SLOVENIA AND YUGOSLAVIA: Crises and reforms 1968/1988

Znanstvena konferenca / Scientific Conference

SLOVENIJA IN JUGOSLAVIJA :KRIZE IN REFORME 1968/1988

SLOVENIA AND YUGOSLAVIA :CRISES AND REFORMS 1968/1988

Povzetki / Abstracts

Ljubljana, 22. – 23. januar 2009Muzej in galerije mesta Ljubljane,

Gosposka 15, Ljubljana

�� Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino / Institute for Contemporary HistoryKongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljubljana

Zanjdr. Damijan Guštin

Uredil��

PrevodiBorut Praper, Studio S.U.R.

�� Medit d.o.o.

Naklada150 izvodov

SLOVENIJA in Jugoslavija: krize in reforme 1968/1988 : povzetki : znanstvenakonferenca = Slovenia and Yugoslavia: crises and reforms 1968/1988 : abstracts :�� prevodi Borut Praper ... [et al.]. - Ljubljana : Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2009

ISBN 978-961-6386-15-9

!� "#�� $� �� 243408640

PROGRAM

�� ob 9.30

dr. Peter Vodopivec, Od poskusov demokratizacije (1968–1972) do agonijein katastrofe (1988–1991) / From Democratisation Attempts (1968–1972)to Agony and Catastrophe (1988–1991)

�� , Jugoslovanske reforme v šestdesetih / The 1960s Yugo-slav Reforms

�� , Pomen in posledice brionskega plenuma – var-nostne ocene / The Significance and Impact of the Brioni Plenum: Secu-rity Evaluations

�� , Slovenski »liberalizem« šestdesetih let in vloga Staneta�� !"#$� �� %� �� & ��

�� ' �� (��% �(�� a-�� )*��* +��*, & �� -� .��/ �%� 0i-mension and Realism of Its Views

�� ob 15.00

�� , Percepcija Praške pomladi in njenega zloma v Sloveniji inJugoslaviji / Perception of the Prague Spring and Its Demise in Sloveniaand Yugoslavia

Jurij Hadalin, Tito in Praška pomlad v jugoslovanskih diplomatskih virih /Tito and the Prague Spring in the Yugoslav Diplomatic Sources

�� , »Ostpolitik« Willyja Brandta in Jugoslavija 1964–1974 /The »Ostpolitik« of Willy Brandt and Yugoslavia 1964–1974

mag. Franci Pivec, Osamosvajanje študentske skupnosti (Slovensko študent-sko gibanje v šestdesetih letih) / The Emancipation of the Student Com-munity (Slovenian Student Movement in the 1960s)

�� !�� "#�$, Uporništvo generacije 68 1 ��*�2� �� s-tance of the Generation of '68 – Ethicising of the World

�� %�&��, Ustava SFRJ 1974 : mehanizem za razreševanje krize in/alinjen generator / The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republicof Yugoslavia: Crisis Solving Mechanism and/or Its Generator

Petek, 23. januar 2009 / Friday, 23. January 2009

�� ob 9.00

dr. Stefano Lusa, Slovenska demokratizacija v osemdesetih / Slovenian De-mocratisation in the 1980s

'�&� �(�� ' 3�� (��2� � �2�� *��mladine Slovenije / New Social Movements in the Context of the SocialistYouth League of Slovenia

dr. Gregor Tomc' 4��2� �� 2� / �� slovenskega socializma / Hippies and Punkers : Two of the CharacteristicYouth Subcultures of Slovenian Socialism

ddr. Neven Borak, Jugoslavija med integracijo in dezintegracijo / YugoslaviaBetween Integration and Disintegration

)(��*�� +�� , Gospodarske razmere v Jugoslaviji v obdobju 1968–1988: na poti v razpad / Economic Situation in Yugoslavia in the Periodfrom 1968 to 1988: On the Way to Dissolution

dr. Mile Bjelajac, JLA v šestdesetih in prvi polovici sedemdesetih / Yugo-slav Army in the 1960s and the First Half of the 1970s

dr. Damijan Guštin, Teritorialna obramba 1968–1987: vojaška potreba ali�� 2��5 � 6�� 0�&��*� !"#78!"79/ � :��, 3�*��, �Political Project?

OrganizatorInštitut za novejšo zgodovino / Institute for Contemporary History

�� Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije /Slovenian Research Agency

Pokroviteljstvo0�� 3�� ;��*��

Programski in organizacijski odbor�� 8 ��' �� 0��2�� .��' �� <�� =' ��>��2 +��' ��&� �� +�� ?��*' ��&� �� >��*� ?��

5

Peter Vodopivec*

OD POSKUSOV DEMOKRATIZACIJE (1968–1972) DO AGONIJEIN KATASTROFE (1988–1991)

»Mi v Jugoslaviji vse do leta 1972 še nismo prišli do javnega in kul-��(� �2� ��2' � �� %�' �� 2�' �� 2� ��2� �� (��2�� 2� ��2� ' �� 2� � �� (��%�� (� �� +��'da je bilo v Jugoslaviji še dovolj »sil, znanja in spodobnosti«, ki bi jugoslo-�� *�� %� ��2�� 2 �� i-%��' �� 2�% �� ' �� (� '2� ��2�� 2 �� % ��&�� u-(�% 2�(��% ��% �� ' �� jugoslovansko tragedijo.

6�� 2� �� >�(��2 � ��% !"#78!"9@ �� (�� e-&�� (��2 �� &' �� % ��%5 �� !"#A �� (�� &�� 2� �� !"#7 � (�� ' �*��' ��*�� ' �� (� �� *� ��&��' �� &�� 2�� t-�� (��2� �� i-��2��% �� >�(��2� �� 0 �� % �� *� ��&��% �� liberalizacije, ki so bili še odprti za medsebojno sporazumevanje o preobli-��2� �� ' ��2 �� 2�� (�� i-�� *�2� 2��(� ��2��2�' �� 2�%�� (�� ( &�d-eracije, mednacionalna razmerja v Jugoslaviji in gospodarsko politiko so se�� 2��2�� 2� �� ' �� 2� ��(��2�� (��2��2� �� ' ��2� �2�%�� 2�� % ��2�� &��*��2� ��% �(�� *�2�� 2�� *�� 2��' �� u-�� >�(��2� �� (' � %�� ' ��*�2� ��(� �� (��(� �� (�� B�� *�2� �� (� ��2� ��(� �� 32�%��%�� 2� �� 2� �� 2�� i-�� ' �� ' � ��2�� vprašaj tudi nekatere temeljne ideološke predpostavke jugoslovanskega so-cializma.

* Dr. / PhD, znanstveni svetnik / scientific councillor, redni prof. / full professor, Inštitut za

novejši zgodovino / Institute for Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljub-ljana e-mail: [email protected]

6

>�(�� % �� ' �� ' �� 2� �� (� ��o-ritarizma. Nova jugoslovanska ustava leta 1974, ki jo je leta 1976 dopolnil �� ' 2� �� ' �� (� �� (� ��2� �� r-(��2� �� *�2 �� (�� ' �� (�� ' �� 2�� 2�� *�2 ��' 2� �� 2� �� (��' �� 2�� 2 ��2�� 2�� (�� ' ��*��l-nimi zaostritvami in pripravami na Titov odhod je postopni proces dezinte-gracije v drugi polovici sedemdesetih let zajel tudi oblastno vertikalo Zveze��' �� 2 ��2� �� 2� �� 4�� % ��% �� % �� (��2�� ' �� (�� (�� +�� 2� ��2�� 8 � ��2� ��2��' �� 4�� 2� %��2�� 8 �� *�2� �� %�2��2� � �� *��

Prispevek opozarja, da je bila kriza v osemdesetih letih, ki je privedla do�� >�(��2� �� 2�� 2�' �� % (os-��% �� *��% ��2 ��% ��' �� (��' �� 2 ��2�2�� (� ��' �� 2 2� �� !"9C �� 2��2 ��globje spremembe in s togim vztrajanjem pri »Kardeljevem sistemu« ni mo-(� �� 2� �� >�(�� u-�� 2� �� (� ��*� ��% �� 2��2� ' �� % �� 2 �(d-kov povsem nepripravljene.

3� ��2� ��' �� 2 �� (��' �� !"9@ �>�(��2� �� &��' �� (�� odgovoriti. Nekateri tuji avtorji (npr. ameriški zgodovinar Gale Stokes) me-nijo, da sta modernizacija in demokratizacija v Jugoslaviji konec šestdesetih�� (�� 2� ��2' �� 2� 2� �� %� �(�� 2� �� 2� ��% �� >�(��2 2� �� 2 �� 2 ��(��' �� e-publiških vodstev in federacije ob koncu osemdesetih let, ko je padel berlin-�� ' �� ' �� ( ��2��% ��% ��2��' �� 2�% 2� �� 8 ��&��B�� bdobju dvajset let prej.

7

FROM DEMOCRATISATION ATTEMPTS (1968–1972)TO AGONY AND CATASTROPHE (1988–1991)

»Until as late as 1972, we have not reached a public and cultural clash ofopinions in Yugoslavia, where everyone, without a danger of being out-��D��' *�� %�� (�� &� �%�� *��*�� ' �� wrote into his diary in the year of his forced retreat from the political scene.He was convinced that there was enough »power, knowledge and skill« inYugoslavia, which could lead the Yugoslav socialism into a »better anddemocratic« future, »if only we would come together in a tolerant, deliberateand cultured dialogue«; so he saw his removal and the removal of the so-called liberal reformists in the other Yugoslav republics not only as a per-sonal failure, but also as a Yugoslav tragedy.

But was it still possible to carry out efficient reforms and transformYugoslavia in the years from 1968 to 1972 and thus prevent the agony andcatastrophe which followed in the 1980s? The economic reform, undertakenin 1965, mostly already failed until 1968. The social, national and politicalunrest, brought about by the failed reforms, mostly anti-reform students'movements, and the violent demise of the Czechoslovak Spring evenstrengthened the opponents of the more radical changes in Yugoslavia. Untilthe beginning of the 1970s, most of the republics may have been led by thesupporters of the reformist measures and political liberalisation, still open formutual communication about the transformation of the relations between therepublics, a more market-oriented economic policy and democratisation ofpublic life; however, their views of the role of federation, relations betweenthe Yugoslav nations and economic policy differed drastically. The Slove-�� %��' %�� , �� ' ��(�� &� �%� �� *��changes, speaking in favour of the freest possible negotiations between therepublics, the increased independence of the republics in regard to their con-nections with foreign countries, and the financing of the federal bodies andinstitutions according to the principle of participation fees. As communists,�� %�� , %�� %�� %� ��(�� & ;��u-nists should keep its leading political role in Yugoslavia, but at the sametime they believed that modernisation of the political and economic systemwas impossible without efficient democratisation and pluralisation of thepolitical space. Their demands for greater flexibility in regard to allowingprivate enterprise initiatives and private capital, even though not completelynew, already questioned some of the basic ideological assumptions of theYugoslav socialism.

The Yugoslav regime in the 1970s was not »neostalinist«, as we can fre-quently read and hear, but it was a hardline and contradictory form of com-munist authoritarianism. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974, amendedin 1976 by the Associated Labour Act, strengthened the political monopolyof the League of Communists on one hand, while on the other hand it weak-

8

ened not only the federal but also the republican bodies and political institu-tions with a complex system of political representation and organisation aswell as the atomisation of the society and economy through »TOZDs – BasicOrganisations of Associated Labour«. The system, designed to encourage themass politicisation of the population, was utterly inefficient and unintelligi-ble, while all the important decisions were still made by selected leadershipsof the League of Communists. With growing economic problems, mountingnational tensions and the preparations for Tito's departure, the gradual proc-ess of disintegration in the second half of the 1970s also encompassed theauthoritative vertical of the League of Communists, while the political ini-tiative was taken over more and more independently by the republican com-munist leaderships. When because of the critical situation in the middle ofthe 1980s even these leaderships started loosing the political power andauthority in Slovenia and Croatia, the final political crisis became unavoi-dable. Its bloody conclusion was fatally influenced by the dynamics of de-mocratisation – slower in Serbia and swifter in Croatia and Slovenia – andthe conflicts with the communist political concepts and patterns.

The following contribution emphasises that the crisis in the 1980s, lead-ing to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the attainment of Slovenian inde-pendence, is not only a result of critical economic situation and national as-pirations of individual nations, but also a deep crisis of the political system,lasting for several decades, which was only intensified by the 1974 Consti-tution. The Slovenian communist leadership, not prepared for deeperchanges and rigidly clinging to »Kardelj's system«, could not contributeanything in order to solve the tensions and problems. Thus in the second halfof the 1980s, the time of the Yugoslav communism simply ran out, and thegovernment elites in the individual republics were completely unprepared forthe coming events.

The question whether the development would be significantly differenthad the so-called »liberal« reformists prevailed in 1972 cannot be answeredconsistently. Certain foreign authors (for example, the American historianGale Stokes) believe that modernisation and democratisation in Yugoslaviain the end of the 1960s already reached the final point still possible in thecommunist system. But there were no real possibilities for more decisivechanges of the system in the circumstances of that time. In this light, it wasespecially tragic for Yugoslavia that in the end of the 1980s, when the BerlinWall fell, there were not even as many political leaders, ready for »tolerant,deliberate and cultured dialogue«, leading the republics and the federation,as in the »liberal – reformist« period twenty years earlier.

9

�� *

JUGOSLOVANSKE REFORME V ŠESTDESETIH

Zgodovina t. i. druge Jugoslavije je bila v znaku stalnih kriz in ukrepov,�� 2�%� ��2��2� 8 ��&�� &�� *� � ��B�2��2� ��(� 2�(�� 2�� &�� &�� povz��

0��(� 2�(�� 2� �� *�2' �� 2��(� b-��2� �� 2� ��2�� *�2� ��&�� +�� &�� 8 �� a-��2��2� �� *�� *�2� 8 2� �� *�� ucio-�� 2' ��2 2� �� ' �� 2� �� (>�(��2 �� 2�� (�� 2� 6 2� �� efor-��' �� E��2 �� FG 2�(�� E�� (��r-��G �� (� � �� 2� � ��(�% �*��s-��B��% ��%� + �� 2��2� � �� %letih 20. stoletja izvedene reforme z namenom deetatiziracije, debirokrati-��*�2�' ��*��*�2�' �� *�2� ��(�sistema druge Jugoslavije. Petdeseta leta so bila v znamenju reform poli-��(� �� &�� 2� �� 2� � ��2� ��i-��(� �� (��*�2� �� 2� �� 2� �� 2�� 8 �� 2�� e-�� 2� �� 2�� E�� 2� �� 2��G �� (�' �� 2 �� 2�� &�� 2�� 2� �� (�� 2�� sicer bolj deklarativna kot pa dejanska.

