Skepticism in Latin America (Stanford Encyclopedia of ... · Robert J. Fogelin coined the word...

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Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophySkepticism in Latin AmericaFirst published Fri Feb 12, 2016

This entry examines the development and impact of the study of philosophical skepticism throughout LatinAmerica. It also highlights some significant trends and important contributions made to this venerabletradition by a number of Latin American philosophers.

Skepticism is a philosophical activity of investigation characterized by the notion of suspension of judgment.Whereas dogmatists affirm or deny a proposition on a given philosophical topic, skeptics neither affirm nordeny any proposition, i. e., they remain uncommitted to any dogmatic doctrine. According to skeptics, thebasic opposition in philosophy is that between those who endorse a philosophical theory and those who, afterhaving inquired into the truth, did not find an answer to the questions under examination. That is whyskepticism came to be seen by dogmatic philosophers as a major challenge to their philosophical project offinding the truth. Epistemologists and metaphysicians alike set themselves the task of overcoming skepticismin order to establish their own doctrines. Thus, one constantly finds dogmatic philosophers trying to refute theskeptic. One criterion to accept a philosophical proposal is to determine to what extent it overcomes theskeptical challenge.

In ancient times, skepticism had two main different forms: Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism.Rediscovered in the Renaissance, skepticism became one of the pillars of modern philosophy, not only aftermodern skeptics, such as Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Bayle and David Hume, gave new impulse to it, butalso because of the many answers to it developed by philosophers such as Francis Bacon, René Descartes,George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant. In the analytic tradition, from G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russellonwards, skepticism is a central topic of concern. This surprisingly long history shows not only how deep isthe skeptical challenge, but also how fascinating the skeptical stance turns out to be.

Similarly to philosophers in many other parts of the world, Latin American philosophers have faced skepticalchallenges and have devoted close attention to skepticism. They adopt, by and large, the same understandingof skepticism, share the same historical tradition, from Pyrrho to contemporary analytic philosophy, thatphilosophers elsewhere have engaged with, and carry out the same kind of research as scholars all over theworld do. What is specific about Latin American scholars on skepticism is the fact that they are, in general,more sympathetic toward skepticism than philosophers elsewhere tend to be. Consequently, one finds notonly studies on the history of skepticism and philosophical criticisms, but also developments of new forms ofskepticism, which are worth considering with some care.

1. Introduction2. Historical Background3. Skepticism rediscovered4. Neo-Pyrrhonism5. Reactions to neo-Pyrrhonism6. Contemporary skepticism7. History of modern skepticism

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8. History of ancient skepticism9. Skepticism and literatureBibliographyAcademic ToolsOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries

1. IntroductionIt may not be a mere coincidence that in 1991 Oswaldo Porchat, a leading Brazilian philosopher, and in 1994Robert J. Fogelin coined the word “neo-Pyrrhonism” to describe their respective philosophical positions.That coincidence reflects both the increasing significance of the scholarship on skepticism, in Latin Americanand in Anglo-American philosophy, and a more sympathetic attitude toward this venerable tradition.

To write about skepticism in Latin America is more difficult than one may expect. First, the phenomena to bedescribed are complex and multifarious. Interest in skepticism is widespread in this part of the world, and byno means confined to one country or to a small group of philosophers. On the one hand, the significance ofskepticism in the philosophy of each country seems to vary wildly; on the other, the history of studies onskepticism in each country has its own internal development, despite many connections among the variouscountries involved. Second, interest in skepticism is so recent in Latin America that not enough time haselapsed to provide some perspective on the issue. It is perhaps still too soon to give an entirely balanced viewof skepticism in the region. But we will attempt our best to achieve that.

An interesting feature of the Latin American way of approaching skepticism is by not taking it just as theembodiment of an opponent to be refuted. At the very least, there is not a widespread prejudice againstskepticism. On the contrary, many Latin American philosophers have strong sympathy for the skepticalproposal, and even those who are not skeptics themselves do not think that if the assumption of aphilosophical thesis leads to skepticism, this constitutes a kind of reductio ad absurdum of the initialassumption. Skepticism is, for many Latin American philosophers, at least a prima facie tenable position.That does not mean, of course, that the majority of those Latin American philosophers who deal withskepticism are skeptics, but we do find many that consider themselves as such. Even for those who are notskeptics, the significance of philosophical skepticism is undeniable, and Latin American philosophers havemade efforts to understand carefully its meaning and historical role.

The best way to introduce skepticism in Latin America is not to explain what goes on in each country, but toreport what Latin American philosophers have said concerning those topics that caught their attention.However, we will begin by presenting a brief historical background and the thought of the two foundingfathers of Latin American work on skepticism: Oswaldo Porchat (Brazil) and Ezequiel de Olaso (Argentina).Special care must be taken with their work, because together they set the stage for a proper understanding ofwhat happens in all other Latin American countries. We will then examine what Latin American philosophershave been doing both in contemporary skepticism and in the history of this philosophical tradition. Ours isnot an exhaustive account, and being selective, it is unable to accommodate every proposal in the field. Wehope, however, to give a fair idea of what has happened and is currently taking place, in order to situate thereader and prompt additional research in the area.

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2. Historical BackgroundContemporary studies of skepticism began in Latin America thanks to the works of Oswaldo Porchat andEzequiel de Olaso, a distinguished Argentinian historian of philosophy. Due to their works, skepticism hasattracted a significant, although somewhat scattered, amount of attention in Latin America. Both were alreadyinterested in skepticism before they met for the first time. In 1968, Porchat gave a famous lecture, publishedin the following year, in which he called attention to a basic skeptical problem that every philosopher shouldtry to overcome: the problem of the conflict of philosophies (roughly, the fact that philosophical doctrinesoften disagree on their answers to any given philosophical question). Given his B.A. in classics and his Ph.D.dissertation on Aristotle’s conception of science, it is not surprising that Porchat came to know ancientskepticism very well. His perspective was philosophical, and he identified his own philosophical experiencewith that of the ancient skeptics. In the same year of 1969, Olaso defended his Ph.D. dissertation on “Leibnizand the Ancient Skeptics” at Byrn Mawr College (Pennsylvania), in which he showed that Leibniz had a deepknowledge of Greek skepticism, whose modes he clearly identified in the Cartesian arguments. Thus, one cansay that skepticism in Latin American began in the end of the 1960s.

In 1975, invited by Porchat, Olaso went to Brazil where he became a professor at the State University ofCampinas (UNICAMP) until 1977. This fact had a profound influence on the development of the studies ofskepticism in both countries and even in other Latin American countries. Their mutual collaboration provedvery fruitful. Philosophers interested on skepticism soon got in touch, for they organized seminal conferenceson the topic (1986, in Campinas, Brazil; in 1992, in Buenos Aires, Argentina; unfortunately, no proceedingswere published). Throughout the years, many other conferences on skepticism were held (in Brazil,Argentina, and Mexico) in which philosophers from many countries took part and collective books onskepticism appeared.

Porchat’s and Olaso’s influence was huge. They were the founding fathers of skepticism in Latin America.One can speak of a second generation that was in touch from the 1990s onwards because they paved the wayfirst. Philosophers in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia have been collaborating in the last twentyyears because they both inaugurated a friendly, collaborative way of doing philosophy that has beenpreserved by their followers. Though Olaso, Porchat and some of their disciples were in touch with manyphilosophers from other countries and had a far-reaching influence, there is no single, integrated explanationfor that widespread interest.

