Socially Constructing China: Friend, Foe or Our Choice?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan B. Craycraft

United States Air Force

United States Army War College Class of 2014

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14. ABSTRACT

China's rise during the early 21st century is similar to Athens' rise preceding the Peloponnesian Wars.

The depiction of China within U.S. strategic and popular culture will shape the debate about how the U.S.

should wield its instruments of national power when dealing with China. This paper examines what bronze

of China is being cast by Americans via elite political speeches, State and Defense Department policies,

and official documents. It also examines the way that China is depicted in the outlets of U.S. popular

culture, including high-subscription newspaper articles, political cartoons, and entertaining news programs.

Ultimately, the battle of the narrative, or the socially constructed idea of the “other,” is important. If the

portrayal of China is distorted, the caricature can lead to inappropriate, overly hostile, or narrow policy

choices in the event of conflict or crisis.

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Social Constructivism, Narrative, Strategic Communications

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Socially Constructing China: Friend, Foe or Our Choice?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan B. Craycraft United States Air Force

Dr. Tami D. Biddle Department of National Security and Strategy

Project Adviser This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract Title: Socially Constructing China: Friend, Foe or Our Choice? Report Date: 15 April 2014 Page Count: 34 Word Count: 5,871 Key Terms: Social Constructivism, Narrative, Strategic Communications Classification: Unclassified

China's rise during the early 21st century is similar to Athens' rise preceding the

Peloponnesian Wars. The depiction of China within U.S. strategic and popular culture

will shape the debate about how the U.S. should wield its instruments of national power

when dealing with China. This paper examines what bronze of China is being cast by

Americans via elite political speeches, State and Defense Department policies, and

official documents. It also examines the way that China is depicted in the outlets of U.S.

popular culture, including high-subscription newspaper articles, political cartoons, and

entertaining news programs. Ultimately, the battle of the narrative, or the socially

constructed idea of the “other,” is important. If the portrayal of China is distorted, the

caricature can lead to inappropriate, overly hostile, or narrow policy choices in the event

of conflict or crisis.

Socially Constructing China: Friend, Foe or Our Choice?

Thucydides eloquently portrayed the way that people can socially construct the

image and identity of another group of people or another nation. He used the speeches

that run throughout his text as the vehicle for this activity. In one excellent example, he

portrayed a Corinthian speech that characterized the Athenians as a people “born into

the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others.”1 With these words, the

Corinthians were trying to goad the Spartans into taking the “threat” of Athens more

seriously. They contrasted the active cosmopolitan Athens with the stoic, conservative

Sparta – arguing that Sparta was losing ground to its upstart rival. The Corinthians’

contrasts between an active and vital Athens and a hesitant, halting Sparta did not in

themselves cause the Peloponnesian War, but they did help to raise tensions and

arouse the assertive elements within Sparta. In the end, the words mattered.

Humans use language to express ideas, thus, they can “socially construct” the

world they live in. This matters for national behavior since words can shape images of

an “other.” We can create perceptions about other states in the international system by

using repeated characterizations in speech and in written texts. Over time, these

characterizations become persuasive.

This essay concerns itself with understanding the image of China that is being

constructed in the present U.S. national narrative, so that we may also better

understand the context for future U.S. policy decisions. How is it that U.S. policy makers

come to understand another country’s actions as hostile or benign? Stephen Walt, the

consummate realist, explains that, “Beijing is seeking to build its economy, then expand

its military capacity, achieve a position of regional dominance, and then exclude other

major powers from its immediate neighborhood.”2 From this perspective, Chinese

2

actions will be seen as paving the road to regional hegemony demanded by its strategy.

On the other hand, Stefano Guzzini, points out in constructivist terms that “people act

towards objects on the basis of the meaning they give to them: objects themselves do

not determine their meaning.”3 This idea was first proposed by Alexander Wendt in his

writing on constructivism which separated “causal” questions (typical of realism and

liberalism) from “constitutive” questions which concern themselves more with “identities

and meanings” as the basis for an actor’s behavior.4 Once considered a “radical”

approach, constructivism is now complementary to realism and liberalism and increases

our understanding of international relations.5 Joseph Nye and David Welch point out

that “constructivists help us understand how preferences are formed and how

knowledge is generated prior to the exercise of instrumental rationality. In that sense,

constructivist thought complements rather than opposes the two main theories [of

realism and liberalism]”.6

Using a constructivist lens, this essay will examine how the rise of China has

been socially constructed since the November 2011 announcement of the U.S. “pivot to

the Pacific.” During that month President Obama announced in a speech to the

Australian Parliament that the U.S. was “turning our attention to the vast potential of the

Asia-Pacific region.”7 Also in that month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton penned an

op-ed in Foreign Policy’s “America” issue that argued that “one of the most important

tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a

substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in

the Asia-Pacific region.” 8 Taken together, these statements are generally thought to

mark the beginning of what was dubbed by many as America’s “pivot to the Pacific.”

