South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview ... · This briefing paper is a synthesis...

A TRAFFIC REPORT

A TRAFFIC REPORT

SOUTH AFRICA’S ILLICIT

ABALONE TRADE: AN

UPDATED OVERVIEW AND

KNOWLEDGE GAP ANALYSIS

byKimon De Greef

anD SerGe raemaeKerS

Environmental Evaluation Unit

Published by TRAFFIC International, Cambridge, UK.

© 2014 TRAFFIC InternationalAll rights reserved.

All material appearing in this publication is copyrightedand may be reproduced with permission. Any reproductionin full or in part of this publication must credit TRAFFIC as the copyright owner.

The views of the authors expressed in this publication donot necessarily reflect those of the TRAFFIC network, WWF or IUCN.

The designation of geographical entities in thispublication, and the presentation of the material, do notimply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on thepart of TRAFFIC or its supporting organizations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, or area, or its authorities, or concerningthe delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

The TRAFFIC symbol copyright and RegisteredTrademark ownership is held by WWF. TRAFFIC is astrategic alliance of WWF and IUCN.

Suggested citation: De Greef, K. and Raemaekers, S. (2014). South Africa’s Illicit Abalone Trade: An Updated Overview And Knowledge Gap Analysis. TRAFFIC International, Cambridge, UK.

ISBN 978-1-85850-372-1

Front cover photograph: Poached Abalone shells line the shoreline after being washed ashore on Robben Island, Robben Island, Western Cape, South Africa

Photograph credit: Peter Chadwick / WWF-Canon

Author background:

Kimon de Greef recently completed a Masters dissertation investigating abalone poaching in Hout Bay, a Cape Town fishing community. He currently works as a freelance researcher and journalist.

Dr Serge Raemaekers spent five years researching abalone poaching in South Africa and now works broadly within the field of fisheries governance. He is based at the University of Cape Town’s Environmental Evaluation Unit, where he is completing a post-doctorate. This publication was made possible through the support provided by the Office of Forestry and Biodiversity, Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment, U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of award number AID-AID-EGEE-IO-13-00002. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

TRAFFIC is a UK Registered Charity No.1076722

SouthAfrica’sillicitabalonetrade:Anupdatedoverviewandknowledgegapanalysis

A TRAFFIC

Report

Kimon de Greef & Serge Raemaekers

Dried abalone, for sale in Sheung Wan District, Hong Kong. © Jürgen Freund / WWF‐Canon

Table of Contents Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................................................iii Listofacronymsandabbreviations...........................................................................................................iiiExecutiveSummary..........................................................................................................................................iv Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................1 HistoryofthecommercialabalonefisheryinSouthAfrica..............................................................2 Theriseoftheillegalabalonefishery........................................................................................................6 Keydrivers.......................................................................................................................................................6 TheresponseoftheState...........................................................................................................................7 Socio‐economicimpacts.............................................................................................................................9

Theillegalabalonefisherysystem............................................................................................................10 Illegalabalonediversandfishery.........................................................................................................10 Playersandpathways:TradenetworksandroutesinSouthAfrica......................................18

Conclusions: Actions necessary to address the trade more efficiently......................................23 Integratedfisheriesreformandlocaleconomicdevelopment.................................................23 Addressingknowledgegaps....................................................................................................................23 Increasedcollaboration............................................................................................................................26 Tradecontrols...............................................................................................................................................26

Keyreferences...................................................................................................................................................27

ii South Africa’s illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap analysis

Acknowledgements

Thanks toMarkusBurgener fromTRAFFIC forgenerouslyproviding tradedataandreviewingthe paper, Roget Fox from SANParks for information about the illegal wildlife trade in theEasternCape,CarstenWentinkfromtheEEUforinformationaboutthecrayfishindustry,aswellas all anonymous intervieweesand informants.Also, thankyou to JamesCompton, JulieGray,GlennSantandNickAhlersofTRAFFICfortheirreviewofthebriefingpaper.

This report was funded by USAID through the TRAFFIC/IUCNWildlife Trafficking, Response,AssessmentandPrioritySetting(W‐TRAPS)project.

TheRuffordFoundationisgratefullyacknowledged

foritssupportintheproductionofthisreport.

List of acronyms and abbreviations

AFCD

CITES

HongKongDepartmentofAgriculture, Forestry,ConservationandEnvironment

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ofWildFaunaandFlora

DAFF DepartmentofAgriculture,ForestryandFisheries

DEAT DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism

MARINEs Management Action for Resources of Inshore and NearshoreEnvironments

MCM MarineandCoastalManagement

MCS Monitoring,Control&Surveillance

MLRA MarineLivingResourcesAct,1998

MPA MarineProtectedArea

SANParks SouthAfricanNationalParks

SAPS

RILO

SouthAfricanPoliceService

Regional Intelligence Office (of the World CustomsOrganization)

TAC TotalAllowableCatch

TURF

WCO

WCRL

TerritorialUserRightsFishery

WorldCustomsOrganization

WestCoastRockLobster

South Africa’s illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap analysis iii

Executive Summary

More than two decades of unsustainable harvesting has had damaging, and potentiallyirreversible,consequencesforSouthAfrica’sformerlyabundantstocksoftheendemicabalone,Haliotismidae.Effortstocombattheillegaltrade,includinglistingthespeciesintheConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpeciesofWildFaunaandFlora(CITES)AppendixIIIin2007, conducting government‐led enforcement operations, establishing designatedenvironmental courts to dealwith abalone poachers, and developingmore inclusive fisheriespolicieshavebeenlargelyunsuccessful.Thishasbeenduetoalackofadequateresourcesandlongstandingsocio‐politicalgrievancesbetweensmall‐scale fishermenand thepost‐apartheidgovernment.In2010,H.midaewasdelistedfromCITESAppendixIII,despiteincreasedlevelsofillegal poaching, due to difficulties in implementation according to the South Africangovernment.

Organizedcriminalsyndicateshavetakenadvantageof thissocio‐politicaldynamicmentionedabove to recruit poachers from local communities who feel disenfranchised by governmentpolicyandentitledtoextracttheeasilyharvestedresource.Furthermore,evidencesuggeststhatpoachersaresometimespaidforserviceinillegaldrugs,addinganothercomplexlayerofsocialchallengesandaddictionalongthecoastofSouthAfrica.

Trade data analysis on abalone reveals a complex network that links poaching to syndicatedtrade through various countries, some of them landlocked, across southern Africa beforeeventually reaching Asianmarkets. Calls for radical governance reform have beenmade, butchange isslow.Nevertheless, there isvalue inprofiling the illegal tradeas fullyaspossible, todrawlessonsfordealingwithpoachingandotherformsofwildlifecrimemoreeffectivelyinthefuture.

This briefing paper is a synthesis of current knowledge about South Africa’s illegal abalonefishery,drawingonbothavailableliteratureandunpublishedresearch.Thebriefingpaperisnotexhaustive,butoffersacomprehensiveanduptodateoverviewofthehistory,drivers,impactsandmodus operandi of this country’s illicit abalone trade. By profiling the current situationholistically, this briefing paper aims to inform stakeholders and stimulate discussion onrecommendedsolutionsandfurtherareasofstudyasdescribedinSection4.

Recommendationsinclude:

1) long‐term systemicwork is required on fisheries reform and local economic developmentalternativesincoastalcommunitiesintheEasternandWesternCape;

2) furtherresearch isneededtounderstandtheknowledgegapsurroundinghowthecriminalsyndicatesoperateoutsideofSouthAfricaandtheirtiestootherformsofillicittrade;

3)increasedcollaborationbetweennationalandregionalenforcementagenciesandmoreuseoftradedataanalysesaspartofanintelligence‐ledapproachtodisruptingpatternsoftrafficking;

4) stricter trade controls‐, including consideration of reinstating abalone as a CITES‐listedspecies,ideallyinAppendixII.

iv South Africa’s illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap analysis

Introduction

A large sea snail that lives close to shore, grazing on algae, is being illegally harvested to thepointofcommercialextinction.Powerfulsyndicatesoperatealucrativeandhighlycriminalizedblack‐market to East Asia,where consumers pay hundreds of dollars per kilogramme for thesnail.Thisdocumentsummarisescurrentknowledgeoftheabalonetradebyexploringthepast25yearsoftheindustryandfactorsleadingtothecurrentpoachingcrisis

Aconservativeestimateof1723tons1ofabalone—speciesnameHaliotismidae—waspoachedin SouthAfrica in 2012,more than 10 times the official Total Allowable Catch. In the last 10years,itisestimatedthatmorethan20500tonshasbeenpoachedandillegallytradedintotal.VirtuallyallofthiswillhavetravelledtoHongKong,theepicentreoftheglobalabalonetrade,beforeeitherbeingsoldlocallyorre‐exported(Burgener,2013).

At the consumer end of the value chain it is prepared with great care and served at specialoccasions: to mark the conclusion of successful business deals, for example, or to celebrateweddingsandotherauspiciousoccasions.

Thesupplysideoftheillicitabalonetrade,thedistallimbsofwhichhavespreadrightacrossthebiogeographicrangeof theresource inSouthAfrica,canbebroadlycharacterizedbyviolence,opportunism and plunder. Criminal organizations exploit a range of vulnerabilities (fromcommunitytoStatelevelandabove)tooperateanextraordinarilyorganizedsystemofexportsthathasthusfardefiedallattemptstobringitunderregulatorycontrol.

That the illicit abalone trade has survived for so long points to, among other things, thepersistence of the criminal black‐market, which in itself speaks volumes about South Africansociety. Crime operates in the shadows, and it is in shadow that some of themost revealingtruthsaboutatimeorplacecanbefound.Takingacriminologicallenstothiscountry’sabalonepoaching epidemic thus highlights a much deeper set of problems—entrenched structuralinequality, weak governance, and widespread institutional failure—that allow this particularillicittrade,likemanyothers,tocontinuetoflourish.

Part of the reason for the resilience of the illegal abalone fishery, as this documentdemonstrates,isthatpoachinghasfilledasocio‐economicvoidleftbehindbyapartheid,offeringhistorically disadvantaged small‐scale fishers an unprecedented opportunity to earn goodmoney from the sea. Another component of the overall picture is that South Africa and itsneighbourshaveporousborders, enabling large volumesof contraband tobe transportedoutwithout detection. In parallel with the southern African development context, sustainedeconomicgrowthinEastAsiahasboosteddemandforhigh‐endgoodsinthepasttwodecades.Asafinalpiecetothepuzzle,abalone,beingashallow‐watersnail,isincrediblyeasytoharvest.

