferation

strategy which mainly focused on multilateral

treaties and arrangements. But the focus shifted

from non proliferation to Counter Proliferation

(CP) with the demise of USSR when US

assessed that the threats it now faced to its

national interests and its people were now posed

by the rogue states and terrorist groups.

In 1993 Clinton administration outlined a new

US approach to non proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD) in post cold war era

posed by the irresponsible states and terrorist 1organizations. But it came to limelight as the

pivotal point of US national security strategy

after 2001 under the administration of President

Bush.

However, the central argument around which

the whole paper revolves is that whether CP will

serve as best for all members or not, especially

Pakistan. What are the tangible costs and

benefits of joining CPI? And how will the

compliance to CPI translate into other tangibles

such as enhancing national security, enhancing

trade and commerce, providing access to

nuclear industry, allowing peaceful application

of nuclear science and technology, and in

Pakistan's case, according nuclear power status.

The government of Pakistan has rendered every

effort to assimilate its non proliferation policy

with international non proliferation regime. But

considering the changed approach Pakistan has

its own concerns.

The traditional non proliferation measures in

their classic sense were mainly consisting of

multilateral treaties and regimes with all

participating states having equal space for

bargaining, thus giving collective ownership to

the participating states. However, the post 9/11

CP initiatives are mainly US dominated and are

not treaty based, hence are comprising of

'coalition of the willing'. Arguably, CP and non

proliferation are the two sides of the same coin.

The purpose of both is to control proliferation.

The can be difference is that of the structure and

the approach in pursuing both the policies. The

CP initiatives have no clear rights and obli-

gations, are not negotiated under UN framework

and have no international backing. There is a

huge power differential between the core groups

and the participating states, their methodology

is aggressive and use of force is the hallmark of

them all. Will such initiatives serve as best for all

members?

The tools of CP are Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative

(CSI), United Nations Resolution 1540

(UNSCR 1540) and Global Initiative to Combat

Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). These tools and ad

hoc mechanisms can be described as a

multifaceted approach to prevent proliferation

and nuclear terrorism and are together referred

to as CP. US has laid down its diplomatic and

strategic priorities for combating WMD

terrorism built on the objectives set forth in

National Strategy to combat WMD terrorism.

Those objectives clearly call for developing

innovative approaches that blend counter

proliferation, non proliferation and counter

terrorism efforts to counter WMD threat. The

three main ingredients of CP identified in

National Strategy to Combat WMD 2002 are

interdiction, deterrence and defence and 2mitigation. This acknowledges pre-emptive

measures in appropriate cases and active

defences including air and missile defences. It is

1 Presidential Decision Directives, December 1993, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm, retrieved on March 13, 2008

2 “National Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”, , 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

U.S. Department of State



argued that “the best defense against

proliferation and terrorism is a good offense

backed up by effective deterrent, operational, 3and mitigative plans and capabilities.”

The innovation of CP strategy is that of

emphasis on use of force and interdiction as a

policy. Interdiction is to be done by improving

the US military, intelligence, technical and law

enforcement communities to prevent WMD 4proliferation. Since with the arrival of new

approaches to deal with the proliferation

problem, non proliferation measures seem to

have been placed in the background and it is

likely to remain so in the coming years.

In this paper it is argued how the current trends

in CP would affect Pakistan in the years to come.

This paper seeks to answer a couple of

fundamental questions with regards to CP that

may impact Pakistan's interest directly. Pakistan

has been a staunch supporter of multilateralism

and has faced pressures for upholding

multilateralism. So basically the contention is

that whether multilateral way forward is the

right approach or if unilateral system enshrined

in bilateralism the right way forward? And

secondly does joining CP initiatives limit state's

sovereignty and bargaining strength vis-à-vis

international nuclear non proliferation regime?

Does compliance to CPI provide tangible

benefits?

As stated earlier, the answers to the questions

raised in this paper have a direct bearing on

Pakistan's interest particularly because Pakistan

is a de facto nuclear weapon state. It is of great

relevance to Pakistan that endorsing the said

initiatives should not mean to corner Pakistan

by implication or otherwise. The paper will first

discuss in detail what the initiatives are, their

provisions and the later half will discuss how

these initiatives would affect Pakistan.

2. What are Counter Proliferation

Initiatives?

he US believes that the security of the US is Tdepended upon the skill as well as the

vigilance with which the US government

protects its people, its homeland and its allies.

Therefore under the Bush administration

emphasis was laid on developing new measures

to counter the post 9/11 threats as envisaged in

National Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass

Destruction.

Actually, the post 9/11 environment has given

an enabling environment for the operative

implementation of CP initiatives since it is

argued that the existing non proliferation regime

fails to address issues of indigenous technology

development and transfers by non parties and

non state actors, including individuals,

commercial and criminal entities and terrorists.

CP pertains to strategies adopted after

proliferation has occurred to compel these

actors to give up those unconventional military 5capabilities.

The previous US administration downgraded

the earlier treaty and regime based approaches.

It is said that the US Counter Proliferation

policy was launched in response to the two

underlying assumptions that WMD and missile

capabilities have and will continue to

proliferate; and use of these weapons against US

forward-deployed forces, US friends and allies,

or even US or allied homelands is increasingly 6

likely.

3

Quarterly, Spring 2003.4 Peter Lavoy, “What's new in the new US strategy to combat WMD?”, Strategic Insights, Vol. 1, issue 10,

December 2002.5 Michael Nacht, “US Counter Proliferation policy”, Wilson Center, January 28, 2005, available at

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=107038&fuseaction=events.event_summary, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

6 Jason D. Ellis, “The Best Defense: Counter Proliferation and US national Security”, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003.

Jason D. Ellis, “The Best Defense: Counter Proliferation and US national Security”, The Washington

SEPTEMBER 2009



Several new mechanisms have been introduced

considering the urgency and nature of threat

posed by the terrorist groups and rogue states.

These new measures include maritime

interceptions, essentially focusing on air

transport and seagoing craft because they are

vulnerable in terms of security. These initiatives

are essentially informal groupings of states such

as PSI and GICNT, or US customized unilateral

initiatives enshrined in bilateralism such as CSI

and Mega Ports Initiative (MPI) and UNSCR

1540 that establishes binding obligations on all

member states to take effectively stringent

measures to curb the proliferation of WMD,

their delivery means and related materials.

2.1 Container Security Initiative (CSI)

Announced in January 2002, CSI is an extension

of the Advance Commercial Information

program. The US Customs Services, now US

Customs and Border Protection (CBP),

launched CSI, proposed by Commissioner

Bonner to secure an indispensable but

vulnerable link in the chain of global trade: the

oceangoing sea container. Ensuring the security

of the maritime trade system is essential, given

that approximately 90 percent of the world's 7cargo moves by container.

