Six Steps to Understanding and Evaluating Argumentsfasnafan.tripod.com/evaluatingarguments.pdf ·...

CHAPTER TEN

Putting It All Together: SixSteps to Understanding andEvaluating Arguments

The previous nine chapters have presented various techniques for understandingand evaluating arguments. Chapters 2 and 3 concentrated on extracting argu-ments from a text. Chapter 4 outlined the task of evaluating arguments, broadlydescribing the criteria for soundness—validity and truth of premises—and chap-ter 5 focused more specifically on the concept of validity. Chapter 6 consideredhow we might be taken in by fallacious reasoning. Chapters 7 through 9 discussedthe evaluation of specific kinds of premises: definitional premises, empirical gen-eralizations, and theory-based statements, as well as conclusions based on conver-gent arguments. Now we can bring these parts together in a sequence of stepsillustrated by the flowchart in Figure 10.1.

Much of the earlier discussion of particular steps in reconstructing or evalu-ating arguments concentrated on relatively short, stylized passages in which eachsentence played a role as a premise or conclusion.We will now survey the wholesix-step procedure represented on the flowchart and adapt it to understandingand evaluating arguments found in longer passages, such as essays and editorials.

Preliminary step. This step directs you to read the passage in question care-fully. The importance of this step should not be overlooked. One of the firstthings you need to determine is whether a passage does in fact put forth an argu-ment, as opposed to describing, explaining, classifying, and so forth. Consider thecontext of the passage. Make use of hints such as titles or recurring themes.Youcan also initially determine (without fully reconstructing any arguments) whether

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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 341

Figure 10.1 Six steps to understanding and evaluating deductive arguments

Step 1 Identify any explicit

premises or conclusions (see ch. 2, 3)

Preliminary Step Read passage carefully to

identify arguments (see ch. 3)

Accept the conclusion and

endorse the argument (see ch. 4)

Step 6 Reject the argument and

consider why it may have seemed persuasive

(see ch. 6)

Step 2 Identify any implicit

premises or conclusions (see ch. 3)

Step 3 Determine whether the conclusion follows

(see ch. 4, 5)

Step 4 Determine whether

the premises should be accepted (see ch. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9)

Step 5 Determine whether to

give a more charitable interpretation (see ch. 2, 3)

START

STOP

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

YesCritical

Evaluation

Reconstruction

342 CHAPTER TEN

there is one argument or several and how different arguments are related.Youmight need to read a passage carefully several times before you understand it wellenough to identify any arguments it contains and to begin reconstructing them.

Step 1. You should identify any explicit premises or conclusions, but thisdoesn’t mean copying sentences out of a passage exactly as they are written. Morelikely, you will paraphrase or restate assertions made by the passage. In actual prac-tice, the distinction between identifying explicit and implicit premises is not assharp as in the stylized passages we dealt with, where whole sentences could becopied as premises. But even if no premises can be copied word for word fromthe passage, some premises might be strongly suggested and easily paraphrasedfrom what is actually written.This will allow you to begin your reconstruction.

Step 2. We pointed out in chapter 3 that the step of identifying implicitpremises typically amounts to adding any premises that are needed to make theconclusion follow (insofar as this can be done without radically distorting themeaning of the passage being interpreted).Adding an implicit conclusion consistsof adding a conclusion that would follow from the interpreted premises, if the con-clusion is not already stated in the passage.This will lead to a full reconstruction.

Step 3. Given what we just said about step 2, determining whether the con-clusion follows will often be carried out in the process of adding implicitpremises or an implicit conclusion.The premises and conclusion of the argumentmight have been stated so explicitly, however, that step 2 is unnecessary, and anegative answer to the question in step 3 (Does the conclusion follow?) might beunavoidable. Or (as happens more frequently), the argument might contain anunclear expression that occurs more than once. If so, you will probably make sev-eral quick loops through steps 3, 4, and 5, and back through 1 and 2, to deter-mine whether a single meaning that makes all the premises acceptable can beassigned to this expression (see chapter 7).

Step 4. Determining whether the premises should be accepted or rejectedwas discussed in general in chapter 4. More detailed techniques for evaluatingadditional kinds of premises—particularly definitional premises and empiricalgeneralizations—as well as convergent arguments and scientific theories wereinvestigated in chapters 7, 8, and 9. If you decide that the premises should beaccepted, then you are done with your evaluation. If you decide to reject theargument, you move to a reassessment stage at step 5.What do you do if you canneither clearly accept nor reject the argument? You have two options again.Youmight move to step 5 and try another interpretation, or, especially if you havetried various interpretations, you might quit and decide to remain uncommittedto the conclusion until a better argument is given.

Step 5. If you find that the conclusion of an argument does not follow or thepremises are unacceptable, the flowchart directs you to consider giving a morecharitable interpretation of the argument.This procedure is in keeping with therationale for critical reasoning that has been promoted throughout this book:being presented with an argument should be taken as an opportunity to deter-

343PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

mine what is reasonable to believe, not as a contest in which the object is todefeat the person who has presented the argument.

If an argument can be interpreted in such a way that the conclusion followsand the premises are acceptable, then the flowchart calls for the conclusion to beaccepted. If, on the other hand, there is no reasonable way of interpreting theargument so that it passes these tests, the argument should be rejected.

Step 6. However, if an argument is rejected, the flowchart calls for the addi-tional step of considering why the argument may have seemed persuasive.This isa particularly helpful step in a direct exchange with someone who has offered anargument or with an audience that might have been persuaded by it. It is muchmore likely that you will be able to sell your negative appraisal of the argumentif you can explain why the arguer or audience was tempted to accept it in thefirst place. For this purpose, the discussion of fallacies in chapter 6 should be help-ful, since that analysis was aimed at explaining why people tend to be persuadedby certain kinds of bad arguments. Step 6 can also serve as an occasion to suggestwhat direction might be taken to improve the argument being examined. Oftensome core of reasonableness that the presenter of the argument was not able toadequately express lies behind the argument being offered. Perhaps even thePrinciple of Charitable Interpretation won’t permit the argument to be revisedradically enough to capture this reasonableness. But in applying the six-step pro-cedure you might have developed some ideas about how a different but relatedargument could be constructed that would be acceptable.

A Sample Application of theSix-Step Procedure

It may be helpful to apply the entire six-step procedure to an argument found in anewspaper editorial.The following discussion is much more thorough than wouldbe appropriate to present in, say, a critical essay. It explains the steps you could gothrough in your mind in preparing to write about or discuss the argument.

Suppose you came across the editorial included as passage 10.1 and decidedto consider it carefully to understand it clearly and evaluate its main arguments.How could the six-step procedure be used to carry out this task?

The way you would proceed depends in part on the particular purpose youhad in analyzing the editorial.You might intend to write a reply, discuss the edi-torial with someone interested in the topic of prayer in the public schools, orsimply figure out whether to accept the point of view being advanced by thewriter. For many purposes, the following analysis is probably more detailed thanyou would need to go through, but the steps you would take would be essentiallythe same. An example of a shorter, more tightly organized discussion that couldbe presented in a critical essay is given later in this chapter.

344 CHAPTER TEN

Preliminary Step: Read Passage Carefully to Identify ArgumentsEven though the main points of this editorial are reasonably clear, a careful readingwill lead you to see beyond some surface features that might mislead the casual reader.

Passage 10.1

In Georgia, a teacher ofAmerican government chose apoor way to deal with a lawwith which he disagreed. Hebroke it. He went right onteaching while other members ofthe faculty were observing amoment of silence, as requiredby the new law.

The teacher was suspendedwith pay. He said he planned tosue the school system, saying thesuspension violated his FirstAmendment rights.

Yes, the teacher has everyright to disagree with the law.Reasonable people differ overthe propriety of requiring prayer,moments of silence and similarobservances in public schools.But what a wonderful opportu-nity he had to teach his studentsabout the responsibilities of a cit-izen to obey a disagreeable lawwhile working within the systemto change it.And how thor-oughly he blew that opportunity.

Certainly breaking a law isone way to protest its existence.Civil disobedience has a longhistory in the movements toabolish slavery, win civil rightsand end unpopular wars. Civildisobedience is one way to getthe question before the court. It’salso a way to stir up public sup-port for one’s position.

But if the teaching ofAmerican government is worth-while, it shouldn’t convey theimpression that civil disobedi-ence is the first line of attack.There should be lessons onmajority rule and how it affectsthe making and changing oflaws.The students should lookat the role of political partiesand special interest groups inbuilding a consensus for change.There should be attention tothe option of running for officeor supporting candidates whoare committed to changing thelaw.And finally, young peopleneed to know that they can’talways have their way. Somelaws must be tolerated eventhough a few people might dis-agree with them.

