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Smart Grid SecurityAhmad Reza Ghaznavi

Ar.Ghaznavi@itrc.ac.ir

Winter 2015

What you will see…• Introduction to Smart Grid Concept

• Smart Grid Cyber Security Overview

• Smart Grid Cyber Security Guidelines

• Smart Grid Cyber Security Program: Case Study

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Section IIntroduction to Smart Grid Concept

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Why we need smart grid 3/1

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Price of Electricity is Increasing

We need more generation capacity

We need a better monitoring and control

Energy usage is highly unbalanced over time

Sm

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ow

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rid

What is Smart Grid?

Short Answer :

Smart Grid = Power Grid + ICT

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NIST Smart Grid Conceptual Model

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At IEEE, the smart grid is seen as a large "System of Systems," where each NIST smart grid domain is expanded into three smart

grid foundational layers:

(i) The Power and Energy Layer,

(ii) The Communication Layer

(iii) The IT/Computer Layer.

Layers (ii) and (iii) are enabling infrastructure platforms of the Power and Energy Layer that makes the grid

"smarter."

Bulk Generation

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• The Bulk Generation domain of the smart grid generates electricity from renewable and non-renewable energy sources

in bulk quantities.

• Energy that is stored for later distribution may also be included in this domain.

Distribution

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• The Distribution domain distributes the electricity to and from the end customers in the smart grid.

• The distribution network connects the smart meters and all intelligent field devices, managing and controlling them

through a two-way wireless or wire line communications network.

• It may also connect to energy storage facilities and alternative distributed energy resources at the distribution level.

Customer

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• The Customer domain of the smart grid is where the end-users of electricity (home, commercial/building and

industrial) are connected to the electric distribution network through the smart meters.

• The smart meters control and manage the flow of electricity to and from the customers and provide energy

information about energy usage and patterns.

• Each customer has a discrete domain comprised of electricity premise and two-way communications networks.

• A customer domain may also generate, store and manage the use of energy, as well as the connectivity with plug-in

vehicles.

Operations

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• The Operations domain manages and controls the electricity flow of all other domains in the smart grid.

• It uses a two-way communications network to connect to substations, customer premises networks and other

intelligent field devices.

• It provides monitoring, reporting, controlling and supervision status and important process information and

decisions.

• Business intelligence processes gather data from the customer and network, and provide intelligence to support the

decision-making.

Markets

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• The Markets domain operates and coordinates all the participants in electricity markets within the smart grid.

• It provides the market management, wholesaling, retailing and trading of energy services.

• The Markets domain interfaces with all other domains and makes sure they are coordinated in a competitive market

environment.

• It also handles energy information clearinghouse operations and information exchange with third-party service

providers.

• For example, roaming billing information for inter-utility plug-in-vehicles falls under this domain.

Service Provider

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• The Service Provider domain of the smart grid handles all third-party operations among the domains.

• These might include web portals that provide energy efficiency management services to end-customers, data exchange

between the customer and the utilities regarding energy management, and regarding the electricity supplied to homes

and buildings.

• It may also manage other processes for the utilities, such as demand response programs, outage management and field

services.

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16Co

mp

osit

e H

igh

-Lev

el

Vie

w o

f th

e A

cto

rs w

ith

in E

ach

of

the S

ma

rt

Grid

Do

ma

in

Sm

art

Gri

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cosy

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Rela

tion

s

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Section IICyber Security in smart grid

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Can ICT make the Power Grid Vulnerable?

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Interconnected

networks

Increased

number of entry

points and paths

Interconnected

systems

Increased private

data exposure and

risk when data is

aggregated

Increased use of

new technologies

introduce new

vulnerabilities

malicious

software/firmware

or compromised

hardware

Results in

malicious attack

Expansion of

collected data potential for compromise

of data confidentiality,

including the breach of

customer privacy

Security Goals in SG

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Security Requirements in SG

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Incident Handling

Self-healing

To meet these requirements, every node

in the Smart Grid must have

at least basic cryptographic functions

time-criticality

security

balance communication efficiency and information security

Notice!!!!!

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Smart Grid is a cyber-physical System

Cyber

Security

Breaches

Real

World

physical

Impacts

Physical

Security

Breaches

Cyber

Space

Incidents

Hybrid Cyber-Physical Solutions to :

Making Secure the Smart Grid

Cyber Security Concerns? 3/1

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Confidentiality

Integrity

Availability

Challenges in Securing Smart Grid

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Data and information security requirements

Large numbers of “smart” devices

Physical security and grid perimeter

Legacy and (in)secure communication protocols

Large number of stakeholders and synergies with other utilities

Lack of definition of the smart grid concept and of its security requirements

Lack of awareness among smart grid stakeholders

Security in the supply chain

Promote the exchange of information on risks, vulnerabilities and threats

International cooperation

Threat to Privacy??

