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    Socialist Renewal:

    Lessons from the

    "Calculation"

    Debate

    FIKRET ADAMAN AND PAT DEVINE

    t:crisis of confidence confronting socialists todayhas various causes. The most insistent, immediate rea-

    son is the historic failure of the Soviet model, with

    the attendant disintegration of country after country formerly

    within the Soviet sphere of influence, and the precipitate

    attempts of the ruling elites in these countries to restore orcreate some form of capitalism. In the short term, this ex-

    perience has placed all socialists on the defensive, including

    those who have long criticized the Soviet model in the name

    of socialism itself. This might be expected to pass as the

    realities of "actually existing" global capitalism make them-

    selves felt. Indeed, the removal of the Soviet model of "ac-

    tually existing" socialism from the historical stage creates

    space for the emergence of alternative, non-oppressive vi-sions of socialism, more in line with the values of human

    freedom and emancipation historically associated with the

    socialist project.

    However, the prevailing crisis of confidence in the pos-

    sibility of socialism is not just due to the Soviet experience

    and the absence of any examples of socialism in practice.

    It is also, and in the long run more seriously, due to the

    absence of any convincing theoretical model of how a so-

    cialist society, and in particular a socialist economy, might

    be organized. Important insights into the requirements of

    such a model can be gained from a re-examination of the

    "economic calculation" (orwirtschaftsrechnung) debate that

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    took place during the 1920s and 1930s and revived during

    the 1980s. The debate was about whether rational economic

    calculation was possible under socialism - defined as stateownership of the means of production. Its principal protago-

    nists were economists from the Austrian school, who denied

    the possibility, and socialist economists, most notably Oskar

    Lange, who affirmed it.

    Until recently the calculation debate was regarded pri-

    marily as part of the history of economic thought, having

    little relevance to the actual problems of constructing a so-

    cialist economy in practice. In the 1980s, however, the situ-ation began to change. On the one hand, growing awareness

    of the systemic problems of the Soviet model led to a re-

    newed interest in market socialism and the emergence of a

    modem school of market socialism, tracing its roots back

    to Lange's model. This has become the predominant para-

    digm within which work on the economics of socialism is

    currently being undertaken.! On the other hand, a modem

    neo-Austrian school began to contest the standard account

    of the calculation debate, arguing that it is based on a mis-

    understanding of the original Austrian challenge.s and that

    a proper understanding of the Austrian position finally dis-

    poses of any possibility of an effective economic system

    not based on private property and markets - including, of

    course, modem market socialism.I

    This paper seeks to draw some lessons from the calcu-

    lation debate, both the original and its recent revival, for

    the renewal of socialism. Part one contends that the argu-ments of all the major protagonists in the original debate

    were problematic as they were set largely within a static

    neoclassical framework. This is developed through an ex-

    amination of the work of Maurice Dobb, whose largely ig-

    nored contribution to the debate first addressed the limits

    of this framework, and through an analysis of the arguments

    of the neo-Austrian school, which approached the issue in

    a very different manner. We argue that Dobb made a signalcontribution in identifying the limits of Lange's celebrated de-

    centralized model. Lange failed to address the unavoidable un-

    certainty associated with atomistic decision making, especially

    in relation to investment, a feature which Dobb emphasized

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    in his arguments on behalf of central planning. The principle

    insight of the neo-Austrians, on the other hand, lies in their

    recognition of the importance of tacit knowledge. This wasalso implicit in the original Austrian position.

    The second part of the paper assesses the overall positions

    of Dobb and the neo-Austrians. We suggest that the neo-

    Austrians' advocacy of capitalism as the only effective way

    of mobilizing tacit knowledge fails to confront satisfactorily

    the insights of Dobb's contribution concerning the ineffi-

    ciencies of atomistic decision making. Dobb's analysis, how-

    ever, fails to recognize the importance of tacit knowledge,making his advocacy of central planning unconvincing as it

    stands. The paper ends by arguing that a process of partici-

    patory planning enables both the social mobilization of tacit

    knowledge and the ex ante coordination of major interde-

    pendent decisions - indeed, that each is a necessary con-

    dition for the other.

