Sources of Knowledge: Perception, Inference and Testimony: Some Contemporary Problems

and their Solutions from the Indian Perspective

J.L. Shaw Introduction

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of Indian epistemology to Western philosophy so that it can be integrated with the mainstream of Western philosophy. Hence I shall discuss (1) how to suggest solutions to some unsolved problems of Western philosophy, (2) how to suggest better solutions to certain epistemological problems of Western philosophy, and (3) how to add new dimensions to Western philosophy. Ř In the first section I shall mention the Nyāya concept of perception. In this context I shall explain the perception of a whole as distinct from its parts. This discussion will demonstrate how to avoid the sceptical argument raised against the perception of an object. Again, the Nyāya discussion of extraordinary perception will add a new dimension to Western philosophy. The Nyāya distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative perceptual cognition will further illuminate Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Russell’s concept of acquaintance leads to solipsism. Since the Nyāya concept of non-qualificative perceptual cognition does not lead to solipsism, it is superior to Russell’s concept of knowledge by acquaintance. The second section deals with the Nyāya concept of inference which cannot be claimed to be purely inductive or deductive in character. Moreover, it will reveal the relevance between the premises and the conclusion of an inference as it is called a large sentence (mahāvākya). Hence the inference of q (conclusion) from p and not p (contradictory premise) violates the condition of relevance. This discussion would throw some light on relevant logic, which is concerned with this problem. The third section deals with the causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, simple or complex. According to several schools of Indian philosophy, the cognition of words, the memory – cognition of objects, the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, the syntactic expectancy between the words (ākāïkùā), semantic compatibility (yogyatā), contiguity of words (āsatti) and the intention of the speaker (tātparya) are treated as causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. Since the discussion of Indian philosophers is very comprehensive, it would add a new dimension to Western philosophy. Furthermore, the Nyāya philosophers have explained both the atomistic and the holistic understanding of a molecular sentence. Since the Western philosophers have not yet developed a logic or mechanism for holistic understanding, the Nyāya discussion would add lustre to Western philosophy.

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The last and the fourth section deals with the question of how to describe the phenomenological properties of perceptual, inferential and verbal cognitions. The Nyāya philosophers explain the difference between them in terms of the ways cognitions are related to the same object. The difference between them is explained in terms of the following pairs of the Nyāya philosophy:

1. anuyogã- pratiyogã ( first term- second term) 2. ādhara- ādheya (substratum- supersratum ) 3. vi÷eùya- vi÷eùaõa (qualificand- qualifier) 4. vi÷eùya – prakāra ( qualificand- relation qualifier) 5. udde÷ya- vidheya ( subject- predicate) 6. paksa - sādhya ( the locus of inference- probandum ) 7. hetu- sādhya (probans- probandum )

Perceptual cognition involves four pairs, verbal cognition three pairs, but inferential cognition involves all the seven pairs. The distinction between these pairs is important not only from the phenomenological point of view, but also from the point of view of solving some of the puzzles or problems related to the distinction between the subject and the predicate of a sentence or judgment. As I shall be discussing the relevance of Indian epistemology to Western philosophy, let me introduce the Nyāya concept of relevance in this context. According to Gaïge÷a, the founder of Navya-Nyāya, relevance is a relation between the contents of expressions, sentences, or sets of sentences. According to him, if P is relevant to Q, then Q is an answer to a question, say S, and S is due to a cognition, say T, and the content of this cognition, say R, is the relation of relevance. Since the content of P is related to that of Q by the relation R, the former is the second term and the latter the first term of this relation. It is to be noted that the cognition T is causally related to S, and S is causally related to Q. In this context Indian epistemology is our P and the questions, such as whether it can solve some of the problems of Western philosophy, whether it can suggest a better solution, and whether it can add a new dimension to Western philosophy, will be our S. The cognitions which are causally related to these questions will be our T. The content of T, i.e. R, will be the relation of relevance. Our answers to these questions will be Q. The R will relate P to Q by the relation of relevance. Hence our justification of relevance will correspond to Q. As regards sources of valid cognition or knowledge, all the systems of Indian philosophy have emphasized perception. Hence I shall focus on perception with special reference to the Nyāya point of view. In this context I would like to point out that there is a substantial difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the sources of knowledge. For the Cārvāka (a type of materialist) philosophers, perception is regarded as the only source of valid cognition. The Bauddha and the Vai÷eùika philosophers accept both perception and inference as sources of knowledge. The Sāükhya, Rāmānuja and Bhāsarvaj¤a accept perception, inference, and verbal testimony; the Nyāya accepts perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. But the followers of the Prabhākara school of Mãmāüsā accept presumption in addition to the four sources accepted by the Nyāya. The followers of the Kumārila Bhañña school of Mãmāüsā and the Advaita Vedānta accept non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) in addition to the previous five sources of knowledge. The followers of

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the Purāõas accept two more, namely, entailment (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya). The followers of the Tantra accept gesture and posture (ceùtā) in addition to the eight other sources of knowledge. The Jaina philosophers have accepted two more sources of valid cognition, namely, the use of a type of counterfactual conditional (tarka), and memory (smçti). Since the Nyāya philosophers do not accept presumption as a source of valid cognition, it is reduced to agreement in absence type of inference (vyatirekã-anumāna). Similarly, non-apprehension is reduced to perception, entailment to inference, tradition to verbal testimony, and gesture (or posture) to inference. But tarka is not reduced to an inference. It gives rise to an inference and thereby becomes auxiliary to an inference. Similarly, memory is not reduced to some other source of valid cognition. But the truth of a memory-cognition depends upon the truth of a previous apprehension which is derived from perception, inference, comparison, or verbal testimony. In this paper I shall focus on the Nyāya concept of perception, inference and testimony. Section one: Perception A) Ordinary Perceptual Cognition: The Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions of perception. The perceiver (the self), the internal sense-organs (manas), the external sense-organs such as the eyes, the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc., are positive causal conditions. As regards negative causal conditions, the Sāükhya philosophers have mentioned the following, some of which have been accepted by the Nyāya philosophers:

a) Not being too far, b) Not being too close, c) Absence of loss of sense-organs, such as deafness, blindness, etc., d) Not being inattentive, e) Not being too subtle, f) Not having intervening objects, such as wall, screen, etc., g) Not being overshadowed by a more powerful object, e. g., during the day stars

are not visible as they are overshadowed by the rays of the sun, h) Not being mixed up with similar objects, e.g., rain water cannot be perceived

in a lake separately as it is mixed up with similar objects. The Nyāya philosophers would consider only a), b), g) and h) as negative causal conditions. The sense-object contact is the operation (vyāpāra) and the sense-organ is the special instrumental cause (karaõa) of perception. The object of perception is an uncommon instrumental cause (asādhārana kāraõa). Since we have introduced some technical terms, let us explain the Nyāya conception of causality. The Nyāya philosophers have defined causal conditions in terms of the following three properties: • The property of being related to the locus of the effect immediately prior to the

effect (avyavahita pårvavartitva). • The property of being always present (niyatatva). • The property of being simpler than other competing conditions

(ananyathāsiddhatva).

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From the first condition it follows that if x is a causal condition for the effect E, then x is present immediately prior to E. From the second condition it follows that x is always present whenever E occurs. Hence from these two conditions it follows that a causal condition has the property of being the pervader which is limited by the property of being present immediately prior to the effect. The third condition specifies the principle for selecting the conditions which have satisfied the first two conditions. Let us illustrate with an example of the Nyāya system. When an earthen jar is produced, there are innumerable conditions which are present immediately prior to this effect. Moreover, all of them are, directly or indirectly, related to the locus of the effect. These conditions can be divided into three types. Some of the conditions are such that they are present whenever an effect is produced. Positive causal conditions such as space and time are always present whenever an effect is produced. Hence they are called ‘common causal conditions’ (‘sādhāraõa kāraõa’). But there are certain conditions which are present whenever a type of effect such as a jar is produced. The conditions such as the jar-maker, the parts of the jar, the conjunction between the parts of a jar, the wheel, the stick and the thread are present whenever an earthen jar is produced. This type of condition would come under uncommon causal conditions (asādhāraõa kāraõa). Some of the uncommon causal conditions remain the same for different types of effect. For example, thread is used for making a jar as well as for making a piece of cloth, among many other types of effect. But the set of uncommon causal conditions for one type of effect would never be the same as the set of uncommon causal conditions for another type of effect. Hence the set of causal conditions for making a jar would not be the same as the set of causal conditions for making a piece of cloth. The third type of causal conditions may be called ‘unique conditions’. These causal conditions would explain the particularity of the effect as distinct from the effects of the same type. In this example, the particularity of a jar is to be explained in terms of the particularities of its parts. All the parts and the relations of conjunction between the parts are positive unique causal conditions. The not-yet type of absence of the jar would be the negative unique causal condition. Hence the distinction between different types of effect would be drawn in terms of the uncommon causal conditions and the distinction between the effects of the same type in terms of the unique causal conditions. Now let us explain the distinction between the terms ‘vyāpāra’ (‘operation’) and ‘karaõa’ (‘special instrumental cause’), which are technical terms of the Nyāya. An operation (vyāpāra) is defined in terms of the relation of one causal condition to another. An operation is itself a causal condition, but it is due to another causal condition (tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam). Hence it may be defined in the following way: (A) x is an operation of the effect E Df (∃y) (y is a cause or a set of causes of E and x

is a cause of E, but x is due to y). In our above example, the movement of the wheel is due to the stick and the jar is due to the movement of the wheel. For this reason the movement of the wheel is considered an operation. Since the movement is due to the stick, the stick becomes the operation-possessor (vyāpāravat). Since the stick is related to the parts of the jar through this operation and becomes a cause by virtue of this relation, it is called

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‘karaõa’ (vyāpāravat kāraõaü karaõam). Hence karaõa may be defined in the following way: (B) x is a karaõa of the effect E Df x is a causal condition, x is related to the locus

of E through an operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation only. . According to the Nyāya philosophers, we do not infer the object of perception from its look or from the apprehension of sense-data. Since we perceive the object without intermediary entities, the Nyāya view may be called ‘direct realism’. But the supporters of the sense-data theory in Western philosophy claim that we cannot perceive an object directly. According to some supporters of this theory an object is an inferred entity, while according to others it is a logical construction out of sense-data. But these views create more problems than they solve as they lead to scepticism or solipsism. The Nyāya philosophers claim that if we are in contact with a part of an object, then we are in contact with the whole. Hence, when we are in contact with a branch of a tree, we are in contact with the entire tree. In order to substantiate the perception of the whole from the perception of its parts the Nyāya philosophers have used a reductio ad absurdum argument. It is claimed that if we do not accept the contact with the tree which is a whole, then there cannot be contact with its branch which is also another whole. The question is whether there is contact with the entire branch or with its parts. If we apply the same argument, then we have to say that there is contact with a part of a branch, not with the whole. Now the question is whether we are in contact with this part which is another whole. If it is said that we are in contact with a part of this part, then it will involve a regress. In order to stop the regress it might be said that our sense-organ is in contact with the ultimate parts or some of the atoms of the tree. But this position is not tenable. Since the atoms are not amenable to our senses (atãndriya), the contact with an atom will not be amenable to our senses. If it were so, then we cannot have contact with any object. Since we do accept contact with the things or objects, the above position is to be rejected. In other words, we have to accept the contact with the branch which is a whole. Through this contact our sense –organ is in contact with the entire tree, which is a whole. In order to explain the perception of a whole, amongst other things, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted contact which is due to another contact. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would reply to the sceptical arguments put forward by Western philosophers against the perception of the whole. This would also lead to the rejection of sense-data theory of perception or phenomenalism, which claims that a physical object is a construction out of sense-data. It is to be noted that the Nyāya philosophers have discussed not only the causal conditions of perception in general, but also the causal conditions of false perception, the causal conditions of true perception, and the causal conditions which justify the truth of a perceptual cognition. To illustrate this point, let us consider the example, The table has a book. In this case our visual sense-organ is the special instrumental cause, and the contact between the visual sense-organ and the table is the operation. As our sense-organ is related to the table by the relation of contact, it is also related to the book which is on the table by a complex relation. Since the cognition that the table has a book is due to the sense–organ, it is considered as perceptual. The cognition is related to the table, the book and the conjunction relation. It is to be noted that the cognition will be related to these items even if it is false. Hence in terms of the

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relation between these items and the cognition alone we cannot draw the distinction between a true and a false cognition. When a perceptual cognition is true, our sense-organ is related to the qualified object. Hence, in our above example, our visual sense-organ is related not only to the table but also to the table qualified by a book on it. In the technical language of the Nyāya, the relation of the cognition to the qualified object or the fact is called ‘vi÷iùña viùayatāā, and the converse of this relation is called vi÷iùña viùayitā. It is to be noted that these are relational properties. The former qualifies the object, while the latter qualifies the cognition. Hence a true perceptual cognition presupposes certain additional conditions. A false perceptual cognition could be due to a defect (doùa) or an inappropriate causal condition ( kāraõavaiguõya). A defect (doùa) is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perceptual cognition; but an inappropriate causal condition (kāraõavaiguõya) is the weakness or the absence of a positive causal condition of a true perceptual cognition. So a visual perception could be false due to distance (dåratva) which is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perception. Similarly, it could be false due to weakness of the visual sense –organ. In the case of a false cognition, our sense-organ is not related to the qualified object or the fact as there is no such fact. In addition to the relations of our cognition to its objects, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted the relations of the cognition to the qualifiers of its objects. Hence, in our above example, the cognition is related to the universal tableness as well as to the universal bookness. These additional relations will explain our ability to identify or discriminate the objects of cognition, which is necessary for knowledge. It is to noted that, on Goldman’s theory, if S knows that P , then S can discriminate the truth of P from relevant alternatives. But his theory cannot explain why a person is able to discriminate the truth of P from relevant alternatives, but another person is not able to discriminate it from relevant alternatives. Since the Nyāya view can explain this phenomenon in terms of certain epistemic relations to the qualifiers of the objects, it would be relevant to contemporary philosophy. B) Extraordinary Perceptual Cognition The Nyāya discussion of extraordinary perceptual cognition would also be relevant to Western philosophy. The Nyāya philosophers, by and large, have postulated three extraordinary relations for the explanation of certain types of perceptual cognitions. These relations are called ‘ sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa’ (‘universal or cognition of universal as a relation’), ‘j¤ānalakùaõa sannikarùa’ (‘cognition as a relation’),and ‘yogaja sannikarùa’ ( ‘the property produced by yoga as a relation’). In this paper I shall mention only the first two types of relation as they suggest solutions to some of the problems of Western philosophy. (I) Sāmānyalakùaõa-sannikarùa: As regards the nature of sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa there are two views in the Nyāya literature. (1) According to one of them the universal’s cognition or the cognised universal (j¤ āta-sāmānya) is the relation which relates our sense-organs to all its instances or loci, past, present and future. Here the word `universal’ (`sāmānya’) signifies a property which has more than one locus. Hence not only class-characters (jātis) such as cowness but also physical objects such as a table are treated as universals. This conception of universal may be defined in the following way:

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x is a universal (sāmānya) Df (∃y) (∃z) (y is a locus of x and z is a locus of x). When our sense-organs are related to an object which is universal in the above sense through an ordinary perceptual relation, the universal’s cognition (or the cognised universal) serves as a relation. This relation relates our sense-organs to all the loci of that universal. When we perceive a cow, our visual sense-organs are related to the individual cow through light rays. For simplicity let us consider this relation to be a case of conjunction between our sense-organs and the cow. Since cowness inheres in a particular cow, our visual sense-organs are related to it through the complex relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence. According to this view the universal’s cognition (or the cognised universal), not the cognition of the universal, relates our visual sense-organs to all the loci of cowness. This is how we can cognise all cows, past, present and future, as loci of cowness. In other words, all cows are presented under the mode of cowness. Similarly, when we cognise a table in a room through ordinary perceptual relation, all the loci of it (table) are also cognised through this table’s cognition (or cognised table). In this context it is to be noted that in a universal’s cognition (or cognised universal) the universal is the qualificand and the cognition is the qualifier. Since a qualified object is dependent upon its qualificand, there cannot be universal’s cognition if the universal which is the qualificand ceases to exist. In this context it is also to be noted that, in general, there cannot be a qualified object unless it is qualified by its qualifier which exists. But there are a few exceptions. The existence of an absence or a cognition does not depend upon the existence of its qualifier. It is to be noted that there cannot be the absence of a table in this room unless there is a table. But once an absence is produced, its existence does not depend upon its negatum. Hence the absence of table would exist even if there is no table anywhere. Since the negatum (pratiyogã) of an absence is its qualifier, the existence of this type of qualified object does not depend on the existence of its qualifier. Similarly, the existence of a cognition does not depend upon its object, which is its qualifier. But in the case of universal’s cognition the universal is the qualificand, not the qualifier of the cognition. Its existence is dependent upon the qualificand as well as upon the qualifier. Now let us consider an impermanent universal (anitya sāmānya) such as a table. When it ceases to exist, we cannot cognise its loci which were cognised when it existed. This is due to the fact that its cognition is the relation. Since this relation depends upon the existence of the table and the cognition of table’s loci depends upon this relation (i.e. the table’s cognition), we cannot cognise the loci of the table if the table ceases to exist. (2) In order to avoid this type of problem the cognition of a universal is

considered as the relation. In this case the cognition is the qualificand and the universal is the qualifier. On this view the cognition of a universal exists even if the universal ceases to exist. Hence there will be the cognition of the table when the table no longer exists. This view has been interpreted in two ways. Let us discuss the difference between them.