3

This demarcation by the two most important U.S. policymakers drew a clear line on the

current administration’s perception of where U.S. attention needs to be focused. Later,

because pivot seemed to imply a turning away from other areas, US decision-makers

amended the language, choosing instead to use the term “rebalance.”9

This analysis begins with a brief discussion of the constructivist argument and

how it complements other international relations theories. This essay will then walk

through selected examples of prepared elite political speeches and published U.S.

strategic documents. The examination of elite speeches will include those given by the

President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

Publications reviewed include the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as they are the only two major U.S. strategic

documents published within the timeframe under consideration.10 Following that, it will

look at elite reactions to the establishment of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone

(ADIZ) in the East China Seas, and a naval encounter between the USS Cowpens and

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships in the South China Sea. It will then

compare reactions to those events in the three most widely circulated newspapers in

the U.S.: The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and The USA Today. Finally,

the analysis will turn to popular culture and mainstream media in the form of political

cartoons, an entertainment news program, and a survey of public opinion. The results

do not predict how the U.S. will respond to the rise of China, but by understanding the

picture of China being shaped by elite and popular communication in the U.S., we can

better understand the tone of the discourse the U.S. will use, or the range of policy

options the U.S. will consider in response to China in a conflict or crisis.11

4

Social Constructivism

In order to understand how an entity is socially constructed and how that idea

can influence policy choices, it is necessary to understand constructivism. Alexander

Wendt posited that constructivism concerns itself with “where … identities and interests

come from” and how decision-makers’ cognition causes them to react to the

environment around them.12 In the same argument, Wendt also compared

constructivism to other international relations theories and made sure to emphasize that

a constructivist model was “not better” but simply different.13 The difference, he

explained, was that these two paradigms were simply asking different questions. Where

realists assumed that actors acted rationally based on “identities and interests,”

constructivists inquire “where those identities and interests come from.”14

Constructivism’s ideational basis for international relations posits that socially

constructed ideas form the foundation of how actors rationally react to events based on

the “ideas, discourse, and practice within a social context.”15 This particular analysis

focuses on certain elements of the U.S. national “discourse in the social context” of

American society in order to discover elements of the U.S. perception of China.

Understanding how these elements of national discourse actually affect the construction

also requires a brief discussion of perception.16

Constructivism also draws on social cognitive theory as a way to better explain

how events are interpreted.17 This is similar to the idea posited by Robert Jervis when

he laid out the role that perception plays in international relations. In his analysis, Jervis

questioned purely rational thought in international relations by bringing elements of

cognitive psychology into the discussion.18 Specifically, he argues that “cognitive

consistency” describes the “strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see

5

and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images.”19 When applied to

decision makers, cognitive consistency emphasizes the importance of the original

image of an external actor because all future information will be compared to that

original image. Subsequent information will then tend to be discounted if it does not

conform to the original image and retained if it does conform to the original image.20

Thus, knowing the texture of the original image becomes of prime importance since all

future information will be filtered based on the original image. In addition, understanding

the details of the image itself is also of prime concern to this paper. Sensitivity to the

image of China being formed in the national discourse since the announcement of the

rebalance can help us understand the post-rebalance original image and also enhance

our ability to understand how future policy choices toward China will be framed.

The image of China after the rebalance is not, of course, without its own history

and antecedents. History will influence any ongoing relationship between two nations in

the international system, and this is surely true of China and the U.S.. But the image of

China that concerns us here is one that is relatively recent, and largely shaped by

China’s economic rise in the past two decades and its increasing investment in military

spending. China’s GDP has risen so that it is now the world’s second largest behind the

U.S..21 China is also second to the U.S. in the world on defense spending.22 Lastly,

China is, depending on the measured timeframe of the data, the U.S.’s second or third

largest trading partner.23 Coupled with these U.S. – China relationships, China is

embroiled in territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas with Japan and the

Philippines, both of which are allied to the U.S. by treaty. This complicated relationship

6

leads U.S. policy makers to spend significant time attempting to characterize and

describe China, and its present and future interaction with the U.S..

Elite Speeches and Publications

When the U.S. Presidential campaign kicked into high gear in early 2012, the

tone of the administration’s rhetoric about China took on a harsher tone compared to

the 2011 statements announcing the rebalance. The 2012 State of the Union address

set the tone for the remainder of the year when the President spoke of bringing “trade

cases against China” due to unfair trading practices.24 Throughout 2012, while the

President was on the campaign trail, he repeated a phrase that depicted China as an

economic competitor who competed unfairly. At the Democratic Convention in

September, 2012, the President amplified his campaign trail rhetoric by claiming to have

“stood up to China” by filing trade disputes.25 In the second and third presidential

debates, the President again mentioned trade disputes with China but then deviated

slightly from that narrative in the third debate by adding that China was “both an

adversary but also a potential partner.”26 These debates most likely made a significant

impact on the national image of China because they reached a large American

audience and because they provided an emotionally appealing narrative.

