Social Capital and Generation “Y”: does it address … Capital and Generation “Y”: does it...
Transcript of Social Capital and Generation “Y”: does it address … Capital and Generation “Y”: does it...
Social Capital and Generation “Y”:
does it address inequalities in political participation across the education divide?
Paper Presented to the Annual General Meeting of the
Canadian Political Science Association
May 31-June 2, 2016
University of Calgary
Calgary, AB Canada
Dr. L.S. Tossutti
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Brock University
St. Catharines, ON
Young Canadians emerged as an engaged and powerful voting group that helped propel the Liberal
Party to victory in the 2015 federal election (Colletto, 2016). Turnout among 18-24-year-olds grew by 12
percent over 2011─the largest increase of any age group (Statistics Canada, 2016). Yet even with this
impressive growth, the youngest members of “Generation Y”1 voted at rates almost 20 points lower than
Canadians aged 65-74 years. The persistence of the age gap in electoral participation is the chief reason why
turnout rates plunged in the late 1990s and did not show signs of recovery until the most recent election. The
same pattern has been observed for municipal elections, with younger people less likely to vote than older
Canadians (Kushner and Siegel, 2006; Tossutti, 2007). While troubling, these trends must be viewed in the
context that not all young people are the same, and that youth absentionism is largely confined to those with less
formal education. As Bastedo has argued, worthy initiatives to set up voting stations on university and college
campuses across the country do not reach the most tuned-out segment of the youth electorate (Bastedo, 2015).
A new critical perspective on young people’s political engagement has argued that a generational shift in
citizenship norms is underway. Research has suggested that young people are disengaging from conventional
models of duty-based citizen participation (voting, party membership and reading the newspaper) and moving
towards “a more personalised politics of self-actualisation through digital networking or consumer activism”.
These theories posit that young people see and engage with politics in a more individualized rather than
collectivist way and prefer ad hoc involvement in issues-based campaigns, to long-term organizational
commitments or a particular ideology (Vromen et al., 2015). Because they prefer to work in a non-hierarchical
environment with their peers, their social circles constitute important sources of information and support
(Bennett et al., 2009). Other researchers have argued that everyday local spaces offer young people the ideal
venue for practicing a more individualised and personalised form of political engagement (Harris and Wyn,
2009).
There is evidence that digital networking has opened up avenues for more personalized and less
hierarchical forms of political engagement for the young. Canadians aged 18-34 years are more likely than
Canadians in general to circulate or report political information on social networking sites, use email or instant
messaging to discuss societal/political issues,blog about a political issue and participate in an online group
about a societal/political issue in the last 12 months (Samara Canada, 2014). A preference for acting in a non-
systematic and less hierarchical fashion is also manifested in the fact that young Canadians born after 1970 are
more likely than older Canadians to take part in a protest (Gidengil et al., 2004). In 2002, 70 percent of 20-29-
year-olds had signed a petition and between 11-22 percent reported participating in a boycott or attending a
demonstration (Tossutti, 2007). More individualized and personalized modes of political behavior are also
evident in the rise of “political consumerism,” where consumers seek to change institutional or market practices
thought to be politically or ethically objectionable through boycotts (rejecting consumer goods) or buycotts
(follow purchasing guidelines and buy labeled goods) (Micheletti and Stolle, 2008). Data on rates of youth
political consumerism in Canada are not available, but one Swedish study found that boycotts are often even
more important for 18-29-year-olds than for older individuals. Nevertheless, while the young may be more
inclined to adopt more personalized and less hierarchical forms of political action, Canadian evidence suggests
that even these venues are dominated by the better-educated (Gidengil et al., 2004).
1Statistics Canada defines a generation as a group of individuals who are about the same age and have experienced, most often as children
or young adults, specific historical events that may influence their world views. Among the Canadian population in 2011, children of baby boomers
born between 1972 and 1992 are often referred to as “Generation Y”. See https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-311-x/98-
311-x2011003_2-eng.cfm.
This paper examines the question of how young people with different levels of formal education
participate in institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics, through the lens of social capital theory. Social
capital theory posits that social networks help generate trust and goodwill, through which benefits such as
information, influence and solidarity are conferred to a collective or an individual (Coleman, 1988).
Participation in voluntary associations and social trust have been praised as key resources that help create an
active and committed citizenry. In his observations of nineteenth-century America, de Toqueville observed that
the presence of non-hierarchical voluntary associations contributed to the development of democracy by
overcoming individualism and encouraging people to cooperate to achieve the collective good (1969).
Contemporary survey data has shown that at both the individual and country level of analysis, “people who trust
others are more likely to engage in non-institionalized forms of political action, are more often members of
political groups, show higher levels of political interest, tend to trust their governments and display more
support for democracy” (Rossteutscher, 2008). Voluntary associations can serve as recruitment networks for
political activities or as incubators for the civic attitudes and skills necessary for political participation. Voting,
party membership, discussing and taking an interest in politics, attending meetings, and contacting political
officials have all been linked to associational involvements in mature and newly-established democracies
(Almond and Verba 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Olsen 1972; Rogers et al., 1975; Erickson and Nosanchuck
1990; Verba et al., 1995; Stolle and Rochon 1998; Seligson 1999).
The positive verdict on the relationship between social capital and political engagement has been subject
to qualifications. Skeptics have argued it is inherently anti-political to rely on voluntary associations embedded
in the intermediate structure of pluralistic societies to mobilize participation, on the grounds that they encourage
a privatized rather than public response to societal problems (Lisman 1998). At the micro-level, the relationship
between participation in groups and participation in politics is robust but “modest” (van Deth, 1996). The
salutary effects of social capital for political engagement are contingent on the organizational type (Stolle and
Rochon 1998; Seligson 1999; Putnam 2000) and the internal activities of these groups (Erickson and
Nosanchuk, 1990: 206).
Using the unique opportunity provided by the 2013 General Social Survey on Social Identity, with its
oversample of young Canadians, this paper offers a preliminary examination of whether different forms of
social capital, as measured by the type and nature of memberships in voluntary organizations, the frequency and
nature of online and offline social contacts with family and friends, generalized and particular social trust, and
neighbourhood social capital, are associated with the increased odds of voting in the most recent federal and
municipal elections, signing an internet petition and participating in a boycott/”buycott” in the previous 12
months, for Canadians 24 years and under, who have not obtained a post-secondary diploma or degree. These
findings will be compared to their peers with a higher level of formal education in order to determine whether
social capital is a promising route for stimulating the involvement of the most tuned-out segment of the
Canadian citizenry.
Young Canadians and Political Engagement
Age has consistently been found to be the most important predictor of turnout in Canada. Just 38.8 percent of
young adults aged 18–24 voted in the 2011 federal election, compared with 54.5 percent of 35–44-year-olds,
and 75.1 percent of 65–74 year-olds (Elections Canada, 2012). While there was a strong uptick in youth voting
in 2015, their participation rates are still substantially below those of older Canadians. Generational decline has
been pinpointed to explain this phenomenon. Canadians born since 1970 are less likely to vote than their
parents or grandparents when they were the same age (Blais et al., 2004), and younger generations of voters are
also less likely than their predecessors to start voting even as they grow older (Elections Canada, 2008). Life-
cycle effects also help explain the age gap in electoral participation; as people grow older, they get more
involved in their social milieu and develop stronger preferences over time, and they are more likely to vote
(Baum, 2002). This is because as they settle down with a partner, become parents, and find a job, they become
more aware of how political issues such as taxes, economic development, and access to social and health
services affect their lives (Gidengil et al., 2004). Other lifecycle effects that depress youth electoral
participation include: singlehood (Stoker and Jennings, 1995), greater mobility (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003),
reaching political adulthood in an atmosphere of political uncompetitiveness (Johnston et al., 2007); declining
levels of civic duty (Blais, 2000); a preference for non-electoral political participation (Gidengil et al., 2004;
Young and Everitt, 2004); value change associated with a “decline of deference” (Nevitte, 1996); and greater
partisan de-alignment (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).
Studies comparing the voting habits of younger to older Canadians have found that the former are less
likely than Canadians aged 30 years and over to agree they have a duty to vote, and are less interested in and
knowledgeable about politics (Gidengil et al., 2004; Howe, 2010). The decline of newspapers as the most
important source of political information and the increased dependence on commercial television have been
blamed for contributing to lower levels of political knowledge (Milner, 2002), which are also more likely to be
found among younger Canadians (Rubenson et al. 2004). When non-voting Canadian youths were asked why
they did not cast a ballot in 2000, they were more likely than older respondents to cite a lack of interest, in
addition to personal/administrative factors and registration problems as the reason (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003).
Younger voters and non-voters tend to be distinguished by their attitudes, lifestyles, and demographic
characteristics. Following the 2011 election, Canadians aged 18–34 years were asked why they voted. Many
referred to voting as a civic duty and to their desire to express their opinions and views. A majority of those
who did not vote said they were too busy with school, work, or taking care of their families. Those with higher
levels of education and household income and who were employed were also more likely to have voted than
young people who were unemployed and who had lower levels of education and income (Statistics Canada,
2011). A study of 18–30 year olds between 1997–2008 found that youths who were informed and interested in
politics were also more likely to vote than those who were not (Blais & Loewen, 2011). While research on the
profile of young participants in non-institutionalized forms of political activities is less developed, we do know
that protest activity, including signing a petition, joining a boycott and attending a demonstration, tends to be
dominated by well-educated and relatively affluent baby boomers (Gidengil et al., 2004).