��&�� ' �� 2 �� &�� 8 �� *�� 2�� 6 �� &�� E��G �� *�� 2 �� 2� ��2� �� (� ��b-�� 2� �� &�� % ��%� .�� 2e-(� �� 2 �� 2� � ��*�2� E��*��*�2�G ��(� ��' �� 2 �� 2�� 2��2� (�� 2 ��(��2� � ��2�� E��*�n-��G ��' � �� % �� 6� �� 2�� % �(��% � ��2�� vzroke gospodarske krize. Razlogi krize so bili sicer v gospodarstvu, dejan-�� *��' ��%�2�2� �� *��% �� (��o-��% �� H�je za odnos med gospodarsko razvitejšimi in gospodarsko nerazvitejšimi re-publikami in za vprašanje, kdo bo vlagal v njihov razvoj.

* Dr. / PhD, višji znanstveni sodelavec / senior research associate, Inštitut za novejšo zgo-

dovino / Institute for Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljubljana;e-mail: [email protected]

10

Šestdeseta leta so bila zato krizna in reformska. Reforme v šestdesetihletih so imele nacionalni predznak; reforma federacije z zmanjšanjem vloge*�� *�2� �� 2�� (�� i-�� &�� 2�� 2� �� E��Bupravljanje) in nacionalnim (federalizem). Nacionalna problematika je do-�� 2� ��* �� !"#C �� 7� ��(�� >�(��2�� 2� �� 2��2� ��&��% �� a-cionalni« osnovi, tudi spreminjanje ustave sprejete dobro leto pred tem.:�� 2� �� &�� 2� �� *�2� E!"##G�� 2 ��2��% ��*�� *��% �(�� (��2��2�� 3��2� �� 2� � �� 2� �� &�� &�� 2� �� &�� &�� (��i-��*�2� � �� 2� ��(� �� 2��2�� (� *��Reforma federacije, ki je federacijo korenito federalizirala, je tekla do leta1971.

Poleg reforme federacije, ko je nacionalno dobilo prednost pred razred-��' 2� �� 2�� &�� % ��% ��&�� (�� e-&�� 2� �� k-�� 2�� &�� 2�2I �� rga-nizacijske in kadrovske z delno zamenjavo generacij na vodilnih funkcijahpo republikah. Reforme partije niso sledile vsebinskim reformam na ravni��ave.

THE 1960S YUGOSLAV REFORMS

The history of the so-called Second Yugoslavia was riddled by constantcrises and measures to remedy these crises – various reforms. Crises and re-forms were constant in the life of the second Yugoslav state. Crises de-manded reforms and reforms gave rise to crises.

The second Yugoslav state was established through revolution, but theduration of its existence was perceived as a reflection of an evolving reform.The first reform – the introduction of self-management and the so-called so-cialist democracy – may have had a revolutionary character, since it meant aradical change, defining the Second Yugoslavia and its political as well aseconomic development. This gave rise to reforms, which (should have) madethe Yugoslav political (and thus its closely associated economic) system dif-ferent from the system and operations in the other socialist-communistcountries. After the introduction of self-management, in the 1950s the re-forms with the intention of deetatisation, debureaucratisation and decentrali-sation were carried out; all of this with the intention of the democratisationof the Second Yugoslavia's political system. The 1950s were riddled withpolitical system reforms. The constitution was changed. The attribute ofclass gained a greater emphasis in the functioning of the political system and

11

state organisation. The ruling party – Communist Party – was also trans-formed. This change was reflected in its name (it changed from a communistparty into a league of adherents) as well as its social or political role it wassupposed to have in the new state. The reform of the ruling party in regard tothe manner of its rule was more of a declarative than an actual affair.

The reforms opened the issue which should have supposedly been over-come with federalism – the so-called national question. This, or the relation-ship between the federal parts of the state (republics) and the centralauthorities as well as the understanding of the position and role of the repub-lics, was characteristic of the 1960s crises and reforms. Economy and itsetatist character on one hand and the wish for deetatisation (decentralisation)on the other hand, where the principles of self-management in regard to theallocation or the possibility of managing the generated resources at the re-publican (national) level should have been implemented, gave rise to the po-litical crisis in the beginning of the 1960s. It manifested itself especially inthe various attitudes of the state Party leadership to the causes of the eco-nomic crises. The reasons for the crises may have lied in the economy, but inreality the causes were political and national, stemming from the social oreconomic differences among the individual parts of the state or the republics.This involved relations between the economically more developed and lessdeveloped republics and the question of who would invest in their progress.

Thus the 1960s were critical and involved a number of reforms. The re-forms in the 1960s had a national character; the federation reform encom-passed the reduction of the role of the central administration and the in-creased role of the republics, especially in regard to investment policies. Thereforms sought to establish an ideal symbiosis of the aspects of class (self-management) and the national (federalism). The national issue was politi-cally acknowledged in the end of 1964 at the 8th Congress of the League ofCommunists of Yugoslavia. This made it possible to consider the reforms onthe »national« basis, and also to change the constitution, adopted a bit over ayear earlier. The chance for this occurred after the political police reform(1966) and the removal of the key supporters of the centralist views from thepolitical life. Next year the constitution reform started with constitutionalamendments. It was oriented towards reforming the federal system and stateorganisation by strengthening the role of the republics and reducing the im-portance of the centre. The federation reform, thoroughly federalising thestate, was carried out until 1971.

Besides the federation reform, during which the aspect of the nation be-came more important than the aspect of class, the 1960s economy reformwas essential. The defence system was also reformed and a new doctrine wasintroduced. Due to its inefficiency, the ruling political party was also thesubject of organisational and staff reforms with a partial replacement of thegenerations holding the leading functions in all the republics. The Party re-forms did not follow the substantive reforms at the state level.

12

�� !�� "�� #��*

POMEN IN POSLEDICE BRIONSKEGA PLENUMA:VARNOSTNE OCENE

J�� !"## �� ' �� 2�% 2� ��' 2� �� prelomnica v jugoslovanski zgodovini, ne le za organizacijo in delovanje2�(�� (��% �� *��% ��%��%��% ��' �� 2� �� *�� (�� B��' �� 2� �� >�(o-��2� �� (�2�� 2 �� J�� 2�� *�2� � >�(��2�' ��*��' �� 2� ��a-�� % ��' �� 2�� *� E�� (�� (�� 8 � �� *�2� 8 �� (��' � ��%��*�2� ��% �� >�(��2�G' �� 2� �� *��*�2�' �� (�� J�� 2�� 2�� 2� >�(��2� 8 �� 2�� (� �� (��2��2� �� ' �� 2� ��(� �� 2�� (��2�� 2�� ' � ��2� �policijo, sodstvom in partijsko oblastnim aparatom. Razkritja plenuma ozi-�� % �(�� 2 �� (��2��2�� % ��2�%� ��' � �� (��r-�� 2�� ' �� 2� �� 2�� 2� �� o-��2 �� E��*�� ' ��2� ��% ��% �� %��' �*�� G �� 2�� 2� �� (� �� >�(��2� �� 4�� 2� ��i-�� *�� ' ��2 �� 2� �� E��*�2�' ��2� �� 2 �� ' ��2�sodobnejših ali bolj ustreznih ustavnih rešitev).

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF THE BRIONI PLENUM:SECURITY EVALUATIONS

The 1966 Brioni Plenum, with all the activities it triggered, was an es-sential turning point in the history of Yugoslavia, not only for the organisa-tion and operations of the Yugoslav State Security Service and according tothe analyses and evaluations of the Western security services, but it actuallyhad impact on the whole state and economic system, on the Yugoslav for-eign relations and above all on the search for future solutions, as well as the

* Dr. / PhD, redna prof. / full professor, Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Mariboru, Oddelek

za zgodovino / Faculty of Arts of the University in Maribor, Department of History, Ko-roška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor; e-mail: [email protected]

13

relations between nations and regions within the state. The Brioni Plenumwas a true beginning of destalinisation in Yugoslavia, the process which de-claratively started in the beginning of the 1950s, but had not been consis-tently finalised (all segments are relevant here: from classic destalinisation –the division of power and responsibility, to the rehabilitation of victims ofStalinism in Yugoslavia), neither in the field of state decentralisation nor inthe field of economy. The Brioni Plenum reopened the key dilemmas of theYugoslav development – the deviation from the prevalent use of the repres-sive apparatus in order to ensure political stability, which had since theWorld War II mostly been ensured by the Secret Service in cooperation withthe police, the judicial system and the Party government apparatus. The dis-closures of the Plenum and the findings of the investigative bodies at theBrioni Plenum and after it, displayed the main deficiencies in these areas.The direction in which politics and economy evolved after the Plenumopened all the existing key problems within the country (relations betweenthe Yugoslav nations, the search for new constitutional and political solu-tions, socialist pluralism) and in its foreign policy; they also disclosed thefuture causes for the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a unified and united coun-try. Furthermore, the plenum pointed towards the latent crisis in the socialistbloc, as the Soviet Union faced similar dilemmas (destalinisation, the rela-tionship between the Party and the state, the search for more contemporaryor more suitable constitutional solutions, etc.).

14

$�%� &��*

SLOVENSKI »LIBERALIZEM« ŠESTDESETIH LET IN VLOGA#�'()�' *'!�+�'

�� 2�� 2�� 2� � �� B��' �� (� ��(� �� E��G �� !"#98!"9@ E��2 2� �� 2�� G� �� 2� ��( �� % ��% �&��' �� *�� '�� 2� �� 2� ��*�� pripadal vodilni partizanski generaciji, vendar je bil mlajši, iz »druge vrste«,ki jih je ozka skupina predvojnih komunistov med vojno in v letih po njej�� 2�� *� � �� Bmerili, ker je kot predsednik ideološke komisije CK ZKS leta 1964 obra-�� *�2�� 2 +��' �� ' �� 2' � �2�%��mnenju, ne bi kazal pretiranega posluha za kulturo oziroma ni hotel svojih��% E�� (o��%G *��2�� %�� 2�� >� �� 2�' � ��% ;�� 2� 2��(� ��2�' � �� 2� �� najbolj priljubljen slovenski politik.

+��2�� ' �� (� 2� ��2�� ' �� 2� � ��2� ��(�� 2� ��*�� 2' � J�� (%��2�� ?��2� ��(%�� % �� 2�� ' � �� >�(osla-vijo absolutno obvladovala Josip Broz-Tito in politbiro (kasneje Izvršni ko-��G ;� �>'� �� % �� *�� (�2�2�(� �� 2� �� &��*�2 �� *��*�2� ��' � �� 2� �� ' ��2�� (�2� �� 2� �*��(� 2�(��' � �� %�� aj-��2�� 2�� 2�% ��' �� 2 &��*�2�' �� 2�� 2� � �� Nova usmeritev se je najprej izrazila na 8. kongresu ZKJ 1964, na katerem� ��' �� *�� *��(� ��2� � >�(��2� �� 2' �� % (�� &�� E!"#AG �� K�� =�� E�� 1966). Normativno so bile te spremembe uveljavljene z ustavnimi amand-��2� �� !"#78!"9!' �� !"9C' �� >�(o-��2� ��2�� E��G&�� 6�� desetletje.

�� 2�� % ��*�� %� �a-cionalizma, npr. na Kosovu leta 1968 in na Hrvaškem leta 1971, potem in-

* Dr. / PhD, redni prof. / full professor, Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, Oddelek

za zgodovino / Faculty of Arts of University in Ljubljana, Department of History, Ašker-�� [email protected]

15

�� 2� E�� *�� % ��%in skozi študentske demonstracije leta 1968), deloma pa so na spremembe�� 2�� (� E�� *�2� ��Bslovaške zaradi katere so se jugoslovanski politiki bali, da bodo izgubili�� 2��2 ��&�� *�� G�

.�� 2� �� *� 2� �� (��2�� 2�� 2�� 2� ��/ ��2� (�(��&��lege in vpetost v gospodarske tokove med vzhodom in zahodom, severom in2�(�' �� E��(��2� *��(� ��G' ��' ��dejavnosti predvsem pa v inovacije in znanje. Njegova vlada je bila zago-��*� �� % ��(�2 �� 2�� :�� (�� 2� �� Bpravami na izgradnjo jedrske elektrarne v Krškem.

3� �� 2� 2� �� * ' � �� 2�(� �� &�� (�� 2�socialdemokratskim usmeritvam, oboje je seveda treba upoštevati v kontek-�� 2� ��2�� (��2�� 2� �� *�� E��2�� lni-��G' �� *�� e-lavcev in prebivalstva sploh. Tudi njegov pogled nazaj (Dnevnik in spomini)�� 2�' �� 2� �� ' �� e-��*�2� �� *�� ? �� 2� �� (��2� �� 2�' �� 2� ��' �� i-�� *� �� % ��' �� (�� B�� prakse na Slovenskem.

SLOVENIAN »LIBERALISM« IN 1960S AND THE ROLEOF STA() *'!�+�

The Slovenian Party »liberalism« is most often associated with Stane��' �� & �%� �� )L�*�� ;��*�� E�%� (��G �e-�D�� !"#9 �� !"9@ ED%�� %� D�� &�*�� (�G� �� (��%�� strong group from various social spheres around him, which may not havebeen very tight-knit, but operated somehow in according to the principle of��%� �� D��(�% � �� , %�� (�� %� ��( ��i-san generation, but he was younger, from the »second rank«, which the smallgroup of pre-war communists let take the leading political positions duringthe war and in the post-war years. The Slovenian intellectuals resented himbecause as the president of the ideological commission of the Central Com-mittee of the League of Communists of Slovenia he settled the score with theopposition magazine Perspektive in 1964, and also because he supposedly,in their opinion, failed to show enough open-mindedness for culture and re-fused to subordinate his political (especially economic) goals to the demandsfor greater intellectual freedom. But during the time of his presidency in the�� (��' �� D��' �**��( � �%� ��,� & �%� +��*

16

Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, by far the most popularSlovenian politician.

