Social Science on 2010

© The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navSocial Science Information, 0539-0184; Vol. 49(2): 1–20; 358646

DOI: 10.1177/0539018409358646 http://ssi.sagepub.com

Theory and methods

Théorie et méthodes

Etienne Mullet, Stéphanie Nann, Joachim Kadima Kadiangandu, Félix Neto and María da Conceição Pinto

The granting of forgiveness in an intergroup context: African and Asian social representations

Abstract. The model for representing intergroup forgiveness suggested by Neto, Pinto & Mullet (2007a) has been extended through the examination of data from a large sample (n = 1036) of Asian (Cambodians and East Timorese) and African (Angolans, Guineans and Mozambicans) adults who have been personally affected by long-term wars and conflicts in their area. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that a nine-factor model could adequately fit the whole set of data. Overall, a large majority of the participants agreed with the view that forgiveness as an intergroup process was conceivable. For a majority of the participants: (a) the aim of the intergroup forgiveness process is reconciliation with the former offender; (b) the process does not need to be strictly conditional on adequate reparation and compensation; (c) it should be democratic; in other words, forgiveness should not be decided solely by politicians, traditional or religious authorities; (d) it belongs to the forgiver–forgiven dyad – in other words, interference from the international community should be minimal; (e) it should be public (and not a negotiation between members of the elite) – forgiveness should be announced to the whole community using broad international languages; and (f) it should be an all-encompassing process, that is, it should encompass all the members of the requesting group, all the members of the forgiving group and all the offences.

Key words. Angola – Cambodia – East Timor – Forgiveness – Group – Guinea-Bissau – Mozambique

Résumé. Le modèle de représentation du pardon intergroupe proposé par Neto, Pinto & Mullet (2007a) a été étendu à travers l’examen d’un échantillon large de données (n = 1036) recueillies en Asie (Cambodge et Timor Leste) et en Afrique (Angola, Guinée-Bissau et Mozambique) auprès d’adultes ayant directement souffert des guerres et des conflits qui

2 Social Science Information Vol 49 – no 2

ont longtemps ravagé leurs pays. Des analyses factorielles exploratoires et confirmatoires ont montré qu’un modèle complexe à neuf facteurs pouvait rendre compte des données de manière adéquate. Une large majorité de participants est en accord avec l’idée que le pardon intergroupe est un concept qui a du sens. Pour une majorité de participants: (a) le but du pardon intergroupe est la réconciliation avec l’agresseur; (b) le processus de pardon intergroupe ne doit pas être strictement subordonné à des repartions ou compensations adéquates; (c) ce processus doit être démocratique, c’est-à-dire que le pardon ne doit pas être décidé par les politiciens ou les autorités religieuses ou traditionnelles; (d) ce processus appartient à la dyade pardonnant–pardonné – les interférences de la communauté internationale doivent se trouver réduites au minimum; (e) le processus doit être public et ne pas résulter d’une négociation secrète entre membres de l’élite – le pardon doit être annoncé à toute la communauté dans des langues internationales de grande communication; et (f) ce doit être un processus large englobant tous les membres du groupe demandeur, tous les membres du groupe qui pardonne, et tous les torts commis.

Mots-clés. Angola – Cambodge – Groupe – Guinée-Bissau – Mozambique – Pardon – Timor Est

In more than thirty countries (e.g. Chile, El Salvador, Germany, Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Honduras), truth commissions have been a component of the process by which a nation has attempted to rebuild itself after a period of division, violent conflict and/or civil war (Minow, 1998; Rothberg & Thomson, 2000; Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd, 2000; Hayner, 2002; Long & Brecke, 2003; Skaar, Gloppen & Suhrke, 2005; Borer, 2006; Mullet, Neto & Pinto, 2008). The emergence in Argentina of a National Reconciliation Movement during the early 1980s culminated in the work of the Republic of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Rothberg & Thompson, 2000). The South African commission, which was largely based on the idea of forgiveness (Tutu, 2000), demonstrated:

the possibility of progress towards bridging the divide peacefully in a post-conflict society. It facilitated the beginning of a dialogue between former opponents, between victims and perpetrators; through its special hearings into the role of different institutions in the apart-heid era, it attempted to promote understanding; through living examples of pain, grief, and cruelty, it encouraged reflection on responsibility for past wrongs, whilst at the same time supporting the possibility of forgiveness; it understood the need for redress but did not seek to punish. In all these ways, and by the compassion and concern of the Commissioners, it offered hope for a better future. (Jenkins, 2002: 251)

Reconciliation and forgiveness

The precise meaning of the term reconciliation depends on the degree to which trust and cooperation have been restored. Four levels can be usefully

Mullet et al. The granting of forgiveness 3

distinguished. At the lowest level, reconciliation means little more than acquiescence and submission (because they are the only options available).