    Part One: Two Analytic Failures in the Historical "Neo-

    classical" Debate Although the challenge to the possibility

    of rational economic calculation under socialism came pri-

    marily from two prominent Austrians, Mises and Hayek, it

    was taken up primarily by socialist economists operating

    within a neoclassical framework. These "neoclassical" so-

    cialists interpreted the challenge as denying the possibility,

    in the absence of real markets for means of production, of

    arriving at a Pareto optimal static equilibrium. They, there-

    fore, sought to show how equilibrium could be achieved

    without such markets. The standard account of the debate

    accepts this neoclassical interpretation of the issue at stake

    and concludes that the socialists were successful in demon-

    strating that rational economic calculation is possible in an

    economy based on state ownership of the means of produc-

    tion'

    Mises' initial challenge was directed at a moneyless model

    of socialism in which the allocation of all means of produc-tion was decided centrally. Without prices for means of pro-

    duction, he argued, there would be no way of calculating

    costs and therefore no way of rationally allocating scarce

    resources among alternative uses.f This was the issue taken

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    up in the subsequent debate, with first centralized and then

    decentralized solutions offered as responses to Mises' chal-

    lenge. However, Mises also argued that the problem of eco-nomic calculation would not arise in a static state, but was

    only an issue in conditions of change and uncertainty: "the

    problem of economic calculation is of economic dynamics;

    it is no problem of economic stattcs." It is this argument,

    largely ignored in the historical debate, that is regarded by

    today's neo-Austrians as his central point.

    The centralized solutions to the problem of rational eco-

    nomic calculation were essentially developments of Walras'analysis, in which a general equilibrium is reached through

    a tatonuement procedure mediated by an imaginary auction-

    eer. The simultaneous equations underlying Walras' analysis

    can, in theory, be solved directly, rather than through an

    iterative process, provided that the data on production func-

    tions and the relevant utility function(s) are known. This

    had already been demonstrated by Barone, using the mathe-

    matical techniques developed by Pareto, who showed thathis "Ministry of Production" would arrive at exactly the same

    marginal equivalences as would a perfectly competitive mar-

    ket economy,"

    Both Pareto and Barone emphasized the fact that although

    it was analytically possible to solve their systems, it would

    not be practically possible, due to insuperable informational

    and computational problems. Despite this, however, the

    standard account of the calculation debate attributes the prac-

    tical argument against socialism above all to Hayek. This

    is not really surprising, since Hayek gave much greater

    prominence to the argument that the problems of data col-

    lection and analysis would be insuperable than did his prede-

    cessors.f Indeed, it was his emphasis on the practical prob-

    lems that led the neoclassical advocates of the possibility

    of rational calculation under socialism to conclude that

    Hayek's position represented a retreat. Mises' claim of theo-

    retical impossibility was regarded as a stronger objection

    than the claim of practical impossibility.

    The neoclassical socialists respondedto the allegedpractical

    impossibility of rational calculation under socialism by devel-

    opingdecentralizedmodelsthat economizedon theinformation

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    collecting and computing demands made on the Central Plan-

    ning Board. The best known of these models is that of Lange,

    perhaps the seminal work of market socialism.? In Lange'spreferred blueprint the Central Planning Board takes the

    place of Walras' auctioneer. Wages and prices for consumer

    goods are set in real markets but prices for means of pro-

    duction are announced by the Central Planning Board. Man-

    agers of state-owned enterprises and sectors treat prices

    (market determined and Central Planning Board announced)

    as parameters and follow two rules - minimize costs and

    set price equal to marginal cost. Enterprises hire labour andsell consumer goods in real markets, and buy and sell means

    of production from/to one another in simulated (pseudo) mar-

    kets. The Central Planning Board observes movements in

    stocks of means of production and adjusts prices accordingly,

    and this process of ex post coordination continues until an

    equilibrium set of prices is reached. Thus, it was claimed,

    rational economic calculation, resulting in a Pareto optimal

    allocation of resources, was possible under conditions ofstate-ownership of the means of production, just as it was

    under conditions of private ownership. There were, of

    course, many additional aspects to Lange's model, and many

    problems with it have been identified, not least the question

    of managerial motivation and, stemming from this, the need

    for the Central Planning Board to monitor enterprise adher-

    ence to the rules. However, the standard account of the de-

    bate is that Lange's model and subsequent refinements set-

    tled the argument in favour of the possibility of rationalsocialist calculation.