In the Slovenian economic field, the Party »liberalism«, personified by��' %�� , �� &��' D��% J�� (%�� 4D��' ��(%��had still operated in the circumstances of an explicitly Party-run country,when Yugoslavia was in the absolute hands of Josip Broz-Tito and the Po-litical Bureau (later the Executive Committee) of the Central Committee ofthe League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and during the political crisis in�%� ��(��( & !"#$� �� , �� %� %�� & 6��-� ��*�� took his leading position in the time of gradual emancipation of the repub-lics, when the forced unity, based on the communist ideology and the idea ofsocialist Yugoslavia, had already started to crumble. Especially the most de-veloped republics started defending their interests and tried to function as in-dividual states within the federation, which they were able to do according tothe constitution. The new direction was first expressed at the 8th Congress ofthe League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1964, where it was admittedthat socialism failed to solve the national questions in Yugoslavia in princi-ple once and for all; and then again in the beginning of the economic reformE!"#AG �� ( �%� ��*�� *��( D��% K�� = E�%�1966 Brioni Plenum). Normatively, these changes were introduced with con-stitutional amendments from 1968 to 1971 and finalised with the 1974 Con-stitution, which despite the (con)federal nature failed to keep Yugoslavia to-gether for more than a decade after Tito's death.

The changes were accompanied by strong national pressures and nation-alist outbursts, for example in Kosovo in 1968 and Croatia in 1971, as wellas by intellectual distress (expressed by protests of intellectuals in the 1960sand the students' demonstrations in 1968). Partly these changes were also in-fluenced by foreign political reasons (the »Prague Spring« and the occupa-tion of Czechoslovakia, which made the Yugoslav politicians afraid Yugo-slavia would lose its reputation as the most reformatory socialist state).

M�� ,-� %��*�� *��' �� (�� &� �%� ��l-opmental orientation which Slovenia still tries to assert today: exploiting thegeographical location and the involvement in the economic flows betweenthe East and the West, the North and the South; focusing on the transport(building the highways), tourism, service activities, and especially innova-tions and knowledge. His government argued for the use of clean energysources and environmental care. Among other things this government un-dertook the preparations to build the Krško nuclear plant.

�� %� �*��* &�� D�� ' D%�� %� D�� *��sense his political profile and »programme« orientation were closer to so-cial-democratic directions; of course, both aspects need to be taken into ac-*�� %� *��L� & D%�� D�� %�� +��, �� (�� &�the marketing concepts (including stock ownership), but mostly with publicproperty and social protection of workers and the population in general. His

17

recollections (Dnevnik in spomini – [Diary and Memoirs]) also express theconviction that he saw the right path in the connections between the capital,political democracy and social state. In this sense, the question of how to in-��(�� i-cian and author of several theoretical works into the history of leftist – libe-ral thoughts and practices in Slovenia, presents a challenge for historians.

18

��%� ,��*

-�#,�.'&#*' ,�/+�+*' !/'.) #�'()�' *'!�+�'0&'�#)1(�#� +( &)'/(�#� ,OGLEDOV

Šestdeseta leta dvajsetega stoletja zavzemajo posebno mesto v naši��2�� (�� (�� ? �� 2� �� 2� ��2�� *�� (� �� *��*�2 ��2� ��(�� 2 ��%�Med dejavniki, ki so igrali vidnejšo vlogo v tem reformnem »vrenju« je iz-�� ' ��2 �� 2� � �� !"#9do konca leta 1972 zavzeto trudila ne samo do konca izrabiti in uveljaviti�� &��' �� 2�% �� (�� 2� ��pogoje, da izpolni svoje poslanstvo, ki je bilo najtesneje povezano s sloven-skimi nacionalnimi gospodarskimi interesi. Bil je eden tistih visokih parti-2��% &��*��2��' �� 2� ��' �� (�' � �� s-��2��(� ��(� (�� ' ��*��

.�� 2� �� (��*��2�� +�� 2� �� (�� 2��2� � ��' �� 2�� r-�� (� ��2�' �� (� ��(� �� 2 �� 2��2 �� 2�%��% ��2�� *�� (� �*��(� �d-2�� 0��(� *��2 2� �� 2�� 2�� ' ��*��i-��*�2� (��(� ��2��2� �� +�� 2� �� ' �� 2�(�� 2�� >�(o-��2 ��2�� 2��2�� ' &��*�2 �� 2��'ki ji kroji usodo«. Tretji in proti koncu tudi najbolj izpostavljeni cilj, je bilo��2��2� �� (�� 2�� ' �� %�� *�2�'�� 2� �� ' �� 2' �� stopnjo gospodarske rasti, izboljšala ekonomijo dela in zagotovila, da bo lah-� �� (� �� %��2�� (��r-�� 2��

�� 2� ��2 �� 2� �� 2�%�� (�� 2�� '��2 �2�(��% ��*�� 2��2 �� (�� 2� �� 2�� 2�' � �� 2� �� gospodarstvo in nacionalni gospodarski interes. Takšne razmere so nudile�(�� *��2��2� ��

* Dr. / PhD, znanstveni svetnik / scientific councillor, Inštitut za novejši zgodovino / Insti-

tute for Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljubljana;e-mail: [email protected]

19

)2�(�3+2 ,�/+24 �� #�'() *'!�+�5# -�!)&(3)(�0THE DIMENSION AND REALISM OF ITS VIEWS

The 1960s have a special place in our recent economic history. In thistime the attempts to find symbiosis between socialism, market and decen-�� *%�� %�� -� (�� D�� ( �%�more prominent factors in this »reform seething«, because since the springof 1967 until the end of 1972 it tried not only to finalise and implement theprinciples of great reforms, but also upgrade them at the same time. Stane�� %�� %� �� & �*%��( %�� ' �� (%��, *��*�� Slovenian national economic interests. He was one of those prominent partyfunctionaries, who came to realise that without an efficient market-orientedeconomy, open to the developed world, no society can prosper, not even asocialist one.

6%� �*��* ��*, & �� -� (�� %�� goals. Its first goal was to modernise the economic life by diminishing the»arbitrary« role of the Party, while increasing the role of the market and therelated autonomy of companies and their managers as the carriers of success-ful socialist enterprise. The second goal was to limit the authority of the fed-eral state, decentralise the economic life and establish a new kind of relations��D�� %� ��*�� %�� %�� %��supporters accepted Yugoslavia as the Slovenian living space, while thinkingof the Federation as the »subject steering its fate«. The third and, towards theend, the most emphasised goal was passing the new long-term developmentguidelines to promote the technological revolution, taking place all over theworld, in Slovenia, ensuring a high economic growth rate, improving the la-bour economy and guaranteeing a high ratio of the national product toswifter economic and social progress.

The liberal wing within the Communist Party of Slovenia did not haveenough time to realise its plans and visions in the economic field. With the��(�� & �� ' �%� �� & %�� %�� %� ��c-tion of the new economic policy, a period lasting for fifteen years started,with little room for market economy and national economic interests. Suchcircumstances provided fertile ground for unrealistic evaluation of the�*%�� & ��-� (��

20

3�� &�%��*

PERCEPCIJA PRAŠKE POMLADI IN NJENEGA ZLOMAV SLOVENIJI IN JUGOSLAVIJI

>�(��2� 2� � �� !"#7 �� 2�� 3��(��2� �� 2�� *� �� *� (�� (�� %�� ' �� 2�(��n-�� 2 ��' ��*�� 2� �� t-��2�� .�� &�� % ��' 2�(��2� ��( 2� ��' �� *�� 2�� ' �� %� ��(�� 2� � � �� 2��2� !"#7 ��2��2 �� (�� (��2�� t-�� ' � �� (� 2� �(�� *�2� ��% �� (�pa�� @$� �� @!� ��(�� !"#7�

Zaradi morebitnih negativnih odzivov Moskve so Tito in njegovi sode-��*� �(�2��2� �� !"#7 ��2�� *�2 ��B��' �� (� ��(� �� 2� �� >�(��2� �� 2�� +��( ��(� � 2�(�� 2��vrhu ni bilo popolne enotnosti v pogledih na praško pomlad. Poleti, ko se je�� %��*�' �� 2� 6�� 2 �k-tivno politiko in 9. avgusta 1968 celo obiskal Prago, vendar svojega mnenja 0��% ��&��% �� +��2�� 2� ��*��' �� 2�� *�� 2�� 2 �� *�� * ��2�� 2 �� *��'%�� 2� �� 2� ��' ��2 2�% ��&��

>�(�� % 2� �(��2 ��(� �� o-vaško ostro obsodil, v neposredni kritiki sovjetske politike pa je bil še vedno�� +�� 2� �� 2��' �� J��B�2�� (� �� 2�� *��% �� (�� >�(��2� 6� 2� �� 2� ��2�� 2model socializma izven vzhodnega bloka in dokaj spretno krmarila med�� %�� 2��' �� 2� �� 2� ��*� �*�� 2�� 2�� 2�(�� 2� ��pomemben generator vzhodnoevropskega revizionizma.

? ��%� �� ?�%�� 2� 2�(�� vrh sprejel vrsto ukrepov, s katerimi naj bi okrepil pripravljenost Jugoslavijena obrambo, med drugim je s konceptom splošne ljudske obrambe posegel

* Dr./ PhD, doc. / senior lecturer, višja znanstvena sodelavka / senior research associate,

�� !�� "!��#!�� $ ��% #& '�� #& ��University of Primorska, Titov trg 5, SI-6000 Koper, Inštitut Nove revije – zavod za hu-manistiko, Cankarjeva 10b, SI-1000 Ljubljana; e-mail: [email protected]

21

�� 2 ��2�� 2�(�� N��2� ��% �� 2��%�� 2��% �� 3� �� 2� �� ' �� 2� �� 2 �� 2 ��2�� ' �� s-�� % �� 2� �� >�(�� 2� 2� �� 2�� 2 �� %�� 2�� 2�' �� 2� >�(��2� �� (� �*�� ljub-�� 2�� +��*� �(�� 2� �� ' �� %�� % ��% ��&�� *�2 ��J�2 �� 2 � *�� 2� �� &�� 2�(�� &��*�2�'�� 2� ��' �� 2� �� 0��&��' �� 2� �� 2�(� �� !"#"' �� &��i-��*�2� �� 6 �� %� � ��% ��% �� B�� (�' �� &��

Proti koncu leta 1968 je sovjetski pritisk do Jugoslavije popustil, ne pa�� 2�� >�(�� % 2� �� % ��2�� 2�� &��2 �� ' � 2�� ' �� ?�%�� >�(�� o-tegnili tudi iz zaostritve odnosov med Sovjetsko zvezo in ZDA po posegu��(� �� 2� (�� %�� +�� (�� 2� �� ' �� 2 2� �� b-��2��% �� % (��% ��' ��% � ��2��2�� 2� �?�%�� 2�� ' >�(��2� � �%�� 2��2��2 �� <� �� *�2� �� so se na svojo drugo »pot v Canosso« – k Titu v Beograd podali tudi Sovjeti.

PERCEPTION OF THE PRAGUE SPRING AND ITS DEMISEIN SLOVENIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

In the beginning of 1968, Yugoslavia was aggravated by numerous prob-lems. Conflicts between the Party »liberals« and »conservatives« in regard tothe political and economic future of the country were becoming increasinglytense, the relations between the Yugoslav republics became more and morestrained, and national differences became increasingly obvious. The eco-nomic reform failed to bring about the expected results, and the Yugoslavexternal debt was increasing together with prices, unemployment rates andthe consequent discontent of the population, especially youth. The alreadytense political atmosphere was at first heated even further by the Belgradestudents' unrests in the beginning of June 1968, and finally brought to theboiling point by the intervention of five Warsaw Pact countries in Czecho-slovakia in the night from 20 to 21 August 1968.

Due to possible negative responses of Moscow, Tito and his associateswere quite reserved towards the events in Czechoslovakia in the spring of

22

1968, and the Czechoslovak Party leadership was also careful in its relationswith Yugoslavia because of the same reason. Besides, the Yugoslav Partyleadership failed to reach unity in their attitudes towards the Prague Spring.In the summer, as the Czechoslovak crisis was heading towards the criticalpoint, Tito decided for a more active policy; therefore on 9 August 1968 he�� +��(�� 4D��' %� �� *%��(� %�� & 0��-� �e-forms significantly. He may have emphasised that the relations between so-cialist states should be based on the principle of equality and that thus everysocialist state had the right to develop its own model of socialism, but at thesame time he warned the Czechoslovak leaders not to take their reformistzeal too far.

The Yugoslav political leadership condemned the aggression of the War-saw Pact in Czechoslovakia resolutely, but remained relatively reserved asfar as direct criticism of the Soviet policy went. It was especially careful dueto the concern that on the basis of the doctrine of limited autonomy of so-cialist states, Brezhnev might also decide to subdue Yugoslavia. Yugoslaviamay have been developing its own model of socialism outside the EasternBloc for more than two decades, skilfully avoiding the pitfalls of the ColdWar, but due to its own version of socialism it was constantly a thorn in theside of the Kremlin. Namely, the Soviets saw the Yugoslav Party as an im-portant generator of East European revisionism.

Fearing a possible invasion from the East, the Yugoslav political leader-ship passed a number of measures intended to strengthen the readiness ofYugoslavia for defence; among other things it also intervened in what haduntil then been the untouchable Yugoslav Army, introducing the concept ofgeneral people's defence. The atmosphere of the state of emergency had asignificant impact on the fundamental freedoms. The press was especiallyexposed and became subordinated to the state interests even more than be-fore. The State Security Service intensified their monitoring of the real andsupposed political opponents of all kinds. For a short time, the YugoslavParty managed to strengthen its internal consistency, significantly increaseits membership and at the same time consolidate the public opinion thatYugoslavia was the only defender of true socialism and peaceful extra-blocpolicy in the world. Another consequence of the events in Czechoslovakiawas also that the foundations for certain planned reforms were significantlynarrowed. Only the reform of the Yugoslav Federation was carried out more� �� D%��' �� ( �%�� %� ��, 0��-� ��&�� %�� r-vived his removal in the spring of 1969 was precisely the federalisation ofCzechoslovakia. In both cases we could also understand this as the balancingof the other unrealised reforms.

