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DOI: 10.1177/0038038511406597 2011 45: 634Sociology

Amanda RohloffCivilization

Extending the Concept of Moral Panic: Elias, Climate Change and

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Article

Extending the Concept ofMoral Panic: Elias, ClimateChange and Civilization

Amanda Rohloff Brunel University, UK

AbstractCombining the theories and concepts of Norbert Elias with the empirical example of climate

change, this article aims to extend and develop the concept of moral panic. The focus of the

analysis is on the documentary An Inconvenient Truth – an exemplar of a more general trend in

popular culture regarding the moralization and individual regulation of climate change. In the

final sections of the article, Al Gore’s short-term campaign is related to more long-term social

processes.

KeywordsAl Gore, An Inconvenient Truth, climate change, moral panic, Norbert Elias, risk

Introduction

This article aims to extend and develop the concept of moral panic. Within the moral

panic literature, there has been a great deal of debate over the adequacy of the concept,

and its relevance to contemporary issues. This article aims to address some of these

debates, by examining the moral panic concept in relation to an example that does not perfectly fit with many of the ‘classic’ criteria, as developed by Cohen (2002[1972]),

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994), and others.

Several authors have argued that the concept is imbued with the assumption that

moral panics – particular types of reactions to perceived social problems – are irrational,

inappropriate overreactions (Hier, 2002a; Hunt, 1999; Moore and Valverde, 2000;

Rohloff and Wright, 2010). In one of the early critiques of moral panic, Waddington

argues that ‘to describe an expression of public and official anxiety as a “moral panic”

suggests that the scale of this response is disproportionately greater than the scale of the

Corresponding author:

Amanda Rohloff, Department of Sociology and Communications, School of Social Sciences, Brunel

University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK.

Email: [email protected]

Sociology

45(4) 634–649

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Rohloff 635

problem’ (1986: 246). He further criticizes moral panic researchers for focusing on the

scale of the reaction to the problem, while neglecting the scale of the problem itself,

arguing that:

Without some clear criteria of proportionality, the description of publicly expressed concern,anxiety or alarm as a ‘moral panic’ is not more than a value judgment. It simply says that the

person using the term does not believe that the particular problem is sufficiently serious to

warrant these expressions of concern or actions designed to remedy the problem. (1986: 257)

This issue of proportionality (and the related issue of value judgment) has led some

researchers to come up with alternative ways to conceptualize moral panic. Rather than

assessing proportionality, some authors (such as Hier, 2002a, 2008; Rohloff, 2008, 2011;

see also Rohloff and Wright, 2010) argue that we should instead explore moral panic as a

process of change in the moralizing discourse; a heightened sense of concern and a changein the expression of moralizing discourse at a time of perceived crisis. In addition, rather

than assessing proportionality per se, we could instead assess how effective proposed mea-

sures will be, or have been, in addressing the problem (of course, there may still be some

examples, such as the Satanism Scare, that facilitate assessments of proportionality).

Nevertheless, despite revisions of the concept of moral panic, Waddington’s and oth-

ers’ interpretations of moral panic have led some authors to reject the concept of moral

panic, arguing that it is too tainted with these normative, debunking connotations (as is

evident with the usage of moral panic in popular culture). To move beyond these inher-

ent, normative presuppositions, and extend the concept of moral panic, it is important to

explore empirical cases that do not obviously fit the model of a ‘bad’ ‘irrational’, ‘exag-

gerated and distorted’, ‘panic’. Indeed, Waddington himself perhaps implicitly suggests

this, in the conclusion to his article:

… the validity or otherwise of [Hall et al.’s] wider analysis does not depend upon the view that

‘mugging’ is not serious or does not merit official concern. It is, of course, perfectly possible to

panic about the most genuine problem. People may panic in a fire, but this does not imply that

the building is not burning nor that there is no threat.

However, the way in which the term ‘moral panic’ is used to describe official and media concernabout specific crime problems suggests that it is a polemical rather than an analytical concept.

It seems virtually inconceivable that concern about racial attacks, rape, or police misconduct

would be described as a ‘moral panic’. This is because the term has derogatory connotations: it

implies that official media concern is merely a ‘moral panic’ without substance or justification.

If official reaction to crime and deviance is to be analysed adequately perhaps it is time to

abandon such value-laden terminology. (1986: 258, emphasis in original)

Instead of abandoning the so-called ‘value-laden terminology’ of moral panic, I am

instead attempting to revise the moral panic concept to address these and other critiques,

via novel theoretical and empirical analyses; that is, to develop a more analytical ratherthan polemical conceptualization of moral panic. Therefore, this article looks at the

example of climate change, as it is a contemporary issue (albeit with historical anteced-

ents), and it challenges many of the assumptions and problems with moral panic.

