Sixth Review Conference of the Sixth Review Conference of the

Biological and Toxin Weapons Biological and Toxin Weapons

ConventionConvention

Preparations and ExpectationsPreparations and Expectations

Presentation to the UNGA First Committee

Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, President-Designate of the

Review Conference

New York; October 11, 2006

The BWC: urgent need for commitment

• The Biological Weapons Convention is as relevant today as it was 30 years ago. “Developments in the life sciences in the years ahead will no doubt bring remarkable benefits, but they also carry with them, as an almost inevitable corollary, considerable dangers. There has never been more urgent need for international commitment to the universal application [of] and full compliance with the Convention.”

Secretary General Kofi Annan, December 5, 2005

• “Nuclear, biological and chemical arms are the most inhumane of all weapons. Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they can, in the hands of either states or non-state actors, cause destruction on a vastly greater scale than any conventional weapons, and their impact is far more indiscriminate and long-lasting.” -Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report, June1, 2006.

A Global Norm

• The BWC has had marked success in defining a clear and unambiguous global norm, completely prohibiting the acquisition and use of biological and toxin weapons under any circumstances

• The preamble to the Convention so forcefully states: the use of disease as a weapon would be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind”

• It captures the solemn undertaking of the states parties “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” such weapons.

• With 155 states parties, the treaty is not universal, but no country dares argue that biological weapons can ever have a legitimate role in national defence. Such is the force of the treaty.

A Network

• The BWC is a fundamental pillar, along with the NPT and CWC, of the global regime against weapons of mass destruction.

• It is also part of a network of measures that deal - directly and indirectly - with the prevention of and response to biological weapons.

• Other parts of this network include: WHO, FAO and OIE, Interpol, UNESCO Security Council Resolution 1540, the international scientific organisations, and the various UN agencies involved with emergency response. The growth of this network supports both the security and development objectives of the Convention

• Coordination becoming ever more important.

• The UN Secretary-General in his recent report Uniting Against Terrorism, suggests creation of a forum to coordinate these activities.

• The Review Conference will be, in effect, just such a forum, andwe should use it as such.

Transcend the past

Move to the future

• The Convention experienced disappointments, due largely to difference of opinion on how to strengthen and improve its effectiveness.

• Changes in the international security environment since 2001, especially the focus on the threat of bioterrorism, have added urgency to our task.

• The Review Conference should build on the success of the Convention, find ways to overcome problems and convert divergences into convergences.

• Common objectives: strengthen the barriers against biological weapons; reduce the risk of bioterrorism; ensure that the vitally important peaceful applications of biological science and technology are safely and securely developed to their full potential, for the benefit of people around the world.

A Good Start

• We have provisional agenda in our hands, thanks

to the maturity and wisdom of states parties!

• An agenda that is flexible enough to ensure a

thorough review of all aspects of the Convention.

• At the Preparatory Committee in April, we met all

the objectives we had set ourselves.

• We settled the necessary procedural machinery

Not science fiction

• The use of disease as a weapon is not just a subject matter for science fiction

• A real, potent threat. Bioweapons have struck or stalked us since ancient times.

• Designed for military use or terrorist attacks, biological weapons kill or injure human beings, animals and plants. In their impact, as deadly as nuclear weapons, and even deadlier.

• They hit and disable combatants and civilians alike.

• They do not distinguish between friend and foe.

• Their vicious fury strikes massively and indiscriminately and the death caused by them is gruesome.

What does the BWC say?

The Preamble: The use of biological agents and toxin weapons is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”.

Article I: Never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons.

Article II: To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biologicalweapons and associated resources prior to joining.

Article III: Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire or retain biological weapons.

Article IV: To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC domestically.

What does the BWC say?

•Article V: To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the implementation of the BWC.

Article VI: To request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC and to comply with its subsequent decisions.

Article VII: To assist States which have been exposed to a danger as a result of a violation of the BWC.

Article X: To do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology

FOUR CHALLENGES

One, universal adherence to the Convention.

Two, the threat of terrorists or non-state actors gaining access to biological weapons.

Three, the immense potential of the life sciences – particularly in the fields of genetic engineering and synthetic biology– will enhance the lethality and range of biological weapons.

Four, the need to strengthen compliance with the Convention.

• Universalize the Convention, which at the moment has 155 States Parties and 16 signatories. There are 23 states which have neither signed nor ratified.