(2a) According to the followers of the old Nyāya the cognition of the universal as a qualifier (sāmānya-prakāraka-jñāna) is the relation which relates our sense-organs to the loci of the universal. According to this view also our sense-

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organs must be related to the universal and its locus through ordinary perceptual relation. When we perceive a pot, our visual sense-organs are related to it by the relation of conjunction. Since potness resides in a pot by the relation of inherence, our visual sense-organs are related to it by the relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence. Then we have a non-qualificative (nirvikalpaka) perception of the pot and the potness. In other words, the pot as such and the universal potness as such are cognised. After this cognition we have a qualificative (savikalpaka) cognition of a pot being qualified by potness. In this cognition the pot is the qualificand (vi÷eùya) and the potness is the qualifier (prakāra). This cognition is followed by an extra-ordinary perception of all the pots which are loci of the universal potness. In this extraordinary perception the second term (pratiyogã) would be our visual sense-organs, the first term (anuyogã ) all the loci of potness, but the special relation would be the cognition of potness as a qualifier. This cognition would also presuppose the ordinary relation of the visual sense-organs to the internal sense-organ called `manas’ and the relation of manas to the cognition of potness. But both the perceptual cognition of all the loci of potness and the cognition of potness as a relation are considered extraordinary (alaukika). This is due to the fact that the relations of ordinary perception cannot relate our sense-organs to innumerable particulars or all the loci of a universal. The Nyāya philosophers have also accepted an extraordinary perception of all the instances of a universal which resides in a mental state such as happiness. When we perceive all the instances of the universal happiness (sukhatva), our internal sense manas is related to them through the cognition of the universal happiness (sukhatva) as a qualifier. Similar is the case with respect to other types of mental states such as pain.

(2b) But according to the followers of the new Nyāya the cognition of a universal (sāmānya-jñāna) itself is the relation which relates our sense-organs to the loci of the universal. It is claimed to be simpler than the view of the old Nyāya philosophers. Let us explain why it is simpler than the view of the old Nyāya in terms of our previous example of a pot. When we perceive a pot through an ordinary perceptual relation, our sense-organs such as eyes are related to the pot and the potness. Then we have a non-qualificative perception of the pot and the potness. After this perception we have an extraordinary perception of all the pots which are loci of potness. In this extraordinary perception the relation is the non-qualificative perceptual cognition of potness. The object of this non-qualificative cognition cannot be said to be either the qualificand or the qualifier. This follows from the very nature of a non-qualificative cognition. The qualificative cognition of the pot qualified by potness occurs after the non-qualificative cognition of the pot and the potness. Hence the cognition which occurs after the non-qualificative cognition is ordinary with respect to the perception of the particular pot, but extraordinary with respect to the perception of all other pots. As regards the relation, it is ordinary with respect to the particular pot, but extraordinary with respect to all other pots. Unlike the view of the old Nyāya it does not presuppose two separate qualificative perceptual cognitions such that the extraordinary follows the ordinary. There is only one qualificative cognition which follows the non-

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qualificative cognition. For this reason it is claimed to be simpler than the view of the old Nyāya philosophers.

Now the question is: Why should we accept this type of extraordinary perceptual relation? In reply, the Nyāya philosophers have put forward the following arguments:

(a) It is claimed that we cannot explain certain types of dubious cognition unless we postulate this type of relation. A dubious cognition has the form: Is x F or G?, where x is the property-possessor, F and G are incompatible properties. Hence G could be not F as well. A dubious cognition presupposes the non-dubious cognition of the property-possessor. Hence a person who doubts whether x is F or not F has the non-dubious cognition of x. Now the Nyāya philosophers claim that after having observed the co-presence of smoke and fire in a kitchen or hearth one may doubt whether all other smokes are accompanied by fire. Hence the doubt takes the form: Are all other smokes accompanied by fire or not?

A doubt of this type presupposes the cognition of all the property-possessors. In this case it presupposes the cognition of all the instances of smokeness. Hence we cannot explain this type of doubt unless we postulate the cognition of the universal as a relation which relates our senses to all the loci or the instances of the universal.

(b) Secondly, we require the cognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya) for an inferential cognition (anumiti). Having observed the smoke on the mountain we infer the presence of fire on it. The cognition of smoke being pervaded by fire is the special instrumental cause (karaõa) of this inferential cognition. The cognition of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire presupposes the cognition of all the particular smokes and all the particular fires. If we postulate sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa (the cognition of universal as a relation), then we can explain the perception of all the smokes through the cognition of the universal smokeness and all the fires through the cognition of fireness.

(c) Thirdly, the perception of a generic absence (sāmānyābhāva) cannot be explained unless we postulate sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa (the cognition of a universal as a relation). For example, the cognition of the absence of a cow presupposes the cognition of all the cows. In order to explain the possibility of the latter cognition the Nyāya claims that the cognition of cowness relates our perceptual sense-organs to all the cows which are loci of the universal cowness.

(d) Similarly, the cognition of a not-yet type of absence cannot be explained unless we postulate sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa (the cognition of universal as a relation). Let us consider the cognition of the absence of a jar before its production. Since the jar has not yet been produced, we cannot have ordinary

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perception of it. Hence we have to postulate an extraordinary perception of it. The acceptance of sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa will explain how we can perceive this jar as well. Since we have perceived all the loci of jarness through the cognition of jarness, we have also perceived the negatum of this absence.

(II) Jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa (cogntion as a relation):

As the postulation of sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa solves some of the problems of epistemology, so does the postulation of jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa. Here the word `lakùaõa’ is used to emphasise the fact that the relation is of the nature of cognition. Hence in jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa the cognition itself is the relation which relates our sense-organs to its object. It has been postulated by the Nyāya philosophers to solve the following epistemic problems.

(a) Sometimes we perceive the hardness of a wall or the softness of a flower without touching it. The hardness or the softness of an object is perceived through tactual sense-organ. Similarly, the smell of an object is to be perceived through olfactory sense-organ. But sometimes we perceive the smell of a sandalwood when we look at it from a distance. The Nyāya philosophers are trying to explain this type of perception in terms of jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa.

Let us suppose our visual perception of the hardness of the wall is true. The Nyāya philosophers claim that it presupposes our previous perception of the hardness of the wall through tactual sense-organ. When we look at a wall, our visual sense-organs are related to it. But our visual senses cannot be related to its hardness through ordinary perceptual relation. But in the case of a perceptual cognition our sense-organs are to be related to the qualificand as well as the qualifier of it. In this case our visual sense-organs are related through ordinary perceptual relation to the qualificand, but not to the qualifier. In order to relate our visual sense-organs to the qualifier the Nyāya philosophers have made the following suggestion:

When the previous cognition of the instances of hardness is revived in the form of a memory-cognition, it would relate our visual sense-organs to the hardness of the wall. Since it is a case of true perceptual cognition, we have to cognise the hardness which belongs to this wall. The Nyāya philosophers explain this cognition in the following ways:

(i) If we have cognised the hardness of this wall in the past through our tactual senses, then the memory-cognition of it would relate our visual sense-organs to the hardness which belongs to the same wall. Hence our visual sense-

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organs are related to the qualifier of perception through an extraordinary relation called `jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa’.

(ii) Another alternative has been suggested to explain this type of perception if we have not cognised the hardness of this wall through an ordinary perceptual relation. This alternative presupposes sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa (the cognition of universal as a relation) by means of which our tactual sense-organs are related to all the instances of hardness. In other words, we have already cognised all the instances of hardness through the cognition of hardness. Hence we have also cognised the hardness which belongs to this wall. The cognition of the hardness which belongs to this wall is the relation which relates our visual sense-organs to the hardness of the wall. If the cognition of some other hardness is the relation, then we attribute the hardness which does not belong to this wall. If it were so, our cognition of the hardness of the wall would be false. Since we have considered our cognition to be true, this possibility is to be ruled out. Therefore, the hardness which belongs to the wall has been cognised. This alternative presupposes both sāmānyalakùaõa and jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa.

(b) Secondly, it is used for the explanation of certain types of perceptual errors. Suppose our perceptual cognition of the table being red is false. According to the Nyāya this presupposes the cognition of the table, a red colour and the relation of inherence which relates a quality to a substance. Since the cognition is false, the table lacks red colour. Hence the red colour which has been cognised in this case does not belong to this table. But it has been cognised elsewhere or elsewhen. The mental disposition (saüskāra) of the previous cognition of a red colour is revived, and the memory-cognition of it is the relation which relates the visual sense-organs to the red colour. The red colour which has been cognised elsewhere or elsewhen is being cognised in the table. Hence jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa (cognition as a relation) is required to relate our visual sense-organs to the red colour cognised in the past.

In this context it is to be noted that the Nyāya philosophers have discussed several types of erroneous cognitions, but only one type of perceptual erroneous cognition requires jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa. Let us briefly mention the Nyāya classification of erroneous cognitions. First of all, they are divided into two types, namely, errors of apprehension (anubhavātmaka-bhrama) and errors of memory-cognition (smçtyātmaka-bhrama). Errors of apprehension have been classified into four types, namely, perceptual (pratyakùātmaka), inferential (anumityātmaka), analogical (upamityātmaka) and verbal (÷ābdātmaka). This classification is based on the fact that according to the Nyāya perception, inference, analogy and testimony are sources of valid or true cognition. As regards memory-cognition, the Nyāya claims that it is reproductive, not a source of true cognition. Hence if a memory-cognition of a is F is true, then there is a true cognition of apprehension. In other words, the true cognitions of a is F is derived from perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. Similarly, if the memory-cognition of a is F is false, then it is derived from perception, inference, analogy, or testimony.

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Again, the errors of perceptual cognition are divided into two types. If a perceptual erroneous cognition does not depend upon external sense-organs, then it depends upon internal or mental sense (manas). In order to emphasise the dependence upon the mental sense (manas) it may be called `mental perceptual erroneous cognition’. In this case a may be cognised as F even if a has not been cognised as F in ordinary perceptual, inferential, analogical, or verbal cognition. For example, in dream or in a deliberate cognition of the contradictory (āhāryajñāna) a may be cognised as F.

If a perceptual erroneous cognition is dependent upon external sense-organs such as eyes or touch, then it may be called `external perceptual erroneous cognition’. Most of our perceptual errors would come under this category. Again, it has been divided into two types, namely, qualified (aupādhika) and non-qualified (anaupādhika). If our senses are related to both a (locus, adhiùñhana) and F (superimposed, āropya) through ordinary relations, then it is called `qualified error’ (`aupādhika-bhrama’). On the contrary, if our senses are related to a through ordinary relations but to F through an extraordinary relation, then it is called `non-qualified error’ (`anaupādhika-bhrama’). For example, the perception of a snake in a rope, or the perception of a silver in a mother-of-pearl. But the perception of the moon in water or the perception of one’s own face in a mirror is a case of qualified external perceptual error. When we perceive the moon in the water, our external senses are related to both the reflection of the moon and the moon through ordinary relations, although directly to the reflection and indirectly to the moon. Similarly, when one perceives one’s own face in a mirror, one is directly related to the reflection of the face but indirectly to the face. In the case of any error of reflection, our senses are related to the reflection directly, but to the thing reflected indirectly or via the reflection, although both of them are ordinary relations.

In addition to errors of reflection, there are certain other types of qualified perceptual errors. For example, the taste of molasses as bitter. If it is due to some defect in our bile, then the bitter taste of it is imposed upon the molasses. Here also our senses are related to both the molasses and the bitterness imposed upon it through ordinary relations. Hence in the case of any qualified external perceptual error our senses are related to both the locus and the imposed entity through ordinary relations. But in the case of a non-qualified external perceptual error our senses are related to the locus through ordinary relation, but to the imposed entity through extraordinary relation. For this reason the Nyāya philosophers have postulated jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa (cognition as a relation) which relates our senses to the thing imposed upon the locus of error. In the case of perception of a rope as a snake, our external senses are related to the rope through ordinary relation (laukika-sannikarùa), but not to the snake through ordinary relation. The postulation of jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa explains how our senses are related to the elsewhere or elsewhen snake through an extraordinary relation. The Nyāya classification of erroneous cognitions mentioned above may be represented by the following diagram:

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Erroneous cognition

____________________________________

of apprehension of memory _________________________________________

perceptual inferential analogical verbal

__________________________

due to external senses due to internal sense(manas) ______________________________

qualified non-qualified

(c) Thirdly, jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa is necessary for the explanation of recognition (pratyabhijñā). Consider the cognition of This is that Tom. In this cognition the person Tom is characterised by the property of being this (idantā) and by the property of being that (tattā). The property of being this signifies presentness and being in front of the cogniser. The visual sense-organs of the perceiver are related to Tom as well as these properties of Tom through ordinary perceptual relations. But the property of being that (tattā) signifies the property of being present at some past time or at a different place. The visual sense-organs of the cogniser cannot be related to these properties through ordinary perceptual relations. But the Nyāya philosophers claim that our sense-organs are related to the elsewhere or elsewhen Tom through the memory-cognition of Tom. Hence it presupposes a previous cognition of Tom. In this context it is to be noted that pastness in Tom will be cognised when we are aware of the temporal difference between the memory-cognition and the previous cognition of Tom. Therefore, jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa is required for the attribution of pastness or elsewhereness to Tom, although Tom is related to the perceiver through ordinary perceptual relation.

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(d) Fourthly, in order to explain a higher order cognition (anuvyavasāya) the Nyāya postulates jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa. Let us consider a second order cognition. The object of it is both the first order cognition and the object of the latter cognition. Since a higher order cognition is a mental perception, the mental (internal) sense-organ (manas) must be related to both the objects of a higher order cognition. Consider the cognition of the cognition of a table. The mental (internal) sense is the special instrumental cause (karaõa) of a higher order cognition. The relation of the internal sense to the object of a higher order cognition is the operation of it. Hence the manas must be related to both the cognition of the table and the table. The internal sense manas is related to the cognition of the table through the relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence. In other words, the manas is related to self (soul) through the relation of conjunction and the self (soul) is related to the cognition of the table through the converse of inherence relation. Now the question is: How can manas be related to the table which is an external object? In order to answer this question the Nyāya postulates jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa. In this case the cognition of the table itself becomes the relation and the object of this cognition becomes one of the relata of this relation. Hence the manas is related to the table through the relation of conjunction-cum the converse of inherence-cum the property being the object of the cognition of the table. Hence the internal sense manas is related to the cognition of the table through an ordinary relation, but to the table through an extraordinary relation. In this context it is to be noted that jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa need not always be a memory-cognition. In the case of a higher order cognition the lower order cognition itself, not its memory, is the relation. For this reason the cognition of the table itself becomes the relation. Moreover, the object which is one of the relata of this relation becomes its qualifier. Hence the table becomes the qualifier (vi÷eùaõa) of the cognition of the table which is the qualifier (vi÷eùaõa) of the second order cognition. This is how the table becomes the qualifier of the qualifier of the second order cognition of the table.