    Thanks to the modem neo-Austrian school, we now know

    that this interpretation can only be sustained within the static

    equilibrium framework of the neoclassical paradigm, in

    which two crucial sources of imperfection of knowledge are

    assumed away and data are assumed to be given. Dobb and

    the Austrians can be seen as having challenged this neoclas-

    sical analysis, but Dobb's main contribution was largely ig-nored, and the Austrians' position was not clarified suffi-

    ciently for its full significance to be understood.

    Dobb's Insight For Dobb, when comparing capitalism andsocialism, "the essential contrast is between an economy

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    where the multifarious decisions which rule production are

    taken each in ignorance of all the rest, and the economy

    where such decisions are coordinated and unified.t'U' Hismajor contribution to the economic calculation debate was

    to argue that Lange and the other principal participants on

    the socialist side missed the essence of socialism by a "nar-

    rowing of the focus of study to problems of exchange-rela-

    tions,"ll and that this prevented them from understanding

    that the central economic questions in relation to socialism

    are primarily those of production and the treatment of dy-

    namic problems. Dobb rejected the path of seeking to mimicthe working of the competitive market and argued instead

    for planning.

    Dobb's arguments for the advantages of planning may be

    summarized as follows. First, when decision makers are at-

    omized, as they necessarily are in the market mechanism,

    the expectations, on the basis of which they make their de-

    cisions, are formed in a context of uncertainty. This uncer-

    tainty is unavoidable in an atomistic economy but can beovercome by planning. In a market economy disequilibrium

    can only be corrected after the event. It "is only reached

    through the mechanism of fluctuations, which are themselves

    conditioned by the uncertainties inherent in production for

    a market when each autonomous decision is necessarily

    'blind' in part with respect to related decisions."12 Economic

    planning, by contrast, consists of an attempt to make inter-

    dependent decisions in a coordinated way, in advance ofany commitment of resources. As Dobb put it, "[t]he advan-

    tage of a planned economyper se consists in removing the

    uncertainties inherent in a market with diffused and autono-

    mous decisions, or it consists in nothing at all."13In response

    to Lerner's argument that with the same degree of foresight

    an atomistic and a planned economy would reach the same

    result,14 Dobb replied, "[t]o speak of a competitive economy

    achieving the same result, if it had the same degree of fore-

    sight, is to ignore the fact that its essential nature is that it

    does not and cannot possess the same degree offoresight.t'I>

    A second advantage of plannedex ante coordination, ac-

    cording to Dobb, arises in relation to external effects in pro-

    duction and consumption. Since interrelated decisions would

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    be coordinated before they were implemented, it would be

    possible to take account of the wider social effects of pro-

    duction that fall outside the balance sheet calculations ofatomized decision-making units. These social effects include

    not only the influence that the development of one industry

    or sector has on the possibilities for development of other

    sectors, but also the external effects of infra structural de-

    velopment and of infant industries. Dobb also raised the

    question of planning in relation to consumption, in order to

    tackle the issues, among other things, of public goods and

    externalities in consumption.Thirdly, only through planning can things which figure

    as "data" in a static context be converted into "variables"

    in a dynamic framework. Among the decisions which Dobb

    included in this category were those on the rate of invest-

    ment, the distribution of investment between capital and con-

    sumer goods industries, the choice of techniques, the re-

    gional distribution of investment, the relative rates of growth

    of transport, fuel and power, and of agriculture in relationto industry, the rate of introduction of new products and

    their character, and the degree of standardization or variety

    in production that the economy at its stage of development

    feels able to afford.! 6

    In summary, the analysis of the necessary imperfections

    of knowledge associated with the market process is what

    underlies Dobb's case for planning in production and con-

    sumption. In his 1953 review of the calculation debate Dobb

    notes,

    the quintessential function of planning as an economic mecha-nism is that it is a means of substituting ex ante co-ordinationof the constituent elements in a scheme of development - i.e.