Inotherwords,abalonetradeisahighlycomplexphenomenon.Sustainedover‐harvestinghaspushedstockstothebrinkofcommercialextinctionforlegaloperators:afisheriesmanagementand conservation issue. The evolution of a potent criminal economy in coastal working classsettlementshasintroducedgangsterismanddrugabuse,amongothersocialills:awelfareissue.Theeasewithwhichshipmentsofpoachedabalonecontinue to leave thecountry,despite theillegalfisheryhavingbeenidentifiedasapriorityconcernmorethantwodecadesago,pointstoglaringweaknesses in thesystems thatgovernbordercontroland international trade:ahigh‐endgovernanceissue.

Theauthorsofthisbriefingpaperstronglybelievethatabalonepoachingcannotbeunderstood,letalonetackled,withoutengagingwiththesedifferentlayersofcomplexityinaholisticfashion.

1“tons”inthisbriefingpaperreferstometrictonnes.Onetonisequivalentto1000kg.

South Africa’s illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap analysis 1

History of the commercial abalone fishery in South Africa

OfthefiveabalonespeciesfoundinSouthAfricanwaters,justone,theendemicHaliotismidae,iscommerciallyexploited.Aslow‐movinggrazingmollusc,H.midaereachessexualmaturityafterseven years. It occupies shallow inshorewaters from Cape Columbine on the country’s westcoastasfarasPortStJohnsintheEasternCape(Figure1),withgreatestdensitiesoccurringinwaters less than 10 metres deep. Taken together, these two biological characteristics—slowgrowth and late sexual maturity—combined with relative ease of access render H. midaeparticularlyvulnerabletoover‐exploitation,athreatcompoundedbythehighvalueofabaloneproductsinEastAsianmarkets(deGreef2013).

South Africa’s commercial abalone fishery began near Gansbaai, on the south coast of theWesternCape,inthelate1940s.Itwasinitiallyrunonanopen‐accessbasis,withteamsofdiversworkingfromsmallboatsfittedwithsurface‐airsupplyequipment.Shore‐basedharvestingalsotookplaceatlowtide,asindeedithadforcenturiesthroughoutthebiogeographicrangeoftheabaloneresource.Catchlicenceswererequiredfrom1954onwards,butotherthansizelimitsofaminimum14cmshell length,noharvestrestrictionsapplied.Thislackofregulation,coupledwith booming demand in key importer countries like Japan, allowed catches to rise tounsustainable levels, peaking at 2800 tons in 1965 before falling into rapid decline due todepletingstocks(Raemaekersetal.2011).

Alarmed at theprospect of over‐harvesting, fisheriesmanagers imposed catch regulations forthe first time in 1968 (Table1). The total quotawas steadily reduced until the early 1970s,when annual catches stabilized around 700 tons. In the early 1980s this figure decreased toapproximately615tons,withnoindicationsofsignificantlong‐termdecline(Figure2).

Figure1MapofSouthAfricaandtheWesternCape,showingthebiogeographicrangeofabalone(Haliotismidae)andthespatialextentof thecommercialabalonefishery.Since1986thecommercial fisheryhasbeenmanagedinsevenseparatezones(A–Gonmap).AdaptedfromRaemaekersetal.(2011).

2 South Africa’s illicit abalone trade: An updated overview and knowledge gap analysis

From1986onwardsthecommercialfisherywassubdividedintosevenfishingzones,witheachallocateditsownTotalAllowableCatch(TAC)basedonstockassessmentsandpreviousyields(seeFigure1).Theseremaininplacetoday.AcommercialfisherywasneverestablishedintheEastern Cape Province, despite the presence of a sizeable abalone population, as authoritiesdeemed the resource too patchily distributed to be economically viable (Raemaekers & Britz2009).

Until theearly1990s thesemanagement interventionsappeared tobeworkingwell.Harvestswere steady, divers were reporting improved catch‐per‐unit‐effort, and the prospect ofincreasedTACsinthefuturewasattractingnewentrantstothefishery.Co‐operationbetweenresourcemanagersandrightsholders,inotherwords,wasseentohaveputtheabalonefisherybackontrack(Raemaekersetal.2011).

Figure2CommercialabalonefisherylandingsandevolutionoftheTotalAllowableCatch(TAC).AdaptedfromRaemaekersetal.(2011).

Inequalityandthetransformationdrive

Although tightercontrolbroughta senseofoptimismto theabalone fishery, itsbenefitswerenot shared equally. Like in the rest of the South African fisheries sector, commercial abalonerightswerereservedforwhiteindividualsduringapartheid,essentiallyreducingtheroleofnon‐whitestoprovidingcheaplabour.Intheearly1990sfivewhite‐ownedcompaniesheldabalonepermits,with52divers—mostlycoloured2individuals—employedonaseasonalbasis(Sauret

2 In South Africa, the term “coloured” refers to a diverse group of people—descended largely from slaves, indigenous Khoisangroups,andawiderangeofotherAfricanpeoples—whowereassimilatedintocolonialsocietybytheendofthenineteenthcentury.Being alsopartly descended fromEuropean settlers, coloureds are popularly regarded as being of ‘mixed’ race, andoccupied anindeterminate status in the South African racial hierarchy during apartheid, distinct from the historically dominant ‘white’ orEuropeanminority,‘Indians’,andthenumericallypredominant‘black’Africanpopulation(adaptedfromvanSittertetal.2006).


al.2003).ThissystematicexclusionmeantthatresidentsoftraditionalfishingcommunitieslikeHawstonandGansbaaihadminimalformalaccesstoabalone,sowingtheseedsfortherampantillegalharvestingthatwastofollow.

Table1:KeyeventsintheevolutionofSouthAfrica’slegalandillegalabalonefisheries

Date Event

Earlydays

1949* CommercialabalonefisherybeginsnearHermanus

1954 Firstcommerciallicencesestablished;nocatchlimits

1965 Annualcommercialharvestpeaksat2800tons

1968 Firstcommercialcatchlimitsestablished

1972 Annualcommercialharveststabilizesat700tons

1983 Recreationallicensesestablished

1986 Commercialfisheryzones(A‐F)established

Abalonepoaching

takesoff

1990* SouthwardmigrationofWCRLintoZonesA&B;abalonerecruitmentfailure

1994 Annualrecreationalharvestpeaksat750tons

1994 Apartheidends

1994* The'AbaloneWars'beginonOverbergcoast

1998 MarineLivingResourcesActadopted

Firstsubsistencequotaallocated,representing10%ofTAC

Crisismanagem

ent

1999 StartofOperationNeptune

2001 Subsistencerightsreplacedwith'limitedcommercial'rights

2003 EnvironmentalCourtestablishedinHermanus

‘Limitedcommercial'sectormergedwithcommercialsector

Long‐termabalonecommercialrightsgranted

MARINESestablishedbyOverbergMunicipality

NewAbalonePolicyadopted

OverbergMunicipalitytakesovercomplianceresponsibilityfromMCM

Closureofrecreationalfishery

2004 AbaloneProtectionPlanadopted

StartofOperationTrident

TableMountainNationalParkproclaimed

2005 OperationNeptuneends

OperationTridentends

2006 EnvironmentalCourtcloses

MARINESdisband

2007 H.midaelistedinCITESAppendixIII

2008 CommercialfisheryclosedinOctober;re‐openedinNovember

2010 H.midaewithdrawnfromCITESAppendixIII

*Approximatedates


Transformation of the abalone fishery began in 1998, when 236 traditional abalone fishersreceived subsistence quotas, representing 10% of the national TAC. This followed the formalrecognition,forthefirsttime,ofthetraditionalrightsofsubsistencefishersbythenewnationalMarineLivingResourcesAct.Thehighvalueofabalonemadeitananomalyinthesubsistencesector, however, which primarily consisted of low‐value species. The inclusion of traditionalabalone fishers into the quota system proved difficult to manage, and it was replaced by asystemoflimitedcommercialrightsin2001(Raemaekersetal,2011).

The new limited commercial regimewas also plaguedwith challenges. Abalonepoachinghadalreadyrisentocrisislevelsbytheearly2000s,rapidlydepletingstocksintheOverbergregionand posing a serious threat to management efforts (see Section 2). An unusual ecologicalphenomenon exacerbated the problem. In response to changing oceanic circulation patterns,rocklobstersfromthewestcoasthadmigratedsouthwardstotheBetty’sBayarea(commercialfishery Zones C and D) in large numbers during the previous decade, decimating localpopulations of sea urchins and removing vital refuge sites for juvenile abalone—which hadformerlyshelteredfrompredatorsbetweentheurchins’spines—intheprocess(Hauck&Sweijd1999). Coupled with increasingly unsustainable levels of illegal harvesting, the widespreadrecruitment failure that followed had dire implications for the abalone resource, forcingauthorities todecreasetheTACsubstantiallywhilesimultaneouslyopeningthefisherytonewentrants.

Theaveragesizeofacommercialabalonequotadroppedfrom120tonstojust5.2tonswiththeintroductionoflimitedcommercialrightsin2002(Raemaekersetal.2011).Shrinkingquantitiesofabalonewerebeingsharedamongincreasingnumbersofpermitholders,addingpressuretoan already fragile situation. Established rights holders, who were understandably dismayed,resistedfurthereffortstobroadenaccess,causingtensionbetweenrightsholdersanderodingthe relationshipbetween rightsholders and the State. Combating abalonepoachingbecame atop priority for the Department of Environmental Affairs: Branch of Marine and CoastalManagement.Despitethis,however,thenegativespiralcontinued.

Bytheearly2000sillegalharvestingcomprisedthebulkofSouthAfrica’sannualabalonecatch,and was estimated at more than 2000 tons per year. To give this figure context, the totalrecordedlegalcatchinthe2003/2004fishingseasonwaslessthan300tonnes(Raemaekersetal.2011).

By2007thesizeofanaveragequotaallocationhaddroppedtolessthan250kg.Thefollowingyear Marthinus van Schalkwyk, then Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,controversiallyannouncedthetotalclosureof theabalonefishery.Theensuingoutcry—rightsholders argued that theywere beingpunished for the crimes of others—led to thebanbeingrevokedthefollowingseason.

The commercial abalone fishery has remained open sincewith an annual TAC of 150 tons, afractionofitsformersize.HarvestingisnolongerpermittedinZonesCandD,theformerheartofthecommercialabalonefishery.

TheabalonemarketinAsia

Virtuallyallabaloneharvested inSouthAfrica—whether legallyor illegally—isexportedtoEast Asia, where abalone is considered a status symbol and a delicacy. Hong Kong is theepicentre of the international trade, importing shipments from South Africa, Australia,Indonesia,Japanandahandfulofothercountriestosupplyaboominglocalmarket,aswellassecondaryimportersinmarketslikeChina,TaiwanandtheUnitedStates(wherepresumablywealthyAsianexpatriatesconstitutethebulkofthemarket).