Social capital: a flexible concept
The notion of “social capital” has generated a vigorous debate about its emergence, nature and consequences for
individuals and communities alike. What various conceptualizations of the term share in common is the idea
that social relations built on trust and fellowship constitute a resource distinct from financial (money), human
(skills and expertise) and physical capital (tools). Perspectives differ on whether social capital arises out of
rational self-interest or combination of self-interest and cultural norms, whether it is a private or public good,
and whether it is an exclusionary resource designed to maintain social hierarchies, or one that produces positive
and inclusive benefits for individuals, neighbourhoods or countries.
The earliest known use of the expression “social capital” was in 1916, when L.J. Hanifan, a state
supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia observed that the good will, fellowship, sympathy and social
contact among individuals and families could result in an accumulation of social capital that might satisfy the
needs of an individual, as well as improve living conditions in the whole community (Hanifan, 1920). In the
1980s, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu employed the social capital concept to explain how upper and middle
classes maintained their dominant position in society, describing it as the “sum of the actual or potential
resources that are linked to possession of a durable relationship of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”
(Bourdieu, 1986). While distinct from economic capital, it was inseparable from it because upper and middle
classes used it to preserve the exclusivity of their spheres of influence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).
Writing in the late 1980s, American sociologist James Coleman challenged economic assumptions that
people were motivated by rational self-interest and unconcerned about other people or society (Couto, 2010).
According to Coleman, economic models failed to account for how social structures─history, cultural norms
and beliefs─could shape and redirect individual actions. He proposed that cultural norms also motivated people
to invest time and energy into relationships, in addition to a self-interested hope that the investment would
eventually bring a pay off; by cooperating with others, the individual would acquire a good reputation in the
community and benefit from being trusted in the future. Although no individual could own social capital, he
saw it as a resource created by and for the individual (Couto, 2010). Coleman was primarily concerned with
socialization processes in families and school systems, and argued that social capital could foster the
development of human capital in the next generation by helping young people acquire a stronger sense of self-
identity, confidence in expressing their opinions and emotional intelligence. This in turn would lead to better
learning and educational outcomes (Coleman, 1988).
Writing in the same era, American political scientist Robert Putnam extended the social capital concept
from the individual to societies and communities. He interpreted social capital as not just an individual asset,
but as a collective asset of neighbourhoods and communities. He defined social capital as consisting of social
networks and interpersonal relationships that give rise to trust and reciprocity, which in turn generate “civic
virtue” where residents know each other and are involved in each other’s lives and maintain trustful and helpful
relations (Putnam 2000, 19). In contrast to Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital as primarily a private
good, Putnam regards social capital as an asset that benefits the broader community.
In Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Putnam draws on rich databases
of aggregate and individual-level measures of social connectedness and trust to document the decline of social
capital across the United States. Following a rapid increase in the membership market shares for major civic
organizations during most of the first two thirds of the century, these organizations experienced a levelling and
decline in their market shares, and then an absolute decline in their membership numbers (Putnam, 2000).
Longitudinal data on the frequency of attendance at church and club meetings, volunteering, socializing with
friends and family, and even picnicking, painted the same portrait of weakening social ties between 1975 and
1999. Altruism, a strong predictor of social connectedness, also declined. Fewer people gave blood, money or
volunteered their time, and since 1964, there has been a steady decline in the fraction of income given to
charities. Trust in others, which Putnam regards as a consequence of social capital, also experienced a forty-
year decline, with the drop most pronounced among American youths. Weakening social bonds have been
accompanied by a decline in political and civic engagement: fewer Americans were signing a petitions, writing
a letter to their members of Congress, attending a local meeting, serving as an official of a local club, serving on
a committee of any local organization, and working for a party. The decline was most pronounced among the
generations born after 1940 compared to the activism of the long civic generation born between 1910 and 1940
(2000).
Putnam argues that the implications of the loss of social connectedness are profound: American states
with a large stock of social capital enjoyed greater economic and civic equality, better student educational
performance and child welfare outcomes, lower rates of violent crime and higher rates of tolerance for gender,
racial equality and civil liberties (2000). The policy consequences of social capital build on the findings of his
comparative study of social capital in Italy, which found that regions with dense networks of voluntary
associations enjoyed superior economic development and institutional performance at the regional level
(Putnam, 1993).
Further refinements to the social capital concept have distinguished between the structure of social
networks, the frequency and intensity of connections between network members, and the sociological diversity
of the network. Social capital could be formal, such as joining an organization that is “formally organized with
recognized officers, membership requirements, dues and regular meetings...” or informal, such as a group of
people who gather at a bar (Putnam and Goss, 2002). Some forms of social capital are dense and
interconnected, while others are “thin”. An example of the former would be a group of people who work
together every day, attend the same religious institution on a weekly basis, and socialize with each other every
Saturday. Thin networks would involve casual forms of social connections, such as nodding to an
acquaintance. Even these had the potential to generate reciprocity in the sense that the individual would be
more likely to come to your aid (Putnam and Goss, 2002). Other researchers have focused on the frequency of
social connections, with Granovetter naming frequent ties as “strong” and less frequent ties as “weak”.
Another relevant distinction is that of bonding verus bridging social capital (Putnam, 2008). Bonding
social capital is developed within groups of sociologically similar people, as might be found in churches or
ethnic organizations. Bridging social capital refers to networks comprised or people from diverse social
cleavages, such as those in youth service groups or the civil rights movement etc (Warren, 2008). While the
line between the two is not always clear, and the same organization can encompass bonding and bridging ties
(e.g. a religious group that includes people from different socio-economic backgrounds), their respective impact
on social cohesion differs: bonding social capital creates strong in-group loyalty, encourages reciprocity, and
can provide social and psychological resources for marginalized groups, but it can also generate out-group
antagonism and intolerance, or negative externalities (Putnam, 2008). Bridging social capital extends networks
and connects groups to resources they might not otherwise access, enhances information flows and generates
broader identities and reciprocity Along these lines, bonding social capital has helped Caribbean young people
in the United Kingdom develop a sense of belonging and ethnic identity (Reynolds, 2007). Their same-ethnic
friendships encouraged particularized trust, provided mutual support and a shared understanding concerning
issues of racial discrimination and social exclusion. However, it also discouraged friendships existing outside
of these bonds, suggesting that it can operate as an exclusionary device.
Social Capital and Political Engagement
The mobilization version of social participation theory maintains that even involvement in apolitical voluntary
associations can encourage political participation by broadening one’s sphere of concerns to include political
issues, expanding social networks so that people meet new individuals who might introduce them to political
activities, and providing training in social interaction and leadership skills. By lobbying decision makers or
providing political elites with a channel for contacting their constituents, they can also serve as parapolitical
mediators between individuals and the political system (Olsen, 1972).
In his analysis of American elections during the 1960s, Olsen found that membership and participation
in secular and church-sponsored voluntary groups, as well as participation in community events, was positively
associated with voter turnout (1972, 323). Another study found that participation in voluntary associations led
to higher turnout rates in local and national elections and to diminished political alienation in the United States
(Hanks and Eckland, 1978). In Sweden, Germany and the United States, members of voluntary associations
scored significantly higher than nonmembers on all indicators of social capital, including political contacting
and engagement (Stolle and Rochon, 1998). Individuals with multiple associational memberships in these
countries were also more likely to vote in local elections and to participate in neighbourhood and community
activities outside of group life (Stolle, 2001). In Canada, members of voluntary organizations were more likely
than non-members to have voted in the 2000 federal election and to join political parties (Pammett and LeDuc,
2003; Gidengil et al. 2004). Bowler, Donavan and Hanneman (2003) concluded that membership in some
private, non-political associations was associated with greater political engagement in Europe, with engagement
operationalized by an index composed of discussing politics, being a member of a party, and political interest.
Nakhaie used the 2004 General Social Survey to evaluate the importance of social capital for the
political participation of native-born Canadians, early immigrants and more recent immigrants who landed
between 1970 and 1989. Seven indicators of social capital were used: trust, belonging to associations,
volunteering, involvement in social groups while in high school, religious participation, intensity of contact
with friends, and the extent of friendship networks within the same ethnicity. Participation was measured by
questions asking respondents if they had searched for information on political issues, expressed their views by
contacting newspapers/politicians, signed a petition, boycotted a product/chose a product for ethical reasons,
attended a public meeting and/or participated in a demonstration or march. He found that associational
involvements and social networks, followed by trust and volunteering, were the best predictors of political
participation for the three groups (2008).
The effects of organizational type and the intensity and nature of a member’s involvement have also
been investigated. The boundary between voluntary associations that are primarily designed to influence
government action or the selection of people who make public policies, and non-political voluntary activity, is
often unclear (Verba et al., 1995). This is because apolitical organizations such as sports clubs, philanthropic
groups or churches can serve as recruitment venues for political participation, expose people to political cues or
messages, or perform functions normally undertaken by governments such as aiding in refugee settlement or
collecting money to fund medical research (40-41). Research on the effects of political and non-political
voluntary associations is mixed. A study of six Central American countries found that participation in
community development groups was the only form of voluntary involvement consistently associated with
making demands of government officials (Seligson, 1999). However, in Germany, Sweden, and the United
States, political activity was strongly related to memberships in both political and apolitical voluntary
associations. Members of political, economic and community groups were most likely to be heavily involved in
political and community participation, while members of cultural, personal interest and economic groups
registered higher levels of political trust and efficacy (Stolle and Rochon, 1998).