    before decisions have been embodied in action and in actualcommitments - for the co-ordination ex post which a decen-tralized pricing system provides (via the "revising" effect of

    price movements which are the subsequent, and generally de-

    layed, effect of previous decisions, when the latter have bornefruit in actual input- or output-changes).17

    The Neo-Austrians' Insight There is disagreement, or at least

    a difference of emphasis, among modem neo-Austrians about

    the extent to which Mises and Hayek were themselves re-

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    sponsible for the fact that their socialist opponents in the

    economic calculation debate interpreted their challenge

    within the neoclassical framework. Lavoie, the principal ex-ponent of the revisionist interpretation of the debate, argues

    that the learning and discovery aspects of the market mecha-

    nism, the hallmark of the modem neo-Austrians' analysis

    and the aspects that, above all, distinguish the Austrian from

    the neoclassical position, were already present in the early

    contributions of Mises and Hayek.lf

    Kirzner, on the other hand, suggests that the underlying

    Austrian position was developed through the wirt-schaftsrechnung debate and only crystallized into a coherent

    and complete analysis in the later contributions of Mises

    and Hayek in the 1940s. Indeed, Kirzner argues that neither

    Mises nor Hayek were aware in the 1930s of just how sharply

    the Austrian concepts differed from those of the neoclassical

    school. He quotes Mises, writing in 1933, as follows:

    the Austrian and the Anglo-American Schools and the Schoolof Lausanne ...differ only in their mode of expressing the samefundamental idea and ...are divided more by their terminologyand by peculiarities of presentation than by the substance oftheir teachings.ts

    However, while there may be differences over the extent

    to which the Austrian contributions of the 1920s and 1930s

    anticipated subsequent developments, there is broad agree-

    ment among modem neo-Austrians about the distinctive fea-

    tures of their present analysis. The fundamental weakness

    of the neoclassical school is seen as its assumption that in-

    formation on prices and costs is objectively given. Instead,

    the neo-Austrians argue, knowledge is essentially subjective

    and can only be discovered in the course of competition,

    with the corollary that this inarticulate or tacit knowledge

    can neither be objectified and codified nor transferred. This

    Austrian notion of subjectivism, arising from the continu-

    ously changing environment, the dynamics of adjustment,and the inherent unpredictability of human activity, is a much

    wider concept than that of the neoclassical approach, which

    restricts subjectivism to price theory.

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    According to the modem Austrian school, the economic

    problem is not, as the neoclassical school maintains, the

    allocation of limited resources among limitless wants, butrather the question of how dispersed and fragmented knowl-

    edge can be socially mobilized. In this context, the function

    of the market process in coordinating the use of dispersed

    knowledge, and the activity of entrepreneurs operating in

    conditions of uncertainty, are complementary ways of un-

    derstanding the same reality. The market mechanism is con-

    ceptualized as selecting the efficient from inefficient, on the

    basis of how well they respond to the information signalledabout potentially profitable opportunities, and rewarding

    them accordingly. The crucial point is that the function of

    the market mechanism is not to achieve equilibrium but to

    transmit information and provide incentives. The transmis-

    sion of knowledge is not a passive activity. Competition

    motivates the mobilization of knowledge about more effi-

    cient ways of utilizing the factors of production. Thus, in

    the Austrian view, rivalrous entrepreneurial activity, allocat-ing and reallocating resources to meet constantly changing

    conditions, is the most important characteristic of economic

    life. As Barry puts it, in the Austrian paradigm, "competition

    and entrepreneurship explain how an economy moves

    through time; how it is that through a process of evolutionary

    adaptation dispersed knowledge is coordinated so that an

    order is produced."20

    The modem Austrian position has been clearly summa-

    rized by Lavoie. He identifies three "cognitive functions of

    markets" - computation, incentive and discovery. The first

    two functions are recognized by both Austrians and neoclas-

    sicals, but for the Austrians

    [w]hat is crucial to [the market's] cognitivefunction...is thatit providesa discoveryprocessthat by its very nature cannot

    be centrallydirectedbut dependson a bidirectionalcommuni-cative interplaybetweenits participants.z!