RapideconomicgrowthinEastAsiaoverthepasttwodecadeshasledtoincreaseddemandforhigh‐endproductslikeabalone,whichfetchesstreetpricesofuptoUSD1000/kg.InHongKong,driedabalonecanbepurchasedfromfoodstoresthatalsosellsharkfin,seahorsesandotherspecialityproducts(Toetal.2006).Awidevarietyofabalone“brands”—representingdifferentspecies,sizesandtreatmentmethods—areavailable;Dawangbao,thenamegiventoSouthAfricanabalone,isconsistentlyamongthemostexpensive.


The rise of the illegal abalone fishery

Key drivers

Thelongperiodofstabilityinthecommercialabalonefisherycametoanendintheearly1990s,when illegal harvesting began negatively impacting legal catches for the first time (Hauck &Sweijd1999).Whilstabalonepoachingwasnotanewphenomenon—ithadbeentakingplace,and at relatively low levels, since quotas were first put in place—the start of the decadewitnessed its emergence on a far bigger scale than ever before. Following Steinberg’sauthoritative2005summary,thisshiftcouldbeattributedtofourmainfactors.

First, the South African rand (currency code: ZAR) depreciated in value, falling steadily fromthreeunits to theUSdollar in1992 to13unitsnineyears later.Thisbenefitted local abaloneexporters—bothlegalandillegal—whowereabletoearnproportionallymorefortheirproductinZARterms.At thesametime,rapideconomicgrowth inEastAsiaboosteddemand,causingpricesforabaloneandotherhigh‐endgoodstorise.Bythemid‐1990s,abalonewasreportedlyfetching more than USD65/kg on the Hong Kong market, equivalent to approximatelyZAR300/kgatthetime.Thismadeabaloneanexceptionallyvaluable(aswellasabundantandhighlyaccessible)resourcethroughoutitsbiogeographicrangeontheSouthAfricancoast.

Secondly, a sophisticated network of ethnic Chinese criminal syndicates, with connections tomainlandChina,HongKongandTaiwan—collectivelyknownasTriadgangs—hadalreadybeenoperatinginSouthAfricaforoveradecade(Gastrow2001).Engaginginawiderangeof illicitactivities, from drug smuggling to human trafficking, these groups played a key role inorganizing the illegal tradewhenthevalueofabalone increased(Steinberg2005).LinkswereforgedwithkeyactorsintheCapeTownunderworld,particularlythepowerfulCapeFlatsgangsthat controlled the recreational drug trade. In one important arrangement, Triads beganbartering ingredients for themanufacture ofMandrax—an addictive barbiturate‐like sedativemorepopularamongpoorerresidentsoftheWesternCapethananywhereelseintheworld—inexchange for abalone, tightly entwining the booming illegal fisherywith the broader criminaleconomy.

In later years this pattern would be repeated with the stimulant methamphetamine, knownlocallyas‘tik’andusageofwhichsurgedthroughtheghettosofCapeTownfromthelate1990sonwards.

ThethirdmainfactordrivingtheexplosionoforganizedabalonepoachinginSouthAfricawastheliftingofeconomicsanctionsaftertheendofthecountry’sapartheidera.SouthAfrica’sre‐insertionintotheglobaleconomy,andtheconcomitantriseinlegalcross‐bordertrade,madeiteasier for transnational criminal groups to conduct their operations without being detected(Hübschle2001).Slackenedbordercontrolsalsomadeiteasierforpoachedabaloneandothercontrabandtoleavethecountry.

The final, crucial factor identified by Steinberg, building on existing work by fisheries socialscientists and others, was the widespread frustration and disappointment at slow fisheriesreformfeltbyresidentsofSouthAfricanfishingcommunities.Withtheendofapartheidin1994came widespread optimism—encouraged by the new ruling party, the African NationalCongress, which took office spreading a message of social justice and societal change—thatSouthAfricanfisherieswouldreformforthebenefitofthepoor.Butthetransformationprocessthatbeganshortlyafterwardsprovedcumbersome,constrainedbyeconomicandenvironmentalobjectives and hamstrung by a lack of capacity in the national fisheries authority. As aconsequence,theexpectationsofmanyformerlydisadvantagedfisherswerenotmet,leavingavoidforcriminalgroupstoexploit(Hauck1997;Steinberg2005).

Theupshotofthesedevelopmentswasthatbytheendofthe1990salandmarktransitionhadtaken place: abalone poaching had ceased to be an informal, opportunistic activity and hadenteredtherealmoflarge‐scale,highlyorganizedtransnationalcrime.


The response of the State

In hindsight, the early years of South Africa’s illicit abalone trade industry must have beensomethingofahoneymoonperiodforpoachersandthesyndicatestheysupplied.Stockswerestillhighlyabundant—“abaloneshellswerepackedtogetherlikethesurfaceofacobbledstreet,”recalledanostalgicformerkingpininterviewedoff‐the‐recordin2013—andco‐ordinatedanti‐poaching strategies had not yet been put in place. Indeed, it took years for law enforcementofficials to respond properly to the illegal harvesting that had started to flourish in the early1990s, seriously setting back the State’s attempts to curb the plunder. This section, adaptedfrom de Greef (2013), will provide an overview of some keymanagement interventions thatfollowed,aswellasevaluatetheireffectiveness(referbacktoTable1foratimeline).

In 1999Marine and CoastalManagement (MCM), the national fisheries authority at the time,establishedOperationNeptune,ajointventurewiththeSouthAfricanPoliceService(SAPS),onthe Overberg coast. The main focus of Operation Neptune was preventing poachers fromenteringthewater,withasecondaryfocusonarrestingknownoffendersandbringingthemtojustice.OperationNeptune ran intermittentlyuntil 2005,when itwas absorbedback into theinstitutionalstructuresofMCM.

In 2003 the OverstrandMunicipality took over responsibility for enforcing compliance in itswaters—where abalone poaching was most serious—from MCM. Their first project wasestablishing a special task force called the MARINEs (Management Action for Resources ofInshoreandNearshoreEnvironments)whichamongotheractivitiesconducted24‐hourpatrols,monitored slipways, liaised with local schools and communities, and co‐operated with otheranti‐poachinggroups.

The same year, a dedicated environmental court was set up in Hermanus to handle abalonepoachingcases,whichthemainstreamjusticesystemhadstruggledtodealwitheffectively.Initsfirst18monthsofoperationthecourtprocessedalongbacklogofcriminalcasesresultinginaremarkableprosecutionrateof75%.Bycomparison,theprosecutionrateinmainstreamcourtswas estimated at 10%. Despite these successes the Department of Justice closed theenvironmentalcourtin2006,citingbudgetaryconstraints.

AfurtherattempttostrengthenlawenforcementwasthelaunchofOperationTridentin2004,which formedpartof abroader “AbaloneProtectionPlan”byMCM.Alongwith theMARINEs,OperationTridentwasdiscontinuedtwoyearslater.

Anewpolicy

Besidespolicingtheabaloneresource,authoritiesalsomadeeffortstoaddresstherootcausesofpoaching by drafting a new abalone policy, which they adopted in 2003 (DEAT 2003). Thispolicy established parameters for allocating long‐term fishing rights more equitably andproposed a fresh management plan for tackling illegal harvesting. One key intervention was

Therecreationalfishery

In parallel with the commercial abalone fishery, a recreational fishery began on an open‐accessbasiswithbagandsizelimits.From1983onwards,recreationalfisherswererequiredto purchase permits, with additional managementmeasures gradually put in place as thestatus of the resource worsened. The recreational fishery was suspended in 2003 due toconcerns in controlling the combined impactonabalone stocks from legal commercial andrecreationalfishingandithasnotre‐openedsince.


settingupco‐managementstructuresandestablishingaso‐calledTerritorialUserRightsFishery(TURF) system,which gave rights holders exclusive access to, and thus greater responsibilitytowards,abalonestocksindifferentdemarcatedharvestingareas.Therecreationalfisherywasalsosuspended,inordertoreserveabaloneexclusivelyforthecommercialsector.

Despite these progressive measures, the new policy proved difficult to implement. Problemsincludedan ineffectiveTURFsystem,whichallowedrightsholders to fish inzonesother thantheir own and thereby undermined their sense of resource custodianship; a flawed co‐management process that only offered stakeholders limited opportunities to participate indecisionmaking; andmost notably the unilateral decision to close the commercial fishery in2007,whichcompletelyalienatedrightsholders(Hauck2009b).

The presence of legitimate abalone divers was also not a deterrent to armed poachingsyndicates,whocontinuedtoactwithimpunity(Raemaekersetal.2011).Individualquotasforrights holders remained unfeasibly small, prompting anger towards the government and abreakdownoftrust.Finally,andperhapsmostimportantly,theunderlyingconditionsofpovertyand unemployment in coastal fishing communities had not been adequately addressed, andmany traditional small‐scale fishers had not yet been formally recognized, meaning strongeconomic incentives for poaching remained (Hauck & Sweijd 2006). What had been initiallybeenlaudedasaboldsteptowardstacklingabalonepoachingholisticallythusresultedinlittlechange, with little link‐through between policy interventions at government level andcompliancebehaviourontheground.

Havingmetwith little success in itswaron abalonepoaching, fisheries authoritiesmade twofinal attempts toprotect the resource.The firstwasestablishingnewMarineProtectedAreas(MPAs)ontheCapePeninsulaandonBirdIslandinPortElizabeth,whereillegalharvestingwasrampant.DyerIsland,ahotspotnearGansbaai,wasalsoclosedtocommercialharvesting.Lawenforcement in these areas remained poor, though, hampering the effectiveness of thesemeasures(Raemaekersetal.2011).

ThesecondstrategywaslistingH.midaeinAppendixIIIofCITES(ConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpeciesofWildFaunaandFlora).Thisrequiredall legalabaloneexportsleavingSouthAfricatobeaccompaniedbyapermitissuedbythecountry’sCITESManagementAuthority(Raemaekersetal.2011).Itwashopedthatregulatorycontrolsinimportercountries,as well as in neighbouring southern African states through which abalone was known to besmuggled,wouldtightenasaresult.Thisdidn’thappen, though:afterencounteringaseriesoflogistical obstacles the CITES listing was withdrawn in May 2010 and never reinstated(Raemaekersetal.2011).