However, while moral panic may be used in popular culture to dismiss reactions to


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636 Sociology 45(4)

climate change as just a moral panic, I do not intend to use moral panic in this dismissive,

debunking way; moral panic needs to be reconceptualized so that it does not imply truth

claims at the outset (Rohloff, 2011; Rohloff and Wright, 2010). Instead, I wish to recon-

ceptualize moral panic as a heightened campaign or sense of concern about a particular

issue (or set of issues), where there is a perceived crisis in the ‘civilizing’ of the self andthe other; where the regulation of one’s own, or another’s, behaviour is seen to be failing

or out of control, or where it is believed that we need a drastic change in the regulation

of the self and/or the other in order to avoid a potential crisis (Rohloff, 2008: 73; see also

Rohloff, 2011; Rohloff and Wright, 2010).

An additional way that this article aims to extend the concept of moral panic is by

exploring how a particular short-term campaign about climate change relates to other

social processes, including long-term changes. Moral panics are, by definition, tempo-

rary events. Consequently, moral panic research has tended to focus on the episode of the

panic, to the relative neglect of other social processes, including more gradual long-term processes, and how they affect and are affected by a moral panic (Rohloff, 2011; Rohloff

and Wright, 2010).

To assist with extending the concept of moral panic, I draw upon the research of

Norbert Elias; in particular, his theory of civilizing (and decivilizing) processes.1 To

empirically test and develop this synthesis of Elias and moral panic, I analyse Al Gore’s

campaign on climate change. As an illustrative example, the documentary presented by

Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth, represents a more general trend in popular culture

regarding the moralization of climate change, and the associated call upon the self to

control and regulate one’s own behaviour in order to manage climate change. The docu-mentary contains common themes that are present in other sources, such as popular books

and guides about climate change, ‘how to live green’ guides, and eco-documentaries and

eco-lifestyle/makeover reality TV shows that individualize and moralize the issue of

climate change.

By Gore’s own account, he has been interested in climate change since the 1960s,

when he was first exposed to the topic by his professor, Roger Revelle (Gore, 2006: 40).

Since then, Gore has been involved in climate change campaigning, both in politics and

in popular culture (with the publication, in 1992, of Earth in the Balance). However, it

was not until 2006, when the award-winning documentary An Inconvenient Truth: AGlobal Warning was released, that Gore established himself as a ‘climate change celeb-

rity’. Presented by Gore, the documentary sought to both educate the public about

anthropogenic climate change and affect changes in behaviour that might potentially

alleviate the problem. Following its release, An Inconvenient Truth was distributed and

shown in schools throughout the UK and the USA (although the viewing of the film in

classrooms was contested by those who disagreed with the film’s messages; McClure

and Stiffler, 2007; Mellor, 2009). A companion website was created (http://www.cli-

matecrisis.net/), which includes links to a downloadable ‘free companion education

guide’, as well as a downloadable teaching curriculum (http://participate.net/aninconve-

nienttruth). Volunteers throughout the United States have since been trained by Gore and

his staff to introduce Gore’s climate change presentation to others and spread his mes-

sage on global warming (Haag, 2007). A companion book (Gore, 2006), and a children’s

version of the book (Gore, 2007), have also since been published.




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Rohloff 637

In the year following the release of An Inconvenient Truth, Gore, along with the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), was jointly awarded the Nobel

Peace Prize ‘for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-

made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to coun-

teract such change’ (Nobel Prize, 2007). Despite the apparent significance of Gore’sglobal warming campaign, there has been little in the way of sociological analysis of it.

Drawing from the concept of moral panic and Norbert Elias’s theory of civilizing (and

decivilizing) processes, this article conceptualizes An Inconvenient Truth as part of a ‘civi-

lizing offensive’ – as part of a wider moral panic that seeks to improve upon the behav-

iours, manners and morals of all of ‘us’ who contribute to the perceived social crisis of

anthropogenic climate change. Carrying out an Eliasian moral panic analysis of the docu-

mentary, the article further develops an Eliasian approach to moral panic (Rohloff, 2008).

Drawing from existing literature on the development of environmentalism and on civiliz-

ing processes, Gore’s short-term campaign is then related to long-term social processes.

Moral Panics and Civilizing Processes

Chas Critcher has argued that, for its continual development, the moral panic concept

needs to be connected to sociological theory (2003, 2008, 2009). Some authors have

already contributed to this development. Sheldon Ungar has examined the relationship

between moral panic and risk in his analysis of the ‘rise and (relative) decline of global

warming as a social problem’ (1992), where he argues that panics may develop following

‘real-world’ events, such as the heat wave of the ‘summer of 1988’. These events are thenused by claims-makers to ‘piggyback’ on; employed as warning signs of what will hap-

pen if something is not done now. Similarly, drawing from the sociologies of risk and

governance, Sean Hier conceptualizes panics as short-term volatile episodes of moral

regulation, where past grievances interplay with perceived future risks to affect the

development of the regulation of the other and of the self (Hier, 2002a, 2002b, 2003,

2008). For Hier, moral panics are volatile moments of moralizing discourse, where regu-

lation comes to be temporarily displaced from the self onto the ‘dangerous’ other. This,

he argues, is in contrast to the more routine, everyday practices of self-regulation via

self-avoidance of risk. In this way, Hier goes some way to theoretically situate moral panic within more long-term projects of moral regulation, within wider social process.