(e) Fifthly, jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa is necessary for the perception of any absence. Consider the absence of a cat in this room. In the perception of this absence, our visual sense-organs are related to the room through the relation of conjunction. Since the absence characterises the room, our visual sense-organs are related to it by the relation of conjunction-cum-the property of being the qualifier (saüjukta-vi÷eùaõatā). Since a cat is the qualifier of this absence, our visual sense-organs must be related to it as well. But our visual senses cannot be related to a cat as it is opposed to the absence of a cat. In other words, if there is the absence of a cat, then there cannot be a cat in the same locus by the same relation, and vice versa. For this reason our visual sense-organs cannot be related to a cat through an ordinary perceptual relation, although a cat is a qualifier of the absence of a cat. In this context it is to be noted that the relation of an absence to its negatum is called `pratiyogitā’ (`the property of being the second term or negatum’). But the relation of the locus of an absence to the absence is called `vi÷eùaõatā’ (`the property of being the qualifier’), although both the absence and the negatum are qualifiers. In order to distinguish the negatum from other qualifiers of an absence such as the property of being the occurrent on the floor (bhåtalavçttitva) the Nyāya

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philosophers have used the term ‘pratiyogã’. Hence the relation of the absence of a cat to the property of being the occurrent on the floor is called `vi÷eùaõatā’ (`the property of being the qualifier’) and the converse relation is called `vi÷eùyatā’ (`the property of being the qualificand’), but the relation of the absence of a cat to a cat is called `pratiyogitā’ (`the property of the negatum or the second term’) and the converse relation is called `anuyogitā’ (`the property of being the first term’).

Now the question is: How can our visual sense-organs be related to a cat which is a qualifier of the absence of a cat? The Nyāya philosophers have answered this question by postulating jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa. The memory-cognition of a cat relates our visual sense-organs to a cat. Hence our visual senses are related to the absence of a cat through an ordinary relation, but to a cat through an extraordinary relation. From the above arguments it follows that we cannot explain the perceptual nature of certain cognitions unless we postulate jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa (cognition as relation).

From our above discussion of sāmānyalakùaõa sannikarùa and jñānalakùaõa sannikarùa it follows that the Nyāya philosophers can explain the perceptual nature of certain cognitions which cannot be explained in terms of ordinary relations. Hence the Nyāya discussion of extraordinary perception would add a new dimension to Western philosophy.

C) Qualificative and non-qualificative cognition (savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka j¤āna)

The Nyāya distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative cognition would also through some light on contemporary epistemology as some philosophers have used Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. This distinction is analogous to the distinction between knowing things and knowing about things. Russell has introduced this to explain the difference between our knowledge of sense-data and that of physical objects, among many other things. The knowledge by acquaintance is a direct awareness of an entity, without any process of inference or knowledge of truths. According to Russell, in the presence of my table I am directly aware of its colour, shape , size, etc., but not the table. As he says:

The table is ‘the physical object which causes such-and- such sense-data’. This describes the table by means of the sense-data. In order to know anything at all about the table, we must know truths connecting with things with which we have acquaintance: we must know that ‘such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical object’. There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and the actual which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known to us at all. (The Problems of Philosophy, P 26)

From this remark it follows that our knowledge of sense-data is knowledge by acquaintance, while our knowledge of the table is knowledge by description. Since we are not directly acquainted with the table, our knowledge of the table is indirect and hence inferential. Since the public or the physical objects are not amenable to our senses, Russell’s theory has paved the way for scepticism or phenomenalism.

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Moreover, this theory would lead to private language as the objects of acquaintance are not public.

But there is no such problem in the Nyāya conception of non-qualificative perception. The contents of non-qualificative cognition are public objects, such as a chair or a table, not something private. Moreover, the Nyāya philosophers do not postulate sense-data for the explanation of our perception of physical objects. According to the Nyāya, the possibility of qualificative perception cannot be explained without postulating non-qualificative perception.

Let us consider the qualificative perception of a table , which is atomic in nature. In this cognition there are three elements, viz., a particular table which is a substance, tableness, and the relation of inherence. Since the perceptual cognition of a relation presupposes the cognition of its relata, the cognition of the inherence relation in this case presupposes the cognition of both a particular table and tableness. Hence they are cognised in a non-qualificative perceptual cognition.

i) It is to be noted that only the qualificand and the qualifier of an atomic qualificative cognition are cognised in a non-qualificative perceptual cognition, but not as a qualificand or as a qualifier. They are cognised as such, without any mode of presentation. Since a qualificative cognition presupposes the cognition of the ultimate qualificand and qualifier, the Nyāya postulates the non-qalificative cognition in which these elements are cognised as such. ii) The objects of a non-qualificative cognition cannot be cognised by expressions. In other words, a non-qualificative cognition cannot be generated by an expression. For example, the expression `a table' or simply `table' will not generate a cognition of a table which is not qualified by a property. Similarly, the word `tableness' will not generate simply the cognition of tableness. According to the Nyāya philosophers the word `table ' will generate the cognition of a table presented under the mode of tableness. Similarly, the word `tableness' will generate the cognition of tableness presented under the mode of the property of being present in each and every table and not in anything but a table. In other words, it is something which is present in tables and tables only. Hence the cognition generated by an expression will not be the same as a non-qualificative cognition. This is due to the fact that the former will contain a qualificand-qualifier relation, but not the latter. From the fact that a non-qualificative cognition cannot be generated by an expression, one should not conclude that the objects of a non-qualificative cognition are not nameable. Since everything is nameable in the Nyāya system, the objects of a non-qualificative cognition are also nameable, but they cannot be named when the non-qualificative cognition occurs. Since the existence of a non-qualificative cognition is established by an inference, its objects can be named when it is being established. But the cognitions generated by those names will not be non-qualificative. iii) As regards the validity (pramātva) or the truth of a non-qualificative cognition, the Navya-Nyāya philosophers claim that it is neither valid nor invalid. This is due to the fact that both valid and invalid cognitions presuppose qualificand-qualifier relations. Since there is no qualificand-qualifier relation in a non-qualificative cognition, it is outside the scope of both validity and invalidity.

iv) A non-qualificative cognition is always perceptual. It cannot be inferential,

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analogical, or verbal. Since it is a cause of our perceptual qualificative cognition, it is always immediately prior to a perceptual qualificative cognition. When an external sense-organ is related to its objects, the initial cognition which is due to this contact is non-qualificative. Thereafter a qualificative cognition is generated.

v)As regards the relation of a non-qualificative cognition to its object, the Nyāya claims that it cannot be any of the relations present in a qualificative cognition. Since relations such as the property of being the qualificand (visesyatā), the property of being the qualifier (visesanatā), and the property of being the relation (samsargatā) are present in a qualificative cognition, none of them can hold good in a non-qualificative cognition. Hence we can simply say the relation of a non-qualificative cognition to its object is different from those which are present in a qualificative cognition.

v) Since it has been postulated to give an account of qualificative perceptual cognition, it is also considered as perceptual in character, not inferential, analogical, or verbal. The objects of non-qualificative cognition are cognised as being related in a qualificative perceptual cognition. Hence the objects of non-qualificative perception are public, not private sense-data. Therefore, the proplems of Russell do not arise in the Nyāya philosophy, although the Nyāya postulates the non-qualificative cognition to give an account of our qualificative cognition

Section Two: Inference A) An inference, according to the Nyāya, involves three terms, viz., sādhya, pakùa (locus of inference), and hetu. The term `sādhya' refers to what is to be inferred. In other words, it refers to the predicate of the inferential cognition which corresponds to the conclusion of an inference. The term `pakùa ‘refers to the locus where there is some doubt about the presence of the sādhya (sandigdha-sādhyavān pakùaþ). Since the pakùa has pakùa tā (a special relational property of the pakùa , which is due to its relationship to a dubious cognition), the term `pakùa tā' signifies some doubt about the presence of the sādhya in the locus of inference. The term `hetu' (or `linga') refers to the reason by means of which the sādhya is inferred in the pakùa . The validity of an inference depends on certain characteristics of the hetu. Since the terms `sādhya' and `hetu' are usually translated as `probandum' and `probans' respectively, we shall follow this convention. An inference, according to the Nyāya, is a cognition which results from certain other cognitions. Hence it may be defined in terms of its causal conditions. Since an inferential cognition is a quality of the cogniser, it inheres in the self of the cogniser. Hence the cogniser is the inherent cause (samavāyã-kāraõa) of an inferential cognition. Since in the Nyāya system a cognition is due to the contact of the mental sense-organ (manas) with the self, the contact (i.e. the relation of conjunction) is the similar-to-inherent cause (asamavāyã-kāraõa) of an inferential cognition. In addition to these two types of causal conditions, an inferential cognition has certain instrumental causal conditions (nimitta-kāraõas) such as parāmar÷a (operation),

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vyāptij¤āna (the cognition of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum), and pakùatā (a special relational property of the locus). An inferential cognition is usually defined in terms of parāmar÷a (operation) and pakùatā (a special relational property of the locus). Parāmarùa (operation) is defined as the cognition of the presence of the probans pervaded by the probandum in the locus of the inference. Hence it presupposes the cognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Pakùatā refers to certain epistemic attitude of the cogniser towards the probandum. The ancient Nyāya defines pakùatā as doubt about the presence of the probandum in the locus of inference (pakùa). But this definition is not acceptable to the modern Nyāya (Navya-Nyāya) philosophers, as the desire to infer leads to inferential cognition even if there is no doubt about the presence of the probandum in the locus. Hence the Navya-Nyāya philosophers define it as the absence of certainty about the probandum in the locus qualified by the absence of desire to infer. This definition may be explained in terms of the following disjunction: There is absence of certainty about the probandum in the locus or there is desire to infer the probandum in the locus. Hence this definition rules out the possibility of inferential cognition in a cogniser in the presence of parāmar÷a (operation) if the cogniser is certain about the presence of the probandum in the locus and there is no desire to infer the probandum in the locus.

In this context it is to be noted that this explanation cannot be identified with the definition of ‘pakùatā’, although they are equivalent. If this explanation is taken as the definition of ‘pakùatā’, then it would violate the law of parsimony as the former is simpler than the latter. This is due to the fact that the latter would refer to innumerable differences which would qualify the desire to infer and the absence of certainty. This is involved in the meaning of ‘one or the other ’ (‘anyatara’) which will occur in the latter definition of ‘pakùatā’. Since these innumerable differences (e.g. difference from a table, difference from a chair, etc.) are limitors of the property of being the cause (kāraõatāvacchedaka), this definition would violate the law of parsimony. Moreover, it would be difficult to know so many differences residing in both the alternatives, viz., absence of certainty and the desire to infer. For this reason the above explanation should not be taken as the definition of ‘pakùatā’. From the above discussion of paksatā it follows that a dubious mental state or a desire to infer, or simply absence of certainty is related to pakùa (the locus of inference). Therefore, when we say that pakùa has paksatā what we mean is that an attitude of doubt or a desire to infer is directed towards the pakùa (the locus of inference). The Nyāya philosophers have classified inferences into three types depending upon the nature of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the probans and the probandum. Again the probantia (hetus) have been divided into three types depending upon the nature of the invariable concomitance. If the rule of invariable concomitance used in an inference takes the form of agreement in presence of the probans with the probandum, then the inference is called `anvayã' (`agreement in presence'). If this rule takes the form of agreement in absence, then the inference is called `vyatirekã' (`agreement in absence'). And if the rule takes both the forms, then the inference is called `anvaya-vyatirekã' ('agreement in presence and absence'). Similarly, the probantia involved in these inferences are divided into three types. The inferences for others would take the following forms if `p' stands for the locus, `h' for the probans and `s' for the probandum. (a) Agreement in presence type of inference:

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(1) p has s (2) Because of h (3) Wherever there is h, there is s, and an example in favour of this rule. (4) p has h which is pervaded by s (or, h which is present in, or related to, p is

pervaded by s). (5) Therefore, p has s (or, s is present in p). (b) Agreement in absence type of inference: (1) p has s(2) Because of h(3) Wherever there is absence of s, there is absence of h, and an example in favour

of this rule. (4) p has h which is the negatum of the absence which is the pervader of the absence

of s. (5) Therefore, p has s (or, s is present in p)

(c) The third type of inference is a combination of (a) and (b). It refers to both the types of invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum.

Let us mention the usual example of the Nyāya philosophers which comes under the category (c). The hill has fire. Because of smoke. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, such as kitchen. The hill has smoke which is pervaded by fire. Therefore, the hill has fire. If the rule of invariable concomitance is of the agreement in presence type only, then the inference is called `kavalānvayã-anumāna' (`agreement in presence type of inference only'). The probans of this type of inference is called `kevalānvayã-hetu' (`agreement in presence type of probans only'). If the rule of invariable concomitance is of the agreement in absence type only, then the inference is called `kevalavyatirekã-anumāna' (`agreement in absence type of inference only'). The probans of this type of inference is called `kevalavyatirekã-hetu' (`agreement in absence type of probans only'). In the case of inference for oneself all the premisses in (a) or (b) are not needed. What we need is the parāmarsa i.e. the fourth member in our above formulation of (a) or (b) provided pakùatā is present. Hence in our above example what is needed is ‘The hill has smoke which is pervaded by fire’. B)Valid and Invalid Inferences Now let us discuss the Nyāya distinction between valid and invalid (or fallacious) inferences. If the inference is of the agreement in presence and agreement in absence type (anvya-vyatiriki-anumāna), and it is used to generate the inferential cognition (anumiti) in others, then it is expressed by the following form: Thesis (pratij¤ā): a is G. Reason (hetu): because of F. Example (udāharaõa): Wherever there is F, there is G, as in b, etc; and wherever there is absence of G, there is absence of F, as in c, etc.