CSI was introduced as a part of developing anti-

terrorism program to secure US homeland and 8its people. This initiative protects containerized

shipping, which is the main method of global

trade from being exploited or disrupted by

terrorists. It addresses border security and is

designed to safeguard global marine trade while

enabling legitimate cargo containers to move

faster and more efficiently through the supply 9chain to seaports worldwide.

CSI is a reciprocal program through which

participant countries are provided with the

opportunity to send their customs officers to

major US ports to target ocean-going cargo in 10containers, being exported to their countries.

Containers are identified and inspected at

foreign ports before they are destined for US.

Automated targeting tools are used to identify

containers that pose a potential risk for

terrorism, based on advance information and 11strategic intelligence. A proactive stance by

Customs in screening sea containers will

significantly contribute to the agency's overall

efforts to secure the borders against dangers that

might be introduced through commercial 12

traffic.

US Customs and Border Security Program has

stationed multidisciplinary teams of US officers

from both CBP and Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) to partner with foreign

government counterparts to target and prescreen

containers and to develop additional investi-

gative leads related to the terrorist threat to 13

cargo destined to the US. The technology used

to prescreen high risk containers is large scale

X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation

detection devices.

The US customs officers work with their

counter parts in host countries to determine

7

at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2002/March/custoday_csi.xml, retrieved on October 13, 2008.8 “CSI in brief”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, available at

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml, retrieved on October 13, 2008.9 “Container Security Initiative”, Canada Border Services Agency, available at http://www.cbsa-

asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/csi-irsc-eng.html, retrieved on October 13, 2008.10 Fact Sheet, “US Customs and Border Protection”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, October 2, 2007,

available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/, retrieved on October 13, 2008.11 “CSI in brief”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security , available at

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml, retrieved on October 13, 2008. 12 “Container Security Initiative to safeguard U.S., global economy”, US Customs Today, March 2002, see on

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2002/March/custoday_csi.xml. 13 “CSI in brief”, op.cit..

“Container Security Initiative to safeguard U.S., global economy”, US Customs Today, March 2002, available

SEPTEMBER 2009



security criteria for identifying the high risk

containers. A participating nation depends upon

its domestic laws while discussing the

implementation of the CSI but in order to

accommodate the differences separate

declarations are drafted with each participating

port. If required, CBP also reviews existing laws

and crafts new legislation to support implemen-14

tation of CSI.

The US claims that customs administrations all

over the world are committed to joining CSI. It

is now operational at ports in North, Central, and

South America, the Caribbean, Europe, Africa, 15the Middle East, and throughout Asia. The

World Customs Organization, European Union

(EU) and G8, it is said are on their way to intro-

ducing and implementing security and

inspection procedures similar to that of CSI at 16ports through out the world.

It is argued in favour of CSI that since the world

economies rely heavily on international trade

system, which in turn relies on containerized

shipping therefore having CSI, implemented on

their ports is an added means for the protection

of their borders and cargo containers. The most

significant argument given is that CSI is a

'deterrent' to terrorist organizations that may 17

seek to target any foreign port. Having this

initiative in place gives a significant measure of

security not only to the US but to other

participating ports as well.

With CSI implemented globally, a kind of global

security regime is formed on the ports. If

terrorists were to carry out an attack on a seaport

using a cargo container, the maritime trading

system would likely grind to a halt until seaport

security is improved. Participating ports handle

containerized cargo far sooner than other ports

that haven't taken steps to enhance security. In

the event of a terrorist attack the CSI ports will

have a competitive advantage and would 18experience least security disruption.

Since the customs administrations of the

participating nations work in collaboration with

the US Customs administration therefore this

brings an improvement in their capabilities and

overall effectiveness of the targeting process.

Since the effective implementation of CSI

requires additional sea cargo information in

advance be provided to US CBP, this will also 19benefit other participating nations.

It will improve their opportunity to obtain

advance information on potential threats and

containers that was not previously available and

it will give them a chance to collaborate with

foreign countries' customs services to identify 20

high risk containers. It is a pre-requisite that a

state must be ready to share critical data,

intelligence and information with the US

Customs and Border protection. However, this

information sharing can prove to be detrimental

for a participating state's national interest. How

much information and what level of information

is to be shared should be a state's decision.

Joining the initiative will curtail the sovereign

decision making of the participating state.

It is generally argued that since all the nations

have stakes in protecting global trade and global

economy because a terrorist attack on US or

anywhere else in the supply chain is going to

have a worldwide impact, therefore, adopting

and implementing CSI would be beneficial to all

the national economies of the world. Through

collaborative targeting and analysis, the trade

14

15 Fact Sheet, “US Customs and Border Protection”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, October 2, 2007, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

16 “Container Security Initiative: 2006-2011 Strategic Plan”, U.S. Custom and Border Protection, Washington Dc, August 2006.

17 Fact sheet, op.cit.18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.20 Ibid.

Ibid.

SEPTEMBER 2009



has become more secure in each commercial

port.

Apart from the CSI benefits, there are also

significant financial costs for implementing CSI

security measures of non intrusive inspections

and screening by using radiation detection

technology to screen high-risk containers. The

host country determines who pays for the direct

cost of screening and unloading containers. In

the US the importer pays the costs associated

with moving, inspecting, and unloading 21containers.

The average cost per CSI port includes: site

assessments and certifications, telecom circuit

installation, Local Area Network (LAN) and

office equipment, commercial-off-the-shelf

(COTS) software, office furniture, Radiation

Isotope Identification Device (RIID) equip-

ment, purchase of automobiles, initial lease and 22

utilities costs and initial shipping costs.

It is argued that this initiative does not entail

substantial new costs to the host nations. CBP

pays to deploy officers and computers in foreign

seaports and many host nations already have

screening and detection technology in place.

And as far as additional detector or IT

equipment needed to implement CSI is

concerned, the proponents argue that the

investment is well worth it considering that it is

insurance because CSI protects the port and the 23national economy of a CSI host country.

In its spirit, CSI can be called a good initiative.

However, it does raise a number of questions

that can have an impact on the credibility of the

initiative. This is a US dominated initiative

primarily serving US interest. The first issue

that can be raised is that of the sovereignty of the

participating nations. Despite their claims, a

participating port is not independent in deciding

which container is of potent threat. With CBP

officials deployed on the participating ports,

little space is left for participating ports to take

autonomous decisions, which raises issues with

regards to the sovereignty of a participating

nation.