However, this aspect of his research has been empirically underdeveloped. Accordingly,

this article, informed by the theories of Norbert Elias, aims to contribute to developing a

long-term approach to panic analyses, one which takes greater account of the relation-

ship between short-term campaigns (panics) and long-term social process. I argue that

such an approach can afford greater insight into moral panic research and answer calls

for its theoretical-conceptual development.

In The Civilizing Process (2000[1939]), Elias examined how the historical develop-

ment of manners (in Western Europe) was related to the formation of states, proposing a

long-term developmental theory of how changes at the individual level affect and are

affected by changes at the structural level. This theory of civilizing processes explains an

overall gradual shift from social constraint towards self-constraint (whereby controls

become increasingly internalized in the form of self-regulation), increasing foresight,

and widening circles of mutual identification.




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638 Sociology 45(4)

Elias did note that civilizing processes are not unilinear: ‘several types of change, even

in opposite directions, can be observed simultaneously in the same society’ (2000[1939]:

450). Others have since built on his work by proposing different symptoms (Mennell,

1990) and criteria (Fletcher, 1997) of ‘decivilizing’. While decivilizing symptoms may be

described as the reversal of civilizing symptoms, they may not all occur together in anygiven episode of decivilization (Mennell, 1990: 219). Where there is only a partial, short-

term breakdown (or perceived breakdown) of civilization, moral panics may occur.

During moral panics, a social problem comes to be (re)defined as something that needs

to be dealt with ‘before it is too late’; a perceived crisis. ‘Concern’ about the problem

(Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994: 33) reflects the perception that the state and/or citizens

are weak and failing to adequately regulate the problem. The extent of the problem may

come to be ‘exaggerated and distorted’ (Cohen, 2002[1972]: 19–22) or even invented,

making it appear that danger is increasing (importantly, this criterion of disproportional-

ity is not strictly essential; even the mere increased media attention on a social problemmay contribute to heightened concern, or make it appear that the problem is increasing).

It is here that the civilizing process contributes to the development of moral panics:

increased division of labour and increasing expertization of knowledge lead to increasing

reliance on others for information about the reality of social problems. This potentially

enables (but does not necessitate) the distortion of claims, as non-experts do not always

have the knowledge to assess claims, thereby resulting in danger becoming increasingly

incalculable when the information we receive about social problems may be unreliable

(Rohloff, 2008). This works both ways, where both the presentation of the social problem

and counter-claims trying to dismiss the problem as a ‘non-problem’ may employ tacticsto make their claims seem more believable (for example, with the case of climate change,

the interchange between climate change campaigners and climate change ‘sceptics’). In

this way, civilizing processes can contribute to the development of decivilizing trends.

During a moral panic, the stereotyping of the problem and the search for a scapegoat

can in some cases result in the development of folk devils (the ‘other’), which can lead

to a decrease in mutual identification and an increase in cruelty; where calls for extreme

measures to counter the problem may become justifiable on the grounds that these are

extreme times and that these wrongdoers do not deserve the same rights as the rest of us.

It is during such times that we may witness an increase in involvement and a decrease indetachment, where emotional involvement may become prominent in the rhetoric of

politicians, ‘experts’, and other interested parties, and there may occur an increased sus-

ceptibility to wish fantasies about the means to resolve the problem (Rohloff, 2008).

Mennell and Goudsblom write of decivilizing processes:

During the times of social crisis – military defeats, political revolutions, rampant inflation,

soaring unemployment, separately or, as happened in Germany after the First World War, in

rapid sequence – fears rise because control of social events has declined. Rising fears make it

still more difficult to control events. That renders people still more susceptible to wish fantasies

about means of alleviating the situation. (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998: 21–2)

During panics, the perception that ‘control of social events has declined’, with the rise in

fears that would accompany this perception, allows for the possibility of moral panics to

be conceptualized as (at least partial) decivilizing processes.2




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Rohloff 639

To conceptually locate moral panics as the outcome of deliberate campaigns within

more long-term processes, we can then examine the interplay of the aforementioned

processes (civilizing and decivilizing) with the Eliasian concept of ‘civilizing offensive’.

The latter is defined as ‘deliberate (but not necessarily successful) attempts by people

who considered themselves to be “civilized” to “improve” the manners and morals of people whom they considered to be “less civilized” or “barbaric”’ (Dunning and Sheard,

2005[1979]: 280). Civilizing offensives, while they may be attempts to bring about

increased ‘civilizing’, may contain decivilizing symptoms (e.g. Van Krieken, 1999). And

so it follows that moral panics, even though they can in some instances be comparable

with civilizing offensives, can also contain decivilizing symptoms. Consequently, this

creates space for us to explore the interplay between a possible ‘ecological civilizing

process’ (Quilley, 2004, 2009; Schmidt, 1993; see also Aarts et al., 1995) and short-term

moral panics, as represented in An Inconvenient Truth. I begin the analysis by first exam-

ining the moral content of the documentary.