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Application (upanaya): a has F which is pervaded by G; or a has F which is the counterpositive (i.e. negatum) of the absence which pervades the absence of G. Conclusion (nigamana): Hence a is G, or G is present in a, where a is the locus of the inference (paksa), F is the probans, G is the probandum, b is the locus where G is known to be present (sapakùa ), and c is the locus where the absence of G is known to be present (vipakùa ). According to the Nyāya each of the sentences in an inference for others is an answer to a question and each of them except the last one will give rise to a question. Moreover, each of them is used to generate a cognition in the hearer. Since a self-contradictory sentence such as `a is both G and not G' cannot generate a cognition, it cannot be used either as a premise or conclusion of an inference. If the inference (not the inferential cognition) is valid (nyāya), then all the sentences must be true and the conclusion will follow from the premise or the premises. In other words, there is no true preventer cognition. Hence the application (upanaya-vākya), which represents the operation (vyāpara) of an inferential cognition (anumiti), will entail the conclusion. Invalid inferences (nyāyābhāsas) are divided into two types. One type of invalid inference contains a false premise or premises, but the other type does not contain any false premise. Hence the former may be called `logically invalid' and the latter `epistemically invalid', although the Nyāya uses the word `nitya' (`permanent') for the former type of invalidity and `anitya' (`impermanent') for the latter type of invalidity. Hence the truth of the premises and the conclusion is not sufficient to define the validity of an inference. But any inference, valid or invalid, must satisfy the relevance condition. If there is no relevance between the two sentences, then no inference arises. This point also is very important for understanding the difference between the Western and the Indian concept of inference. In an inference for others, all the five sentences are needed, because each of them is an answer to a different question and gives some new information. But in an inference for oneself all of them are not required and there is no need to use a sentence. Hence a deaf and a mute person can also have an inferential cognition. What is required is the operation (parāmarsa) which corresponds to the application in our above example and the cognitions which will give rise to this operation. In our above example the thesis (pratijnā-vākya) is an answer to the question what is to be established in a (paksa ). a is usually considered as something where there is doubt about the presence of the probandum. The reason (hetu-vākya) is an answer to the question what signifies the probandum. Hence it states that the probans signifies the probandum. The signifier-significate (j¤āpya-j¤āpaka) relation holds between the objects of two cognitions. The cognition of the signifier (jnāpaka) gives rise to the cognition of the significate (jnāpya). The reason does not state that the locus a (paksa ) is characterised by the probans. Hence the reason should not be stated as ‘a is F’. Now it may be asked, why should we consider the probans as the signifier? The answer is given by stating a rule (vyāpti) along with some examples which give rise to the cognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum (vyāpti-jnāna). For this reason the third step is called `example'. Both the examples of agreement in presence and agreement in absence are to be stated in support of this rule of invariable concomitance. The observation of the presence of the probans and the probandum in some loci and the non-observance of the presence of the probans and the

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absence of the probandum in some other loci are required for the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. The rule takes the form of a universal sentence which can be stated as: (x) ( If F x, then G x). As regards the range of the variable x, the Nyāya claims that all the loci including a in our above example will come under its range, but the cognition of this rule does not entail the cognition of a qualified by a unique mode of presentation. Hence a (i.e. paksa ) is known as something different from b (i.e. sapaksa ) and we know that if it has F, then it has G. Therefore, in order to avoid the inferential circularity (siddha-sādhana), the Nyāya claims that the cognition of the rule does not entail the cognition of the inferential locus qualified by F and G, although the cognition of the rule rests upon the cognition of some of the instances of the rule. According to another interpretation, the sentence `wherever there is F, there is G' simply states the pervader -pervaded relations between F and G. It does not refer to any instances or loci of these properties. Hence the rule by itself does not refer to a, b, or c in our above example. But the cognition of the rule, according to both the interpretations, presupposes the observation of the presence of the probans and the probandum in the same loci and the non-observation of the probans in a locus which is characterised by the absence of the probandum. If the cognition of the rule is true, then F is pervaded by G. In other words, F has the property of being pervaded by G. The application (upanaya-vākya) is an answer to the question whether a (i.e. paksa ) is characterised by this type of F. Since the reason does not state that a is characterised by F, the application gives us some new information about a. The reason simply states that F is the signifier of G. Hence the application gives us some new information which is not already contained in the previous sentences. The conclusion (nigamana-vākya) is an answer to the question whether the probandum which is the significate of that type of probans is in a. Hence it is an answer to the question whether G which is the significate of F which is pervaded by G is present in a. The difference between the thesis and the conclusion lies in the fact that the thesis simply states what is to be established in the locus, but the conclusion states how it is to be established in the locus. The word `hence' or its synonym in the conclusion means `the significate of the cognition of the probans'. Hence the conclusion (nigamana-vākya) means that G which is the significate of F, which is pervaded by G and is in a, is present in a. Here the new information lies in the fact that G is the significate of that type of F. The difference between the thesis (pratij¤ā) and the conclusion ( nigamana) lies in the fact that the thesis simply states what is to be established in the locus, but the conclusion states how it is to be established in the locus. Since each of the members in an inference is related by the relation of relevance, an inference, valid or invalid, is considered a large sentence (mahāvākya). As regards the utility of operation (parāmarsa) which is expressed by application there is some difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The Mimāmsā and the Vedānta philosophers claim that there is no need to accept operation (parāmarsa) as distinct from the cognition of the presence of probans in the locus (paksa dharmatā-jnāna) and the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance (vyāpti-j¤āna) for the inferential cognition. Hence the inferential cognition of the mountain has fire is causally dependent upon the cognitions of wherever there is smoke there is fire and the mountain has smoke. Now the Nyāya philosophers claim that if the above view is tenable, then there is no

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difference between the following two inferences as both of them equally satisfy the above two conditions of an inference. (a) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The mountain has smoke. Hence the mountain has fire. (b) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The mountain has light. Hence the mountain has fire. In this context it is to be noted that both smoke and light are pervaded by fire. Hence both the inferences contain the rule of invariable concomitance and the presence of the probans in the locus. But in (b) the inferential cognition will not be generated by these two conditions alone. In response to this objection the followers of the Mimāmsā claim that if the mode of presentation of the probans which resides in the locus is the same as the limitor of the property of being pervaded (vyāpyatāvacchedaka), then these two conditions will yield the inferential cognition. In (a) smokeness is both the limitor of the property of being the probans (hetutāvacchedaka) and the limitor of the property of being the pervaded (vyāpyatāvacchedaka). But in (b) lightness is the limitor of the property of being the probans and smokeness is the limitor of the property of being the pervaded. For this reason the cognition of the mountain has fire will not be generated by the cognitions of the presence of the probans in the locus and the rule of invariable concomitance. Now the Nyāya philosophers raise another objection against this view. Suppose John has the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus, Tom has the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance, and the limitor of the property of being the probans cognised by John is the same as the limitor of the property of being the pervaded cognised by Tom. Since all the conditions are satisfied, the inferential cognition will be generated either in John or in Tom. But this does not happen. Hence some additional conditions are needed in support of the view of the Mimāmsā. On this point the supporters of the Mimāmsā claim that if a person has cognised the limitor of the property of being the probans in the way he/she has cognised the limitor of the property of being the pervaded, then he/she will have the inferential cognition. Hence the above counterexample does not refute the view of the Mimāmsā. Now the Nyāya philosophers raise another objection. It is claimed that the explanation of the Mimāmsā goes against the law of parsimony in two ways. First, the causal explanation has reference to persons. Second, since persons are different, the causes of the inferential cognitions would also be different. Hence the instances of the causal law would take the following form: If x cognises p and q, then x cognises r, If y cognises p and q, then y cognises r, and so on. But the causal explanation offered by the Nyāya philosophers does not have any reference to a person. It simply states that the operation (parāmar÷a) will yield the inferential cognition. In other words, the cognition of a is F pervaded by G will generate the cognition of a is G. Hence the causal explanation of the Nyāya is simpler than that of the Mimāmsā. Moreover, the Nyāya claims that the inferential cognition may be due to the cognition of the locus characterised by something which is pervaded by the probandum (sādhya-vyāpyavāna-paksah). Hence the cognition of (Ex) (a has x which is pervaded by G) will yield the inferential cognition a is G. In other words, the cognition of any specific

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probans is not needed for an inferential cognition. If the Mimāmsā philosophers accept it also as a causal condition for an inferential cognition, then they have to accept two separate sets of causal conditions for the same inferential cognition. One of them will be the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus and the cognition of the rule of the invariable concomitance, and the other one will be the cognition of the locus characterised by something which is pervaded by the probandum. But the Nyāya philosophers accept only one type of causal condition for an inferential cognition. What is required for an inferential cognition is the cognition of the locus which has a property which is characterised by the property of being the pervaded (vyāpti-prakāraka-paksa dharmatā-j¤āna). In our above two inferences, the operation `the mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire' and the operation `the mountain has light which is pervaded by fire' satisfy the causal condition of the inferential cognition. Hence either of the operations will yield the inferential cognition `the mountain has fire'. Moreover, the more generic cognition of the mountain has something which is pervaded by fire also satisfies the above definition of the causal condition for the inferential cognition. Hence it also yields the inferential cognition `the mountain has fire'. As regards the nature of the operation which is a cognition, the Nyāya claims that there are different types depending on the source of its origin. It could be perceptual or inferential. In other words, it is derived from perception if the probans is perceived in the locus of the inference. It will be inferential if it is cognised as a conclusion of another inference. Moreover, an operation (parāmar÷a) may be due to a mental disposition (samskāra), and thereby it will be a type of memory-cognition. Again, it may be generated by verbal testimony. Hence it may be a case of verbal cognition as well. As regards the form of an operation, the Nyāya accepts four types of it. As there are two types of rule of invariable concomitance, namely, agreement in presence (anvya-vyāpti) and agreement in absence (vyatireka-vyāpti), so there are two types of operation, namely, agreement in presence (anvyã-parāmar÷a) and agreement in absence (vyatirekã-parāmar÷a). Again, each of them may take two different forms at cognitive level. In one case the locus of inference becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of the mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire. In another case, the pervaded becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of the smoke which is pervaded by fire is on the mountain. Similarly, the agreement in absence type of operation has two forms. In one case the locus of inference becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of the mountain has smoke which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire. In another case the pervaded becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of smoke which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire is on the mountain. The Nyāya has also discussed whether the two types of inferential cognition, namely, a is G and G is in a, are derivable from different types of operation. Here we come across two different views: (I) According to some Nyāya philosophers both the types of inferential cognition are derivable from any of the following four types of operation: (i) a is F which is pervaded by G. Since the locus is the qualificand in this cognition, it is called `locus-qualificand type of agreement in presence operation' (`paksa -visesyaka-anvyi-parāmarsa').

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(ii) F which is pervaded by G is in a. Since the pervaded is the qualificand in this cognition, it is called `pervaded-qualificand type of agreement in presence operation' (`vyāpya-visesyaka-anvyi-parāmarsa'). (iii) a has F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G. Since the locus is the qualificand, it is called `locus-qualificand type of agreement in absence operation' (`paksa -visesyaka-vyatireki-parāmarsa'). (iv) F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G is in a. Since the pervaded is the qualificand, it is called `pervaded-qualificand type of agreement in absence operation' (vyāpya-visesyaka-vyatireki-parāmarsa). (II) According to some other Nyāya philosophers the locus-qualificand type of inferential cognition (paksa-visesyaka-anumiti) will be generated by the locus-qualificand type of operation (paksa-visesyaka-parāmarsa), and the probandum-qualificand type of inferential cognition (sādhya-visesyaka-anumiti) will be generated by the pervaded-qualificand type of operation (vyāpya-visesyaka-parāmarsa). Hence a is G is derivable from either a is F which is pervaded by G or a has F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G. Similarly, G is in a is derivable from either F which is pervaded by G is in a or F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G is in a. Now let us discuss the nature of the probans in a valid inference. If the valid inference is of the agreement in presence and agreement in absence type, then its probans has the following five characteristics: (a) It is present in the locus of the inference (paksa ). Hence it has the property of being present in the locus (paksa sattva). (b) It is also present in some of the loci which are known to be characterised by the probandum. Hence it has the property of being present in similar loci (sapaksa sattva). (c) It is not present in those loci which are known to be characterised by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of being absent from dissimilar loci (vipaksāsattva). (d) It has no counter-probans (prati-hetu) which will demonstrate the absence of the probandum in the locus of the inference. A counter-probans is different from the probans in question and it is pervaded by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of not having a counter-probans (asatpratipaksa ttva). (e) It is different from the probans which can be used to establish the probandum in the locus which is characterised by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of being different from this type of probans (abādhitattva). An inference of the agreement in presence type only (kevalānvayi-anumāna) has no dissimilar cases (vipaksa ) as examples. In other words, there is no locus which is known to be characterised by the absence of the probandum. For example, this table is knowable, because of nameability. Since there is no locus which is characterised by the absence of knowability, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti) is not possible. Hence the probans of this type of inference has no vipaksāsattva. But it has the remaining four characteristics of a valid probans (sad-hetu). Similarly, an inference of the agreement in absence type only has no similar cases as examples (sapaksa). In other words, there is no locus which is known to be characterised by the probandum. For example, earth is different from other things, because of smell. Since in the Nyāya ontology earth alone has smell and since earth is

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the locus of the inference (paksa), there is no example in favour of the rule `whatever has smell is different from other things'. Hence the probans of this type of inference has no sapaksa sattva. But it has the remaining four characteristics. An inference, according to the Nyāya, will be fallacious if the probans lacks one of these characteristics. In other words, if the probantia of the inferences of the agreement in presence and absence type do not have all the five characteristics, and the probantia of the other types of inferences do not have the remaining four characteristics, then they are fallacious. It is to be noted that there are two types of fallacies. One of them would render some of the sentences false and hence the cognitions expressed by those sentences would not correspond to facts. Another type of fallacy would simply prevent the occurrence of doubt free cognitions expressed by the sentences of an inference. Since the Nyāya has ascribed the term `fallacy' to the probans of an inference, a fallacious inference is called `hetvābhāsa' (`defective probans'). The probans which is free from all the defects will generate a true inferential cognition, and the sentences used to generate the inferential cognition in others will also be true. Hence the validity of an inference will be defined in terms of the presence of these properties in the probans. But an invalid inference will lack some of these properties. Since a probans is used to infer the probandum, the fallacy of an inference has been ascribed to the probans. A fallacy or hetvābhāsa has been defined in the following way: x is a hetvābhāsa iff the true cognition of x prevents the occurrence of an

inferential cognition (anumiti) or the operation (parāmarsa) which is the vyāpāra of an inferential cognition, where x is a qualified object of cognition.

Let us consider a fallacious inference, for example, this lake has fire because of smoke. In this case the inferential cognition this lake has fire is false. From the above definition of fallacy it follows that if the person would have known that this lake has no fire, then the inferential cognition would have been prevented. The absence of fire in the lake which is the object of cognition is the defect of the probans. Since smoke is the probans in this inference, it is infected with this defect. Hence, in our above example, the defect is the absence of fire in the lake, and smoke is the object qualified by this defect. Now the question is, how can smoke be qualified by this defect? The Nyāya philosophers explain the relation between them in terms of the relation of a cognition to its object, which is called `visayatā', and the limitor of the property of being the probans (hetutāvacchedaka). In other words, it is explained in terms of a conjunctive cognition such that one of them is the defect and the other one is the probans. In our above example, one of the objects of this conjunctive cognition would be the lake qualified by the absence of fire and the other one would be smoke. Since both the objects are objects of the same cognition, the property of being the object of one cognition (eka-j¤āna-visayatā) resides in both. The property of being the object of one cognition is not something over and above the property of being the qualificand and the property of being the qualifier residing in the qualificand and the qualifier respectively. Since these properties are determined by the same cognition, the objects of this cognition have the property of being the object of one cognition. Hence the objects will be related to each other at epistemic level. This is analogous to the relation between two persons who have the same father. In our above example, since the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition resides in both smoke and the lake qualified by the absence of fire, they are related to each other. Now the question is whether this