At the second level, reconciliation means non-lethal coexistence: Civil strife has been stopped, the fury between the parties has subsided, and a modus vivendi has been agreed on. If fighting has been put to rest, the issues that led to the fighting have, however, not been fully resolved. Crocker viewed reconciliation of this type as the ‘thinner form of reconciliation; that is, refraining from one’s impulses at insulting or killing the person guilty of severe offences’ (Crocker, 2003: 54).

At the third, more ambitious level, reconciliation means democratic reci-procity. Former enemies resume the capability to socially interact and to cooperate, at least minimally; that is, the capacity to live together, to hear each other, to work together and to forge compromises on a daily basis (Crocker, 2003). This third level of reconciliation has also been called trust-building reconciliation:

The process of trust-building reconciliation aims to replace distrust with trust, disregarding the painful past and focussing instead on repeated intergroup cooperation in the present. This is a prolonged process through which ingroup members gradually learn to accept the adversary’s positive intentions at face value and to base their own judgments and actions on the adversary’s words and deeds. (Nadler & Liviatan, 2004: 218)

At the fourth, much more demanding level, reconciliation means the com-plete termination of enmity, the restoration of friendship and widespread collaboration for the attainment of mutually defined goals. This level implies mutual apologies, mutual forgiveness, and deep changes and adjust-ments to everyone’s cultural values and political attitudes. ‘Reconciliation suggests that antagonists have been brought into a grander harmony or unity’ (Digeser, 2001: 65). Crocker saw in this type of reconciliation the ‘thicker form of reconciliation’, which ‘implies forgiveness, mercy, mutual healing, and a restored sense of common humanity’ (2003: 54). This fourth level of reconciliation has also been called socio-emotional reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan, 2004: 218). Although this definition of reconciliation has sometimes been referred to as ‘unhelpful’ by some authors (Villa-Vicencio, 2006: 67), it can be argued that it may precisely be the attainment of this level of reconciliation that has allowed European nations to build a common future (see also Neto, Pinto & Mullet, 2007a, 2007b).

Examples of intergroup forgiveness

Early examples of actions by political leaders that also support the possibility of forgiveness in political settings have been analyzed by Shriver (1995).


One of the strongest examples given by Shriver of how forgiveness may be applied to politics is to be found in the conduct of the leaders of the 1865 Charleston Colored People’s Convention. In this convention, two thousand former slaves met to celebrate freedom and to protest against a discrimina-tory state legislature already at work in many parts of the country. The final document issued at the end of the convention was entitled: ‘Address to the White inhabitants of the State of South Carolina’. The most significant excerpt, from the viewpoint of the present study, is the following piece of text:

We are American by birth, and we assure you that we are American in feeling … We would address you – not as rebels and enemies, but as friends and fellow-countrymen, who desire to dwell among you in peace, and whose destinies are interwoven and linked with those of the whole American people, and hence must be fulfilled in this country. (Shriver, 1995: 175)

The fact that such words had been pronounced so few times after the liberation of the slaves in the South and in spite of all the wrongs that black people ‘so long and silently endured in this country’ constituted an unprecedented politi-cal achievement. Contemporary people ‘of all races who do not resonate with astonishment to these words are historically unmusical’ (Shriver, 1995: 176).

One century later, Martin Luther King’s political action was still com-pletely in line with the political views and moral stances contained in the ‘Address to the White inhabitants’. Over the 14 years between his initiation of the Civil Rights Movement in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955, and his assassination in 1968, King

persisted in his call for a non-retaliatory struggle for justice against laws and antagonists often backed up by one or another form of retaliatory violence.… King called his church followers to a moral protest fortified by other forms of pressure which, while short of vio-lence, constituted real power. (Shriver, 1995: 181)

His hope was that nonviolence, as a consistent response to violence ‘[would] cause the oppressors to become ashamed of their own methods and we [would] be able to transform enemies into friends’. Under the leadership of King, black people struggled ‘for justice with a method that has reconciling power built into it’ (p. 181). We think it is no exaggeration to see in the Charleston Colored People’s Convention and in Martin Luther King’s political precepts early precursors of the Truth and Reconciliation Movement initiated in the early1990s in the Republic of South Africa (see also Henderson, 1996, for numerous other examples of forgiveness in politics).

