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The Dialectical Commons of Western Civilization and Global/World HistoryAuthor(s): Nathan DouthitSource: The History Teacher, Vol. 24, No. 3 (May, 1991), pp. 293-305Published by: Society for History EducationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/494618Accessed: 28/10/2009 16:35

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The Dialectical Commons of Wester Civilization andGlobal/World History

Nathan Douthit

"All alchemistic talk - the chthonic descent of the Black Work, the electriccharge of the White - is only a metaphor, a metaphor clear to the initiatedfor this age-old auscultation whose final result will be the Red; globalknowledge, brilliant dominion over the planetary system of currents."Umberto Eco, Foucault's Pendulum (1988), p. 451.

GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS HAS BECOME ALL PERVASIVE inthe last quarter of the 20th century. Umberto Eco's recent novel with itsironically humorous reatment of the pursuit of occult global knowledgeis only one among many documentary examples.1 Although the debatebetween proponents of western civilization or global/world history seemsstalemated,2 he trend oward a more global perspective n the history cur-riculum of schools and colleges seems irreversible.

I teach an introductory history of western civilization course in acommunity college, but over the last year I have become increasinglyinterested n exploring the disputed ground between western civilizationand global/world history. What at times seems to be a no-man's-landbetween the two histories, its arbitrary boundaries established by text-

books and tradition, can also be seen as a dialectical commons ofquestions, conflicting interpretations, nd alternative heories which canbenefit historians on either side of the two histories debate. In this paperThe History Teacher Volume 24 Number 3 May 1991


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I will examine three questions which represent or me a start n using the

disputedtheoretical

groundbetween the two histories as a common

resource. First: What are the origins of global consciousness in westerncivilization and what is global/world history? Second: Is global/worldhistory uniquely western or do other civilizations deserve credit for itsdevelopment? Third: Do current heories of global processes adequatelytake into consideration ocal/national processes of historical change?

Origins of Global Consciousness and Global/World HistoryGlobal consciousness, strictly speaking, should begin with the globe,

what Umberto Eco's character Casaubon, who together with his occultobsessed friends pursued he secret of the Templars across the centuries,refers to as "the one true Stone that fell in exile from heaven, the GreatMother Earth."3 Although the Babylonians first thought of the earth as asphere and the Greek philosopher Ptolemy in the second century A.D.produced the first world map, it was Martin Behaim, a Nuremberggeographer, who in 1492 constructed he first globe displaying existingknowledge of the planet earth's geography on the eve of Columbus'sdiscoveries.4 European explorations of the 16th century ed to an explo-sion of globe and world map-making, the maps and globes of Gerard

Mercator being the best known.5 The words "globe" and "global" enteredthe English language.

"Global" history and consciousness, however, can be traced back to thefirst expressions of universal or world history. Herodotus's history of theconflict between the Greek city states and the Persian Empire, written nthe fifth century B.C., included nformation bout Egypt and other peoplesof Asia Minor. It might be considered the first "global" history that weknow about. But the second century B.C. Greek historian Polybius, whowrote about the rise of Rome to power in the period 264-146 B.C., came

closer to our meaning of global history n his statement of intent: "Now upto this time the world's history had been, so to speak, a series ofdisconnected transactions, as widely separated n their origin and resultsas in their ocalities. But from this time forth History becomes a connectedwhole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia andGreece, and the tendency of all is to unity."6 Later Roman historians alsowrote in the tradition of universal history,7 but after Tacitus the vision ofuniversal humanity died out in secular historical writing, as in politicallife.8 A sense of universal vision survived, but in philosophy and the new

religion of Christianity. Augustine's City of God, a theological interpre-tation of history, became the new model of universal history for the nextthousand years.