Those approaches may lackthe drama of “taking a stand.”But when a dramatic, attentiongetting gesture is depicted assuperior to working within thesystem and building a consensusa harmful message is delivered.This teacher’s example said it’spermissible to pick and chooseamong the laws obeying or dis-obeying as one sees sees fit. Ifeveryone followed that selfishnotion, the result would bechaos.

1. © 1994 by the Omaha World-Herald. Reprinted by permission.

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A Selfish Way of Looking at the Law1


The first two paragraphs set out the case at issue.A Georgia schoolteacher intention-ally disobeyed a new law requiring a “moment of silence” at the beginning of theschool day, was suspended from teaching, and planned to appeal his suspension onconstitutional grounds.The third paragraph indicates that this case involves freedomof religion, in particular “the propriety of requiring prayer, moments of silence andsimilar observances in public schools.” It is useful but not essential to understandingthe passage to realize that the teacher’s action has taken place against a background ofSupreme Court decisions apparently prohibiting prayer in the public schools. TheGeorgia law could be seen as an attempt to get around these decisions.

Paragraph 3 sets up an opposition between the teacher’s action, which it latercharacterizes as “civil disobedience,” and the alternative of working within thesystem. The final sentence—which says he “blew” the opportunity to workwithin the system—indicates the conclusion of the argument in the editorial: theteacher should have worked within the system to change the law.

Paragraph 4 summarizes some of the reasons why a person might want tocarry out civil disobedience, and paragraph 5 sets out the alternative open to ateacher in criticizing the law without breaking it in an act of civil disobedience.

Finally, paragraph 6 argues that the teacher shouldn’t have committed civildisobedience in this case. It suggests that picking and choosing which laws toobey would result in chaos.

A careful reading leads us to an initial interpretation of the main argumentalong the following lines.The central conclusion is that the teacher should haveworked within the legal system to change the laws. Paragraphs 3 to 5 set out thealternatives and suggest that civil disobedience should not have been carried outin this case.The final paragraph provides a reason for holding that an act of civildisobedience should not have occurred; namely, that such civil disobediencewould result in chaos.

Step 1: Begin Reconstruction by Identifying Any ExplicitPremises or Conclusions in Overall Argument As we discussed inchapter 3, the distinction between explicit and implicit premises and conclusionsis not sharp when you are reconstructing an argument from a complex prose pas-sage. Nowhere in the essay is it explicitly stated that “the teacher should haveworked within the legal system to change the law.” Rather, evaluative commentssuch as “he blew that opportunity” or the title “A Selfish Way of Looking at theLaw” suggest that the editorial is arguing in favor of working within the sys-tem. Even though no “either-or sentence” is given, the two alternatives beingconsidered—civil disobedience and working within the system—are fairly explicitin the text.This suggests the premise

(1) Either the teacher should have committed civil disobedience or he should have worked within the legal system to change the law.

346 CHAPTER TEN

Paragraphs Containing Main Argument 1

Yes, the teacher has every right to disagree with the law.Reasonable people differ over the propriety of requiring prayer,moments of silence and similar observances in public schools. But whata wonderful opportunity he had to teach his students about the respon-sibilities of a citizen to obey a disagreeable law while working withinthe system to change it.And how thoroughly he blew that opportunity.

Certainly breaking a law is one way to protest its existence. . . . Butif the teaching of American government is worthwhile, it shouldn’t con-vey the impression that civil disobedience is the first line of attack.

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Step 2:Complete Reconstruction by Adding an Implicit Premiseto the Main Argument On reviewing the premise as stated above and theconclusion we identified in the preliminary step, we can recognize that we have twoof the three statements needed for a disjunctive argument fitting the pattern:

(i) A or B.

(missing) (ii) Not A.

∴ B.

To interpret the argument in this form, we would need to add as an implicitpremise: The teacher should not have committed civil disobedience.

First Interpretation of Passage 10.1

(suggested by (i) Either the teacher should have committed civil disobedience or paragraphs 3–5) he should have worked within the legal system to change the law.

(ii) The teacher should not have committed civil disobedience.

∴ The teacher should have worked within the legal system to change the law.

Premise (ii) in this reconstruction is itself the conclusion of a supporting argument.

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Paragraph Containing Supporting Argument

But when a dramatic, attention getting gesture is depicted as superiorto working within the system and building a consensus a harmful mes-sage is delivered.This teacher’s example said it’s permissible to pick andchoose among the laws, obeying or disobeying as one sees fit. If every-one followed that selfish notion, the result would be chaos.


Applying Steps 1 and 2 to the Supporting Argument The argu-ment in paragraph 6 supports the conclusion that The teacher should not have com-mitted civil disobedience (which was the implicit premise of the main argument).And we have already identified the explicit premise that if it is permissible for every-one to pick and choose among laws, then chaos would result. Implicit in the argumentis the assumption that chaos shouldn’t occur and a link between the teacher’s civildisobedience and the notion that it is permissible for everyone to pick andchoose among laws.2

Supporting Argument

(implicit) (1) If the teacher should have committed civil disobedience, then it is permissible forhim to pick and choose among laws.

(implicit) (2) If it is permissible for him to pick and choose among laws, then it is permissiblefor everyone to do so.

(paragraph 6) (3) If it is permissible for everyone to do so, then chaos would occur.

(implicit) (4) Chaos shouldn’t occur.

∴ The teacher should not have committed civil disobedience.

Applying Steps 3, 4, and 5 to the Arguments As will often be thecase, we have interpreted these arguments in such a way that the implicit premiseswe add permit the conclusions to follow from the premises. Indeed, we couldhave combined the main and supporting arguments into one continuous argu-ment, as we discussed in chapter 3.

Arguments Combined into One Continuous Argument

(suggested by (1) Either the teacher should have committed civil disobedience or he should have paragraphs 3–5) worked within the legal system to change the law.

(implicit) (2) If the teacher should have committed civil disobedience, then it is permissible forhim to pick and choose among laws.

(implicit) (3) If it is permissible for him to pick and choose among laws, then it is permissiblefor everyone to do so.

2. The argument can be interpreted as an extended version of modus tollens that combines it with achain argument, having the form:

(1) If A, then B.(2) If B, then C.(3) If C, then D.(4) Not D.

∴ Not A.

348 CHAPTER TEN

(paragraph 6) (4) If it is permissible for everyone to do so, then chaos would occur.

(implicit) (5) Chaos shouldn’t occur.


The two fairly explicit premises—1 and 4 in the continuous version of the argu-ment—appear quite acceptable. As premise 4 suggests, if everyone were to pickand choose which laws to follow (for example, which traffic laws), then chaoswould likely follow.And given that the teacher was going to respond to the law,civil disobedience or working within the system appear to be the two alterna-tives, as suggested in premise 1.We should note, however, that a supporter of theGeorgia law would maintain that the teacher had a third course of action open,namely, following the law. Hence, the argument might contain a false dilemmafallacy.

What about the implicit premises? Are they acceptable? Premise 5 is straight-forward. It is easy to agree that social chaos shouldn’t occur. Premise 3 is less easyto assess. But it is plausible to maintain that if the teacher can be permitted topick and choose which laws to obey solely on the basis of his judgment, then itmust be permissible for anyone to do so.3 There is nothing special about this par-ticular teacher.

We are left to assess premise 2: If the teacher should have committed civil disobe-dience, then it is permissible for him to pick and choose among laws.This premise can becriticized by noting that the civil disobedience in this case is limited to a contro-versial law that is of dubious constitutionality. Furthermore, breaking of the lawdoes not do direct, serious harm.We can hold that civil disobedience in such cases(those involving controversial laws of dubious constitutionality in which break-ing of the law does no serious harm) is justified (and permitted) without hold-ing that the teacher (or anyone else) is permitted to break all laws. Laws againstmurder, driving on the wrong side of the road, and even tax evasion do notinvolve controversial laws of dubious constitutionality, and in the case of murderand reckless driving breaking them would likely cause serious harm.

These considerations give us grounds for rejecting premise 2 of the contin-uous version of the argument at step 4 in the flowchart.This leads us to consideraccording to step 5 whether a more charitable interpretation is possible.The titleand choice of words in paragraph 6 suggest another version of the argument:

3. This premise embodies what is sometimes called the Generalization Principle in ethics: roughly, ifit is right for someone to do something in a situation, it is also right for similar people to do simi-lar things in similar situations.


A Second Version of the Argument in Passage 10.1

(suggested by (1) Either the teacher should have committed civil disobedience or he should have paragraphs 3–5) worked within the legal system to change the law.

(implicit) (2) If the teacher should have committed civil disobedience, then it is permissible toact selfishly.

(implicit) (3) It isn’t permissible to act selfishly.