Organizational effects are also contingent on country setting. In the United States, members of political
groups were more likely to have voted in local elections or to have participated in neighbourhood and
community activities than members of church choirs. In Sweden, members of church choirs were most likely to
have voted and to have participated in neighbourhood and community activities. In Germany, church choir
members were less likely to have voted in local elections than other group members (Stolle, 2001).
The political consequences of bonding and bridging, formal and informal social capital have also been
explored. Bonding social capital has facilitated turnout in Denmark, where membership in an ethnic association
had a positive effect on turnout for Lebanese and Turkish voters in local elections (Togeby, 1999). Members of
Amsterdam’s Turkish community reported higher turnout in municipal elections and other political activities,
higher levels of interest in local news and politics, and more trust in local, non-ethnic institutions relative to
other ethnic groups─patterns attributed to the community’s larger network of interlocking ethnic associations
(Fennema and Tillie, 1999). Across six cities in The Netherlands, large and dense networks of Turkish migrant
organizations corresponded with higher Turkish voting turnout rates and local council representation compaed
to other ethnic minority communities with smaller associational networks (van Heelsum, 2002).
A study of the Canadian population aged 25 years and over found that measures of bonding social
capital (i.e. same ethnic friendship networks and the intensity of networks) helped predict political participation,
but their effects were weaker than forms of bridging social capital, such as high school group involvement.
Nakhaie attributes this to the capacity of bridging social capital to facilitate the acquisition of information about
political and social issues that is not otherwise available, and to build trust with others (Nakhaie, 2008).
Bevelander and Pendakur found that high levels of formal interaction (i.e. membership in a recreational group,
voluntarism, attendance at religious services), trust in government, civic awareness, and a sense of belonging at
the local level were associated with higher odds of voting in federal and/or provincial elections for immigrants
and ethnic minorities. Informal interactions such as talking to friends and neighbours did not have a significant
effect on turnout (Bevelander and Pendakur, 2007).
A related strand of research has focussed on the intensity and substance of involvement in a voluntary
association. Even passive memberships in Swedish voluntary associations were related to higher levels of
political contacting and manifestations, primarily because these groups connected members to more possibilities
for political recruitment (Teorrell, 2003, 56-59). The same was not true for the United States, where simply
being a member of a non-political voluntary organization was insufficient to foster overall levels of political
activity. The capacity for associations to mobilize political participation depended upon whether a member had
been asked to participate in a political activity or had acquired civic skills such as writing a letter, planning a
meeting, or giving a presentation within the organization (Verba et al., 1995). Organizational members who
engage in political discussion are also more likely to be politically active (Verba and Nie, 1972; Rogers et al.,
1975). A study of an Ottawa-Hull bridge league found that political discussions between bridge partners
exerted significant and positive effects on standard measures of federal political participation, even after
controlling for the association’s characteristics, the work performed for the association, a member’s personal
characteristics, and sense of political efficacy (Erickson and Nosanchuk, 1990).
Not all research has been as sanguine about the connection between associational involvements and
political behaviour. Van Deth’s analysis of Western European countries found that membership in social
movement and political organizations was only weakly related to interest in politics and opinions about its
personal and overall saliency. Membership in church-related groups and welfare organizations was actually
linked to a decline in the perceived saliency of politics (2000).
Young People, Social Capital and Political Participation
It has been argued that organizational involvements undertaken in one’s youth can plant the seeds for civic
engagement later in life (Jennings and Stoker, 2004; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). “The presence of social capital
as early as the eighth grade – in the way of parental involvement, youth religious involvement, and voluntary
association participation in one's youth were significant predictors of greater political and civic involvement in
young adulthood” (Smith, 1999). American adolescents who belonged to religious organizations were
significantly more likely to report that they expected they would cast an informed vote when they became
adults,while in Columbia, adolescent membership in a religious organization was a significant predictor of the
expectation that one would write a letter on a political issue and join a political party in adulthood (Torney-
Purta et al., 2004). In Canada, immigrants under the age of 35 who belonged to a voluntary organization were
more likely to vote in federal, provincial and local elections and to express more interest in current affairs
(Tossutti, 2003).
As with the general population, the salutary effects of social capital on youth political participation are
contingent on organizational type and the nature of activites undertaken in the organization. McFarland and
Thomas found that while involvement in extracurricular activities was important, involvement in youth
voluntary associations concerned with community service, representation, speaking in public forums and
generating a communal identity was most conducive to future political participation in adulthood in the United
States (McFarland and Thomas, 2006), net of self-selection and causal factors. In Canada, voluntary
organization involvements were not significantly associated with higher turnout for people under the age of 30
years, once mobilization factors, socio-demographic attributes and attitudes were held constant (Tossutti, 2007).
In fact, young members of artistic/musical/cultural clubs were significantly less likely to have cast a ballot in
the 2000 federal election. While membership in hobby/sports/leisure, charitable/service,
artistic/musical/cultural, and environmental/human rights associational memberships was positively associated
with a higher score on an index of informal activism (measured by signing petitions, letter-writing campaigns,
meetings and demonsrations), young members of neighbourhood associations were significantly less likely to
engage in informal activism.
Social networks, as a measure of social capital, can be forged in virtual space thanks to digital
infrastructures and applications that are particularly popular among the young. However, the early social
capital literature regarded face-to-face communication as a privileged form of human interaction that
encourages pro-social attitudes and behavioural patterns. Putnam pointed to television and its electronic
cousins as prime culprits behind the erosion of social and civic life, in the way they discouraged socializing and
community involvement and allowed watchers and users to be selective about the information to which they
were exposed, thus limiting their exposure to diverse orientations (Putnam, 2000). It has also been argued that
while some groups use the internet mainly to retrieve information and become informed, the internet is
primarily a source of entertainment for the vast majority of users (Hooghe and Oser, 2015).
Recent literature suggests that internet-based forms of communication can have strong networking
effects (Hooghe and Oser, 2015). Digital media, and social network sites in particular, are useful for
establishing and maintaining relationships with a large and often heterogeneous network of people who provide
support, information and other resources (Quinn, 2016). They allow for “quicker political mobilization,
accelerated cycles of action and protest, and new forms of collectivity” (Couldry, 2014). Hooghe and Oser’s
assessment of the impact of internet screen time on generalized trust, socializing and generosity found there is
usually a positive relationship between internet use (i.e. amount of time per week on email, amount of time per
week on the Web in addition to emailing ) and social capital indicators. A random web survey of college
students across Texas found small, but positive and significant relationships between the intensity of Facebook
use and students’ life satisfaction, social trust, civic engagement, and political participation (Valenzuela et al.,
2009).
Taking into account the diverse ways in which social capital has been conceptualized and
operationalized by researchers across many disciplines, the sum of evidence suggests that membership in
voluntary associations and social trust are positively related to institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms
of political engagement for the general population and some sub-populations. Research also suggests that the
relationship varies across country settings, and is contingent on the structure of the social connection (formal or
informal), as well as the nature, intensity and frequency of social connections (bonding or bridging, strong or
weak). Studies on the same relationship for youth sub-populations and the political consequences of newer
digital forms of networking are less extensive and the results mixed. This paper will further our insights on the
relationship between social capital and political engagement for the most tuned-out segment of the Canadian
citizenry: young people aged 24 years and under, with less than post-secondary education.
Methodology
Based on the literature review, this paper will draw on a rich and detailed set of nationally representative survey
data on young Canadians to test the following research hypotheses:
H1: Indicators of social capital will be associated with higher odds of voting in federal and municipal elections
for Canadian citizens aged 18-24 years.
H2: Indicators of social capital will be associated with higher odds of signing an internet petition and
participating in a boycott or “boycott” for Canadians aged 15-24 years.
H3: Membership in political organizations will be associated with higher odds of institutionalized and non-
institutionalized forms of political engagement for Canadians 24 years and under.
H4: Belonging to bridging organizations and social networks will be associated with higher odds of
institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political engagement for Canadians 24 years and under.
H5: Indicators of social capital will be more likely to exert positive effects on the political engagement of
younger Canadians with less formal education.
The General Social Survey on Social Identity interviewed individuals 15 years and over in Canada’s ten
provinces and was conducted from June 2013 to March 2014. It was implemented using telephone and internet
modes of data collection and included an oversample of immigrants and youth to allow for a more sophisticated
analysis of these groups. The final sample for analysis in this paper includes 3,486 respondents between the
ages of 15 and 24. Of those, 2,732 had not obtained a post-secondary diploma or degree and 754 had. The
survey is ideal for this study as it contains batteries of questions on voluntary association memberships, social
networks, generalized and particular trust, and institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political
engagement.