It is not surprising that presidential candidates turn to tougher sounding words

during the run-up to an election. As one journalist noted about the 2012 race, both

candidates used harsh rhetoric “to score political points with an electorate frustrated by

the feeble economic recovery at home.”27 But that does not capture the entirety of the

situation. As Jennifer Jerit pointed out in 2004, politicians use inflammatory rhetoric

“because cognitive biases cause citizens to give emotionally compelling data

disproportionate weight” and “political elites who speak the language of emotion have a

7

better chance of connecting with the electorate than those who do not.”28 Once

President Obama was re-elected, his rhetoric returned quickly to the less inflammatory

tones that preceded the campaign trail.

The 2013 State of the Union address was remarkably devoid of commentary

about China. Later in the summer of 2013, at the retirement of National Security Advisor

Tom Donilon, President Obama pointed out that Donilon had “worked tirelessly to forge

a constructive relationship with China.”29 The President made a telling comment toward

the end of 2013 when he offered remarks after a meeting with President Xi of China.

During those remarks, President Obama offered detailed speculation about the future

relationship between the U.S. and China:

Although there will continue to be some significant disagreements and sources of tension, I’m confident that they can be managed. And I want to reiterate that the United States welcomes the continuing peaceful rise of China and is interested in a China that is playing a stable and prosperous and responsible role, not only in the Asia Pacific but around the world.30

Although these words were spoken near the end of 2013, there has been no discernible

change in the Administration’s depiction of China since then; the U.S. President has

consistently, since the 2012 election, depicted the U.S.-China relationship as an

opportunity for cooperation as China’s economy grows and as an interaction requiring

close management to prevent security tensions.

The Secretary of State’s depictions of China were not noticeably influenced by

the presidential election of 2012. Both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and her

successor John Kerry have depicted the U.S. relationship with China as one that needs

to be based on increasing cooperation, and whose economic and security ties are in

need of further maturity.31 This statement was well articulated at the end of Secretary

Kerry’s remarks to the opening session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic

8

Dialogue in Washington, D.C. in July 2013. There he spoke of the need for the U.S. and

China to have “dialogue [that] is about cooperating on our shared interests,” and

“addressing our differences, speaking candidly about them, and trying to find ways to

manage them.” 32 Both Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of State Kerry have

complemented the post-Presidential election rhetoric of President Obama by talking

about the need for cooperation between the U.S. and China rather than the potential for

conflict.

Since the announcement of the rebalance to the Pacific, both Secretaries of

Defense Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel have echoed similar sentiments to those

mentioned above: the U.S.-China relationship is an area where both sides should seek

cooperation.33 The Secretary of Defense’s office has provided the two U.S. strategic

security documents that have been released since the rebalance to the Pacific: the

2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The

opening discussion of the U.S. relationship with China in the Defense Strategic

Guidance mimicked previously-mentioned elite statements except for the

confrontational comments spoken on the campaign trail and during the debates. The

authors argued that, “over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will

have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our

two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in

building a cooperative bilateral relationship.”34

The QDR has similar wording, talking about the future DOD actions in relation to

China as requiring a cooperative relationship toward areas of overlapping interest while

managing “the competitive aspects of the relationship in ways that improve regional

9

peace and stability consistent with international norms and principles.”35 The

environmental scanning section of the QDR also mentions China’s opaque military

modernization effort and its development of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)

capabilities, which are described as a way to “counter U.S. strengths.”36 Neither the

Defense Strategic Guidance nor the QDR directly refers to China as a threat to U.S.

interests, but both emphasize a relationship that requires close attention to manage

opportunities for cooperation while working to minimize potential for conflict. As one

would expect, these images are aligned with the Secretary of Defense’s prepared

speeches.

During Secretary of Defense Panetta’s first trip to China in September 2012, he

stated that the goal of both countries was to “build a sustained and substantive United

States-China defense relationship that supports the broader United States-China

cooperative partnership.” 37 Those comments support the notion of a homogenous

strategic approach: elite security speeches and relevant strategic documents seeking to

promote an image of a rising China that is not threatening.

Homogeneity, however, is more easily achieved with carefully-crafted speeches

engaging specific audiences than with extemporaneous remarks. More complexity --

and possibly more accuracy -- of the image constructed by national elites is apparent in

improvised crisis response statements. Especially considering the impact that emotional

rhetoric is postulated to have on an audience, the reactions to a surprising event may

have a greater influence on national perception. Two recent events provoking

spontaneous language include the declaration of the Chinese ADIZ in the East China

Seas in November 2013, and the maritime incident between the Cowpens and ships

10

escorting the PLAN aircraft carrier, Liaoning in December 2013. U.S. policy maker

remarks about these two events are excellent examples of crisis response statements

that may contribute disproportionally to the national perception of China.