What has been referred o as "the iberation of history from theology"

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The Dialectical Commons of Western Civilization and Global/World History

began in 16th century Italy.9 Secular universal history re-emerged n the18th century as a result of two centuries of European exploration andcolonization. Voltaire in his Essay on the Manners and Customs ofNations (1757) wrote sympathetically about he religious and philosophi-cal ideas of other cultures.10 A few decades ater, he German philosophersKant and Herder both published essays on universal history." Hegel fol-lowed with his idea of universal history as the unfolding of a spiritualreality through the nation-state.'2 Marx and Engels, in the mid-19thcentury, contributed a new global historical perspective in The Commu-nist Manifesto (1848), with their thesis that "the history of all hithertoexisting society is the history of class struggles." They also pointed to theglobal impact of the latest victor in the history of class struggles, theEuropean bourgeoisie, whose "need of a constantly expanding market orits products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe."13Recent theories of westernization, uch as world system and dependencytheory, which I will discuss later, have built on this basic insight of Marxand Engels about the global impact of capitalism.

In the 20th century the idea of universal, world, or global historycontinued to attract interest, although the trend within the emerginghistorical profession was to write monographs or general histories on

nation-state development. Disillusioned by the destructive forces ofwestern civilization in the First World War, Oswald Spengler popularizedthe idea of studying world cultures rom a relativistic point of view in TheDecline of the West (1918, 1923).14 The Second World War producedanother wave of disillusionment reflected in the writings of GeoffreyBarraclough n the late 1940s and early 1950s.15 He expressed doubtsabout the existence of a common European tradition and warned thatemphasis on a classical tradition obscured outside influences on thedevelopment of wester European history. In "the new constellation of

world-affairs," Barraclough saw a need for more recognition of theinfluence of non-western history on the West. True to his misgivings,Barraclough has been a leader among historians n the effort to develop amore global framework or the understanding f western civilization inthe post-World War II period.'6

This brief survey of universal, world, or global historical thought inwestern civilization suggests that global consciousness has origins in theclassical tradition of western thought, which some scholars have con-trasted with what they regard as the ahistorical universalism of non-

western Buddhist and Confucian civilizations."7 As a practical matter,however, contemporary lobal consciousness can probably be dated o thecrossing of a more recent threshold of awareness n the 1960s. In 1962 thehistorian Hans Kohn, who had just turned seventy years of age, wrote in

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the preface to his book The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global

History,that "in the middle of the twentieth

centurymankind has entered

the first stage of global history."18 he historian L. S. Stavrianos and othersalso published their textbook A Global History of Man that same year.19In 1968 Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore's book War and Peace inthe Global Village popularized he global village metaphor.20 his bookdocumented the growing intellectual consciousness of global intercon-nections stemming from a combination of political, economic, and elec-tronic communication developments. By 1970 a concern with the globalenvironment intensified to the point that United Nations Secretary-General U Thant issued a "global alert," warning that "ours is the firstglobal civilization which can wreck not just one nation or society, but thevery earth tself."21 Through he 1970s and 1980s this new sense of globalawareness originating in communications and environmental studiesbroadened o influence thinking in all of the humanities, social sciences,and sciences.22

Despite the rise of global consciousness, historians have been cautiousin their use of the word "global." Among the proponents of global historythere has been a reluctance to apply the word "global" to the whole ofhuman history. Kohn and Barraclough reserved the word for specialapplication to the recent era, either the 19th or 20th century. EvenStavrianos and his collaborators, espite their use of "global history" n thetitle of their extbook, stated hat "global history began in 1500." That date"ended the age-old separation between Eurasia and the other conti-nents.'23

There seem to be two current definitions of global history. One treatsglobal history as synonymous with world history, a history that encom-passes all the major civilizations and their interactions. Let's call this thegeneral definition of global history. However, if one refers to "the era ofglobal history," then one means the recent period of intensified globalinterconnections which has followed western expansion since 1500. Let'scall this the special definition of global history. The Times Atlas of WorldHistory uses the word "global" in a way consistent with the specialdefinition when it calls the period from 1870 to the present "The Age ofGlobal Civilisation."24

If one thinks of global consciousness as an historical interest n othercultures or as philosophical and religious ideas which embrace otherpeoples regardless of their race or culture, then the classical tradition ofwestern thought has incorporated global consciousness to some degreesince the fifth century B.C. But if global consciousness is something quitedistinct from universalizing principles and perspectives in history, phi-losophy, and religion, if it is a state of mind peculiar to the age in which

