SOCIAL DUMPING IN „NEW EUROPE”?

LIMITS IN WEST-EAST TRANSFER OF WELFARE MODELS AFTER EE

byPal TAMAS

HAS, Budapest

STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

a. Ideal-type visions of Social Europeb. Institutional frames of social policy

integration in Europec. Motives for welfare state reformsd. Capability deprivation as policy targete. Reform frontlinesf. CEC dilemmas: hard-soft law

enforcement + opposition through the backdoor

IDEAL-TYPE VISIONS OF SOCIAL EUROPE

A. EURO-CORPORATIST IMAGES a. enlarged traditional welfare state

philosophies b. uniform social standards c. „social dialogue” of labour + capital

[social contract] UNIONs, NGOsB. DECENTRALIZED CONCERTATION

APPROACH a. coordinating national-level activity b. cross-country sensitivities CENTRAL EUROPEAN

ELITES

FRAMES FOR INTEGRATION: MOBILITIES- RIGIDITIES

EU MEMBERSHIP NOW MORE BONUS FOR DEMOCRACY, THEN CREATION OF A UNIFIED ECONOMIC SPACE:

Employed labour mobility YESSocial assistance mobility NOService provider”s mobility LIMITEDAgricultural benefits- mainly NATION-

BOUNDED

SOCIAL POLICY INTEGRATION [SE- Social

Europe]Until the late 90iesINTERNAL MARKET+MONETARY UNION

highly visible SE- hardly visibleLisbon Summit- March 2000 more active

social policyCEC EU images of the elites: basically pre-Lisbon

vision

MOTIVES FOR WELFARE STATE REFORMS

a.approach: external competition pressure forces

governments to welfare state reformsb.approach: domestic structural- population,

deindustrialization, fiscal crises, weakening the family as safety net

CEC reform histories:early 90ies- externallate 90ies –external + internalearly 2000s- more internal

THEORETICAL PUZZLE

Social policy integration – inclusion policies are better integrated, as others

1992- directive on Sufficient Measures in Social Assistance Systems

2001- OMC on social inclusion. Central element: ACTIVATION [re-integration into the labour market]

Asymmetry in favour of negative integration [dismantling barriers] against positive integration [building new regulatory framework]

THE RIGHT QUESTION

CENTRAL ISSUENot whether a particular arrangement is

better for all than no cooperation at all, but whether the particular divisions to emerge are fair divisions given the alternative arrangements that are made.

J.F.Nash: The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18 [1950]

THE RIGHT QUESTION:Are the empowered actors getting a fair

share of the benefits of economic interrelations?

CAPABILITY DEPRIVATION

POVERTY = CAPABILITY DEPRIVATION [CD] –A.SEN

[lack of capability to live a minimally decent life]

Or [Adam Smith…]: not „being able to appear in public without shame”

Social exclusion = a. part of CD b. a cause of different capability failures

[relational failure]

FAIRNESS IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SPACE

VISIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICEa. Grand universalism [classical

utilitarism]b. National particularismsc. Plural affiliation [A.Sen] processing of multiply

identities

CAPITAL FLOW- SOCIAL EXPENDITURE

GLOBAL IMPACTSOpen-and-smaller welfare state [liberal]Open-and-therefore-big welfare state [left]

Net capital outflow –growth of social expenditure NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

GROWING WELFARE STATES ARE DOMESTIC REGIME MOTIVATED

REFORMS: MAJOR- MINOR FRONTLINES

OMC ACTIVATION POLICIES, as social policy co-ordination:

-fiscally marginal-not a major concern for the average

voterREAL CONCERN:SOCIAL EXCLUSION in different

national welfare capitalisms. BUT this is regime specific, internal reforms

WELFARE CONVERGENCE

90ies:Progressive dismantling of ideal-types of

welfare state [ESPING-ANDERSEN typology]

Focus on SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE, rather on the QUALITY OF SOCIAL POLICY

Monetary union leads to less reform of the labour market fdistribution of the costs to the others]

THE „HARD” AND „SOFT” LAW DILEMMA

OMC [European Employment Strategy] –informal sanctions, soft law

Community Method- hard lawInstitutional debate: relative capacities

of different modes to handle specific tasks

Governance modes –policy options??CEC- culturally hard law oriented [here

the soft law is too informal]

CEC OPPOSITION THROUGH THE BACKDOOR?

Basic: effects of Europeanization on domestic systems of governance

Degree of misfit between European rules and existing institutional +regulatory traditions is high

Non-compliance with EU directives in the new and old member states

?? Related/unrelated to opposition and/or due to administrative shortcomings

CEC policy philosophies: tactics in interest representation of the week and latecomer