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Threat to Privacy??

Backing to Smart Metering and Privacy Case

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Cyber Security Solutions Power System Solution (Physical)

Cyber Attacks against Smart Grid 3/1

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Type 1

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• This type of attacks affect the operation of generators.

• Turning off/on a generator can imbalance supply and demand.

• Ripple effect is usually a major problem in such cases.

• Although such attacks are complex and need resources:

• We need to highly protect access to power plants:

• Physical Access

• Cyber Access

• Any remote access should be controlled by firewalls:

Key use cases in distribution and transmission systems in the Smart Grid 3/1

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Type 2

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Department of Homeland Security

released a report in July

2013 about GPS Systems vulnerabilities to

jamming attacks.

With invalid time-stamp, GPS data

is useless or misleading.

Attack to NetworkSource Spoofing

Content Spoofing

Attack to Sensors

False Data Injection Attacks

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• We need to do our best to protect sensor data.

• But what if an attack goes through?

• Solution: PMUs readings should add up!

• What you observe at different

locations should be consistent!

Hybri

d C

yber-

Ph

ysi

cal

Solu

tion

s to

:

Ma

kin

g S

ecu

re

th

e S

ma

rt

Grid

• It is not enough to just hack PMU 1:

• PMUs 4 and 6 need to be hacked too.

• Or the attack will be detected!

Attacker’s Viewpoint: Attacker has limited resources.

Operator’s Viewpoint: Operator has limited resources.

Which one to protect or to attack to ?

Key use cases in the AMI and home-area networks 3/1

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Type 3

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• A Type III attack affects the load sector.• One of the standard Type III attacks is “load altering attack”.

• Load altering attack is an attack against demand response.

• Assume that a hacker compromises the price data:

• Sent to hundreds of thousands of ECS devices.

• A large number of users jump into the low price hour.

• This can cause a load spike at an already peak hour .

• Price signals have to be source authenticated.

• A sudden spike in load demand for 1 million users

• A sudden shot down of multiple generation units!

• It resembles Denial of Service attacks with botnets!

Comparison between the distribution and transmission system and the AMI networks 3

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Dos Attack Attack to Integrity

Attack Countermeasure to DoS Attack

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At the physical or MAC layer

detector can measure the received signal

strength information (RSSI)

at every layer by identifying a significant increase of

packet transmission failures

at the early stage by proactively sending probing

packets

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The Layered Approach to Security

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Section IIISmart Grid Cyber Security Guidelines

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National Institute of Standards and Technology Role: Coordination of Interoperability Standards in United States

• Department of Energy (DOE) lead agency for U.S. Government Smart Grid effort $3.4 billion of ARRA-funded Smart Grid Investment Grants; R&D portfolio

Smart Grid Task Force – DOE, NIST, FERC, FCC, EPA, ITA, DHS, …

• NIST coordinates and accelerates development of standards by private sector SDOs

• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission initiates rulemaking when consensus

• State Public Utilities Commissions (California, Texas, Ohio, …)

… and more

… and more

International

Global Consortia

Regional/National

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NIST Three Phase Plan for Smart Grid Interoperability

• NIST rolePHASE 1

Identify an initial set of

existing consensus

standards and develop

a roadmap to fill gaps

2009 2010

PHASE 2

Establish Smart Grid

Interoperability Panel (SGIP)

public-private forum with

governance for ongoing efforts

Smart Grid Interoperability Panel

established Nov 2009

PHASE 3

Conformity Framework

(includes Testing and

Certification)

NIST Interoperability Framework 1.0

Released Jan 2010

Summer 2009 workshops

Draft Framework Sept 2009

2012

NIST Interoperability Framework 2.0

Released Feb2012

2014

2013

industry-led incorporated non-profit

organization (SGIP.2)

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NIST Framework and Roadmap, Release 1.0

http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/

Conceptual Model

• Revised version January 2010

Public comments reviewed and addressed

• Smart Grid Vision / Model

• 75 key standards identified

IEC, IEEE, …

• 16 Priority Action Plans to fill gaps

• Includes cyber security strategy

Companion document NISTIR 7628

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Accomplishments since NIST Framework Release 2.0• Smart Grid Interoperability Panel

The NIST-established SGIP has transitioned to an industry-led non-profit organization.