• Before 2011, we should work towards universal adherence. The Sixth Review Conference should be a starting point for this effort.

• The EU has already committed resources.

AdherenceAdherence

BIOTERRORISM

Indeed, the Convention (BWC) does need strengthening and I hope that progress is made at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference. Nevertheless, we need additional measures to address the problem of non-State actors” – Secretary General Kofi Annan, Uniting Against Terrorism

UN Secretary General’s prescription:

Dissuasion: dissuading people from resorting to terrorism

Denial: denying terrorists the opportunity to carry out an attack.

Deterrence: deterring states from supporting terrorism.

Development: developing state capacity to defeat terrorism.

Defense: defending human rights.

Forum: a forum that will bring together all stakeholders – governments, industry, science, public health, security.

Bioterrorism

• BW: “The poor man’s nuclear weapon”. Requisite know-how/ technology is not as complex, elaborate or as sophisticated as the one for nuclear weapons.

• Intelligence reports: terrorists groups are seeking the capability to carry out attacks using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.

• Fight bioterrorism with full force and refined skill. Preventative measures therefore are in order.

• Our present preoccupation with bioterrorism, however, should not blind us to the deficits in the capacity of states parties’ to identify pathogens and to combat outbreak of disease in real time.

Life scientists have to become more aware of how their work can impinge on the BWC’s legal and ethical norms against bioweapons.New vaccines, for instance to cure Alzheimer’s , can be used forharmful purposes.

Scientists are increasingly getting used to the idea of inviting enhanced scrutiny and peer observation. But this responsibility does not stop at the door of scientists. Governments and other relevant agencies should always be in a position to (a) monitor scientific advances that may lead to the production of bioweapons that are resistant to known medicines and (b) develop effective measures against them.

Beyond classical bio-warfare agents – anthrax, plague and smallpox, creation and use of new hostile agents pose a potential threat. For example, lethality of mouse pox discovered through recombinant DNA splicing.

“… biotechnology may be used for the creation and /or production of enhanced biological warfare agents and toxins”. – Catherine Rhodes, University of Bradford, 2005.

New Scientific DevelopmentsNew Scientific Developments

Intersessional Process

• The meetings took up the following subjects: national implementation; security and oversight of pathogens; capabilities for responding to and insevtigating alleged use of BW; mechanisms for disease surveillance and response; codes of conduct for scientists;

• Lessons:

• Discussions that are not expected to lead to binding commitments are more collegial, cooperative, and constructive. States parties and all other actors learn more.

• They raise awareness

• Less polemical

• They keep the focus on the BWC and make it responsive to cotemporary developments.

• Such discussions serve as building blocks that states parties can use for possible agreements when they are ready to do.

• They also work as catalysts for agreements

• Growing sense among states that the Sixth Review Conference should decide on an intersessional calendar from 2007 to 2010

C mpliance

• Hinges on intent.

• Strong national legislation and administrative measures are critical to a coordinated and coherent implementation of the Convention.

• Precautions should be taken to ensure that research in bio-defense programmes has

• a defensive orientation;

• it is amenable to scientific oversight;

• and it conforms to the BWC.

Biosecurity

• Not just physical security, but risk awareness, denial of know-how, technology, dangerous and dual-use pathogens of access to criminals, terrorists, and biowarriors

• Preparedness and Response, at the national, regional and international levels, in the event of biosafety and biosecurity crises

• Disease surveillance is the key to threat reduction activities. This should also include destroying bioweapon equipment

• Measures aimed at biosecurity are an imperative, not a matter of choice.

A concise outcome document

• It should be concise and accessible.

• We need to record our understandings and commitments in a way that communicates them clearly to the media, the scientific community, industry, and the general public.

• This is important for ensuring that the struggle against biological weapons is a shared effort, across governments, commerce and civil society.

• It is also important for promoting and developing the peaceful applications of biological science and technology.

Capture core elements

• It will be important to recapture and reaffirm, very briefly, core elements of the Convention and previous understandings reached by States Parties.

• Because of the phenomenal advances in the life sciences, it will be both prudent and desirable to state that the Convention applies to all relevant scientific and technological developments.

• It would also be useful to recall the understanding that the Convention implicitly prohibits the use of biological weapons.