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Europeans began to explore and colonize other continents, then it has tobe treated as discontinuous with the classical tradition of westem thought.As history teachers we can choose either one or the other of these twodefinitions of global history. But perhaps we should look upon them asopposing cases in a debate that has yet to be concluded. In my opinion, themore we explore the boundaries between civilizations and contacts acrossthose boundaries, the more we are likely to discover the important roleplayed by interactions between civilizations which the general definitionof global history highlights, n short, he more we are ikely to discover thebeginnings of global consciousness before 1500 in various civilizations.

Contributions of Non-Western Civilizations to Global/World HistoryThe second question is related to the first. Is global/world history

uniquely western or do other civilizations deserve credit for its develop-ment? The classical tradition of westen civilization identifies a stream ofuniversalistic deas that point to the eventual unifying embrace of Euro-pean colonization, industrialization, nd imperialism. Similarly, the spe-cial definition of global history gives credit to westerization for theglobalization of recent human history. The general definition of globalhistory emphasizes the contributions of all civilizations, but it also

incorporates he special definition when it comes to the modem era.Let me draw upon one of the leading global/world history college

textbooks, A History of the Human Community 3rd edition, 1990) toillustrate the general definition of global history. William H. McNeillstresses the importance of trade and conquest in the global expansion ofempires. However, he shows that the spread of new religious ideas wasassociated with the expansion of the Chinese and Indian as well as Greco-Roman and Roman-Christian mpires in the period 200 B.C.-600 A.D.Writing about the impact of Buddhism on Japan, for example, McNeill

states that "conversion to Buddhism was a very important step towardcivilization."25 Throughout his period the major centers of civilizationexperienced cycles of "advance, retreat, and partial recovery."26 WhenIslam burst onto the global historical stage in the seventh century, itexpanded quickly over the next several centuries from North Africa toIndia. McNeill notes that "in many ways it was unique, built aroundreligion and the fresh revelation of God's will."27

On the whole it is difficult to single out unique contributions of majorcivilizations and empires to the development of global consciousness in

McNeill's survey text. Global consciousness seems to arise in a generalway through rade and the spread of cultural deas. In discussing the basisof European expansion after 1450, McNeill stresses three factors: aflexible economy; a warlike spirit; and the "techniques" of printing,

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shipbuilding/navigation, nd gunpower/military rganization.28From the perspective of the general definition of global history, as it is

represented by McNeill's text, global history derives more or less equallyfrom different civilization centers. Prior to the 18th and 19th centuriesthere s little to distinguish he world's civilizations n terms of their globalunifying influence. A history of the non-western world n the period 1500-1850 reinforces this point by stating that "nowhere n Africa or Asia didEuropean power reach more than a few miles inland until the eighteenthcentury."29 Hans Kohn stresses that what emerged in Europe in the 17thand 18th centuries was "a new and revolutionary civilization."30 Butparadoxically t may have been another ivilization that provided he pushinto this new historical dimension. The Islamic scholar Hichem Djaitemphasizes Islam's influence on Europe: "Islam was at once a militaryforce threatening Europe and an economic sphere sharing ts dynamism,just as later it would be an ideological enemy and a philosophical model.In a word, Europe's emergence nto history ook place - and could not havetaken place otherwise - through he mediation of Islam: in the beginningby means of a defensive recoil, afterward by an offensive explosion."31

The answer o the second question herefore depends upon whether oneworks within the general or special definition of global history. Global/world historians emphasize the contributions f non-western and westerncivilizations to the development of global consciousness prior to about1500. After 1500 they highlight the West's role in shaping a new era ofglobal history. However, if Djait's thesis is correct, he West took on thisrole in response initially to the challenge of Islam.