These appeals to forgiveness and reconciliation between persons and between groups are associated with the fact that political leaders and spiritual leaders have been made increasingly aware that during any conflict ‘hearts and minds are as ravaged by war and violence, and in as much need of reconstruction, as burnt out towns or villages’ (Lerche, 2000: 1; see also Licata, Klein & Gély, 2007). As stated by Azar, Mullet & Vinsonneau:


a lasting peace cannot be brought about between different communities who have fought each other for many centuries if the cycle of violence is not broken at some time. This cycle can be broken if the members of the different parties decide to do so, and decide not only to negotiate, but also to forgive. (1999: 170)

People’s social representations on intergroup forgiveness

‘Empirical research into interpersonal forgiveness is a relatively young field of scientific enquiry …, and yet it still is decades ahead of similar work in inter-group forgiveness’ (Roe, 2007: 5; see also Cairns et al., 2005). This is partly because forgiveness has long been conceived by moral philosophers and then by social psychologists as a process that can only involve people directly con-nected with the offence; that is, the offender and the offended. Moral philoso-phers have tended to accept what Shriver termed ‘the captivity of forgiveness’ (1995: 113) when speaking of issues of individual, personal resentment, ban-ishing from legitimacy the notion of third-party guilt and responsibility along with third-party forgiveness (for similar conceptions, see Tavuchis, 1991; Henderson, 1996; Digeser, 2001; Amstutz, 2004). Even proponents of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa ‘framed forgiveness as an interpersonal relationship between individual victims and perpetrators and not as an intergroup social relationship’ (Chapman, 2007: 52). As a result, some of the first attempts at studying forgiveness in socio-political contexts addressed only interpersonal forgiveness (e.g. Azar, Mullet & Vinsonneau, 1999; Azar & Mullet, 2001, 2002; Ahmed, Azar & Mullet, 2007).

This representation of forgiveness as a strictly interpersonal process, however, does not take into account the fact that, as was suggested in the previous sections: (a) many, if not most major injuries in social life are col-lective (Amstutz, 2004; Gorringe, 2004; Totten, Parsons & Charny, 2004); (b) in war in particular, offences are committed not only against individuals but against the whole society (Thomas & Garrod, 2002); (c) the responsi-bilities for these injuries are frequently shared by many individuals at the same time or at different times; (d) the proper justice for them is often unob-tainable (Digeser, 2001); (e) to be complete, the confession of these offences must be a collective enterprise; and (f) the proper cure for them can be undertaken only at a community level (Tutu, 2000).

Another reason why few empirical studies have been conducted on inter-group forgiveness probably also lies in the fact that, in most cases of collec-tive offences that immediately come to mind (e.g. the Holocaust, the genocide in Rwanda or the political violence in Tibet), the very idea of for-giveness seems to be offensive. ‘Even to people outside the victim group, the idea that survivors should forgive following the genocide is an affront,


an anathema’ (Staub & Pearlman, 2001: 197). Finally, even in circumstances where the concept of intergroup forgiveness is deemed to be relevant, it remains a difficult concept to grasp, at least from the Western viewpoint. That is why empirical studies on intergroup forgiveness have been difficult to formulate, and possibly why research proposals have not been readily funded, despite the fact that the universality of forgiveness has been amply demonstrated (Kadima Kadiangandu et al., 2007; Paz, Neto & Mullet, 2007, 2008; Suwartono, Prawasti & Mullet, 2007).

Neto, Pinto & Mullet (2007a, 2008) have examined the social representa-tions that East Timorese, Angolan and Guinean adults who have survived the many conflicts that took place in their countries may have about intergroup forgiveness (for a general review on social representations, see Moscovici, 2000). In the East Timor sample, a large majority of participants agreed that the granting of forgiveness in an intergroup context was conceivable. Only a small percentage of participants believed that it was not possible for a group of people to forgive another group of people. Furthermore, more than half of the sample agreed with the idea that intergroup forgiveness was meaningful even in the absence of apologies from the other group. In the Angolan sample and in the Guinean sample, the percentage of participants who agreed with the idea that a group of people could forgive another group of people, even without any request for forgiveness, was even higher than in the East Timor sample. In addition, in all three countries, these results were robust as regards age, gender and other individual-difference variables, including victim status. They were consistent with results concerning the symmetrical concept of seeking forgiveness in an intergroup context, showing that a large majority of participants from African countries believed that it was possible for a group of people to seek forgiveness from another group of people (Kadima Kadiangandu & Mullet, 2007; Neto, Pinto & Mullet, 2007b).