There is no doubt that skepticism flourished in Brazil like in no other Latin American country. It is perhapsnot amiss to say that Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism is the most important achievement of Latin Americanskepticism, providing material for further systematic discussions. In Brazil, an important group ofphilosophers around Porchat was organized throughout the country in the 1980s, and they were devoted notonly to understand the history of skepticism but also to discuss contemporary skepticism, by developing itand criticizing it. The group held conferences every year, sometimes twice a year, and many books,individual monographs and edited collections, were published. Moreover, Porchat was professor andsupervisor of a number of young philosophers as well as a reference to all other philosophers studyingskepticism. Even philosophers who were not primarily interested in skepticism found the group’s way ofdoing philosophy quite attractive. In fact, the group has always systematically invited non-skepticalphilosophers to enrich its discussions. As a result, as time went by, the group grew larger and larger.

Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia have also shown a lot of interest in skepticism with many importantcontributions to it, albeit perhaps not as systematically as in Brazil. In Argentina, work on skepticism



remained at first somewhat confined to Olaso and to some historians of modern philosophy around him.Later, there has been a growing interest in Argentina, this time from philosophers belonging to the analytictradition, who were (and still are) also in touch with the Brazilian group, including, more recently, a newimpulse to the study of ancient skepticism.

In Mexico, there is also a deep interest in skepticism. History of skepticism was not neglected, as we can beseen from the works of Laura Benítez and José Antonio Robles, among others, both of whom worked withOlaso (and Popkin). Their focus is on modern skepticism. Some Mexican philosophers, working within aKantian tradition, focused on transcendental arguments as weapons against skepticism. Others work oncontemporary skepticism in connection to questions such as disjunctivism and perception. Finally, skepticismand its connections to fallibilism and skeptical or epistemic concepts, such as doubt and certainty, were amajor theme of some Mexican philosophers.

There has also been some interest in skepticism in many other countries, most notably in Colombia. Usually,this interest is combined with a classic author, such as Descartes, Hume, or Kant, or with an analyticphilosopher, like Wittgenstein or Dennett. More recently, an interest in ancient skepticism has also arisen. Inother countries such as Peru, Chile and Uruguay, the interest in skeptical issues is more scattered. No morethan a minor or incidental interest in either the history of skepticism or in current epistemological questionsthat bear on the skeptical challenge is found.

3. Skepticism rediscoveredThe study and diffusion of skepticism in Argentina and in other countries such as Brazil and Mexico owes agreat deal to Ezequiel de Olaso. When Olaso died, Porchat noted that, despite not being a skeptic himself,Olaso “was indeed the father of Brazilian skepticism” (Porchat 1997). But his leadership and influence wasvast, as Popkin testified:

Ezequiel de Olaso was one of the most prominent historians of philosophy. He contributedenormously to arousing interest in a wide range of topics in the history of philosophy through hiswritings, his teachings and his lectures in Latin America, North America and Europe. (Popkin1997)

Olaso taught in many universities both in Argentina and elsewhere. His Ph.D. dissertation has not beenpublished, but many papers resulted from it. Olaso wrote a number of important papers on skepticism, bothancient and modern. He explored many authors in the 17th and 18th centuries: Hume, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo,Rousseau, Hobbes, and Leibniz. These developments were summarized in Olaso 1994. Many of his papersare dedicated to Hume’s skepticism. Olaso argued that Hume was an Academic skeptic, not a Pyrrhonist, asPopkin had supposed. More importantly, his study of certain Enlightenment authors made Popkin revise hisinterpretation that, apart from Hume, there was no interest at all in skepticism during the 18th century.

Olaso’s work was not limited to the presence of skepticism in modern philosophy. He also devoted his effortsto interpret certain concepts of the main lexicon of skepticism. He was not only interested in skepticism froma historical point of view, but also from a philosophical perspective: he argued vigorously against thecoherence of the skeptical position in “Zétesis” (Olaso 1988) a detailed paper on ancient Pyrrhonism, inwhich he displayed both an accurate understanding of this philosophical stance and a highly critical attitudetoward the Pyrrhonian conception of investigation. His assessment of the concept of zétesis was very



influential. Olaso interpreted it as an inquiry whose goal was suspension of judgment, which definedPyrrhonism, and contrasted it to the open inquiry led by Academic and modern skeptics, whose goal is truth.Among his contributions, one finds also the distinction between the concept of doubt, or suspension of themind, and the concept of epokhé, or suspension of judgment, which would be the proper attitude of a skeptic,because it is beyond doubt itself and tries to overcome it. These new interpretations were part of his debatewith scholars like Naess, Chisholm, Mates, Frede and, of course, Porchat in order to find an acceptable formof contemporary skepticism. Based on Ortega y Gasset’s distinction between belief and knowledge, heproposed new accounts of Moore’s notions of common sense and certainty (Olaso 1975a) and the criticalanalysis carried out by Wittgenstein (Olaso 1999).

Olaso’s work on skepticism opened up two main directions that were followed by many philosophers,whether under his direct influence or not. First, skepticism emerged as an epistemological problem and, in thelight of the linguistic turn, he set the task of reinterpreting and making sense of this philosophical stance.Second, he initiated a scholarly investigation of the history of skepticism; particularly of modern skepticism,but also both versions of its ancient form.

4. Neo-PyrrhonismIt is now time to present in some detail Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism, for it is arguably the most importantcontribution to Latin American skepticism. His seminal paper, “On What Appears”, was published in 1991,laying the foundations and the outline of his skeptical stance. Later, in a number of papers, he explored themain ideas further, corrected minor points, developed new aspects, and wrote some introductory andaccessible texts.

One of the merits of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism is that it provides a general, articulated philosophical stancethat one can adopt. Skepticism is not, as it is usually presented in epistemological circles, a mere doubt onthis or that topic that should be superseded, that is, it is not a methodological doubt or an expedient tostrengthen a dogmatic position. For most philosophers concerned with skepticism, the coherence andintelligibility of the skeptical position is not really important. Any doubt, however crazy, may be useful, if itallows the philosopher to learn something about an argument. But Porchat does not think so. For him,skepticism is thought of as an articulated, plausible stance proposed by some philosophers. Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism is not even confined to a broad epistemological doctrine, since it is meant to be a generalphilosophical attitude, which includes epistemological aspects, but is not restricted to them.

One should also emphasize that his neo-Pyrrhonism has to be sharply distinguished from Cartesianskepticism. Porchat makes it clear that neo-Pyrrhonian aporiai are a different sort of argument from Cartesiandoubts. In particular, neo-Pyrrhonism is not committed to mentalism (the doctrine that one can conceive themind, and its representations, as independent from the body) and does not it invite any sort of solipsism.Thus, most of the criticisms leveled against Cartesian skepticism do not apply to neo-Pyrrhonism.

Neo-Pyrrhonism has two parts: one negative, and the other positive. The two most important concepts of thenegative part are diaphonía (the conflict among the various philosophical doctrines) and epokhé (thesuspension of judgment). For Porchat, ataraxía, or tranquility of mind, is not an essential ingredient ofPyrrhonism and it is more of historical interest. Given the conflict of philosophies, Porchat draws theskeptical conclusion: being genuinely unable to choose between the various philosophical views, he suspendshis judgment. He argues vigorously that the disagreement between philosophies is undecidable. Not even hisprevious “philosophy of the common view of the world” (Porchat 1975, 1979) is able to solve or avoid the



conflict. The conflict involves the dogmatism not only of philosophers of the common view of the world, butalso of ordinary people. However, not all philosophies are part of the conflict, since some philosophies arenot dogmatic: they do not intend to describe the ultimate nature of things.