All the critical information and data is to be

transmitted to the US which can be crucial, in

the sense that it can be used against the

participating state. Stakes for a state such as

Pakistan are more since Pakistan's nuclear

program is outside NPT and any arrangement

outside the multilateral and legal framework of

international non proliferation regime can be

seen as an effort to putting impediments in

Pakistan's way to have an access to global

energy market or even towards abolishing the

entire nuclear weapon program of Pakistan. The second issue is that of the resources spent

and the cost of implementation procedures of

CSI. It requires great financial costs purchasing

the Information Technology (IT) equipment and

maintaining the electronic security on the ports,

which may tend to act as a huge liability on the

weak economies. The training of the personnel

required to carry out inspections is also costly.

2.2 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

President Bush announced PSI on May 31, 2003

to interdict shipments of weapons of mass

destruction and related goods to terrorists and

countries of proliferation concern. US

involvement in the PSI stems from the US

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass

Destruction, December 2002 that calls for

developing 'robust' tools, specifically 24interdiction to stop WMD proliferation.

21

22 “Container Security Initiative: 2006-2011 Strategic Plan”, U.S. Custom and Border Protection, Washington Dc, August 2006.

23 Fact Sheet, “US Customs and Border Protection”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, October 2, 2007, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

24 “United Nations Security Resolution 1540”, U.S. Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

Ibid.

SEPTEMBER 2009



The initiative's aim was to keep the world's most

destructive weapons away from the shores of

US and out of the hands of world's common 25enemies. PSI is not a treaty based approach. It

is described as “political arrangement” of like-

minded countries and its sole objective is

interdicting “WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, 26and on land.” Other than the US, Australia,

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,

Poland, Portugal, Spain and UK are the ten

states which are the original participants of PSI.

Russia too joined in 2004.

However, China, India, Malaysia and Indonesia,

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, states considered as

key maritime states are still outside its

framework because of their reservations with 27regards to the legality of interdiction. Along

with Russia and Singapore the PSI core group

consists of the original eleven participants. The

PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles that

identifies specific steps participants can take to

effectively interdict WMD-related shipments

and prevent proliferation was formulated by the

core group.

The PSI is said to work in three primary ways.

First, it channels international commitment to

stopping WMD-related proliferation by

focusing on interdiction as a key component of a

global counter proliferation strategy. Second,

the PSI provides participating countries with

opportunities to improve national capabilities

and strengthen authorities to conduct

interdictions. Third, the PSI provides a basis for

cooperation among partners on specific actions 28when the need arises.

PSI relies on voluntary actions by states that are

consistent with national legal authorities and 29relevant international law and frameworks.

The PSI Principles call for participating

countries to work together to apply intelligence,

diplomatic, law enforcement, military, and other

capabilities to prevent WMD-related transfers

to states and non-state actors of proliferation 30concern.

There is no plan to take the initiative to United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) to win its

backing and according to Bolton 'We think

we've got plenty of authority as it stands now to 31

conduct interdictions'. This implies US

unilateralist approach in implementing its

policies. The proponents of the initiative claim

that there have been successful interdictions in

the past which were not made public since 32

publicity could impair the initiative.

And in this regard US claims that between April

2005 and April 2006 the US had cooperated with

other PSI participants on “roughly two dozen” 33occasions to prevent transfers of concern. It is

claimed that the PSI increases traffickers'

25

26 Andrew K. Semmel, “Effective multilateralism: The US strategy for dealing with global nuclear nonproliferation”, address to the National Strategy Forum, Nov 14, 2005

27 “Progress has been made but more needs to be done to implement UNSCR 1540”, United Nations Security Council, August 18, 2008 available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9425.doc.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

28 “Announcing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, 15 July 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69021.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

29 “The Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism drives forward”, WMD Insights, July/August 2007, available at http://www.wmdinsights.org/I17/I17_RU1_TheGlobalInitiative.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

30 “The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism”, STIMSON, available at http://www.stimson.org/cnp/?SN=CT200705181262, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 “Pakistan, port of Qasim joins US Container Security Initiative”, Congressional Information Bureau, March

08, 2006, available at http://www.koreanregister.com/kor/dn/Scc/Port%20of%20Qasim.pdf, retrieved on June 10, 2008.

Ibid.

SEPTEMBER 2009



operational costs and the risks associated with 34trafficking prohibited items.

There have been certain apprehensions and

uncertainties regarding the legality of PSI.

There have been concerns that PSI could

endanger international commerce and give

unwarranted powers to US to act as global 35police force. It is in contradiction with the Law

of the Sea (LOS) which allows each state

criminal and civil jurisdiction over ships flying

its own flag and therefore with the permission of

the target state's own flag state interdiction can

be legally carried out. However, in high seas, the

PSI operation is likely to be undertaken by a

state other than the flag state. In this regards PSI

activities are in contradiction with the

international law.

The PSI targets terrorists and countries of

proliferation concern. This is a vague term that

can be maneuvered to include de facto nuclear

weapon state; hence joining such an initiative

can be problematic. Moreover, this effort is also

seen by non nuclear weapon states as means to

dominate world sea routes.

There are many reservations about PSI as an

effective counter proliferation tool due to the

fact that it should seek global participation for

required effectiveness whereas perhaps because

of its secretive nature and some legal issues with

regard to interdiction on high seas, it maintains 36

less than universal membership. The US is

concluding boarding agreements on a bilateral

basis only. It has achieved agreements with

several states like Liberia, Panama, Marshall

Islands, Cyprus, Malta and Mongolia.

Some scholars have pointed out that many of the

so-called supporting countries have not publicly

endorsed the PSI principles, so such support can

easily evaporate. On the issue of widespread

geographic participation it is pointed out there

are areas like Malacca strait from where

considerable number of world sea based cargo

passes and it remains inaccessible to PSI

operations due to the reservations of countries

like Malaysia and Indonesia. Moreover, rather

than being deterred by the threat of interdiction,

terrorist operatives could simply pursue

alternative transport routes that are essentially 37

out of reach to the PSI.

The PSI has been criticized for insufficient

public accountability, impeding legal trade, and

because of legal issues regarding interdiction.

Because of such reservations even many of the

participating countries have not endorsed the

interdiction principles which points to the

limited effectiveness of PSI. Some countries

have voiced concerns about the two-tiered

structure of the PSI that differentiates between

the core group and other members. To conclude it can be argued that the legitimacy

and effectiveness of PSI interdictions is

questionable and needs to be addressed.

Proliferation issues are meant to be resolved

within the international legal frameworks. New

multilateral negotiations and agreements are

required to seek a wider mandate for

interdiction.