    This discovery process is crucial because it "produces a kind

    of social intelligence that depends on, but goes beyond, the

    individual intelligence of the system's llarticillants."22 It fol-

    lows from this analysis that, as Kirzner puts it,

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    [i]nstead of judging policies or institutional arrangements interms of the resource-allocation pattern they are expected to

    produce (in comparison with the hypothetically optimum pat-tern), we can now understand the possibility of judging themin terms of their ability to promote discovery.23

    To summarize the argument so far, two analytic failures

    have been identified in the neoclassical socialists' solution

    to the problem of rational economic calculation: first, the

    failure to address the uncertainty confronting atomized de-

    cision makers that arises from ignorance of one another's

    interdependent actions (as pointed out by Dobb); and, sec-ond, the failure to address the uncertainty inherent in the

    subjective nature of tacit knowledge, which can only be dis-

    covered by a process of social interaction among individuals

    (as pointed out by the Austrians). However, the responses

    of Dobb and the Austrians to the failures they identified are

    diametrically opposed. Dobb seeks to remove the uncertainty

    necessarily associated with atomized decision making by re-

    placing the market process with planned coordination ex

    ante, and assumes that the relevant information can be cen-

    trally gathered and processed in one way or another. The

    Austrians, by contrast, insist that only the market process,

    based on the rivalrous actions of individual entrepreneurs,

    can discover and mobilize the potential of dispersed tacit

    knowledge. They accept that the ex post coordination of the

    market mechanism involves inefficiencies due to mistakes,

    but argue that this is inherent in the nature of economic

    reality. As Kirzner puts it,

    [t]o describethe competitiveprocess as wastefulbecause it cor-rects mistakes only after they occur seems similar to ascribingthe ailment to the medicine which heals it, or even blaming thediagnostic procedure for the disease it identifies.24

    Part Two: A Resolution of Two Insights - Participatory

    Democratic Planning The insights of both Dobb and the

    (modem) Austrians are powerful. At the risk of over simpli-fication it could be said that, at a technical level, Dobb's insight

    identifies the fundamental systemic problem of capitalism,25

    while the Austrians' insight identifies the fundamental sys-

    temic problem of centralized administrative command

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    planning. Yet Dobb's advocacy of central planing fails to

    address the Austrians' insight, and the Austrians' advocacy

    of the capitalist market fails to address Dobb's insight. Par-ticipatory democratic planning (unlike market socialism) of-

    fers a way of combining the two insights.26

    The participatory planning alternative seeks to combine

    planning with the articulation of tacit knowledge. At first

    sight, such a task seems impossible. Planning, for Dobb,

    involves restrictions on the autonomy of enterprises and

    hence seemingly affords little scope for economic agents to

    participate actively in decision-making processes in orderto discover and articulate their tacit knowledge. The way in

    which the Austrians understand the process of discovery and

    articulation categorically rules out planning. The contradic-

    tion arises, however, because in neither context do there

    exist institutions to facilitate participation. Instead, people

    are subject to the coercive power of either administrative

    commands from the hierarchically organized planning

    mechanism or market forces operating with inherently un-

    predictable and unintended consequences.

    Democratic participatory planning is postulated as a proc-

    ess in which the values and interests of people in all aspects

    of their lives interact and shape one another through nego-

    tiation and cooperation. This process enables tacit knowledge

    to be discovered and articulated, and economic decisions to

    be consciously planned and coordinated on the basis of that

    knowledge. However, for a process of participatory planning

    to be possible, two prerequisites can be identified.First, people must have access to the material and personal

    resources that are necessary for their participation in the

    social process of discovery to be real. This highlights a strik-

    ing paradox in the Austrians' position. While correctly in-

    sisting on the universal importance of tacit knowledge, they

    also insist that such knowledge can only be discovered by

    entrepreneurs competing in a market process based on pri-

    vate ownership. This necessarily excludes the tacit knowl-edge potential of non-entrepreneurs from the social process

    of discovery and mobilization. At the level of the enterprise

    this omission might be overcome by various forms of worker

    participation. But such arrangements, although a move in

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    the right direction, do not deal with the tacit knowledge of

    people outside the enterprise. It follows that if Kirzner's

    criterion for judging institutional arrangements ("their abilityto promote discovery") is adopted, there is a prima facie

    case that market processes based on private ownership are

    socially inefficient. A set of institutional arrangements that

    generalizes access to the resources needed for participation

    in the social process of discovery would not only be more

    democratic and more just, but also more efficient.