Despite these discouraging events, however, there has been subsequent improvement in themanagement of South Africa’s abalone poaching epidemic. The Department of Agriculture,Forestry&Fisheries (DAFF) has re‐structured itsMonitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS)

Abalonefarming

With poaching heavily impacting commercial abalone harvests, and consumer demandremaininghigh,theaquaculturesectorhasbecomeanincreasinglyimportantcomponentofthe legal abalone trade, currently producing some 1200 tons a year. Abalone is reared inland‐based tanks on a mixture of synthetic feed and kelp. The sector, already the mostvaluableintheSouthAfricanaquacultureindustry, isexpectedtogrowstronglyinthenextfewyears, thoughhighcapitaloutlayanda lackofexpertiseandtechnicalcapacityarestillmajorobstaclestoexpansion.


wing,andasaresult,co‐operationwithSouthAfricanPoliceServicesseemstohaveimproved,withsignificantinterdictionsbeingmadeonaregularbasis.

Socio‐economic impacts

Abalonepoachinghasbroughtunprecedentedwealth to impoverished fishing communities intheWesternandEasternCape,thoughthishaslargelyaccruedinthehandsofasmallnumberofpowerful kingpin figures. Nevertheless, abalone has had profound economic consequencesthroughoutitsbiogeographicrange,injectinglargecashsumsinplacestheformaleconomyhasnotyetbeenable to reach.Whilenosystematic studiesassessing the truemagnitudeof theseimpacts have been conducted, there is ample quantitative, qualitative and anecdotal evidenceillustratingthattheyhavebeensubstantial.Thissectionprovidesabriefsummary.

Steinberg in 2005 (p. 6) wrote: “if one drives through Hawston, Kleinmond or Hermanus’scolouredtownshiptodayoneseesgarishdouble‐storeyfacebrickhousesstandinganomalouslyamongthetinymatchboxhousesofthecoastalworkingclass…Abalonemoneyhasquiteliterallychangedthephysicallandscape.”Visitstoothercoastaltownsoffersimilarlyglaringexamplesofthe economic impacts of the abalone trade. In Hout Bay, on the Cape Peninsula, successfulpoachers cruise gleaming sports cars down the streets, passing decaying council flats andcramped backyard dwellings (de Greef 2013). In Buffeljagsbaai, a remote one‐street fishingcommunity on the south coast, one is confronted by the incongruous sight of rundownbungalows affixed with satellite dishes. These scenes are common wherever poverty andabaloneoverlapinSouthAfrica.

Therawfiguresoftheillicitabalonetradeareastonishing,especiallywhenconsideredagainstabackdropofpoverty.By1995divers inHawstonwereearningUSD50/kg forshuckedabalone(the flesh thathas been extracted from the shell), equating toUSD2000 for a 40 kg bag. Thisquantity,whichingoodconditionscouldbeharvestedinlessthantwohours,representedmorethan four times the averagemonthly income in the community at the time, providing strongeconomicincentivestopoach(Hauck1997).Sincethenthispricehasfluctuated,withevidencesupportinganecdotalreportsofalong‐termdecline.

Awide range of accomplices and assistants draw an income from the illegal abalone fishery.From the money they earn supplying local buyers and middlemen, divers pay carriers andlookouts,aswellasskippersanddeckassistantsinthecaseofboat‐basedpoachingoperations(Hauck1997,deGreef2013).Middlemen, in turn,employdrivers,packersandassortedotherhenchmentoprocessandtransporttheirproducttobuyersfurtherupthechain.

Surprisingeconomic linkageshavebeendiscovered inpoaching towns, revealing thedepth towhich the abalone black‐market has become engrained: women refrigerating batches ofcontraband in their homes, for example, or gang members funding purchases of boats andequipmentwithouttakingpartinanypoachingoperationsthemselves(deGreef2013).Theneteffectisthatmanymorepeoplemaybeconnectedtopoaching—andpoachingmoney—thanisimmediatelyapparent.

Research in bothHawston (Hauck 1997) andHoutBay (deGreef 2013) revealed thatmoneyfrom abalone poaching has contributed both to economic development and wasteful,extravagantexpenditure.

“Some peoplewere involved in poaching because itwas amechanism bywhich to feed theirfamilies and to survive a desperate situation,”wroteHauck& Sweijd ofHawston in 1999 (p.1028), characterising a more general trend. “In addition, there was great consensus in thecommunitythatmanypeoplewereinvolvedinillegalexploitationbecauseofthelargeamountsofmoneyassociatedwithpoaching.”

Atthegroundlevel,moneyfrompoachingisalmostexclusivelyincashform.Anecdotalreportsbypoachersindicatethatitisfastandreadilyavailable,withhighturnoverrates:evenassistants


can earn hundreds of USD from a single operation (de Greef 2013). On this basis, abalonepoaching has attracted a wide cast of opportunists seeking easy money, and found partialexpressioninacultureofextravagant,materialwealth.

Policeand fisheriesofficials interviewedoff‐the‐record in2012repeatedlyspokeof the“partylifestyle” adopted by abalone poachers in Hout Bay, revolving mainly around drugs, alcohol,expensive clothes, jewellery, fast cars and women. Field observations confirmed that somepoachers flauntedtheirwealthandthatrecreationaldrugusewascommon.Atthesametime,there were indications of less wasteful expenditure, including renovations, groceries, schoolfees,andChristmaspresents(deGreef2013).

Besides cash payments, another formof remuneration operates in the illegal abalone fishery,though its impactshavebeen less thoroughly investigated:drugs.Since theearly2000s ithasbeen widely known that Asian criminal groups have bartered precursor ingredients for firstmandrax and latermethamphetamines for abalone, forging cash‐free trade relationshipswithCapegangsthatcontrolthelocaldrugmarket(Steinberg2005).

Similarexchangesreportedlytakeplaceatacommunitylevel,too,withbuyersandmiddlemenpaying divers and assistants in addictive substances—or, more commonly, fronting drugs toindividuals and forcing them to work off the debt. The likely amplifying impacts of thesetransactionsonabalonepoachinghasreceivedlittleattention,althoughabio‐economicmodelofpoaching effort developed by researchers at the University of Cape Town incorporated theinelastic nature of drug demand—addicts seldom adjust their consumption in response tochangesinprice—withtroublingimplicationsforabalonestocks(Bricketal.2009).

Finally,middlemeninHoutBayalsoallegedlysecurelabourthroughunsecuredcashloans(deGreef 2013). The stark poverty in fishing communities throughout the country means thatsimilar“loanshark”behaviourislikelyelsewheretoo.

Socialimpacts

Lucrative, unregulated and highly criminalized: South Africa’s illegal abalone trade sharescharacteristicswiththebroaderblack‐market,withsimilarthreatstosocialcohesionandwell‐being.Shortlyaftersyndicatedabalonepoachingtookoff inthemid‐1990s,thegatekeepersoftheCapecriminaleconomymovedinontheOverbergcoasttoclaimtheirshareoftheboomingtrade.Steinberg,inTheNumber,his2004bookonprisongangs,explains:

“Itwas1996.TheFirm(amajorWesternCapestreetgang)hadjustbegunmovingintothefishingvillageseastofFalseBay.Therewasathrivingpoaching industryalongtheabalone belt … it was too good an opportunity for The Firm to pass up. They builtdouble‐storyface‐bricks inthe fishingvillages’colouredtownships,andsentdozensofsoldiers (gangmembers), each armed to the teeth, to live in them. Their planwas tomaketheabalonebelttheirturf…bythelate1990stheyweremakingafortune.”

This sudden infiltration of the criminal underworld had profound consequences for fishingcommunities,rangingfromviolentturfwarstosharpincreasesingangsterismanddrugabuse.In particular, the widespread uptake of methamphetamine, a highly addictive stimulantcolloquiallyknownastik,hasdisruptedfamiliesanddrawngrowingnumbersofyouthsintothepoachingeconomy,whichisnowfirmlyentwinedwiththedrugtrade.

The illegal abalone fishery system

Illegal abalone divers and fishery

Profile

At the ground level, South Africa’s abalone black‐market is predominantly the domain of theunemployed and the working class. Poaching—loosely defined here as the physical act of


unauthorized removal of abalone from the seafloor and arranging for its onwards sale—hashistorically been most rampant in impoverished coloured fishing communities, althoughindividuals from diverse other backgrounds have also joined the trade. A range of organizedcriminalgroupsoperatehigherupintheillicitabaloneeconomy,formingachainthatultimatelylinksdiverswithconsumers inEastAsia,althoughidentifyingthesegroupsandprofilingtheiractivitiesismoredifficult,andwillbedealtwithlaterinthisreport.ThefollowingsectionbrieflydescribesthemainroleplayersinSouthAfrica’sillegalabalonetrade3.

Traditionalfishingcommunities

Abalonepoaching in the traditional fishing communities of theWesternCape—comprisedalmostexclusivelyofindividualsofmixedrace,classified“coloured”underapartheid,andalabel that remains inwide use today—is largely a story of historical contingency. Deniedrights to marine resources during apartheid, small‐scale fishers awaited the onset ofdemocracy in 1994 with high expectations, hoping for widespread access to the marineresources that underpinned their livelihoods. For a number of reasons, this did not quitehappen(seeSection2).AngeredbytheState’sinabilitytotransformthefisheriessector,andunder persistent strain from the inequality that still underpins South African society, anumberofthesefishersreactedquicklytotheopportunityofsupplyingtheabaloneblack‐market in the early 1990s, which simultaneously offered lucrative sums of money forworking at sea—which had never been possible before—and an opportunity to defy thegovernment.Withinafewyearspoachinggroupshadsprungupinfishingtownsacrossthesouthcoastabalonebelt,boostingeconomicactivityanddramaticallyredefiningthe termsofcommunitylife.Today,abalonepoachingisstillcloselyassociatedwithsmall‐scalefishing,and poaching groups continue to operate in fishing communities throughout theWesternCape.Insomeoftheseplaces,highlyorganizedillegalfisherieshaveevolved,characterizedby high‐speed boats and large harvests; in others, poaching has remained ad‐hoc andopportunistic.

WhitepoachersintheEasternCape

Whileabalonepoachinghaspredominantlybeenassociatedwithcolouredfishermen,othergroups have also joined the trade. In Port Elizabeth, for example, Raemaekers (2009)profiled the activities of working class white poachers, many of whom had formerlyharvestedabaloneonarecreationalbasis.Whiletheseindividualshadnolinkstothesmall‐scalefishingsector,theysharedwithcolouredpoachersadeepmistrustoftheSouthAfricangovernment,andthusjustifiedintransgressingitsrules.Raemaekersidentifiedtwoseparategroups during his study: one comprising opportunistic and loosely organized individualswhoharvestedforquickmoney,oftentosupportrecreationaldrughabits,andoneoperatingon a much grander scale, employing high‐speed boats and sophisticated equipment toconduct exceedingly well‐planned operations. Elsewhere, there is anecdotal evidence ofwhiteindividualscollaboratingwithcolouredpoachinggroups:inHoutBay,deGreef(2013)found that white divers were regarded to be more highly skilled than local poachers.Preliminary, unpublished research among older poachers has also indicated that the firstorganizedpoachinggroupsintheWesternCapecomprisedpredominantlyofwhitedivers.