Even if we accept premises 1 and 3 there are problems with premise 2. Exactlywhy is the teacher’s act selfish? Many would hold that he is acting altruisticallyfor what he perceives as a larger constitutional principle. Indeed, his suspensionpresumably caused him some amount of harm. It is true that he did what hewanted to do and believed was right to do. But this is not enough to make theact selfish. If anything, this version of the argument is less charitable than the first.This interpretation fails as well.

A third interpretation, which focuses on the issue of whether civil disobe-dience should be the first line of attack, is also suggested, particularly in para-graph 5. This interpretation of the argument acknowledges that civildisobedience might ultimately be used, but not until a person has exhausted otheravenues. It notes that teachers are especially well positioned to work for changeof a law they believe is bad within the system.

A Third Version of the Argument in Passage 10.1

. (suggested by (1) If a person can work within the system to change a bad law, then that paragraph 5) person should not commit civil disobedience (as the first line of attack).(suggested byparagraph 5) (2) The teacher can work within the system to change a bad law.

∴ The teacher should not commit civil disobedience (as the first line of attack).

As in the case of the first two interpretations, this version of the main argumenthas been constructed so that it is valid. It is an instance of modus ponens. Whatabout the premises?

Premise 2 is certainly plausible.As paragraph 5 indicates, the teacher can worktoward changing the law by teaching students lessons about democracy and abouttheir options in working toward a change of state law within it.We can criticizepremise 1 by pointing out first that even if a person can work toward somethingin a certain way, that doesn’t mean that there is much chance of success using thisroute. If there is another more effective alternative, perhaps this should be carriedout instead. For example, it might be the case that if you win the lottery, you need notlook for a job. It does not follow that if you try to win—that is, play the lottery—youneed not look for a job. So it can be true that you play the lottery, but false that you

350 CHAPTER TEN

need not look for a job. Perhaps you should do both. Similarly, teaching a few stu-dents, even galvanizing them to act, might possibly be instrumental in changingstate law, but like the lottery the prospects are not very good. Just as looking for ajob is a viable alternative to trying to win the lottery, civil disobedience might bea viable alternative to working within the system as a teacher.

Second, even if the teacher could be successful in overturning Georgia statelaw by working within the system, there is the larger question about similar lawsthat might be passed in other states.The teacher is described as interested in theFirst Amendment. He is challenging the constitutionality of the law. If the Georgialaw is overturned by the federal district court or the U.S. Supreme Court, then hisaction would have an effect not just in Georgia but in other states as well.To raisesuch a constitutional issue it is necessary to have standing. By breaking the law, theGeorgia teacher is in a position to appeal its constitutionality. Seen in this light, hisaction is actually necessary to achieving his larger aim. So, the first premise is falseon these grounds as well.Even though he could (successfully) work within the sys-tem to change the Georgia law, given his larger constitutional aim he should alsocommit civil disobedience (as the first line of attack).

Applying Step 6 to the Arguments To conclude the application ofthe flowchart to the three interpretations of the editorial, we should ask why theymight have seemed persuasive. In addition to the false dilemma in premise 1 thatwe mentioned earlier, two premises from interpretation 1 can be seen as com-mitting the slippery slope fallacy:

(3) If it is permissible for him to pick and choose among laws, then it is permissiblefor everyone.

(4) If it is permissible for everyone to do so, then chaos would occur.

These statements suggest that his act of disobedience with respect to a newlypassed law of questionable constitutionality might somehow encourage wide-spread law-breaking, which would then lead to chaos. A single act of civil dis-obedience is unlikely to produce this effect.

The second argument depends on the premises

(2) If the teacher should have committed civil disobedience, then it is permissible toact selfishly.

(3) It isn’t permissible to act selfishly.

They contain an equivocation involving the concept of a selfish act. Premise 3depends on the common interpretation of a selfish act as one that is done to ben-efit oneself at the expense of others. Premise 2 seems to assume that any act thatoccurs for one’s own reasons is selfish.

Similarly, argument 3 might seem plausible because of an equivocation aswell.The term system is used differently in the two premises.


(1) If a person can work within the system to change a bad law, then that personshould not commit civil disobedience (as the first line of attack).

(2) The teacher can work within the system to change a bad law.

In premise 2 the “system” is the system of state laws and the political action thatmight change them. But as we pointed out in our analysis, the truth of premise1 is plausible only if the “system” includes the larger system of laws and their con-stitutional interpretation.

If you are discussing this editorial with someone who accepted the argu-ments it contained, you might be more effective in promoting your negativeappraisal if you helped the person understand how these arguments could havemisled him or her.The discussion above suggests some possibilities.

A Second Sample Application ofthe Six-Step Procedure

A second example, passage 10.2 starting below, will help you understand the six-step procedure better.

Preliminary Step: Read Passage Carefully to Identify ArgumentsThe main points in this second editorial are reasonably clear.Although the begin-ning and ending attempt to defend a political economist for some remarks hemade in a speech, the body develops the writer’s own arguments against the pro-posal of comparable worth and goes beyond assessing whether the economist’sremarks were appropriate.

Passage 10.2

Some people in a largelyfemale audience objected theother day when . . . economistWilliam Niskanen criticized . . .the concept known as “com-parable worth” or “comparablepay.” Niskanen called the idea “a truly crazy proposal.”

Perhaps that wasn’t the mostdiplomatic way Niskanen couldhave selected for disagreeingwith a concept that theNational Organization forWomen, among other groupsand individuals, insists is a mat-ter of justice.

Pitfalls in Comparable Worth4

4. © 1984 by the Omaha World-Herald. Reprinted by permission.

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352 CHAPTER TEN

But he was right to criticizethe idea. . . .There is no goodargument for an employer topay less to women for doing thesame job men do simplybecause they are women.Thatkind of discrimination is wrong.

But that isn’t the issue here.The comparable worth conceptsays men and women in differ-ent occupations should receivethe same wages if their jobs are“comparable.”Advocates of theidea say such a plan is necessaryto address the fact that womenwith full-time jobs are, on theaverage, paid less than men withfull-time jobs.

Who decides what is com-parable? A study by the StateUniversity of New York sug-gested that a registered nursewas comparable in responsibilityand education to a vocationaleducation teacher.Anotherstudy ranked dining-hall direc-tors with auto parts handlersand highway maintenanceworkers with clerk-typists.

Such judgments can dependon criteria that are so arbitrarythat they are almost worthless.Some people might make a casefor the idea that nurses havemore responsibility than voca-tional education teachers andconsequently should be paidmore. Or that dining-hall direc-tors ought to be paid more thanauto parts handlers.

A National Academy ofSciences committee conducteda comparability study based onrequired skills, level of experi-ence, responsibility, effort, work-

ing conditions and other factors.The committee said there areno absolute standards for judg-ing the worth of all jobs.

Such efforts raise questionsof fairness. How much weightshould be given to each of thefactors? How about such diffi-cult-to-measure factors as num-ber of interruptions in anemployee’s working day? Or thedegree of danger involved in thejob?

Even if it were possible todevise a fair system of deter-mining comparability, it wouldnot be a logical basis for deter-mining compensation.

The imposition of a compa-rable pay plan for publicemployees could place a consid-erable burden on taxpayers.Obviously, nobody’s pay wouldbe reduced. Equalizing wouldmean raising.

A comparable worth systemalso could disrupt market forcesthat encourage people to enteroccupations where more workersare needed and discourage peo-ple from entering fields wherethere is a surplus of workers.

When there is a shortage of nurses, employers ought to beable to offer higher nursingsalaries without causing nearbyhigh schools to have to offerhigher salaries for vocationaleducation teachers.

Niskanen might have beenundiplomatic in calling compa-rable worth a “truly crazy pro-posal.” But the term “voodooeconomics” has already beenused.

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Paragraph 4 specifies that it is not the issue of men and women getting the samepay for the same jobs that is being discussed, but rather the issue of whether “menand women . . . should receive the same wages if their jobs are ‘comparable.’”Clearly, the writer is opposed to such a policy.

What does a careful reading lead us to take as the main arguments of thisessay? A major conclusion being supported is that a system of comparable worthshould not be implemented. Paragraphs 5 through 8 give one set of related rea-sons for this conclusion, and paragraphs 10 through 12 give another set of rea-sons.We can interpret these as two arguments with the same conclusion.

Step 1: Begin Reconstruction by Identifying Any ExplicitPremises or Conclusions As we discussed in chapter 3, the distinctionbetween explicit and implicit premises and conclusions is not sharp when you arereconstructing an argument from a complex prose passage. Nowhere in the essayis it explicitly stated that “a system of comparable worth should not be imple-mented.” But the statements that the economist “was right to criticize the idea”(paragraph 3) and “even if it were possible to devise a fair system of determiningcomparability, it would not be a logical basis for determining compensation”(paragraph 9) leave no room for doubt that this is what the writer intends.