2.3 UNSCR 1540

As an important tool of CP Strategy, in April

2004, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR

1540, considered as first international

instrument to deal with WMD in an integrated

34

2006, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/ 2006_news_releases/ 032006/03072006_2.xml, retrieved on June 10, 2008

35 Ibid. 36 “Secure Freight Initiative Begins Data Transmission for Radiation Scanning in Pakistan”, U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, May 2, 2007 available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/ 2007_news_releases/052007/05022007.xml, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

37 Gabrielle Kohlmeier and Miles A. Pomper, “Pakistan advances export Controls”, Arms Control Today, October 2004, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Pak.asp, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

“Pakistan to participate in container Security Initiative”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 07,

SEPTEMBER 2009



and comprehensive manner that calls on each

state to prioritize and systemize its legal 38frameworks for curtailing proliferation.

All states have three primary obligations under

UNSCR 1540 relating to such items: to prohibit

support to non-State actors seeking such items;

to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting

the proliferation of such items to non-State

actors, and prohibiting assisting or financing

such proliferation; and to take and enforce

effective measures to control these items, in

order to prevent their proliferation, as well as to

control the provision of funds and services that 39contribute to proliferation.

Since the regulations are to be made at the

national level hence it is called as an effective

tool in building the capacity from the bottom up 40

rather than attempting to impose it from top.

This resolution is significant for the fact that it

calls on all states to formulate domestic export

control and non proliferation laws, and this is

mandatory for all states since the resolution has

been passed under chapter VII of UN charter.

And if states fail to comply there will be

coercion by use of force. So implementation of

this resolution establishes an actual threat of

waging war against a member state.

Interestingly this is the first ever non

proliferation resolution supplemented by the

use of force, which of course is the hallmark of

counter proliferation strategy.

The threat of nuclear terrorism post 9/11 with

terrorists showing willingness to acquire and

use WMD and some other proliferation issues

helped US to forge its way ahead with

developing such an instrument that gives

legitimacy to use of force against proliferators

and proliferating state through domestic laws;

since this is the resolution that puts the premium

on establishing legal and regulatory measures at

the national level.

The issue of terrorist acquisition of WMD was

not addressed by the NPT or other non

proliferation treaties. As adopted under the

chapter VII of UN Charter, this resolution is

legally binding on all states. It also provides

authorization for sanctions in case of non-

compliance. This resolution recognizes illicit

trafficking in nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons and their means of delivery as a new

dimension of proliferation and as a threat to

international peace and security.

The resolution dovetails with PSI such that it

calls upon all states in accordance with their

national legislation and international law to take

cooperative action to stop, impede, intercept

and otherwise prevent illicit trafficking.

To promote the implementation of the

resolution, the mandate of 1540 committee has

been extended until April 2011 by the Security

Council. The second report submitted by this

committee affirms that states have taken

additional measures to implement this

resolution however, more needs to be done. It

requires a long term commitment to the

objectives of the resolution by many parts of

international community given the gravity of

the threat.

Therefore it calls on strengthening the

committee's role in providing assistance to

states in need and to make better use of and

consider options for developing existing

financial mechanisms in order to build capacity

to implement resolution 1540. It calls on an

increase in tailored dialogue with and among

states to identify assistance needs and assistance

38

http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2008.39 Ibid.40 Andrew K. Semmel, “Effective multilateralism: The US strategy for dealing with global nuclear

nonproliferation”, address to the National Strategy Forum, Nov 14, 2005.

“United Nations Security Resolution 1540”, U.S. Department of State, available at

SEPTEMBER 2009



projects to meet them.

It is argued that if this resolution becomes fully

implemented, it will ensure that no state is a

source of WMD proliferation for terrorists.

However, the states are facing challenges in the

implementation of 1540 that requires an

inventive approach to help countries build

sufficient administrative, technical and expert

capacities to deal with the priorities of

preventing the spread of WMD.

2.4 Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear

Terrorism (GICNT)

After the 9/11 attack concerns about nuclear

terrorism began to surface. Al-Qaeda and illegal

international black market of nuclear materials

were considered to be prime global threats. Due

to this US and entire international community is

considered at risk. The US and Russia jointly

announced the Global Initiative to Combat

Nuclear Terrorism during the 2006 G8 Summit

in St.

Petersburg in order to 'reduce the risk of such

terrorist attack and to remedy the current gaps in

international non proliferation regime' with a

stated goal of preventing the acquisition,

transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear

materials and radioactive substances or

improvised explosive devices using such

materials, as well as hostile actions against 42nuclear facilities.

Both the presidents, Bush and Putin described

the initiative as designed to improve

implementation and coordination of existing

41 national and multinational programs aimed at 43countering nuclear trafficking. The Global

Initiative also dovetails with UNSCR 1540,

which mandates that all UN Member States

implement a set of supply-side controls on

WMD and dual-use technology and criminalize 44proliferant activities within their territories.

There are two major shortcomings with respect

to the objective of improving the accounting,

control, and physical protection of nuclear

materials: First, the Global Initiative ignores the

fact that there are inadequate international

nuclear security and accounting standards by

which to determine whether nuclear materials

(or weapons) are secure; second, the Global

Initiative does not cover military nuclear 45facilities, materials, and weapons.

GI lays necessary diplomatic foundations to

defeat the new threats using elements of

national power: diplomatic, intelligence,

military, economic, financial, informational,

and law enforcement in taking effective action

to implement the Statement of Principles of the 46

Global Initiative.

3. Counter Proliferation initiatives

and Pakistan

akistan's nuclear program can be Prationalized as an effort to safeguard its

national interest. Nuclear program of Pakistan

was a direct consequence of its security

concerns vis-à-vis India. Although Pakistan not

being a member of NPT is under no obligations,

yet it supports all equitable and multilateral

41

Council, August 18, 2008 available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9425.doc.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

42 “Announcing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism”, U.S. Department of State, 15 July 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69021.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

43 “The Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism drives forward”, WMD Insights, July/August 2007, available at http://www.wmdinsights.org/I17/I17_RU1_TheGlobalInitiative.htm, retrieved on October 13, 2009.

44 “The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism”, STIMSON, available at http://www.stimson.org/cnp/?SN=CT200705181262, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

45 Ibid.46 Ibid.

“Progress has been made but more needs to be done to implement UNSCR 1540”, United Nations Security

SEPTEMBER 2009



measures to control nuclear weapons

proliferation. Pakistan has always supported the

cause of non proliferation and supports all such

initiatives provided they are non discriminatory

in nature.

Pakistan has been proposing to India all possible

measures that could be supportive to the

international non proliferation regime such as

simultaneous ratification of NPT twice, which

was rejected by India. Pakistan's approach has

been Indo-centric in the past. Pakistan also

proposed to establish a Nuclear Weapons Free

Zones (NWFZ) in south Asia, mutual

acceptance of International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear

installations, and offered to have Nuclear

Restraint Regime in the subcontinent, etc, but

none of the proposals were welcomed by India.