Towards the end of 1968, the Soviet pressure against Yugoslavia was re-duced, but the internal political pressure remained the same. Namely, theYugoslav political leadership used the mass media to exploit the patrioticeuphoria even after it had become completely obvious that there would be no

23

invasion from the East. Yugoslavia also profited from the worsening rela-tions between the Soviet Union and the United States after the interventionof Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, even more closely linking the Yugoslaveconomy with the West. The economic aid was what Yugoslavia neededmost from the West at that time due to the pre-existing and new economicproblems, related to the reducing business with the East and the increasingexpenses for defence. However, already a bit more than a year after the in-tervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets also headed for another »walk toCanossa« – to Tito in Belgrade.

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Jurij Hadalin*

TITO IN PRAŠKA POMLAD V JUGOSLOVANSKIHDIPLOMATSKIH VIRIH

Pregled virov v beograjskih diplomatskih arhivih ponudi raziskovalcu��* ��' �� 2 �� 2� 2�(��(� �� 2 �(�� * ��% �� @$� ��2� �� N�� % ��*�% �� !"#7� �� * 2�predstavljala reforma obeh gospodarstev, vendar je reformni proces v Jugo-��2� ��(�� 2� �� 6�� 2�(��(� �� K�� 3��,�� %�� i-�� 2� ��*�� ' �� 2 � �2�� K�*�2��(� ��o-(��' �� 2� �� 2� ��&�� ' ��%� ��e-dimo poskusom izogiba primerjavi z Jugoslavijo. Jugoslovansko vodstvo je� �� 2�� *�2 ��' ��2 2� �� *vzhodnega bloka negativen. Novo reformno vodstvo z Aleksandrom Dub-�� 2�� 2� �� 2��2�� >�(��2�' �je pritisk Sovjetske zveze in nerešeno vprašanje prevlade ene izmed sil v�� 2� ��&��*�2 ��(� � 2�� N �� n-2�% �2�� % � �� %��(� �� J�(�� (�� 2��2�� o-��% ��% �� 4�� * �*��(� �� s-�� *� � 0�� 2� �� ' ��2 2� ��*�� *�2� �&��2� !"#7 �� %�2�� 2� �� n-�� 3�� 2� ��2�� 2�(�� ' �� 2� ��*�� 2� �� :�� 3��= �� 6�� (��% � 0�� 2�� (� ��' �� +� � ��2 ��2�� *��B�� ' �� 2� ��2�� :��&�� @$$$ �� ?zgodnjem poletju so znaki, ki so bili Titu in sodelavcem dobro znani iz leta!"C7' �� ' �� 2� � �� 2�� ( �*��(� �� 0s-�� 2�� % ��% ��% ��2' �� J��2�� 2� � �(��% � 0�� 2��' �� v-��(� �� %�� % �2��% ��%'nastavljenih pa je bilo tudi nekaj incidentov, ki naj bi dokazovali, da ozemlje�� %�� 2� 2�(�� 0�� >�(��2�' � %�� *��' �� 2�% ��z-

* Univ. dipl. zgodovinar / University graduate historian, mladi raziskovalec / young reser-

cher, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino / Institute for Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1,SI-1000 Ljubljana; e-mail: [email protected]

25

��% � �� >��2� � �� &�� 2�� 6�� +��(�� +�� ;� �+� � �� b-��' �� 2 �� >�� 2 �� B�� *�2' �� 2��N�� 2� �� 2��' ��2 � �� 2�� 6�� J��' �� 2 �� 2��' �� 2� �� "� �� !!�avgustom. Usklajen je bil z nekaj dni kasnejšim obiskom romunskega vodje3�*�� ;��*��*�' �� 2� ��%� �� ' �� 2� �� 2� ��2�� 2 ��Varšavskega pakta. Moralna podpora jugoslovanske politike in njena ostraobsodba invazije je med prebivalstvom bila zelo odmevna in najverjetneje sezaradi tega še danes pojavlja teza, ki jugoslovanskemu vodstvu pripisuje�� (� �� &��(� ��*�� ?�� a-%� ��' �� 2� �� 2��2 �� ( � �� >�Bgoslavija odigrala v tednu po invaziji, ko je diskretno podpirala nekatere�� ' �� 2� �� >�(��2��

TITO AND THE PRAGUE SPRING IN THE YUGOSLAVDIPLOMATIC SOURCES

The examination of resources in the Belgrade diplomatic archives pro-vides the researchers with an abundance of documents, pointing at a livelyinterest of the Yugoslav leadership in the developments in Czechoslovakia inthe end of the 1960s. The relations between the two states were at a veryhigh level even before the changes in the Czechoslovak leadership in thefirst months of 1968. The common denominator was the reform of botheconomies; however, the reform process in Yugoslavia also influenced therealm of the social regime. Strong orientation of the Czechoslovak leader-ship at the time, with Antonin Novotny at the helm, towards the Eastern po-litical space, hindered the process. Thus at least until the establishment of theso-called Action Programme, which outlined a more radical reform of theCzechoslovak society, we can follow attempts at avoiding any comparisonwith Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership had a quite restrained public at-titude to the changes, since the response of the majority of the Eastern BlocD�� (�� 6%� ��D ��&�� %�� D��% K��L�� 0�� %� &��secretary expressed friendly intentions towards Yugoslavia, but the pressureof the Soviet Union and the unsolved issue of the dominance of the forceswithin the leadership prevented a more obvious public manifestation of theseintentions. Belgrade was very well informed about the internal struggles andproblems with the other Eastern Bloc countries during frequent contacts withthe highest representatives of the Czechoslovak authority structures. Theswift response of the members of the socialist camp at the meeting in Dres-

26

den in the end of March meant trouble, since the Communist Party ofCzechoslovakia started losing the control of the liberalisation process afterFebruary 1968. The Yugoslav leadership, otherwise reserved in its com-ments of the process, also expressed concern about that fact. In their talksD��% 0��' �%� ��*��, & M��(� K&&�� :�� 3��= �� +��Tito especially expressed their concern with the emergence of political plu-ralism, because the Socialist Party, until then subordinated to the CommunistParty of Czechoslovakia, and various interest associations tried to operate inthe manner of political parties. The political Manifest of 2000 Words alsogave rise to mixed feelings. In the early summer the signs, well known toTito and his associates due to the 1948 events, suggested that the socialistcamp is likely to intervene in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. They hadaccess to reports on the meetings of five communist parties; the rhetoric of�� J��%�� *�� *��(�, �� ( %�� D��% 0��Ithe Warsaw Pact forces refused to retreat after their military manoeuvres;and several incidents were instigated, supposedly proving that the territory ofthe Czechoslovak Social Republic was not safe from the invasions from theO�� )�� %�(% �%� P�(�� D�� &�� & 0��-� �� Yugoslavia, they quickly decided that this would not be suitable in those cir-cumstances. Therefore in July, in the already very strained atmosphere, theyorganised President Tito's visit to Prague instead. Through their contacts inthe Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, theywere informed that the Hungarian president Janoš Kadar was barely able toprevent an armed intervention; and they were very familiar with the situationof the Czechoslovak Army. The visit was postponed several times, because��, ��&�� %�� ( �%�� (� �� *� �� Tisou and in Bratislava, at least seemingly calming the disagreements be-tween the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and five other communist par-ties. Thus Tito's visit was carried out between 9 and 11 August. It was in linewith the visit of the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, which took place afew days later, and it could only mean a symbolic expression of the supportof the Prague Spring politics, which ended a bit more than two weeks laterwith the invasion of the Warsaw Pact forces. The moral support of theYugoslav politics and its decisive condemnation of the invasion were veryresounding among the population. Most probably this is why even todaysome theories ascribe important merits for the defence of the reform processin Czechoslovakia to the Yugoslav leadership. But we can definitely claimthat the most important and direct role in the Czechoslovak politics wasplayed by Yugoslavia in the week after the invasion, when it discretely sup-ported certain members of the Czechoslovak government vacationing inYugoslavia in the time of the invasion.

27

. "�� (�6��*

»OSTPOLITIK« WILLYJA BRANDTA IN JUGOSLAVIJA 1964–1974

Prispevek obravnava dogajanja jugoslovanske zunanje politike, ki so po-�� 2��2��% �*��% �� (� ��O��,2� J��' � ��' � 2� �� E��(�� JQ�(�r-meister 1957–1966), zunanji minister (1966–1969) in zahodnonemški zveznikancler (1969–1974). Za svojo politiko pomiritve in sodelovanja med Vzho-dom in Zahodom, ki je dobila ime »Ostpolitik« je leta 1971 dobil Nobelovo��(�� ? ��2 ��' �� 2' 2� �� *�� >�(��2� �zahodnonemške strani vedno z naklonjenostjo obravnavala kot »poseben�� E��&��G� 6�� ' � � �� 2��(1957–1968) kot posledice implementacije tako imenovane »Hallsteinove�� E!"A9G� ? �� % �� predstavništvi, v Bonnu kraljevine Švedske, v Beogradu pa republike Fran-*�2�� N�� 3 �� >�(��2 � �� B�� sicer hladni in uradnih stikov domala ni bilo, zato pa je sodelovanje na go-�� 2� �� 2�� 2��2� �� 2�� %�� % �� 2� �� 2��2� ��2� �� 3�� b-�� % �� 2� �(�� (��' �� %d-�� 2�(�� 2� � �� % �� ' �� 2� ��2� !"## E�� D�(� )�%��G ��%�� k-retar v zunanjem ministrstvu Karl Carstens pisal zaupno depešo v Beogradpredstavniku zahodnonemške diplomacije na francoskem veleposlaništvuHansu Bocku, da se strinja z njegovim mnenjem, da bi bil koristen pogovor�� 2�� 2�(�� 2�� :�� 3��=�� +o-govor, ki naj bi bil nekje izven ZRN in SFRJ, naj bi bil le izmenjava mnenj onekaterih vprašanjih.

+��2� ��% �� ' �� 2�� <� 2��2� !"#9' � 2� O��, J�� 2�� .��(� ��(��2�' � � �� 3��2�2�� (�� % d-nosov z Jugoslavijo. O tem je spregovoril na tiskovni konferenci zvezni kan-*�� (�� * �� !"#9 � �� 2� � �� 2�� d-�� %�� 2� �� *�� !"#9 ��2�(� �� J��' �� (�2��2� �� o-��% �� >�(��2� +�� 2� �� 2��2�

* Dr. / PhD, redni profesor / full professor, Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, Od-

delek za zgodovino / Faculty of Arts of the University in Ljubljana, Department of His-tory (��!�� )��*+��)�!��)��

28

��' �� 2�(��% ��%�� B�� 2�� (� �� 2�� EO��(��*%��(G' ��2� �� 2�(�� 2�� 2�� (�� +�� R!� 2��2� !"#7 � �� onov-no vzpostavljeni.

+�� % �� 2� �� 2��2� �� J�� +�� % �� 2� �� !"#"' � 2�� J�� *�� 2 �N�� I � 2�� (�� !"#C �� 2� ��2��2� ��2��% �� 2�� 3��2 �� >�(��2� �� 2� �� 2��2�� 2� �� 2� �� 2�� (� �� 2�� EO��(��*%��(G� N�� 2�� 2� �� 2� ��2� ��2� 2�(�� Bgracije v ZRN, pa tudi gospodarska vprašanja povezana s t. i. jugoslovan-�� (��2��2� � 6 2� �� ' � 2� >�(��2� �� (o-spodarske krize odprla svoje meje za ekonomsko emigracijo, katere tok se je� ��2��2� �� 3� 3�2��2�� 2� 8»Wiedergutmachung« se je po mnogih zapletih rešilo leta 1973/1974, nje-gova rešitev pa je temeljila na tako imenovanem Brionskem sporazumu med6�� J�� !"9R� ? ��% ��%' ��2 � �� e-�� E��%��&�G' 2� ��2 >�(��2� �� 2�� ' �� 2� � �� ' �� 2� �e-nar porabil »v splošno dobro«. Problematika vojnih odškodnin ima zato še�� 2� ��

THE »OSTPOLITIK« OF WILLY BRANDT AND YUGOSLAVIA1964–1974

The following contribution focuses on the developments of Yugoslav for-eign policy, related to one of the most prominent social-democratic politi-cians of modern times, Willy Brandt, in the time when he was the mayor ofBerlin (Regierender Bürgermeister, 1957–1966), Minister of Foreign Affairs(1966–1969) and West German Federal Chancellor (1969–1974). In 1971 hereceived the Nobel Prize for Peace for his policy of reconciliation and coop-eration between the East and West, dubbed »Ostpolitik«. In accordance withthis policy, as well as before, the socialist Yugoslavia was always treated asa »special case« (Sonderfall) by the West German side. Even in the timewhen the diplomatic relations were severed (1957–1968) as a consequenceof implementing the so-called »Hellstein Doctrine« (1957). In this time theinterests of both countries were represented by the diplomatic representa-tions of the Kingdom of Sweden in Bonn and of the Republic of France inBelgrade. The relations between the Federal Republic of Germany andYugoslavia may have been cold at the diplomatic – political level and offi-

29

cial contacts may have been nonexistent; however, cooperation in the eco-nomic field and everyday life went on. The West German policy in the be-ginning of 1960s by no means digressed from its orientation towards pre-venting the acknowledgement and influence of the German Democratic Re-public in the world. In the mid-60s it can be discerned that tentative politicalattempts at re-establishing diplomatic contacts began on the West German aswell as Yugoslav side. Therefore it is not strange that in the middle of May1966 (already in the time of Ludwig Erhard's government), the West GermanState Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Karl Carstens, wrote aconfidential dispatch to the representative of West German diplomacy at theFrench embassy in Belgrade, Hans Bock, stating his agreement with Bock'sopinion that a dialogue between Carstens and the Yugoslav Minister of For-��(� K&&��' :�� 3��=' D�� , ��&�� 6%� ��*��' ��to take place somewhere outside the Federal Republic of Germany and theSocialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was to be just an exchange ofopinions about certain questions.

The approximation of these countries took place gradually and carefully,away from the public eye. Already in January 1967, as Willy Brandt becamethe new Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Kurt Georg Kie-singer, Federal Republic of Germany started openly and officially discussingthe possibilities of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. TheFederal Chancellor Kiesinger spoke about that at a press conference. In theend of 1967, diplomatic attempts already brought about clear decisions.Namely, in the middle of December 1967 the West German governmentauthorised the Minister of Foreign Affairs Brandt to initiate the negotiationsin regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. Dur-ing these negotiations the German side had an important and exclusive re-servation – not to acknowledge the Yugoslav demands in regard to the repa-rations for crimes committed during World War II (Wiedergutmachung),which had to be clearly emphasised to the Yugoslav side. The closing talksoccurred in Paris, and on 31 January 1968 the diplomatic relations betweenthe countries were re-established.