Porchat (1993) distinguishes between two kinds of skeptical arguments: dialectical and empirical. This is asignificant contribution of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism to skepticism. Let us consider, first, dialecticalarguments. The mode of diaphonía, in Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism, is the crucial one. But, of course, Porchatalso considers the other modes of Agrippa as important skeptical weapons against dogmatism. Moreimportantly, he recognizes that for ancient Pyrrhonism the skeptical method of antinomies (arguing both proand con with equal persuasiveness) is indispensable against the dogmatic claim that some doctrines andarguments are felt stronger than others. That is, the method is indispensable to neutralize that dogmaticexperience of unbalanced arguments, by making stronger the weaker arguments. By arguing on both sides ofan issue, the skeptic experiences them as being equally strong. Why do they seem equally powerful in theskeptic’s intellectual experience? For the following reason: any criterion proposed to decide the issue willitself be part of the dispute, and disagreement about it re-emerges. Skeptics do not commit themselves tothese dialectical arguments. They just use what dogmatists admit against dogmatism. Their whole point is toinduce suspension of judgment in dogmatists while still maintaining their own epokhé.

There is, however, another route toward suspension of judgment. Skeptics can employ arguments they areable to endorse, which lead to the conclusion that one ought to suspend judgment. As skeptics (Pyrrhonists)live their ordinary life like everyone else, they can also reason like everyone else. They can search for theconjunction of phenomena in the world, establish empirical correlations, and infer the presence of fire fromthe fact of smoke or the occurrence of a wound from the presence of a scar. Empirical reasoning leads usfrom one phenomenon to another. Couldn’t it be the case that such empirical arguments lead to suspension ofjudgment? These arguments have as premises what is apparent, and they do not indicate a conclusion beyondthe phenomena, since epokhé, their conclusion, is an intellectual experience. According to Porchat (1993),Aenesidemus’ modes are empirical, not dialectical, arguments in support of epokhé.

With regard to the positive part, neo-Pyrrhonism presents a detailed account of the crucial notion ofphainómenon. Porchat thought, in an earlier phase, that phainómenon was to be identified with, or assimilatedto, phantasía (Porchat 1985, 1986). That explains why he once construed that notion as implying some formof mentalism: what appears was conceived of as a mental representation. He later rejected that identification(Porchat 1991). On his new explanation, phainómenon is best accounted for by another crucial notion: bíos,or common life. After all, says Sextus Empiricus, what appears is bíos. Thus, Sextus’ explanation of theskeptical standard of action is also an explanation of the notion of phainómenon. By paying close attention tothe fourfold everyday observances, one may understand better what the phainómenon is. At the same time,common life is to be understood as what is apparent (what appears to those who live it), not as a reality initself.

According to Porchat, phenomena are a kind of residue from suspension of judgment; they are what is leftafter we have suspended judgment about dogmatic discourse. And once dogmatism is left behind, life is whatis left for us. The phenomena impose themselves to us, and it is not up to us to accept them or not. One couldsay that phenomenon is what is “given” to us, but that is misleading, for in one sense it is not “given” at all.At first, Porchat asserted that language is a kind of constitutive ingredient of the phenomena and languagepermeates all our experience (Porchat 1991); later, perhaps to avoid some Kantian or idealist connotation, hepreferred to talk of an association between what appears and language (Porchat 1995, 2013). Thus,phenomena are impregnated by language, not given to us.



One important comment Porchat makes concerning phenomena is that they are always relative to someone. Infact, they may be personal or public. Something may appear to someone or to more than one person, maybeeven to all of us. For instance, it may appear to you right now that your are reading this article; and it mayappear to many of us that Brasilia is the capital of Brazil; and it may appear to all of us that there are trees inthe world. Here it can be noted that there is no solipsistic tendency in neo-Pyrrhonism, since many people infact share most phenomena. That solipsism is not an inherent tendency in neo-Pyrrhonism can already beseen due to the connections between the phenomena and common life. After all, what is apparent to us areobjects and events in the world, part of the life all of us live.

Another remark is that phenomena are sensible or intellectual. When something appears to the senses, such asthe perception of a table in front of you, it is a sensible phenomenon; when it appears to the intellect, such asa law, it is an intellectual phenomenon. For Porchat, there is no sharp line between these two kinds ofphenomena. A sensible phenomenon also has some intellectual aspect: when you see a table in front of you,the very idea of a table includes in it something that goes beyond what is present in your sensory modalities.However, although Porchat does not develop this idea explicitly, most intellectual phenomena seem to have areference to something sensible, or at least to have something sensible in its origin. Therefore, manyphenomena are typically of one kind, always including both a sensible and an intellectual aspect in them.Very recently, however, Porchat dropped that doctrine, and he now prefers to distinguish between two kindsof phenomena (Porchat 2013).

Porchat’s interpretation of Pyrrhonism seems closer to Frede’s (1997) than to Burnyeat’s (1980). It seemsthat, for him just like for Frede, skeptics have many beliefs in ordinary life, but are not committed tophilosophical beliefs (beliefs about the truth of various philosophical views about the world). His neo-Pyrrhonism, therefore, would seem to be an urbane form of skepticism (cf. Barnes 1992). However, the verydistinction at the basis of that dispute between Frede and Burnyeat presupposes what Porchat rejects: acontrast between philosophers and ordinary people. From a neo-Pyrrhonist point of view, both are typically,though not always, dogmatists: most philosophers are dogmatists and so are ordinary folk; dogmaticphilosophers only tend to be more refined in some of their conceptions.

The crucial distinction is that between dogmatism and non-dogmatism. Sometimes, ordinary people are notdogmatic, and neither are some philosophers, such the skeptics (Pyrrhonists). For Porchat, manycontemporary philosophers are skeptics or have a skeptical tendency without knowing it (Porchat 2001).Thus, what matters for a neo-Pyrrhonist is not whether the skeptic has no beliefs whatsoever or only ordinarybeliefs, but whether he has dogmatic beliefs (concerning ádela) or non-dogmatic beliefs (concerning whatappears, that is, the world or bíos). Frede would have missed the point concerning the scope of epokhé for nothaving understood properly the notion of phainómenon (Porchat 1991).

Accordingly, the basic neo-Pyrrhonian distinction is that between the phenomena and what is said about thephenomena. Dogmatic discourse is about the phenomena. When dogmatists say “roses are red” they mean“roses are really red”, and they have a theory to explain what that alleged reality consists in. Thus, they areno longer talking about the world, but about a further reality posited by their theory. No one disputes whethera rose appears red, but whether it is in fact red. Not all discourse, however, is about the phenomena and somemerely expresses the phenomena. Such is ordinary language in daily life, and such is also the use of languageby neo-Pyrrhonists: they use language to express what appears to them (or to us, if the phenomenon is acommon one), but not to state how things really are. In this sense, “roses are red” expresses how roses appearto us; and in this sense, neo-Pyrrhonists may even say it is true that roses are red and that we know it.Therefore, neo-Pyrrhonism is not, in one sense of the word, a form of relativism, since it accepts an objectiveknowledge about the world.



Two other Pyrrhonian concepts are updated by the neo-Pyrrhonist in the positive part: haíresis and zétesis.According to Porchat, neo-Pyrrhonists have a doctrine or “a skeptical view of the world”. This skeptical viewof the world is an elaboration of how things appear to neo-Pyrrhonists. Skeptical discourse should beunderstood as an expression of phenomena. Thus, neo-Pyrrhonists may articulate explicitly their own view ofthe world. Since most phenomena are common, especially those that concern philosophical issues, neo-Pyrrhonists will try to make explicit our ways of thinking, at least as they see them. However, each skepticwill have his or her own skeptical view of the world, since this view depends also on the circumstances inwhich they live.