Elite Reaction to Air Defense Identification Zone and Cowpens Incident

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced the creation of an ADIZ on

November 23, 2013. U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel was the first to respond when he

announced that the U.S. was “deeply concerned” and continued by characterizing the

Chinese ADIZ as “a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This

unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.”38 Vice

President Joe Biden also responded, almost two weeks later, with comments on

December 3rd and 6th. On the 3rd, his remarks were made after meeting with Japanese

Prime Minister Abe. On the 6th, Biden spoke at the Yonsei University in South Korea;

he had met with PRC President Xi the day before.39 In his remarks on the 3rd Biden,

speaking from the territory of a strategically significant U.S. ally, said that the U.S. is

“deeply concerned by [China’s] attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the East

China Sea. This action has raised regional tensions and increased the risk of accidents

and miscalculation.”40 On the 6th of December, after meeting with President Xi and after

more time to consider the event, Biden was more constrained with his remarks. He

elaborated on the very careful consideration required by the U.S. and the PRC to

prevent tension and conflict during China’s peaceful rise:

It is not written anywhere that this competition [between the U.S. and China] is destined to be conflict … It’s not only in our interest, it’s in the interest of the region, the interest of the world that we get that relationship right with China. …There will be competition, but the President and I refuse to accept the proposition that it’s inevitably going to result in conflict.41

11

These remarks prefaced Biden’s remarks about the PRC ADIZ which had, he stated,

“created considerable apprehension across the region.”42 Vice President Biden did an

excellent job of portraying the tension associated with China’s rise as a powerful

country. Secretary Hagel’s initial reaction was to portray China’s action as

“destabilizing” but the later, more thoughtful response by Vice President Biden after he

had met with President Xi portrayed the event in more even terms, as the kind of action

that demonstrates the need for regional measures to prevent certain events from

resulting in conflict.

The initial remarks by both leaders portrayed the PRC ADIZ as an inflammatory

act that raised tensions in an already tense area. Biden’s later remarks, after a few days

of consideration, were more in line with how ADIZs are viewed around the world. Many

countries, including the U.S., already have established ADIZs; merely having an ADIZ is

not a hostile act. Also, the announcement of the ADIZ should not have come as a

surprise since The Japan Times released information about the PRC’s plans for an

ADIZ two weeks prior to the actual announcement.43 Three months later, an even less

hostile characterization of the incident was articulated by U.S. Air Force General

Herbert Carlisle during an interview with Defense News. In that interview he said that

having an ADIZ was not in itself a threat, but the manner in which it was announced was

a cause for consternation.44 That statement constructs a much less hostile image of the

PRC, but that image was not the one presented by either Biden or Hagel’s immediate,

reactive statements which presumably reached a much wider audience. Their rhetoric

created a much more antagonistic portrayal of China’s actions than was necessary and

12

shows how much care must be taken by political elites during tense moments in order to

retain control of the long-term image they are attempting to create.

Another opportunity to examine the American social construction of its

relationship with China can be found in the confrontation between the Cowpens and the

PLAN Liaoning Carrier Group. The Liaoning is the PRC’s first operational aircraft carrier

and it was on its first training exercise. The incident involved the Cowpens (a U.S.

guided missile cruiser) taking “evasive action to avoid colliding with a Chinese warship

escorting the Liaoning in the South China Sea.”45 In a press briefing, Secretary Hagel

answered a question about the incident by claiming that it was “not a responsible action”

on the part of the PLAN; he went on to label the incident as “incendiary, that could be a

trigger or a spark that could set off some eventual miscalculation.”46 Secretary Hagel’s

reaction focused exclusively on the ship-to-ship encounter without mentioning the larger

context of what the Cowpens was doing in relation to PLAN operations.47

Press Reactions to the ADIZ and the Cowpens Incident

The descriptions of these two events, and the language used in those

descriptions, were markedly different depending on which article the reader consulted.

The three most widely read U.S. newspapers, for example, adopted quite different tones

in their respective articles. Chris Buckley wrote an article about the ADIZ declaration in

the November 23, 2013 edition of The New York Times.48 He portrayed the declaration

of the PRC ADIZ as a step taken by China in the context of the ongoing Senkaku

Islands territorial dispute with Japan.49 Overall, the article did not suggest that the ADIZ

declaration was, by itself, a hostile act, but it did suggest that it could lead to an

unintended confrontation between the two countries.50 In a remarkable omission, the

article did not point out the ubiquity of such airspace zones around the world.

13

The Wall Street Journal not only presented a more detailed analysis, but also

focused on the regional reactions of the Japanese and South Koreans. The article

quoted the reactions by Secretaries Kerry and Hagel, and also pointed out that South

Korea, Taiwan, Japan and many other countries have established ADIZs.51 Similar to

the New York Times article, it speculated on why China had declared this ADIZ, and

described the context of the ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands.52 The

article explained that ADIZs are common around the world, and mentioned the official

Chinese response to the U.S. reaction of the ADIZ announcement. The Wall Street

Journal article alerted readers to the fact that “China's Assistant Foreign Minister Zheng

Zeguang had raised the issue with U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke on Sunday,

urging the U.S. to ‘correct its mistakes and stop making irresponsible remarks.’"53

Although the article did not elaborate on the Chinese point of view, it did indicate that an

ADIZ is common throughout the world and that China had protested the U.S.

characterization of the announcement. Although not specified, it can be inferred that

the Chinese representatives were referring to the statements released by Vice

President Biden and Secretary Hagel which characterized the Chinese action as

destabilizing.