Given critical perspectives on the rise of new citizenship norms among the young, this paper adopted a
more inclusive approach to measuring political engagement. The dependent construct of “dutiful”
institutionalized political engagement was measured with two items: turnout in the most recent federal and
municipal elections. The dependent construct of non-institutionalized political engagement was measured with
two items: signing an internet petition and boycotting/buycotting in the previous 12 months. The voting
participation questions were only administered to individuals aged 18 years and over, and non-citizens were
excluded from these analyses.
The independent construct of social capital was measured using structural (i.e. memberships in
voluntary organizations, social networks) and attitudinal components (i.e. generalized and particular forms of
social trust, perceptions of helping behavior at the neighbourhood level). Since previous research has shown
that the effects of voluntary associations are contingent on organizational type, binary items measuring
membership (where 1=yes and 0=no) in political (i.e. political parties, civic associations, with the latter
encompassing school, neighbourhood and community associations) and apolitical organizations whose primary,
albeit not sole purpose, is primarily expressive or service-oriented (i.e. sports, hobby, religious, service, youth,
ethnic ), were included as explanatory variables. These organizations also mirror the analytical distinction
between bonding (religious, youth, ethnic) organizations and bridging organizations (parties, civic associations,
sports, hobby, service). Another item categorized respondents according to whether they were a member of a
bonding organization where at least half or more of the members belonged to the same age group.
The social network concept was measured with six items tapping into the frequency of offline and online
social contacts. These measured the frequency of personal, text and email contacts with relatives, the frequency
of personal, text and internet contact with friends. Frequent contacters were defined as those who were in
contact with friends or relatives, at least once a week if not more. Given the early social capital literature and
the growth in popularity of digital technologies, particularly among the young, it was deemed important to
explore qualitative distinctions between face-to-face and virtual modes of communication. Two additional
explanatory variables contributed to a further refinement of the social network concept by drawing a distinction
between bonding and bridging social networks; respondents were asked about the ethnic and income
homogeneity of their social networks. Respondents who indicated that at least half or more of the individuals in
their social network came from the same ethnic or income group were deemed to be part of bonding networks,
while those who indicated fewer than half came from the same ethnic or income group were deemed to be part
of bridging social networks. The concept of social trust was measured with items asking how much respondents
trusted people in general, their families, and their neighbours; responses at the median or higher were assigned a
value of “1”, while responses below the median were assigned a value of “0”. Neighbourhood social capital
was measured with an item asking respondents whether they lived in a neighbourhood where neighbors helped
each other.
Political participation is affected by a variety of socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. These
variables include: gender (Gidengil et al. 2004); household income (Verba et al., 1971; Nevitte et al., 2000);
immigrant or newcomer status (Blais et al., 2004; Tossutti, 2007); and political interest (Pammett and LeDuc,
2003). Items measuring the respondents’ sex, household income and immigrant status were included as
controls, in addition to two variables measuring political interest and whether the respondent followed the news
on a daily basis. While a sense of civic duty and administrative barriers have also been shown to affect youth
turnout, these items were not available on the GSS survey.
Prior to testing the hypotheses, a bivariate analysis explored whether there are significant differences in
the participation rates of young people with less and more formal education. Binary logistic regression was
then used to test the hypotheses since all the response variables were categorical and dichotomous: event Y
occurs or does not occur. Binary logistic regression permits the analysis of the simultaneous effects of multiple
independent variables on the dependent variables, while holding the values of all other predictor variables
constant. With binary outcomes, estimates derived from conventional logistic regression are preferable to
Ordinary Least Squares regression techniques, which tend to produce inefficient parameters and biased standard
errors (Long, 1997: 38-53).
All variables were entered into the regression model using the block recursive approach developed by
Miller and Shanks (1996). The strength of estimating the model in stages is that it allows for each variable to be
examined in isolation, and then in relation to and in combination with other items. By entering the variables in
stages, shifts in model fit and in the magnitude of the coefficients and their statistical significance may be
observed. The overall fit of the model was assessed with the following summary statistics: the -2 Log
Likelihood statistic (-2LL) shows whether a large portion of unexplained variance still remains in the model
(Pampel, 2000). Smaller values of the statistic indicate better predictions of the dependent variables. The model
chi-square statistics provides a test of the null hypothesis that the model coefficients=0. As a result, if the chi
square is statistically significant, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the independent variables help
predict the probability that Y=1, than without the independent variables. Other measures of model fit include
the Cox and Snell R-square, an analogue to the linear regression r-square that reports the amount of variance in
the dependent variable accounted for by the explanatory variables (Menard, 2002). Larger values indicate that
the model explains more variation in the dependent variable. Tables 2 thru 9 show the log odds of turnout for
each level of election, for signing an internet petition and for participating in a boycott/boycott, for the two
education domains. The estimates (b coefficients) show the differences in the log odds of engagement for those
in a category compared to the reference category for each predictor. For reasons of tabular clarity, the
exponentiated coefficients are only presented for the full model (Model 7) for each activity.
In order to determine the quality of the estimates and to calculate the coefficient of variation, the
standard deviation must be calculated. Since the GSS uses a multi-stage survey design and calibration, the
bootstrap method was used to calculate variance estimates (Statistics Canada, 2015). The SAS analytical
package was used to compute variances with the help of 500 bootstrap weights provided with the microdata file.
Only estimates with a coefficient of variation of between 0-16.5 percent are considered for general and
unrestricted release.
A word of caution about the limitations of using a cross-sectional survey to explore the relationship
between social capital and political engagement is necessary. This paper posits that social capital is associated
with the increased odds of political participation. Cross-sectional surveys do not permit a clear conclusion
about the causal relationship between the two. A correct specification of such a relationship requires
longitudinal panel data, where the same subjects are repeatedly asked about their social capital resources and
political behavior. A second limitation is that if differences in political behaviour are observed between
respondents with different stocks of social capital, it is difficult to untangle whether they can be attributed to
social capital indicators or to self-selection effects. In other words, people who engage in political affairs may
also be more inclined to join voluntary organizations, to socialize and to trust. Although studies in Sweden and
the United States suggest that involvement in voluntary associations precedes political participation (Teorrell
2003, 58; Olsen 1972), available evidence on the relationship between associational memberships and social
capital indicators such as generalized trust is inconclusive (Hooghe, 2008). This analysis allows us to view the
relationship between social capital and political participation as a correlation. Only future longitudinal data can
definitively establish a hypothesized causal relationship between the two, and control for self-selection effects.
While these are intriguing questions that merit close inspection, this does not detract from the insight into the
relationship between social capital and political engagement among young respondents, that can be drawn from
the GSS.
Educational Differences in Youth Political Participation
Just 43 percent of people aged 18-24 years reported voting in the 2011 federal election (data not shown). While
surveys generally overestimate voting behaviour by a large margin, the GSS estimate is quite close to official
reports of 39 percent for this age group. Respondents who did not have a post-secondary diploma or degree
voted at about half the rate of their peers with more education in both federal and municipal elections (Table 1).
Slightly more than 65 percent of young Canadians with a higher level of education voted in 2011, compared to
31 percent of their peers with less than a post-secondary education (p ≤ .0001). The same pattern was observed
for the most recent municipal elections. Young citizens with a post-secondary diploma or degree voted at
almost twice the rate of their peers with less education; 41 percent compared to 23 percent (p ≤ .0001). It is
interesting to note that the turnout rates reported by the more highly educated youths are similar to official
turnout for the general population at both the federal and municipal levels, suggesting that the “issue” of youth
absentionism should be framed as a phenomenon restricted to a specific segment of young Canadians.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The education gap carried over to non-institutionalized modes of participation which do not involve the
administrative burden of voter registration; slightly more than 31 percent of the more highly educated reported
participating in a boycott/buycott in the previous twelve months, compared to about 15 percent of those who
had graduated with a high school diploma or less (p ≤ .0001). A narrowing of the participation gap was seen
with respect to internet petitions, but the less educated were still much less likely to engage in this activity as
well. About 32 percent of the best-educated had signed an internet petition, compared to 20.3 percent of the
less educated (p ≤ .0001). These patterns paint a portrait of inequality at all levels of elections, in both
institutionalize and non-institutionalized forms of political engagement.
Social Capital, Voting and Education
Just one form of social capital was associated with higher odds of voting in the previous municipal election for
young people with less than post-secondary education (Table 2). Those who were in frequent personal contact
with their relatives (once a week or more) were significantly more likely to vote than those who were in contact
less frequently, with all else held constant (p ≤ .06). Turnout rates were also significantly higher for males and
respondents who were very/somewhat interested in international, national, provincial or municipal politics, even
after controlling for other demographic, social capital and political interest factors. For the more highly-
educated cohort, party memberships and frequent texting with friends (once a week or more) were significant
predictors of municipal turnout, until the introduction of the social trust variables in Model 6 (Table 3). In the
full model, immigrant status was the only variable significantly linked to local turnout for young Canadians
with higher education; Canadian-born citizens were more likely to vote than their foreign-born counterparts (p≤
.07). Interestingly, none of the social capital variables were important enough to overcome this difference
among young people with more education.
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE
Overall, organizational involvements and social networks – whether of the bonding or bridging variety,
as well as social trust, were not significantly associated with municipal turnout for young Canadians, regardless
of their education level. The relevance of frequent personal contact with relatives, and the irrelevance of
contact with friends and all internet-based modes of communication, suggests that who one is in contact with
and how that contact is made matters. Young people with less education may be receiving more cues from their
relatives to vote in local elections, but not from their friends. As Coleman has argued, families can be an
important source of social capital, and appear to be more important than friendship networks in this instance.