    The second prerequisite for participatory planning is that

    decision making at all levels takes place through a partici-patory process involving all those affected by the decision.

    This, of course, contrasts sharply with the Austrian position

    in which participation is confined to the micro level. For

    Austrians, this is not a matter of choice but a necessary fact

    of life. As Hayek puts it:

    The main point of emphasisis that the conflict between, on theone hand, advocates of the spontaneous extended human order

    created by a competitivemarket, and, on the other hand, thosewho demand a deliberate arrangementof human interaction bycentral authority based on collective command over availableresources,is due to a factual error by the latter about how knowl-edge of these resources is and can be generated.27

    However it is mere assertion to state that social processes

    of discovery can only take the form of rivalrous behaviour

    in markets based on private ownership. Participatory plan-

    ning at each level of decision making would enable knowl-edge of previously unarticulated interests, possibilities and

    interdependencies to be discovered and rendered transparent,

    through a process of social interaction among those affected.

    It is precisely this possibility that enables' a more general

    social mobilization of tacit knowledge than that envisaged

    by the Austrians to be combined with the ex ante coordina-

    tion of major interdependent decisions that Dobb considered

    to be the essence of planning. At the same time, participatoryplanning, unlike Dobb's concept of planning, is not vulner-

    able to the Austrian critique that central planning is premised

    on a misunderstanding of the tacit nature of knowledge.

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    The two prerequisites for participatory planning may be

    linked by the concept of social ownership.28 Social owner-

    ship is neither private ownership nor state ownership, butrather ownership by those who are affected by the use of

    the assets involved. The principle underlying the concept of

    social ownership is that the right to decide on the use of

    assets should be vested in those who are affected by the

    decisions. The people who are affected by decisions over

    the use of assets will vary according to the assets involved,

    and the type of decision in question. Thus, the set of people

    who are affected by the use of the assets of an individualenterprise will be less inclusive than the set of people who

    are affected by the interdependent investment decisions of

    the industry to which the enterprise belongs. Social owner-

    ship at the level of the enterprise, defining the set of people

    who participate in enterprise decision making, will be dif-

    ferent from social ownership at the level of the industry,

    where a wider set of people would participate. Similarly,

    participatory planning at the level of a national economy,would involve social ownership and decision making by

    those affected by the decisions taken at those levels (or by

    their representatives).

    Several models that incorporate participation and differing

    degrees of planning have recently been developed,29 a re-

    curring theme in discussion of these models has been the

    question of their ability to deal with innovation. This is the

    obverse of the claim that generalized participation would

    result in a more efficient social mobilization of tacit knowl-

    edge than that resulting from the private entrepreneurial ac-

    tivity celebrated by the Austrians. The incentive to innovate

    within one possible participatory institutional structure has

    been elaborated elsewhere.J? In the context of this paper,

    however, the importance of a process for discovering the

    tacit, qualitative, knowledge of people about how they would

    be affected by innovation in their various roles - as pro-

    ducers, consumers, citizens, members of different commu-nities - cannot be overemphasized. Such knowledge, com-

    bined with the available scientific knowledge about the most

    lik.ely impact of innovation on the environment, is likely to

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    be an essential input into the process of negotiating a more

    sustainable relationship between economy and ecology.

    The intellectual climate of our postmodern age discountsthe possibility of purposeful, rational human action. Plan-

    ning, understandably, has come to be associated with grand

    designs gone wrong. The sobering experience of the Soviet

    experiment has reinforced Hayek's judgement of socialism

    as "The Fatal Conceit," and his advocacy of a more modest

    "spontaneous extended human order." Socialists must take

    this challenge seriously.U

    However, we do not think this is an insurmountable chal-lenge. The key to any future that socialism may have is

    likely to be found in the concept of participatory democracy.

    With respect to a socialist economy this concept makes it

    possible to render the Austrian insight into the nature of

    knowledge compatible with planning. This does not negate

    but rather reinforces the underlying belief of socialists in

    the ability of people to create a self-governing society of

    self-activating subjects.