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Paragraphs Containing the First Argument in Passage 10.2

Who decides what is comparable? A study by the State Universityof New York suggested that a registered nurse was comparable inresponsibility and education to a vocational education teacher.Anotherstudy ranked dining-hall directors with auto parts handlers and high-way maintenance workers with clerk-typists.

Such judgments can depend on criteria that are so arbitrary thatthey are almost worthless. Some people might make a case for the ideathat nurses have more responsibility than vocational education teachersand consequently should be paid more. Or that dining-hall directorsought to be paid more than auto parts handlers.

A National Academy of Sciences committee conducted a comparabilitystudy based on required skills, level of experience, responsibility, effort,working conditions and other factors.The committee said there are noabsolute standards for judging the worth of all jobs.

Such efforts raise questions of fairness. How much weight should begiven to each of the factors? How about such difficult-to-measure factorsas number of interruptions in an employee’s working day? Or the degreeof danger involved in the job?

Even if it were possible to devise a fair system of determining com-parability, it would not be a logical basis for determining compensation.

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Picking out premises in the first argument (paragraphs 5 through 8) demandsmuch more interpretation. Paragraphs 5 through 7 assert that different peoplewould judge comparable worth differently, that criteria of comparable worthare arbitrary, and that there are no absolute standards of comparable worth.Theway the writer moves from one of these assertions to the next, using the samekind of examples in support of each, would suggest that he takes all three tobe roughly equivalent.When paragraph 8 moves to the claim that the (unsuc-cessful) efforts to judge comparable worth objectively “raise questions of fair-ness,” we are led to take two of the premises of the first argument to be:

(1) There are no objective criteria for determining comparable worth.

(2) If there are no objective criteria for determining comparable worth, then compa-rable worth can’t be determined fairly.

When the writer states in paragraph 9 that “even if it were possible to devise afair system of determining comparable worth, it would not be a logical basis fordetermining compensation,” he seems to suggest that the impossibility of deter-mining comparable worth fairly is one consideration that would establish thatcomparable worth shouldn’t be implemented, and now he is going to set forthanother one. On this interpretation, we assume that the writer has already com-pleted his first argument against comparable worth.

Step 2:Adding an Implicit Premise to the First Argument Onreviewing the premises stated above, we can see that we need an implicit premisein order to reach the intended conclusion.

(1) There are no objective criteria for determining comparable worth.

(2) If there are no objective criteria for determining comparable worth, then compa-rable worth can’t be determined fairly.

(implicit) (3) If comparable worth can’t be determined fairly, then a system of comparableworth should not be implemented.

∴ A system of comparable worth should not be implemented.

Applying Steps 1 and 2 to the Second Argument in Passage10.2 The second argument is more straightforward.The writer raises two con-siderations against implementing comparable worth: (1) such a practice for pub-lic employees would be burdensome to taxpayers (paragraph 10), and (2) it woulddisrupt market forces (paragraph 11).

Argument 1 (suggested by

paragraphs 5-8)


Paragraphs Containing the Second Argument in Passage 10.2

The imposition of a comparable pay plan for public employeescould place a considerable burden on taxpayers. Obviously, nobody’spay would be reduced. Equalizing would mean raising.

A comparable worth system also could disrupt market forces thatencourage people to enter occupations where more workers areneeded and discourage people from entering fields where there is asurplus of workers.

When there is a shortage of nurses, employers ought to be able tooffer higher nursing salaries without causing nearby high schools tohave to offer higher salaries for vocational education teachers.

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11

12

The reasoning for the second consideration is interesting enough to be detailedas part of the argument: under a system of comparable worth, if offering highersalaries were necessary to counteract a shortage of workers in one field, thenhigher salaries would also have to be offered in comparable fields. Combiningthese premises with the obvious implicit premises and keeping the same conclu-sion as in argument 1, we would have:

Argument 2

(paraphrase of (1) A system of comparable worth for public employees would be burdensome paragraph 10) to taxpayers.

(paraphrase of (2) If a system of comparable worth were implemented, then higher salariesparagraph 11) offered to attract workers to one field would have to be matched by higher

salaries in comparable fields.

(implicit) (3) If a policy would be burdensome to taxpayers and would have the consequencesfor the market described in premise 2, then it shouldn’t be implemented.

∴ A system of comparable worth shouldn’t be implemented.

Applying Steps 3, 4, and 5 to the First Argument in Passage10.2 As will often be the case, we have interpreted these arguments in such away that the implicit premises we add permit the conclusions to follow from thepremises.That is, the conclusions will follow unless there is a shift in the mean-ing of a word or expression. Noting this for our reconstruction, we can move tostep 4. If in our determination of whether to accept the premises we find thattheir acceptability depends on the meaning of an unclear expression, we can thendetermine whether there are any shifts in meaning from one premise to another.

356 CHAPTER TEN

Premise 1 states that there are no objective criteria for determining comparableworth.As we noted earlier, the writer seems to interpret this in either of two ways:(1) criteria of comparable worth are arbitrary, or (2) different people would judgecomparable worth differently.But it must be remembered that however we interpretthis premise, we must use the same interpretation when we consider (in premise 2)whether comparable worth can be determined fairly if there are no objective crite-ria, if the criteria are arbitrary, or if different people would judge it differently.

With this in mind, we can reject the second interpretation of premise 1 assimply stating that different people would judge comparable worth differently;there are, in fact, many things people would judge differently but that could nev-ertheless be judged fairly. Different people would judge criminal guilt or inno-cence differently. They would judge whether a person deserved a promotiondifferently.They would judge the quality of a dive differently. If we maintain thatthese are also things that can’t be judged fairly, we must remember that in premise3 the failure to be able to judge something fairly will be taken as a reason againstimplementing it. Should the practices of holding criminal trials, promotingemployees, and holding diving contests also be abandoned?

What we are doing at this point is following the flowchart from step 4 to step5 and back through steps 1, 2, and 3.This is the dialogue process of interpretingand evaluating that we referred to in chapter 7.We determined that if a premiseis assigned a certain meaning, this will force another premise to be false (or elsethe argument will become an equivocation and the conclusion will not follow).So we attempted a more charitable interpretation and determined whether thiswould make the premises acceptable and still allow the conclusion to follow.

In argument 1, we still need to consider the first of the two interpretationsof premise 1—that is, we could interpret the claim that there are no objective cri-teria to mean that all criteria are arbitrary: either no defensible rationale could begiven for using one set of criteria rather than another, or after some set of crite-ria was decided on, it would yield different results depending on who applied thecriteria.The latter would run into the same difficulties as did “different peoplewould judge comparable worth differently.”What about the former?

Could a defensible rationale be given for using one set of criteria for com-parable worth rather than another? In determining this we come to some sub-stantive issues that probably lie at the basis of the comparable worth controversy.One approach to the worth or value of a worker would simply be to point to themarket for a worker’s skill as a gauge of its value. How much people are willingto pay for your work is a measure of how valuable it is to them. But on this inter-pretation, there can be no problem of comparable worth because (if the marketis allowed to operate freely) each person will get exactly what she or he is worth.

Others, however, will estimate the worth of a worker in terms of somenotion of what is deserved. Such factors as effort, stress on the job, or educationrequired for the position might be seen as indicating that a person deserves a cer-tain wage, regardless of the market demand for his or her work.


No doubt the proponents on any side of this issue could give a defense oftheir criteria. But it is likely that none of them will be able to convince all, oreven very many, of their opponents. In this sense we can probably accept theclaim that there are no objective criteria for determining comparable worth.

Again, we must assign this same interpretation to premise 2 when we askwhether comparable worth can be determined fairly if there are no objective cri-teria. What if certain criteria are arrived at (by vote, say), even though no oneagrees to all of them? If these criteria are applied as uniformly as possible fromcase to case, then won’t comparable worth have been determined fairly? Thedetermination may not satisfy everyone’s criteria of accuracy, but would thedetermination be unfair? It may be like the diving example, in which differentpeople might think different factors should be taken into account in judging adive. But once a set of criteria is decided on (again by vote), it might well beclaimed that the judging could be done fairly.

The implicit premise—if comparable worth can’t be determined fairly, thenit shouldn’t be implemented—would seem to depend on how unfair the deter-mination of comparable worth was and how grievous the injustice was that ittried to correct. If it were necessary to spend tax money obtained by a systemthat has some minimal unfairness in it in order to provide the right to vote topeople who had been unjustly excluded from voting, then this would surely notbe an overriding consideration against providing this right.The extent to whichdifferences in wages between women and men have been the result of past injus-tice and the gravity of the injustice would have to be determined.

We have gone to considerable lengths to interpret and reinterpret thepremises of the first argument so they will be acceptable and the conclusionwill follow, but with little success.The point at which we give up this proce-dure (that is, give a negative answer to step 5) is somewhat arbitrary.Realistically, it depends on how much time and energy we are willing to devoteto the argument.