The Moralization of Risk

While risk talk and risk analysis have ‘influenced the domain of deviance, crime and

social control’ (Cohen, 2002[1979]: xxv), some moral panic theorists have contended

that, while risk discourse may be invoked during panics, risk society anxieties and those

anxieties that give rise to moral panics are fundamentally different:

Moral panics are short-lived campaigns about public issues requiring management byauthorities. Risk anxiety is constant, private and has to be managed by individuals. The case for

seeing moral panics as particular forms and expressions of risk consciousness has yet to be

made. (Critcher, 2003: 167; see also Critcher, 2009)

However, this dichotomous separation between risk and moral – between individual

management and management by authorities – is an artificial separation, and ignores the

continuum through which social- and self-control operate together. An Inconvenient

Truth is an illustrative example of this, since the documentary is representative of general

trends whereby a risk (climate change) has become increasingly moralized in the form of

a moral panic. Indeed, as is suggested later when examining Gore’s proposed solutionsto the problem of global warming, this divide between moral panic and risk anxiety is not

always so clear-cut. For, when moral panics emerge over risk society anxieties, we may

witness ‘short-lived campaigns’ where there is a call for both ‘management by authori-

ties’ and risk management by individuals. For example, with the ozone hole, manage-

ment by individuals occurred, and still occurs, through protecting oneself and ones’

children from the sun; and management by authorities occurred through the phasing out

of CFC products (Ungar, 1998, 2000).

While Ungar (2001) argues that a shift is occurring from those anxieties associated

with moral panics towards those associated with the risk society, and, therefore, onewould likely witness a decrease in moral panics, Hier (2003) argues that it is precisely

this growth in uncertainty, associated with uncertain future risk, that will contribute to an

increase in moral panics. We can see how the example of Gore’s global warming cam-

paign supports Hier’s argument about the moralization of risk. In contrast with risk




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640 Sociology 45(4)

enabling increased calculability of danger, the example of global warming entails the

possibility of inherent uncertainty (at least in popular media) – incalculability of danger.

In the documentary, global warming has gone through a process of moralization perhaps

in an attempt to overcome this uncertainty. While notions of risk are still present in the

documentary, these risks have been reframed as moral certainties: ‘Politicians hold thisat arms length; because if they acknowledge and recognize it, the moral imperative to

make big changes is inescapable’ (Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006). Such a reframing of

global warming may assist in overcoming public uncertainty about the danger posed by

global warming, by asserting that it is a certain moral issue, thus providing an absolute

yes answer to questions of the (moral) danger of this problem. As Hunt argues: ‘The

particular significance of posing risks as “moral questions” is that it acts as a mechanism

of closure … The assertion that the issue is a “moral question” excludes considerations

other than moral judgments’ (2003: 181–2). And so global warming becomes not an

uncertain risk, but a moral certainty. This is also reflected in the word ‘truth’ in the titleof the documentary.

Cohen argues that panics over risks only become moral panics if ‘risk analysis

becomes perceived as primarily moral rather than technical (the moral irresponsibility

for taking this risk)’ (2002[1972]: xxvi, emphasis in original). The ‘moralization of risk’

theme reported here points towards at least a partial convergence of risk and moral:

‘Ultimately, this is really not a political issue so much as a moral issue. If we allow [the

projected CO2 concentration after 50 more years of unrestricted fossil fuel burning] to

happen, it is deeply unethical’ (Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006).

The ‘moral irresponsibility of taking this risk’ becomes more apparent when Gorecompares the development of the science of global warming and the lack of action with

initial responses to the scientific literature linking tobacco with lung cancer – in the case

of tobacco, Gore argues that the slow response resulted in the deaths of many, implying

that a slow or inadequate response to climate change could have devastating conse-

quences. The comparison between climate change and tobacco also reflects a sense of

urgency; that something must be done before it is too late – we cannot afford to wait and

see. This urgency is also evident when Gore implies that, if Greenland were to melt, a

‘sudden jump’ to an ice age could occur, as it occurred in the past when Europe ‘sud-

denly’ went into an ice age for 900 to 1000 years. Thus, it is inferred that we could sufferfrom a similar ‘sudden jump’ to a new ice age; that is, the gradual future-orientation of

the problem of global warming is, instead, suggested as being sudden and soon.

Past and Future Events

As suggested above, the future-oriented problem of global warming is related to the

‘here and now’ by framing it as a highly topical moral issue. This is also addressed by

relating the problem to recent events (catastrophes):

We have already seen some of the heat waves that are similar to what scientists are saying are

going to be a lot more common. A couple of years ago [2003] in Europe they had that massive

heat wave that killed 35,000 people. India didn’t get as much attention but the same year the

temperature there went to 122 degrees Fahrenheit … (Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006)




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Rohloff 641

Although Ungar argues that, ‘since computer models only predict tendencies, particu-

lar extreme events cannot be directly attributed to climate change’ (2001: 286–7) and,

when they are, those claims are often discounted (by the media, at least), it would seem

that in times of crises this scepticism may be overridden. Ungar also allows for the pos-

sibility of claims being accelerated when ‘they piggyback on dramatic real-world events’(1992: 483). So, just as during times of social crisis, where ‘fears rise because control of

social events has declined … [rendering] people still more susceptible to wish fantasies

about means of alleviating the situation’ (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998: 21–2), during

times of ‘natural’ crises (disasters), which may then lead to social crises, rising fears

about the apparent limitations to control ‘natural’ events may be conducive for more

involved and less detached thinking, which may then assist in increased receptivity

towards ‘piggybacking’ on extreme weather events.