    Notes

    1. A. Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism (London: Allen &

    Unwin, 1983); J. Le Grand and S. Estrin (008.), Market Socialism

    (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); P. Bardhan and J. Roemer, "Market So-

    cialism: A Case For Rejuvenation,"Journal of Economic Perspectives(1992).

    2. W. Keizer, "Recent Reinterpretations of the Socialist Calculation De-bate," Journal of Economic Studies (1989); D. Lavoie, "A Critique

    of the Standard Account of the Socialist Calculation Debate,"Journal

    of Libertarian Studies (1981); K. Vaughn, "Economic Calculation

    under Socialism," Economic Inquiry (1980).

    3. D. Lavoie, "Computation, Incentives and Discovery," in J. Prybyla

    (ed.), Privatising and Marketising Socialism, Annals of the American

    Academy of Political and Social Science (London: Sage, 1990).

    4. A. Bergson, "Socialism," in H. Ellis,A Survey of Contemporary Eco-

    nomics (New York: Blakiston, 1948); Lavoie, "A Critique of the

    Standard Account..."; D. Lavoie,Rivalry and Central Planning (Cam-

    bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).5. L. von Mises, "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Common-

    wealth," [orig. 1920]in F. von Hayek,Collectivist Economic Planning(London: Routledge, 1935).

    6. L. von Mises, Socialism (New York: Jonathan Cape, 1936), p. 139.

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    Adaman & DevineIRenewing Socialism

    7. E. Barone, "The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State,"

    [orig. 1908] in Hayek Collectivist Economic Planning.

    8. F. von Hayek, "The Present State of the Debate," in idem, CollectivistEconomic Planning.9. O. Lange, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," in B. Lippincott

    (ed.),On the Economic Theory of Socialism (Minneapolis: University

    of Minnesota Press, 1938).

    10. M. Dobb, Political Economy and Capitalism (London: Routledge,

    1937).

    11. M. Dobb, "Economists and the Economics of Socialism," [orig. 1939]

    in idem, On Economic Theory and Socialism (London: Routledge,

    1955).

    12. M. Dobb, "Review" [of B. Brutzkus, Economic Planning in Soviet

    Russia (London: Routledge, 1935); and Hayek, Collectivist EconomicPlanning], Economic Journal (1935), p. 535.

    13. Ibid.14. A. Lerner, "Economic Theory and Socialist Economy," Review of

    Economic Studies (1934).

    15. M. Dobb, "Economic Theory and Socialist Economy: A Reply,"Re-

    view of Economic Studies (1935), p. 150.

    16. M. Dobb, "A Review of the Discussion Concerning Economic Cal-

    culation in a Socialist Economy," in idem, On Economic Theory and

    Socialism, pp. 77 et seq.17. Ibid., p. 76.

    18. Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning.19. L. von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics (1933), p.

    214, cited in I. Kirzner, "The Economic Calculation Debate: Lessons

    for Austrians," Review of Austrian Economics (1988), p. 9.20. N. Barry, ''The 'Austrian' Perspective," in D. Whynes (ed.), What Is

    Political Economy? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).

    21. Lavoie, "Computation, Incentives and Discovery," p. 74.

    22. Ibid., p. 78.

    23. Kirzner, "The Economic Calculation Debate...," p. 13.

    24. I. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago: University

    of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 232.25. And also of market socialism; See P. Devine, "Market Socialism or

    Participatory Planning?" Review of Radical Political Economics(1992).

    26. F. Adaman, "A Critical Evaluation of the Economic Calculation De-

    bate with Special Reference to Maurice Dobb's Contribution," (un-

    published Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences,

    University of Manchester, 1993).27. F. von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, edited

    by W. Bartley (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 7.

    28. P. Devine, Democracy and Economic Planning (Cambridge: Polity

    Press, 1988).29. M. Albert and R. Hahnel, The Political Economy of Paricipatory

    Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Devine,

    Democracy and Economic Planning; D. Elson, "Market Socialism or

    Socialization of the Market," New u:ft Review 172 (1988).30. Devine, "Market Socialism or Participatory Planning?"

    31. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit. ...

    77