3Theuseofrace‐basedcategorieshereisnotdoneun‐reflexively,butoutofnecessity:SouthAfricaremainslargelydividedalongraciallines,withstronglinksbetweenrace,classandculturalidentity,twodecadesaftertheendofapartheid.


NewblackAfricanentrantstotheillegalabalonefishery

Althoughlittlehasbeenpublishedonthetopic,agreatdealofanecdotalevidenceindicatesthatblackAfricanindividualshavestartedoperatinginSouthAfrica’sillegalabalonefishery,dramaticallywideningthepoolofpotentialpoachersinboththeWesternandEasternCape.Off‐the‐recordinterviewswithlawenforcementofficialshaverevealedthatwell‐organizedgroups,allegedlywithmilitarytraining,haveevolvedinthepastdecade,bothcollaboratingwith and working separately to established participants. On the Overberg coast, wheresyndicated poaching has declined due to resource depletion and tighter control, poachershaverevealedthatlooselyorganizedblackAfricanindividualshavefilledthegapleftbytheretreating abalone fishery, harvesting from shore using cheap gear. In the Eastern Cape,meanwhile,Raemaekers(2009)reportedthatresidentsofHamburghadjoinedtheregion’sabalonegoldrushof the late1990s.An importantdistinctionmustbemadebetweennewentrants with no history of fishing entering the Western Cape illegal fishery, and blackAfricans fromtraditional fishingcommunities in theEasternCape linkingupwithabalonebuyersintheearly2000s.

Table2Comparingkeyfeaturesofopportunistic,poorlyorganizedabalonepoachingactivitieswiththoseconductedbyorganizedgroups.Notethatindividualsmayoperateinbothcategoriessimultaneously,forexampledivingonapart‐timebasisandworkingasanassistantforalargergroup.

Opportunistic Highlyorganized

Shore‐based Shoreandboat‐based

Smallgeographicrange Widegeographicrange

Lowcapitalinvestment Highcapitalinvestment

Lowyield Highyield

Inexpensivegear(e.g.snorkels) Expensivegear(e.g.SCUBA,GPS)andhigh‐poweredvessels

Minimalcounter‐intelligence Sophisticated counter‐intelligence (incl.corrupt relationships with lawenforcementofficials)


Modusoperandi

Todate, three separate studieshave investigated theoperationsof poaching groups indetail,reportingonbroadlysimilarprocedures:Hauck(1997)inHawston,Raemaekers(2009)intheEasternCape,anddeGreef(2013)inHoutBay.Thissectionsummarizestheirkeyfindings.

Organizationandstructure

Throughout the Western and Eastern Cape, abalone poaching appears to be structuredaccordingtothesamebasicformat:buyersandmiddlemenpaydivers,anddiverspaytheirownassistantsandserviceproviders.Theseincludecarriersandspotters,and,inthecaseofboat‐basedoperations,skippers,deckassistants,andboatowners(Figure3).Whathappenshigherupthevaluechain—beyondmiddlemen,intherealmoflargerbuyers,processorsandexporters—is less clear, althoughanecdotal reportshave shone lightoncertainaspectsoftheseoperations,whichwillbediscussedinalatersection.

Figure3Examplestructureofan illegalabalonefishery(HoutBayontheCapePeninsula)witharrowsindicating the flow of payments through the system. Approximate fees and prices have been includedwhere known. The price of USD22/kg paid bymiddlemen to divers represents an average price for amixedharvestcomprisingbothmedium(USD25/kg)andlarge‐sized(USD20/kg)abalone(2012prices).AdaptedfromdeGreef(2013).

DIVERS'

BOAT/WNERS

10 kgabalone

CREW

SKIPPERSR20 / kg

R10 / kg

R20 / kg

CARRIERS

HEADCARRIERS

CARRIERTEAMS

LOCALMIDDLEMEN

R220 / kg

OUTSIDESYNDICATES

SCALERSPACKERSDRIVERSSTORAGE

HENCHMEN

SPOTTERS

DECKASSISTANTS


Poachingoperations

Abalone poaching can be split into two broad categories: shore‐based and boat‐based.Initially, most diving took place from shore, using either SCUBA or snorkel gear (Hauck1997). While this has continued, it has been superseded in many places by boat‐basedoperations that allow divers to access distant reefs, harvest larger quantities and escapepatrols more easily. Poachers prefer semi‐rigid inflatable vessels for their speed andmanoeuvrability,theirsuitabilityfornavigatingshallowwater,andtheirsafety.Theseboats,which range from small vessels to purpose‐built “superducks” measuring 14 metres, arefitted with high‐powered outboard motors, often in pairs and rated up to 250 HP each(Figure4;Raemaekers&Britz2009).Theyarepurchasedneworsecond‐hand,andinsomecasesallegedlyacquiredonthecheapfromcorruptofficialsinchargeofconfiscatedvessels(deGreef2013).

A typical poaching operation proceeds as follows. Using a system of paid informants(including corrupt officials) poachers monitor law enforcement activity and patrols, andthenselectatargetdivelocation.Boatsanddivecylindersareprepared,trailershitchedtotowing vehicles, and lookouts positioned at strategic locations. In some cases, decoylaunches are conducted to distract law enforcement officials. In Hout Bay, vessels departfrom the harbour without divers or equipment on board, stopping to collect these at asecondarylaunchsitesomedistanceaway.

Manyoperations takeplaceatnight.Uponreaching theirdestination,diversenter the seaandtheskipperoftenretreatstodeeperwaterforsafety.Usingpowerfultorchesstrappedtothe sides of their dive masks or to their forearms, divers prise abalone from the rocks,collectingtheminlargewaistbags.Theyinformtheskipperwhentheyaresurfacingusingcellphonesdouble‐wrappedincondomsforwaterproofing,anddelivertheirharvesttothesurfaceusingbuoyancycontrol(BC)devices.Somediversshucktheirabaloneunderwatertoreducetheweight;othersleavethefleshintheshellasitallowsthemtoworkquicker.

On board, an assistant helps lift the bags from the water while the skipper controls thevessel.Largerboats,whichcarrymoredivers,usuallyhavetwoassistantsondeck.Whenthe

Figure4An unmarked poaching vessel with twin 150 HPmotors parked at anundisclosedlocationintheWesternCape(photographbyKimondeGreef).


boatisfull,oratthefirstsignofdanger,theskipperreturnstoshore.Occasionallydiversareabandonedinthewaterandmustwaitfortheskippertoreturnorabackuprescuevesseltoarrive.

Shore‐based operations take place slightly differently. Some involve careful planning, co‐ordinatedmotorvehicledrop‐offsandnight‐timepickups;othersaremorehaphazardandsimplyentail, according toone interviewee inCapeTown, “groupsofmenwalkingamidstthe rocks at low tide, scratching in shallow water for abalone”. In the rural areas of theEasternCape,intertidalwadershavebeenreportedtouseropesattachedtotheirwaist,andconnectedtoindividualsontheshore(Raemaekers2009).

Illegalfishingeffort

Theclandestinenatureoftheillicitabalonetrademakesitdifficulttogaugepoachingeffortaccuratelyorthetruescaleofpoachingoperations.Threemainapproacheshavebeenusedto date: analysing trade data fromHong Kong,modelling poaching effort as a function ofabaloneconfiscations in theWesternCape, andusingvariousproxies to estimateeffort atgroundlevel.

A recent synthesis by Raemaekers et al. (2011)—which combined harvesting effortestimates for the Western Cape and Eastern Cape provinces, and compared these withavailable abalone import data from Hong Kong—reveals that harvesting increaseddramatically throughout the 1990s and2000s,with the estimated illegal catchpeaking atmorethan3000tonsofabaloneayearbeforedecreasingslightlyin2007,whentheperiodofanalysisended.Overthesameperiod,asalreadydiscussedinSection2,thecommercialabalonefisheryeffectivelycollapsed,withlegalharvestsplummetingtolessthan100tonsayear(Figure5).

Morerecenttrendssuggestthatpoachinghasremainedhigh,withCustomsdatafromHongKongalone—themain importingmarket—indicating thatmore than2450 tonsof abalonewas imported indried form fromSouthernandEasternAfricabetweenOctober2012andOctober2013.With legalproducers still favouring fresh, cannedand frozenproducts, it issafetoassumethatthisfiguremostlyrepresentspoachedabalone(Table3).

Table 3 Total abalone imports to Hong Kong from southern and eastern African countries betweenOctober 2012 andOctober 2013. All figures have been converted towholemass (unshucked). Source:HongKongCustomsandStatisticsBureau.AdaptedfromM.Burgener,TRAFFIC(unpublished).

Abaloneproduct Totalimports(kgwholemass)

Live/fresh/chilled 488343

Canned 784664

Frozen 54273

Dried 2463330

Total 3790610


Figure 5 Legal and illegal abalone catches between 1953 and 2007, and farmed abalone production.Figuresrepresentabalonewholemass.AdaptedfromRaemaekersetal.(2011).

Pricestructure

There is evidence to suggest that the streetprice forabalone—i.e.whatdivers receive fortheir catch—has decreased over the past decade. In the mid‐1990s divers in Hawstonreported earning USD50/kg (Hauck 1997), in 2009 divers in Port Elizabeth earnedUSD40/kg (Raemaekers 2009), and in 2012 divers in Hout Bay earned approximatelyUSD30/kg(deGreef2013).Anecdotalreportssupporttheseobservations,withpoachersinHoutBayandelsewherecomplainingthattheabalonemarketisnolongeraslucrativeasitoncewas.

Two sets of factors are known to influence the abalone price, although little dedicatedresearch has been conducted on the topic. The first involves demand for abalone in themarkets of East Asia, which rose sharply in tandem with economic growth through the1990s and has remained insatiably high since. Two recent interventions may havemoderated this demand somewhat: anti‐corruption and austeritymeasures by the centralChinese government in 2013,whose official parties and functionswere once reportedly amajordestinationforabaloneproducts,andanewcommitmentbyChineseCustomsofficialsto charge import duties on abalone entering the mainland from Hong Kong, a taxrequirement that is alleged to have beenwaived in the past (Markus Burgener, TRAFFIC,pers. com.). Nevertheless, with average incomes still rising in China and elsewhere in theregion,unyieldingdemandforabaloneandotherhigh‐endproductsislikelytoremain.