Hurricane Katrina plays a prominent role as the central ‘event’ with which global

warming is connected. Throughout the documentary there are references to Katrina,including satellite images of the hurricane and images of the survivors and the dead, both

during and in the aftermath of the hurricane. Indeed, the image for the DVD cover, adver-

tising posters, and website (http://www.climatecrisis.net/) of the documentary is that of

an industrial building or factory emitting smoke that then morphs into a hurricane – the

implication being that carbon emissions lead directly to global warming, which then

leads directly to hurricanes like Katrina, implying that Katrina is a direct result of global

warming. Katrina, along with other recent disasters, is used as a warning of what will

happen. Here we see an element of prediction (Cohen, 2002[1979]: 26–7) – where what

has happened (Katrina and other disasters) is certain to happen again. There is also the prophecy of doom (2002[1979]: 38) – that these events are not normal and, not only will

they reoccur, they will also get worse. For example, Gore draws parallels with the rise of

Nazi Germany (a storm brewing in the 1930s) and climate change (the storm of Hurricane

Katrina), arguing that in both cases there were warning signs, but in the latter they were

ignored, thereby highlighting the dangers of the ‘wait and see’ approach and of not heed-

ing warnings – an argument to adopt a precautionary principle.

Throughout the documentary, there exists the implication that current events – droughts,

heat waves, and hurricanes – are fundamentally different to events of the past; they are not

normal, they are a warning sign of things to come. It is here we also see an element ofsymbolization (Cohen, 2002[1979]: 27), where the words and the associated images of

Katrina come to be associated with the dangers of global warming. And so, grievances

over past events come to be associated with potential future risks (Hier, 2002a, 2008).

This is not to say that these predictions may not be accurate, nor does it mean that this

emotional involvement is somehow wrong or inappropriate. Indeed, such emotional

engagement with the audience may be necessary to accelerate the development of social

problems. Emotional involvement does not necessarily imply irrational emotions; one

could argue that it is indeed quite rational to use examples, such as Katrina, as warnings

of what could happen, if we are not to act soon. Through highlighting these ‘tools’ that

Gore employs, I am trying to understand how his actions relate to other processes, includ-

ing potential obstacles to the development of climate change as a perceived social prob-

lem. However, with some examples of moral panic it may indeed be the case that reactions

are not as appropriate as they could be (which, in some instances, may further contribute




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642 Sociology 45(4)

to the problem). It is unclear, at this stage, how ‘appropriate’ current reactions to climate

change are; there is not space within this article to explore this issue of adequacy.

A Threat to Children and ‘Civilization’Moral panics characteristically are presented as a threat, where: ‘A condition, episode,

person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and

interests …’ (Cohen, 2002[1979]: 1). Critcher notes that some of the dominant discourses

in moral panics are about dangers to children and childhood (2003: 155). The threat to

children is also a prevalent theme in An Inconvenient Truth; for example, when Gore

talks about when his son nearly died and relating this to global warming. This event –

nearly losing his son – changed everything for him, leading him towards his mission to

find out more about global warming. He then goes on to relate the prospect of losing

one’s son to the possibility of losing the earth. Thus, global warming comes to be framedas a threat to children, the earth and, by extension, ‘civilization’:

… and that is what is at stake, our ability to live on planet earth, to have a future as a civilization.

I believe this is a moral issue. It is your time to seize this issue. It is our time to rise again to

secure our future. (Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006)

Causation and Blame: Searching for a ‘Folk Devil’

Just as ‘civilization’ is seen as being threatened, it is also seen as a threat:

Over the years I’ve come to think of the climate crisis … as really a symptom of an underlying,

deeper crisis that has to do with the relationship between us and planet earth. And that relationship

has changed. And in the context of human history, the change has come pretty recently and fairly

suddenly. The relationship between our civilization and the ecological system of the planet has

been disrupted by a combination of factors … the technology and science revolution … our way

of thinking … the population explosion. (Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006)

Thus, climate change and the associated disasters (Cohen, 2002[1979]: 39) that have

been linked in the documentary are seen as merely a ‘ sign of the times’, where ‘the behaviour [or the phenomenon] was seen not as the sickness itself but as a symptom of

something much deeper’ (2002[1979]: 46, emphasis in original).

Who or what is to blame? ‘Civilization’ as a problem is a theme throughout the docu-

mentary, but how does one direct social control against ‘civilization’? Ungar argues

that, with potential risk society ‘accidents’ (such as global warming), folk devils are

often not easily identifiable: ‘… the violators are more institutionally-based and some-

what invisible. It is often their routine rather than deviant actions that underlie the

problem …’ (2001: 284). Here we witness a departure from ‘classic’ moral panics,

where anxieties and fears were (often) directed at a deviant folk devil. In contrast withmoral panics enabling the materialization of grievance in an identifiable ‘other’ (Hier,

2008), with the example of global warming blame is directed at everyone: ‘Each one of

us is a cause of global warming, but each one of us can make choices to change that’

(Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006).