Global Versus Local Influences in HistoryIf we approach he era of global history since 1500 from the perspective

of non-western civilizations, then the process of local adaptations to

westernization becomes a key focus of study. This leads to the thirdquestion: Do current theories of global/world historical processes ade-quately take into consideration ocalnational adaptations o westerniza-tion? Here again it seems to me that the general and special definitions ofglobal history ead in different directions. The special definition of globalhistory has emphasized, as Marx and Engels did, the hegemonic force ofcapitalism as it spread around the world. But do we run the risk ofoverlooking the influence of local factors by imposing world system ordependency theory on local, regional, or national history?

In thewriting

ofhistory textbooks there are a handful of leadinghistorians who over the last three decades have pushed historical studies

in the global direction T. Walter Wallbank, Alastaire M. Taylor, EdwardMcNall Bums, William H. McNeill, and L. S. Stavrianos figure most

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prominently.32 But no one has exerted a more forceful theoretical nflu-ence on

globalhistorical

studythan Immanual Wallerstein, a

sociologistof social change, whose "world-system heory" has provided the leadingparadigm for historians writing about the relationship of Third Worldcountries to the West in the modem era.33 According to Wallerstein hereemerged in Europe during he period 1450-1620 a "world-system" basedon capitalist principles. This system spread ts influence over the rest ofthe world during the course of the next four centuries, establishingrelations of domination by the European "core" nation-states over the"periphery" f non-Westem societies. Wallerstein's world-system heorydraws upon the French historian Femand Braudel's writings about worldeconomy and on "dependency" heory which explains the underdevelop-ment of the Third World in terms of capitalist economic hegemony.

Wallerstein's world-system theory has been sharply criticized, espe-cially for its empirical weaknesses.34 Wallerstein's more severe criticsreject the idea that an integrated capitalist world-system emerged beforethe 19th century. The major thrust of their arguments are that Waller-stein's methodological insistence on the study of a world-system directsattention away from ocal conditions e.g. domestic production ather haninternational trade) that contradict his global thesis.35 In addition toMarxist critics who strongly reject Wallerstein's redefinition of classrelations and de-emphasis of class conflict in the development of capital-ism and European world hegemony, historians and anthropologists tudy-ing the Third World also have difficulty with global development heories.

The critique of world system and dependency theory from a ThirdWorld perspective can be illustrated by William B. Taylor's article,"Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiry nto EarlyLatin American Social History, 1500-1900."36 Taylor raises five majorcriticisms of dependency heory (and by extension of Wallerstein's world-system theory): 1) Viewing "capitalism as a single system of meaning,"dependency studies pay too "little attention o the differential ffects of thecapitalisms [mercantile and industrial] on social relationships n variousplaces and times"; 2) Economic determinism ignores "pre-Conquestsocial forms and relationships of production n different localities"; 3)Emphasis on "capitalist relationships of exchange" de-emphasizes therole of the state in Latin America; 4) Economic change is viewed asimposed from the outside thereby neglecting "the role of local modes ofthought and practice and local arrangements f power [i.e. local elites]";and 5) By emphasizing "the sweeping influence of capitalism dependencystudies overlook regional variations" e.g. Argentina and Mexico "in thefirst half-century after Independence, [which] do not seem to fit thedependency models").37 Carol A. Smith reinforces Taylor's critique n a

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discussion of Western Guatemala.38 mith evaluates world-system ap-

proachesto the

historyof Guatemala

against ethnographicdata. She

concludes that "to understand ny particular ocal system, such as that inGuatemala, one must look at the interaction of global and local forces"instead of global capitalism alone.39

The terms "local" and "global" represent polarities in terms of whichwe can think about historical change. In discussing "paradigms of inter-national relations," or example, Erie Keenes writes about the need tolink thinking about international elations to local politics - "the processby which groups of people decide for themselves what the good life is intheir particular omer of the world, and how to get it."40 Politics, a senseof history, as well as the writing of novels, poems, and plays begin at thelocal level. Clifford Geertz in his collection of essays entitled LocalKnowledge emphasizes the foundational nature of the "local" when hesays "the shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local."41 n theirdifferent ways and separate ields of research, Taylor, Smith, Keenes, andGeertz are warning against neglect of local influences on global/worldhistory.