In East Timor, as well as in Angola and Guinea, participants appeared to have articulated representations of what could define granting forgiveness in an intergroup context. Their responses were clearly structured, and referred to important questions such as: (a) What is the aim of this process? (b) Should adequate reparation occur before the start of the process? (c) Who may decide to forgive? (d) What may be the role of international institutions? And finally: (e) To whom should the decision to forgive be announced? That a clear factor structure was evidenced in one study and replicated in a second study is of considerable importance. If the participants had no clear represen-tation about intergroup granting of forgiveness or, worse, if the items in the questionnaire had been largely meaningless to them, their responses to these items would have been given in a more or less random way, and, as a result, no clear factor could have been found, and no model could have been tested. In other words, the appearance and interpretability of the factors, and their


replication within different samples, were not just accessory methodological aspects of these studies; they in fact constitute a strong guarantee that what was studied was meaningful to the participants.

The present synthesis

In this article, we present and discuss findings on intergroup forgiveness that were gathered on a larger sample of participants (n = 1036) than those analysed by Neto, Pinto & Mullet (2007a, 2008). Our augmented set of data included, in addition to the East Timorese (n = 354); Angolan (n = 250) and Guinean sam-ples (n = 198), which were separately examined in the previous studies, two new samples, from Cambodia (n = 147) and from Mozambique (n = 82). As indicated before, several separable factors characterizing the way people may represent intergroup forgiveness have been found. By reanalysing the whole set of data from these five Asian and African countries, we expected to find a richer factor structure, and we hoped that this new structure would be robust enough to allow a direct comparison of the results between these five countries. Our hypothesis regarding a richer structure was, among other things, based on the fact that a factor referring to the role of religious and traditional authorities and to the role of international bodies was to be found in all three samples already analysed (East Timorese, Angolan and Guinean). However, this factor did not have the exact same composition in each case. In the study conducted in East Timor, it clearly referred to the role of the religious authorities. In the study conducted in Guinea, it referred mainly to the role of the international bodies. As a result, we suspected that, if a larger sample were to be available, two factors might be distinguishable, one that referred to local authorities (reli-gious or traditional) and the other that referred to international authorities.

The total sample in the present study was composed of 515 females and 521 males from the Luanda area of Angola, the city of Pnomh Pen in Cambodia, the Dili area of East Timor, the Bissau area of Guinea-Bissau and the Maputo area of Mozambique. The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 70 years, and the mean age was 27.60 (SD = 9.31). Seventy-nine percent of the participants declared they believed in God, and 72% declared they were regular mosque-, temple- or churchgoers. As many as 58% of the participants considered they had personally suffered from the conflicts in their area, and 76% of them considered they had suffered through at least one of their family members. Only 18% of the participants declared they had not suffered – either directly or indirectly – from the conflicts. Overall, the participation rate was 72%.

Participants were approached in various ways, as suggested by Robson (1993). Some were known by the researchers or by a member of their family. They were contacted directly, explained the aim of the study and asked to


participate. These first participants, after working with the researchers, helped to contact other people. Direct contact and mutual reassurance convinced people to participate in the studies. Special efforts were made to contact peo-ple from different geographical areas of these regions in order to maximize, as much as possible, the representativeness of the sample. However, for evident reasons, the samples were composed only of people who were literate.

The material consisted of several different questionnaires, which had, how-ever, 82 items in common. These common items referred to the meaningful-ness of intergroup forgiveness and possible representations about granting intergroup forgiveness (if this concept was deemed meaningful). A large scale was printed at the end of each item. The two extremes of the scale were labelled ‘Disagree completely’ and ‘Completely agree’. The questionnaire was written in Cambodian, in Portuguese (the official language of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique) and in Tetum (the official language of East Timor). The material had also been submitted to several knowledgeable indi-viduals from each country in order to detect any possible inconsistency.