SGIP has grown to 194 members as of June 2014, providing > 50% of funding through member dues.

• Regulatory Engagement and International Leadership FERC and NARUC point to the NIST framework and SGIP process for guidance in the

coordination, development, and implementation of interoperability standards.

Numerous liaison/working relationships have been established with international organizations.

• Outcomes with Major Contributions from NIST Multiple new or revised standards, including Open ADR 2.0, SEP2, IEEE 1547, NAESB REQ18,

and UL 1741 standards

SGIP EMIIWG report on electromagnetic compatibility issues Two documents—“Technology, Measurement, and Standards Challenges for the Smart Grid” and “Strategic R&D Opportunities for the Smart Grid”—resulting from an August 2012 workshop hosted by NIST and the Renewable and Solar Energy Institute (RASEI)

NISTIR 7823 (AMI Smart Meter Upgradeability Test Framework)

Precision Time Protocol (IEEE 1588) Testbed, Dashboard, and Conformance Test Plan

Revision 1 of NISTIR-7628 (“Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity”), published in September 2014.

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NIST Framework and Roadmap, Release 3.0

• In Release 3.0, smart grids are viewed from the perspective of cyber-physical systems (CPS)

hybridized systems that combine computer-based communication, control, and command with physical equipment to yield improved performance, reliability, resiliency, and user and producer awareness.

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NISTIR 7628 Overview• This three-volume report presents an analytical framework that organizations can

use to develop effective cyber security strategies tailored to their particular combinations of Smart Grid-related characteristics, risks, and vulnerabilities.

• This initial version of the Guidelines was developed as a consensus document by the Cyber Security Working Group (CSWG) of the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP).

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NISTIR 7628 Volume I• The first volume of the report describes the analytical approach, including the risk

assessment process, used to identify high-level security requirements.

• It also presents a high-level architecture followed by a logical interface architecture used to identify and define categories of interfaces within and across the seven Smart Grid domains.

• High-level security requirements for each of the 22 logical interface categories are then described.

• The first volume concludes with a discussion of technical cryptographic and key management issues across the scope of Smart Grid systems and devices.

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Exam

ple

: Cate

gory

11

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Interface between sensors and sensor networks

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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLE• Each security requirement is allocated to one of three categories:

Governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) : Organizational Level

Common technical : are applicable to all of the logical interface

Unique technical : are allocated to one or more of the logical interface categories

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NISTIR 7628 Volume II• The second volume is focused on privacy issues within personal dwellings.

• It provides awareness and discussion of such topics as evolving Smart Grid technologies and associated new types of information related to individuals, groups of individuals, and their behavior within their premises and electric vehicles; and whether these new types of information may contain privacy risks and challenges that have not been legally tested yet.

• Additionally, the second volume provides recommendations, based on widely accepted privacy principles, for entities that participate within the Smart Grid.

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Privacy Dimensions in SG 3/1

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Type I: Personal information not

previously readily obtainable

Type II: Mechanisms for obtaining

(or manipulating) personal

information that did not

previously exist.

NISTIR 7628 Volume III• The third volume is a compilation of supporting analyses and references used to develop

the high-level security requirements and other tools and resources presented in the first two volumes.

• These include categories of vulnerabilities defined by the working group and a discussion of the bottom-up security analysis that it conducted while developing the guidelines.

• A separate chapter distills research and development themes that are meant to present paradigm changing directions in cyber security that will enable higher levels of reliability and security for the Smart Grid as it continues to become more technologically advanced.

• In addition, the third volume provides an overview of the process that the CSWG developed to assess whether standards, identified through the NIST-led process in support of Smart Grid interoperability, satisfy the high-level security requirements included in the report.

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USE CASE SCENARIOS

CEN-CENELEC-ETSI Smart Grid Coordination Group• M/490 Standardization Mandate to European Standardization Organizations (ESOs), to

support European Smart Grid deployment.

• References: ISO/IEC 27001:2005

ISO/IEC 27002:2005

IEC 62351-X : Power System Automation Protocol Security

NERC CIP V4 (US Standard)

NISTIR-7628 - 2010 (US Guidelines)

• It Contains : SGIS essential requirements (Weighted triad CIA)

Security requirements and recommendations On the implementations of security through European SG stability scenario.