Lastly, it should be noted that neo-Pyrrhonists are empiricists, but their empiricism is improved by currentphilosophy of science. For instance, they may endorse the hypothetic-deductive method. For them, we canexplore the world empirically, and in their skeptical view of the world they may incorporate scientific results.For instance, we think that the earth moves, and we no longer think that the earth is at the center of theuniverse. Scientific results may and do have important impacts on our view of the world, including on theneo-Pyrrhonists’. Porchat went as far as to distinguish between a philosophical realism and a scientificrealism (Porchat 1991, 1994), asserting that neo-Pyrrhonists need not be instrumentalists, but could holdscientific realism, although not, of course, philosophical realism. If there is objective knowledge of thecommon world, it seems that the sciences can improve on that knowledge being guided by an experimentalmethod such as the hypothetic-deductive. Neo-Pyrrhonian zétesis is not only a philosophical inquiry todestroy dogmatism, as in the case of Sextus, but also an empirical exploration of the world of phenomena.

5. Reactions to neo-PyrrhonismNeo-Pyrrhonism provoked a lot of different reactions in Brazil and elsewhere. Since it is impossible to reviewthem all here, our purpose will be to give a fair idea of them.

The first important reaction came from philosophers concerned with scientific knowledge. Hilan Bensusanand Paulo Souza (1994) thought that Pyrrhonism was an outdated philosophy. In the face of contemporaryscience, Pyrrhonism would no longer be a viable alternative, for it had not the adequate concepts to explainthat science. Therefore, the fact that science has evolved in unforeseeable ways is an objection to neo-Pyrrhonism. Luiz Henrique de Araújo Dutra (1993, 1995, 1996, 1997b), also criticizing Porchat’s conceptionof science, came to propose another skeptical position, which he called “alethic skepticism”. Dutra thoughtthat the metaphysical notion of truth is indispensable to scientific research. Both held that modern scienceestablishes theories that cannot be doubted by the neo-Pyrrhonist. Otávio Bueno has a more sympatheticproposal toward skepticism and develops a neo-Pyrrhonist approach to contemporary science by combining itwith van Fraassen’s view (Bueno 2015). Neo-Pyrrhonian empiricism emphasizes the notion of empiricaladequacy.

A second kind of response was given by those who want to develop or improve on basic features of neo-Pyrrhonism. Some, such as Plínio Junqueira Smith (1995b), tried to purify neo-Pyrrhonism from what stilllooked like a dogmatic notion. For instance, the idea that dogmatism is a disease and that the skeptic(Pyrrhonist) offers a better way of life by curing dogmatists of their disease may be mere prejudice.Therefore, the skeptical idea of therapy is perhaps dogmatic. The notion of common life as used by the neo-Pyrrhonist also seems to be an inheritance of Porchat’s “philosophy of the common view of the world”(Porchat 1975, 1979). The skeptical view of the world has an undeniable personal aspect. Waldomiro José daSilva Filho explored, on the one hand, skeptical difficulties in common life neglected by the neo-Pyrrhonist(Silva Filho 2015) and, on the other, difficulties in self-knowledge, thereby trying to extend neo-Pyrrhonism



to subjects not touched upon by Porchat (Silva Filho 2007, 2008).

Another important discussion intended to correct and improve on neo-Pyrrhonism concerns the neo-Pyrrhonist view on truth. Porchat developed in an important paper a skeptical doctrine of truth (Porchat1995). According to Porchat, once they have divorced from a metaphysical notion of reality, neo-Pyrrhonistscan defend a correspondence theory of truth: what we say and what appears would be correlated in ourexperience; it appears that there is a link between what we say and what appears to us. Eduardo Barrio(2000), however, thinks that the only alternative to a neo-Pyrrhonist is to adopt a deflationist theory of truth,like the redundancy theory, and that any correspondence theory would imply dogmatism.

An unexpected and important development of neo-Pyrrhonism came from philosophers who were alsoconcerned with political philosophy. They were interested in knowing what would be the skeptical(Pyrrhonian) proposal in politics. Porchat (in conversation) has always been very clear on this issue, for heholds that the skeptic could have any political doctrine, including a radical one: from extreme right toextreme left. After all, skepticism would not exclude any content of phainomena. But most think that not allalternatives are accessible to a skeptical position. Renato Lessa (1995) argues that the neo-Pyrrhonist wouldbe a liberal; Paulo Jonas de Lima Piva (2002) thinks he could be a social democrat or a socialist; CiceroRomão Araújo (2007, 2008) connects the notion of skepticism with the notion of citizenship. This debateopened up a new line of research concerning skepticism.

Very recently, an internal criticism of neo-Pyrrhonism emerged and it deserves to be mentioned. VitorHirschbruch Schvartz (2015) and Diego Machuca (2013a) argue for a rustic version of neo-Pyrrhonism,according to which Pyrrhonists hold no beliefs, and do not stop short of all the consequences that one shouldderive from the force of the skeptical attack on dogmatism. A truly skeptical position would destroy allbeliefs, whether ordinary or philosophical. Accordingly, Schvartz and Machuca see themselves as rustic neo-Pyrrhonists, and do not accept Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism with its non-dogmatic beliefs.

But there have been many external criticisms whose intention is to reject neo-Pyrrhonism. Roberto BolzaniFilho developed an incisive criticism of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism. Bolzani (1996, 2003) identified a sort of“naturalized reason” or some dogmatic presuppositions in the idea of a “healthy philosophy” in Porchat’sthinking. One could apply to skepticism the same kind of argument that the skeptic uses against otherphilosophies. In the end, skepticism would be part of the conflict among philosophies it tries to avoid.Bolzani also attempted to show that, despite Porchat’s intention, neo-Pyrrhonism is an outdated way ofphilosophizing. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (2003) presented a Kantian answer to Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism. He raised a number of difficulties to understand Porchat’s conception of phenomena, and arguedthat an acceptable solution would come only from a transcendental philosophy. These two criticisms, ifsound, should make one reconsider neo-Pyrrhonism. More recently, Pereira (2015) came to defend naiverealism against Pyrrhonism.

6. Contemporary skepticismJust as in many other parts of the world, contemporary skepticism in Latin America deals withepistemological issues within analytic theory of knowledge. Many anti-skeptical strategies, such ascontextualism and externalism, deserved close scrutiny by Latin American philosophers. Also thetranscendental strategy has captured the attention of many philosophers interested in skepticism. Butcontemporary skepticism is not confined to epistemology alone and it engages with, more broadly, analyticphilosophy as a whole. Analytic worries about language and, more specifically, the notion of meaning have



led to the development of a new form of skepticism, known as meaning skepticism. We will review some ofthe discussions on these topics, beginning with the connections between skepticism and analytic philosophy.

Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho (Brazil) developed some skeptical concepts using Austin’s pragmatist viewof language, and he also identified many common ideas between Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism (Marcondes deSouza Filho 1988, 1996a,b). Thus, Marcondes was articulating Pyrrhonism further in a similar spirit asPorchat. Another groundbreaking work on skepticism derived from the linguistic turn is that of SamuelCabanchik (Argentina). Cabanchik was interested in the possibility of a linguistic form of skepticism orskepticism about meaning not only in Wittgenstein, but also in Aristotle and Francisco Sanchez. His mainfocus, however, was Wittgenstein, about whom he wrote two books (2003, 2010) and many papers (1990,2008a,b).