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At the same time, we can witness more general trends towards the emergence of eco-

friendly and non-eco-friendly standards of behaviour (as exemplified in guides on ‘how to

live green’). The morality and condemnation associated with these changes in standards

of behaviour may eventually contribute towards the establishment of ‘eco-deviance’ and

‘eco-deviants’, and the growing field of ‘environmental crime’.

‘Something Must Be Done’

One prominent theme throughout the documentary is that something is terribly wrong and

‘the state’ is not doing enough about the problem; Gore draws attention to the USA and

Australia, ‘…the only 2 advanced nations in the world that have not ratified Kyoto …’

(Guggenheim, 2006). The ‘failure of the state’ is reflected in Gore’s descriptions of his

(failed) attempts to get the United States government to make changes.

As the state is not acting, throughout the documentary the emphasis is, instead, onwhat ‘we’, ‘you’, ‘us’ can do to change: ‘We can make changes to bring our individual

carbon emissions to zero’; ‘It is your time to seize this issue. It is our time to rise again

to secure our future’ (Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006, emphasis added). The state is not act-

ing, so there is a call for grassroots level action, led by the ‘moral crusader’ Al Gore.

A change is required, but this change does not appear to be occurring yet: ‘I look

around for meaningful signs that we’re about to change. I don’t see it right now’ (Gore,

in Guggenheim, 2006). And so one of the reasons Gore is carrying out his campaign is to

try and bring about this change, something which he believes he has failed at so far.

Thus, Gore’s campaign is an attempt to try to bring about behavioural changes at theindividual level, while still calling for changes at the level of the state.

As there is no obvious folk devil and it is believed that the state is not doing enough

about the problem, Gore calls for an increase in self-restraint with regard to behaviour

that is believed to contribute to the problem. It is not that there is an identified group that

we need protecting from – it is about everyone’s behaviour – so control is directed towards

the self instead (although Gore still calls for more state-imposed constraint as well).

This call for changes in behaviour towards increased self-restraint, however, is depen-

dent on a degree of foresight: ‘… the forms of behaviour we call rationality are produced

within a social figuration in which short-term impulses are subordinated to longer-term projects …’ (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998: 19). For global warming to be acknowl-

edged, and behaviour to be changed accordingly, short-term impulses (for example, the

increased consumption of fuels that emit carbon emissions) must be subordinated to

longer-term projects of decreasing carbon emissions (where the results of such long-term

projects may be gradual, not immediate). However, with global warming the long-term

observable reality may not be readily observable – it is very long-term.

Throughout the documentary, then, Gore calls for increased foresight, often relating

global warming as a threat to children: ‘Future generations may well have occasion to

ask themselves “what were our parents thinking, why didn’t they wake up when they had

the chance?” We have to hear that question from them now’ (Guggenheim, 2006). An

additional tool Gore employs to address this barrier – that global warming is a gradual

future-oriented problem – is of visually illustrating the predicted sea level rise if

Greenland or west Antarctica were to melt. While the immediate effects may not be




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644 Sociology 45(4)

readily observable, such a dramatic visual display of what might happen in the future

may be an attempt to address this barrier by increasing awareness of the potential conse-

quences of global warming – the idea that this is what might happen if we don’t act now.

A related theme to foresight is the interdependencies between humans, technology and

‘nature’:

Making mistakes in generations and centuries past would have consequences that we could

overcome. We don’t have that luxury any more. … Making mistakes in our dealings with nature

can have bigger consequences now because our technologies are even bigger than the human

scale. (Gore, in Guggenheim, 2006)

Here, technology is seen as having a (potentially) greater impact, requiring increased

foresight to think about those potential consequences. This points towards the realization

that technization requires increased control (Elias, 1995), where changes at the level ofthe individual, as well as structural (social) changes, are deemed necessary in order to

ensure the continuance of civilization. And so, control over ‘natural’ forces (the climate)

requires the control of social forces and the control of the self as well – they are all inter-

connected (e.g. Elias, 1978: 156–7; Sutton, 2004: 176–82, on the ‘triad of basic con-

trols’; also De Vries and Goudsblom, 2002).

Unintended Outcomes

The aforementioned calls for changes in behaviour – increased self-restraint, increased

foresight, and increased recognition of interdependencies – appear to be intentional calls

for change. However, there might also be the potential for unintended consequences of

climate change campaigns. One possible unintended outcome of this civilizing offensive

could be decivilizing in its consequences. Potentially, wider campaigns surrounding cli-

mate change could contribute to a decrease in mutual identification if not all the popula-

tion comes to believe global warming to be a certain problem that needs to be dealt with

now; if standards of behaviour changed to such a degree, but not everyone changed their

behaviour in accordance with the problem and proposed solutions. And so, those who still

‘deviate’ may come to be regarded as different in kind from the rest of us, where ‘behav-

iour that fails to incorporate risk-avoidance comes to be viewed as irresponsible; not onlyis such conduct unwise, it is increasingly viewed as “wrong”’ (Hunt, 2003: 181). Indeed,

if changes in standards of behaviour are continually occurring, it would follow that not all

people would necessarily change at the same rate and, therefore, there may continually

occur the potential for the creation of deviant behaviour, deviant persons, and, conse-

quently, the emergence of moral panics as a reaction to the newly created deviance.