The second setof factors relates to theunreliabilityof theblack‐market. If amajor illegalabaloneexportergetscaughtoranimportanttraderouteshutsdownthendownstreamlocalsupplychainsgrindtoahalt.Equally,ifanewplayersetsupshoporanewexportstrategyisdevelopedthendemandmayquicklyriseagain.PoachersinterviewedinHoutBayin2012,for example, claimed that a major syndicate bust had negatively impacted the market,


resultinginfewerbuyerslookingforproduct,andconsequentlyamarkeddropinprice(deGreef2013).

Similardynamicsoccurlowerdownthesupplychaintoo.MiddlemeninHoutBayhavefinitestoragecapacityandreportedlypaylowerpriceswheneverthislimitisapproached.Arangeof obstacles—increased periods of police scrutiny, mistrust of assistants, sullied workingrelationshipswithbiggerbuyers—candelaythese individuals fromsendingabaloneoutofHoutBay,occasionally leadingtoperiodsofdecreasedpoachingactivity in thecommunity(deGreef2013).

Higherupthesupplychainthevalueofpoachedabaloneincreases,withsuccessivebuyersandintermediarieseachaddingtheirowncut.Itispossiblethatthishasimpactedthestreetprice,asinthepastdiverssolddirectlytobuyersfromlargersyndicates.

“Poachers claim that buyers used to drive toHoutBay and purchase abalonedirectly.Theincreasedriskofbeingcaughtintransit,however,hasbeguntodeterthis‘travellingmerchant’activity,anditissaidthatmostbuyerswillnowonlypayuponhavingabalonedeliveredtotheirpremises.PoachersinterviewedinHawstonrepeatedasimilarstory,suggestingthatthisshifthastakenplaceelsewhereintheWesternCape.Thisappearstohaveconsolidatedthepositionof localmiddlemen,whohavebecomean indispensablelinkbetweendiversandthelargersyndicates…”(deGreef2013).

InterviewsinHoutBay,Kleinmondandelsewherehaveindicatedthatpoachers,confrontedwith this elongated value chain, effectively face a choice: accept the increased risk oftransporting abalone to distant buyers for extramoney, or sell to localmiddlemen—whothentakeontheriskthemselves—andsettleforless.

Reportssuggestthatalargenumberofroleplayersoperateintheillicitabalonetradenow,andthatthesupplychainconsequentlyconsistsofmyriad,branchingchannels,buttodatealmostnoworkhasbeenpublishedonthetopic.

Newhotspotsandthemobilepoachingfleet

HavingevolvedontheOverbergcoast—theformerheartofthecommercialabalonefishery,where resourcesweremost abundant—there is ample evidence that syndicated poachingactivityhasshiftedawayfromtheabalonebeltinresponsetostockcollapseandimprovedpolicing.OneprominentexamplehasbeentheemergenceofHangberg,atraditionalfishingcommunity in Hout Bay with no history of commercial abalone harvesting, as a majorpoachinghotspotsincetheearly2000s(deGreef2013).OrganizedpoachinggroupsevolvedintheEasternCapeatasimilartimeandquicklyexpandedtheiroperationsoutwardsfromPort Elizabeth (Raemaekers 2009). Today, poaching groups are known to operatethroughoutthebio‐geographicrangeoftheabaloneresource,althoughlittleisknownabouttheiractivities inmanyplaces.There isalsoevidence thatgroupsmovebetweendifferentpoaching hotspots, in some cases collaborating with local poaching networks (de Greef2013).

Mediumversuslarge

An interestingrecent finding is thatabalone ispricedaccording tosizebrackets,whichwasnotthecaseinthepast.InHoutBayin2012diversreportedearningUSD5/kgextrafor medium‐sized abalone—weighing less than 115 g out the shell—than largerspecimens,suggestingaconsumerpreferenceforsmallerproductsinEastAsianmarkets.PoachersinHawstonhavealsoreportedearningmorefor“mediums”(deGreef2013).


Players and pathways: Trade networks and routes in South Africa

Organizedcrimesyndicates

Although it is widely known that international criminal groups, in particular so‐called Triadgangs fromEastAsia, areheavily involved in the illicit SouthAfricanabalone trade, relativelylittle has been written about their activities. Since Steinberg’s 2005 review, which broadlyoutlined the linksbetween these syndicates and local gangs, aswell as the general drugs‐for‐abalone barter scheme that is still thought to underpin the abalone black‐market, there havebeen no published updates, meaning that knowledge of the powerful syndicates that controlabalonepoachinginthiscountryisnearly10yearsoutofdate.

According to Gastrow (2001), Triad groups from China and Taiwan have been operating inSouthAfricasinceatleastthemid‐1980s,dealinginarangeofillicitactivitiesincluding“fraud,drugtrafficking,firearmsmuggling,extortion,moneylaundering,prostitution,illegalgambling,the smuggling of illegal immigrants, tax evasion, and the large‐scale importing of counterfeitgoods”(p.3).Thesecriminalorganizationstracetheirrootsto17thCenturyChinaandoperateonaglobalscaletoday,althoughtheirstructureandmethodsofoperationhavebeendisputed.

Inthepast,criminalresearchersinSouthAfricahavecastTriadsinanalmostreverentiallight,writing of their “secret forms of identification and communication”, “obsessive” secrecy, and“highlyritualisedinitiationceremonies”(Gastrow2001,p.3).Steinberg,however,dismissesthisview as “almost entirely mythical”, quoting international police experts and former gangmemberswhodescribemodernTriadsascriminal“fraternities”,withlimitedtop‐downcontrolor hierarchical structure. On this first point Gastrow agrees—“Triads tend not to be strictlycontrolledfromthetop…membersfrequentlybranchoutintotheirowncriminalenterprises”(p.3)—highlightinginsteadthenetworkingopportunitiestheyoffercriminals:

“Triadmembership is a valuable asset to the new international criminal. It facilitatescriminalactivitiesinamannersimilartothewaymembershipinbusinessassociationsfacilitatestheactivitiesofalegitimatebusinessperson.”(p.3)

ThishasimportantimplicationsforabalonepoachinginSouthAfrica.IfTriadorganizationslackclearverticalstructurethenremovingtheirinfluencewillbemoredifficult:asSteinberg(2005)hasargued,itwilltakemorethanlocatingandshuttingdownahandfulof“MrBig”figures:

“Asuccessful investigationcouldclosedownthebusinessofaMrBig,draining itof itsprimary source of capital. But the networks, contacts and expertise Mr Big deployswould not collapse with him … while organised crime investigations could certainlydestroy the businesses of individual abalone smugglers, it is unlikely that they couldseriouslyimpairtheabalonesmugglingmarketasawhole.”(p.10)

Moreover,accordingtoSteinberg,“poaching,drying,transportingandshippingabaloneisnotaparticularlycapitalintensivebusiness,”theoreticallyenablingmanydifferentplayerstooperatesyndicatesatthesametime,andmakingitmoredifficulttoshutdownthetrade(2001;p.10).

BesidesTriads,othercriminalgroupsareknowntobeinvolvedintheillicitabaloneeconomy.TheroleofCapestreetgangs,whocontrollargesectionofthedrugtradeintheWesternCape,has been discussed already. Unconfirmed reports by poachers in Hout Bay indicate thatPakistaninationalshavestartedplayinganimportantroleinthetrade,too.


Processingandexport

Historically, South Africa’s commercial abalone fishery has produced a range of differentabaloneproductsforexport:canned,frozen,fresh/live,anddried.Theillegaltrade,bycontrastand out of necessity, consists predominantly of dried abalone, which consumers rehydratebefore cooking, much like dried mushrooms. Dried abalone can be stored for long periodswithout refrigeration,making it easier for syndicates to collect and export large batches at atime.Itsmellslesspungentthanfreshorfrozenabaloneandisthusmoredifficulttodetect.Itcanbereadilydisguisedasotherproducts,forexampledriedfruit,toconfuselawenforcementofficials.Finally,driedabaloneshrinkstoatenthofitsoriginalmass,makingitpossibletopackandtransportlargevolumesefficientlyanddiscretely(Steinberg2005).

Thedryingprocessrequiresskillandexpertise,andsignificantlyinfluencesthevalueofthefinalproduct:poorlytreatedabalonemayfetchaslittleasaquarterofthepriceofsun‐driedabalone,thetraditionalmethodinChina(Steinberg2005).InSouthAfrica,illegallyharvestedabaloneistreated with chemical preservatives and dried in low‐temperature ovens. Covert treatmentfacilitieshavebeendiscoveredacrossthecountry,aswellasinneighbouringStateslikeNamibiaandSwaziland,overthepasttwodecades,stockedwithanimpressivearrayofvats,dryingracksand packaging materials. Usually, East Asian nationals—drying specialists, presumably—arearrestedonsite,andlargequantitiesofabaloneconfiscated.

EachyearCustomsdata fromHongKong, the tax‐freeepicentreof theglobal abalonemarket,revealastrangequirk: largequantitiesofdriedabalone imported fromMozambique,Lesotho,Swaziland and a host of other southern African countries that are either landlocked orconfirmed as having no abalone stocks whatsoever. The only reasonable explanation is thatpoached abalone is surreptitiously transported to neighbouring countries with lax bordercontrols, and then exported. Upon arrival in Hong Kong the importer dutifully declares thecontents of the shipment, Customs officials dutifully record its origin and volume, and thepoached abalone enters the general market stream, in which it instantly becomesindistinguishablefromitslegalequivalent.

In other words, by the time poached abalone lands in Hong Kong—as well as other importmarkets like Japan and Taiwan—it has been cleansed of its black‐market shadow, emergingfromtheCustomsprocessalegitimateproduct,availableover‐the‐counterlikeanyotherlegallytradedproduct(Figure6).

Figure6DriedabaloneforsaleinHongKong(Credit:MarkusBurgener/TRAFFIC).


Seeking to secure the assistanceofmarket and in‐transit States, SouthAfrica’sDepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourismlistedH.midae inAppendixIIIofCITESin2007.CITES,aninternational agreement between governments aimed at regulating the international wildlifetrade,listsendangeredspeciesinoneofthreeAppendices,dependingonthelevelofprotectionrequired. Appendix III, to which H. midae was added, is the least stringent of these lists,requiringallexportstobeaccompaniedbyaCITESpermit.AppendixIIIcomprisesspeciesthataCITESParty identifies as being subject to regulationwithin its jurisdiction for the purpose ofpreventing or restricting exploitation and as needing the co‐operation of other Parties in thecontroloftrade.Importsrequireacertificateoforiginand,iftheimportationisfromtheStatethathas included the species inAppendix III, anexportpermit is required.ThismeasurewastakenbySouthAfricabothinordertoenlisttheassistanceofothercountriesintrackingSouthAfrican abalone in international trade and also to strengthen regulatory controls in keyimportingmarketssuchasHongKong,China,TaiwanandJapan.