Marcondes’ and Cabanchik’s concern with analytic philosophy and its relation to skepticism was truly a guideto other philosophers. The connections between skepticism and the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein havebeen highlighted by many scholars. Plínio Junqueira Smith (1994) tried to show the strong affinities betweenWittgenstein’s later philosophy and ancient Pyrrhonism, to which Paulo Roberto Margutti (Brazil) (Pinto1996a) offered a criticism. In the same spirit, Guadalupe Reinoso (Argentina) (2006, 2008, 2009) calls ourattention to the value of skepticism in both Sextus and Wittgenstein as an ars vivendi: their criticism oflanguage’s bewitchment, anti-theoretical perspective, and conception of philosophy as a therapy. MagdalenaHolguín (Colombia) (1997) and R. Meléndez (Colombia) (2014) also analyze the relations betweenskepticism and Wittgenstein. Pamela Lastres (Peru) (2011) has recently been doing some promising work onWittgenstein and Moore, but also on Pyrrhonian skepticism. It is also worth noting that Oscar Nudler(Argentina) (2010) has developed what he calls a “philosophy of the limits”, inspired both by Wittgensteinand the Socratic awareness of our ignorance, which, although not properly skeptic, is a doctrine at leastclosely associated with skepticism.

More recently, Glenda Satne (Argentina) (2003, 2005a,b, 2008) also pursued a line of research based onanalytic theories of meaning and, more specifically, on meaning skepticism. She has been busy with skepticalarguments derived from contemporary semantics, such as Quine’s argument from the indeterminacy ofradical translation, Putnam’s model-theoretic argument, Dummett’s argument from the manifestation oflinguistic knowledge and, above all, Kripke’s (or Kripkenstein’s) skeptical arguments. Meaning skepticismwas also the subject of a very well informed book by Silvio Mota Pinto (Brazil/Mexico) (2009, 2014), andEfraín Lazos (Mexico) (2002) published interesting papers on Wittgenstein, Kripke, and meaning skepticismas well.

Thus, the connection between skepticism and analytic philosophy became a topic to be further explored byLatin American philosophers. Porchat had argued that contemporary analytic philosophy was to a good extentskeptical without knowing it. According to him, many analytic philosophers don’t understand very well whatskeptics had said and what they call a skeptic does not correspond to skepticism, properly understood. If theyhad the appropriate knowledge of the history of skepticism, they would perhaps acknowledge the skepticalorientation of their doctrines. It is not clear, however, that that is the case in analytic philosophy. One debatethat has received some attention is how far this or that analytic philosopher is close to skepticism. Forinstance, against Porchat’s opinion about Quine, Marcos Nascimento Bulcão (Brazil) wrote a book onQuine’s naturalistic realism, denying that he is a skeptic (Bulcão 2008). However, the perception of askeptical Quine still persists in some places.

Davidson is another analytic philosopher whose connections to skepticism have been assessed by LatinAmerican philosophers. Eleonora Orlando (Argentina) (2000) wrote a paper criticizing Davidson, for his



conception of language would end up, despite his intentions, into a kind of semantic skepticism. CristianBarturén (Peru), on the other hand, is interested on Davidson’s critique of global Skepticism. Otávio Bueno(Brazil/USA) criticized the way in which Davidson tries to respond to skepticism (Bueno 2005).

The relation between P.F. Strawson and skepticism has also been assessed by a number of Latin Americanscholars on contemporary skepticism or on analytic philosophy. Perhaps the most important contributioncomes from a Mexican group. We will talk more about them below, when we discuss transcendentalarguments as an anti-skeptical strategy. Sergio Sanchez (Argentina) (2006), Marco Franciotti (2009) andPlínio Junqueira Smith (2015) have also done some work in this topic.

Other analytic philosophers engaged with the issue further. To give but one example, Miguel ÁngelFernández (Mexico) (2014) criticized the incoherence of the anti-skeptical epistemology of belief attributiondeveloped by Crispin Wright. According to Fernández, Wright intends to combine two desiderata in a singleanti-skeptical strategy, to wit, a concessive element to the skeptic, on the one hand, and a rescue element, onthe other. However, he argues, that combination is impossible.

Perhaps one should note that contemporary skepticism was also developed along other philosophicaltraditions, not only of an analytic orientation. Under the influence of Wittgenstein, but also of Stanley Cavell,Mario Gensollem (Mexico) (2006) explored the role of skepticism not only in philosophy, but also incommon life. He came to embrace the Cavellian thesis that philosophical skepticism is the best expression ofthe intrinsic finitude of human nature. Sergio Sánchez (Argentina) (2006) called attention not only toStrawson’s but also to Heidegger’s assessment of skeptical arguments. Jônadas Techio (Brazil) (2013) alsoinvestigated, from a Cavellian and Heideggerian points of view, the importance of philosophical skepticism.

Skeptical worries are usually linked to epistemological issues. We find in Mexico a group of philosopherswho have a very strong connection to skepticism. They go as far as proposing new forms of skepticism.Armando Cíntora (Mexico) (2010), for instance, holds a Pyrrhonian position in philosophy of science.According to Cíntora, a methodological Pyrrhonism would be of great help to liberate scientists from thedogmas that keep them captive when they try to develop their scientific research. Just like in Sextus’ case,Cíntora argues that this kind of methodological Pyrrhonism is not an epistemic paralysis: Pyrrhonianscientists can practice science, since they are aware of the non-dogmatic (temporal) character of theirontological, methodological and semantic principles. Such acknowledgment will keep them safe from adogmatic outlook.

Jorge Ornelas (Mexico) (2012, 2014a; Cíntora and Ornelas 2013a), a younger member of that group, focusedon the main anti-skeptical strategies in contemporary philosophy (contextualism, belief-attributionepistemology, dogmatism, transcendental approach, externalism, etc.). Ornelas tried to show that none ofthese strategies succeed or dislodge the traditional skeptical challenge, chiefly because they lack asatisfactory diagnosis of the motivations behind the skeptical problematic. Therefore, they fall prey to adouble error: not only do they fail to eradicate the basic motivations behind skepticism, but also they pay noattention to the fact that the traditional skeptical problematic emerges only for theories and concepts ofknowledge that do not threaten ordinary knowledge attributions.

Fallibilism and skepticism were the topics of some papers written by Guillermo Hurtado (Mexico). Hurtado(2002a) holds that, although these two positions are closely related, one must keep them apart; he rejectsfallibilism because it is revisionist. Not much later, he argues in favor of using more fine-grained epistemicterms. According to Hurtado (2005), one should distinguish various senses of “doubt”, introduce the notionof “suspicion”, and accept various degrees of certainty. His basic idea is to enrich the vocabulary of



epistemology, including more sophisticated skeptical terms.

Many, of course, reject the skeptical position. Paulo Francisco Estrella Faria (Brazil) (2007, 2012), forinstance, argued against skepticism. In fact, he thinks, skepticism is committed to a kind of idealism, even inthe case of Porchat and despite his explicit rejection of this philosophical view. According to Faria, anyassertion implies a claim to absolute truth and, if skeptics assert anything, as they do in ordinary life, thenthey are committed to what they would rather avoid. The skeptic view of language is, therefore, untenable,and there is a type of pragmatic contradiction in the skeptic’s position. That criticism has been endorsed byRoberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (Brazil) (2003, 2015).

The works of Eleonora Cresto (Argentina) and Alejandro Miroli (Argentina) also distance themselves fromthe skeptical position. Cresto (1996, 1997) focused on anti-skeptical strategies that arise from naturalisticpositions, whether along Wittgensteinian lines or following F. Dretske and other reliabilists. Miroli (2007,2008, 2010), in turn, dealt with scientific skepticism, addressing both general cases and socially importantones. He also examined Dretske’s relevant alternatives argument, and tried to determine which kinds ofalternatives one should exclude and which one can neglect in knowledge attributions.

Several additional epistemological strategies were put under close scrutiny by Latin Americanepistemologists. Here are a few of them. Diana Hoyos (Colombia) (2006) works on contemporary theory ofknowledge, linking the concepts of epistemic responsibility, Gettier examples and skepticism. Jorge GregorioPosada (Colombia) (2007) has responded to her work. Ignacio Ávila (Colombia) (2003) confronts Davidson’sthesis that most of our beliefs are true with the corresponding skeptical challenge. Another popular anti-skeptical strategy is contextualism. Flávio Williges (Brazil) devoted his Ph.D. dissertation to that subject,from which resulted a paper (Williges 2013), and André Joffily Abath (Brazil) (2012) uses contextualism torefute Cartesian skepticism.