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relation by itself can uniquely make the lake qualified by the absence of fire the qualifier of smoke which is the probans. In order to specify the relation of the lake qualified by the absence of fire to smoke, it may be said that the property of being the object of the same conjunctive cognition residing in smoke is limited by a unique property of smoke such as gaseous carbon particles. Now the question is whether this relation of the lake qualified by the absence of fire to smoke is the same as the relation of defect to that which is infected with this defect. If it is considered sufficient, then in the following example a pot would also be infected with this defect. Consider a conjunctive cognition of the lake qualified by the absence of fire and a pot. Here also the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition resides in both the pot and the lake qualified by the absence of fire. Here also we can specify the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition residing in the pot in terms of a unique property of the pot such as potness. If this method of specifying the relation were sufficient, then the pot would also be infected with the same defect. And if there is a more complex conjunctive cognition in which the lake qualified by the absence of fire is a conjunct, then all the remaining members would be infected with this defect if the relations were specified. In order to exclude such cases we have to show that the specific relational property of being the object of the same conjunctive cognition residing in a pot is not the same as the relation of the defect to that which is infected with the defect. Hence it has been proposed that the relation which relates the lake qualified by the absence of fire to smoke is qualified by a property which resides only in the probans. In other words, the limitor of the property of being the probans (hetutāvacchedaka) which is smokeness will qualify this relation. Hence the relation of the defect to that which is infected with it will be the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition qualified by the limitor of the property of being the probans. Since smokeness is the limitor of the property of being the probans, and not the gaseous carbon particle, smokeness will be used to specify the relation of the defect to that which is infected with it. Hence the complex relation in which smokeness is the qualifier will make the lake qualified by the absence of fire, which is the defect, the qualifier of the probans which is smoke. If we would have known this property of smoke, then we would not have inferred the presence of fire in the lake. Since smoke was used to make this inference, and since this function of smoke will be restricted by our cognition of smoke qualified by the absence of fire in the lake, smoke as a probans is considered defective. In other words, it will fail to perform its function as probans for the above inference. Now it may be said that the fallacious inference is due to the lack of knowledge about reality. In our above example, the person who infers that the lake has fire does not know that the lake is qualified by the absence of fire. Hence the fallacy is due to this lack of knowledge. In reply the Nyāya would say that even in a valid inference the person, who infers that the lake has absence of fire, does not know that the lake is qualified by the absence of fire. Here also the person lacks the same knowledge. Hence in terms of the lack of knowledge the distinction between the valid and the invalid inferences cannot be drawn. From the above discussion it follows that the probans is used to infer the probandum in the locus of an inference. If the inferential cognition or the operation (parāmarsa) of an inference is prevented by a true cognition, then the probans is considered defective and thereby the inference becomes fallacious. Moreover, it also follows that if the cognition

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of the presence of the probans in the locus (paksadharmatā-j¤āna) or the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance (vyāpti-jnāna) is prevented, then the operation (parāmarsa) will also be prevented as the contents of the former two cognitions are necessary for operation. Hence the inference will be fallacious if the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus or the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance is prevented by a true cognition. Therefore, the cognition of the defect (dosa) is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus or the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance or the inferential cognition. If the inference is fallacious, the probans will lack at least one of the characteristics of a valid probans (sad-hetu). Now let us discuss the fallacies which are, according to the Nyāya, due to the defects of the probantia. There are five types of fallacies, viz., (1) asiddha (unestablished), (2) vyabhicāra (deviation), (3) viruddha (opposed), (4) satpratipaksa (existence of a counter-thesis), and (5) bādha (absence of the probandum in the locus). (1) asiddha (unestablished): If the probans cannot be established, it is called `asiddha'. This type of fallacy can occur in five ways: (a) The locus of the inference (paksa) is not real. For example, the golden mountain has fire, because of smoke. Here the golden mountain is the locus (paksa ), smoke is the probans, and fire is the probandum. Since the locus is unreal or unexemplified (aprasiddha), the probans cannot reside in it. Since the locus cannot be established, this fallacy is called `ā÷rayāsiddha' (`unestablished locus'). Here the defect is the absence of gold in the mountain or the mountain not being made of gold. The cognition of this defect is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (paksa dharmatā-jnāna) and the inferential cognition (anumiti). Here the probans lacks the property of being present in the locus (paksa sattva). The absence of gold in the mountain, which is the defect, is related to smoke in a conjunctive cognition. Since the cognition of this defect will prevent the occurrence of the operation or the inferential cognition, the probans will fail to perform its function. Hence the probans will be considered defective. (b) The probans does not reside in the locus of the inference, although the locus is real and the probans is real. For example, sound is non-eternal, because of visibility. Here both sound and visibility are real entities, but visibility does not qualify sound. Since the probans cannot qualify the locus of the inference, this type of fallacy is called `svarupāsiddha' (`unestablished in the locus'). This type of fallacy is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (paksadharmatā-jnāna). Here also the probans lacks the property of being present in the locus (paksa sattva). The defect (doùa) is the absence of visibility in the sound. Hence the cognition of the absence of visibility in the sound would prevent the occurrence of the operation which contains the presence of probans in the locus. (c) The probans is unreal or unexemplified, although the locus is real. For example, the mountain has fire, because of golden smoke. In this case the golden smoke which is the probans is itself unreal. Since the probans is unreal, this type of fallacy is called `hetvasiddha' (`unestablished probans'). This type of fallacy is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the

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locus of inference and the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Since the probans is unexemplified, it cannot have any property of a genuine probans. That is, it lacks all the five properties of a genuine probans (sad-hetu). Here the defect (doùa) is the absence of gold in smoke. Hence the cognition of the absence of gold in smoke would prevent the occurrence of the operation (parāmarsa) which contains the golden smoke. (d) Another type of asiddha (unestablished) fallacy will occur if the probans of an unexemplified probandum is not present in the locus of an inference. For example, the mountain has golden fire, because of smoke. In this case, smoke is present on the mountain, but not as the probans of the golden fire. Hence this type of fallacy is called `sādhyāsiddha' (`unestablished probandum'). Here the probans lacks both sapaksa sattva (the property of being present in similar cases) and vipaksāsattva (the property of being absent from dissimilar cases). Here the defect is the absence of gold in fire. Hence the cognition of the absence of gold in fire (i.e. fire not being made of gold) would prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and golden fire and the inferential cognition. Hence the cognition of this defect is opposed to both the operation and the inferential cognition. (e) There is another type of asiddha fallacy. In this case the locus is real, the probans is real and the probans is present in the locus but the probans is not qualified by the property of being the pervaded which is limited by a property. In other words, the probans lacks the property of being the pervaded of the probandum as the property of being the pervaded is not limited by the appropriate limitor. It is to be noted that the property of being the pervaded which is a relational property of the probans is limited by a property-limitor, and this limitor also fixes the referents of the `probans'. The observation of the co-presence of the probans and the probandum in some loci, and the non-observation of the presence of the probans without the probandum in some other loci are causal conditions for the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Now the mode under which the probans has been cognised becomes the limitor of the property of being the pervaded (vyāpyatāvacchedaka). This type of fallacy will occur when the mode under which the probans has been cognised does not limit the property of being the pervaded which resides in the probans. For example, the mountain has fire, because of blue smoke. If blue smoke is the probans, then the rule of invariable concomitance would be between blue smoke and fire. The property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke will be limited by blue smokeness (i.e. blueness and smokeness). But this rule of invariable concomitance cannot substantiate the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Hence we have to postulate two rules of invariable concomitance, viz. (i) wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire, and (ii) wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Therefore, there would be two properties of being the pervaded. The property of being the pervaded residing in any smoke will be limited by smokeness only but the property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke will be limited by both blueness and smokeness. Now the question is whether there is any need to postulate two properties of being the pervaded. The postulation of the property of being the pervaded limited by blue smokeness cannot explain the rule of invariable concomitance between any smoke and fire. But the postulation of the property of being the pervaded limited by smokeness

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only can explain the invariable concomitance between any smoke and fire, and thereby between blue smoke and fire as well. Hence, on the ground of simplicity, the Nyāya philosophers accept only the property of being the pervaded which is limited by smokeness. Since there is no property of being the pervaded which is limited by blue smokeness and resides in blue smoke, the type of fallacy present in the above inference is called `vyāpyatvāsiddha' (‘unestablished property of being the pervaded'). Here the defect will be the absence of the property of being the pervaded which is limited by blue smokeness and which resides in blue smoke. The cognition of this defect would prevent the cognition of the invariable concomitance between blue smoke and fire. Hence during the observation of the co-presence of smoke and fire we have to cognise smoke, blue or black, under the mode of smokeness alone, because this mode of presentation will be the limitor of the property of being the pervaded. If the blue smoke is not cognised under the mode of smokeness alone, then it will lack the property of being present in sapaksa (similar cases). This is due to the fact that other modes of presentation such as blue smokeness cannot limit (or determine) the property of being the pervaded of fire, which resides in a blue smoke. Hence the property of being present in sapaksa (similar cases) requires not only the presence of the probans in similar cases but also the mode under which it is to be cognised. In this case, blue smoke is present in the locus of fire, but blue smoke lacks the property of being the pervaded limited by blue smokeness. If the mode under which the probans is cognised cannot be the limitor of its property of being the pervaded, then also the probans lacks the property of being present in sapaksa . Hence in this technical sense of the word `sapaksa sattva' blue smoke as probans, in our above example, lacks this property. On the contrary, if blue smoke is cognised in sapaksa under the mode of smokeness only, then it will satisfy one of the conditions for the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Since blue smokeness is not the limitor of the property of being the pervaded, the cognition of the probans under the mode of blue smokeness will prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. From the above discussion it follows that blue smoke lacks the property of being the pervaded limited by the blue smokeness. The cognition of this defect will prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between blue smoke and fire, and thereby the operation of this inference. (2) vyabhicāra (deviation): There are three types of fallacy of deviation. In all the three cases the cognition of the defect would prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. (a) sādhārana-vyabhicāra (common deviation): If the probans is present in paksa (locus of the inference), sapaksa (locus known to be characterised by the probandum) and vipaksa (locus known to be characterised by the absence of the probandum), then this type of fallacy would occur, and the probans is called `sādhārana-vyabhicāri-hetu' (`common deviating probans'). For example, the mountain has fire, because of knowability. Since the probans is present in the locus of the absence of the probandum, the cognition of deviation (vyabhicāra) is opposed to the cognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. If we take a lake as vipaksa , then fire is absent from it, but knowability is present in it. Hence there cannot be a cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and fire. Moreover, since there is

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deviation, the rule of invariable concomitance will not hold good between the probans and the probandum. In this case, the defect (dosa) is the absence of fire in a lake which has knowability. Hence the cognition of this defect will prevent the cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and fire. Since the cognition of the invariable concomitance is prevented, the operation will also be prevented. In this fallacy the probans lacks the property of not being present in vipaksa . (b) asādhārana-vyabhicāra (uncommon deviation): If the probans is present in the locus of the inference (paksa ) only, then it is called `asādharana-vyabhicāri-hetu' (`uncommon deviating probans'). In other words, the probans is not present in sapaksa (the locus of the probandum) and in vipaksa (the locus of the absence of the probandum), but is present in paksa (the locus of the inference). For example, sound is non-eternal, because of soundness. In this case, sound is paksa , a non-eternal object such as a pot is sapaksa and an eternal object such as space is vipaksa . Since soundness is not present in a pot, it lacks the property of being present in sapaksa . Since soundness cannot be perceived in non-eternal objects, there cannot be cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. But the probans is absent from the eternal objects. Since the agreement in absence between the probans and the probandum can be observed, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti) can be cognised. In this example, the defect is the absence of soundness in a non-eternal object such as a pot, and the probans lacks the property of being present in sapaksa . The cognition of this defect would prevent the cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance (anvya-vyāpti). But it will not prevent the cognition of the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti). Since there are two types of invariable concomitance, there would be two types of operation. Since the agreement in presence type of operation depends on the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance, it will be prevented by the cognition of this defect. But the agreement in absence type of operation which depends on the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance will not be prevented by the cognition of this defect. Hence the cognition of this type of defect does not prevent the cognition of all types of invariable concomitance or operation. For this reason it may be treated as an epistemic fallacy as opposed to a logical one (where some of the sentences are false). In the example above, the sentences would not be false, but we fail to cognise the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance and thereby the agreement in presence type of operation. Moreover, this type of epistemic defect can also be removed. In our example, this defect can be removed if there is certainty about the presence of the probandum in some sounds such as the sound of a music. If it were so, then the locus would not be sound in general as it is in the above example, but some specific sounds such as the one which follows lightning. From the observation of the copresence of the probans and the probandum in some loci (sapaksa ) and the non-observation of the probans in the locus of the absence of the probandum one may cognise the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance. Hence the cognition of both the types of invariable concomitance are possible. Again in our example, the defect remains so long as there is doubt about the presence of the probandum in every sound. Since this defect can be removed, it is called `anitya' (`impermanent'). (c) anupasamhāri-vyabhicāra (unsupported deviation): If everything becomes paksa and thereby the probans does not have either sapaksa or

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vipaksa , then the fallacy of anupasamhāri-vyabhicāra will occur. Let us consider the following two examples. (i) Everything is non-eternal, because of knowability. (ii) Everything is nameable, because of knowability. In both (i) and (ii) everything is the locus of inference. There is doubt about the presence of non-eternality in (i) and nameability in (ii). Since everything is paksa , there is no sapaksa or vipaksa . Since the co-presence of the probans and the probandum cannot be observed, the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance cannot be cognised. Similarly, since the co-absence of the probans and the probandum cannot be observed, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance cannot be cognised. Since neither type of invariable concomitance is cognised, neither the agreement in presence nor the agreement in absence type of operation will occur. Hence this type of fallacy prevents the occurrence of any type of operation which is necessary for an inferential cognition. Since there is neither sapksa nor vipaksa , the probans lacks both the property of being present in sapaksa and the property of being absent from vipaksa . As regards the nature of this fallacy, it is not logical, but epistemological. If a person does not have doubt about the presence of the probandum in everything, then this epistemic defect can be removed. From the observation of the co-presence of the probans and the probandum and the non-observation of deviation, one will have the cognition of the invariable concomitance between them. In (i), if everything ceases to be paksa , then the cognition of the invariable concomitance may be possible on the basis of the observation of co-presence and non-observation of deviation. But this cognition will be false as there are eternal objects such as space and time which are knowable in the Nyāya system. Hence there will be another type of fallacy. In (ii) if everything ceases to be paksa , then the cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and nameabilty will be possible from the observation of co-presence and the non-observation of deviation. Moreover, the cognition of invariable concomitance will be true as the invariable concomitance holds good in the Nyāya system, and the inference will be valid. From the above discussion it follows that this type of defect can also be removed. Hence it is also epistemological, not logical. It is due to the fact that the person in question has doubt about everything and as a result he cannot cognise the invariable concomitance. This type of defect will last so long as there is doubt about the presence of the probandum in everything. From the above discussion of three types of fallacies of deviation, it follows that the last two are epistemic and hence impermanent, but the first one is logical and hence permanent. But all of them are opposed to the cognition of the invariable concomitance although not in the same way. Moreover, all of them are infected with the fallacy of deviation, but not in the same way. The probans of the first one occurs in the locus of the absence of the probandum, and it is vyabhicārã (deviating) in this sense. But the probantia of the other two types are not vyabhicārã (deviating) in this sense. The probans of the second type is vyabhicārã (deviating) in the sense that it does not reside in the locus of the probandum i.e. sapaksa . The probans of the third type is vyabhicārã (deviating) in the sense that there is neither sapaksa nor vipaksa . Since there is neither sapaksa nor vipaksa , the cognition of the co-presence of the probans with the probandum or the cognition of the co-absence of the probans with the probandum is not possible. Hence the cognition of any type of invariable concomitance is not possible so long as this defect remains. In spite of these senses of the word `vyabhicāra'

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(`deviation'), all the three types of deviation have one thing in common. Each of them refers to the object of a true cognition which is opposed either to the cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance or to the cognition of the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance. (3) viruddha (opposed): If the probans is pervaded by the absence of the probandum, the probans is called `viruddha-hetu' (`opposed probans'). Hence the invariable concomitance would be between the probans and the absence of the probandum, not between the probans and the probandum. In other words, wherever the probans is present, the probandum is absent. For example, sound is eternal, because of the property of being an effect. Since an effect is non-eternal, the probans, far from establishing the probandum, establishes the absence of the probandum. In the case of viruddha fallacy, the probans lacks the property of being present in sapaksa and the property of being absent from vipaksa . In other words, it is absent from the loci of the probandum, but is present where the probandum is absent. Hence the agreement in presence (anvya-sahacāra) and agreement in absence (vyatireka-sahacāra) cannot be observed. From this it follows that neither the invariable concomitance in presence nor the invariable concomitance in absence can be cognised. Moreover, since both the types of invariable concomitance are false, the defect would be the falsity of the invariable concomitances. Hence the cognition of this defect will be opposed to the cognition of both the types of invariable concomitance and thereby both the types of operation. It is also opposed to the inferential cognition. Since it is a permanent defect, it may be called `logical fallacy'. (4) satpratipaksa (existence of counter-thesis): The word `satpratipaksa has two meanings. It may mean either the thesis of the opponent or a type of defect (dosa) which will prevent an inferential cognition. In the context of a debate it simply means the thesis of one's opponent, which tries to establish the opposite conclusion. Hence there would be two operations so that two opposite conclusions can be established. The operation of the proponent has the form: (a) p has h which is pervaded by s, but the operation of the opponent takes the form: (b) p has counter-h (different from h) which is pervaded by the absence of s. Since the opponent uses a counter- probans, the word `satpratipaksa , in a debate, refers to the probans of the operation of the opponent. The opponent tries to establish the conclusion p has absence of s, which is the contradictory of the conclusion of the proponent. The operations of both the proponent and the opponent may be false, but the conclusions of both of them cannot be false as they are contradictories. Let us consider the following operations of the proponent and the opponent respectively. (c) The lake has smoke which is pervaded by fire. (d) The lake has light (counter-probans) which is pervaded by the absence of fire. The proponent will deduce the conclusion `The lake has fire', and the opponent the conclusion `The lake has absence of fire'. Since the opponent uses a counter-probans to establish the absence of the probandum in the same locus, there is a satpratipaksa . If the opponent uses the probans of the proponent, then it will not be an example of satpratipksa. For example, (e) The lake has smoke which is pervaded by the absence of fire. Hence from the very definition of satpratipaksa it follows that the probans of the opponent is different from that of the proponent.