Perhaps it would be adequate for our purposes to suggest a direction thatmight be taken if the process of reinterpretation were to be carried further.Thedifficulties raised by the writer with arriving at criteria for judging comparableworth do carry some weight as a consideration against implementing a policy ofcomparable worth. Perhaps the writer did not intend that this consideration alonewould be compelling; but that in combination with the problems raised by thesecond argument, we have adequate reason to reject the idea of comparableworth.A possible direction for further revision of the argument could then be tocombine argument 1 with argument 2.

Applying Step 6 to the First Argument in Passage 10.2 To con-clude the application of the flowchart to argument 1, we must ask why this argu-ment might have seemed persuasive. The argument doesn’t straightforwardlycommit any of the common fallacies (unless it is taken as an equivocation).There

358 CHAPTER TEN

may be an illegitimate appeal to authority in citing a National Academy ofSciences Committee as having determined that there are no absolute standardsfor judging comparable worth. (It is questionable whether this issue could be set-tled by any of the sciences.)

It is undeniable that different people will interpret comparable worth in rad-ically different ways. And it is tempting to conclude from this that comparableworth should not be implemented.Why is this? Perhaps it seems unreasonable toenact a public policy when there is little consensus regarding the criteria onwhich it would be based. Perhaps the fact that there is little agreement on crite-ria raises the possibility that some really inappropriate criteria—ones that shouldhave nothing to do with comparable worth—would be implemented. If this werethe case, then it would really seem unjust to implement a comparable worth pol-icy that included inappropriate criteria.

It is likely that the writer is beset by fears such as these, which are not clearlyarticulated, and that his argument seemed persuasive to him because it capturedsome of his reasoning and led to the desired conclusion—that comparable worthshould not be implemented. It must be remembered that even if the particularargument he presented is not judged to warrant its conclusion, that doesn’t meanthe conclusion is false. Finally, as we suggested earlier, it could be that the firstargument was intended only as one consideration against comparable worth, withthe major consideration set forth in the second argument in passage 10.2.

Exercise 10.1 Applying the Six-Step Procedure

1. Carry out the remainder of the six-step procedure in evaluating the secondargument from “Pitfalls in Comparable Worth” (passage 10.2).

2. In chapter 3 you applied the first two steps of the procedure to the passagesin Exercise 3.3. Apply the remainder of the six-step procedure to the argu-ments from those passages.

3. Apply the six-step procedure to the following longer passages. (i) Supplyappropriate reconstructions and sketch criticisms. (ii) (optional) Weave yourpresentation of the central arguments in the passages and your criticisms intoshort essays.

a. Full article by Ellen Goodman on following pages.


The woman beside me patsher rounded stomach and rolls hereyes to the ceiling, exclaiming,“Isshe ever active today!”The “she”in this action won’t be born untilMarch. But my pregnant compan-ion already knows the gender ofthis gestation.

I have grown accustomed tothe attachment of a pronoun to afetus by now. Most women Iknow of her age and anxietylevel have had “the test” and got-ten the results.

Over the past two decades,through amniocentesis and thenCVS and sonograms, a genera-tion of parents has received aprenatal exam, a genetic checkupon their offspring.They have allbeen given new information andsometimes new, unhappychoices.

But the “she” playing soccerin the neighboring uterus is ahealthy baby.And the woman ismore than pleased with both ofthose pieces of knowledge.

What if she were not? What ifshe and her husband had regardedthe sex of this child as a devastat-ing disappointment?

I wonder about this because,in the news, doctors report suc-cess on the road to developing asimple blood test on pregnantwomen to determine the sex ofthe fetus.The geneticists areexcited because such a test couldallow safer, widespread testing. It

could help those worried aboutgender-linked inherited diseases.

But this test may increase thepossibility of abortion for sexselection by those who regardgender—the wrong gender—as agenetic flaw.

The repugnance to abortion-by-gender runs deep in our cul-ture. Both pro-choice supporterswho believe that abortion is aserious decision and pro-life sup-porters who believe it is animmoral decision unite inopposing sex selection as themost frivolous or sexist ofmotives.

It is the rare person whodefends it on the grounds ofpopulation control or pureparental choice. It is a rarerAmerican who chooses it.Indeed, the only countries inwhich sex selection occurs indiscernible numbers have beenthose such as India or Koreawhere daughters have long beenunwanted. It is almost alwaysfemale fetuses that are aborted.But gender testing and thecapacity for gender choosing—before and after conception—isan ethical issue in this country,too.This is the first, but hardlythe last time, that the new tech-nology will be available to pro-duce designer babies.Today,genetic testing is valued inAmerica because it leads to thediagnosis of diseases that cause

5. Ellen Goodman,New York Times. © 1992 by The Boston Globe Newspaper Company/WashingtonPost Writers Group. Reprinted with permission.

Gender Tests May Not Be Worth Risk of Misuse5

360 CHAPTER TEN

pain and death and disability.Eventually it may lead to theircure. But in the future, we alsoare likely to have access to muchmore information about genesthan we need medically.We maybe able to identify the gene forheight, hair color, eye color, per-haps even athletic ability orintelligence.

There will always be parentswho, out of ego, or some per-verse view of children as a per-fect product, want to pick andchoose genes according to amaster plan. Should societyencourage or allow that? Mustdoctors perform tests and turnover information to patients todo with as they will?

John Fletcher, an ethicist atthe University of Virginia, sug-gests a line to be drawn aroundour right to know.“Any kind ofgenetic knowledge that isn’trelated to a genuine disease,” hesays,“is on the other side of theline.”

Because gender, like haircolor, is not a disease, he believesthat the medical profession canrefuse testing and disclosing for

two reasons.To prevent abor-tion-by-gender and, in a widermoral context, to keep geneticresearch on the right track.

Americans haven’t yet learnedhow to say “no” to knowledge.Doctors may feel uncomfortable,even paternalistic, withholdinginformation from people abouttheir own bodies, genes, fetuses.Pennsylvania has banned abor-tion for sex selection in a billthat goes into effect this month.Such a ban is not only impossi-ble to enforce but says nothingabout the future dilemmas ofreproductive knowledge.

At the moment, the moralconsensus against sex selection isholding.The medical professionshould at least state, in public andin unity, a strong position againstgender selection and a moralprohibition against geneticeugenics. But in the longer run,the rest of us may be called uponto ask whether our curiosityabout gender is worth the riskthat others will misuse thatinformation. It may be wiser tolearn if the baby is a “he” or a“she” the old-fashioned way.


b.

College Station,Texas—The basicproblem with government subsi-dized student loans is that theyare a subsidy to future highincome people.The loans stu-dents receive carry interest ratesfar below what even the moststable corporations pay.

While students, especiallythose from relatively poor fami-lies, do not have a high standardof living during college, theyenjoy above-average earningssoon after receiving theirdegrees. Since the loans areslowly paid off after graduation,during a period of high earnings,subsidized interest rates seemunjustified.Why should factory-workers and secretaries be taxedso would-be managers, lawyers,and doctors can be subsidized?

And subsidized federal loansare only a small part of our edu-cational subsidies. Here at TexasA & M, each student pays only asmall percentage of the $10,000-plus it annually costs the state ofTexas.The great majority ofthese students come from rela-tively well-to-do families. In thecases of those few who do not,the argument about transfers tofuture high-income earnersapplies. It is important to distin-guish loans per se from the cur-rently heavily subsidized loans.

While subsidized loans areunjustified, a weak case can bemade for government loan guar-antees or possibly loans at unsub-sidized rates.This is because ofthe problems created by currentbankruptcy laws, which in somecases have allowed students to ridthemselves of educational debtby simply declaring bankruptcyafter graduation. Banks maytherefore consider student loanstoo risky.

Unfortunately, these bank-ruptcy laws probably hurt chil-dren from poor families themost. For a student from a poorfamily, the parents’ co-signaturedoes not appreciably reduce theriskiness of the loan, since theydo not own enough assets.

The simplest and best solutionis to alter the bankruptcy laws toget rid of this problem. Privatebanks could then handle studentloans entirely, with no role playedby the federal government.

Evidence provided by SamPeltzman of the University ofChicago suggests that abolishingsubsidized loans will have littleeffect on the number of peopleattending higher education.Theprimary effect will be to end theunjustified taxing of people tosubsidize the future wealthy ofthis country.

6. Copyright 1985 USA TODAY. Reprinted with permission. John R. Lott, Jr. was a visiting assis-tant professor of economics at Texas A&M University when he wrote this passage.

Stop Subsidizing the Future Rich6

by John R. Lott, Jr.

362 CHAPTER TEN

c.

Boston—The public debate overabortion, already bitter, is likely tobecome even more so. Indeed,with state legislatures debatingnew restrictions made possible bythe Supreme Court’s decision inWebster v. Reproductive HealthServices, consensus looks furtheraway every day.