The findings also support the early social capital literature, which valued face-to-face modes of communication.
No form of virtual contact, with friends or relatives, was significantly associated with voting in local elections.
Very few social capital indicators were associated with higher turnout in the 2011 federal election for
young citizens with less than a post-secondary education. Among those with less formal education,
membership in a bonding organization and bonding social network increased the odds of federal turnout (Table
4). Respondents who reported that only a few or none of the friends with whom they were in contact in the past
month (in person, by telephone, by text or by email) were from an ethnic group that was visibly different from
their own, had 2.5 times higher odds of voting than those from more ethnically heterogeneous groups.
Furthermore, respondents who belonged to organisations where at least half of the people they met through the
organization were around the same age, had 2.5 times higher odds of voting than their peers who belonged to
organizations with a more diversified age profile. These results challenge theories that bonding social capital is
a less effective means of encouraging civic involvement and an outward-looking perspective than bridging
social capital, and support literature on the positive role of bonding social capital in less privileged populations.
The results show that when young people with less formal education are involved in clubs or associations with
people from their own age group, and socialize with people from their own ethnic group, they are more likely to
vote in federal elections. In this case, bonding organizations and networks may provide the cues, support or
incentive required to mobilize the vote, although this can only be confirmed through a qualitative case study of
how these groups and networks function.
Finally, while certain social capital indicators were significantly associated with federal turnout, they
were not sufficient to wash out the effects of certain demographic differences among the less well-educated:
males and the Canadian-born still voted at higher rates than females and immigrants, with all else held constant.
The failure of any social capital indicator to overcome these gaps speaks to the possibility that the organizations
and networks to which these individuals belong are not venues where political cues and mobilization efforts are
a priority (Table 4).
INSERT TABLES 4 and 5 HERE
For more highly educated young citizens, having few or no friends from a visibly different ethnic group
was significantly and positively related to federal turnout, until the social network indicators were introduced in
Model 4 (Table 5). The difference in immigrant and Canadian-born voting rates that was initially observed for
this group, faded after social trust was controlled. While this paper is not primarily concerned with
investigating the turnout of females and immigrants, the absence of gender and nativity differences among
better-educated young people is noteworthy. When young immigrants with more formal education expressed
similar levels of trust in others, their families, their neighbours, and felt that they lived in a neighbourhood
where people helped each other, they were as likely to vote as their Canadian-born peers (Table 5).
Social Capital and Non-Institutionalized Political Engagement
Young Canadians who belonged to political parties had 5.8 times higher odd of signing an internet petition in
the previous 12 months than non-party members (Table 6). Whether this means that party membership led to
political activity on the internet, or whether those who were active on the internet were more likely to join a
party, is not a question that a cross-sectional survey can resolve. What can be said is that for young people with
less education, membership in organizations that are not primarily concerned with public affairs is not
associated with internet-based political activism. This shows that organizational type matters for young
Canadians, supporting previous research on Canadians under the age of 30 (Tossutti, 2007). As with the federal
voting model, belonging to a bonding organization where at least half of the membership was from the same
age group was positively associated with signing an internet petition. Unlike the federal voting model,
ethnically heterogeneous social networks were associated with signing an internet petition. It is difficult to
explain why contact with people from a similar ethnic group was linked to voting, while ethnically diverse
networks were conducive to internet activism; one possible explanation is that the global reach of digital
technologies exposes young people to diverse social connections and to global issues, which in turn could
reinforce their inclination to sign petitions distributed through this medium. Another is that young people who
are already embedded in ethnically diverse social networks are more interested and invested in the types of
issues that are often the subject of internet petitions, such as environmental and social justice issues. For young
people with less education, both bonding and bridging social capital were associated with signing an internet
petition. Generalized trust was also relevant, as young people who said that people can be trusted were more
likely to sign a petition than those who said one cannot be too careful about trusting others (Table 6).
Interestingly, females and immigrants in this education cohort were no less participatory than males and the
Canadian-born, suggesting that non-institutionalized forms of political engagement provide certain sub-
populations with opportunities that institutionalized forms do not.
INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE
For the group of young Canadians with a post-secondary diploma or degree, membership in a civic
group was the only significant predictor of the likelihood of signing an internet petition, with all else held
constant, and even that coefficient barely met the conventional threshold of statistical significance (Table 7).
This underscores the point that political and apolitical voluntary organizations have different consequences, and
that voluntary associations need to be venues where political messages and cues are primary and not secondary
activities. With that said, no social capital indicator contributed as much explanatory power as political interest;
respondents who were very/somewhat interested in politics had 10.8 times higher odds of signing a petition than
those who were not interested (Table 7).
Boycotts and buycotts are increasingly popular means of political expression, particularly for the young.
For young Canadians with less formal education, party membership was the only organizational indicator that
was significantly associated with political consumerism. Party members had 9.6 times higher odds of
participating in a boycott or buycott, with all else held equal. Only one other social capital indicator proved to
be significant. Individuals who texted their relatives at least once a week or more, were less likely to engage in
boycott/boycotts in the previous twelve months. Without deeper insight into the content of these texts, this
pattern is difficult to explain. It is possible that young people with closer connections to their relatives, are
inclined towards more conventional forms of political expression, but this remains speculative. As with internet
petitions, political interest was also significantly associated with boycott/boycott behaviour.
INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 HERE
For young people with a post-secondary diploma or degree, political interest was the only variable
significantly associated with boycott/boycott activity (Table 9). Membership in a hobby organization was a
significant predictor, until its effects were washed out by the political interest control. Finally, an examination
of the change in the Cox Snell R-squared statistic across Models 1 thru 6 presented in Tables 2 thru 9 shows
that contrary to the expectations of H5, social capital indicators contributed more explanatory power to the
political engagement of more highly-educated youths, and were less substantial predictors of political
engagement for young Canadians without a post-secondary diploma or degree. This held true for all forms of
political engagement.
Conclusion
The phenomenon of youth disengagement from politics is best understood as one that is confined to individuals
without a post-secondary education. Young Canadians with higher levels of formal education participate in
both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political engagement at twice the rate of their less well-
educated peers, and at rates similar to those reported for the general population. Starting from this point of
departure, this paper investigated whether the links between social capital and political engagement that have
been observed for the general population in Canada and for citizens in both mature and recently-established
democracies, also hold true for young Canadians, and for the most marginalized group of young Canadians in
particular.
This preliminary analysis provided limited evidentiary support for the first four research hypotheses, and
has rejected the last. Only a few social capital indicators were related to institutionalized and non-
institutionalized forms of political engagement. Social trust effects were limited and mostly non-existent when
other factors were taken into consideration, as were the effects of belonging to apolitical organizations. Overtly
political organizations such as political parties and civic organizations were associated with non-
institutionalized forms of political engagement. Bridging organizations or networks did not generally increase
the odds of political involvement, while bonding organizations and networks were in some instances helpful for
less well-educated young people. Another striking finding is that regardless of the mode of communication,
social connections with friends and relatives, were largely irrelevant. These findings suggest that informal
social networks are not fertile grounds for political discussion and mobilization for this sub-population. They
also raise questions about the privileged place of face-to-face modes of communication in the early social
capital literature. This analysis suggests neither is superior to the other, at least when it comes to offering a
venue where political discussions can take place.
Among the less well-educated, frequent personal contact with relatives was positively associated with
municipal turnout, while ethnically homogeneous social networks and belonging to an organization where at
least half of the members were from the same age group were both associated with higher odds of voting in
federal elections. Those who had signed an internet petition were more likely to belong to a political party, to
an organization with a substantial youth membership, to connect with ethnically diverse social networks, and to
express generalized trust in other people. Boycotters/buycotters were also more likely to belong to a political
party and less likely to be in frequent text contact with their relatives.
The overall and relatively modest contribution of social capital to the political engagement of the most
tuned-out segment of the Canadian population speaks to the need for additional research on understanding why
the impact of membership in voluntary organizations and social networks (face-to-face and virtual), and the
social trust they presumably generate, is limited, and why it is the better-educated young Canadians who seem
to benefit the most from these memberships and ties.