Among the anti-skeptical strategies, the one that invokes transcendental considerations deserves specialmention. A group of philosophers in Mexico is the most distinguished one concerning this Kantian-Strawsonian-inspired answer to skepticism. Pedro Stepanenko (Mexico) explored the anti-skeptical potentialof the Kantian concept of the synthetic unity of apperception in many papers (2001, 2002a, 2006, 2007,2008). According to his interpretation, this unity should be considered as the unity of our mental states that ispossible only through the inferential relations to their contents. This unity makes possible the self-consciousness that any argumentative practice requires. If we could suspend judgment with respect to anysubject, we would renounce to establish inferential relations among the contents of our mental states; in thatcase, there would be no consciousness unity, nor knowledge of our mental states.

In that same Kantian group, the works of Efraín Lazos (México) are outstanding. Lazos (2002, 2014) wasable to combine Kantian and Wittgensteinian anti-skepticism to produce new perspectives on the skepticalchallenge. More recently, Lazos appealed to a transcendental strategy based on the works of Barry Stroud toshow the anti-skeptical force of transcendental arguments. Isabel Cabrera (Mexico) (1999) edited a book ontranscendental arguments, in which the force and limits of such arguments as tools against skepticism areassessed. Cabrera (2002) also worked out the relations between Buddhism and skepticism. In particular, sheshowed that both in Buddhism and in Humean skepticism there is an attack on the notion of substance, andthat the lack of commitment to substances in one’s understanding of the world has a therapeutic function,namely, to avoid suffering.

The so-called Agrippan trilemma is an important argument for contemporary skepticism. Some LatinAmerican philosophers have tried to answer this deep, difficult skeptical challenge. José de Teresa (Mexico)



(2000, 2013, 2014) developed an anti-skeptical strategy inspired in Plato’s dialectic. According to de Teresa,Plato’s strategy is effective against the trilemma presented by the skeptic, because it escapes the threealternatives under consideration.

Among the Agrippan modes, however, the most important for Latin American skepticism seems to bediaphonía or disagreement. We saw how important it is to Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism (1969, 1991, 1993).Some efforts have recently been made to compare the skeptical, Agrippan mode of diaphonía tocontemporary reflections on disagreement. Of particular importance is Diego Machuca’s (Argentina) (2013a)idea that diaphonía is different from disagreement. Machuca accuses contemporary epistemologists whodefend that disagreement leads to suspension of judgment of dogmatism. According to Machuca, they basetheir arguments on dogmatist principles to reach suspension of judgment. It also deserves to be noted OtávioBueno’s (Brazil) defense of diaphonía from recent attacks, such as Barnes’ criticism (Bueno 2013). Buenooffers an interpretation of diaphonía free from the problems that arise from faulty interpretations. Perhapsthis is another topic in which one may discover some original contributions from Latin American skepticism.There has also been some efforts to extend the mode of disagreement in contemporary skepticism into logicalmatters (Barrio 2015), as well as some discussion concerning evaluative judgments and the notion of relativetruth (Orlando 2014).

7. History of modern skepticismThe history of skepticism has also attracted the attention of many scholars throughout Latin America. As inmost places, historical investigation tended to concentrate in the modern period, mostly on Cartesian andHumean skepticism, though many other authors, such as Montaigne, Bacon, Bayle, and Kant, were also onthe spot. Although Brazilian scholarship has perhaps made more contributions, one should not neglect thehuge and widespread interest in modern skepticism throughout Latin America.

The most important work on the history of skepticism is arguably that of José Raimundo Maia Neto (Brazil),who worked with Popkin. Maia Neto got interested in skepticism through his contact with Danilo Marcondesand, some time later, with Porchat’s works. His main contribution is that Academic skepticism played a moreimportant role in modern skepticism than Popkin’s interpretation recognizes (Maia Neto 1997a, 2005, 2013a).According to Maia Neto, Popkin emphasized the importance of Pyrrhonism for modern philosophy, butneglected the fact that Academic skepticism was also widely known and used by many philosophers. In orderto defend this interpretation, Maia Neto wrote a number of papers on philosophers like Montaigne (MaiaNeto 2004, 2012), Pierre Charron (Maia Neto 2014), Descartes (Maia Neto 2001), Gassendi (Maia Neto1997b) and Pierre-Daniel Huet (Maia Neto 2008a,b). In fact, he explored the whole modern skepticism fromMontaigne onwards, with important texts on Pascal (Maia Neto 1995), Bayle (Maia Neto 1996), and Hume(Maia Neto 1991).

Another important contribution is that of Luiz Antonio Alves Eva (Brazil), who has studied in great detailMontaigne’s Essays, publishing two books (2004, 2007b) and a number of papers in Brazil and elsewhere(2001a, 2012, 2013a). Still in Brazil, Renato Lessa (Brazil) (1995, 2003) has done some work onMontaigne’s political skepticism, showing that skeptics, by acknowledging the role of habit, would be realistsin politics. Smith (2012a), criticizing Eva’s interpretation, who insists on the affinities between Montaigneand ancient skeptics, tries to uncover more differences. In Argentina, there has also been some work onMontaigne’s skepticism. In addition to Fernando Bahr (Argentina), to whom we shall return, Soledad Croce(Argentina) (2006, 2007), for instance, has published many papers on what she takes as the practicalskepticism of Montaigne.



Luiz Eva (Brazil) (2006, 2008, 2011) also focused on the relations between Francis Bacon and skepticism. Heproposed some careful interpretations of the Theory of the Idols and skeptical arguments stemming fromancient Pyrrhonism and from Montaigne and Sanchez. He showed not only the skeptical origins of mostBaconian idols, but also how their structure changed the skeptical Modes, thereby revealing what is properlynew in Bacon. Silvia Manzo (Argentina) (2009) wrote on the same subject, holding a balanced view, in whichthere is a double attitude in light of the skeptical threat. More recently, she returned to that topic (Manzoforthcoming), providing a reconstruction of Francis Bacon’s reception of Academic skepticism. She dealswith the assessment of ancient skepticism throughout Bacon’s writings and argues that he, on the one hand,approved of the state of doubt and the suspension of judgment and, on the other hand, rejected the notion ofacatalepsia. Plínio Junqueira Smith (Brazil) (2012b), referring to both scholars, showed that Bacon’s mainfocus is on the propositions “nothing is known” and “nothing can be known”, to which he devoted carefulattention. According to him, Bacon used skeptical weapons to reject the whole traditional philosophy(including skepticism), not only to criticize dogmatism, thereby distancing himself from it.

Danilo Marcondes (Brazil) (2009, 2012) has been doing original, important research on the ancient Modesand the discovery of the New World. This discovery offered not only many more examples of the same kindof diversity Europeans were familiar with, but also of a different, more radical kind, strengthening the forceof the skeptical Modes. That is a vast and rich literature not yet explored by scholars on the history ofskepticism.

As expected, Cartesian skepticism is one of the main objects of study. In almost every country we findscholars trying to understand its sources, the nature of its arguments, their force and persuasiveness. Onedecisive contribution, already noted above, is that of Porchat, who credited Descartes’s methodological use ofskepticism a special place in the philosophy. In Porchat’s view of the 1980s (Porchat 1985, 1986), there was astrong affinity between ancient skepticism and Cartesian doubt, so that one could speak properly of a skeptic-Cartesian model. The problem of the external world became, thereby, a crucial issue for those concerned withskepticism, because it was thought of as a skeptical problem. Following his lead, many other philosophers inBrazil, like Paulo Francisco Estrella Faria (2007), Luiz Eva (2001b, 2013b), Alexandre Noronha Machado(2007a), Flávio Williges (2007), among others, wrote papers on the topic.