This bitter debate grows outof widespread confusionbetween legal issues and moralones, between religious issuesand political ones.We cannotdevelop a clear understanding ofthese difficult issues withoutconsidering legal and ethicalpoints of view.

I would oppose any law pro-hibiting abortion in the first twotrimesters.That is, I believe thatthe states should retain the stan-dard set by the Supreme Court inRoe v.Wade even thoughWebster allows them to restrict it.

It is very doubtful, consideringpast experience, that restrictivelegislation would do more thanmake presently legal abortionsillegal. Some of these abortions,involving technologies thatenable laymen to perform abor-tions safely, would be differentfrom current abortions only intheir illegality. Others, performedwith coat hangers in back alleys,

will be fatal. I could not in con-science recommend legislationhaving these effects.

But this is not the same as the“pro-choice” position. It is possi-ble to believe that abortionought to be legal without believ-ing that it is an unconditionalright, or even that it is morallyjustified in more than a limitednumber of cases.

Nor is the belief that manyabortions are immoral the same asthe “pro-life” position.There areinstances when the taking ofhuman life is justifiable, legally andmorally. Homicide is not equiva-lent to murder. Some homicidesare entirely justified, especiallythose involving self-defense.Awoman whose life is threatened bya pregnancy is justified in termi-nating the pregnancy that mightkill or severely injure her.

So, too, when a woman israped she is under no obligationmorally, and should be under noobligation legally, to accept theconsequences of an act of sexualintercourse in which she did notvoluntarily participate. She has aright to protect herself from theconsequences of assault.

But this does not lead me toconclude that abortions aremorally justified when the

7. Copyright © 1990 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted with permission. John R. Silberwas president of Boston University.

Don’t Roll Back “Roe”7

by John R. Silber


pregnancy does not threaten thelife of the mother and followsfrom sexual intercourse inwhich she voluntarily partici-pated. Indiscriminate use ofabortion is wrong because theindiscriminate taking of humanlife is wrong.

If abortion were not a super-charged issue, it would be appar-ent to all parties that a fertilizedovum is, in fact, a living human.Obviously it is not a completehuman being. But neither is afetus in the third trimester or,for that matter, a newborn infantor a child of one or two years ofage.The value of the life of aninfant is based on its potential tobecome a fulfilled human being,and that potential exists fromthe time of conception.

Believing firmly as I do inthis moral view of abortion, Ithink it would be a disastrouserror to write it into the statutebook.

A free society cannot main-tain its unity and order unlessthere is toleration of diverseopinions on which consensushas not been achieved.Without

religious toleration, for example,the unity of the 13 Colonieswould have been torn asunderby religious wars of the sort thatplagued Europe for centuries.The abortion issue is for manyindividuals a religious issue, andon such issues we should scrupu-lously observe the separation ofchurch and state.

By tolerating contrary views,we accept an important fact thatis too often overlooked.Theinstruments of the state and itslegal institutions are far toocrude and inexact to be used indeciding highly complex issuesof personal morality on whichpersons of good will fundamen-tally disagree. It is proper to leavesuch important moral and reli-gious issues to individual moralagents and religious believers.

On the issue of abortion,there is no political, philosophi-cal, moral or religious consensus.I believe abortion is, in general,morally wrong. But I also believethe state should not enact laws torestrict abortion further.This isan issue that cries out for tolera-tion.

Application of the Six-Step Procedure to PassagesContaining Theoretical Statements

In the previous sections we have examined the passages containing deductivearguments without direct appeal to definitions, empirical generalizations, or the-ories. Consider the following passage that focuses on the theoretical underpin-ning of an argument.

364

Although the major focus of the passage is to provide an account of why mil-lionaires are especially competent, a preliminary reading of this passage suggests anargument justifying the rewards given to millionaires in American society.

Reconstruction of the Argument in the Passage

(1) Millionaires are naturally selected for certain work.

(2) If millionaires are naturally selected, then millionaires are especially competent(fit) for their environment.

(implicit) (3) If millionaires are especially competent (fit) for their environment, they providegreat benefits for society.

(4) If millionaires provide a great benefit for society, then they deserve their riches.

(implicit) ∴ Millionaires deserve their riches.

As in previous examples, we have reconstructed the argument to make it valid(steps 1 to 3). Central to evaluating the argument according to step 4, however,is a consideration of the underlying theory of natural selection, which the authorof the passage puts forward fairly directly in support of the second premise.Although the theory of natural selection is not developed in the passage, it canbe presumed to contain a theoretical statement along these lines:

T1: Natural selection produces organisms that are especially fit for their environmental niche.

Some version of this statement has backing from evolutionary biology(though modern versions of biology are more likely to hold that organisms areadequately suited to their environmental niche). If natural selection applies tomillionaires, then T1 would support the view that millionaires are suited to their

CHAPTER TEN

The millionaires are a product of natural selection acting on thewhole body of men to pick out those who can meet the requirementof certain work to be done. . . . It is because they are thus selectedthat wealth—both their own and that entrusted to them—aggre-gates under their hands. . . .They may fairly be regarded as thenaturally selected agents of society for certain work.They get highwages and live in luxury, but the bargain is a good one for society.There is the most intense competition for their place and occupa-tion.This assures us that all who are competent for this functionwill be employed in it, so that the cost of it will be reduced to thelowest terms.8

Premise 2

Premise 4

Theory-BasedPremises

Premise 1

8. William Sumner, Earth-Hunger and Other Essays (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1913), 3.


environment. But it is unclear whether the concept of “natural selection” as usedin a testable biological theory (that is, in T1) is used in this sense in premises 1and 2. Crucial to the biological theory is that some inheritable trait (a traitpassed down genetically from parents to offspring) is naturally selected if itimproves the likelihood that the organisms having it will live to pass on the generesponsible for the trait. It is not obvious that the traits that make individualsmillionaires are inheritable or that they improve the likelihood that organismspossessing them will reproduce. Indeed, some millionaires receive their wealthfrom their parents, not because their parents transmitted it biologically, but moredirectly, by having money willed to them when their parents died. Even if par-ents had traits of character that suited them to earn wealth, their children neednot have them. Furthermore, even if there are such traits, they don’t enable mil-lionaires to reproduce more. Indeed, the wealthy tend to have fewer—notmore—offspring than the poor. As we pointed out in chapter 7 in our discus-sion of misleading definition, an argument is faulty if it uses different definitionsof a term in different premises.We have here an extension of this case.The senseof natural selection in biological theory doesn’t seem to apply to the notion as itoccurs in premises 1 and 2.As a consequence, premise 2 is not really supportedby natural selection theory.

The argument is open to further criticism. Premise 3 asserts that if million-aires are suited to their environments, then they will produce great benefits forsociety. It is not obvious that all, or even most, activity of millionaires (say thosewho play the financial markets) will benefit society as a whole. Even if some mil-lionaires (for example, Bill Gates of Microsoft or other entrepreneurs in the com-puter industry) do benefit society by the activities that make them rich, it is notobvious this is always or even usually the case in other areas.

Exercise 10.2 Criticizing Arguments Based on Theories and Generalizations

Apply the six-step procedure to the following more complicated passages. Be sureto reconstruct any arguments and identify relevant theoretical statements.

1.

Are girls really being insidiouslydamaged by our school systems?That question actually remains tobe investigated. Everyone knowswe need to improve our schools,but are the girls worse off than

the boys? If one does insist onfocusing on who is worse off,then it doesn’t take long to seethat, educationally speaking, boysare the weaker gender. Considerthat today 55 percent of college

366 CHAPTER TEN

students are female. In 1971women received 43 percent ofthe bachelor’s degrees, 40 per-cent of the master’s degrees, and14 percent of the doctorates. By1989 the figures grew to 52 per-cent for B.A.’s, 52 percent forM.A.’s, and 36 percent for doc-

toral degrees.Women are stillbehind men in earning doctor-ates, but according to the U.S.Department of Education, thenumber of doctorates awarded towomen has increased by 185percent since 1971.9

2. (Hint: Clearly distinguish between the argument and theory attributedto the Wellesley Report and Sommers’s own argument and theory.)

9. Reprinted with the permission of Simon & Schuster. Christina Hoff Sommers, Who StoleFeminism: How Women Have Betrayed Women (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 160. Copyright1994 by Christina Sommers. Reprinted with permission.10. The AAUW Report: How Schools Shortchange Girls (Washington, D.C.: AAUW EducationalFoundation, 1992).