An article in the USA Today newspaper portrayed the incident slightly differently

than the New York Times and Wall Street Journal articles. The article introduced the

PRC ADIZ with an accompanying explanation about what an ADIZ is and the fact that

they are common throughout the world.54 It described Secretaries Kerry and Hagel’s

reactions but also included Chinese nationalist reactions from “China’s Twitter

equivalent” website.55 These reactions are included in the context of another comment

14

not found in the other articles about how “Japan’s wartime (WWII) actions are kept alive

in TV series, films, and government propaganda” in China.56 Of all three of these widely

circulated newspapers, the USA Today is the only one to capture elements of the

Chinese populations’ reactions to the event in its initial article on the issue. All three

newspapers also parroted the words of the U.S. elites who responded to the

declaration.

There is a similar pattern in the three articles about the encounter between the

Cowpens and Liaoning aircraft carrier. The USA Today repeated its unique perspective

by being the only one of the three newspapers to include a PRC version of events.57

The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times both failed to mention the Chinese

version of events, which described the protection of the Liaoning as the reason for the

Chinese ship to cross in front of the Cowpens. The Wall Street Journal article

completely omitted the fact that the U.S. ship was in relative proximity to the PLAN

carrier.58 The article in The New York Times began by stating, “In a sign of the

increased tensions between the United States and China on the open seas,” but did

explain that the Cowpens was shadowing the Liaoning when the encounter occurred.59

The reporting reveals that the message in the national media is heterogeneous and

shapes the national discourse in inconsistent ways. This leaves one to question which

perspective contributes most to the common narrative but also shows how important

elite reactions are to an event since each article carried elite quotes to help readers

understand the American government perspective on the events. There are certainly

many more articles about China that contribute to this narrative but these three

15

newspapers covering these two events offer insight into the range of characterizations

that can be made about a single event.

Visual Images and Popular Television

In addition to news articles, visual images are quite powerful forms of

communication and influence.60 Going back to the American Revolution, Paul Revere’s

“romanticized cartoons of the [Boston] massacre were widely circulated” and helped

exaggerate the actual incident in order to inflame the domestic population and influence

political behavior.61 Political cartoons are an example of the kinds of images that

contribute to the current national narrative. Patrick Chappatte, who draws editorial

cartoons for the New York Times (and International Herald Tribune), penned a cartoon

in April 2012, that directly addressed the U.S. pivot to the Pacific. His cartoon depicted a

U.S. aircraft carrier running aground next to a building flying a Chinese flag. President

Obama sits on the deck of the carrier and asks the presumed President of China “Is this

your backyard, really? I’m sorry.”62 The reader is left with the image of the U.S. intruding

in the arena of natural Chinese influence.

Later that year, Chappatte drew Uncle Sam reluctantly getting drawn into a fight

between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands; he followed that later in 2013 with

an editorial cartoon that depicted China sending an enormous warship to a very small

island. 63 A similar search of the keyword ‘China’ on the Association of American

Editorial Cartoonists website depicts China more often as a competitor and source of

conflict than as a peacefully rising state. 64 It is not the intent of this article to presume

that editorial cartoons dictate the national discourse, but only to submit that they provide

additional information and context that is in contest with the rhetoric put forth by the

national elites.

16

The TV show The Colbert Report, hosted by comedian Stephen Colbert, also

contributed to the image of China shortly after Typhoon Haiyan devastated the

Philippines on November 8, 2013. On November 14, after criticizing the PRC for

donating a mere $100,000 to disaster relief efforts, he challenged his viewers (whom he

refers to as the “Colbert Nation”) to donate more than the PRC.65 During that segment of

The Colbert Report, Colbert began by outlining the U.S. military and financial

contributions to the relief effort. Then, after referring to China as a ‘so-called

superpower’, he ridiculed their contribution of $100,000 and challenged his audience to

“out-donate China.”66 After providing information on how to donate, he closed by

referring to China as “stingy jerks.” Four days later, he disclosed that the “Colbert

Nation” did, in fact, exceed Chinese donations to hurricane relief and then proceeded to

humorously make demands based on the fact that the “Colbert Nation” should be

allowed to have China’s seat at the U.N. Security Council.67 Although his show is for

entertainment, it still has an impact on popular thought. Colbert presented China as a

nation in conflict with American values – values that superpowers are expected to

exhibit. While it is difficult to assess the long term impact of popular media, it is clear

that it can have a cumulative effect over time, nudging public opinion towards – or away

from – hostility.68

Public Opinion

In December 2013 The Washington Post published an article explaining the

Carnegie Endowment’s efforts to assess U.S. perceptions of China. The Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace study was entitled, “U.S.-China Security

Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications.”69 What was important about this article

was not only what the survey found, but also how that information was portrayed in the