SGIS Standardization Defining SGIS Standard landscape and enhancing existing and making additional ones to integrate smart grid

needs

SGIS Toolbox Smart Grid Use Case stakeholders and security needs

Risk consideration In connecting Smart Grid critical infrastructures equipments to public networks

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SGIS Key Elements Architecture Model (SGAM)

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SGIS Key Elements Security Levels (SGIS-SL)

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SGIS Key Elements Data Protection classes (SG-DPC)

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SGIS Key Elements Security View per Layer

SG

IS-S

L H

igh

Level

Reco

mm

en

dati

on

s

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SGIS Standard Landscape (Areas)

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SGIS Standard Landscape (Analysis)

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SGIS Standard Landscape (Target)

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P2030 O

vera

ll G

oals

1. Provide guidelines in understanding and defining smart grid

interoperability of the electric power system with end-use applications and

loads

2. Focus on integration of energy technology and information and

communications technology

3. Achieve seamless operation for electric generation, delivery, and end-use

benefits to permit two way power flow with communication and control

4. Address interconnection and intra-facing frameworks and strategies with

design definitions

5. Expand knowledge in grid architectural designs and operation to promote

a more reliable and flexible electric power system

6. Stimulate the development of a Body of IEEE 2030 smart grid standards

and or revise current standards applicable to smart grid body of

standards.

IEEE Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology Operation with the Electric Power System (EPS), End-Use Applications, and Loads

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P2030 O

RG

AN

IZA

TIO

N

• TASK FORCE 1: Power Engineering Technology

• TASK FORCE 2: Information Technology

• TASK FORCE 3: Communications Technology

IEEE Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology Operation with the Electric Power System (EPS), End-Use Applications, and Loads

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75high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP) and intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI)

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Pow

er sy

stem

s inte

rop

era

bility

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Com

mu

nica

tion

syste

ms in

tero

pera

bility

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Characteristics of smart grid communications network connectivity

• Tier classes 1, 2, or 3 are defined by the level of assurance, minimum latency, and impact on operations.

• Level of assurance is used to define the tier class priority hierarchy

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Security objectives for communications interoperability 3

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Section IVUS Smart Grid Cybersecurity Program

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Introduction• in February 2013 the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13636: Improving

Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and released Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, which aims to increase the overall resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure.

• The Department of Homeland Security's Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community C³ Voluntary Program helps align critical infrastructure owners and operators with existing resources that will assist their efforts to adopt the Cybersecurity Framework and manage their cyber risks. Learn more about the C³ Voluntary Program by visiting: www.dhs.gov/ccubedvp.

• NIST released the first version of the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity on February 12, 2014. The Framework, created through collaboration between industry and government, consists of standards, guidelines, and practices to promote the protection of critical infrastructure.

• NIST is also pleased to issue a companion Roadmap that discusses NIST's next steps with the Framework and identifies key areas of cybersecurity development, alignment, and collaboration.

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What does DoE due to NIST Framework?• The Energy Department is coordinating with the energy sector on

implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework through the electricity and oil and natural gas sector coordinating councils.

The Department will provide updates as consensus is reached on energy sector implementation guidance for the Framework.

• The Department also plans to leverage the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), to further facilitate the energy sector’s implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

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Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)

• Addressing cybersecurity is critical to enhancing the security and reliability of the nation’s electric grid.

• Ensuring a resilient electric grid is particularly important since it is arguably the most complex and critical infrastructure that other sectors depend upon to deliver essential services.

• Over the past two decades, the roles of electricity sector stakeholders have shifted: generation, transmission, and delivery functions have been separated into distinct markets; customers have become generators using distributed generation technologies; and vendors have assumed new responsibilities to provide advanced technologies and improve security.

These changes have created new responsibilities for all stakeholders in ensuring the continued security and resilience of the electric power grid.

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Administration’s strategic comprehensive approach

• The Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) supports it by:

Facilitating public-private partnerships to accelerate cybersecurity efforts for the grid of the 21st century;

Supporting sector incident management and response; and Enhancing and augmenting the cybersecurity workforce within the electric sector.

Funding research and development of advanced technology to create a secure and resilient electricity infrastructure;

Supporting the development of cybersecurity standards to provide a baseline to protect against known vulnerabilities;

Facilitating timely sharing of actionable and relevant threat information;

Advancing risk management strategies to improve decision making;

• OE works closely with the Department of Homeland Security, industry, and other government agencies on an ongoing basis to reduce the risk of energy disruptions due to cyber attack.

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Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2)• The C2M2 helps organizations—regardless of size, type, or industry—evaluate, prioritize,

and improve their own cybersecurity capabilities.