The CITES listing also allowed neighbouring southern African States such as Mozambique,Zimbabwe and Swaziland—countries through which abalone is smuggled—to assist inregulatingtheinternationaltrade(Burgener,2008).Intheory,thisshouldhaveclosedtheloopbetweenabaloneexporterand importer,preventingpoachedshipments frombeingcleared inHongKong.Unfortunately,theCITESlistingdidnothavethedesiredimpactwithfeedbackfromgovernment and industry stakeholders indicating that it only restrictedabalonepoachingandrelated trade for a period of between two and four months. This was largely attributed toinadequateimplementationofthelistinginSouthAfricawiththemajorshortcomingbeingthefailurebySouthAfricanofficialstoendorseCITESabaloneexportpermitsatportsofexit.Thiswas primarily due to the challenges posed by the trade in live abalone which requiresconsignmentstomeetverytightflightdeadlinestoensurethesurvivaloftheanimals.TheSouthAfrican Customs agency and DAFF lacked the resources to ensure that all live abaloneconsignmentscouldbecheckedandCITESpermitsendorsedwithin the tightwindowperiodsavailable (Burgener, 2010). It was not possible to exclude live abalone from CITES traderequirements as Appendix III does not allow for a listing to be annotated to only requirespecimensofthespecies incertaintradedforms(e.g.driedandfrozen)tobesubject toCITEScontrols.Thisispossible,however,underCITESAppendixII.

Although the CITES Appendix III listing did not have the desired effect, the lack of a traderegulatory system such as CITESmeans that in‐transit countries andAsianmarket States areseverely limited in their ability to regulate the trade in poached abalone. The Hong KongDepartment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) has stated thatfollowingtheremovalofH.midaefromCITESAppendixIII,inthecasewhereaconsignmentisopenlydeclaredasabalonebyanimporter,thereiscurrentlynolegalbasisonwhichtopreventthe import, even thoughAFCDmay be providedwith comprehensive information from SouthAfricanauthoritiesthattheabalonewasillegallyharvested(A.Wong,AFCD,pers.comm.toM.Burgener,4September2012).

NotwithstandingthediscouragingpicturepresentedbyHongKong’stradestatistics,theyoffervaluableinsightintotheclandestineactivitiesofSouthAfrica’sabalonesyndicates,aboutwhichlittlehasbeenpublished. Steinberg, theonlyauthor tohaveexplored the topic fully,wrote in2005 that “the majority of (poached abalone) is smuggled across land borders or on lightaircraft,” before being re‐exported toHongKong. Import data analyses prepared by TRAFFICsuggestthatthisisstillthecase.

TRAFFIC’s research shows that more than 181.5 tons of dried abalone—representing some1810 tonswetmass,more than10 times theentireTotalAllowableCatch for the2012/2013season—wasimportedtoHongKongfromZimbabwe,Mozambique,Zambia,NamibiaandKenyabetween January 2012 and June 2013 (M. Burgener, unpublished data). By comparison,approximately 117.5 tons of dried abalonewas imported from South Africa during the sameperiod, a figure that includes legal exports.However, towards the end of this analysis, a newpatternemerges,withmostimportsbeingrecordedasbeingfromSouthAfrica(Figure7).


A monthly breakdown of these figures reveals an interesting pattern, with sharp spikes inimports from different southern African countries over short time periods. For example,recorded dried abalone imports from Zambia rose from nearly 1.3 tons in February 2013 tomorethan17tonstwomonthslater,beforequicklyplummetingagain.SimilarsurgesappearinimportdatafromZimbabweandMozambique,hintingatapossibleunderlyingdynamicinSouthAfrica’sillicitabalonetradetoday.

Figure7RecordedimportsofdriedabalonetoHongKongfromsouthernandeasternAfricancountriesbetweenJanuary2012andOctober2013.Figureshavebeenconvertedtowholemass.Source:HongKongCustomsandStatisticsBureau.AdaptedfromM.Burgener(unpublisheddata).

Abalonesyndicates,itisimportanttoremember,moveverylargevolumesofcontrabandoutofSouthAfricaeachyear:anestimated1567tonsin2012,forexample,afterahighofmorethan3200tonsin2004.AsyndicateoperatinganillegalabalonetraderoutemustthusfindwaystotransportlargeshipmentsoutofSouthAfricasafelyandwithoutdetection.Overtimeitmakessensetoemployflexibleroutesandtactics;perhapsthisisthereasonforerraticspikesinexportactivity from Zambia, Zimbabwe and the like. More research is needed to fully disaggregatethesecomplexoperationalprocedures.

Linkageswithotherwildlifetrade

“Contrabandtradersspecialise in traderoutesrather thancommodities.Asingle traderoutecanhostan infinitearrayof commoditiesover time,andseveral commoditiesatthesametime.”(Steinberg2005;p.4)

WhilethelinksbetweenabalonepoachingandotherfacetsofSouthAfrica’sillegalwildlifetradehavenotbeenexploredindetail,itisalmostcertainthattheyexist.Rhinoandelephantpoachinghave received extensive coverage in recent years, catapulted to the front of the publicconservationagendabyprominentpresscoverageandemotivecampaigningbyenvironmentalgroups,butamuchwiderrangeoflocalwildlifeproducts—includingcycadsandraresucculents,lion bones, animal hides, live game, shark fins and sea cucumbers—is traded on the black‐market (Hübschle2011).The illicitnatureof theseproductsmeans it is likely that there is atleastsomeoverlapbetweentheclandestinegroupsthatdealinthem.

0

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

10 000

12 000

14 000

16 000

18 000

20 000

Jan‐12

Feb‐12

Mar‐12

Apr‐12

May‐12

Jun‐12

Jul‐12

Aug‐12

Sep‐12

Oct‐12

Nov‐12

Dec‐12

Jan‐13

Feb‐13

Mar‐13

Apr‐13

May‐13

Jun‐13

Jul‐13

Aug‐13

Sep‐13

Oct‐13

Dried abalone im

ports (kg wet m

ass)

SOUTH AFRICA

ZIMBABWE

MOZAMBIQUE

ZAMBIA

NAMIBIA

KENYA


According to one comprehensive report on the illegal rhino horn trade, there is “evidence tosuggest that (rhino) trading networks have linkswith other highly lucrative natural resourceproduct trades,” including abalone (TRAFFIC 2012, p. 76). Details, however, are thin. Trans‐national“Asian‐runsyndicates”reportedlycontrolthetrade,whichoperatespredominantlyoutof Viet Nam. These syndicates are also “known to be involved in other high‐risk criminalactivities such as drug and diamond smuggling, vehicle theft, armed robberies and ATMbombings,” the report claims, citing criminological researchbyHübschle andothers.Whetherabalonesyndicatesaresimilarlyprolificwith their criminalactivity isnotknown;against thisbackdrop,however,itseemslikely.

AnecdotalreportsfromtheEasternCapesuggestadegreeofoverlapbetweenabalonepoachingandotherwildlifecrime,withknownabalonesyndicatesreportedlyinvolvedintheillegalrhino,cycad and parrot trades as well (R. Fox pers. com.). In the Western Cape, meanwhile,stakeholders in theWest Coast Rock Lobster industry have claimed that a Chinese national,whose name has been purposefully excluded from this report, is accused of running amajorabalone syndicate, formerly operated a suspected illegal lobster export business, suggestingpossiblelinkagesbetweentheillicittradeofthesetwospeciesaswell(C.Wentink,pers.com.).


Conclusions: Actions necessary to address the trade more effectively

This document has aimed to provide a comprehensive and updated overview of the illicitabalone trade in South Africa, in order to stimulate discussion and collaboration betweenstakeholders; as such itmustbe regarded as aworkingdocument.More than twodecadesofunrelenting illegal harvesting, in spite of dedicated anti‐poaching efforts by various Stateagencies, point to the immense difficulty of curbing the trade. Nevertheless, a number of keyinterventions have been proposed over the years and are summarised below. Because theabaloneresourceisinsuchapoorstate,withlittlerealisticpossibilityofrecoveryintheshortterm, the proposed actions below focus on those thatmay be applicable to the broader illicitwildlifetrade,usingabaloneasacasestudytoinformthedevelopmentofmoreintegratedanti‐traffickingandmarketregulationstrategiesinthefuture.

Itmustbenotedthatthecausesoftheabalonefisheryproblemarenowfairlywellunderstood,and opportunities exist to reconfigure the governance andmanagement arrangementswithinthefishery.Whilepoliticalwillappearstoexisttorebuildtheabalonefisheryforthebenefitofcoastal communities, the major challenge will be the creation of the required public sectordevelopmentalcapacitytosupportthevariousimplementationprocesses.

Integrated fisheries reform and local economic development

Abalonepoaching is symptomatic of lasting inequalities in SouthAfrican society. It cannot beunderstoodortackledinisolationfromthisbroadercontext.Thesocialandeconomicvoidleftbehind by apartheid, and the subsequent failure of fisheries transformation efforts and otherofficial schemes to address it, has allowed the illicit trade to flourish in coastal settlementsacrossthecountry,effectivelyofferingsmall‐scalefishersafunctionalalternativetotheformalStatefisherysystem.Addressingtheserootcauseswithintegratedlocaleconomicdevelopmentschemeswillbeessentialfortacklingillegalharvestinginthefuture.

Onepromising areaof current fisheriespolicydevelopment is the recentpromulgationof thesmall‐scale fisheries policy in June 2012. This policy aims to recognize traditional small‐scalefishersalongtheSouthAfricacoast,byallocatingcollectiveuserightstoidentifiedcommunities,anddelineatingspecificareasfortheirpreferentialorexclusiveuse.Thepolicyiscentredontheneed to establish co‐management committees, whereby DAFF and fishers jointly makemanagement decisions regarding harvesting levels, law enforcement and sanctions, andparticipatoryresearch.WhileimplementationwillrequireimprovedcapacityatbothDAFFandlocal level, it is believed that devolved decision‐making power will instil a greater sense oflegitimacy for the fisheries governance framework, and with this an increased ownership oflocal marine resources. The abalone resource will most likely be aggregated with otheridentified resources available to relevant local communities. Assistance will nevertheless berequired to develop local co‐management plans with DAFF and the fisher entities holdingownershiprights.

Another interesting development is the option for abalone stock enhancement and reseeding.Abalone farming technology has opened the possibility of rehabilitating overfished abalonestocks with hatchery‐reared seed. This may be particularly important in the worst affectedareas,wherenaturalrecruitmenthasbeenseverelycompromised.