This establishes that Pakistan remains

committed to the cause of non proliferation and

fulfills its obligations as a responsible nuclear

state. With the shift in the US policy from non

proliferation to CP, Pakistan, still abiding by its

commitment not to transfer nuclear weapon or

related material and the technology to any state

or non state actor, supports the spirit of CP

measures launched in the aftermath of 9/11. But

these initiatives also put question marks to

Pakistan's non proliferation policy.

Pakistan at one level has been playing an active

role in multilateral forums such as Conference ston Disarmament (CD) Geneva, UN 1

committee etc and is considered as a key player.

Pakistan has acted as a buffer state for upholding

sometimes restive pressures of international non

proliferation regime by upholding multi-

lateralism. Post 1998 Pakistan has tried to

project its non proliferation credentials by

assimilating its non proliferation policy with

international non proliferation norm.

It has enforced stringent export control laws in

2004 too. But Pakistan has been under pressure

of US sanctions, nonproliferation concerns

regarding safety and security of Pakistan's

nuclear arsenal, illicit trafficking of nuclear

material etc. So with such concerns prevailing

amongst international community, new means

to counter the threat of proliferation emerging,

being different in their form and approach, it

needs to be ensured that they are not meant to

corner Pakistan and that they do not impinge on

Pakistan's sovereignty. It needs careful

consideration that whether Pakistan is a part of a

problem or a part of a solution. And that

Pakistan is regarded as a partner or a target if it

endorses these initiatives.

These initiatives should not mean to close doors

on Pakistan with regards to access to the global

energy market. Pakistan is under great

international pressure but simultaneously it has

its own competing needs and it aims at

producing 8800 MW of electricity by the year

2030. So on one hand where these new

initiatives open new vistas, they also pose great

challenges for states like Pakistan.

3.1 Pakistan and CSI

CSI is an innovative security program that pre-

screens and inspects cargo at foreign ports

destined for the United States. And Pakistan's

port Bin Qasim is a party to this security 47program. CSI is a key initiative designed to

prevent global maritime cargo from being

exploited by terrorist. The Islamic Republic of

Pakistan has taken steps to support CSI to 48

safeguard global maritime trade.

Pakistan has signed a declaration of principles

with US customs and Border Protection. Being

47

08, 2006, available at http://www.koreanregister.com/kor/dn/Scc/Port%20of%20Qasim.pdf, retrieved on June 10, 2008

48 “Pakistan to participate in container Security Initiative”, March 07, 2006, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/ cgov/ newsroom/news_releases/archives/2006_news_releases/032006/03072006_2.xml, retrieved on June 10, 2008

“Pakistan, port of Qasim joins US Container Security Initiative”, Congressional Information Bureau, March

SEPTEMBER 2009



now a member to this initiative, the Port of

Qasim will use remote targeting with real-time

remote imaging of a container examination

process, while incorporating a live video

transmission/feed, to monitor the inspection

process. Non-intrusive inspection and radiation

detection technology will be used to screen

high-risk containers before they are shipped to 49

US ports.

In 2007, US in partnership with Pakistan

designed Security Freight initiative to safeguard

global maritime cargo that became operative in

May 2007 and began transmitting data from a

new radiation scanning system. The goal is to

provide nuclear and radiological detection for

shipping containers destined to the US at Port

Qasim. Port Qasim was selected as an initial

Secure Freight Initiative port due to the strong

political will of the host nation, the unique

nature of its operation in a strategic location, and

its processing of a significant amount of 50transshipments.

Under CSI the critical data, information and

intelligence regarding the containers is

transmitted to the US which can be problematic

for us because Pakistan's nuclear program is

outside NPT and any arrangement outside the

multilateral and legal framework of inter-

national non proliferation regime can be seen as

an effort to putting impediments in Pakistan's

way to have an access to global energy market or

even towards abolishing the entire nuclear

weapon program of Pakistan.

Therefore Pakistan by joining the initiative has

placed high stakes with regards to the autonomy

of decision making when it comes to deciding

which container is of potent threat which in turn

places costs on its sovereignty. And not just that,

joining the initiative also puts question marks

for Pakistan's access to global energy market.

The information transmitted can be used as

means to deny Pakistan an access to energy

market and this way Pakistan might not be able

to cater its domestic energy needs. And

eventually Pakistan might end up paying a price

in terms of losing its nuclear weapon program.

3.2 Pakistan's implementation of UNSCR

1540

In April 2004, UNSCR 1540 was passed which

directs all states to implement domestic

legislation that stiffens controls over sensitive

materials and technologies in an effort to

prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of

mass destruction. In compliance with that,

Pakistan passed the bill of Export Control on

Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment

Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and

their Delivery Systems. Introduced in June 2004

and approved by the Parliament in September

2004, this export control legislation was

intended to strengthen existing measures to

prevent proliferation of weapons of mass 51destruction.

The legislation allows the government to

oversee export, re-export, transshipment, and

transit of goods, technologies, and equipment as

well as to maintain control lists of goods and

technologies subject to licensing requirements

under the bill. Exporters must also maintain

records of all transactions and report these to 52designated authorities. For Pakistan the

legislation represents an important move to

49

50 “Secure Freight Initiative Begins Data Transmission for Radiation Scanning in Pakistan”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, CBP, May 2, 2007 available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2007_news_releases/052007/05022007.xml, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

51 Gabrielle Kohlmeier and Miles A. Pomper, “Pakistan advances export Controls”, Arms Control Today, October 2004, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Pak.asp, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

52 “INFCIRC/636”, Information Circular, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc636.pdf, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

Ibid.

SEPTEMBER 2009



strengthen regulations and controls on exports,

re-exports, transshipments, and transit of items

of proliferation concern as this law provides a

framework to deal with sensitive technologies 53and proliferation.

The legislation includes several other important

elements, such as end-use and end-user

certification requirements and new penalties for

violators. It affirms Pakistan's broad jurisdiction

on Pakistani nationals, its nationals living or

working abroad and foreign nationals within

Pakistan. It is also extended to any ground

transport, ship or aircraft registered in Pakistan

wherever it may be. Since its adoption, Pakistan

has established a Strategic Export Controls

Division (SECDIV) and an associated

Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible

for formulating rules and regulations for

implementing the legislation. The board is

comprised of officials from multiple agencies 54and is headed by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary.

But Pakistan needs to look at this resolution with

great caution. UNSCR 1540 places the onus on

the states to establish legal and regulatory

measures at national level. And since Pakistan,

in compliance to this resolution has already

promulgated an export control bill, the bill along

with other provisions contains punitive

provisions for violations such as fourteen years

of imprisonment to a fine of a 5 million Rupees,

or both. And those involved even in supporting

any of the proliferation related activities, such as

financing or even enabling access to the fissile

or radioactive material etc will be tried as if

guilty of actual proliferation. Pakistan needs to

be cautious that they do not end up making

unacceptable compromises.