• The model focuses on the implementation and management of cybersecurity practices associated with the information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) assets and the environments in which they operate.

• The goal is to support ongoing development and measurement of cybersecurity capabilities within any organization by: Strengthening organizations’ cybersecurity capabilities;

Enabling organizations to effectively and consistently evaluate and benchmark their cybersecurity capabilities;

Sharing knowledge, best practices, and relevant references across organizations as a means to improve cybersecurity capabilities;

Enabling organizations to prioritize actions and investments to improve cybersecurity; and

Supporting adoption of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework.

• The C2M2 program is comprised of three cybersecurity capability maturity models: The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2);

The Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2); and

The Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ONG-C2M2).

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Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2)

• The ES-C2M2 includes the core C2M2 as well as additional reference material and implementation guidance specifically tailored for the electricity subsector.

• The ES-C2M2 comprises a maturity model, an evaluation tool, and DOE facilitated self-evaluations.

Maturity model: cybersecurity practices, grouped into ten domains and arranged according to maturity level.

Evaluation tool: allows organizations to evaluate their cybersecurity practices against ES-C2M2 cybersecurity practices, determining score for each domain and risk tolerance according to the desired scores.

Self-evaluation: Facilitators guide discussions, answer questions, and clarify model concepts to increase the accuracy of an evaluation.

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Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity,Why and How?• Energy delivery systems are the backbone of the energy sector - a network of processes that

produce, transfer, and distribute energy and the interconnected electronic and communication devices that monitor and control those processes.

• The CEDS program emphasizes collaboration among the government, industry, universities, national laboratories, and end users to advance research and development in cybersecurity that is tailored to the unique performance requirements, design and operational environment of energy delivery systems.

• CEDS program activities fall under five project areas, guided by the Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity. They are: Build a Culture of Security. Through extensive training, education, and communication, cybersecurity “best

practices” are encouraged to be reflexive and expected among all stakeholders.

Assess and Monitor Risk. Develop tools to assist stakeholders in assessing their security posture to enable them to accelerate their ability to mitigate potential risks.

Develop and Implement New Protective Measures to Reduce Risk. Through rigorous research, development, and testing, system vulnerabilities are revealed and mitigation options are identified which has led to hardened control systems.

Manage Incidents. Facilitate tools for stakeholders to improve cyber intrusion detection, remediation, recovery, and restoration capabilities.

Sustain Security Improvements. Through active partnerships, stakeholders are engaged and collaborative efforts and critical security information sharing is occurring.

• DOE is helping to address the critical security challenges of energy delivery systems through a focused R&D effort and integrated planning.

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R&D: National SCADA Test Bed• Securing energy delivery systems is essential for protecting energy infrastructure. The

National Research Council identified "protecting energy distribution services by improving the security of SCADA systems" as one of the 14 most important technical initiatives for making the Nation safer across all critical infrastructures. In addition, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003) states that "securing DCS/SCADA is a national priority."

• The National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) provides frontier research development as well as a core testing environment to help industry and government identify and correct vulnerabilities in SCADA equipment and control systems within the energy sector.

• NSTB is a one-of-a-kind national resource that draws on the integrated expertise and capabilities of the Argonne, Idaho, Lawrence Berkeley, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National Laboratories.

• NSTB combines a network of the national labs' state-of-the-art operational system testing facilities with expert research, development, analysis, and training to discover and adresscritical security vulnerabilities and threats the energy sector faces.

• NSTB offers more than 17 testing and research facilities, encompassing field-scale control systems, 61 miles of 138 kV transmission lines, 7 substations, and advanced visualization and modeling tools.

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National SCADA Test Bed Key Researches?• Core and Frontier R&D projects being conducted by national laboratories that

comprise the NSTB include: Los Alamos National Laboratory is researching quantum key distribution (QKD) to exchange cryptographic

keys that are then used in traditional algorithms to encrypt energy sector information, including smart grid data. In December 2012, the lab successfully demonstrated QKD on the University of Illinois test bed in collaboration with the CEDS-funded Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid (TCIPG) project.

Idaho National Laboratory is developing a methodology to allow energy sector stakeholders to analyze technical, cybersecurity threat information and understand how those threats affect their overall risk posture. The methodology provides a framework for analyzing technical security data and correlating that data with threat patterns, allowing stakeholders to formulate an appropriate response to a given threat.