Table 1: Political Participation Among Canadians aged 24 years and under, by Education
(column percent)
Less than
Post-
Secondary
CV Post-
Secondary
Education
CV Rao-Scott Chi
Square
Voted in Previous Federal
Election (n=2324)
31.16
(466)
.06 65.63 (430) .04 92.11a
Voted in Previous
Municipal Election
(n=2295)
23.19
(341)
.07 41.10 (259) .06 36.58a
Signed an Internet Petition
in Previous 12 Months
(n=3445)
20.3 (574) .05 32.22 (201) .08 17.82a
Boycott/Purchase a product
for ethical reasons in
previous 12 months
(n=3451)
15.44(389) .07 31.61(210) .08 39.24a
a p ≤.0001
Table 2: Predictors of Municipal Vote for Domain=Less than Post-Secondary Education
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7
Odds
Ratio
Intercept -2.53(.47)a -2.74(.49)a -2.54(.68)a -2.81(1.12)b -4.41(2.01)c -4.78(2.29)c -5.73(2.60)c
Male .55(.21)b .57(.21)b .62(.25)d .77(.33)c 1.14(.39)b 1.24(.42)a 1.46(.44)a 4.32
Canadian-
born .51(.27)d .62(.28)d .71(.36)d .38(.45) .31(.54) .31(.56) .15(.57) 1.16
Hhld Income
$60K+
.10(.21) .08(.22) -.08(.28) -.22(.38) -.09(.43) -.09(.45) -07(.47) .92
Party .42(.53) .04(.61) .28(.67) .31(1.07) .26(1.13) -.01(1.17) .98
Sports .10(.22) -.15(.29) -.10(.35) .04(.43) .07(.46) .14(.51) 1.16
Hobby -.13(.25) -.23(.27) -.30(.36) -.24(.42) -.28(.45) -.43(.45) .64
Religious .17(.33) .05(.35) .007(.43) -.15(.50) -.17(.52) -.02(.58) .97
Civic -.07(.27) -.20(.28) -.18(.34) -.20(.40) -.26(.42) -.40(.46) .67
Service .87(.57) .65(.56) 1.43(.80)d 1.21(1.02) 1.28(1.06) 1.12(1.15) 3.08
Youth .04(.38) -.01(.36) .27(.46) .44(.55) .49(.56) .51(.57) 1.67
Ethnic 1.10(.61)d 1.17(.59)d 1.14(.74) 1.11(.98) 1.16(.97) .84(1.02) 2.33
Bonding
Org/Age
.23(.28) .43(.36) .70(.43) .71(.44) .78(.48) 2.20
Personcomm/
relatives
.65(.34)d .77(.38)d .79(.40)c .78(.42)d 2.19
Text comm/
Relatives
.-.15(.38) -.02(.43) -.06(.46) -.13(.51) .87
Int/email
comm/
Relatives
.35(.42) .30(.48) .32(.50) .33(.53) 1.39
Personal
comm/friends
-.05(.55) -.16(.57) -.25(.60) -.47(.62) .62
Textcomm/
Friends
-.21(.96) .41(1.85) .43(1.96) .62(2.22) 1.86
Int/email
contact/friend
.28(.46) .31(.51) .35(.53) .27(.55) 1.31
Bondig
network/Eth.
.34(.43) .37(.45) .53(.45) 1.70
Bonding
network/Inc.
-.32(.47) -.39(.49) -.19(.54) .82
Trust People c .37(.42) .44(.43) 1.56
Trust Family .20(.58) .01(.55) 1.01
Trust
Neighbour
-.02(.61) .06(.67) 1.06
Neighbour
help
-.11(.54) -04(.58) .96
Political
Interest
.91(.52)d 2.50
Follow News .32(.47) 1.38
N 1741 1739 1164 830 740 726 724
AIC 1640325.5 1615255.9 1102083.9 825285.81 697636.38 693185.73 669560.28
-2LL 1640317.5 1615231.9 1102056.9 825247.81 697594.38 693135.73 669506.28
Likelihood
Ratio
8744.47a 3992.82a* 2777.14a 2660.61a 2341.99a 2002.69a 2256.67a
Cox and Snell
Rsquare
.017 .03 .037 .083 .113 .119 .15
ap ≤.001;
bp ≤.01;
cp ≤.05;
d p≤.10
Table 3: Predictors of Municipal Vote for Domain=Post-Secondary Education or more
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Odds
Ratio
Intercept -1.15(.53)d -1.30( )d -.92(.75) -5.016
(3.55) -8.07(2.68)b -8.06(497.6) -8.43(822.9) .
Male .07(.25) .06(.28) .01(.23) -.32(.42) -.66(.46) -.63(.56) -.83(.62) .43
Canadian-
born
.61(.34) .36(.05) .47(.49) 1.56(.73)c 1.59(.81)c 1.45(.89) 1.67(.94)d 5.3
Hhld Income
$60K+
.31(.28) .32(.28) -.04(.34) -.31(.44) -.38(.49) -.32(.53) -.45(.56) .63
Party 1.72(.76)d 1.94(.87)d 2.15(1.29)d 1.87(1.07)d 1.27(1.21) 1.01(1.27) 2.75
Sports -.14(.30) -.008(.35) .02(.43) .20(.44) -.06(.55) -.12(.60) .88
Hobby -.05(.39) -.01(.41) -.20(.52) -.53(.55) -.44(.60) -.59(.63) .54
Religious .54(.50) .26(.55) .14(.71) -.22(.80) -.55(1.03) -.38(1.06) .67
Civic .14(.41) .12(.46) .14(.57) .61(.59) .86(.71) .76(.73) 2.14
Service -.58(1.00) -.38(1.01) -.10(1.14) -.007(1.16) .14(1.54) .20(1.48) 1.22
Youth .16(.58) .11(.57) .29(.75) .62(.78) .26(.90) .18(.95) 1.20
Ethnic -.77(1.07) -.65(1.08) -.72(1.4) -1.00(1.72) -1.23(1.84) -1.5(1.89) .22
Bonding
Org./Age
.01(.34) .27(.42) -.23(.40) -.47(.50) -.50(.51) .60
Personal
Comm/rels
.31(.49) .79(.49) .89(.57) 1.01(.62) 2.76
Text comm/
relatives
.03(.54) -.31(.54) 0.39(.63) -.64(.68) .52
Int/email
comm/rels
.48(.48) .78(.54) .61(.61) .65(.63) 1.92
Pers.comm/
Friends
-11(.65) -.24(.70) -.41(.81) -.59(.87) .55
Text comm/
friends
3.51(3.43) 5.90(2.35)b 5.42(497.7) 5.65(823) 284.7
9
Int/email
comm/friend
-.17(.61) .07(.60) .13(.78) .24(.85) 1.27
Bonding
network/eth
1.13(.76) 1.18(.82) 1.36(.89) 3.93
Bonding
network/inc
.16(.45) .18(.51) .32(.56) 1.38
Trust People .07(.54) .02(.58) 1.02
Trust Family 1.13(.91) 1.23(.92) 3.43
Trust
Neighbours
-.17(.80) -.33(.81) .71
Neighbours
Help
-.03(.61) .05(.63) 1.05
Political
Interest
-.16(.61) .84
Follow News .93(.57) 2.54
N 1741 1739 1164 830 740 726 726
AIC 1220756.6 1232726.8 798797.49 569114.86 471099.52 448229.05 431887.89
-2LL 1220748.6 1232724.8 798771.49 569076.86 471057.52 448179.05 431833.89
Likelihood
Ratio
4427.12a 2969.89a 1741.43a 1660.81a 2813.37a 448179.05 .22
Cox and Snell
Rsquare
.013 .048 .048 .129 .19 .185 .209
ap ≤.001; bp ≤.01; cp ≤.05; d p≤.10
Table 4: Predictors of Federal Vote for Domain=Less than Post-Secondary Education
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7
Odds
Ratio
Intercept -2.23(.40)a -2.53(.44)a -3.05(.61)a -3.00(1.01)b -3.61(1.39)a -4.25(1.64)b -5.12(1.87)b
Male .40(.18)c .47(.18)b .53(.25)c .58(.31)d .81(.35d .85(.36)c 1.01(.37)b 2.75
Canadian-
born 1.04(.23)a 1.17(.26)a 1.46(.34)a 1.33(.46)b 1.05(.52)d 1.10(.55)c .98(.56)d 2.66
Hhld Income
$60K+
.05(.20) .07(.21) .24(.30) .14(.37) .14(.42) .13(.44) .07(.44) 1.07
Party .07(.21) -.21(.63) -06(.74) -.12(92) -.13(.98) -.27(1.00) .76
Sports .07(.56) -.17(.28) -.26(.35) -.03(.40) -.10(.42) -.04(.43) .95
Hobby -.03(.22) .29(.29) .27(.36) .42(.39) .45(.42) .33(.43) 1.39
Religious .29(.28) .35(.30) .32(.38) .31(.47) .29(.50) .46(.52) 1.59
Civic .30(.29) -.23(.27) -.14(.33) -.34(.37) -.37(.39) -.40(.41) .66
Service .81(.53) .66(.52) 1.43(.80)d 1.78(1.15) 1.81(1.17) 1.65(1.15) 5.21
Youth -.54(.33) -.59(.35)d -.41(.48) -.27(.51) -.16(.53) -.16(1.15) .84
Ethnic .77(.59) .88(.60) .69(.82) .98(1.10) .98(.1.12) .72(1.10) 2.06
Bonding
Org/Age
.29(.27) .58(.36) .78(.41)d .84(.44)d .92(.46)c 2.52
Personcomm/
relatives
.31(.33) .39(.37) .34(.38) .35(.39) 1.42
Text comm/
relatives
-.48(.40) -.62(.38) -.57(.50) -.61(.50) .53
Int/email
comm/
relatives
.46(.43) .64(.50) .60(.51) .63(.52) 1.89
Personal
comm/friends
-.07(.62) -.08(.67) -.08(.70) -.10(.73) .89
Textcomm/
Friends
-.23(.88) -.09(1.36) -.13(1.54) .26(1.71) 1.30
Int/email
contact/friend
.19(.46) .08(.53) .07(.55) -.04(.57) .95
Bondig
network/Eth.