The renewed diplomatic relations were mostly Brandt's achievement. Acompletely new chapter of bilateral relations opened in 1969, when Brandtbecame the Federal Chancellor and began implementing his »Ostpolitik«policy, which he had already outlined as the mayor of Berlin in August 1964.Intense adjustments of mutual relations between West Germany and Yugo-slavia started. Reparation for crimes (Wiedergutmachung), committed duringWorld War II, remained the most important question during all this time.Another very important and unpleasant issue was the question of Yugoslavpolitical emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany, and also the eco-nomic question of the so-called Yugoslav »Gastarbeiter« (migrant workers).Namely, this was also the time when Yugoslavia opened its borders to theeconomic emigration due to Yugoslav economic crisis, and the flow of this

30

emigration was, for the most part, oriented precisely towards the Federal Re-public of Germany. The most important bilateral question – »Wiedergut-machung« – was solved after numerous complications in 1973/1974, and thesolution was based at the so-called Brioni Agreement between Tito andBrandt of 1973. At that time Yugoslavia received around a billion GermanMarks in various forms, also in the form of the so-called capital aid (Kapi-talhilfe), which mostly did not go to the persons concerned, but was used»for the greater good«. Thus the issue of war reparations continues to have apolitical impact in Slovenia even today.

31

Franci Pivec*

OSAMOSVAJANJE ŠTUDENTSKE SKUPNOSTI (SLOVENSKOŠTUDENTSKO GIBANJE V ŠESTDESETIH)

Po prvih povojnih letih, ki so bila tudi na univerzi obremenjena z ideo-�� ' 2� �� % �� @$� ��2� ��2��Zveza študentov Jugoslavije kot unitarna in centralizirana organizacija z »iz-postavami« na univerzah. Ko je z Ustavo leta 1963 šolstvo prešlo v repub-�� 2��' 2� �� %��s��

Študentska organizacija v Ljubljani je bila pod relativno odprtim »men-�� ?�� 6�� E� 0�G' �� % ��% �»narodnih izdajalcev«, »klera«, »informbirojevcev«, Djilasa in Kocbeka.+�� 2� ��2�� (�2��2�% �� 2� A9 �� J�� 2�� !"#@' �� 2� �� pred-vsem revija Perspektive. Študentska Tribuna je igrala pri tem opazno vlogo,�� 2 �� 2� � �(�2��2� ��2�� (��*�2� ��

�� !"#A 2� ;� �� 2�� r-��2�� :�� 2 �� &��*��2� �� e-�� (� � ��&��% *��' �� 2� �� Bces liberalizacije. Študentje so tak razvoj pospeševali s kulturnim in publi-*�� 2��' �� 2�%�� S�i-�� 2� � ��2 ��(� �� (� ��*��

3� �� 2� �2��2��% �� 2�bilo povezovanje z mednarodnim študentskim gibanjem. Zanimivo je, da so�� 2�%� ��2��2� � (�� 2�� ?�� aj-bolj odklonilno odzvali akademiki. Iz repertoarja mednarodnega študent-skega gibanja je Ljubljana prevzela vrsto vsebin, ki na drugih jugoslovanskih��% �� / &��' ��2��' �� (o-��' ��' �� *�� E��G�

Ni res, da bi bili študentski nemiri leta 1968 v Ljubljani le odblesk doga-2��2 � J�(�� (�� (��usmeritve. Prav zato je bila neodvisna Skupnost študentov kot glavni nasle-dek ljubljanskih dogodkov popolnoma nerazumljena drugod po Jugoslaviji.J�� 2� �� &��*�2� ��izstopa iz unitarne strukture. Seveda je prišlo do ovadbe o »odcepitvi« in sle-dilo je temeljito izpraševanje s strani Titovega urada (maršalata), kar doslejše ni bilo omenjeno. Rešilni argument za pobudnike avtonomne Skupnostištudentov je bilo sklicevanje na samoupravno organiziranost študentov.

* Mag. / M.Sc., svetovalec direktorja / advisor to the director, Inštitut informacijskih zna-

nosti / Institut of Information Science, Prešernova 17, SI-2000 Maribor;e-mail: [email protected]

32

Skupnost študentov, ki je bila tudi prva vseslovenska študentska organi-��*�2�' 2� �� >�(��2�' �� (�� 2�� 2� � ��*�2��%odborih«, ki je popolnoma odstopal od standardne politike, pa je bila zaradi�(��(� ��2� � �� ' �� 2 � ��2 ��% �� *�� E �:G� ?�� *�� (�� (��' �� 2� �� % � ��2 ��' �� 2� �� % � �� *�� 2� E �:�G�

THE EMANCIPATION OF THE STUDENT COMMUNITY(SLOVENIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT IN THE 1960S)

After the first post-war years, riddled with ideological conflicts also at theuniversity, the Students' Association of Yugoslavia was established in thebeginning of the 1950s as a unitarian and centralised organisation with»branch offices« at different universities. When education became the do-main of the individual republics with the 1963 Constitution, such a politicalstructure became clearly anachronistic.

The Students' Organisation in Ljubljana was under the relatively open��%�� & ?�� 6�� E�*�� K��*�� & O��( +��G'but with »immovable« attitude to »national traitors«, »clergy«, »Cominformsupporters«, Djilas and Kocbek. The political pressure mounted during theevents surrounding the »Revija 57« and the »Beseda« magazines, and be-came very tense with the »magazine crisis« after 1962, whose victim wasespecially the »Perspektive« magazine. The students' magazine »Tribuna«had a noticeable role in this, and the Students' Organisation itself became in-creasingly involved in the situation.

In 1965 the Central Committee carried out a »coup« at the university,radically strengthening its Party leadership. However, despite the expecta-tions the new functionaries turned the university in one of the reformist cen-tres, which became very actively involved in the process of liberalisation.The students encouraged such a development with their cultural and publi-cist activities, followed also by their political appearances. The university%�� %�� %� &�� & ��

Establishing connections with the international student movement was anew moment in the political activities of the Ljubljana students of that time.It is interesting that their involvement in the global protests against the warin Vietnam was most negatively responded to by the academics. Ljubljanaadopted a number of ideas from the repertoire of the international students'movement, which did not receive much attention at the other Yugoslav uni-versities: feminism, minorities, freedom of speech, multiculturalism, com-munes and a whole range of criticism of the university (anti-university).

33

It is not true that the students' unrests of 1968 in Ljubljana were only a re-flection of the events in Belgrade. The reasons were different and the pro-grammes were not alike at all. Therefore the independence of the Students'Community as the main consequence of the events in Ljubljana was com-pletely misunderstood all over Yugoslavia. It was the first example of »self-determination« of a certain republican political formation and withdrawalfrom the unitarian structure. Of course, a denouncement in regard to the »se-cession« took place, and thorough investigation by Marshal Tito's Cabinet(the so-called Maršalat) followed, which had not been mentioned until now.The main argument for the initiators of the autonomous Students' Commu-nity was the reference to the self-government organisation of students.

The Students' Community, which was also the first all-Slovenian studentorganisation, irreversibly affected the unitarian Yugoslav Students' Associa-tion, which never recovered afterwards. With its autonomist way of operat-ing in the »action committees«, which completely deviated from the standardpolitics, it was so disruptive and even uncontrollable because of its frequentinterference in the »high politics«, that after a few years it was skilfullydrowned in the Socialist Youth Association (ZSM). However, the »autono-mism virus« could no longer be repressed and the story, which began withthe Students' Community in the 1960s, gained new momentum with the ac-tions of the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia (ZSMS) in the 1980s.

34

27�� 8��%�� 9��*

UPORNIŠTVO GENERACIJE 68 : )�+�'2+�' #!)�'

+�� 2��' �� 2� �� % ��%��2��2�(� ��2� ��2�� 2�� (��*�2� ��2�� 6� ��ni mogla doumeti in razvozlati. Revolucionarna tradicija se je nadaljevala,�� 2� ��2�� (��*�2� �� K�� 2� �� a-role iz konca šestdesetih prepovedano je prepovedovati razvidna utopija in��2 ��(�' ��' �� 2� � �� ' �� ' ��2�� ' ��2�' ��2�%' ��% �� 2�� skušamo odkriti smisel napisov, ki so takrat spravili v zadrego uradno mark-�� (�2 ��%��(� ��' ��' �� (�' �� 2� �� B�� 2�� *�� 2��' �� (��2�od Berkeleya in Mexico Cityja vse tja do Varšave, Prage, celo Beograda in�2��2�� (��' �2� ready made subjekt. Onemel in��2�� 2�� 2 �� 2�� 2��2�� % �� %��

�� (��*�2� #7 �� *�� o-�� ' �� 2� �� S�� (��*�2� #7 2� ��revolucija »od spodaj«, ki je skušala dopovedati revolucijam »od zgoraj«, da2� �� *��' �� (� �(�2 �� i-�� 2�� 0� �� 2�� 1 �� 2� �� naše uporniške mladosti 1 � �� 2�' ��' �� vsepovsod kot doma, zato je treba storiti še ogromno.

Juriš na nebo! �� 2� ��2�� ' �� (� 2� ��a-2��' �� potrebo po poštenosti in svobodi ter z , ��' �� *��.N��2� �� ' �� *� �� 0��2�� 2 �� ' �� 2 ��' �� 2' � ��2�' �� (�� ? �� (� ��2��2�' �� 2� ��2�� ' �� 'da je šlo za gibanje, ki ni odkrivalo velike stvari samo v rušenju kapitalizma,�� (� �� ' �� 2� �� T�� 2� ��e-��% ��*��% ��*�� % �� (� ��2� ,*�� ,�. Zato je generacija 68 odpravljala tradicionalno politiko,��2�� *�� *�' � �� 2��2��% �� 2��2�(��% �� (� ��' �� *�� -�*�,� �� (�� .

��' �� 2� �� 2��2� ��% ��2��% �� 1 ��%' ��% �� 2��% ��2��2�� 6��2��2� ��2��% �� 2� �� 2��2�I ��% �Vietnamu, ki so se borili namesto nas, veselili smo se upanja Kubancev kot

* Dr. / PhD, redna prof. / full professor, Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, Oddelek

za filozofijo / Faculty of Arts of University in Ljubljana, Department of Philosophy, Aš-��!�� )�#��*&&)�� )��

35

svoje lastne radosti. Politizacija je pomenila etizacijo sveta in svetovljanstvo��(� �� 2� �2 (��*�2 #7 ��2�� 0�� (��o globalizaciji, o svetovnem etosu, ne o revoluciji, saj je ta beseda iz besed-�2�� 2��2� �� (��*�2�' �� 2�%�� (��' ��»ful izginila«.

6�� (�2� 2� �� 2� � ��smislu, ker je vse sicer dobronamerno reševala s politiko, in mnogi smovideli, da socializmu manjkata izdelana etika in sistem vrednot. In dejansko,� �� (�� 2' ��*� � �� 2� �� 2 �� t-��(� �� 2�� 0 ��2�� % �� 2� �� *� @$� ��2�' �� ' � 2� �� *�2� ��o-padla.

RESISTANCE OF THE GENERATION OF '68 – ETHICISINGOF THE WORLD

The following contribution focuses on the leftist message, incomprehen-sible to the older leftist generation in the 1970s. This older generation wasunable to comprehend and unravel many issues. The revolutionary traditioncontinued, but the difference was that the younger generation had its ownmessage. Can we see utopia or anything utopian in the catchphrase from theend of the 1960s, it is forbidden to forbid – the motto which, when we wereyoung, expressed what we as young rebels felt about the authorities, theParty, teachers, parents or the universe? If we attempt to discern the meaningof the slogans, difficult for the official Eastern bloc Marxist ideology at thattime, we see that nothing that was deemed as a revolutionary subject for theleftist ideology was recognisable. For the movement from Berkeley andMexico City all the way to Warsaw, Prague, even Belgrade and Ljubljana,the proletariat was no longer a certain, that is, a ready-made subject. It fellsilent and stalled. And why did we, who studied in Ljubljana, respond to allof this and found ourselves in the messages from the West?

The message of this »Generation of '68« was not really political in thetraditional sense of the word, even though it had political effects. The rebel-lion of the Generation of '68 was a revolution »from below«, trying to makethe revolutions »from above« understand that the true changing of the worldis a process, involving much more than merely and nothing but the politicalfield. In order to change the world and the situation in it – the ideal of ourrebellious youth – into a genuine home, so that that we could live anywherein the world as if we lived at home – in order to achieve that, tremendous ef-forts were still needed.

Storming heaven! How can we explain this today? Only by what gaverise to that motto then, namely, the need for honesty and freedom and thefeeling of righteousness. Righteousness is never partly felt, and neither is

36

justice. You experience it like rays of sunshine with the power of shiningthrough everything, completely, like x-rays. In the name of these experi-ences, permanent in nature, we must admit this was a movement that did notdiscover great things only in bringing down capitalism, which it did not carefor anyway. Instead it identified an urgent need in the destruction of the re-pressive traditional patterns of interpersonal relations and personal behaviourin the existing society. Thus the Generation of '68 tried to do away with tra-ditional politics, including the traditional leftist politics, with one of the mostattractive and most meaningful catchphrases of that time – with the mottothe private is political.

In short, what needs to be changed is interpersonal relations and the suf-fering of those who are pushed from society – the discriminated, the de-graded, the rejected outsiders. We felt the suffering of faraway worlds as ourown: the suffering of those in Vietnam who fought instead of us, and wecheered at the hope of Cubans as if it were our own happiness. Politicisationmeant the ethicising of the world, and the cosmopolitanism of that time con-stantly accompanies my Generation of '68. Today, of course, we talk aboutglobalisation, about global ethos, not revolution, since this word »totally dis-appeared« from the vocabulary of today's youth, to put it in their words.

But back then, ethics was a somewhat foreign concept to the officialMarxist ideology, in the sense that, although with good intentions, it solvedeverything with politics, and many of us saw that socialism lacks elaborateethics and a system of values. And in fact, when you look back, the leftistsof that time were not interested much in the theory of ethical questions. Theconjuncture of ethical research did not take place until as late as the end ofthe 20th century – after a certain politicisation had already fallen in ruins.