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Now let us consider what happens to those who remain non-committal to the thesis of the proponent or the opponent. In our above examples, both (c) and (d) will generate cognitions in those who are not committed to either of the conclusions. But the operation (c) will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to (d), and the operation (d) will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to (c). Hence we cannot say that these two operations are mutually opposed to each other in the sense that the cognition of (c) will prevent the cognition of (d) and vice versa. But the very existence of satpratipaksa is opposed to the inferential cognitions among the non-committals. There is another use of the word `satpratipaksa’ which identifies a satpratipaksa with a fallacy (satpratipaksa dosa). It is to be remembered that a fallacy or a defect (dosa) is the object of a true cognition which is opposed to the occurrence of the operation or the inferential cognition. In our above examples, neither the object of the operation (c) nor the object of the operation (d) is a defect (dosa), because both the cognitions are false. An example of this type of defect would be the object of a true cognition such as (f) The lake has water which is pervaded by the absence of fire. Therefore, the defect will be the object of any true operation which has the same locus (paksa ) as (c) and the counter-probans of this operation is pervaded by the absence of fire. The operation (f) will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition `The lake has fire' which is due to the operation (c). Since the object of the operation (f) is the defect, the probans of (c) will be infected with this defect. Since there is a counter-probans which is pervaded by the absence of fire, the probans of (c) lacks the property asatpratipaksattva (the property of not having a counter-probans which is pervaded by the absence of the probandum). But the probans of the opponent used in (d) is not infected with this defect as it is also pervaded by the absence of fire. It commits the fallacy of svarupāsiddha (unestablished in the locus). Hence the probans of (c) only commits the fallacy of satpratipaksa . But the defect called `satpratipaksa dosa' is not the object of either (c) or (d). If the opponent would have used the operation (f) instead of the operation (d), then (f) would have been a satpratipaksa , the object of (f) would have been the defect, and the probans of (c) would have been infected with this defect. Similarly, the inferential cognition from (c) would be prevented by any other operation, the object of which is a satpratipaksa defect. It may also be noted that whenever there is a fallacy of satpratipksa, there are other fallacies as well. In the example above, (c) commits the fallacy of svarupāsiddha (unestablished in the locus) and bādha (absence of the probandum characterising the locus). If a person does not know that the locus is characterised by the absence of the probans and also does not know that the locus is characterised by the absence of the probandum, then also his inferential cognition can be prevented by a true operation the object of which is a defect of satpratipaksa . The fallacy of satpratipaksa is a logical one. Since it does not depend upon the epistemic attitude of the agent, the Nyāya calls it a `permanent defect' (`nitya dosa'). (5) bādha (absence of the probandum characterising the locus): The fallacy of bādha occurs when a probans is used to establish a probandum in a locus which is characterised by the absence of the probandum. For example, Fire is cold, because of substancehood, as in water.

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In the case of a bādha fallacy the inferential cognition is directly prevented by the cognition of the absence of the probandum in the locus. In the above example, the operation is the cognition expressed by the sentence `Fire has substancehood which is pervaded by coldness'. This operation will yield the cognition `Fire is cold'. But the cognition `Fire has absence of coldness' will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition. Since the preventer cognition is true, its object is the defect (dosa). Hence the cognition of bādha fallacy is directly opposed to the inferential cognition. In the example above, the preventer cognition may be due to direct perception of fire through our sense organs. Since the Nyāya accepts four sources of valid cognition, a preventer cognition may be derived from perception, comparison, verbal testimony, or some other inference. It may also be noted that whenever there is a bādha fallacy, some other fallacy such as vyabhicāra (deviation) or svarupāsiddha (unestablished probans in the locus) is also involved. But these fallacies are not directly opposed to the inferential cognition. Hence if someone does not have the cognition of other fallacies in connection with this type of inference, then the inferential cognition will be prevented by the cognition of the bādha fallacy i.e. the knowledge that the locus lacks the probandum. Since this type of fallacy does not depend on the epistemic attitude, it is also a permanent defect. It is to be noted that there is a difference between satprtipaksa and bādha fallacy, although both of them are directly opposed to the inferential cognition. This difference may be explained in the following way. Let us consider the following satpratipaksa : The lake has water which is pervaded by the absence of fire. This satpratipksa would prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition the lake has fire, which is derivable from the operation the lake has smoke which is pervaded by fire. Moreover, this operation is directly opposed to the cognition the lake has fire as it yields the cognition the lake has absence of fire. Therefore, it is directly as well as indirectly the preventer of the cognition the lake has fire. But the cognition of the bādha fallacy is directly opposed to the inferential cognition the lake has fire. From the Nyāya discussion of different types of fallacies it follows that the Nyāya philosophers are dealing not only with the falsity of the premise(s) or the conclusion of a fallacious inference but also with the different ways the operation or the inferential cognition of an inference can be prevented. In the case of inference also, the Nyāya philosophers have drawn the distinction between the causal conditions of an inferential cognition (anumiti), the causal conditions of its truth, the causal conditions of its falsehood, and the causal conditions which will justify the truth of an inferential cognition or the ability to discriminate. A cognition of the form ‘a is G’ is treated as inferential if it is derived from the cognition of the form ‘a is F which is pervaded by G’ provided there is pakùatā. But the truth of the inferential cognition does not depend on this causal condition. Hence the truth of the cognition a is G does not depend on the cognition a is F which is pervaded by G. The truth depends on the fact that the locus which is cognised in the operation is characterised by the probandum. Similarly, the falsity of an inferential cognition depends on the fact that the locus cognised in the operation is characterised by the absence of the probandum. It is to be noted that a true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge unless certain other conditions are fulfilled. This is due to the fact that a false operation , such as The mountain has fog which is pervaded by fire, might lead to the true inferential cognition The mountain has fire. Since this operation can be prevented by the true cognition that fog is not pervaded by fire, the inferential cognition which is due to this

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operation can also be prevented. For this reason the Nyāya would claim that the above true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge Since the Nyāya philosophers have emphasised our ability to discriminate in the case of inference as well, the inferential cognition of the following inference lacks the status of knowledge, although both the premises and the conclusion are true.

a) Wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire. b) The mountain has blue smoke. c) Therefore, the mountain has fire.

The inferential cognition that the mountain has fire would assume the status of knowledge if it is derived from the premise Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as it explains, among other things, our ability to discriminate. This is how we can derive The mountain has fire from any smoke, blue or black. In this respect the Nyāya philosophers have gone beyond Western philosophers, such as Goldman, as they have emphasised our ability to discriminate in the case of inferential knowledge as well. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya philosophers have emphasised the relevance condition for any inference, valid or invalid. Hence the inference does not have the form: P. Therefore, Q, where ‘P’ and ‘Q’ range over sentences or cognitions. Hence the following valid inference of Western logic is not treated as an inference in Indian logic: P and not P, Therefore, Q. This is due to the fact that it violates the relevance condition as well as certain epistemic conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. As a result, we cannot derive 2+2=4 from it is raining and not raining, which is valid in classical symbolic logic. Since the Nyāya logic has emphasised the relevance condition, it might throw some light on contemporary discussion on relevant logic. Section Three: Verbal Cognition or Testimony Usually the cognition of words, the memory – cognition of objects, the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, syntactic expectancy between the words (ākāïkùā), semantic compatibility (yogyatā), contiguity of words in space and time (āsatti) and the intention of the speaker (tātparya or tātparyaj¤āna) are considered as causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. As there is a difference of opinion among Indian philosophers with respect to the referent or the meaning of a word, so there is a difference of opinion with respect to the conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. The aim of this section is (i) to explain the Nyāya and the Advaita Vedānta conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, and (ii) to discuss the nature of understanding the meaning of a complex sentence. Both the followers of the Nyāya and the Vedānta have used the expressions `ākānksā’, `yogyatā’, `āsatti’ and `tātparya’, but not in the same sense. The Vedānta philosophers claim that ākānksā, yogyatā, and āsatti are conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, while the Nyāya philosophers claim that their cognitions are necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence. As regards the interpretation of these terms, there is difference of opinion between the followers of the Nyāya and the Vedānta. Moreover, the New Nyāya differs from the Old Nyāya with respect to the interpretation of certain terms. As regards the (primary) meaning or the reference of a word (padārtha) and the meaning – relation

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which relates an expression (or word) to its referent, there is a striking difference between these two systems of philosophy. According to the followers of the Vedānta the meaning of a common noun or a general term such as `cow’ is the related cowness. In other words, the meaning of a term is the universal being related to something else. According to the New Nyāya the meaning of the word `cow’ includes both the particular cows and the universal cowness, although the Old Nyāya has included the configuration of the particular cows as well in the meaning complex. But neither the Old nor the New Nyāya has accepted the related designation (anvitabhidhana) theory of meaning. Similarly, the Vedānta differs from the Nyāya with respect to the relation between an expression and what is referred to by it. According to the Nyāya the meaning – relation which is called `sakti’ in the case of primary meaning is due to the intention of the name – giver. Hence it is a conventional relation and it takes the form `Let such and such expression generate the cognition of such and such object or objects.’ But the followers of the Vedānta consider the meaning – relation (sakti) to be an entity (padārtha). The sakti of an expression has been explained in terms of certain effects. As fire has the capacity to burn something, so a word (pada) has the capacity which is conducive to the generation of understanding the meaning of a sentence. According to our positive thesis a comprehensive discussion of the conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence would include the conditions of both the Nyāya and the Vedānta philosophers. Hence these two systems in this case, far from being incompatible, would complement each other. At the end of this section I shall discuss the atomistic and the holistic nature of understanding the meaning of a complex sentence. Moreover, since Indian philosophers have put forward a theory for understanding the meaning of complex sentences, it might add a new dimension to contemporary Western philosophy. A) As regards the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, both the schools claim that it lies in cognising a relation between the referents of the words which have occurred in a sentence. According to both the schools the same relation may be cognised in other types of cognition such as perceptual or inferential. In other words, the same object may be cognised in perceptual, inferential, or verbal cognition, but not in the same way. The causal conditions of these cognitions would not be the same. The set of causal conditions for each of them would be different. Moreover, the mode under which an object is cognised in a perceptual cognition cannot be the same as the mode under which it is cognised in an inferential or verbal cognition. Let us consider the cognition of a mountain having fire. In a perceptual cognition the sense-organs are related to the mountain, fire and the relation of conjunction. The mountain which is related to our senses is presented under the universal mountainhood, and its particularity (visesatva) is also cognised. Similar is the case with fire or the relation of conjunction. But in an inferential or a verbal cognition the same mountain can be cognised under the mode of the universal mountainhood, but not under the mode of its particularity. Hence its particularity (visesatva) will not be cognised. Similar will be the case with fire and the relation of conjunction. In other words, in a verbal cognition corresponding to the sentence `A mountain has fire,’ we cannot cognise the particularities of the mountain such as its height. Similarly, we cannot cognise the particular properties of the fire or the conjunction relation.

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Now the question is whether the sentence `A mountain has fire’ would generate the cognition of the relation between any mountain and any fire or between a particular mountain and the fire which is present there. Suppose a, b, c are mountains, d is the kitchen, and F, G, H are fires. Further suppose the following sentences are true.

(1) a has F (2) b has absence of fire (3) c has G (4) d has H

Now the question is whether the sentence `A mountain has fire’ would give rise to the cognition of a has G or a has H, in addition to the cognition of a has F or c has G. Since a is not related to G or H, the sentence would not generate the cognition of a has G or a has H. Hence the sentence `A mountain has fire’ would generate the cognition of a has F or c has G only. Now suppose fire is not present in any mountain, but present in the kitchen only. The sentence `A mountain has fire’ would generate an erroneous cognition of a mountain being characterised by the fire which is present in the kitchen only. In other words, the fire which is related to the kitchen by the relation of conjunction is cognised in a mountain. Hence the sentence would generate at least one of the following cognitions:

(i) a being characterised by H (ii) b being characterised by H (iii) c being characterised by H.

This is how different erroneous cognitions can be generated in different hearers by a sentence which is false. As regards the nature of a sentence there is agreement among the followers of both the Nyāya and the Vedānta. A sentence is an ordered n-tuple such that n > 2 morphemes or meaningful expressions. A sequence of morphemes having mutual syntactic expectancy would constitute a sentence. Hence expressions, such as `cooks’, `is cooking’, (`pacati’), `cooks rice’ (`tandulam pacati’), `Rama cooks rice’ (`Ramah tandulam pacati’), would be considered sentences. Let us explain the meaning of a simple sentence such as `John is tall’. The utterance of this sentence would generate a cognition of the relation between the objects referred to by the words `John’ and `tall’. Since each of the terms is meaningful or non-empty, each of them would generate the memory – cognition of its referent if the hearer knows its referent. This is due to the fact that if two entities are related by a relation and if the hearer knows this relation and cognises one of the terms, then the memory-cognition of the other will be generated. Now let us consider the sentence `cooks’ (`pacati’). Since it consists of the words `cook’ (`pac’) and `s’ (`ti’), it is treated as a sentence.

It is to be noted that according to the Nyāya verbal and nominal suffixes are words (padas). In this example the word `cook’ (`pac’) is characterised by the property of being the immediate predecessor of the word `s’ (`ti’) and the latter by the property of being the immediate successor of the word `cook’. When it is said that there is ākānksā between them, what is meant is that the order between them is conducive to understanding the relation between the referents of the words `cook’ (``pac’) and `s’ (`ti’). Since the word `cook’ refers to cooking activity and the suffix `s’ refers to mental effort or mental preparedness (krtitva or kartrtva), the expression `cooks’ would give rise to the cognition of conduciveness (anukulatva) which will relate cooking activity to mental effort. Hence the word `ākānksā’ is defined in terms of the properties of a sequence (an ordered n-tuple, where n > 2) and the ability of this

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sequence to generate the cognition of a relation which will relate the referents of the second term (pratiyogin) to the referent of the first term (anuyogin). The cognition of ākānksā, not simply ākānksā, is considered as a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of the words which have occurred in a sentence such as `cooks’. The cognition of the words and the memory-cognition of their referents or meanings are also causal conditions for understanding the relation between the referents.