17

Post article. Although The Washington Post is not one of the top three circulated

newspapers, it is a prominent newspaper of the nation’s capital and thus illustrative for

the purposes of this analysis. The Carnegie survey was conducted throughout 2012 in

both the U.S. and China; it surveyed elite and general public perceptions in both

countries.70 This was intended to be the first of many iterations of this survey so that it

could chart the change in perceptions over time. The authors argued “Public and elite

attitudes in both the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence

on the U.S.-China security relationship.”71

In general, the respective surveys measured perceptions of attributes of their

own country and of the other country, and articulated them in three broad categories:

partner, competitor, or enemy, in multiple realms.72 Even though minorities of elites in

both countries view the other country as an enemy, there is a striking difference

between the low percentage of U.S. government elites (2%) who see China as an

enemy compared to the larger percentage of Chinese government elites (27%) who

view the U.S. as an enemy.73 While it is encouraging to know that only a small number

of U.S. elites view China as an enemy, this statistic must be understood within the

context of the greater U.S. population. In the broader population, a larger, yet still small

segment (15%) of the U.S. public sees China as an enemy while clear majorities of

each measured category see China as a competitor.74 This perception across many

demographics echoes Obama’s characterization of the U.S.-China relationship during

the statement he made in June 2013 after meeting with his Chinese counterpart.

When Presidents Obama and Xi met informally at the Rancho Mirage resort to

discuss the U.S.-China relationship, it was the first time they had met together to focus

18

exclusively on the bilateral relationship. During the post-meeting remarks, the

President’s comments closely mirrored the Carnegie proposition. He stated “we're more

likely to achieve our objectives of prosperity and security of our people if we are working

together cooperatively, rather than engaged in conflict.”75 Coupled with his remarks

before the bilateral meeting where he espoused that “healthy economic competition”

between the two largest economies was natural,” one can easily see the elements of

cooperation and economic competition evident in his view of the bilateral relationship.76

The President also explained that China’s “peaceful rise” is in the U.S.’s national

interest.77 This statement also clearly indicates that Chinese actions should be viewed

and characterized in a manner that understands that they will play an increasingly larger

role in international affairs.

Conclusion

In summary, this analysis finds that most planned and prepared elite speeches

and strategic publications use relatively homogenous language. This language depicts

the rise of China as an opportunity for the U.S. to compete economically and cooperate

with the PRC in areas of mutual interest while China continues to grow in power and

influence. In contrast, Presidential speeches during the 2012 presidential campaign,

initial reactions to the ADIZ and Cowpens incidents, and characterizations of China in

popular media depict China as an economic and security rival with the potential to

cause instability in the East and South China Seas. Awareness of these competing

narratives about China is important for two specific reasons. First, initial reactions to

Chinese behavior need to be carefully crafted so as not to misrepresent behavior in a

hostile manner when in fact that behavior may be interpreted as the rational, predictable

action of a nation-state – especially one whose power is increasing. Second,

19

understanding the socially constructed idea of China can ensure that policy options are

not eliminated for the wrong reasons. For example, if U.S. rhetoric about a Chinese act

is inflammatory or characterizes that act as hostile, then policy response options may be

unnecessarily limited to the kinds of options that respond out of a sense of ‘fear’ or

perceived loss of ‘honor,’ rather than rational ‘interest.’78

The disparity between campaign rhetoric and editorial cartoons on the one hand,

and the rather more prosaic rhetoric being constructed by U.S. policy elites is curious.

Based on the assumption that the public increases their attention to elite speeches

during the campaign season because of their interest in deciding how to vote and what

the candidates are saying, one could assume that the public’s perception of China is

influenced more significantly during this period. Especially when one considers that the

viewership of each of the three Presidential debates averaged 64 million viewers, the

impact of rhetoric during debates cannot be underestimated.79 Additionally, the average

American probably has not read the Defense Strategic Guidance, QDR or archived

speeches from the White House, leaving the debates and the open press articles as

unrivaled advocates for a specific image of China that is generally more antagonistic

than the image created by prepared speeches and publications.

Editorial cartoons read by a wider swath of the population are even more likely

than formal policy speeches to define the narrative in the public square. These cartoons

and articles, coupled with images portrayed by shows like The Colbert Report,

challenge pre-planned and prepared U.S. elite remarks that attempt to construct an

image of China as a rising power and a potential partner whose relationship with the

U.S. requires close attention but not fear. These efforts to portray the need for more

20

engagement between the U.S. and China are potentially drowned out by the emotional

rhetoric of the campaign trail and voices read in the news and heard on popular

programs. If one accepts the constructivist notion that culture gives context to policy

decisions, then avoiding a Thucydidean trap will require extremely careful crafting of the

public image of China during emotional events or campaigns.80 This need for diligence

is especially important as shown by Graham Allison who noted that “in 11 of 15 cases

since 1500 in which a rising power rivaled a ruling power, the outcome was war.”81

It may be accurate, then, to liken the rise of the PRC to the rise of Athens. Those

who have a voice in the national discourse need to ensure that they do not

unnecessarily constrain policy choices and cause the U.S. to follow the path of Sparta

by reacting with emotion to incidents between the U.S. and China that can be

characterized in a number of ways. Those incidents need to be portrayed in context so

that policy choices are not narrowed because of a socially constructed image that is

more hostile than objective analysis might suggest. U.S. policy-makers need to keep a

close watch on the image of China being constructed through public discourse. Though

they cannot control it, they can monitor it. By doing so they will better understand U.S.

public views during a crisis with China. This will better prepare and equip them to keep

such a crisis from escalating unnecessarily or arbitrarily.