37

3�� 1��*

USTAVA SFRJ 1974: MEHANIZEM ZA RAZREŠEVANJE KRIZEIN/ALI NJEN GENERATOR

Ustava SFRJ iz leta 1974 je predstavljala pomemben korak v ustavnemrazvoju jugoslovanske federacije po drugi svetovni vojni. Tako, kot to vedno��2� �� ' 2� �� 2�(��o-�� E&��G �� E��%' ��%' ��%' ��G�� 2� ��' �� 2 �kontekstu zgodovinskih procesov. Vsekakor pa lahko to Ustavo SFRJ opre-�� 2��(� ��' �� % �� % �� (�� 2�� *�� 2�2� ��2 �*��(� ��2��2�' �� (� �� (�videli kot najbolj ustrezen sistem in mehanizem za urejanje in upravljanje��% ��' �� 2� �� ? ��e-setih letih se je najprej zdelo, da je ustava opravila svojo vlogo in nalogo. V�� ' �� % ��% � 2 ��(�� (� � ��2��2 �s-��% �� 2��2� �� 2��2� �� % �� ' �� (� ��(� �� +�� 2� � ��% ��% �� (��2��' �� ' �� 2� �� jugoslovanske federacije. Takrat se je izkazalo, da je bila ta ustava dober�� ' (�� 2�' �� 2� �� (��2� �� (� ��2��2��(� ��n-��' � �� &��' �� 2� ��' �� 2�popolnoma zatajila ter kriz in konfliktov ni bila sposobna uspešno upravljatiin razrešiti.

+�� ( �� 2�� 2� �� 2�� B(�2�' �� 2� � ��2�' �� *��(� ��2��2� ��%�� &�� 2� ��*�� (�� &�� ' � �� (�� *�� &�� %�� 2�' ��2��2� �� B��2� ��% �� &�� ?��2�� 2� � �� 2�' ��bodo tudi v prihodnje »neformalni mehanizmi« za upravljanje in razreše-��2� �� &��' ��% ��2�� 2�� 6�� E �>G' �� Bljali svojo funkcijo. Seveda niso predvideli Titove smrti in krize v osemde-��% ��%' �� 2� �� 2�' �� 2� ��2�� 2 �� 6�� 2�' ��sistem kolektivnega vodstva v krizni situaciji, ob odsotnosti nespornega

* Dr. / PhD, znanstveni svetnik / scientific councillor, redni prof. / full professor, Inštitut za

��!#��#�� ,!�� $ �� &#! -�� -!�� . �� e-mail: [email protected]

38

��2�' ��% ��% �� *��%E�� *��%G ��% �� o-��

Vseeno je Ustava SFRJ iz leta 1974 zagotovila okvir, v katerem je po-�� *�� *�2�' �� ( �� r-�� *�2� �� (� ��(� ��

To jugoslovansko ustavo je zanimivo analizirati tudi v kontekstu boja�� *�� *��' �� 2� ��2�� 2� 2�(�� E�� 2��G' � �� o-vali centralisti. Ustava iz leta 1974 pomeni eno redkih zmag decentralistov,ki so jo zato centralisti razglasili za prvi korak in za krivko za razpad jugo-�� &��*�2�� (�� (�� ' �� *��B�� 2� �� 2 �� % �� &��

THE 1974 CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERALREPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: CRISIS SOLVING

MECHANISM AND/OR ITS GENERATOR

The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslaviarepresented an important landmark in the constitutional development of theYugoslav federation after World War II. Like all constitutions as well as le-gal and political documents, this Yugoslav (federal) Constitution was also aproduct of economic, social, political and other situations and circumstancesas well as the balance of power in a certain time in the context of historicalprocesses. By all means we can define this Constitution of the Socialist Fe-deral Republic of Yugoslavia as an attempt of the ruling regime to resolvethe crises of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s and provide for amore suitable institutional framework for further development of socialistself-government, which the ideologists at that time saw as the most suitablesystem and mechanism for the government and management of social rela-tions as well as for the solving of problems and crises. In the 1970s itseemed at first that the Constitution completed its role and task. In this time,and also in the 1980s, it was proclaimed as one of the most successful mod-els of governing and managing ethnically plural societies in the world, and itwas admired by many. Then the economic, social and political crisis starteddeepening in the 1980s and finally led to the dissolution of the Yugoslavfederation. At that time it turned out that this Constitution was a suitablenormative framework for the periods of social and political stability, eco-nomic growth and development, for the time of relative prosperity and risingliving standard. However, as the crises and conflicts worsened, it becameobvious that the Constitution completely failed in successfully managing andsolving the crises and conflicts.

39

An important reason for this weakness of the Constitution was the rulingideology, which, convinced that the system of »socialist self-government«can solve any crisis and conflict, pronouncing the »socialist society« as a»non-conflict society«, »forgot« to integrate the institutional and formal pro-cedures and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution oftense crises and conflicts into the constitutional system. Probably this wasdone with the conviction that the »informal mechanisms« for the manage-ment and resolution of crises and conflicts, which relied on the key factors –president Tito and the political monopoly of the Communist Party (Leagueof Communists of Yugoslavia) – would also in the future keep successfullyand efficiently carrying out these functions. Of course, it was not expectedthat Tito would die and that the 1980s crisis would tear apart the politicalmonopoly of the League of Communists and define the social environment,where the power struggle and the struggle for Tito's legacy took place. Itturned out that in a critical situation, in the absence of an undisputed leader,broader democratic contexts and contents, and in the time of strengtheningnational (and nationalist) political elites the collective leadership system wasobviously not suitable for such circumstances.

Nevertheless, the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia provided the framework for the process of democratisation andthe normative foundation for the introduction of multi-party democracy andmulti-party political system.

It is also interesting to analyse this Yugoslav Constitution in the contextof the struggle between the centralists and decentralists that was taking placeduring the whole existence of the Yugoslav state (already as soon as duringWorld War I), with the centralists mostly prevailing. The 1974 Constitutionrepresents one of the few victories of the decentralists, which was thereforeproclaimed by the centralists as the first step and the reason for the dissolu-tion of the Yugoslav federation. However, a historical overview demon-strates that the centralist solutions did not prove any better, and as a rule theyled to mounting tensions in ethnic relations and gave rise to conflicts in thisethnically plural country.

40

Stefano Lusa*

SLOVENSKA DEMOKRATIZACIJA V OSEMDESETIH

? �� % �� @$� ��2� � �� 2�� N��2� �� 6�� 2�' �� 2 �� %� �� *�2 �� o-�� ' �� 2 ��2 �� 5 �� ' �� i-��2 ��(� �� 2�' �� 6 �� 2�� 2� �� 2��2�� 2� �okviru jugoslovanske federacije. Dolgovezna jugoslovanska ustava, ki ni�� 2�' �� 2� �� 2 �� *�2�in prav tako mnogokrat nejasno napisani zakoni, so Ljubljani vseeno še�� 2�� 2��2�� (�� %�� 2� ��oziroma avtonomije, kakršno si je Slovenija izborila v federaciji.

��*� � �� % � >�(��2� �� %�� 2�pravil igre kot so bile zapisane v jugoslovanski ustavi in drugi zakonodaji,�� (� �� 3�� 2� �� ' ��% �� 2 ��% �� (�� 2�� +�r-��2� �� 2� �� ' �� 2��2 ��2�% ��a-nov.

�� 2� ��2� �� ( ��2 �� u-gih delih (republikah) Jugoslavije, tudi zaradi zemljepisne lege, ki je omo-(�� %�� 6 2� �(�� &��*�2 �� 6�� 2 �� 2�� +�*�&��'ekologija, pankovsko gibanje so bili pojavi, nad katerimi so se po vsej2�(�� (�� ? ��2� �� 2�% �� (�2 ��' ��m-�� 2� �� *�� 2�%�� *�� o-*�� 2�� 3� �� svo��' �� 2� ��' � ��2�� *�2� ��

SLOVENIAN DEMOCRATISATION IN THE 1980S

In the beginning of the 1980s, the Slovenian communists found them-selves in a new situation. The »fathers of the homeland« had died. Tito andKardelj, »who would use their authority to influence the situation andsolve the political and economic problems«, were gone. What were theysupposed to do? They realised they had no other option than to adhere tothe law or legislation, especially the constitution. They thought this wasthe best way to protect the Slovenian interests in the context of the Yugo-

* Dr /PhD, Fondazione Franca e Diego da Castro, Corso Unione Sovietica n. 218/bis,

IT-10124 Torino; [email protected]

41

slav federation. The long-winded Yugoslav constitution was not written tobe read literally – it was more of a political declaration. Frequently thelegislation was written in the same manner, but for Ljubljana it still repre-sented the best guarantee for the preservation of the level of statehood orautonomy, which Slovenia had secured for itself within the federation.

Thus Slovenians started demanding that the rules of the game, as speci-fied in the Yugoslav constitution and other legislation, be adhered to byeveryone in Yugoslavia, including themselves. Suddenly Slovenia allowedcertain freedoms, which had been unimaginable before. The »Party« be-came aware that it no longer controlled the standpoints and acts of itsmembers.

After all, Slovenian society seemed much more open than the otherparts (republics) of Yugoslavia, also due to its geographic location, whichallowed direct contacts with the West. That facilitated the flow of infor-mation and standpoints. Therefore Slovenia soon saw the introduction ofalternative ideas. Pacifism, ecology, punk movement – these were phe-nomena, frowned upon by the rest of the Yugoslav state. In Slovenia theywere not simply tolerated; instead they were even institutionalised in thecontext of the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia. This enabled the spacesof freedom to become increasingly wider, which gradually but surely led tothe democratisation of society.

42

$;�% ! ��*

(�!' .&<1$)(' -+$'(�' ! �$�)3< �!)�) #�2+'/+#�+�()MLADINE SLOVENIJE

N� ��*� ��% �� @$� ��2� � �� *�� 2� E �:�G �� (�2�� i-��(� �� 2� �� (��*�2� � �2�� +�� &��*��2� �� 2� � �� u-(�% ��% �(��*�2 E0+NG� M�� 2� ��*�� :� ��i-vala« mlado generacijo in prenašala interese, ki so se oblikovali znotraj nje v�� ' �� (�� 0+N ��(��2�� 3�&�� 2� �:� � �� (�% 0+N �� (� ��sploh delovala transmisivno, kar pomeni, da je vsebine, ki so se izoblikovale� ��(�% ��% ��(� �� 2� �� 2�% ��(��2�� mladinskimi detajli.

+�� 2� �� 2�� 2��' �� 2�� ' �� 2 �� '��' �� 2�' ��2�' �� 2 �� (�� E�� G' 2� �� 2�� (��2�' � �� ' �� (� �� *��(� �� 2�� 2�2�� (�� 2�(��% E��%��%G ��% � �� s-�� 2� �� 2� ��2��(� �� B�� (��2� �� :�� 2� �� 2� �� 2� �� (� ��2�� (� ��(� ��' �� B�� 2� &�� (��2� �(2�� *�2� 6�� 2� �� 2transmisivne vloge mladinske organizacije, predstavljala pa je uvod v odnos� �� (��2��

3�� (��2� E��' ��' ��%�� Bga) so v slovenski prostor prinesla vsebine podobnih gibanj z Zahoda. Zaradi��(�' �� ' �� 2�%�� 2 ��2��(� ��i-��(� ��' � �� 2��' �� (�� B(�� &��(� �� 2��2��2� ��2�% �� o-�� (�� 2�� E�� 2��G �� 2� �� *�� 2�� .i-��2� � �� (� �� 2�/ �� 2 ��(� �� pogoje delovanja. Oboje jim je zagotovila ZSMS, ki je skozi osemdeseta leta�� 2 �� ' �� 2�% ��2��(��2�' �� 2� (��2�� &�� B

* Mag. / M.Sc., muzejski svetovalec / museum counsellor, Muzej in galerije mesta Ljublja-

ne / City of Ljubljana Museum and Art Galleries, Gosposka ulica 15, SI-1000 Ljubljana,e-mail: [email protected]

43

�� (��2� �� (��*�2 2� �� (�� 2�Vprašanje, ki so si ga postavljali sodobniki, je bilo, kdo potrebuje koga bolj;gibanja mladinsko organizacijo ali obratno. Medtem, ko je ZSMS gibanjem� ��*� ��(��2�� (�� 2 � ��' � (��2� �� r-ganizaciji zagotovila sodobne vsebine in strokovno zaledje pri nekaterih��2�%' �� 2� �:� �� 2� ��2�(� �(�� 2�� 2�� (��2� �� :� � ��spremembe v letih 1988 in 1989. Takrat je ZSMS svojo transformacijo v�� 2 � *�� 2�� %' �� 2�%�� (��2�' ��B�� (��2��' �� 2��2�� t-��*� �� 2� ��(�� (�'��%� �� *��' �� 2 �(��

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THESOCIALIST YOUTH LEAGUE OF SLOVENIA

In the end of the 1970s, certain changes started emerging in the SocialistYouth League of Slovenia (ZSMS) in regard to the attitude to the politicalsystem and the place of this youth organisation within it. Above all, theyouth functionaries wanted more autonomy, in terms of contents, in relationto other social-political organisations. Formally ZSMS may have »covered«the young generation and transferred the interests forming within this gen-eration into the political system, providing other social-political organisa-tions with experienced and proven cadre. However, informally ZSMS oper-ated as a transmitter in terms of other social-political organisations and thepolitical system, meaning that it took the contents, forming in other parts ofthe political system, as its own and then upgraded them with youth details.

At this time punk appeared in Slovenia. With its attributes, for that timeexplicitly characteristic of subcultures, especially in terms of fashion, hair-styles, behaviour, vocabulary and, above all, music (sound as well as lyrics),punk, to a certain degree, aroused general indignation, and it also provoked aresponse from the authorities, which rejected it as non-socialist and as a phe-nomenon foreign to a self-management society. The story of punk and its(unintentional) links with the political system is needed in order to under-stand the subsequent relations between new social movements and ZSMS.Namely, when it came to the question of whether to reject punk or integrateit in the context of the youth interest pluralism, ZSMS decided to defendpunk, and at the next stage it also decided to provide the conditions for punkculture production. Such a decision was also in the context of rejecting therole of this youth organisation as a transmitter and represented the introduc-tion of relations with new social movements.