According to the New Nyāya the cognition of a word (padajñāna) is a karana (special instrumental cause) and the memory – cognition of the referent of a word is a vyāpāra (operation) of understanding the meaning of a sentence. But according to the Old Nyāya the karana is the cognised word or the word’s cognition (jnayamanapada). There is an important difference between `the cognised word’ (`jnayamanapada’) and `the cognition of a word’ (`padajñāna’). In the former case the word is the qualificand (visesya) and the cognition is its qualifier (visesana). If the word is not present, there cannot be word’s cognition (jnayamanapada). Hence the presence of the word is necessary for its cognition. This theory cannot explain the understanding of the meaning of a sentence which is due to the memory-cognition of the words which have been apprehended in the past. Sometimes memory-cognitions of words are due to inscriptions, or gesture and posture. For this reason the New Nyāya considers the cognition of a word as a karana (special instrumental cause).

From the above discussion it also follows that the memory cognition of the referent of a word depends upon the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, and upon the cognition of the word. Now it may be asked whether the cognition of the word which is a karana presupposes the cognition of the relation between them. In reply, it may be said that usually the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent precedes the cognition of the word which is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. But one may cognise the relation after cognising the word. What is required is the cognition of both the conditions for the memory-cognition of the referent. Hence the order between these two conditions is not necessary. It is to be noted that the sequences which are considered as well-formed in our ordinary language have ākānksā. Since there is no use of sequences such as s + cook, they do not have ākānksā. Hence the concept of ākānksā coincides with the concept of well-formedness. In other words, the sequences which are in accordance with the rules of formation or transformation have ākānksā. Therefore, the ordered n-tuples which are in accordance with the rules of language are considered sentences. According to the Old Nyāya, the cognition of yogyatā is another causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. Let us consider the sentence `a is F’. The word `a’ would generate the memory-cognition of a under a mode (say m) and the word `F’ would generate the memory-cognition of F under a mode (say n). Suppose there are three types of relation, namely, R, S, T, and the relation which relates F to a comes under the type T. If we know that neither R nor S relates F to a, then the sentence `a is F’ would generate the cognition of amTFn . But the sentence would not generate the cognition of the specific relation with its particularity. The relation T which relates F to a will be cognised under a description. Hence it may be expressed by the definite description `The T which relates F to a’. In other words, the T will not be cognised as a mode of presentation (prakāra) of F.

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The Old Nyāya also claims that a doubt-free cognition (niscayātmaka j¤āna) of T or a dubious cognition (samsayātmaka jñāna) of T is a causal condition for cognising the meaning of the sentence `a is F’. If it is a dubious cognition, then it is expressed by the sentence `Is a F or not F’? If it is doubt-free, then it is expressed by `a is F’. Since a verbal cognition is always doubt-free, the yogyatā jnāna which could be dubious cannot be equated with it. Now it may be asked whether the verbal cognition can be identified with the cognition of yogyatā if the latter is non-dubious. On this point the Old Nyāya would claim that the cognition of yogyatā is never cognised as doubt-free even if it is non-dubious. In other words, it is presented under the mode of cognitionhood (jnānatva), not under the mode of certainty (niscayatva). But the verbal cognition is presented under the mode of certainty. Hence the non-dubious cannot be equated with certain cognition. In other words, the limitor of the property of being the cause (karanatavacchedaka) is cognitionhood (jñānatva), but the limitor of the property of being the effect (karyatavacchedaka) is certainty (niscayatva). Hence there is no circularity in accepting the cognition of yogyatā as a causal condition for verbal cognition. Moreover, we can have a true or a false verbal cognition from a non-dubious cognition of yogyatā. Similarly, we can have a true or a false verbal cognition from a dubious cognition of yogyatā. If the verbal cognition is true, then its cause would be the true cognition of yogyatā (relation). The cause of the latter could be a previous true perceptual or inferential cognition of it. If its cause is some previous verbal cognition of yogyatā, then the cause of the latter would be some previous perceptual or inferential cognition. If the verbal cognition corresponding to our sentence `a is F’ is false, then its cause would be the false cognition of yogyatā (relation). The latter could be some previous false perceptual or inferential cognition. If it is also verbal, then its cause would be some other false perceptual or inferential cognition about the same object. Now the question is whether the sentence `He irrigates the field with fire’ would generate any verbal cognition. The followers of the Old Nyāya claim that since there is neither a dubious nor a non-dubious cognition of the relation, this sentence cannot generate a verbal cognition. On this point the followers of the New Nyāya claim that it is due to the fact that there is a preventer cognition. In other words, we have a cognition that fire has the absence of irrigation. That is to say, we know that one cannot irrigate the field with fire. Since the presence of a preventer cognition can explain the non-occurrence of a verbal cognition from this sentence, there is no need to consider the absence of a dubious or a non-dubious cognition of it (He irrigates the field with fire) as a causal condition. Moreover, since the absence of a preventer cognition is a common causal condition for the occurrence of any other type of cognition, the acceptance of it would satisfy the principle of parsimony. Hence the view of the Old Nyāya multiplies the number of conditions. The followers of the New Nyāya interpret yogyatā as the absence of bādha. `Badha’ refers to a preventer cognition. If the cognition is F being related to a by the relation R, then the doubt-free cognition of F not being related to a by the relation R is bādha. In other words, it would be a contrary or a contradictory cognition. The absence of it is yogyatā. Hence according to the New Nyāya, yogyatā, not the cognition of yogyatā, is a causal condition for verbal cognition.

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Furthermore, the followers of the New Nyāya do not rule out the possibility of cognising a new relation in a verbal cognition, which has not been cognised before. In such cases the relation is cognised in its generic feature. If it is a relation of conjunction, then it is cognised under the mode of conjunctionhood, not under the mode of its particularity (visesatva), although it has not been cognised before. According to the New Nyāya, the causal condition for cognising it in a verbal cognition would be the cognition of akanksā (syntactic expectancy between the words). Hence the view of the Old Nyāya may be rejected on the ground of inadequacy and the violation of the principle of simplicity. Now let us discuss whether a contradictory sentence or its denial can generate a cognition in a hearer or a speaker. According to the Nyāya philosophers, both old and new, a contradictory or a contrary sentence does not generate a cognition as it has no yogyatā (semantic compatibility). Since it is considered as a sentence, it has akanksā (syntactic expectancy). Hence it is a well-formed formula. The relation between the cognition generated by p and the cognition generated by not p is called `preventer-prevented’. In other words, the occurrence of the former prevents the occurrence of the latter and vice versa. According to the Nyāya there is no contradiction in reality as well as in thought, although contradictory expressions are sentences. Now it may be asked, why should we consider contradictory or contrary expressions as sentences? The Nyāya might claim that since the denial of a contradiction is an analytic or an identity sentence which is true, a contradiction may be considered as a sentence. Let us consider the following sentences:

(a) This brown table is not brown.

(b) This brown table is brown.

(c) John is not John.

(d) John is John.

According to the Nyāya (a) is a contradiction. Hence it cannot generate a unified cognition. The expression `this brown table’ would generate a cognition and the expression `not brown’ would generate a cognition, but the entire sentence would not generate a cognition. In other words, there is no unified cognition such that this brown table is the qualificand and the absence of brown colour is the qualifier. As regards (b), it is claimed by the followers of the Nyāya that it cannot generate a cognition as the limitor of the property of being the qualifier (visesanatāvacchedaka) is part of the limitor of the property of being the qualificand (visesyatāvaccedaka). According to the Nyāya if the former is not contained in the latter or is not identical with the latter, then a cognition can be generated. Since in (d) they are identical, it cannot also generate a cognition. Since (c) is a contradiction, it cannot generate a cognition. Hence two types of argument may be put forward against the generation of verbal cognition. One type of argument would be applicable to contrary or contradictory sentences. Another type of argument would be applicable to identity sentences.

Against the second type it may be said that the limitor of the qualifier of an identity or analytic sentence is neither identical with the limitor of the qualificand nor is it contained in it. Since the relation of the qualifier to the qualificand is also a limitor of

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the qualifier, the set of the limitors of the qualifier is neither identical with nor contained in the set of the limitors of the qualificand. In reply the Nyāya philosophers would argue that by the word `limitor’ in this context they mean property-limitors only. Even if the objection can be avoided in this way, the fact remains that there are two types of rules for two types of sentences. The type of rule for contradictory sentences can be substantiated in terms of the ontological claim that there is no contradiction in reality. Hence there is no contradiction at the level of thought or in the content of thought. In other words, we cannot think of a contradiction. On the contrary, in favour of identity sentences it may be said that the ontological claim is that everything has its own identity. Hence every sentence of the form `a is a’ is true.

On this point it may be proposed that since a contradiction cannot generate a cognition, its negation which is an analytic sentence also cannot generate a cognition. If we do not accept this, then we have to put some restriction on the use of `not’ and thereby the law of parsimony would be violated. Hence the claim is that both the types of expression are sentences and meaningful, but neither of them would generate any unified cognition. Now it may be asked: If they cannot generate cognitions, then how can we know their truth-values? On this point the followers of the Nyāya have given an ingenious reply. In order to know the truth of an identity sentence such as `John is John’ it is not a requirement that it must generate a cognition. In order to know the truth of `John is John’ what we need to know is the truth of a sentence about John, such as `John is tall’ or `John exists’. Since there is an entailment relation, the latter would establish the former. Hence the truth of ‘John exists’ entails the truth of ‘John is John’. As regards a contradictory sentence such as `John is not John’ we know it to be false when we come to know the truth of the sentence `John is John’.

From the above discussion of yogyatā it follows that there is no one-to-one relation between the members of the sets corresponding to `akanksā’ and `yogyatā’. The set which corresponds to `yogyatā’ is a proper subset of the set which corresponds to `akanksā’. It also follows that the Nyāya has avoided two extreme positions present in contemporary philosophy. According to one of them a contradictory expression is meaningless. Hence it cannot be treated as a sentence or well-formed expression. Therefore, an analytic sentence which is a negation of a contradiction has no meaning. According to the other both the types of expression are meaningful sentences and we can understand their meanings. Since a contradiction is a meaningful sentence, it can be a content of thought. This goes against the standpoint of Aristotelian philosophy, which claims that there is no contradiction at the level of thought or reality. But the Nyāya philosophers have avoided both the views as they lead to undesirable or counter-intuitive consequences.

Now let us discuss the Nyāya concept of āsatti, the cognition of which is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. The word `āsatti’ refers to spatio-temporal contiguity between the words of a sentence. Hence the words `cook’ and `s’ which have occurred in the sentence `cooks’ are contiguous in space and time. Similar is the case with other sentences such as `John is tall’, or `John cooks rice’. Here `contiguity’ means absence of a gap or a long gap between the words of a sentence or in an utterance. The gaps which are not conducive to understanding the meaning of a sentence are not permissible. The cognition of āsatti (contiguity) is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence.

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Now the question is whether there is any need for āsatti in addition to the cognition of ākānksā and yogyatā. In reply, it is said that there are certain examples where āsatti is necessary for removing the ambiguity of understanding the relation, which is the meaning of a sentence. Consider the sentence, `Here comes the son-king’s-man should be removed’ (`ayam eti putro-rajnahpurusah apasaryatam’).

It is said that this sentence would give rise to the cognition of the relation of the king to his son or the cognition of the relation of the king to his officer (man). Hence it means either (a) Here comes the son of the king; the officer (man) should be removed, or (b) Here comes the son; the king’s officer (man) should be removed.

In such contexts the ambiguity has been removed in terms of āsatti. In our above example, since the word `man’ (purusa) is contiguous with the word ` `s ’ (the suffix `ïs’ in Sanskrit), the relation of the king to his officer should be cognised, not the relation of the king to his son as the word `son’ (`putra’) is not contiguous with the suffix ` `s ’ (the suffix ïs in Sanskrit). Therefore, it means (b), not (a). Hence āsatti of the Nyāya philosophers plays the role of scope notations or is a substitute for scope notations. Hence it removes the ambiguities which are due to scope notations. The cognition of āsatti, not simply āsatti, is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence.

Now let us discuss the need for the cognition of the intention of the speaker for understanding the meaning of a sentence. If a word is ambiguous or homonymous, then the sentence in which it is used would give rise to different cognitions even if all other conditions for understanding its meaning are fulfilled. Consider the sentence `saindhavamānaya’ (`Bring saindhava’). Since the word `saindhava’ in Sanskrit means both salt and horse, the sentence would generate the cognition of `Bring salt’ or `Bring a horse’. In order to remove this type of ambiguity the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary. From the context of utterance the intention of the speaker may be cognised. Moreover, there are contexts where the intention of the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence, although the sentence does not contain any homonymous expression. For example, Protect the yoghurt from the crow (kakebhyo dadhi raksatām). Here the speaker intends to use the word `crow’ to refer to any animal or bird which will spoil the yoghurt. Hence the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence which contains a metaphorical or suggestive expression.

B) Now I would like to discuss the Advaita Vedānta theory of understanding the meaning of a sentence. According to Vedānta also the meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of terms lies in cognising a specific relation between the referents of its two terms. The meaning of a general term is a related universal, not a set of particulars. Hence the word `pot’ means related potness. In other words, potness being related to something else is the meaning of the word `pot’. If the sentence `The floor has a pot’ (`ghatavat bhutalam’) is uttered, then the word `floor’ would give rise to the memory-cognition of the related floorness and the word `pot’ would give rise to the memory-cognition of the related potness. Since potness is related to a particular pot by the relation of specific inherence (or identity), floorness is related to a floor by a specific inherence and the pot is related to the floor by the relation of conjunction, the universal potness would be related to floorness by an

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indirect relation. When we understand the meaning of this sentence, we cognise the relation of potness to floorness. As regards the cognition of a particular from the cognition of a related universal which is the meaning of a word, there are at least four views. These views may be formulated in the following ways:

(1) If there is a cognition of a universal, then there is a cognition of its instances which are particulars. This is due to the fact that there cannot be a qualificative cognition of a universal without cognising its instances. Hence the set of causal conditions for the cognition of a universal would also be the causal conditions for the cognition of its instances. Therefore, when we come to know that the word `pot’ has the power to generate the cognition of the related potness, then we cognise both the related potness and the particular pots.

(2) According to another view the word `pot’ has the power (sakti) to generate the cognition of both the related potness and the particular pots. Hence there are two powers in a word. But the cognition of both the powers in a word is not necessary for cognising the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs. What is needed is the cognition that it can generate the cognition of related universal. Hence the cognition that the word `pot’ can generate the cognition of a particular pot is not required for understanding the meaning of a sentence in which the word `pot’ occurs.

(3) According to another alternative the primary meaning of a word is the related universal, but the secondary meaning is a set of particulars which are instances of the universal. Hence the relation between the word `pot’ and the related potness is called `sakti’ (`the primary meaning–relation’), and the relation between the word `pot’ and a particular pot is called `laksana’ (`the secondary meaning-relation’). Therefore, the cognition of the former relation would generate the cognition of the related universal, but the cognition of the latter relation would generate the cognition of a particular.

(4) According to another alternative the meaning of a word is the related universal, but the effect of its power is the cognition of the things limited by this universal. Hence the meaning of the word `pot’ is the related potness, but its power (sakti) will generate the cognition of particulars which are limited by potness. Hence this view draws a distinction between the meaning of a word and its power to generate a cognition of particulars.

As regards causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, the followers of the Advaita Vedānta claim that the sentence, not the cognition of it, is the special instrumental cause (karana) of understanding its meaning. But according to the Nyāya the special instrumental cause (karana) is the cognition of words, not the cognition of sentence in which they have occurred. In this context it is to be noted that according to the Vedānta a sentence is not just a collection of words. It is also an ordered n-tuple, where n > 2 words. Hence the words have mutual syntactic expectancy.

The operation (vyāpāra) of understanding the meaning is the memory-cognition of the entities referred to by the words which have occurred in a sentence. The memory-cognition is due to the cognition of the relation between a word and its meaning,

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primary or secondary. Since the Vedantins are followers of anvitabhidhana (related designation) theory of meaning, the meaning complex of a word includes a relation in general, not any specific relation. If there are two words in a sentence, there would be cognition of two relations in general. For example, the floor has a pot. This sentence would generate the memory-cognition of related floorness and related potness. The cognition of these two relations would eventually yield the cognition of a specific relation which relates potness to floorness. In the technical language of the advaita Vedānta it is called `svasrayasamanadhikaranya’ (`the relation of being the locus and having the same locus’). In other words, we cognise the relation of potness to a pot and the relation of the pot to the floor which has floorness.