3.3 Pakistan and PSI

PSI was created with the basic objective of

interdicting the shipments of WMD and related

goods to terrorists and other states of

proliferation concern and is only a political

arrangement that does not have a legal binding.

Pakistan supports the spirit of PSI and therefore

attends its sessions as an observer. In August

2005 Pakistan observed a Proliferation Security

Initiative exercise for the first time and provided

a 125-page follow-up matrix of national 55compliance of Resolution 1540.

For the states joining this initiative the

endorsement of fourteen interdiction principles

is necessary. Although Pakistan supports the

spirit of PSI but it needs to be made clear

whether Pakistan would be a partner or a target

if interdiction principles are endorsed by it.

Secondly Pakistan has some reservations

regarding the legal issues with respect to

interdicting cargoes in high seas. International

community needs to assure Pakistan that it

would not be targeted if it lends support. And

since PSI is not a formal treaty therefore it does

not confer any legal binding on Pakistan to join

it.Unilaterally interdicting the cargoes of other

states under the PSI type regimes is in

contravention to the International Law,

including that of the International Law of the 56Sea.

Pakistan believes that “we cannot be the partner 57

and target at the same time”. Pakistan at some

point in time may think of joining the initiative

provided that it is included in the core group.

However, Pakistan's position on this has always

been very clear. All issues related to non-

proliferation or counter proliferation should be

53

54 Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan's nuclear weapons: proliferation and security issues”, p.14.55 Farooq Adil, “How safe are our nuclear assets?', Pakistan Observer, May 28, 2008, available at

http://pakobserver.net/200805/30/Articles02.asp and http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?201049, retrieved on June 24, 2008.

56 Zulfiqar Khan, “Safeguards against illicit transfers: Pakistan's institutional response”, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) International Conference, 16-17 November, 2006.

57 Author's interview with Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs.

Ibid.

SEPTEMBER 2009



brought to the Conference on Disarmament

which is the sole multilateral forum mandated to

negotiate arms control and disarmament

instruments. Pakistan is not against PSI per se

but we cannot become a party to any

arrangement which has not come about through

genuine multilateral procedures based on 58

consensus. Nevertheless, with the change of

the admin-istration in the US and Obama's

interest in reviving multilateralism Pakistan is

hopeful that PSI will be changed from a loose

coalition of the like minded to something

multilaterally negotiated to become an integral

part of 'non-proliferation regime'.

3.4 Pakistan and GICNT

The US and Russia introduced Global Initiative

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2006 G8

Summit. Pakistan endorsed this initiative in 59June 2007. “While joining the Initiative,

Pakistan has declared that the GI does not cover

Pakistan's military nuclear facilities or 60

activities.” Pakistan's endorsement of this

initiative, prior to India clearly manifests the

responsible behavior of Pakistan as a nuclear

weapon state and as a measure Pakistan has put

in place legislative, regulatory and admin-

istrative infrastructure to prevent and combat

any possible acts of terrorism involving nuclear 61

and radiological materials and facilities.”

Pakistani officials stress the importance of

sharing best practices developed through

GICNT meetings and believe it has helped

member states to learn from and possibly adopt

the best international practices in terms of

training and education as well as to learn more

about equipment and technology for combating

the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. It also

provides Pakistan an opportunity to help the

world better understand Pakistan's perspective

on proactive management of its nuclear matters

including the security of nuclear and radioactive

material by exemplifying that its practices are in 62

sync with the international standards.

This implies that Pakistan is playing a

commendable role in the global efforts to

combat terrorism and the security of Pakistan's

nuclear weapons and export control measures in

Pakistan are in compliance with the latest and

best international practices. A government

official of Pakistan said about GICNT that “It is

in line with our measures of responsibility and

has helped us to understand that the threat is not

as vivid as it appears from the distance. We

nevertheless are not complacent about these 63 matters.” The US president Barrack Obama in

his Prague speech has demonstrated interest in

multilateral engagement and has expressed

intention of making the PSI and the GICNT

durable international institutions. If GICNT gets

institutionalized the compliance and verifi-

cation mechanisms for implementing GICNT

objectives should be negotiated multilaterally

where states like Pakistan should have an equal

say. At present Pakistan must participate in

GICNT exercises cautiously.

4. Analysis

P is seen as an effective strategy to deal Cwith proliferation threat. However, it is

also argued that though CP programs can reduce

US vulnerability to WMDs but they cannot 64totally eliminate the WMD threat. It is

58

59 “Pakistan endorses US-Russia led Global Initiative to combat nuclear terrorism”, June 11, 2007, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200706/10/eng20070610_382664.html, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

60 “Pakistan joins Global Initiative to combat terrorism”, June 10,2007, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200706/10/eng20070610_382664.html, retrieved on October 13, 2008.

61 Ibid.62 Author's discussion with Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director ACDA, Stretgic Plans Division.63 Ibid. 64 Ashton B. Carter, & L. Celeste. Johnson, “Beyond the Counter Proliferation Initiative”, In Henry D. Sokolski

& J. M. Ludes (Eds.), Twenty First century Weapons Proliferation: Are we ready?. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001).

Author's discussion with Abdul Basit, Foreign Office Spokes person for Pakistan.

SEPTEMBER 2009



generally stated that these initiatives are meant

to further help preventing the WMD

proliferation and nuclear terrorism nexus,

therefore joining these are in the better interest

of the states. There are those too in the West who

do not seem to have much faith in CP measures

and argue that CP when founded on active

defenses and interdiction can do little to reduce

the threat from WMDs. US must reaffirm its

commitment to moratorium on nuclear tests and

re-establish its credibility as an adherer of NPT.

By doing so, US can urge other nations to let go 65

of the nuclear weapon pursuit, with credibility.As manifested in the measures adopted by

Pakistan to ensure its effective control over the

nuclear activities in Pakistan, it is obvious that

the cause of non proliferation and the spirit of

Counter Proliferation are supported by

Pakistan. However, along with the points of

convergence, there are issues where states like

Pakistan may have reservations. Most of the CP

measures are US initiated and US dominated

therefore, leaving little room for other

participating nations to bargain for themselves.

States are more or less, compelled to join these

mechanisms. Such initiatives if viewed

objectively depict a unilateral system enshrined

in bilateralism for preventing and controlling

WMD proliferation and thus put question marks

for the existing multilateral system. The

contention therefore is that which of the two the

right way forward is. The table 1a) briefly

summarizes the laws or principles governing the

CP initiatives:

Initiatives Laws

CSI ·Allows for deployment of US personnel at participating ports to check US destined Containers

·X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices are used to pre-screen the containers

·US customs officers work with their counter parts in host countries to determine security criteria for identifying the high risk containers.