.89(.38)c .87(.41)c .94(.43)c 2.57
Bonding
network/Inc.
-.66(.48) -.74(.54) -.68(.57) .50
Trust People -.05(.42) -.05(.43) .95
Trust Family .26(.61) .15(.61) 1.16
Trust
Neighbour
.01(.49) .13(.51) 1.14
Neighbour
help
.58(.50) .67(.54) 1.97
Political
Interest
.28(.44) 1.33
Follow News .73(.46) 2.08
N 1758 1756 1172 833 743 730 728
AIC 1919380.0 1892914.6 1238872 919662.23 784092.14 775837.88 758770.97
-2LL 1919372.0 1892890.6 1238846 919624.23 784050.14 775787.88 758716.97
Likelihood
Ratio
5797.2a 5777.61 5127.54a 2872.62a 3342.64a 2747.45a 2828.48a
Cox and Snell
Rsquare
.029 .042 .066 .088 .136 .146 .168
ap ≤.001;
bp ≤.01;
cp ≤.05;
d p≤.10
Table 5: Predictors of Federal Vote for Domain=Post-Secondary Education or more
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7
Odds
Ratio
Intercept .42(.55) .29(.60) .12(.80) -2.54(2.24) -3.32(3.97) -3.39(3.49) -3.47(3.8)
Male -.26(.27) -.31(.28) -.35(.35) -.52(.46) -.61(.56) -.52(.66) -.54(.70) .57
Canadian-
born .84(.33)b .94(.37)b .65(.47) 1.39(.69)c 1.75(.96)d 1.56(1.03) 1.53(1.04) 4.63
Hhld Income
$60K+
-.03(.28) -.05(.29) -.11(.37) -.31(.43) -.41(.53) -.55(.57) -.67(.63) .51
Party 1.23(2.24) 1.49(1.92) 1.69(1.86) 1.65(1.39) 1.26(1.82) .84(1.74) 2.31
Sports -.14(.30) .31(.34) .17(.42) .45(.51) .11(.64) .09(.72) 1.10
Hobby .29(.39) .36(.41) .26(.51) -.01(.58) .15(.64) .06(.73) 1.07
Religious -.005(.46) -.09(.48) -.21(.62) -.36(.74) -.72(.90) -.44(.96) .64
Civic .36(.37) .51(.39) .39(.49) .69(.56) .91(.69) .78(.75) 2.19
Service .31(.87) .70(.92) 1.01(1.02) 1.11(1.46) 1.58(1.48) 1.31(1.54) 3.72
Youth -.07(.58) -.09(.58) -.01(.73) .20(.90) -.21(1.00) -.38(1.04) .67
Ethnic 1.22(.72)d 1.50(.77)d 2.23(.1.70) 2.17(1.65) 2.05(1.68) 1.94(1.70) 7.02
Bonding
Org/Age
-.02(.37) .16(.42) -.14(.47) -.30(.55) -.40(.60) .66
Personcomm/
relatives
.005(.51) .41(.62) .52(.70) .57(.75) 1.77
Text comm/
relatives
-.17(.51) -.67(.66) -.79(.75) -.87(.78) .41
Int/email
comm/
relatives
.007(.46) .43(.60) .21(.64) .16(.66) 1.18
Personal
comm/friends
.77(.62) .75(.78) .72(.97) .70(1.04) 2.02
Textcomm/
Friends
1.79(2.03) 1.99(3.90) 1.32(3.44) 1.11(3.51) 3.05
Int/email
contact/friend
.01(.57) .01(.63) -.05(.73) -.22(.79) .80
Bondig
network/Eth.
.05(.75) .01(.87) -.08(.90) .92
Bonding
network/Inc.
.47(.53) .51(.61) .72(.72) 2.07
Trust People .63(.56) .65(.62_ 1.92
Trust Family 1.09(.73) 1.19(.81) 3.29
Trust
Neighbour
.30(1.00) .15(1.10) 1.217
Neighbour
help
.19(.63) .18(.65) 1.20
Political
Interest
.73(.72) 2.08
Follow News .40(.70) 1.49
N 1758 1756 1172 833 743 730 728
AIC 1123298.7 1099191.9 735843.49 524333.84 451799.83 407841.8 392274.38
-2LL 1123290.7 1099167.9 735817.49 524295.85 451757.83 407791.8 39220.38
Likelihood
Ratio
5721.95a 1880.30a 1985.05a 1914.63a 1676.44a 1616.86a 1491.36a
Cox and Snell
R-square
.019 .044 .065 .145 .173 .218 .239
ap ≤.001;
bp ≤.01;
cp ≤.05;
d p≤.10
Table 6: Predictors of Signed a Petition for Domain=Less than Post-Secondary Education
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7
Odds
Ratio
Intercept -1.16(.32)a -1.38(.36)a -1.34(.48)b -1.92(.97)c -2.10(.1.49) -2.72(1.63)d -3.23(1.73)d
Male -.04(.17) -.02(.18) -.01(.22) -.49(.28)d -.28(.32) -.14(.34) -.02(.36) .97
Canadian-
born
-.04(.20) .04(.20) .04(.25) .12(.38) .42(.44) .42(.46) .35(.47) 1.4
Hhld Income
$60K+
-.02(.18) -.05(.19) -.12(.25) -.15(.31) -.19(.36) -.22(.38) -.26(.39) .76
Party 1.05(.45)c 1.23(.46)b 1.67(.55)b 1.90(.65)b 1.92(.62)b 1.76(.63)b 5.82
Sports -.27(.19) -.21(.24) -.14(.30) -.04(.35) .009(.37) .04(.39) 1.04
Hobby .57(.21)a .59(.22)b .48(.28)d .62(.33)d .58(.34)d .52(.35) 1.68
Religious -.23(.25) -.24(.26) -.13(.33) -.06(.37) -.11(.38) -.03(.39) .96
Civic -.07(.20) -.04(.21) .17(.27) .10(.31) .06(.32) -.01(.34) .98
Service .43(.42) .52(.41) .57(.58 .67(.65_ .75(.70) .64(.75) 1.89
Youth .38(.26) .36(.28) .40(.34) .31(.39) .32(.42) .37(.44) 1.45
Ethnic .54(.50) .52(.50) .51(.63) .42(.74) .73(.76) .51(.75) 1.67
Bonding
Org/Age
-.11(.22) .38(.30) .64(.35)d .65(.37)d .69(.39)d 2.00
Personcomm/
relatives
-.02(.28) .02(.34) .03(.33) .03(.35) 1.03
Text comm/
relatives
-.52(.30)d -.37(.34) -.45(.34) -.48(.37) .61
Int/email
comm/
relatives
.59(.30)c .55(.34) .57(.35) .56(.37) 1.76
Personal
comm/friends
.17(.45) .37(.51) .30(.54) .19(.55) 1.21
Textcomm/
Friends
.44(.76) .23(1.18) .16(1.22) .15(1.22) .61
Int/email
contact/friend
.16(.37) .07(.43) .13(.46) .13(.47) 1.15
Bondig
network/Eth.
-.87(.36)b -.86(.37)c -.77(.39)c .46
Bonding
network/Inc.
-.09(.41) -.20(.41) -.15(.43) .86
Trust People .56(.31)d .60(.32)d 1.82
Trust Family .45(.42) .38(.41) 1.47
Trust
Neighbour
.-.26(.46) -.24(.47) .78
Neighbour
help
-06(.40) -.001(.44) .99
Political
Interest
.58(.39) 1.78
Follow News .27(.36) 1.31
N 2416 2413 1696 1169 1012 993 991
AIC 2401700.4 2331315.7 1628394.2 1111721 915060.55 893376.75 879299.87
-2LL 2401692.4 2331291.7 1628368.2 1111683 915018.55 893326.75 879245.87
Likelihood
Ratio
112.76a 5499.67a 5312.66 4339.78a 3767.42a 3617.28a 3629.02a
Cox and Snell
Rsquare
.0001 .028 .043 .081 .10 .118 .13
ap ≤.001;
bp ≤.01;
cp ≤.05;
d p≤.10
Table 7: Predictors of Signed a Petition for Domain=Post-Secondary Education or more
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model7
Odds
Ratio
Intercept -.88(.65) -1.24(.78) -2.55(.92)b -4.45(2.80) -3.55(3.12) -5.20(4.73) -7.61(4.25)d
Male -.003(.28) -.005(.32) .15(.36) .48(.48) .43(.57) .83(.63) .99(.67) 2.70
Canadian-
born
.52(.43) .51(.49) .69(.50) .54(.71) .33(.82) -.10(.92) -.29(1.07) .74
Hhld Income
$60K+
-.43(.31) .60(.35)d -.01(.42) .54(.53) .63(.66) .71(.67) .62(.71) 1.87
Party .48(1.27) .69(1.45) 1.13(1.85) 1.29(1.92) .73(4.35) -.02(3.98) .97
Sports .27(.31) .56(.36) .54(.47) .70(.51) .46(.57) .74(.61) 2.10
Hobby .56(.38) .78(.41)d .79(.51) .88(.59) .91(.62) .42(.68) 1.52
Religious -.60(.64) -.86(.71) -.88(.82) -.79(.97) -1.05(.96) -.54(.95) .58
Civic 1.01(.40)b 1.13(.42)b 1.19(.52)c 1.28(.60)c 1.18(.65)d 1.14(.66)d 3.13
Service -.48(.91) -.37(.92) .07(1.37) .31(1.37) .60(1.37) .08(1.53) 1.09
Youth .69(.57) .46(.58) -.27(.74) -.63(.87) -.82(.85) -1.13(.94) .32
Ethnic -1.23(.96) -1.26(1.13) -1.48(1.48) -2.24(1.99) -2.36(1.98) -2.97(2.18) .05
Bonding
Org/Age
.20(.38) .50(.57) .54(.62) .91(.69) .88(.76) 2.43
Personcomm/
relatives
-.80(.57) -.63(.66) -.36(.63) -.24(.70) .78
Text comm/
relatives
.39(.57) .13(.65) .29(.67) .04(.75) 1.04
Int/email
comm/
relatives
.57(.55) .65(.63) .26(.66) .34(.69) 1.41
Personal
comm/friends
.70(.96) .64(1.13) .01(1.01) -.29(1.07) .74
Textcomm/
Friends
-.48(2.44) -.56(2.83) 1.39(4.22) 1.65(3.61) 5.24
Int/email
contact/friend
.87(.80) .63(.84) .61(83) .64(.86) 1.89
Bondig
network/Eth.