In Mexico, concern with Cartesian skepticism was once the dominant focus of research on skepticism. Onereason for this predominance is the connection between the group of Laura Benítez (Mexico) and JoséAntonio Robles (Mexico) with Ezequiel de Olaso and Richard Popkin. This group was strongly orientedtoward the work of Descartes and modern science. Consequently, Cartesian skepticism or methodologicalskepticism was an important subject to them. Many members of the group shared, perhaps implicitly, thebelief that the Cartesian anti-skeptical strategy was successful to avoid disastrous skeptical consequences.Benítez (1987), for instance, has devoted many of her works to Cartesian studies, and explored the positivemethodological aspects of Cartesian skepticism to reach plain certainty, as well as the relevance of skepticismfor discussions concerning the nature of human knowledge.

Something similar can be said about the situation in Colombia, where Jean Paul Margot (2003) and AdolfoLeón Gómez (2002) gave a lot of attention to Cartesian skepticism. Also very important are the contributionsof Mauricio Zuluaga, who has examined contemporary interpretations of Cartesian skepticism, especiallythose based on the closure principle (Zuluaga 2012), the Agrippan Trilemma (Zuluaga 2005) and the relationsbetween Pyrrhonism and Cartesian skepticism (Zuluaga 2014). Zuluaga published an important book thatemerged from his Ph.D. dissertation (Zuluaga 2007) and, with Margot, edited a collection (Margot andZuluaga 2012), in which one finds many papers on modern skepticism, including on Montaigne, featuringscholars from Colombia and elsewhere.



In Peru we also find some interest in the relation between Descartes and skepticism. Jorge Secada (2000) hasdone work on Descartes and Suarez, but focused on Descartes with regard to skepticism. Humberto Quispe(1996) has also done research on this topic, mainly under the influence of Jorge Secada.

French skepticism of the 17th century was given some attention, although not as much as one would like.Besides the already noted contribution by José Raimundo Maia Neto (Brazil), the works of Flávio FontenelleLoque (Brazil) (2012) and Fernando Bahr (Argentina) deserve to be highlighted. Loque’s book is on therelation between skepticism and religion, more specifically on the very notion of a Christian skepticism. Hedevoted attention not only to Montaigne and Pierre Charron, but also to François de la Mothe Le Vayer. Bahr(1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2010) focused mainly on Pierre Bayle, whose skeptical arguments touchon three main points: the problem of evil, the foundations of religious belief and civil tolerance. These topicsled Bahr to study both the 18th century, where he examines the influence of Bayle on Hume (that was thetopic of his Ph.D.), and to the first half of the 17th century, where he focused his attention on the relationbetween La Mothe Le Vayer and Descartes. Plinio Junqueira Smith (2013) shows the importance of theskeptical method both in Bayle's historical work and in his philosophical thinking. Sébastien Charles(Québec, Canada) (forthcoming a,b) has also been working recently on some French skeptics, namely SimonFoucher and Pierre-Daniel Huet. His historical research follows the current trend of erudition, discoveringand exploring less known figures, but who were very important at their time.

Berkeley’s reaction to skepticism or his alleged skepticism did not go unnoticed, despite not having receivedenough attention. One exception is José Antonio Robles (Mexico). Robles (1996) shows that the Berkeleyanskeptical thesis that rejects the existence of a material substance has important consequences, such as therejection of many other subsidiary problems: matter’s indivisibility and the idea of an extended God. JaimirConte (Brazil) (2008) also explored the connections between Berkeley and skepticism in an important paper.Sébastien Charles (Québec, Canada) (2003) wrote a book on the early reception of Berkeley’s immaterialismin France. At that time, Berkeley was considered the greatest skeptic, until Kant pronounced Hume to be evengreater. Charles shows, with plenty of erudition, how this image of Berkeley was created in France.

Not much attention was given to skepticism in the 18th century French materialist philosophy. However,Paulo Jonas de Lima Piva (Brazil) (2007, 2008a,b) has done some work focusing especially on Diderot.Sébastien Charles (Québec, Canada) (2007) called attention to some clandestine skeptical manuscripts as wellas to many less known skeptics of the period, not only in France, but also in Germany. Charles (2012) andRodrigo Brandão (2008) explored the relations between Voltaire and skepticism.

An important contribution to understand Hume’s skepticism was provided by Plínio Junqueira Smith, whopublished a book (1995a) on that topic and many papers (2011a,b). His main idea is that the debate betweenHume’s skepticism and Hume’s naturalism presupposes a false dichotomy. What commentators call Hume’snaturalism is what Hume himself called his skepticism. Moreover, commentators tend to think of skepticismas a mere negative doctrine, not paying enough attention to its positive side. He also devoted much effort toshow how Hume’s mitigated skepticism was connected to ancient skepticism, in both its forms, and tomodern skepticism. One should also note the works of Livia Guimarães (Brazil) (1996, 2008) who hasdevoted her career to the study of Hume’s thought, not only his skepticism, but also many other aspects of thephilosophy of the greatest modern skeptic. Humean scholarship has increased so much in Brazil that it is notpossible to give a fair survey of its status in a limited space.

Interest in Hume’s skepticism is not confined to Brazil. Lisandro Aguirre (Argentina) (2007, 2008, 2010a,b),for instance, has published many papers on Hume. His main point is that Hume follows Pyrrhonism precisely



when he thinks he is avoiding it, i.e., when Hume is saved by nature, he thinks he is not a Pyrrhonian, but infact that would be the hallmark of a Pyrrhonist. Humean skeptical arguments are also studied in Colombia,for instance by Catalina Gonzalez (2010, 2011). Humean skepticism was perhaps what generated Peruvianinterest in modern skepticism. Although Juan Bautista Ferro Porcile (Peru) was mainly concerned with logic,he lectured extensively on modern philosophy, especially in the empiricist tradition and in the Humeanbranch of skepticism, on which he published an influential paper.

The relations between Kant and skepticism attracted much attention in Latin America, most of all in Mexico.We have already seen that a group of philosophers, most notably Pedro Stepanenko (2002a, 2006, 2007),Efraín Lazos (2014), Isabel Cabrera (1999), and Jorge Ornelas (2005), combined historical scholarship withsystematic worries, producing a number of publications on transcendental arguments and skepticism,discussing the works of Wittgenstein, P.F. Strawson and Barry Stroud, among others, from a Kantian point ofview. Stepanenko, in particular, was more historically orientated. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (2003) andMarco Franciotti (1994, 1995), in Brazil, follows a similar path. In Colombia, Alejandro Rosas (Colombia)(1990) opened up this field of research with an influential paper. Following this path, Catalina González(Colombia) (2010) developed a historical study of the relations between Kant and his ancient skepticalsources.

More recently, still in Mexico, Ornelas (2014a, 2015) developed an interpretation of Kantian anti-skepticism,according to which the “Refutation of Idealism” is not relevant, as is commonly assumed, but the “FourthParalogism” is. Plínio Junqueira Smith (2008a) holds a similar view, while at the same time offering a widerinterpretation. According to Smith, Kant responded to three different kinds of modern skepticism: Cartesianskepticism concerning the external world (which Kant came to recognize, in the second edition of theCritique of Pure Reason, as an idealist problem, not a skeptical one); Baylean skepticism and the antinomies,and Humean skepticism on the objective validity of the categories.