PSI ·Calls on states to undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting at sea, air or land, the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern

·Emphasizes on information sharing·Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities, relevant

international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.

·Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts·Calls on states to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in

their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state suspected of proliferation concern

·Calls on states to consider providing consent to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states

·If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points states are called to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport suspected of proliferation concern

65

available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/spratt_mar03.asp, retrieved on May 12, 2008.John M. Spratt, Jr. “Stopping a dangerous drift in US arms control Policy”, Arms Control Today, March 2003,

Figure 1: Table 1a) CP initiatives and their laws

SEPTEMBER 2009



UNSCR 1540

·Calls on states to undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting at sea, air or land, the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern

·Emphasizes on information sharing·Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities, relevant

international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.

·Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts·Calls on states to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in

their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state suspected of proliferation concern

·Calls on states to consider providing consent to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states

·If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points states are called to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport suspected of proliferation concern

GICNT ·Bring together experience and expertise from the nonproliferation, counter proliferation, and counterterrorism disciplines.

·Integrate collective capabilities and resources to strengthen the overall global architecture to combat nuclear terrorism.

·Provide the opportunity for nations to share information and expertise in a legally non-binding environment.

Pakistan has been a staunch supporter of

multilateralism and consensus and treaty based

programs. The points of divergence with

regards to these initiatives for a state like

Pakistan include the legality, practicality,

efficiency and productivity of the US initiatives.

Although Pakistan has endorsed most of them in

order to prove its non proliferation credentials

but the participating states may have to pay a

price too.

The most fundamental question raised with

respect to being party to these initiatives is that

what exactly is the participating state getting out

of it? 'Are we a partner or a target' is usually the

question raised about Pakistan with respect to

US Counter Proliferation strategy such as PSI.

However, the notion is also applicable in a

broader context of Counter Proliferation.

Endorsing an initiative brings a moral

responsibility to a state to abide by the principles

and objectives of it. Going against it is counted

as wrong on moral and ethical grounds.

Therefore it is important for a state to realize

what gains it might have upon joining an

initiative. For a state like Pakistan, joining these

initiatives has a great bearing because Pakistan

is a de facto nuclear state and its nuclear

program has been and still remains of grave

concern to the international community.

It must be realized that these initiatives should

not be meant to corner Pakistan. The unilateral

approach is against the idea of little something

for everyone. It is their belief that proclivity for

multilateral resolutions and consensus

negotiations allows the proliferators to have

time and space to carry out their illicit activities.

And more significantly according to them the

threat of non state actor has prompted a need for

the unilateral approaches as they decry the lack

of effective existing mechanisms to enforce

global non proliferation norms; hence

emphasizing the use of force and interdiction as

major tools to further the task of controlling

proliferation. And therefore an amalgam of

SEPTEMBER 2009



unilateral programs and initiatives has been

introduced by the US. Participating states,

specially the smaller and weaker states need to

realize the cost of joining unilateral arrange-

ment. Multilateral and treaty based approach

gives more legality to the programs. They also

put a constraining effect on the super powers.

The Bush Administration abandoned multi-

lateralism and resorted to unilateral approaches.

The basic US approach was 'we do you follow'.

When states are dealing with security issues,

unilateral approaches do not work. It is

important that the focus is shifted back to the

Conference on disarmament. Obama admin-

istration's subscription to multilateralism is

indeed the right way of negotiating disar-

mament instruments. Treaties and conventions

that emerge through consensus are more likely 66 to secure universal adherence.

It is right though that pre screening of the US

destined containers have improved the speed of

container clearance; however, as of CSI,

endorsing the initiative not only brings the

financial costs but other costs too. The

radioactive detection devices and the electronic

equipment needed is provided by the US but

other IT related equipment and hardware and

personnel maintenance is carried out by the

participating state.

As of political cost, Pakistan needs to make sure

that it has room for bargaining and the

deployment of US customs officers on Pakistani

port should not hamper Pakistan's interest.

Moreover, there may also be a possibility of

equipment provided to the participating state

being bugged. This can turn out to be a

restriction affecting Pakistan's interest directly.

The following table summarizes the analytical

conclusions and key concerns with regards to

the initiatives:

Initiative Source/Origin Form/structure Concerns

PSI US National Strategy to Combat WMD

US dominated Loose coalition of like minded states Not treaty based Consists of core group and other members Bilateral agreements concluded by the US with several states

In serious contradiction with the Law of the sea Its two-tiered structure is a cause of concern Unilateral, should be multilaterally negotiated

CSI and MPI US National Strategy to Combat WMD

Unilateral enshrined in bilateralism

Sovereignty of participating states impinged Political costs + financial costs attached

GICNT US National Strategy to Combat WMD

US-Russia initiativeNot treaty based

If institutionalized in future?Should be multilaterally negotiated

UNSCR 1540

UN Security Council

Binding resolution passed under Chapter VII of UN Charter

First non proliferation resolution backed by the threat of or use of force

Figure 2: Table 1b) CP initiatives and key conclusions

66 Author's discussion with Abdul Basit, Spokes person Foreign Office of Pakistan.

SEPTEMBER 2009



The futuristic goals of CP initiatives are not

known. It cannot be said with conviction what

these initiatives are leading to; non proliferation

or disarmament. Pakistan developed its nuclear

program out of its security concerns vis-à-vis

India. Being a NWS Pakistan now happens to be

a case just like the P5; therefore Pakistan must 67

be dealt on the same premise.

And as NPT suggests, P5 should take the lead

towards disarmament of nuclear weapons.

According to Muhammad Khurshid Khan,

“discriminatory and intentionally customized

approaches to address proliferation problems

have not worked in the past and there is no

possibility that selective approaches will 68achieve desired results in the future as well.”

Where there is a positive outcome of the

endorsement of CP initiatives, it is pragmatic to

think of the need for hard bargaining while

analyzing the practicality and legality of such

initiatives. Secrecy is maintained with respect to

some initiatives for the better results; however

CP initiatives need to be made more transparent

to the world in order to make it known how

practical these initiatives are. They can be made

more productive if they are multilateral.

Moreover, this way states would not have to

compromise on their sovereignty.

Pakistan even now, continues to play a positive

role in curbing the menace of proliferation and

has put in place stringent export control to

prevent 'onward proliferation'. It has joined CSI

and attends PSI as an observer state but in order

to play a more effective role Pakistan needs

assurances that if it lends more support, it will

not be targeted in US Counter Proliferation

measures.

5. Policy Recommendations

or a better understanding of the new Finitiatives it is required that such initiatives

are thoroughly debated in the national assembly

before they are endorsed. Moreover, a technical

analysis of the initiatives would give a deeper

insight of the provisions of the initiatives that

would have a direct impact on Pakistan's

national interest. Hence a debate in national

assembly as well as the technical analysis and

evaluation of the initiatives is recommended so

that Pakistan may take decisions appropriate to

its national interest.