-.26(.68) -.12(.75) .01(.83) 1.01
Bonding
network/Inc.
-.38(.61) -.49(.65) .007(.72) 1.00
Trust People .21(.60) .17(.66) 1.19
Trust Family .11(.86) .42(.89) 1.52
Trust
Neighbour
.44(.82) -.03(.86) .96
Neighbour
help
-.48(.68) -.38(.70) .67
Political
Interest
2.38(.75)a 10.8
Follow News .34(.68) 1.40
N 2416 2413 1696 1169 1012 993 991
AIC 1153876.2 1065969.6 691178.64 483853.37 430876.02 393909.29 335632.84
-2LL 1153868.2 1065945.6 691152.64 483815.37 430834.02 393859.2 335578.84
Likelihood
Ratio
3603.58a 6295.75a 5460.40a 3186.18a 2111.63a 1360.02a 2003.65a
Cox and Snell
Rsquare .012 .102 .145 .24 .227 .235 .338
ap ≤.001;
bp ≤.01;
cp ≤.05;
d p≤.10
Table 8: Predictors of Boycott/Purchase a Produce for Ethical Reasons for Domain=Less than Post-
Secondary Education
Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7
Odds
Ratio
Intercept -2.20(.40)a -2.46(.45)a -2.31(.59)a -4.96(1.60)b -4.54(1.70)b -5.19(2.59)c -6.20(2.80)c
Male .31(.18)d .36(.19)d .32(.23) .38(.30) .31(.34) .41(.36) .63(.39) 1.89
Canadian-
born .46(.27)d .55(.28)c .60(.31)c .73(.47) .70(.51) .91(.58) .86(.63) 2.37
Hhld Income
$60K+ -.37(.20)d -.45(.21)c -.44(.26)d -.44(.35) -.62(.39) -.53(.43) -.62(.44) .53
Party 1.76(.46)a 1.85(.49)a 2.41(.60)a 2.57(.70)a 2.54(.71)a 2.27(.73)b 9.68
Sports -.03(.23) -.13(.27) -.490(.34) -.27(.37) -.18(.41) -.16(.46) .85
Hobby .34(.23) .30(.25) -.07(.30) -.07(.35) -.04(.36) -.16(.38) .85
Religious -.18(.29) -.22(.31) -.19(.39) .04(.43) .03(.47) .23(.51) 1.26
Civic -.06(.24) -.08(.24) .36(.29) .29(.31) .21(.33) .08(.37) 1.09
Service -.17(.45) -.04(.44) -.72(.76) -.81(.93) -.99(1.10) -1.3(.1.14) .27
Youth .04(.30) -.01(.32) -.20(.43) -.17(.48) -.09(.51) -.01(.57) .98
Ethnic 1.09(.50)c 1.11(.50)c 1.51(.67)c 1.33(.75)d 1.30(.87) .90(.93) 2.46
Bonding
Org/Age
-.03(.27) -.05(.32) -.15(.37) -.29(.39) -.23(.42) .79
Personcomm/
relatives
-.28(.33) -.30(.35) -.38(.36) -.44(.43) .64
Text comm/
relatives
-.54(.35) -.89(.40)c -.77(.40)c -.81(.47)d .44
Int/email
comm/
relatives
.09(.35) .44(.38) .31(.37) .32(.43) 1.38
Personal
comm/friends
.64(.49) .71(.60) .61(.68) .31(.73) 1.37
Textcomm/
Friends
2.04(.145) 1.39(1.42) 1.54(2.25) 1.38(.2.21) 3.98
Int/email
contact/friend
.22(.43) .19(.52) .20(.53) .21(.55) 1.24
Bondig
network/Eth.
.002(.39) -.06(.41) .06(.43) 1.06
Bonding
network/Inc.
.46(.51) .37(.53) .49(.56) 1.64
Trust People .50(.38) .54(.40) 1.73
Trust Family -.05(.49) -.11(.50) .89
Trust
Neighbour
-.31(.51) -.31(.53) .72
Neighbour
help
.18(.49) .38(.58) 1.47
Political
Interest
1.31(.55)c 3.74
Follow News .16(.44) 1.17
N 2418 2415 1698 1171 1015 996 994
AIC 2106753.2 2037817.8 1444868.8 912201.29 765165.58 740735.5 704817.03
-2LL 2106745.2 2037793.8 1444842.8 912q63.29 756123.58 740685.15 704763.03
Likelihood
Ratio 7825.23a 7163.37a 5772.31a 4001.30a 3226.60a 2345.31a 2912.82a
Cox and Snell
R-square
.01 .037 .047 .083 .093 .093 .125
Table 9: Predictors of Boycott/Purchse a Produce for Ethical Reasonsfor Domain=Post-Secondary
Education or More
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7
Odds
Ratio
Intercept -1.16(.64)d -1.45(.84)d -1.84(.95)c -2.30 (3.38) -3.69(5.06) -3.39(6.36) -3.77(5.95)
Male -.03(.30) -.07(.35) -.02(.39) .03(.52) -.16(.50) -/09(.54) .02(.56) 1.02
Canadian-
born .72(.41)d .68(.50) .77(.48) .57(.52) .49(.77) .32(.90) .25(.95) 1.29
Hhld Income
$60K+
-.31(.31) -.35(.36) .04(.42) .38(.50) .49(.47) .33(.54) .41(.57) 1.51
Party 1.80(1.16) 1.68(1.25) 1.58(1.52) 1.49(1.28) 1.47(1.61) 1.07(1.52) 2.93
Sports .12(.30) .07(.33) -.33(.41) -.34(.42) -.41(.48) -.20(.57) .81
Hobby 1.06(.39)b 1.20(.42)b 1.58(.60)b 1.23(.62)d 1.28(.71)d 1.20(.80) 3.33
Religious -.52(.60) -.60(.63) -.18(.72) -.33(.65) -.40(.76) -.48(.86) .61
Civic .42(.41) .54(.45) .19(.60) .28(.60) .07(.70) .004(.81) 1.00
Service -.39(.78) -.46(.83) -.02(1.31) .17(1.40) .02(1.59) -.46(1.62) .62
Youth .23(.57) .19(.63) .03(.74) .30(.73) .18(.91) .11(.95) 1.11
Ethnic .43(1.25) .35(1.35) .19(.1.63) .51(1.78) .32(1.88) .32(2.06) 1.38
Bonding
Org/Age
-.25(.38) -.07(.45) .01(.45) .15(.53) .003(.62) 1.00
Personcomm/
relatives
-.87(.53) -.77(.50) -.81(.59) -1.12(.70) .32
Text comm/
Relatives
.21(.56) -.06(.62) .04(.72) .12(.75) 1.13
Int/email
comm/
Relatives
.46(.50) .76(.51) .74(.61) .85(.67) 2.34
Personal
comm/friends
-.20(.72) -.60(.72) -.53(.85) -.61(.98) .54
Textcomm/
Friends
.34(3.11) 1.64(4.79) 1.58(6.29) 1.06(5.62) 2.89
Int/email
contact/friend
.22(.76) .52(.82) .59(.94) .43(1.00) 1.54
Bondig
network/Eth.
.61(.73) .55(.89) .34(.98) 1.41
Bonding
network/Inc.
-.02(.46) .05(.53) .35(.62) 1.42
Trust People .39(.53) .20(.58) 1.23
Trust Family -.70(.71) -.54(.74) .58
Trust
Neighbour
.35(.89) .10(1.06) 1.10
Neighbour
help
.14(.60) .19(.66) 1.21
Political
Interest
1.99(.91)c 7.31
Follow News -.99(.91) .36
N 2418 2415 1698 1171 1015 996 994
AIC 1140842.8 1049835.5 703163.42 497338.8 431485.03 410963.06 375782.3
-2LL 1140834.8 1049811.5 703137.42 497300.8 431443.03 410913.06 375728.3
Likelihood
Ratio 3419.96a 6803.97a 5055.13a 2300.99a 2204.55a 1168.37a 1353.25a
Cox and Snell
R Square
.012 .104 .134 .199 .212 .194 .257
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