New social movements (pacifistic, ecologic, spiritual and certain others)introduced the contents of similar Western movements into the Slovenian

44

space. Because of this and also because their initiatives were not createdwithin the existent political system, these movements were a bit suspicious,and especially unable to ensure the formal space for the assertion of theirviewpoints. Because certain topics also touched upon the untouchable partsof the system (for example, the army), they were often on the brink of crimi-nal persecution or even over the brink. Therefore the movements needed twothings: protection within the political system and conditions for their activi-ties. Both were provided by ZSMS, which all through the 1980s graduallyintegrated certain contents, which these movements represented, into itstheoretical context, while at the same time formally protecting these move-ments from the authorities. The relationship between the movements and theyouth organisation was multifaceted. The question posed by the contempo-raries was who needed whom more: the movements the youth organisationor vice versa. While ZSMS in fact ensured a legitimate position within thesystem for the movements, the movements provided the youth organisationwith contemporary contents and expert background in regard to certain is-sues, which ZSMS knew how to take advantage of when establishing itspublic reputation. The final unravelling of the relationship between themovements and ZSMS was prevented by the changes in the years 1988 and1989. At that time, ZSMS based the substance of its transformation into apolitical party almost entirely on the contents provided by these movements,while the movements lost their importance and momentum at the onset of anew movement, related to the Trial of the Four and the new political situa-tion in Slovenia. We could even state that at that time the movements ex-hausted their historical moment.

45

Gregor Tomc*

8+,+�+ +( ,<(*)&�+ 0 .!) �('�+/(+ 3/'.+(#*+SUBKULTURI SLOVENSKEGA SOCIALIZMA

V šestdesetih, sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja sta se v Slo-veniji izoblikovali predvsem dve prepoznavni mladinski subkulturi; hipiji všestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih ter punkerji v sedemdesetih in osemdesetihletih. Obe subkulturi bomo skušali prikazati interakcijsko, z dejavniki social-��(� ��2�' �� *�&�� &��*�2� �� nas in s povratnim vplivom subkulture na samo ozadje.

K�� / �� E��B�G' �� E*�� G �� E��G �� ovanja.

Ko gre za subulturo hipijev, bomo (med drugim) upoštevali:1. na makro ravni:

- stabilno gospodarsko situacijo pri nas in v svetu,B -��- �� % ��% ��% �� re-stalinizacije v zgodnjih sedemdesetih letih v Jugoslaviji itd.,

2. na mezzo ravni:- anglo-ameriški kulturni vpliv srednjeslojne mladine (študentsko gibanje,vojna v Vietnamu itd.),- študentsko gibanje pri nas in njegove institucije (ŠKUC, RŠ, Tribunaitd.) itd.,

3. na mikro ravni:B �� % ��2��% ��2�% �� EJ��' 0,��' ��itd.),B �� %��2�� EJ��' ;%��,' 0��itd.).Ko gre za subkulturo punkerjev, bomo (med drugim) upoštevali:

1. na makro ravni:- ekonomska recesija v svetu in pri nas,B ��(��*�2� 2�(��(� �*�� E(�� 8 �amo-upravljanja, nacionalizem) itd.,

2. na mezo ravni:- anglo-ameriški vpliv delavske mladine,- vloga ZSMS pri javnem uveljavljanju mladinskih pobud itd.,

3. na mikro ravni:B �� 2��% ��2�% �� E��L +��' ;��%' 0�� e-dys itd.),

* Dr. / PhD, izredni prof. / associate profes�#! �� !�/�� !�� u-

bljani, Oddelek za kulturologijo / Faculty of Social Sciences of University in Ljubljana,0�,�!�� #& 1��!�� 2�!�� ,�#�� 3 �� e-mail: [email protected]

46

- in kreativen odziv na punk gibanje pri nas (bendi kot Pankrti, producentIgor Vidmar, ideolog Peter Mlakaritd.).0�� 2�� %��' �� 2�% �� 2��' ��/�� 2�' � ��% �� %��2�� 2��'

�� 2 ��2��' �� ' �� 2� ��moremo razumeti predvsem kot odzivanje na dejavnike okolja. V enaki merigre tudi za znotraj-subkulturno logiko razvoja. Hipiji in punkerji se skratkaniso zgolj odzivali na pogoje makro in mezo okolja, v katerem je deloval,ampak tudi na lastno in predhodne mladinske subkulture.

Ko razmišljamo o razmerju med dominantnim okoljem in subulturo, negre samo za to, kako okolje vpliva na subkulturo, ampak tudi za povratnevplive mladinske subkultre na dominantno okolje. Torej ne le za to, kako so�� *�&�� *��' �m-�� ' �� *��

HIPPIES AND PUNKERS : TWO OF THE CHARACTERISTICYOUTH SUBCULTURES OF SLOVENIAN SOCIALISM

In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, especially two distinct youth subculturesformed in Slovenia – hippies in the 1960s and 1970s, and punkers in 1970sand 1980s. We will try to depict these subcultures interactively, with socialbackground factors influencing the specific form of the manifestation ofsubcultures in Slovenia, as well as their feedback on the background itself.

In an abstract analytic manner we shall distinguish between three levelsof analysis: the macro (state), mezzo (civil society) and micro (individual)level of observation.

In regard to the hippy subculture, the following shall (also) be taken intoaccount:1. at the macro level:

- stable economic situation in Slovenia and in the world,- the »liberalism« of the communist authorities in the late 1960s and theattempts at re-Stalinising Yugoslavia in the early 1970s, etc.,

2. at the mezzo level:- the Anglo–American cultural influence of middle-class youth (the stu-dents' movement, Vietnam war, etc.).- the students' movement in Slovenia and its institutions (ŠKUC – theStudents' Cultural Artistic Centre, RŠ – the Student Radio, Tribuna – astudents' newspaper), etc.

3. at the micro level:- the influence of certain exceptional foreign individuals (The Beatles,Dylan, Zappa, etc.),

47

B �� %� *�� %� %��, �� EJ��'Chubby, Dekleva, etc.).In regard to the punk subculture, the following shall (also) be taken into

account:1. at the macro level:

- economic recession in the world and in Slovenia,- disintegration of Yugoslav socialism (economic problems with self-management, nationalism), etc.

2. at the mezzo level:- the Anglo-American influence of working-class youth, the role of theSocialist Youth League of Slovenia in the public assertion of youth ini-tiatives, etc.,

3. at the micro level:- the influence of exceptional foreign individuals (Sex Pistols, The Clash,Dead Kennedys, etc.),- and the creative response to the punk movement in Slovenia (bands likePankrti, producer Igor Vidmar, ideologist Peter Mlakar, etc.).The two key hypotheses we shall verify are the following:Even though the environments where the hippy and punk subcultures

were active differ from one another, the subcultures are nevertheless so dif-ferent in terms of concepts that we cannot see them simply as responses tothe environmental factors. In the same manner they also involve the internallogic of development. In short, hippies and punkers did not simply respondto the conditions in the macro and mezzo environments they operated in, butalso to their own and previous youth subcultures.

When we consider the relations between the dominant environment andsubcultures, we cannot only focus on how the environment influences thesubcultures, but also what feedback these youth subcultures have on thedominant environment. Therefore the following article shall not only focuson what specific aspects youth subcultures in Slovenia had due to the contextof socialism, but also on how they themselves influenced socialism.

48

Neven Borak*

JUGOSLAVIJA MED INTEGRACIJO IN DEZINTEGRACIJO

>�(��2� �� % ��(�� (� �� 2�� ' �� ?�� 2�(� ��2� 2�� >�(��2� �� % �� ?��2�� 2� ��(� ��e-dala in si prizadevala, da jih omeji in zmanjša. Posledice tega zavedanja so�� (�� ' �� 2�� B�� 2 � ��2� ��' �� (�� 2�� +��( �(��% ��% ��' �� B��2�� 2�� 2' � �� tudi dogodki v mednarodnem okolju. Integracijski primanjkljaj ustavne ure-��' �� !"9C' 2� �� % ��2�% �� 1971–1972, kazal pa se je med drugim v tem, je vloga federacije pri vodenjuekonomske politike bila opazno okrnjena.

�� %�� 2� �� 2��2�razvojnega modela, ki se je spogledoval z »zaslombo na lastne sile«, kot��*� ��2�� *�� ' �� *�� 6� 2� � �� o-*��*�2 ��(� �� (��% ��%� �� 2�' �� 2�� 2� �� 2� �� (�o-�� 2� 2� �� ( �� 2�� lgo-��2�� (��2� &��% �� ( ��

YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN INTEGRATIONAND DISINTEGRATION

The formation of Yugoslavia was not motivated by economic factors.Although the economic factors did affect the breakup of Yugoslavia, theywere not crucial. Throughout its existence, Yugoslavia was a country of in-controvertible differences. The governing politics was very well aware ofthis fact and was making significant efforts to restrict and minimize them.This awareness brought about frequent constitutional changes often aimed ataltering state regulation in order to evolve into a successfully functioningstate. Frequent and disturbing constitutional changes transformed the rela-tions between entities and the federal government. However, the country wasalso affected by events occurring in the international environment. The inte-gration deficit of the constitutional order adopted in 1974 had already been

* Ddr. / Ph0 "�0 ��!�� ,!#&��#! $ ��#�� ,!#&��#! �� !�/�� $

��% #& �#�� #& ��!��% �� 2�!�� ,�#�� 3 �� u-bljana; e-mail: [email protected]

49

recognized when passing the constitutional amendments back in 1971 and1972. Amidst other, the deficit was clearly seen in the curtailed role of thefederation in pursuing economic policy.

The transition to the new constitutional setting was accompanied by theconsolidation of a new development policy model, which sympathized withthe development strategy of a multinational, unaligned and socialist state.The model contributed significantly to the debt crisis and also to the sociali-zation of debt and economic failures. These served as a mechanism for debtredemption taking place during the détente and the forming of a new geopo-litical reality. The later has swiped the ground for the long-term and solidconsensus of the federal entities as well as for the fundaments of Yugosla-via's existence.

50

';�� /��*

GOSPODARSKE RAZMERE V JUGOSLAVIJI V OBDOBJU1968–1988: NA POTI V RAZPAD

�� !"#7 ��2� �� * � �(�� >�(��2� �� (�� 2�� ? �� 2� ��2�� %�postalo jasno, da je gospodarska reforma iz leta 1965 propadla. Reforma jesicer v prvih dveh letih prinesla veliko pozitivnega, saj so se med drugim*��' ��2��2�� &��*�2� ��' �� &�� 2�(�*��2�' � 2� ��2� (�� 2�� B�� (o-��' �� + �� &�� *�2�� (��' � � �2�%�� Bkakor ne takšni kot je bil njihov namen. Prvo polovico sedemdesetih let so v>�(��2� �� *�� (�� (��2��Vrhunec prizadevanj po zajezitvi razmer je predstavljala ustava iz leta 1974,�� 2� �� 2�� 2' ��2 2� �� *��*�2� �� (��(� ��' �� (� �� 2� �� B�� S�� !"9C 2� �� 2�� 2� >�(��2� �� (� � 2 �� (� ��2��2��%�� 2�� (�� e-��% �� @$� ��2� 2� �� 2�� (� ��2�' ��2� ��2�� 2�' �� 2� ��% �� %� ��2�� (��2��2�� 2��2�U ��(�� %�� 2��2�� !"9# ��2�� ' �� (� �� (�� 2� ? ��(� ��*� ��e-setih let je zašla Jugoslavija v hudo krizo. Eden glavnih razlogov je bil ta, daje Jugoslavija po naftni krizi leta 1973 gospodarila še naprej tako, kot da se�� (��' �� 2 ��

Smrt Josipa Broza-Tita leta 1980 je pomenila prelomnico; Jugoslavija jeprešla iz prikrite v odkrito krizo. Glavni vzroki so bili primanjkljaj v trgovin-�� *�' ��2� �� (�� 2��Boj zveznih vlad po izboljšanju gospodarskih razmer v osemdesetih letih jebil podoben boju z mlini na veter. Vsi poskusi reševanja krize so bili neus-pešni kljub temu, da so nekatere predlagane reforme bile dobre, a so zaradinedoslednega izvajanja propadle. Treba je izpostaviti predsednico vlade v��% !"7@8!"7#' :�� +��*' �� 2� %�� '�� 2� �� 2� �� *�� % �� 2 2� �� 2��2�% ��o-

* Univ. dipl. zgodovinar / University graduate historian, mladi raziskovalec / young reser-

cher, Inštitut za novejši zgodovino / Institute for Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1,SI-1000 Ljubljana; e-mail: [email protected]

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��% ��2�� (� �� K�� J�2� ��2��' �� a-soma ven�� ' �� 2� ��

Beseda kriza se sicer vse do leta 1985 ni uporabljala. Prelomnico je pred-stavljalo delo hrvaškega ekonomista Branka Horvata Jugoslavensko društvov krizi' �� 2� (�� ( �� (�� 2 �� >�(��2� �� 2��% ��*��%' (��% �� % ��2 � 6�� '�� *� ��( ��2��% ��' �� 2� �� o-��2�% �� % ��2�% 2�(�� B�� (o-spodarske ureditve. .�� 2� �� 2�� % ��-��% �� % ��*�%' �� (�� gospodarstvom.

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA IN THE PERIODFROM 1968 TO 1988: ON THE WAY TO DISSOLUTION

The year 1968 brought about an important turning point in the history ofYugoslavia in the economic field. In this time, despite great hopes for suc-cess, it became clear that the economic reform of 1965 had been a failure.This reform may have yielded a lot of positive results in the first two years,since, among other things, the prices, cost of living and inflation stabilised.But the reform of the main goal – to transform the economy into a modernself-managing market economy – had not succeeded. After the failed reform,federal as well as republican stabilisation programmes were drawn up, butthe results were few and far between, definitely not achieving their originalpurpose. The first half of the seventies in Yugoslavia was marked by unevencyclical economic movements. The efforts to control the situation reachedtheir peak with the constitution of 1974, which had a double character, sinceon one hand it moved towards decentralising the state and the economicsystem, while on the other hand it tended to strengthen the communist»party« as the leading state political force. The 1974 constitution was an im-portant turning point in the development of Yugoslavia and many mentionedit as one of the most important reasons for the dissolution of the state and itseconomic problems. In the middle of the 1970s the new manner of socialplanning also came into existence, based on the idea that the functioning ofmarket laws could be more efficiently replaced by self-management agree-ments between companies, which was the foundation for the 1976 Associ-ated Labour Act that also failed to produce any positive effects on the eco-nomic situation. In the second half of the 1970s, Yugoslavia stumbled into aserious crisis. One of the main reasons for this was that after the oil crisis of1973 Yugoslavia kept behaving as if nothing had happened, instead of takingthis into account.