Luis Eduardo Hoyos (Colombia) (2001) has already published his important book El escepticismo y lafilosofía trascendental in which he assesses the argumentative potential of the transcendental argumentagainst Humean skepticism as received in the philosophical German scene of the 18th century. Hoyos worksmotivated a number of Colombian philosophers to devote their attention to the subject and the period. IgnacioÁvila (Colombia) (1996) explored this same vein, while Carlos Patarroyo (Colombia) sides with the Kantianposition against Humean skepticism. Catalina González (Colombia) (2011) worked out the distinctionbetween Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonism in Kant.

As many scholars have perceived the fundamental importance of Kant to modern skepticism (and vice versa),it should not come as a surprise that many others also perceived what is now called post-Kantian skepticism.Perhaps the first important study on the topic is that of Luis Eduardo Hoyos (Colombia) (1995), when hepublishes his Ph.D. dissertation, followed by two papers (Hoyos 1998, 1999), to which Raúl Meléndez(Colombia) (2000) replied. Interest in post-Kantian skepticism is spreading around. Eduardo Brandão (Brazil)(2013) devotes his attention to skepticism in philosophers such as G.E. Schulze, Arthur Schopenhauer, andFichte. Ricardo Cattaneo (Argentina) (2009, 2010) focuses both on discussions on skepticism in Kantian andpost-Kantian philosophy (Jacobi, Schulze) and on the interpretation and assimilation of skepticism in Hegeland German Idealism. Luiz Fernando Barrère Martin (Brazil) (2007a,b, 2011) has written his Ph.D.dissertation and published some papers on Hegel and skepticism.

Sergio Sánchez (Argentina) is an important reference for studies concerning skepticism in the 19th and 20th

century. Sánchez (2010) focused on the presence of skepticism in Nietzsche, especially the influence of



Sextus and Cicero. In his papers, one important topic is that of Nietzsche’s analysis of belief and its relationto skepticism. In connection with Nietzsche, Kathia Hanza (Peru) (2011) has explored different sides ofskepticism. The works of Rogério Lopes (Brazil) (2006, 2012) on Nietzsche and skepticism, very similar inspirit to those of Sánchez and Hanza, also deserve to be mentioned.

8. History of ancient skepticismAncient skepticism has also attracted a lot of attention, though, like in almost all places, it has received lessattention than modern skepticism. Roberto Bolzani Filho (Brazil) published a book (Bolzani 2013) and anumber of papers on the topic (Bolzani 1990, 1998, 2000, 2005a). His book on Academic skepticism andPyrrhonism is very carefully written, well informed, and presents a detailed account of the relationshipbetween these two forms of ancient skepticism. Vitor Hirschbruch Schvartz (2012) defends a rusticinterpretation of Sextus Empiricus. Recent scholarship is improving, as is shown by the works of RodrigoPinto de Brito (Brazil) (2014) on Sextus.

More recently, studies on ancient skepticism grew thanks to the works of Diego Machuca (Argentina)(2006a,b, 2009, 2013a). His Ph.D. dissertation was on Sextus’ ethics. Afterwards, he has published manypapers and reviews, as well as organized events. He has also edited a number of important collections on thehistory of skepticism (2011a,b, 2013b). It is fair to say that no one gave more impulse to improve LatinAmerican scholarship on ancient skepticism than he did. With Duncan Pritchard, Machuca is the editor of theInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Thus, both for his personal papers and books and for hisinvolvement in organizing research, Machuca is a leading figure in ancient skepticism.

Colombia has also given its contribution to the field. In Cuadernos de Filosofía y Letras, we find not only thefirst book of the Esbozos Pirrónicos of Sextus Empiricus translated by the philologist and Hellenist JorgePáramo (1989), but also many papers by scholars such as Popkin, Giorgio Tonelli, Porchat and Olaso,together with an examination of the importance of philosophical skepticism by Carlos B. Gutiérrez(Colombia) (1989). In Mexico, Ornelas (Mexico) (2013, 2014b) read Sextus’ works carefully, and foundtheoretical resources that can help with the engagement with contemporary epistemological issues.

Studies on the history of skepticism before the modern period are not restricted to Pyrrhonism and Academicskepticism. It should not go unmentioned Maurício Pagotto Marsola’s paper (Brazil) (2007) on Plotinus andskepticism, for this is a very unexpected aspect of Plotinus’ philosophy. In connection to the origins ofMedieval Philosophy, and especially Augustine and Descartes, Luis Bacigalupo (Peru) (1999) has also donesome research. Rodrigo Pinto de Brito (Brazil) (2015) has been working on the impact of skepticism inChristian thought.

One should also pay attention to Mauricio Beuchot (Mexico) (1996, 2003) who devoted two papers toskepticism in the Middle Age. His point is that skepticism attracted some attention even before Renaissance.According to him, many medieval authors developed skeptical positions. Among them, Augustine’s PlatonicChristianity appealed to Academic skepticism in its theory of illumination, in which Augustine emphasizedthe fallibility of human knowledge; Averroes’ theory of double truth, according to which there are two kindsof truth (truths for science and truths for faith) similarly has a skeptical tone, and those who thought that Godcould perhaps fool us were considering skeptical argument (Ockham, Pedro Lombardo, Tomás de Aquinoand Buenaventura, among others). Beuchot also remembers that Nicolás d’Autrecourt, a French monk (1300–1350 approximately), active in the University of Paris, anticipated Humean skepticism concerning causality.



9. Skepticism and literaturePerhaps it should also be mentioned some other studies on the history of skepticism. On the one hand, thereare some literary studies. Machado de Assis, one of the best Brazilian writers, has been seen as a skeptic bymany people. One reason is that Machado read and used extensively Montaigne’s skepticism. José Raimundode Maia Neto (1994) published a book on the topic. The novelty of his book is that it was the first discussionon Machado’s skepticism based on the history of skepticism. Paulo Roberto Margutti Pinto (2007) andGustavo Bernardo Krause (2007a) discussed Maia Neto’s interpretation, and Maia Neto replied to them.Krause is a Brazilian novelist as well as a professor of literature who published many books and papers onskepticism and literature (Krause 2004), on Machado (Krause 2006) and other writers such as the well-knownBrazilian poet Carlos Drummond de Andrade (Krause 2007b). On the other hand, Paulo Roberto MarguttiPinto has been studying the history of Brazilian philosophy, in which he sees an important role for skepticismlong before Porchat brought it to center stage. In Pinto 2010, he argues for the influence of Francisco Sancheson Brazilian colonial thought. One of the reasons for Porchat’s success is that it seems that Brazilian thoughthas always had, at least in some places, a tendency towards skepticism. Machado de Assis would not be anexception.

Bibliography

Multiply Cited Edited Collections

[TFM] Bahr, Fernando (ed.), 2010, Tradición clásica y Filosofía Moderna: el juego de las influencias,Santa Fe, Universidad Nacional del Litoral.

[LCM] Beltrán, Julio, and Carlos Pereda (eds.), 2002, La certeza, un mito? Mexico: Universidad NacionalAutónoma de México.

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Related EntriesBacon, Francis | Bayle, Pierre | contextualism, epistemic | Descartes, René | Hume, David | Kant, Immanuel |Montaigne, Michel de | Pascal, Blaise | rationalism vs. empiricism | Sextus Empiricus | skepticism: ancient |skepticism: and content externalism | transcendental arguments | Wittgenstein, Ludwig

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Fernando Bahr (Argentina), José Tomás Alvarado (Chile), Mauricio Zuluaga (Colombia),Jorge Ornelas (Mexico), Pablo Quintanilla (Peru), and Carlos Caorsi (Uruguay) for their feedback on thisentry. We also would like to thank Edward N. Zalta for his help in correcting and improving this entry.

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