The data were gathered from September 2003 to April 2006, depending on the country. Each participant responded individually in his/her own home or at the university, depending on which he/she found most convenient. The experimenters asked participants to read the questionnaire items – sentences expressing feelings or beliefs on intergroup forgiveness – and to rate his/her degree of agreement with each statement.

A set of well-structured responses

Each rating by each participant was converted to a numerical value (express-ing the distance between the mark on the response scale and the origin of the scale; that is, the left anchor. These numerical values were then subjected to statistical analyses. The whole sample was randomly divided into two numer-ically equivalent sub-samples. The analytical procedure was the classical one; that is, the first sub-sample was used for building a new factor model, and the second sub-sample was used for testing the validity of this new model.

A first exploratory factor analysis (principal component) was conducted on the first sub-sample. On the basis of the interpretability of the findings (and other classical statistical indices), a nine-factor solution was retained and sub-jected to VARIMAX rotation (since we sought factors that were as independent as possible). Four items were retained for each factor, the ones with the highest loadings. A second exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the selected 36 items, and the nine-factor solution was again subjected to VARIMAX rotation. The results of this second analysis are shown in Table 1.

Mullet et al. The granting of forgiveness 9T

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Mullet et al. The granting of forgiveness 11T

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The nine factors were labelled ‘Role of international bodies’ (9% of the variance), ‘Role of citizens’ (democratic process) (7%), ‘Process aimed at reconciliation’ (8%), ‘Global and national process’ (8%), ‘Role of politi-cians’ (6%), ‘Public process’ (7%), ‘Receivers of the forgiving message’ (7%), ‘Process not subordinate to reparation or compensation’ (5%), and ‘Role of traditional and religious authorities’ (6% of the variance). (These factors will be explained further.)

A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the second half of the sample. The model tested was the correlated nine-factor model shown in Table 1 (four items for each factor). The fit of the model was good. The GFI and CFI values were close to .90 (.91 and .89, respectively). The Chi²/d.f. value (2197/558) was lower than 5 (3.93). The RMSEA value was lower than .08 (.049 [.047 to .051]), and the RMR value was lower than .05 (.049). All path coefficients were significant, p < .001. Detailed results are shown in Table 1. Cronbach alpha values were computed; they ranged from .65 to .89.

A meaningful set of representations factors

Raw agreement scores were transformed into three categories. The seven lower scores were considered as defining the disagreement range; the seven higher scores were considered as defining the agreement range; and, finally, the three central scores were considered as defining the neutral range. As a result, what is called percentage of agreement (or disagreement) in this study is the percentage of responses that were registered in the agreement (or disagreement) area.

No less than 80% of the participants agreed with the idea that it is possible for a group of persons to forgive another group of persons. Only 10% of the participants disagreed with this idea and 10% were indeterminate. When apologies from the offending group were absent, the agreement percentage dropped to 48%, 41% of the participants disagreed with the idea and 11% were indeterminate. The Cambodians, more than the other participants, insisted on the necessary presence of apologies from the offending group (so that intergroup forgiveness is meaningful). The nine factors are presented below. All the between-group reported differences were significant, p < .001.

Role of international bodies. This factor loaded items related to the possible role of third parties and international bodies. One representative item was ‘Forgiveness should be announced from the UN’. From one group to another, alpha values ranged from .86 to .92. Overall, the participants tended to disagree with the idea that international bodies may have a role in the intergroup for-giveness process (42% disagreed, 23% were neutral and 35% agreed).


There were notable differences between groups: 57% of the Cambodians and 56% of the Angolans disagreed, whereas 49% of the Guineans, 41% of the East Timorese and 41% of the Mozambicans agreed. At the item level, however, participants from all groups clearly agreed with the idea that for-giveness should be announced in one or several broad, international lan-guages (63%).

Role of citizens (democratic process). This factor loaded items related to the role of lay people for deciding whether the group should forgive or not and for designating a speaker. Alpha values ranged from .56 to .79. Overall, the participants agreed with the idea that the intergroup-forgiveness process should be a democratic process (58% agreed, 22% neither agreed nor disagreed and 19% disagreed). The Cambodians and the East Timorese (73% and 65%, respectively) agreed more frequently with this idea than the Angolans and the Mozambicans (48% and 49%).

Process aimed at reconciliation. This factor loaded items related to the many possible symbolic acts and proposals that may accompany the granting of intergroup forgiveness. Alpha values ranged from .73 to .91. Overall, the participants agreed with the idea that the objective of intergroup forgiveness is reconciliation (73% agreed, 15% were neutral and 12% disagreed). The East Timorese, the Angolans and the Mozambicans (80%, 77% and 77%, respec-tively) agreed more frequently with this idea than the Cambodians (59%).