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The death of Josip Broz-Tito in 1980 meant the turning point: Yugoslaviawent from a concealed crisis to an open emergency. The main reasons in-cluded the shortage in the balance of trade and payments, external indebted-ness and vast differences in development. The struggle of federal govern-ments after the improvement of economic situation in 1980s resembledfighting windmills. All attempts of resolving this crisis were unsuccessfuldespite the fact that some of the suggested reforms may have been good, butfailed because their implementation was inconsistent. The president of thegovernment from 1982 to 1986, Milka Planinc, has to be emphasised – shewanted to bring about order with resolute politics, but was too weak and hadto keep giving in to tremendous social pressures and interests of individualrepublics. One of the greatest economy experts of that time, Aleksander Bajt,said that she would perhaps succeed in stabilising the situation, had she beenallowed to work in peace.

Until as late as 1985 the word »crisis« had not been used. The work ofthe Croatian economist Branko Horvat, Jugoslavensko društvo v krizi [Yugo-slav Society in Crisis] was the breaking point, for it saw the main reason forthe economic and social situation in the political system of that time. Thedissolution of Yugoslavia was by no means just the result of national, eco-nomic and political contradictions brought to the extreme after Tito's death;instead, it was a consequence of much longer-lasting circumstances, result-ing from the controversies and non-democratic foundations of the Yugoslavstate-political and economic regime. The economic system was based oncertain ideological and political models that allowed for the absolute domi-nance of politics over economy.

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Mile Bjelajac*

JUGOSLOVANSKA LJUDSKA ARMADA V ŠESTDESETIHIN PRVI POLOVICI SEDEMDESETIH

0(�� !"#7 � �� vpliv na Jugoslovansko ljudko armado (JLA). Titovo mnogokrat nedosledno��2� (�� % ��2 2� �� >�K �� ' ��posebej glede na dejstvo, da je bila vojska le njegova domena. Celotno ob-��2� � !"#@ � !"9A 2� �� *� �� 3�stanje v JLA in na razprave o konceptu obrambe so vplivali mednarodni od-�� E�� E!"#!G �� E!"#@G ��' �2�� J��2�� %��E!"#9' !"9RG' ��2� �� E!"#7G' �2�� ?��G' ��2��seja Izvršnega komiteja CK ZKJ marca 1962, brionski plenum 1966, demon-stracije študentov 1968, demonstracije in nasilje Albancev na Kosovu in vMakedoniji 1968, reforma ZKJ 1969, razvoj nacionalizma v Sloveniji in v4��' �� 2�' ��2�� !"9C�

Tito, ki je nedotakljivo razsojal o vprašanjih JLA, ni bil pripravljen od-stopiti od enotnosti in dopustiti, da bi se kdo drugi vpletal v vodenje vojske..�� (� 2� ��%�2�� 2��2�� 2�� voditelji. Medtem pa glede najvišjih kadrov ni bil dosleden. Zaradi odpora��2�� =� 2� 6�� (�� .��2�� (� ��2�� E!"#9G� 6 � ��2�� 2�� 2� �� (��Isamo v letu 1968 je bilo odstranjenih 38 generalov in 2400 oficirjev. Tito je�� (� ��2� �� (� �� (naravnozaledje) � �� ?��(� �� 6 2� �� *�� r-linske in kubanske krize, posebno pa krize v Sredozemlju 1967. Takrat sta�� >�(��2� �� 2�� Tito je ocenil, da je glavna potencialna pretnja Jugoslaviji na Zahoda.Avgustovski dogodki 1968 so to oceno popolnima spremenili.

V šestdesetih letih je postalo jasno, da v JLA, v njeno partizansko elito, v��2�� (� �� *�� 6 2� �� 2�(�� 2�� 2�� 6� �� 2� �� 2�� 2�(��o-vanske vojske vse do njenega konca leta 1992.

+�� 2�(�� 2�� 2�� !"#7 2� �� %i-trega sklepa, da prevzamejo Centralni komiteji republik obrambo v svoje��' �� 2 (�� ' �� &��2 � ��% �o-2�� 2��' �� 2 �� %�� 2��' ��(�� ' ��2 �� (� �� 2��%��2��% ��2 � �2�� ' � ��' �� %� �� tehnokrat-

* Dr. / PhD, znanstveni svetnik / research coucillor, Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije / Insti-

tute for Recent History of Serbia, 4!+ 5��#�� "��6� �� 7�#+!��e-mail: [email protected]

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ska organizacija Armije. Sprejet je bil po hitrem postopku Zakon o ljudskiobrambi. S tem pa je bilo trajno odprto vprašanje suverene pristojnosti��2��2� �� % �� M�>' �� 6��(� ��Bljenja, pa vsekakor po njegovi smrti.

Ocena pomena študentskih demonstracij leta 1968 ni bila znotraj tedan-2�(� �2��(� ��%� �� 6��2�' �� 2� �� 6�� 2� �� 2�' �� %� �*�� 2�� % ��2� �� o-��2��% ��(�� 6�� 2� ��' �� 2 �2�� 2��2� �� 2� �� 2 �� 2�(�� nobenega koraka. Dogodki na Kosovi in v Makedoniji (1968) z demonstra-cijami in z elementi upora Albancev, kot tudi stopnjevanje Maspoka v4�� %�� *� �� (��' �� 2�� % ��%' � 2� (�� ' ��e-pati. Takšna je bila tudi Titova usmeritev.

V vojaški eliti so bile delitve, afere ki so ostale v spominu po imenih po-��% (�� 2� �� 2 �� *�2�'�� 2� � �� 2� 2�� (�� 2�% �� *�%�

YUGOSLAV ARMY IN THE 1960S AND THE FIRST HALFOF THE 1970S

The events of 1968 only underlined the importance of milestones in thesociety and influenced the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). Tito was fre-quently inconsistent in regard to certain issues, and this had a dramatic im-pact on YPA, especially since the army was in his exclusive domain. Thewhole period from 1962 until 1975 was a turning point for the future of thecommon Yugoslav state. The situation in YPA and the discussions about thedefence concepts was influenced by the international relations (the 1961Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises, the 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East,the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Vietnam war), the secret session ofthe Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia inMarch 1962, the 1966 Brioni Plenum, the 1968 student demonstrations, thedemonstrations and violence of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia in1968, the 1969 League of Communists of Yugoslavia reform, the developingnationalism in Slovenia and Croatia, political changes in Serbia and theadoption of the new constitution in 1974.

Tito, who had the exclusive right to consider the issues in regard to YPA,was not ready to give up the unity and allow anyone else to get involved inthe management of the Army. This gave rise to conflicts with highest-ranking Party and political leaders. Meanwhile he was not consistent in re-(�� %� �� *�� J�*�� & �%� ��*� �(�� =-� ��*e-ment, Tito abandoned general Gošnjak and replaced him with a new minister(1967). This move was accompanied by various purges of generals; only in

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1968, 38 generals and 2400 officers were removed. Tito was also the initia-tor of the renewed approximation and complete alliance (natural hinter-lands) with USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. This was encouraged bythe impact of the Berlin and Cuban crises, and especially the 1967 Mediter-ranean crisis. At that time Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union supported theArab states and were on the same side. Tito estimated that the main potentialthreat to Yugoslavia was coming from the West. After the events in Augustof 1968 this estimation was completely altered.

In the 1960s it became clear that nationalism was gaining much momen-tum in YPA and its partisan elite. This was a cause for concern for theYugoslav-oriented cadre. This conflict became a permanent characteristic ofthe Yugoslav Army until its end in 1992.

Through political criticism of the Yugoslav Army, in the autumn of 1968a conclusion was quickly reached that the Central Committees of the indi-vidual republics should take over the defence, that the republican centralheadquarters should be activated, that the municipalities should form mili-tary headquarters, detachments and battalions, armed with modern lightweaponry, that a communications system must be ensured, and that the roleof radio and smaller radio stations during wartime should be especiallylooked at. It was thought that these measures would overcome the techno-cratic organisation of the Army. The People's Defence Act was passed in anexpedited procedure. This permanently opened the question of sovereign ju-risdiction of command and use of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-via's armed forces – if not while Tito was still alive, then certainly after hisdeath.

Within the Army leadership at the time the evaluation of the importanceof the 1968 students' demonstrations was not consistent. More precisely, itwas drastically polarised. At that time the question was whether the socialistArmy could intervene at all because of internal political reasons. Tito statedthat the Army should focus on monitoring the state border, and that it shouldnot make any moves without his explicit authorisation. The events inKosovo and Macedonia (1968) with demonstrations and elements of Alba-nian rebellion as well as Maspok (»Mass Movement«) in Croatia soon con-vinced even the »liberals« among the generals that the Army should be ableto intervene in special cases, when the law and order was in danger. Tito'sstandpoint was the same.

The Army elite was riddled with conflicts, affairs remembered by thenames of individual generals, and occasional purges. Since this was a ratherclosed institution, the domestic and foreign public frequently guessed aboutthe background and consequences.

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Damijan Guštin*

TERITORIALNA OBRAMBA 1968–1987: VOJAŠKA POTREBA'/+ ,�/+�+�(+ ,&��)*�=

+�� !"#7 �� 2� 2�(�� 2�� ' �� ' �� 2�(�� 8 � �� ( ��% �� 2 �� >�Bgoslovansko ljudsko armado, ki ne bi mogla braniti vsega jugoslovanskega��2� �� *�2� ��2 �� 2�� 2� �� ?��(� �� ' �� ? ��2� �' ��kot po vseh republikah, avgusta 1968 ustanovili štabe in partizanske enote.

Tudi ko je neposredna nevarnost minila, so drugi razlogi vplivali naohranitev teritorialnih enot. V novi koncept jugoslovanske obrambe, uveljav-�2�� (� ��' � �� J�� %� �� (� �� 2��2� ��' �� 2� �� ' �� ' �� 2� �� B��' � �� 2�' �2�%�� (�� 2� �� ' %�� 2�� 2�� e-��% ��2�� 2�' �� %�� B�� 2� ��2�� 2�� !"9! �� 6�� ' � �� 2��' �� ? �� % 2� �� 7$�$$$ &��*�2��% ��' �� 2� �� ' �� B�� (�� 2�� 2 �� 6�� &�� 2� �� o-rabo slovenskega jezika kot poveljevalnega.

Pogledi vojaške elite na Teritorialno obrambo so se postopoma koncentri-rali v njeno redukcijo, doktrinarno in dejansko. Razgradnja sistema SLO se2� ��' � �� 2� �2�� 2�(� ��2��(��%��(� ��' �� 2�(�� krize, ki je dobila z krizo v AP Kosovo leta 1981 svojo varnostno in celo�2�� (��2�� 6�� 2� � !"7@ �� 2�� *��' � �� 2 �� 6�� (�� *�� B�� ' ��2�� 2 �� 2�� %� �� 2 ��v-�� % �� 2� �� I �� 2� ��2�� %��2��2� ��*�� (� �2��(� �� %�a-nitvi svojega vpliva na Teritorialno obrambo Slovenije. Boj je izgubila, tako�� 2��% ��(� �� %' ��2 2� ��2��

* Dr. / PhD, znanstveni sodelavec / research associate, docent / senior lecturer, Inštitut za

novejšo zgodovino / Institute for Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1, SI-1000 Ljub-�� % #& �#�� 1��! #& 0�&�� 2�!�� ,�#�� 3 �� 1000 Ljubljana; e-mail: [email protected]

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okolje v Evropi potrjevalo novo obrambno zamisel. Leta 1987 je nova ob-�� 6�� 2�� B��%��(� �2��' � �� 2�� (� �� 2�� (�

TERRITORIAL DEFENCE 1968–1987: A MILITARY NECESSITYOR POLITICAL PROJECT?

In the summer of 1968, the Yugoslav political and military leadership,facing the crisis in Czechoslovakia, undertook the already tested strength-ening of the Yugoslav defence capabilities – with the increased role of theterritorial forces intended for the support of the Yugoslav People's Army,which could not defend the whole of the Yugoslav territory and prevent theoccupation of at least a part of the territory. Thus the forces of the WarsawPact were also made aware that Yugoslavia intended to defend itself. In Slo-venia, like in all other republics, headquarters and partisan units were estab-lished in August of 1968.

Even when the imminent danger passed, there were other reasons to pre-serve the territorial units. Territorial units were exactly right for the newconcept of Yugoslav defence, introduced as the Czechoslovak examplegained momentum. They also represented an investment of that part of themilitary elite which argued for the new doctrine of state defence, against thepart of the military elite which remained reserved but still very influential.And, ultimately, the organisation of territorial units within the individual re-publics on one hand represented an obligation for the republics, while on theother hand it also gave them an opportunity to promote the republican juris-dictions in the field of defence, even though simultaneously emphasisingmunicipalities as defence units. The Slovenian political elite took advantageof the opportunity that presented itself, despite the crisis of 1971, and devel-oped its Territorial Defence, as these units were named, to the maximum. Inthe beginning of the 1980s, its military formations had room for over 80.000positions; mobile and local forces as well as units up to the size of brigadeshad been developed, and heavy artillery had also been introduced. Formallythese units used the Slovenian language as the language of command.

The attitude of the military elite towards Territorial Defence has gradu-ally focused on its reduction, in terms of military doctrine as well as in actu-ality. The dissolution of the Total National Defence system started when themilitary elite was released from the weight of its untouchable supreme com-mander, but in the actual context of the Yugoslav social crisis this beganwith the 1981 crisis of the Kosovo autonomous territory, which also repre-sented a security and even military risk. Thus as early as in 1982 a new de-fence concept of the state was outlined, and Territorial Defence was to bestrongly integrated into the whole of the military force; in reality this would

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mean subordinating Territorial Defence to the military leadership, while thestate political elites of the republics would lose their influence over theseforces. In regard to this issue, the actual interests of the republican elitesonce again proved different. The Slovenian elite persisted in preserving theconcept of so-caled Total National Defence and Social Self-protection, aswell as tried to protect its influence over the Territorial Defence of Slovenia.It lost this struggle due to internal politics as well as expert opinions, for thechanging security situation in Europe proved to be in favour of the new de-fence ideas. In 1987, the new defence arrangements included the SlovenianTerritorial Defence into the defence of the north-western staging area, thusalso changing its role. This change took place mostly due to political rea-sons.

J��

SLOVENIA AND YUGOSLAVIA: Crises and reforms 1968/1988

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