The Interplay of Civilizing Offensives and Long-term

Ecological-sociological-psychological ProcessesThe question remains to what extent Gore’s campaign – a civilizing offensive interven-

tion to bring about changes in behaviour – is merely reflective of long-term unplanned

processes. How do these calls for changes in behaviour compare with processes which

already seem to be developing?




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How does the call for increased self-restraint with regard to consumption of goods that

are believed to contribute to the problem (for example, by contributing to carbon emis-

sions) fit in with long-term trends towards increased self-restraint with regard to consump-

tion in general? For example, Schmidt argues that, with eating, smoking and drinking, ‘a

growing number of consumers show more self-control, either in consuming less (or evennothing at all) or in consuming in a more sensible or considered way’ (1993: 40). Gore’s

campaign is indicative of a perception that this gradual shift in self-constraint re consump-

tion is not occurring at a fast enough rate, is not widespread enough, or has gone into

reverse with increasing over consumption, hence the call for increasing vigilance.

The attempt to create concern about how the actions of people today might affect the

environment for generations to come reflects the already long-term trends of increasing

foresight and increasing recognition of the interdependencies between humans and the

environment, as reflected in an already growing concern over the consequences of human

actions on the environment, in the long-term development of environmentalism.Goudsblom and De Vries suggest that the industrial regime (what they term the ‘third

ecological regime’) has contributed to a greater reliance on fossil fuel, thereby contribut-

ing to global warming and other environmental issues (what one might regard as unin-

tended outcomes of the processes of technization and civilization), but it has also brought

about what they propose as a fourth ecological regime, which includes ‘the continuous

monitoring of its own impacts’ (2002: 413). This fourth ecological regime is expressed in

the growth of self-reflexive documents (what Goudsblom and De Vries term ‘moral-

ecological discourse’) such as the discourse found in Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring ,

through to the recent proliferation of books on climate change and other environmentalissues, ‘eco-documentaries’ such as An Inconvenient Truth, ‘eco-makeover’ lifestyle real-

ity TV shows, guides on how to ‘live green’, ‘save the planet’ and ‘stop global warming’,

and manners podcasts dedicated to ‘green living’ (for example, ‘Make it green girl: Quick

and dirty tips for an earth friendly life’). As Goudsblom and De Vries describe them:

The message in this genre is an appeal to people’s responsibility as citizens of the earth. They

should be aware of ecological chains and cycles and think of the long-term effects of present

actions. Both personal behaviour and political decision-making must be guided by foresight. The

best strategies on both levels are ‘no regret strategies’, inspired even in the context of uncertainty

by a willingness to subordinate short-term gains to longer term interests. (2002: 413)

In this way, An Inconvenient Truth and other examples of ‘moral-ecological discourse’

represent heightened attempts to accelerate the development of ‘ecological civilizing pro-

cesses’ in the face of the eco-socio-psychological crisis of anthropogenic climate change.

Environmentalism, and Gore’s campaign about climate change, may reflect long-term

processes of increasing mutual identification. Initially, this may have been primarily at

the level of small in-groups (kin, tribes) extending outwards, as chains of interdepen-

dency lengthened, towards increasing mutual identification with other humans, then with

other animals, and now possibly with the environment in general. For example, thedevelopment of considerations about not being ‘cruel’ to, and of not harming, ‘nature’;

of ‘protecting’ and ‘saving’ the environment (see Sutton, 2007: 44–6, on ecological iden-

tification). In this way, An Inconvenient Truth may be representative of a wider ‘ecologi-

cal civilizing process’ (Quilley, 2004, 2009; Schmidt, 1993).




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646 Sociology 45(4)

In contrast with the above, Gore’s civilizing offensive may also be an attempt to counter

different processes. The long-term process of the monopolization of knowledge within sci-

entific establishments – the expertization of knowledge – has resulted in a relative ‘knowl-

edge-ignorance paradox’ (Ungar, 2000). While we may live in what some call a ‘knowledge

society’, where expert knowledge may potentially be available to everyone (thus notmonopolized), the specialization of knowledge has meant that one has to learn the knowl-

edge and the language of the specialty in order to have full access to it. And so this creates a

relative illiteracy, making it difficult to communicate expert knowledge to non-experts.

Therefore, non-experts may turn to popular, simplified, mediated versions of this knowl-

edge, where those social controls that might exist within scientific establishments are absent,

and where this mediated knowledge might not be an accurate translation of the specialized

expert knowledge. This monopolization of knowledge may then coincide with a demonopo-

lization of knowledge, where scientific establishments do not have monopolization over the

knowledge that non-experts have access to, including how their knowledge is mediated.In addition, increases in technology – the advent of ‘multi-mediated social worlds’

(McRobbie and Thornton, 1995) – have enabled counter-claims to be voiced and heard;

a plurality of claims to knowledge in a variety of mediums. Thus, technization has con-

tributed to a democratization of knowledge, where a person’s or a group’s ability to

monopolize knowledge has decreased and, therefore, power ratios have become more

even. With the example of global warming, this contributes to uncertainty over the ‘reality’

of the problem and, thereby, the incalculability of danger.