Endnotes

1 Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the

Peloponnesian War (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 40 (para. 1.70).

2 Stephen Walt, “China’s New Strategy,” Foreign Policy, April 26, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/25/chinas_new_strategy (accessed March 28, 2014).

3 Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism, and Constructivism (New York: Routledge, 2013), 5.

21

4 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1999), 373-374.

5 Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 110 (Spring 1998): 38, in ProQuest (accessed February 27, 2014).

6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and David Welch, “International Actors, Power, and Authority,” in Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History, 8th ed. (Boston: Longman, 2011), 9.

7 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament (accessed October 28, 2013).

8 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy.com’s America Issue, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century (accessed October 28, 2013).

9 Richard Weitz, “Pivot out, Rebalance in,” The Diplomat, May 3, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/pivot-out-rebalance-in/ (accessed Februar 12, 2014).

10 The current U.S. National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy documents were all published in 2010, 2008, and 2011 respectively.

11 Christopher O. Meyer, “Convergence Toward a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms” European Journal of International Relations 2005, 527, citing Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 15.

12 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 34.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 71. This quote is actually Deibel’s definition of ‘socially constructed.’

16 Ibid., 71.

17 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.

18 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

19 Ibid., 117.

20 Ibid.

22

21 The World Bank, “GDP (Current US$),”

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc (accessed March 21, 2014).

22 Arms Control Center, “2012 Topline Global Defense Spending,” http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/2012_topline_global_defense_spending/ (accessed March 21, 2014).

23 U.S. Census Bureau Home Page, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/current/balance.html (accessed March 21, 2014).

24 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,” Washington DC, January 24, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address (accessed October 28, 2013).

25 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Democratic National Convention,” Charlotte, NC, September 6, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/07/remarks-president-democratic-national-convention (accessed October 28, 2013).

26 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President and Governor Romney in the Third Presidential Debate,” Boca Raton, FL, October 23, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/10/23/remarks-president-and-governor-romney-third-presidential-debate (accessed October 28, 2013).

27 Michael Schuman, “Obama vs. Romney: Who’s Right on China?” Time Online, October 24, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/10/24/obama-vs-romney-whos-right-on-china/ (accessed February 25, 2014).

28 Jennifer Jerit, “Survival of the Fittest: Rhetoric during the Course of an Election Campaign,” Political Psychology 25, no. 4 (August 2004): 566.

29 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Personnel Announcement,” Washington, DC, June 5, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/05/remarks-president-personnel-announcement (accessed October 28, 2013).

30 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People's Republic of China before Bilateral Meeting,” St. Petersburg, Russia, September 6, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/06/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-bilatera (accessed October 28, 2013).

31 Due to this analysis’s requirement for brevity, this statement is derived from Secretary of State speeches on March 7, May 3 and 18th, and September 5th of 2012 by Secretary Clinton and on April 13th and July 21st of 2013 by Secretary Kerry while speaking at events in China or speaking in the U.S. at events pertaining to China. Remarks and speeches are all found on the Department of State’s speech webpage, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/index.htm and http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/index.htm respectively for Secretaries Clinton and Kerry (accessed October 28, 2013).

23

32 John Kerry, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint Opening Session,”

Washington, DC, July 10, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/211773.htm#_ftnref1 (accessed October 28, 2013).

33 In the interest of brevity, those comments are not singularly identified, but specific Sec. of Defense speeches on January 5, March 12, and May 12 reflect this sentiment. All Sec. of Defense speeches are found archived at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/archive.aspx (accessed October 28, 2013).

34 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012) http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed October 28, 2013).

35 Chuck Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014), 17.

36 Ibid., 6.

37 Leon Panetta, “Speech delivered to the PLA Engineering Academy of Armored Forces,” Beijing, China, September 19, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1723 (accessed October 28, 2013).

38 American Forces Press Service, Hagel Issues Statement on East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, November 23, 2013, linked from Department of Defense News Articles at “News,” http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121223 (accessed January 9, 2014).

39 “Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan,” The Kaneti, Tokyo, Japan, December 3, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/03/remarks-press-vice-president-joe-biden-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-jap (accessed October 28, 2013); “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on U.S.-Korea Relations and the Asia-Pacific,” Yonsei University, Seoul, Republic of Korea, December 6, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/06/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-us-korea-relations-and-asia-pacific (accessed February 17, 2014).

40 “Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan.”

41 “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on U.S.-Korea Relations and the Asia-Pacific.”

42 Ibid.

43, “China Eyeing Contentious Air Defense Zone in East China Sea: Paper,” Japan Times, November 10, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/10/national/china-eyeing-contentious-air-defense-zone-in-east-china-sea-paper/#.UwKsx4WmX1P (accessed February 17, 2014).

44 “Interview: Gen. Hawk Carlisle, Commander, US Pacific Air Forces,” Washington DC, February 10, 2014 (accessed February 17, 2014).