Despite its critics, however, Wallerstein's world-system heory contin-ues to influence historians ooking for a more global perspective.42 Thatinfluence has recently shown up in writing about the history of theAmerican West. In the November, 1989, issue of the Western HistoricalQuarterly, hree articles converge on the global dimensions of the Ameri-can West. Walter Nugent discusses the interrelatedness f global frontierand imperial mpulses in the period 1870-1914, and a common feature offrontiers and empires - exploitation of indigenous peoples.43 Michael P.Malone urges historians of the American West to cease relying uponFrederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis as a unifying interpretiveframework and to seek a new model for identifying the West as adistinctive region.44 Malone credits the historians William H. McNeill, L.S. Stavrianos, and Theodore Von Laue, as well as Wallerstein, withproviding a useful global view of Western capitalist expansion and itsharmful effects, and he suggests that the word "frontier" e replaced withthe term "globalization the ongoing integration f this long-remote placeinto the human community."45 n a third article, William G. Robbinsargues that historians of the American West have neglected "politics,power, class relations, and other expressions of capitalism" which wouldlink the history of the American West with western civilization history.46Robbins, too, draws upon the global perspectives of Fernand Braudel,Wallerstein, Karl Marx, and dependency heorists or an understanding fthe "evolving dialectic between changes n world capitalism and ocal eco-nomics."47

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These examples of theoretical approaches o research on the histories ofCentral America and the American West illustrate divergent emphases onglobal and local processes. Central American scholars suggest that localprocesses are being neglected, while historians of the American Westargue hat global processes are being neglected. This leads me to concludethat where there has been neglect of global connections, global theoreticalperspectives may be useful. But they may also distort our view ofhistorical processes if not tested by "micro-studies" f the dynamics oflocal cultures.

Hans Kohn in The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global Historyhighlighted the fact that the era of global history began in nationalcompetition. He envisioned that the "age of pan-nationalism" wouldmerge into "the age of pan-humanism."48 n our teaching of contemporaryhistory, there is a danger that we may be swept along by enthusiasm forglobal integration and cooperation. While some international relationsspecialists have embraced he concept of a global political environment,49others are not persuaded hat the world is ready for a paradigm shift ininternational elations heory or world politics. The nation-state ontinuesto exert a strong force in global politics. No "global community" hasemerged to replace the nation-state. As Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W.Mansbach observe, "the intensification of local and sublocal 'national-ism' produces resistance to rising interdependence, repeatedly forcinglocal elites to act contrary o the logic of 'national' or 'global' interestsproduced by that interdependence."50 The same point is made by A. D.Smith, who writes that "many states today are linked in a series of near-global transactions and dependencies," but the international ystem actu-ally encourages nationalism. As a result, "nationalism's diffusion hassimply globalised the traditional European balance of power' conceptsand relationships, and these in turn are now reinforcing nationalisms.""5

Recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also speak to therevival of local ethnic and national aspirations.52

As a teacher of history I believe we should be wary of abandoningconcepts framed in a context of national rivalries and national history.Global history has to take note of trends oward nternational ommunityand conflict resolution, but it must also pay attention o the conservativeforce of nationalism and other forms of local cultural nfluence on humanhistory. Significantly, all recent discussions of the future of Europe botheast and west focus on regional ntegration. t is this fact that has led Silviu

Brucan o suggest that we live in a transitional eriod of time.53 n the shortterm - how long one can only guess - the evolution toward greater worldintegration will pass through a stage of regional integration. If this is thecontinuing reality of our time, as it has been for the past forty years of

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military alliances (since the creation of NATO in 1949), then the teachingof contemporary lobal history must incorporate n evolutionary perspec-tive which leaves room for the older paradigm of political realism andbalance of power politics as the world moves toward a newer paradigm ofuniversally recognized global political principles and institutions.

ConclusionIf the theoretical disagreements between western civilization and

global/world history are truly a dialectical commons, rather han a no-man's land, as I have suggested, then a reader ought to leave this dialoguewith a new sense of direction for teaching. Let me indicate what its

teaching implications are for me.First, I want to work toward breaking down the separation of the two

histories. As McNeill's writing about the interactions of civilizations ontheir boundaries shows, boundary ines are artificial. They exist at policecheckpoints and dissolve in the hills beyond. One important mplicationfor my teaching is that the influence of the wester on the non-westernworld is a proposition o be debated and not to be accepted a priori.