Now let us discuss other causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. According to the Vedānta, ākānksā, yogyatā and āsatti, not their cognitions, are considered causal conditions. But with respect to tātparya the cognigion of it is considered a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence.

As regards the definition of `ākānksā’ the Vedānta differs from the Nyāya. According to the Vedānta, ākānksā is a property of the object of a question which is due to the cognition of the meaning of a word. When we hear the expression `bring’, we may ask, what should we bring? If the answer is a chair, then it has the property of being the object of this question (jijnasa-visayatva). Similarly, if we hear words `a chair’, we may ask, what should we do with it? If the answer is bring, then it (bringing activity) has the property of being the object of this question (jijnasa-visyatva). Hence the cognition of one leads to the cognition of the other via a question. Therefore there is expectancy between them. But if we utter the sentence `Bring a chair’ and there is no further question, then also the chair or the bringing activity does not cease to be the object of a question. Each of them has the ability (yogyatva) to have the property of being the object of a question (jijnasa-visayatva). In other words, the chair or the bringing activity could have been the object of a question. Similarly, there would be ākānksā between the contents or meanings (vakyarthas) of two sentences if one of them is the object of a question which is due to the understanding of the meaning of the other.

It is to be noted that the Vedānta use of the word `ākānksā’ is related to a question or the desire of the hearer. Hence it is closer to our ordinary usage. But the Nyāya conception of ākānksā as a sequence of words is present in the Vedānta conception of a sentence which is a causal condition for understanding its meaning.

In Vedānta the term `yogyatā’ is defined in terms of what is intended by the speaker when he/she utters a sentence and the absence of the preventer cognition in the hearer. Suppose the speaker utters the sentence `a has F’ and intends the relation R which relates F to a. If the cognition of R is not prevented by some other cognition, then there is yogyatā for understanding its meaning. Since it refers to the absence of a cognition in the hearer, it becomes a property of the cogniser. In this respect the Vedānta conception of yogyatā is not different from the New Nyāya conception of it.

According to the Vedānta also, the sentence `He/she irrigates the field with fire’ would not generate a cognition in the hearer, if he/she knows that fire is not a cause of irrigation and the speaker intends this causal relation. But if the hearer does not know that the causal relation between fire and irrigation does not hold good, then this sentence would generate a cognition which is erroneous. In this respect also the

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explanation of the Vedānta coincides with that of the New Nyāya. But the difference between the old Nyāya and the Vedānta remains.

Now let us discuss the Vedānta conception of āsatti. It has been defined in terms of the contiguity or proximity (sannidhi) between the cognitions of the meanings of the words which have occurred in a sentence. The cognition of the relation between a word and its meaning (padavrttijñāna) would give rise to the memory-cognition of the meaning. If the memory-cognitions are contiguous, then there is āsatti between them. Hence āsatti becomes a property of the memory-cognitions, not a property of words. But according to the Nyāya it is a property of the words. For this reason the Nyāya claims that the cognition of āsatti is a causal condition, while the Vedānta claims that āsatti itself is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence.

As regards tātparyajñāna, the followers of the Vedānta consider it to be a causal condition for understanding the meaning of any sentence, ambiguous or non-ambiguous. Even in a sentence such as `Bring a pot’, the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary. The fact that the word `pot’ has been used to refer to a pot and has not been used in a metaphorical sense is the intention of the speaker. Hence the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning of any sentence. But according to the Nyāya the cognition of the intention of the speaker is a causal condition only in the case of homonymous words such as `saindhava’ (`salt’, `horse’), or metaphorical (laksanika) uses such as `Protect the yoghurt from the crows’ (`kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam’).

As regards the nature of tātparya, the followers of the Vedānta claim that it is a property of a sentence, not a property of the speaker. A sentence has the ability to generate a cognition, the object (content) of which is its meaning (vakyartha). The word `tātparya’ is used to refer to this ability of a sentence.

It is to be noted that most of the causal conditions mentioned in the Vedānta are present in the Nyāya or would be acceptable to the followers of the Nyāya. Similarly, most of the causal conditions mentioned in the Nyāya are implicitly or explicitly present in the causal conditions of the Vedānta.

C) Now I would like to discuss the nature of understanding the meaning of a complex sentence. In other words, the question is whether understanding the meaning of a molecular sentence is atomistic or holistic. In the case of atomistic understanding, first we understand the meaning of embedded sentences or complex expressions which have occurred in a molecular sentence. Then we understand the meaning of the entire sentence. But in the case of holistic understanding we apprehend simultaneously the meanings of the embedded sentence(s) and the molecular sentence.

Let us consider the nature of the cognition generated by the sentence `The deer has a brown horn’. The question is whether we first apprehend the relation of a particular brown colour to a horn, and then apprehend the relation of a brown horn to the deer. For the sake of simplicity we consider `the deer’ as one term. According to some followers of the Nyāya the cognition of the relation of a brown horn to the deer follows the cognition of the relation of a brown colour to a horn. But according to some other Nyāya philosophers we cognise both the relations simultaneously. The

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followers of the Vedānta would also accept these two types of the nature of understanding.

Now let us explain the nature of understanding corresponding to the sentence `The deer has a brown horn’. In this case the deer is the qualificand, a horn is the qualifier, and a brown colour is the qualifier of a horn. For the sake of simplicity we are not considering the mode of presentation of these objects of cognition. Hence a horn is the qualifier in relation to the deer, and it is also a qualificand in relation to the brown colour. Since the deer is the qualificand in this cognition, it has the relational property of being the qualificand (visesyatā). Similarly, the brown colour has the property of being the qualifier (visesanatā). But the horn which is the object of this cognition has both the property of being the qualificand and the property of being the qualifier. It is to be noted that these relational properties specify the way objects are related to this cognition. Now the question is how these relational properties are related to each other. In this cognition the property of being the qualificand (visesyatā) residing in the deer is determined by (nirupita) the property of being the qualifier residing in the horn and vice versa. Similarly, the property of being the qualificand residing in the horn is determined by (nirupita) the property of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour, and vice versa. Now the question is whether the properties of being the qualificand and the qualifier residing in the horn are related to each other or not. If they are independent properties, then we cannot draw the distinction between

(a) The deer has a brown horn, and

(b) The deer has a horn, and that horn is brown.

In order to draw the distinction between them it is said that in (a) the property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualificand residing in the same horn are related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited (avacchedya-avacchedaka). In other words, the former is the mode of presentation of the latter and the latter is the mode of presentation of the former. But this is not the case in (b). Hence in (b) they are not related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited. In a holistic understanding we cognise the relation of the brown colour to the horn and the relation of the horn which is brown to the deer simultaneously. In an atomic understanding first we cognise the former relation, then we cognise the latter relation.

This technique is used to explain the nature of understanding corresponding to a more complex sentence. Suppose a sentence contains four terms, say a, b, c, and d. As regards the relation between them, c is qualified by d, b by c, and a by b. At the level of understanding, d has only the property of being the qualifier, and a has only the property of being the qualificand. But b and c would have both the properties of being the qualificand and qualifier. The property of being the qualificand residing in c will be determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in d and vice versa. But the property of being the qualifier residing in c will be determined by the prorpery of being the qualificand residing in b and vice versa. Moreover, these two properties residing in c are related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited. In other words, each of them is a mode of presentation of the other. Similarly, the properties of being the qualificand and qualifier residing in b will be related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited. Since the contemporary philosophers have not yet developed a logic for holistic understanding the meaning of a molecular sentence,

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the Nyāya discussion would add a new dimension to Western philosophy. This is how I would like to demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy to Western philosophy.

D) The techniques developed by the Nyāya philosophers and adopted by others has far reaching consequences. This technique may be used to explain the difference in meaning between the following pairs of sentences :

(a) Brutus killed Caesar.

(a’) Caesar was killed by Brutus.

(b) John gave a book to Tom.

(b’) Tom received a book from John.

(c) John sprayed paint on the wall.

(c’) John sprayed the wall with paint.

(d) A pot is on the floor.

(d’) The floor has a pot on it.

(e) We blamed the trouble on John.

(e’) We blamed John for the trouble.

Since the meaning of a sentence lies in the relation along with its direction, the meaning of (a)would not be the same as that of (a’). Similar will be the case with other pairs of sentences. Contemporary philosophers of language such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore and Jackendoff are also concerned with the question whether the above pairs have the same meaning. Since the Nyāya has developed a theory for the explanation of the meaning of a sentence and its understanding, it might throw some light on the contemporary discussion of meaning and transformation.

With respect to verbal cognition also, the Nyāya philosophers have discussed the causal conditions of it, the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify the truth of it.

The chief instrumental cause ( karana) of a verbal cognition is the cognition of words which have occurred in a sentence, and the operation (vyapara) is the memory-cognition of the referents of the words. The meaning of a sentence lies in the direction of the relation between the referents of the words. Hence cognising the meaning of a sentence amounts to cognising this relation and its relata. If a sentence is true, then it would generate a true cognition and the cognizer would apprehend the relation which holds between the referents. If a sentence is false, then it would generate a false cognition, and the cognizer would apprehend a relation which does not hold between the referents, but holds between some other objects. Hence it is a real relation which holds good elsewhere or elsewhen. A true cognition generated by a true sentence will assume the status of knowledge if it is uttered or inscribed by an āpta (trustworthy person). According to the Nyāya, a person is an āpta iff (i) she/he has a true cognition

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of what she/he says, (ii) she/he selects the appropriate words to convey her/his true cognition, (iii) she/he is not lying, and (iv) her/his sense-organs that are used to utter or inscribe the words are not defective. Hence the true cognition generated by the utterance an āpta has justification, and thereby has the status of knowledge.

Section Four: Correlative Pairs

In this section I shall emphasize the ways cognitions are related to the same object. Since the same entity could be the content (object) of perception, inference, and verbal cognition, the question would be whether these cognitions are related to it (object) in the same way(s). The Nyāya philosophers claim that these cognitions are not related to it in the same manner. The distinction between the following pairs is introduced to explain the ways these cognitions are related to the same object.

A) anuyogã – pratiyogã (first term – second term) a is anuyogã (first term) iff b is related to a by the relation R. At the level of cognition the relation R is cognized in a, but not in b. The relation of our cognition to this aspect of a is expressed by the term ‘anuyogitā’ (‘the property of being the first term’). Similarly, b has pratiyogitā. Hence the relation of this cognition to b is pratiyogitā. As regards the relation of a to b, the Nyāya claims that the former is related to the latter by the converse of R, i.e., Ř. The relation of cognition to b is anuyogita (the property of being the first term), and the relation of cognition to a is pratiyogitā (the property of being the second term). This is what happens when two objects are related by the relation of conjunction (or contact) but one is not in another. For example, the contact between the two palms in salutation, or the contact between two animals in a herd. Both the pairs anuyogã and pratiyogã, and anuyogita and pratiyogita are correlatives, but not the objects referred to by anuyogã and pratiyogã. In specifying the direction of a relation the Nyāya philosophers have used the terms anuyogitā and pratiyogitā. Hence it is necessary for the meaning of a sentence as it lies in the relation between the two terms along with its direction.

B) ādhāra – ādheya If an object resides in another object, then the latter is ādhara (substratum) and the former is ādheya (superstratum). For example, a book is on the table. The relational properties ādhāratā and ādheyatā are also correlatives. If b is related to a by an occurrence-exacting relation R, then the cognition of a as adhara would imply the cognition of b in a by the relation R, but the cognition of b would not imply the cognition of a in b by the relation Ř, i.e. the converse of R. When a is cognized as adhara, it is not only cognized as anuyogã and b as pratiyogã, but also as something in which b resides.

C) visesya – visesana

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The visesya – visesana distinction is applicable to every qualificative or relational cognition. A qualificative cognition has the form aRb, where a is the qualificand, b is the qualifier and R is the qualification relation which relates b to a. The qualifier plays the role of a distinguisher. Hence it distinguishes something from other things, or a collection from other collections. That which is distinguished is the qualificand. Compare ‘A fire is on the mountain’ with ‘The mountain has a fire’. Here also ‘visesyatā’ and ‘visesanatā’ are correlative terms. In the case of perception the Nyāya philosophers have used the category of visesya – visesana, not the category of uddesya – vidheya. If the cognition of fire is present prior to the perception and the cognition of mountain is absent, then the sentence ‘The mountain has fire’ will be used to describe this perceptual cognition. Similarly , if the cognition of mountain is present prior to the perception and the cognition of fire is absent, then the sentence ‘A fire is on the mountain’ will be used to describe this perceptual cognition.

D) visesya – prakāra The Nyāya philosophers have claimed that the qualification relation is a mode of presentation of the qualifier, not the qualificand. Hence, in ‘A fire is on the mountain’, the conjunction relation is a mode of presentation of the mountain, but, in ‘The mountain has a fire’, it is a mode of presentation of a fire. The qualifier which is presented under the mode of the qualification relation is called ‘prakāra’. Since every qualifier is not presented under the mode of the qualification relation, there is a need for this category. When one relation is a qualifier of another relation, the former is simply a qualifier or visesana, not a relational qualifier or prakāra. Here also ‘visesyatā’ and ‘prakāratā’ are correlative terms. It is to be noted that a qualificative perceptual cognition involves all the four pairs discussed above if the relation is occurrence-exacting. These terms signify the ways our perceptual cognition is related to the same object. They also give us information about the roles of the objects of perception.

E) uddesya – vidheya This pair is used in the context of some verbal cognition, but in every inference. The subject (uddesya) is that which is already known to us, but the predicate (vidheya) is not already known to us. In the context of verbal cognition a sentence is used to establish the predicate in the subject. Suppose the question is: where is fire? And the answer is: A fire is on the mountain. Here a fire is uddesya and the mountain is vidheya. Here also uddesya and vidheya are correlatives. Similarly, uddesyatā and vidheyatā are correlatives. In the context of verbal cognition the Nyāya uses only three pairs, namely visesya – visesana, visesya – prakāra, and uddesya – vidheya. This is due to the fact that ādheya or pratiyogã takes the role of a distinguisher in a verbal cognition. Hence in understanding the meaning of the sentence ‘A pot is on the floor’ a pot is cognized as the qualificand (visesya) and the property of being the superstratum (ādheyatā) residing in it is cognized as its qualifier. This qualifier is limited by the relation of conjunction but determined by the property of being the substratum residing in the floor. Similarly, pratiyogitā is cognized as a distinguisher.

F) paksa – sādhya

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This pair occurs only in inference. Consider the thesis ‘The mountain has fire’. The locus of inference, or paksa , is the mountain and the probandum, or sādhya, is fire. The old Nyāya defines paksa as something where there is doubt about the presence of the sādhya. The word ‘paksa tā’ refers to this dubious cognition of the presence of the sādhya in the paksa . But the New Nyāya includes the attitude of desire to infer as well in the definition of paksa tā.

G) hetu – sādhya There are both epistemic and ontological relations between hetu and sādhya. At epistemic level hetu is the signifier and sādhya is the significate. Hence they are correlatives. Similarly, hetutā and sādhyatā are correlatives. At ontological level there is pervader – pervaded relation between them. Hence hetu is the vyapya and sādhya is the vyapaka. They are also correlatives. It is to be noted all the seven pairs are necessary for inference. But only three pairs are necessary for verbal cognition and only four pairs for perceptual cognition. This is how the Nyāya would explain the difference between these three types of cognition even if their objects are the same. Thus the Nyāya concepts or techniques can be used

unsolved problems of Western philosophy. to solve some

Philosophy Department Victoria University of Wellington New Zealand

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