Addressing knowledge gaps

Itisclearfromthisdocumentthatnumerousknowledgegapsstillremain.Forexample,itisstillunknownhowlarge the illegalsectorhasbecome,whatsize thecurrentpoaching fleet is,andhow the trade is linked to organized criminal groups who export abalone and other illegalproducts, and import products such as drugs. Table 4 below presents the most glaringknowledgegapsandproposesmethodstoaddressthem.


Table4CurrentknowledgegapsinSouthAfrica’sillicitabalonetrade,andproposedmethodstoaddressthem

Aspectoftrade Description ProposedmethodsDerivemoreaccurateestimatesof current poaching levels (intermsofvolume:bothmassandnumbers).

At present estimates ofthe volume of poachedabalone are stronglydependent on thoroughtrade data analysis. Thisallows for a conservativeestimate of poachingvolume but has not beenvalidated with proxiesand indicators on theground.

Obtain updated poaching effortestimates from Western Capeabalonefisherymodels

Obtain latest confiscation data,

aquaculture production and legalfisherycatchdatafromDAFF

Activity A: Interview key informants

to build a credible estimate ofcurrentpoachingtrends

Validate the above data with trade

statistics (e.g. such as analyses donebyTRAFFIC)

Assess the size of the currentillegal fishing fleet, and thespatial extent of the illegalfishery

Due to unsustainablefishing pressure inpreviously well‐knownabalonehotspots,currenteffort has changed. Inaddition, continuousupgrading of equipmenttakes place, especiallywithregardstovessels.

Undertake coastal snapshot survey(linkedtotheaboveActivityA)

Interview key law enforcement

officials

Detailed overview of historicaloriginsofillegalabalonetrade

Little is known on whoinitiated and how thefirst trade routes andbusiness transactionswereestablished.

Activity B: Oral history researchprojectwithkeyinformants

Aspectoftrade Description ProposedmethodsUnderstandandmapout tradedynamics (incl. price structureanddetermination)androutes,especially the upper valuechain

Little is known abouttrade routes in SouthAfrica, southern Africaand East Asia, includinglinks with legalharvestingandexports.

Activity C: Conduct structuredinterviews with key informantsinvolved in the illicit abalone trade,as well as law enforcement officialsfromthefollowinginstitutions:SARS–CustomsWCO‐ Regional Intelligence LiaisonOffices(RILOs)INTERPOL‐NationalCentralBureaus(NCBs)DAFF – Special Investigations Unit,Land‐based Compliance Unit &


FisheryPatrolVesselsNPA–NationalPortsAuthoritySAPS – Organised Crime Unit,Endangered Species Unit, WaterWingSANParksMunicipal nature conservation /environmentalpatrolofficers

Profile and updated list of allgovernmental stakeholderscombatting the illegal abalonefishery

Fragmentation and lackof intergovernmentalcollaboration is a majorstumbling block incombating the illegalfishery. In addition, theenforcement capacity ofthese institutions is notwellknown.

Linked to Activity C, obtain anupdated contact list for use towardspromoting collaboration, knowledgeexchange and joint strategy buildingprogrammes

Assessorganizedcrimelinksaswell as links with other illegalwildlifetrade

Thelastcredibleresearchon this topic dates from2005(Steinberg)andisinneedofanupdate.

LinkedtoActivityC

Document institutional andpolicy gaps and provide acomprehensive review fordiscussion with mandatedstakeholdersandagencies

Several policy gaps areknown from a fisheryperspective, yet acomprehensive reviewlinked to trade andexport has never beenundertaken.

Appoint legal and fishery expertconsultant to undertake this studyand discuss findings with a broadrangeofstakeholders

UserelevantinfofromActivityC

Better understand consumerdynamicsandawareness levelsregarding illegal trade in theEastAsia

No published researchexists on this topic.Informationonconsumerbehaviour would bebeneficial for developingconsumer awarenessmaterials and fortrainingcustomsofficials.

A study of this nature could beundertaken by a market researchprogramme (e.g. in collaborationwithHongKongUniversity)

Increased collaboration

Collaborative programmes have taken place over the years, and various institutions such asDAFFandSAPScurrentlyhavejointoperationsinplaceinSouthAfrica;howeverthesespecialoperationsoftenceaseafterseveralmonthsasfundsdryout,ormoralerunslow.Inmanycases,for example, offenders only incur small fines as courts are under‐capacitated to deal withenvironmentalcrimes.AddressingtheknowledgegapsmentionedabovecouldcontributetothedevelopmentofmoreintegratedandrefinedMonitoring,ControlandSurveillanceProgrammeswithinandacrossdifferentinstitutions,bothwithinSouthAfricaandinternationally.Combating


theorganizedcriminalelementsdrivingtheillicittrade,inparticular,willrequirenewformsofco‐operationwithinternationallawenforcementandintelligenceagencies.

TRAFFIChasworkedwithINTERPOLProjectScalestaffduringthecourseof2013—providingupdatedanalysesof tradedataandproviding informationand trainingsessionson tradedataanalysis.ThishasspurredINTERPOLtoinitiateaglobalanalysisofabalonetradedata.FurthercollaborationbetweenINTERPOLandTRAFFIContradedataanalysisisencouraged.

Information obtained through the abalone tradedata analysis shouldbe sharedwithnationalCustoms agencies, INTERPOL and theWorld CustomsOrganization (including throughWCO’sRegional Intelligence Liaison Offices). The results of the analysis allow Customs and otherenforcementofficials in transitandmarketStates toconduct focused investigations thatcouldprovide information on ports and airports through which illegal abalone is traded, specificcontainernumbers,freightcarriers,freightagents,companiesandindividualsthatcouldgreatlyassist targeted law enforcement activities.Monthly trade updates by theHongKong CustomsandStatisticsBureauallowfortradetrackingwithatimelagoflessthantwomonths.

Trade controls

While poached abalone is known to be transported through many African countries andimported and sold in a number of Asian markets, law enforcement efforts are currentlyrestrictedtoSouthAfrica.ApartfromthedevelopmentofnationalregulationsincountriesotherthanSouthAfricaregardingH.midaetradeandsale,whichwouldbeverychallengingtoachieve,theonlyavailableregulatorytoolsavailableareinternationaltradecontrols.SouthAfricashouldaccordingly be encouraged and supported in putting forward a CITES Appendix II listingproposalforH.midae.

A listing, ifsuccessful,wouldat theearliestonlycomeintoeffect in2016.Alternativeregionalpolicyoptionsshouldthereforebesimultaneouslyexplored,forexamplethoseavailablethoughcommitmentscontainedinSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunityAgreementsonfisheriesandwildlife.Itshouldalsobedeterminedwhetherbi‐lateralagreementsbetweenSouthAfricaand key market destinations on illegal abalone trade could be negotiated, and whether theywouldbeofassistance.


Key references

Brick K,Muchapondwa E, VisserM (2009)Abalonepoaching,methamphetamineuse, criminalactivity in SouthAfricaand the associated implications for resourcemanagement.Draft paper,EnvironmentalEconomicsPolicyResearchUnit,UniversityofCapeTown.

Burgener,M.(2008).TheillegaltradeinSouthAfricanabalone(Haliotismidae).In:StopIllegalFishinginSouthernAfrica.StopIllegalFishing,Gabarone,Botswana.85pp.

Burgener,M (2010)Evaluationof theCITESAppendix III listinganddelistingof SouthAfricanabaloneHaliotismidae.TRAFFICBulletin23:42–49.

Burgener, M. (2013). An estimation of the international trade in illegally harvested Haliotismidae,2000‐2012.Unpublishedreport,preparedforSouthAfricanAbaloneScientificWorkingGroupoftheDepartmentofAgriculture,ForestryandFisheries

GastrowP(2001)TriadsocietiesandChineseorganisedcrime inSouthAfrica.OccasionalPaperNo.48.InstituteforSecurityStudies,SouthAfrica.

HauckM(1997)Crime,conservationandcommunitydevelopment:ecologicalcriminologyandthecasestudyofabalonepoaching.Mastersthesis,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica.

HauckM,SweijdNA(1999)Acasestudyofabalonepoaching inSouthAfricaand its impactonfisheriesmanagement.ICESJournalofMarineScience56:1024–1032.

HübschleA(2011)OrganisedcrimeinSouthernAfrica:Firstannualreview.InstituteforSecurityStudies,SouthAfrica.

Isaacs M (2011) Individual transferable quotas, poverty alleviation and challenges for small‐countryfisheriespolicyinSouthAfrica.MAST10:63–84.

Milliken T, Shaw J (2012) The South Africa – Viet Nam rhino horn trade nexus. TRAFFIC,Johannesburg,SouthAfrica.

Raemaekers SJN (2009) Rethinking South Africa’s small‐scale fisheriesmanagement paradigmandgovernanceapproach:EvidencefromtheEasternCape.PhDthesis,RhodesUniversity,SouthAfrica.

Raemaekers SJN, Britz PJ (2009) Profile of the illegal abalone fishery (Haliotismidae) in theEastern Cape Province, South Africa: Organised pillage and management failure. FisheriesResearch97:183–195.

RaemaekersSJN,HauckM,BürgenerM,etal.(2011)ReviewofthecausesoftheriseoftheillegalSouthAfricanabalonefisheryandconsequentclosureoftherights‐basedfishery.Ocean&CoastalManagement54:433–445.

SauerWH,HechtT,BritzPJ,MatherD(2003)AneconomicandsectoralstudyoftheSouthAfricanfishingindustry,Volume2:Fisheryprofiles.ReportpreparedforMarineandCoastalManagementbyRhodesUniversity,SouthAfrica.

SteinbergJ(2005)TheillicitabalonetradeinSouthAfrica.OccasionalPaperNo.105.InstituteforSecurityStudies,SouthAfrica.

SteinbergJ(2004)Thenumber:Oneman’ssearchforidentityintheCapeunderworldandprisongangs.JonathanBallPublishers:CapeTown.


ToAWL,HauBCH,LeeSKH(2006)AstudyonthetradeindriedabalonesinHongKong.TRAFFICBulletin21:25–34.

Van Sittert L, Branch G, Hauck M, Sowman M (2006) Benchmarking the first decade of post‐apartheidfisheriesreforminSouthAfrica.MarinePolicy30:96–110.


TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network, is the leading non-governmental organization working globally on trade in wild animals and plants in the context of both biodiversity conservation and sustainabledevelopment.

For further information contact:TRAFFICHeadquarters Office219a Huntingdon RoadCambridge CB3 0DLUKTelephone: (44) 1223 277427Fax: (44) 1223 277237Email: [email protected]: www.traffic.org

AU

GU

ST 2

014

South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview ... · This briefing paper is a synthesis...

Documents

Transcript of South Africa's illicit abalone trade: An updated overview ... · This briefing paper is a synthesis...