Second, I want to continue to question the distinction between thegeneral and special definitions of global/world history. The distinction

highlights for me the fact that interactions between civilizations vary inscope and intensity in different time periods. But the essential duality of"global" history (i.e. pre- and post-1500 periods), which the general andspecial definitions express, makes me want to look for evidence ofinteraction, mutual influence, diffusion of cultural elements, and other"global" effects throughout human history.

Third, the general and special definitions of global history tend towardsimplification: one as the idea of the globalization of the West, the otheras the idea of the westemization of the globe. I look to the analytical

concept of global/local processes as a way to avoid these simplifications.I believe that we will find local and more global processes at workthroughout most of human history, if we look for them. I find the conceptof global/local processes to be an especially useful check on the impulseto westemize the recent "era of global history."

Notes

1. Umberto Eco, Foucault's Pendulum (San Diego and London: Harcourt BraceJovanovich, 1988).

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2. See, for example, Gilbert Allardyce, "The Rise and Fall of the Wester Civili-zation Course," American Historical Review, 87 (June 1982), 695-743; William A. Percyand Pedro J. Suarez, "Today's Western and World Civilization College Texts: A Review,"The History Teacher, 17 (August 1984), 567-590; Carolyn J. Mooney, "SweepingCurricular Change Is Under Way at Stanford as University Phases Out Its 'WesternCulture' Program," Chronicle of Higher Education, 35 (December 15, 1988), 11-13.

3. Eco, Foucault's Pendulum, p. 451.4. R. V. Tooley, Maps and Map-Makers New York: Dorset Press, 1987 [1949]),

pp. 3-7, 24-25.5. Ibid., pp. 31-32.6. Walter Emil Kaegi, Jr., and Peter White, eds. Rome: Late Republic and

Principate, Vol. 2, University of Chicago Readings n Western Civilization (Chicago andLondon: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 11.

7. M. I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks: An Introduction o their Life and Thought(New York: Viking Press, 1964), p. 94.

8. Andrew Lintott, "Roman Historians,"pp. 26-242, inJohnBoardman, tal., eds.The Roman World (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

9 Hans Meyerhoff, ed. The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology(Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), p. 4.

10. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation/The cience of Freedom (NewYork and London: W. W. Norton, 1977 [1969]), p. 392.

11. Ronald H. Nash, ed. Ideas of History (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), p. 68.12. Patrick Gardner, d. Theories ofHistory (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 58-

73.13. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel

Moore (New York: Socialist Labor Party, 1888), pp. 7-21, 28, in Edgar E. Knoebel, ed.Classics of Western Thought: The Modern World, Vol. 3, 4th ed. (San Diego and Toronto:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), p. 372.

14. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1926, 1928.

15. Geoffrey Barraclough, History inA Changing World (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1957).

16. See, for example, Geoffrey Barraclough, ntroduction o Contemporary History(Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967) and The Times Atlas of World History, editor in 1978,Geoffrey Barraclough, 3rd ed. edited by Norman Stone (Maplewood, NJ: Hammond,1989).

17. See, for example, Eric Voegelin's works The World of the Polis (Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press, 1957) and The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge: LouisianaState University Press, 1974).

18. Hans Kohn, TheAge ofNationalism: The First Era ofGlobal History (New Yorkand Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. x.

19. Leften S. Stavrianos, t al. A Global History of Man (Boston and San Francisco:Allyn and Bacon, 1962). This was a geographical history. The authors used the word"global" n the title, but switched to "world" n the text.

20. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, War and Peace in the Global Village(New York: Bantam, 1968).

21. Henry J. Kellerman, "Ecology: AWorld Concern," pp. 17-39, inThe Great IdeasToday, 1971 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1971).