Global and national process. This factor loaded items related to the pos-sible scope of the forgiveness process (e.g. national process versus local process). One representative item was ‘Forgiveness may be granted by only a fraction of the offended group, the ones who agree to forgive’. Alpha val-ues ranged from .67 to .83. Overall, the participants tended to disagree with the idea that the process may be a fractional process (20% agreed, but 52% disagreed and 28% neither agreed nor disagreed). The Cambodians and the Angolans (64% and 64%, respectively) disagreed more frequently with this idea than the Guineans and the Mozambicans (43% and 40%).

Role of politicians. This factor loaded items related to the possible role of politicians in the forgiveness process (e.g. deciding or speaking on behalf of the group). Alpha values ranged from .66 to .83. Overall, the participants disagreed with the idea that politicians may have a role in the intergroup forgiveness process (51% disagreed, 26% neither agreed nor disagreed and 23% agreed). Again, the Cambodians and the Angolans (67% and 54%,


respectively) disagreed more frequently with this idea than the Guineans and the Mozambicans (42% and 40%).

Public process. This factor loaded items related to the way forgiveness might be publicly announced (e.g. in which language, from which territory, in which place). Alpha values ranged from .72 to .81. Overall, the participants held very different views on the way forgiveness may be publicized (40% agreed, 32% disagreed and 28% were neutral). The East Timorese tended to agree (49% agreed) whereas the other groups were internally divided.

At the item level, a majority of participants agreed, however, with the idea that forgiveness should be announced from the requesting group’s territory (53% agreed), or a symbolic or sacred place (48% agreed), rather than in locations or buildings connected with political authorities.

Receivers of the forgiving message. This factor loaded items related to the identity of the persons or groups of persons to whom forgiveness should be announced. Alpha values ranged from .71 to .81. Overall, the participants held very different views regarding the identity of the possible receivers of the message. As a result, the overall score was neutral.

At the item level, a majority of participants agreed, however, with the idea that forgiveness should be announced to the other group’s particularly respected individuals (56% agreed) and that it may be accompanied by offers of disarmament (56% agreed).

Process not strictly subordinate to reparation or compensation. This factor loaded items related to the possible conditions under which forgiveness might be granted (e.g. adequate reparation, punishment of the main perpetrators). Alpha values ranged from .47 to .78. Overall, the participants disagreed with the idea that forgiveness should be subordinated to reparation or compen-sation (61% disagreed, 25% were neutral and 14% agreed). The Guineans, the Mozambicans and the Angolans more frequently disagreed with this idea (77%, 77% and 71%, respectively) than the Cambodians and the East Timorese (51% and 45%).

Role of traditional and religious authorities. This factor loaded items related to the possible role (e.g. deciding or speaking on behalf of the group) of reli-gious authorities and traditional authorities (the local kings and chiefs). Alpha values ranged from .63 to .75. Overall, the participants disagreed with the idea that the traditional and religious authorities may have a role in the intergroup forgiveness process (26% agreed, 25% neither agreed nor disagreed and 48%


disagreed). The East Timorese tended to agree (45% agreed), but the Angolans and the Cambodians strongly disagreed (74% and 62% disagreed).

In summary

The study extended the model of social representations of intergroup for-giveness suggested by Neto, Pinto & Mullet (2007a) to a larger sample of Asian and African adults who have been personally affected by long-term wars and conflicts in their countries. It was shown that a slightly more com-plex model comprised of nine factors indisputably fitted the whole set of data. The nine different aspects of the intergroup-forgiveness process pos-ited in the model can, as a result, be considered as distinct aspects that can be separately taken into consideration in practical applications.

Overall, and as expected, a large majority of the participants agreed with the view that forgiveness as an intergroup process was conceivable. A strong minority even considered it as conceivable in the absence of apologies from the other group.