These processes (democratization of knowledge; expertization; technization) all con-

tribute to make danger increasingly incalculable. To counter these processes and to addressrival claims-making, Gore calls upon increased trust in scientists. Throughout the docu-

mentary Gore also refers to ‘the scientists’ to add legitimacy to his claims. He confronts

the ‘balancing’ of claims by addressing (what some claim to be) the lack of scientific con-

sensus over the ‘reality’ of global warming: ‘The misconception that there’s disagreement

about the science [of global warming] has been deliberately created by a relatively small

number of people’ (Guggenheim, 2006). This statement implies that there is a consensus

about global warming. Gore then goes on to quote Oreskes’s (2004) study, which analysed

peer-reviewed journal articles on ‘global climate change’, finding no study which dis-

agreed with the apparent scientific consensus. Gore’s statement also suggests that globalwarming ‘skeptics’ are an evil, conspiratorial, elite group that has manufactured these

counter-claims. Thus, Gore is seeking to discredit counter claims-makers by implying that

their claims are invented and that those who disagree are lying (or have been fooled by

lies), therefore we should discount what they are saying. In so doing, Gore may be attempt-

ing to establish a re-monopolization over claims to knowledge about global warming.

Conclusion

This article began with the aim of extending the concept of moral panic. Through com-

bining the empirical example of climate change campaigns (specifically, Al Gore’s cam-

paign, as exemplified in An Inconvenient Truth), with some of Norbert Elias’s theories

and concepts, I have begun to address several limitations with the moral panic concept

and moral panic research (for further discussions of this, see Rohloff, 2008, 2011; Rohloff

and Wright, 2010).




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Rohloff 647

While the original examples explored from the ‘classic’ moral panic framework, as

developed by Stan Cohen, Jock Young, and others, tended to emphasize the innately

misguided nature of the reaction to these perceived social problems, recent research has

aimed to move beyond this inherent normative presupposition. By extending the concept

of moral panics to examples, such as climate change, that do not neatly fit with the origi-nal, ‘classic’ model, we are rigorously testing the concept and continuing its develop-

ment. In shifting the focus of moral panic research to such examples that are not

necessarily indicative of ‘inappropriate’ reactions, and do not necessarily have all the

‘indicators’ of ‘classic’ moral panic models, we are further contributing to an analysis of

the concept of moral panic, thereby developing a programme for research that takes

account of the variant ‘types’ of moral panics and the complex processes that occur

before, during and after different panics. This shift in focus, coupled with the insertion of

developments in social theory, can then potentially attend to the many debates and con-

troversies that are ever present in the moral panic literature.This call for a shift in focus, for extending the concept of moral panic, will no doubt

provoke responses to limit the focus. As was evident in two recent publications that dis-

cussed ‘thinking beyond moral panic’ (Hier, 2008) and ‘widening the focus’ of moral

panic (Critcher, 2009), there is a tension between extending the concept for its develop-

ment on the one hand, and limiting its applicability in order to retain its ‘political project’

on the other. There exists a concern that, if we apply moral panic to examples like climate

change, we will lose the concept’s ability to prove that a reaction was inappropriate and

thus ‘liberate’ the ‘folk devils’. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Rohloff and

Wright, 2010), there is no reason why moral panic research cannot still have this as anaim, provided that, following the research, it is found that the reaction was inappropriate.

The difference here is that such a judgment about the adequacy of the reaction should

come after the research, rather than be essentially imbued into the moral panic concept

as a presupposition.

Funding

I acknowledge the support of a Peter Caws Studentship, an ORSAS Award and an LB Wood

Travelling Scholarship.

Acknowledgements

As well as the reviewers and editors, I would also like to thank David Pearson and Chris Rojek for

their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to Jason Hughes for his helpful

suggestions.

Notes

1 See Rohloff, 2008, 2011, and Rohloff and Wright, 2010, for more in-depth discussions of how

to undertake a figurational approach to moral panic research; see also Rohloff, 2011, for a

more critical comparison of figurational research and moral panic research.2 See Rohloff, 2011, for a more critical, in depth discussion of Elias, moral panic, decivilizing

processes, and civilizing offensives.




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648 Sociology 45(4)

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Amanda Rohloff is a PhD candidate at the Department of Sociology and Communications,

Brunel University, and holds a BA (Hons) in sociology from Victoria University of

Wellington. Her PhD research is exploring the long-term development of climate change

as a perceived social problem, drawing primarily from moral panic and Norbert Elias’s

theory of civilizing processes. She has two related articles, on moral panic and Elias, pub-

lished in Current Sociology and New Zealand Sociology, as well as a forthcoming chapter

in the edited book Moral Panic Studies: Problems, Politics and Possibilities. Amanda is

currently working on several additional publications, and is also co-editing a moral panics

special issue of Crime, Media, Culture, as well as an edited book on moral panics.

Date submitted March 2010

Date accepted December 2010

Sociology 2011 Rohloff 634 49

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