Moreover, Pakistan should actively try to

persuade the Obama administration to bring

these initiatives in multilateral forums such as

CD to multilaterally negotiate them and suggest

the administration that a comprehensive

multilateral agreement on the use of containers

in international trade should be pursued rather

than numerous bilateral agreements. All the

agreements require more investment in terms of

legality, productivity, credibility and

transparency. The concerns of the international

community with regards to effectiveness,

legitimacy and two tiered structure of PSI

should be addressed. Pakistan should seek to

ensure that a wider mandate for interdictions

should be negotiated through multilateral

negotiations rather than only suggesting to be

incorporated into the core group.

67

68 Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Nuclear technology proliferation: Challenges and international response”, IPRI journal, Vol. VIII, no.1, Winter 2008, p.37.

Author's discussion with Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director ACDA, SPD.

SEPTEMBER 2009



6. Conclusion

he new approach of coercion by force, use Tof force and interdiction will continue to

dominate the scene when it comes to preventing

and controlling WMD proliferation in the next

few years. However, the likelihood of these

initiatives as successful approaches is dubious

as long as no change is brought in the

methodology and approach of the CP initiatives.

It is understood that Pakistan and India are

nuclear weapon states. These weapons are here

to stay and are a reality that cannot be wished

away. Therefore there is no question of Pakistan

rolling back its nuclear program. It must be

realized that none of the discriminatory and

customized non proliferation or the new CP

measures should directly or indirectly lead to

the disarmament of Pakistan's nuclear program

before the P5.

Pakistan has in the past been supportive of non

proliferation cause. And although Pakistan

continues to support the CP measures in spirit

yet while making key decisions it has to

safeguard its national security concerns.

However, despite Pakistan's responsible

behavior as a nuclear weapon state, endorsing

the CP initiatives would do little to accord

Pakistan's nuclear status. The CP approach is

customized and US dominated. These could be

made more practical, legal and productive if

these were multi laterally negotiated and treaty

based.

A state has to see its safeguards. For Pakistan,

endorsement should help in improving

Pakistan's non proliferation credentials in the

eyes of international community and accord

Pakistan's status as a new nuclear weapon state.

It should enhance its national security, enhance

trade and commerce and should not limit its

access to nuclear industry. Unless the stated

interests of the states are not met why else would

a state join political and discriminatory treaties.

Moreover, Pakistan should realize that there is a

need for hard bargaining while endorsing CP

arrangements for the better interest of the

participating states. They should not mean to

impede Pakistan's access to global energy

market.

SEPTEMBER 2009



About the Author

he author is currently working as research Tfellow at South Asian Strategic Stability

Institute (SASSI). She has acquired a Masters

degree in Defence and Diplomatic Studies from

Fatima Jinnah Women University (FJWU) and

has been awarded Silver Medal for an all round

achievement during her Masters program

(2008).

Her primary interest is focused on nuclear

related issues and strategic stability debate in

South Asia. And while her stay at SASSI she has

been developing an expertise in knowing and

understanding the new post 9/11 Counter

Proliferation initiatives with particular refe-

rence to their likely impact on Pakistan.

Moreover she has extensively contributed to

SASSI's technical assessment on 'Indo-US

Nuclear Deal' (Feb 2009) as well as SASSI's

strategic brief on 'Pakistan-France Partnership'

(July 2009). Formerly, she has published two

articles in English Dailies.

SEPTEMBER 2009

SASSI is a specialist research institute

based in London, UK with a branch

office in Islamabad, Pakistan. The

institute is at the forefront of Weapons

of Mass Destruction, Arms Control and

Disarmament research on South Asia.

Its partners have included the UN,

NATO, the EU, prestigious academic

institutions, scholars and many

governments.

SASSI Research Report No. 20, Dr. Nazir Hussain, The Role of Media in National Security: A Case Study of 1998 Nuclear Explosions by Pakistan

SASSI Research Report No. 21, Khurshid Khan, Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Options for Pakistan

SASSI Research Report No. 22, Zafar Nawaz Jaspa, Militarisation and Weaponization of Space: A Critical Analysis

SASSI Research Report No. 23, Ghazala Nayyar, China's Export Control System and the Role of MOFCOM

SASSI Research Report No. 24, Inayat Kaleem, Pakistan's Gwadar Port-Prospects of Economic Revival and Inter-Regional Prosperity

SASSI Research Report No. 25, Jamshed Azim Hashmi, Developing A Robust Nuclear Security Infrastructure in a Country Planning or Operating Nuclear Power Plants

SASSI Research Paper No. 26, Ghani Jafar, West Asian Implications of the Iranian Nuclear Programme

SASSI Research Report No. 27, Sana Danish, US Counter Proliferation Strategies Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan

SASSI Research Report No. 28, Sobia Saeed Paracha, Strategic Export Controls: Case Study of Pakistan

SASSI Research Report No. 29, Maria Sultan & Salma Shaheen, Strategic Culture Debate

SASSI Research Report No. 30, Noreen Iftakhar, Safety and Security of Pakistan's Civilian Nuclear Industry

SASSI Research Report No. 15, Ghani Jafar, West Asian Implications of the Iranian Nuclear Programme

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SASSI Research Report No. 16, Jack Boureston,Understanding Pakistan’s Energy Security Needs and the Role of Nuclear Energy

SASSI Research Report No. 12, Gaurav Rajen,Nuclear Export Controls in India; A review of Existing Systems and Prospects for Enhanced India-US Cooperation

SASSI Research Report No. 11, Maria Sultan and Dr. Zulfiqar Khan, The Implication of Pre-emptive Strategy on the Safety and security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal: Post September 11

SASSI Research Report No. 10, Gurmeet Kanwal, Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for Non-Proliferation

SASSI Research Report No. 9, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal,The Indo-US Strategic Relationship and Pakistan’s Security

SASSI Research Report No. 8, Bharath Gopalaswamy, Preventing Ballistic Missile Proliferation through Flight Test Bans: A Look at Verification Technologies

SASSI Research Report No. 7, Nasrullah Mirza and M. Sadiq, Indo-US 123 Agreement; Impacts on Deterrence Stability in South Asia

SASSI Research Report No. 18, Ian Bremmer & Maria Kuusisto, Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control; Perception Matters

SASSI Research Report No. 17, Deba R. Mohanty, The Arms Dynamic and Strategic Stability in South Asia:Current Trends

SASSI Research Report No. 5, Gaurav Rajen, TheProblematic of a Nuclear Force in-Being a StableDeterrence and the Issue of Non-Deployment, February 2006

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