Article X

Our security measures should not impede

but enable and support the peaceful

applications of biological science and

technology for human development through

cooperation and exchanges.

Review: what was done in the past

three years

• The outcome will need to deal with our deliberations and agreements on a number of specific topics passed to us by the Fifth Review Conference, as well as on the various fresh proposals put forward by States Parties, of course subject to consensus.

• The topics passed to us from the Fifth Review Conference were: national implementation; security and oversight of pathogens; capabilities for responding to and investigating alleged use of BW; mechanisms for disease surveillance and response; codes of conduct for scientists. Various proposals for further action on these topics have already been made, and I'm sure more will be forthcoming.

Crucible of Common Interest

• Common themes are already emerging,

• I have heard delegations express interest in proposals relating to the following areas:• An intersessional calendar of meetings and activities on agreed topics for 2007-2010.

• Confidence-building Measures (CBMs).

• Universalisation of the Convention.

• New scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Crucible of Common Interest

• Scientific and technological cooperation and exchanges.

• Bioterrorism

• Compliance and verification.

• Coordination with other organizations and activities (such as WHO, SCR 1540, Interpol, FAO, OIE, ICRC, etc).

• Implementation support arrangements for the Convention, inter alia, to run a new intersessional process.

The subjects listed above are indicative. The States Parties will decide what areas they want to focus on.

The list is very long. States Parties should achieve something more focused, tangible and doable.

A two pronged approach

• We will have an article-by-article review of the Convention, and the many issues which fall naturally under one or other of the articles of the Convention can be dealt with in that review.

• We also have the possibility of a more thematic consideration, to deal with those issues that by their very nature cut across several articles of the Convention.

• We retain the flexibility to manage our work as the Conference proceeds.

Capable Bureau

Competent Secretariat

• I am currently developing, in consultation with my colleagues in the Preparatory Committee Bureau and with other delegations, an indicative programme of work for the Conference.

• The Committee of the Whole, under the capable chairmanship of Ambassador Doru Costea of Romania, will devote itself to the article-by-article review.

• As the Committee of the Whole proceeds with this work, I would propose to convene informal working groups, as needed, to address any issues that appear to be more suited to a thematic approach.

• Once the various proposals have been sufficiently developed and refined through these two complementary avenues, I would suggest that we convene the Drafting Committee, under the equally capable chair Mr. Knut Langeland of Norway, to draw the threads together and produce a concise, coherent and cohesive outcome document. Mr. Langeland is ready the needle and the thread.

• We shall not have a sequential but simultaneous approach.

• Lucky to have Mr. Tim Caughley as the Secretary General

• Mr. Richard Lennane, Secretary.

• Mr. Piers Millet

What can States Parties Do?

Prepare concise proposals. Share them Prepare concise proposals. Share them

with others.with others.

Meet within your own groups and with Meet within your own groups and with

other major/ principal interlocutors.other major/ principal interlocutors.

Prepare Ministries for helping out with Prepare Ministries for helping out with

universal adherence and implementationuniversal adherence and implementation

Sensitize top decision makers to the Sensitize top decision makers to the

importance of the BWCimportance of the BWC

Continue dialogue with industry, IOs, Continue dialogue with industry, IOs,

academia, media, NGOs.academia, media, NGOs.

Touch base with other capitals before Touch base with other capitals before

coming to Genevacoming to Geneva

Build good interpersonal chemistryBuild good interpersonal chemistry

Ensure good conference management.Ensure good conference management.

Visit UNOG website on BWCVisit UNOG website on BWC

www.unog.ch/bwcwww.unog.ch/bwc

Be in a good mood. Come to Geneva to Be in a good mood. Come to Geneva to

succeed.succeed.

The Median Point

• The Sixth Review Conference should succeed.

• It should have concrete, tangible results that add value to the BWC and strengthen it as a barrier against BW. Its outcome should be based on consensus, but with added value. We will not use the lowest common denominator as the yardstick for success but the median point that represents common ground.

• At the BWC RevCon we have a strong possibility of bringing the international community to one platform. This event could represent a peak in disarmament diplomacy.

• There is a growing convergence that there should be a solid outcome – to build on the successful engagement of the states parties in the recent past.

• Not talking about divergences but common ground, where the states parties can meet half way.

• Let’s banish “failure”. The word can be self-indoctrinating and self-debilitating. We are putting success on the table and trying to define what it could be.