The Wellesley Report [“HowSchools Shortchange Girls”10] iscorrect when it points out thatAmerican girls are trailing boysin math and science.The gap issmall but real, and the report isright to suggest that schools mustmake every effort to “dispelmyths about math and science as‘inappropriate’ fields for women.”Unfortunately, that sound sugges-tion is accompanied by morethan twenty questionable anddistressing recommendations thatwould, if acted upon, create anightmarish “gender equity”bureaucracy with plenty of timeand money on its hands—just thesort of recommendation anyonewho cares about the well-beingof American Schools should fearand loathe:“The U.S.Department of Education’sOffice of Education Research

and Improvement (OERI)should establish an advisorypanel of gender equity experts towork with OERI to develop aresearch and disseminationagenda to foster gender-equitableeducation in the nation’s class-rooms.”

Who would be training thegender experts? Who wouldmonitor the nation’s schools onhow well they conform to theideals of a correct sexual politics?More generally, who would bene-fit most from the millions beingrequested for the Gender Equityin Education Act? Would it notbe those who insist that genderequity is our foremost educationalproblem? Our system cannothandle much more pressure fromthese muddled but determinedwomen with their multistage the-ories and their metaphors about


windows, mirrors, and voices,their workshops, and above allthe constant alarms about thestate of male-female relations inAmerican society.

Which leads us back to whatis most wrongheaded about theWellesley Report: its exploitationof America’s very real problem asa nation educationally at risk.Despite its suggestion that solv-ing the “problem of genderequity” will somehow help us tobridge the gap betweenAmerican children and the edu-cationally superior children ofother countries—what the edu-cation researcher HaroldStevenson aptly calls the “learn-ing gap”—the report never sayshow.The reason for the omissionis obvious: the authors have noplausible solution to offer.

In 1992, the MathematicalAssociation of America publisheda translation of the math sectionof Japan’s 1990 college entranceexam.American mathematicianswere startled by what they saw.Professor Richard Askey, a math-ematician at the University ofWisconsin, spoke for manyAmerican scientists and mathe-maticians when he said,“Thelevel at which [Japanese] studentsperform on these [exams] is justincredible.” . . .

American educators some-times explain away the discrep-ancies by pointing out that onlythe best students in Japan takethe test. In 1987, for example, 31percent of American college-agestudents took the SAT; in Japan

the figure was 14 percent for theJapanese equivalent of the SAT.But even our very best studentshad a hard time matching theaverage score of the Japanese stu-dents. Studies by Professor JerryBecker, of Southern IllinoisUniversity, and by FloydMattheis, of East CarolinaUniversity, tell the same story.Becker reports that the problemis not simply that Japanese stu-dents as a whole outperform ourstudents but the “average studentsin Japan show greater achieve-ment than the top five percent ofU.S. students” (his emphasis).Mattheis compared junior highstudents in Japan and NorthCarolina. Reporting on his study,Science magazine says,“It showsJapanese students out front atevery age group in a test thatmeasures six logical thinkingoperations.” . . .What of the gen-der gap between American boysand girls in math? As noted ear-lier, the Educational TestingService (in its InternationalAssessment of Mathematics andScience) found that althoughthirteen-year-old American girlslag a point behind the boys, thegap is insignificant compared tothe one between American chil-dren and foreign children. Recallthat the disparity between ourboys and Taiwanese and Koreangirls was 16 points.

Some theorists speculate thatAsian children do better at mathbecause their languages are socomplex and abstract, providingbetter preparation in the cogni-

368 CHAPTER TEN

tive skills required for math andscience.That does not help toexplain why American childrenlag behind European andCanadian students too. Girls inFrench-speaking Quebec out-perform our boys by 12 pointson the IAEP math test. In fact

American boys lag behind girlsin such countries as Ireland, Italy,and Hungary. In science theresults, although not quite so dis-maying, continue the pattern:American boys trail significantlybehind the foreign girls.11

3.

Introduction: Our VirtueWhen I was a young teacher

at Cornell, I once had a debateabout education with a professorof psychology. He said that it washis function to get rid of preju-dices in his students. He knockedthem down like tenpins. I beganto wonder what he replacedthose prejudices with. He didnot seem to have much of anidea of what the opposite of aprejudice might be. He remindedme of the little boy who gravelyinformed me when I was fourthat there is no Santa Claus, whowanted me to bathe in the bril-liant light of truth. Did this pro-fessor know what thoseprejudices meant for the studentsand what effect being deprivedof them would have? Did he

believe that there are truths thatcould guide their lives as didtheir prejudices? Had he consid-ered how to give students thelove of the truth necessary toseek unprejudiced beliefs, orwould he render them passive,disconsolate, indifferent, and sub-ject to authorities like himself, orthe best of contemporarythought? My informant aboutSanta Claus was just showing off,proving his superiority to me.He had not created the SantaClaus that had to be there inorder to be refuted.Think of allwe learn about the world frommen’s belief in Santa Clauses, andall that we learn about the soulfrom those who believe in them.

By contrast, merely method-ological excision from the soul

11. Sommers, Who Stole Feminism, 178–180.12. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy andImpoverished the Souls of Today’s Students (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). Copyright © 1987 byAllan Bloom. Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc.

The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of

Today’s Students12


of the imagination that projectsGods and heroes onto the wall ofthe cave does not promoteknowledge of the soul; it onlylobotomizes it, cripples its powers.

I found myself responding tothe professor of psychology thatI personally tried to teach mystudents prejudices, since nowa-days with the general success ofhis method they had learned todoubt beliefs even before theybelieved in anything.Withoutpeople like me, he would be outof business. Descartes had awhole wonderful world of oldbeliefs, of prescientific experi-ence and articulations of theorder of things, beliefs firmly andeven fanatically held, before heeven began his systematic andradical doubt. One has to havethe experience of really believingbefore one can have the thrill ofliberation. So I proposed a divi-sion of labor in which I wouldhelp to grow the flowers in thefield and he could mow themdown.

Prejudices, strong prejudices,are visions about the way thingsare.They are divinations of theorder of the whole of things, andhence the road to a knowledgeof that whole is by way of erro-neous opinions about it. Error isindeed our enemy, but it alonepoints to the truth and thereforedeserves our respectful treatment.The mind that has no prejudicesat the outset is empty. It can onlyhave been constituted by amethod that is unaware of howdifficult it is to recognize that aprejudice is a prejudice. Only

Socrates knew, after a lifetime ofunceasing labor, that he wasignorant. Now every high-schoolstudent knows that. How did itbecome so easy? What accountsfor our amazing progress? Couldit be that our experience hasbeen so impoverished by ourvarious methods, of which open-ness is only the latest, that thereis nothing substantial enough leftthere to resist criticism, and wetherefore have no world left ofwhich to be really ignorant?Have we so simplified the soulthat it is no longer difficult toexplain? To an eye of dogmaticskepticism, nature herself, in herlush profusion of expressions,might appear to be a prejudice.In her place we put a gray net-work of critical concepts, whichwere invented to interpretnature’s phenomena but whichstrangled them and therewithdestroyed their own raisond’être. Perhaps it is our first taskto resuscitate those phenomenaso that we may again have aworld to which we can put ourquestions and be able to philoso-phize.This seems to me to beour educational challenge. . . .

The Student and the University:Liberal Education

What image does a first-rankcollege or university presenttoday to a teenager leaving homefor the first time, off to theadventure of a liberal education?He has four years of freedom todiscover himself—a spacebetween the intellectual waste-land he has left behind and the

370 CHAPTER TEN

inevitable dreary professionaltraining that awaits him after thebaccalaureate. In this short timehe must learn that there is agreat world beyond the little onehe knows, experience the exhila-ration of it, and digest enough ofit to sustain himself in the intel-lectual deserts he is destined totraverse. He must do this, that is,if he is to have any hope of ahigher life.These are thecharmed years when he can, ifhe so chooses, become anythinghe wishes and when he has theopportunity to survey his alter-natives, not merely those currentin his time or provided bycareers, but those available tohim as a human being.Theimportance of these years for anAmerican cannot be overesti-mated.They are civilization’sonly chance to get to him.

In looking at him we areforced to reflect on what heshould learn if he is to be callededucated; we must speculate onwhat the human potential to befulfilled is. In the specialties wecan avoid such speculation, andthe avoidance of them is one ofspecialization’s charms. But hereit is a simple duty.What are weto teach this person? The answermay not be evident, but toattempt to answer the question isalready to philosophize and tobegin to educate. Such a concemin itself poses the question of theunity of man and the unity ofthe sciences. It is childishness tosay, as some do, that everyonemust be allowed to developfreely, that it is authoritarian to

impose a point of view on thestudent. In that case, why have auniversity? If the response is “toprovide an atmosphere for learn-ing,” we come back to our origi-nal questions at the secondremove.Which atmosphere?Choices and reflection on thereasons for those choices areunavoidable.The university has tostand for something.The practicaleffects of unwillingness to thinkpositively about the contents of aliberal education are, on the onehand, to ensure that all the vul-garities of the world outside theuniversity will flourish within it,and, on the other, to impose amuch harsher and more illiberalnecessity on the student—theone given by the imperial andimperious demands of the spe-cialized disciplines unfiltered byunifying thought.