22. See Silviu Brucan, "The Global Crisis," International Studies Quarterly, 18(March 1984), 97-109; Gary K. Bertsch, ed. Global Policy Studies (Beverly Hills and New

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Delhi: Sage Publications, 1982); David E. Vocke, "Those Varying Perspectives on GlobalEducation," The Social Studies (January/February 988), 18-20; 'The Age of Global Civ-

ilisation," pp. 254-295, The Times Atlas of World History; Craig Lambert, "Global Spin,"Harvard Magazine (January/February 990), 17-30 on global thinking at Harvard Univer-sity.

23. Stavrianos, et al. A Global History of Man, p. 48.24. The Times Atlas of World History, pp. 254-295.25. William H. McNeill, A History of the Human Community 3rd ed. (Englewood

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 195.26. Ibid., p. 214.27. Ibid., p. 217.28. Ibid., p. 334.29. Johanna M. Meskill, John Meskill, and Ainslie T. Embree, The Non-European

World 1500/1850 (Glenview and London: Scott, Foresman, 1971), p. 139.30. Kohn, The Age of Nationalism, p. 31.31. Hichem Djait, Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity (Berkeley and

London: University of California Press, 1985), p. 109.32. Percy and Suarez, "Today's Western and World Civilization College Texts."33. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and

the Origins of the European World-Economy n the Sixteenth Century (New York:Academic Press, 1974) and The Modern World-System I. Merchantilism nd the Consoli-dation of the European World-Economy, 600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980).

34. See Robert S. DuPlessis, "Wallerstein, World Systems Analysis, and EarlyModer European History," The History Teacher, 21 (February 1988), 221-232.

35. See Gerry Keams, "History, Geography and World-Systems Theory," Journalof Historical Geography, 14:3 (1988), 281-292.

36. In Olivier Zunz, ed. Reliving the Past: The Worlds ofSocialHistory (Chapel Hilland London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), pp. 115-181. On dependencytheory see also Chris Brown, "Development and Dependency," pp. 62-68, in Margot Lightand A. J. R. Groom, eds.InternationalRelations:A HandbookofCurrentTheory Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1985).

37. Ibid., pp. 125-127.38. Carol A. Smith, "Local History in Global Context: Social and Economic

Transitions n Western Guatemala," Comparative Studies n Society and History, 26 (April1984), 193-228.

39. Ibid., p. 224.40. ErieKeenes, "Paradigms f International Relations: Bringing Politics BackIn,"

International Journal, 44 (Winter 1988-89), 41-67.41. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays inInterpretiveAnthropology

(New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 4.42. See, for example, Peter J. Taylor, Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-

State andLocality (New York: Longman, 1985); Bernice Cohen, GlobalPerspectives: TheTotal Culture System in the Modern World London: Codek Publications, 1988); GeorgeModelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle and London: University of WashingtonPress, 1987).

43. Walter Nugent, "Frontiers nd Empires n the Late Nineteenth Century," West-ern Historical Quarterly, 20 (November 1989), 393-408.

44. Michael P. Malone, "Beyond the Last Frontier: Toward A New Approach toWestern American History," bid., pp. 409-427.

45. Ibid., p. 424.

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The Dialectical Commons of Western Civilization and Global/World History 305

46. William G. Robbins, "Western History: A Dialectic on the Moder Condition,"ibid., pp. 429-449.

47. Robbins, bid., p. 442. A global perspective on the history of the American Westcan also be found in Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth ofthe American West (New York: Pantheon, 1985), in which Worster applies the hydraulicsociety concept of Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of TotalPower (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1957).

48. Kohn, The Age ofNationalism, p. 166.49. For a survey of international relations textbooks, see Dennis J. D. Sandole,

"Textbooks," pp. 214-228, in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds. InternationalRelations: A Handbook of Current Theory.

50. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory andInternational Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 105-107.

51. A. D. Smith, "Internationalism," p. 66-77, in Marc Williams, ed. InternationalRelations in the Twentieth Century: A Reader (New York: New York University Press,1989).

52. Zbigniew Bzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, 68(Winter 1989/90), 1-25.

53. Silviu Brucan, "The Global Crisis."

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