Regarding what can be called the spirit of the intergroup process, the level of agreement between participants from different countries may be considered as high. For a large majority: (a) the aim of the intergroup-forgiveness process is reconciliation with the former offender; (b) the process does not need to be strictly conditioned on adequate reparation and compensation or on the pros-ecution of the individual(s) responsible for the atrocities; (c) it must be a democratic process – in other words, forgiveness should not be decided solely by politicians or by traditional or religious authorities; (d) it belongs to the forgiver–forgiven dyad – in other words, interference from the international community should be minimal; (e) it might be announced to the whole com-munity or to particularly respected individuals of the community, but not especially to politicians; and (f) the process should, when appropriate, be an all-encompassing process – that is, it should encompass all members of the requesting group, all members of the forgiving group and all of the offences.

Despite high agreement between participants from different countries, several notable differences were found. The Cambodians, more than most of the participants in the other groups, tended to disagree with the ideas that (a) intergroup forgiveness is meaningful even when no apologies have been offered, (b) the process should be a democratic process and (c) material compensation should not be required. This can be related to the fact that, in present-day Cambodia, members of the former Red Khmer Party are still in government; that is, several of the perpetrators of the atrocities are still cur-rently governing the victimized group. The victims probably expect them at


least to recognize their past political misconduct. The current government of Cambodia is considering the possibility of a truth commission operating in the country.

The East Timorese, more than most participants in other groups, tended to agree with the ideas that (a) religious authorities and international bodies play a role in the process, (b) the process is a public process, and (c) material compensation is required. These differences are consistent with what was observed in East Timor on the seeking of forgiveness in an intergroup context (Neto, Pinto & Mullet, 2007b). These differences possibly reflect the fact that the Catholic bishop of Dili played a positive role during the occupation of the country by the Indonesian army – he was, as a result, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize – and that a (public) truth commission has been operative in the country from 2002 to 2005. They also probably reflect the fact that the future of this country is largely dependent on the attitude of its powerful neighbour, Indonesia. East Timor is the poorest country in the world, thus Indonesian assistance and collaboration is understandably conceived as vital.

The Mozambicans, more than most participants in the other groups, tended to agree with the ideas that (a) international bodies and politicians play a role in the process, and (b) the process is a fractional one. These dif-ferences are consistent with what was observed in Mozambique on the seek-ing of forgiveness in an intergroup context (Neto, Pinto & Mullet, 2007b). They probably reflect the way Mozambican factions reached agreement (the Rome General Peace Accords) after 25 years of bloody conflict; that is, only through the effective mediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio with the support of the UN. They also possibly reflect the fact that the two former combatant groups occupied two geographically different parts of the coun-try. The same line of reasoning may apply to the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

Limitations and future studies

The present set of studies concerned the representations people may have about intergroup forgiveness; that is, it addressed the general conditions in which a group may decide to forgive another group. Items were phrased in very general terms, and made simple enough to be understood and answered by most people. These studies were clearly not about the extent to which par-ticipants were, individually or as a group, willing to forgive perpetrators of violence. Directly asking African and Asian people the extent to which they, as a group, agree to forgive the perpetrators of violence, without preliminarily examining whether or not the idea of intergroup forgiveness is meaningful for them and what its meaning could be, would have been imprudent.


As the idea of intergroup forgiveness seems to be endorsed by a large majority of people (in at least five Asian and African countries), and as these populations seem to have articulated representations of what the process could be, it may now seem appropriate to plan future studies examining the extent to which actual former enemies are willing to forgive each other in an inter-group context. These studies should take into account the context in which enmities occurred (e.g. forced displacement, internal conflicts, international conflicts), the extent of the atrocities and whether they were reciprocal or not.

Etienne Mullet is a director of research at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. His current main interests include conflict transformation, risk perception, and political and medical ethics. Author’s address: Quefes,17 bis, F-31830 Plaisance du Touch, France. [email: [email protected].]

Stéphanie Nann is a post-doctoral student at the René-Descartes in Paris. Her current main interests include conflict transformation and tropical health. [email: [email protected]]

Joachim Kadima Kadiangandu is a Roman Catholic pastor and a post-doctoral student at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. His current main interests include conflict transformation. [email: [email protected]]

Félix Neto is professor of cross-cultural psychology at the University of Oporto, Portugal. His current main interests include conflict transformation and international migration. [email: [email protected]]

María da Conceição Pinto is a post-doctoral student at the Open University in Lisbon, Portugal. Her current main interests include conflict transformation and music psychology. [email: pintomdac@ fpce.up.pt]

Acknowledgment

This work was supported by the Laboratory of Ethics and Work (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris), by the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation (grant no. PTDC/PSI/55336/2006) and by the Université de Toulouse (CNRS, UTM, EPHE).

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