24

45 Barbara Starr, “US China Confrontation,” CNN, December 13, 2013,

www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/politics/us-china-confrontation (last accessed January 14, 2014).

46 Chuck Hagel, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” December 19, 2013, linked from The Department of Defense Home Page at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5345 (accessed January 14, 2014).

47 This information was easily available in news sources from outside the U.S. For example, see Ananth Krishnan, “Chinese Media Blames U.S. for ‘Near Collision’,” The Hindu, December 17, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinese-media-blames-us-for-near-collision/article5466322.ece (accessed February 27, 2014).

48 Chris Buckley, “China Claims Air Rights Over Disputed Islands,” New York Times Online, November 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/china-warns-of-action-against-aircraft-over-disputed-seas.html?_r=0 (accessed February 23, 2014).

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Yuka Hayashi and Jeremy Page, “U.S., Japan Rebuke China in Island Dispute,” Wall Street Journal (Online), November 25, 2013, in ProQuest (accessed February 23, 2014).

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Calum MacLeod, “China Riles Japan, U.S. with Air Defense Zone,” USA Today Online, November 24, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/24/china-japan-disputed-islands/3690911/ (accessed February 23, 2014).

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Calum MacLeod, “China Says all OK with U.S.-China Sea Incident,” USA Today Online, December 18, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/12/18/china-naval-clash-sea/4111727/ (accessed February 23, 2014); Jane Perlez, “American and Chinese Navy Ships Nearly Collided in South China Sea,” The New York Times, December 15, 2013 in ProQuest (accessed February 23, 2013); Adam Entous, “Near Collision Between U.S., Chinese Naval Ships in South China Sea,” The Wall Street Journal (Online), December 14, 2013 in ProQuest (accessed February 23, 2014).

58 Entous, “Near Collision.”

59 Perlez, “American and Chinese Navy Ships.”

60 For an excellent explanation of how images were and are used for the purposes of persuasion, see Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,

25

2006); Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind (Manchester University Press, 2003); J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1997). These books were part of the syllabus for Dr. Donald Abenheim’s course on “Wars of Ideas, Mass Politics, Democracy, Persuasion, Images of the Enemy, [and] Strategic Communications” at the Naval Postgraduate School and are used with his permission.

61 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 134.

62 Patrick Chappatte, “United States and China in the Pacific,” International Herald Tribune, April 6, 2012.

63 Patrick Chappatte, “Japan-China Islands Dispute,” The New York Times, September 20, 2012; “Fishing for Islands,” The New York Times, June 3, 2013.

64 During a search of cartoons published throughout 2012 and 2013, China was typically depicted as the home for cyber spies (in a pre-Snowden era) and as a source of conflict over islands in the East and South China Seas each time there was a conflict between China and one of its regional neighbors. Due to this analysis’s brief nature, individual cartoons were not highlighted but can be found at http://editorialcartoonists.com/ (accessed October 28, 2013).

65 Colbert Nation Home Page, November 14, 2013, http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/430521/november-14-2013/philippines-typhoon-relief (accessed February 27, 2014).

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Colbert Nation viewership as reported by tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com reported viewership at 1.2 million for the week of Nov. 18 – Nov. 22 (Amanda Kondolojy, “Late Night TV Ratings For November 18-22, 2013,” December 2, 2013, http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2013/12/02/late-night-tv-ratings-for-november-18-22-2013/219434/ (accessed February 27, 2014) while newspaper circulation for the three newspapers mentioned in March 2013, as an example, was 5.9 million according to Neal Lulofs of the Alliance for Audited Media homepage, “Top 25 U.S. Newspapers for March 2013,” April 30, 2013, http://www.auditedmedia.com/news/blog/top-25-us-newspapers-for-march-2013.aspx (accessed February 27, 2014).

69 William Wan, “Chinese don’t See United States as an Enemy, Study Finds, but they Distrust its Government,” The Washington Post Online, December 11, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-dont-see-united-states-as-an-enemy-study-finds-but-they-distrust-its-government/2013/12/10/3d05d122-61b5-11e3-bf45-61f69f54fc5f_story.html (accessed February 23, 2014).

70 Michael D. Swaine et al., U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013).

71 Ibid., 3.

72 Ibid., 1, 10-11.

26

73 Ibid., 10.

74 Ibid., 11 shows that 65% or more of the surveyed demographic categories (public, government, military, business, scholars, and media) have this perception.

75 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China after Bilateral Meeting,” June 8, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china- (accessed February 25, 2014).

76 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China Before Bilateral Meeting,” June 7, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/07/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china- (last accessed February 25, 2014).

77 Ibid.

78 Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides, 43.

79 Nielson, “Final Presidential Debate Draws 59.2 million Viewers,” October 23, 2012, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2012/final-presidential-debate-draws-59-2-million-viewers.html (accessed March 21, 2014).

80 Graham T. Allison, Jr., “Obama and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap,” The New York Times Opinion, June 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/obama-and-xi-must-think-broadly-to-avoid-a-classic-trap.html?_r=0 (accessed January 16, 2014).

81 Ibid.