Sandia National Laboratories is investigating moving target defenses to better secure the energy sector against attack by eliminating the class of adversaries that relies on known static addresses of critical infrastructure network devices. This project is automatically reconfiguring network settings and randomizing application communications dynamically to convert control systems into moving targets that proactively defend themselves against attack.

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is considering the physical limitations of devices to develop specifications and enhanced monitoring techniques that can determine when a system does or is about to violate a protocol, which may be the result of external or internal threats. This project is also researching methods of delegating cyber and physical protection responsibilities to low level sensors and actuators.

Argonne National Laboratory supports efforts to develop and deploy control system standards, including the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61850 substation automation standard and trustworthy wireless standards through the Industrial Society of Automation (ISA) working groups. Argonne applies its oil and natural gas industry subject-matter expertise in these and other NSTB efforts.

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NSTB Laboratory-Led Projects• Using Research Calls, mid-term research, development, and demonstrations lead

to next generation capabilities that are expected to become widely adopted for enhancing the cybersecurity of communication and control systems used within the energy sector.

• The Research Calls are a competitive solicitation among DOE’s national laboratories, which encourages collaboration among multiple laboratories, vendors, and asset owners.

• A Research Call conducted in 2012 included the following projects: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and projects partners are developing an

integrated suite of open source tools and techniques to identify compromise in the hardware, firmware, and software components of energy delivery systems both before commissioning and during period of service. The suite includes a range of stand-alone tools that can be run locally to provide hardware supply chain assurances, to large-scale high-performance computing services that can statistically analyze systems of systems to identify potential concerns in critical infrastructure supply chains.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory and project partners are developing a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) capability for the energy sector. The solution decreases cost by enhancing traditional QKD, allowing for multiple clients to communicate over a single quantum channel using low-cost quantum modulators, called AQCESS (Accessible QKD for Cost-Effective Secret Sharing) nodes.

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Long-Term R&D: Academia-Led Projects• The Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid (TCIPG) project is a partnership of

professors, researchers, and students from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Dartmouth College, Cornell University, University of California at Davis, and Washington State University. TCIPG is developing technologies for a secure, real-time communication system; an automated cyber attack

response system; risk and security assessment tools; security validation; and smart grid applications including wide-area control and monitoring, controllable load demand response, and the integration of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.

It is an expansion of the original TCIP project, a five-year effort begun in fall 2005 funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, with support from DOE and DHS. As TCIP, the project developed a range of hardware and software solutions, including a highly efficient technique for protecting message exchanges in existing, already-deployed power systems and a strategy for managing complex security policies in large networks that may have thousands of access rules.

• CEDS also supports The Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a federally funded R&D center at Carnegie Mellon University. SEI provides a unique set of interdisciplinary capabilities, expertise, and partnerships to conduct

frontier research and analysis.

SEI provides independent expertise in support of the CEDS mission by working in public-private partnership to develop, pilot, implement and transition to the electricity sector improved software and systems engineering practices.

Activities include: Supporting public-private efforts to develop security architecture and interoperability guidelines for the electricity sector; Providing guidance in identifying and managing electricity sector risk; and Transitioning other cybersecurity tools to the electricity sector.

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Planning: Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity - 2011• Asset owners and operators, government agencies, and other stakeholders are pursuing various

strategies to improve control systems security. To provide a unifying framework, DOE partnered with industry, DHS, and Natural Resources Canada in 2005 to facilitate the development of the Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity. DOE has used the Roadmap to encourage industry, government, and academic collaboration to stimulate the creation of more secure, next-generation control systems.

• The Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group (ESCSWG) updated this roadmap to build upon the successes of the energy sector and address gaps created by the changing energy sector landscape and advancing threat capabilities, and to emphasize a culture of security. As part of the Obama Administration’s goals to enhance the security and reliability of the Nation’s energy infrastructure, the U.S. Department of Energy released the 2011 Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity that identifies the critical needs and priorities of the energy sector and provides a path for improving security, reliability, and functionality of energy delivery systems.

• The ESCSWG is a public-private partnership consisting of energy delivery systems cybersecurity experts from government and industry that support the Electricity Sub-sector Coordination Council, Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council, and the Government Coordinating Council for Energy under the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council framework. CEDS has co-chaired and supported the ESCSWG efforts since its formation in 2007.

• To enhance the Roadmap's effectiveness, the ESCSWG created the interactive energy Roadmap (ieRoadmap), an online database where industry can share its R&D efforts for achieving Roadmap goals, evaluate its progress, and discover collaborative opportunities for future projects.

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Thanks for your attention

The End

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