The university now offers nodistinctive visage to the youngperson. He finds a democracy ofthe disciplines—which are thereeither because they areautochthonous or because theywandered in recently to performsome job that was demanded ofthe university.This democracy isreally an anarchy, because thereare no recognized rules for citi-zenship and no legitimate titlesto rule. In short there is novision, nor is there a set of com-peting visions, of what an edu-cated human being is.Thequestion has disappeared, for topose it would be a threat to thepeace.There is no organizationof the sciences, no tree ofknowledge. Out of chaos


emerges dispiritedness, because itis impossible to make a reason-able choice. Better to give up onliberal education and get on witha specialty in which there is atleast a prescribed curriculum anda prospective career. On the waythe student can pick up in elec-tive courses a little of whatever isthought to make one cultured.The student gets no intimationthat great mysteries might berevealed to him, that new andhigher motives of action mightbe discovered within him, that adifferent and more human wayof life can be harmoniously con-structed by what he is going tolearn.

Simply, the university is notdistinctive. Equality for us seemsto culminate in the unwilling-ness and incapacity to makeclaims of superiority, particularlyin the domains in which suchclaims have always been made—art, religion and philosophy.When Weber found that hecould not choose between cer-tain high opposites—reason vs.revelation, Buddha vs. Jesus—hedid not conclude that all thingsare equally good, that the dis-tinction between high and lowdisappears.As a matter of fact heintended to revitalize the consid-eration of these great alternativesin showing the gravity and dan-ger involved in choosing amongthem; they were to be height-ened in contrast to the trivialconsiderations of modern lifethat threatened to overgrow andrender indistinguishable the pro-found problems the confronta-

tion with which makes the bowof the soul taut.The serious intel-lectual life was for him the battle-ground of the great decisions, allof which are spiritual or “value”choices. One can no longer pre-sent this or that particular view ofthe educated or civilized man asauthoritative; therefore one mustsay that education consists inknowing, really knowing, thesmall number of such views intheir integrity.This distinctionbetween profound and superfi-cial—which takes the place ofgood and bad, true and false—provided a focus for serious study,but it hardly held out against thenaturally relaxed democratic ten-dency to say,“Oh, what’s theuse?”The first university disrup-tions at Berkeley were explicitlydirected against the multiversitysmorgasbord and, I must confess,momentarily and partiallyengaged my sympathies. It mayhave even been the case that therewas some small element of long-ing for an education in the moti-vation of those students. Butnothing was done to guide orinform their energy, and the resultwas merely to add multi-life-stylesto multidisciplines, the diversity ofperversity to the diversity of spe-cialization.What we see so oftenhappening in general happenedhere too; the insistent demand forgreater community ended ingreater isolation. Old agreements,old habits, old traditions were notso easily replaced.

Thus, when a student arrivesat the university, he finds a bewil-dering variety of departments

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and a bewildering variety ofcourses.And there is no officialguidance, no university-wideagreement, about what he shouldstudy. Nor does he usually findreadily available examples, eitheramong students or professors, ofa unified use of the university’sresources. It is easiest simply tomake a career choice and goabout getting prepared for thatcareer.The programs designedfor those having made such achoice render their studentsimmune to charms that mightlead them out of the conven-tionally respectable.The sirenssing sotto voce these days, andthe young already have enoughwax in their ears to pass them bywithout danger.These specialtiescan provide enough courses totake up most of their time forfour years in preparation for theinevitable graduate study.Withthe few remaining courses theycan do what they please, taking abit of this and a bit of that. Nopublic career these days—notdoctor nor lawyer nor politiciannor journalist nor businessmannor entertainer—has much to do

with humane learning.An edu-cation, other than purely profes-sional or technical, can evenseem to be an impediment.Thatis why a countervailing atmos-phere in the university would benecessary for the students to gaina taste for intellectual pleasuresand learn that they are viable.

The real problem is those stu-dents who come hoping to findout what career they want tohave, or are simply looking foran adventure with themselves.There are plenty of things forthem to do—courses and disci-plines enough to spend many alifetime on. Each department orgreat division of the universitymakes a pitch for itself, and eachoffers a course of study that willmake the student an initiate. Buthow to choose among them?How do they relate to oneanother? The fact is they do notaddress one another.They arecompeting and contradictory,without being aware of it.Theproblem of the whole is urgentlyindicated by the very existenceof the specialties, but it is neversystematically posed.

Putting Convergent Argumentsinto the Picture

We have concentrated in this chapter and in the book as a whole largely onlinked arguments either to illuminate the structure for a whole passage or to pro-vide arguments that support particular premises. But as we mentioned in chapter8, it is often useful to display a complex passage as having the structure of a con-vergent argument. In this section we will look at an example in which a conver-


gent argument is used to support a premise for a larger, embracing linked argu-ment. Passage 10.3, which begins on the next page, provides an example.

The headline Teachers assault online college, put self-interest over education suggestsan embracing linked argument along these lines.

(implicit) (1) If Jones International University clearly offers a quality education, then teachers’harsh criticism of it puts self-interest over education.

(supported by a (2) Jones International University clearly offers a quality education.convergent argument)

∴ Teacher’s harsh criticism of Jones International University puts self-interest overeducation.

At the center of this passage is a convergent argument in support of premise 2. Ithas the following form:

Diagram of Convergent Argument with Counter-Considerationin Passage 10.3

Pro 1: It serves nontraditional students.

Pro 2: It combinesacademic expertise with “real-world” experience.

Pro 3: It is accredited.

Pro 4: It is relatively cheap.

Con 1: It lacks full-time faculty, a bricks-and-mortar library, and personal interaction.

Conclusion: Jones International University clearly offers a quality education.

Pro-considerations Counter-consideration(s)

Con 2: It may lead to a questionable degree.

Premise 2 of linked argument

374 CHAPTER TEN

Our View:Why fight learning athome—particularly when it isaccredited?

The courses are taught on theWeb. Students and faculty meet viae-mail.The library is digital, and thefive students who earned degreeslast spring got them at a cybergrad-uation. Now, Jones InternationalUniversity, the first college to func-tion entirely in cyberspace, hasacquired one crucial trapping of tra-dition—a seal of approval from arespected accrediting group.

That prize, awarded this springafter a four-year effort, marks acoming of age not only for Jonesbut also for students seeking a col-lege education on this new fron-tier. It opens the way for Jonesstudents to apply for federal aidnot available at unaccredited col-leges.And provides at least someassurance that a Jones degree willbe worth something.

With all of that progress, profes-sors should be cheering. Instead,Jones’ accreditation is under fire bymembers of several national teach-ers associations who see it anaffront to quality.

They focus on what’s missing atan e-university: a traditional full-time faculty, a bricks-and-mortarlibrary, personal interaction betweenprofessors and students.With stu-dents able to get federal loans, crit-

ics say, the unwary could end upwith nothing more than a ques-tionable degree and huge debts.

Certainly the pioneering cyber-universities are different, but that’sjust their point.They offer educa-tion to students who need to signon from kitchens or home offices,during pre-dawn hours or breaksat work. Most of the 600 studentsat Jones, for instance, are over age28, with full-time jobs.

Working at an individual pace,students talk with faculty and each

13. USA TODAY, 5 February 1999.

Today’s debate: Higher education on the WebTeachers assault online college,

put self-interest over education13

by Grant Jarding

CybercollegeJones International University, the first all-cyber college, offers a degree at about halfthe cost of a traditional college, when liv-ing and transportation are factored in.

Four-yearJones public

Yearly costs International collegeTuition $3,908 $3,356and fees

Books and $625 $681supplies

Estimated $300 0Internet service

Room, 0 $4,730board,transportation

Total $4,833 $8,767Source: Jones International University:TheCollege Board

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 375

As the summary box indicates, we can criticize a convergent argument byshowing that some considerations are doubtful. For example,we could challenge theclaim that Jones International University is relatively cheap by pointing out that the chartcontained in the passage itself shows that most of the difference in costs arise becausethe four-year college total contains cost of room and board and Jones Internationaldoes not. But of course students using the cybercollege will still be paying for foodand shelter—perhaps even more than college students living on campus.

other in chat rooms or by e-mail.During one recent online forum,experts signed on from variouslocations and chatted with studentsin several countries, a more per-sonal education encounter than alecture to 500.

Jones’ courses are developed byprofessors at well-known schoolsand taught by separate Jones fac-ulty members, prompting a gripethat such duties shouldn’t bedivided. But Jones’ professors oftenwork in the fields they’re teaching,adding real-world zest to the cur-riculum.

As to the fear that these may belittle more than expensive diplomamills, that’s a risk at any new col-lege and a concern that accredita-tion is designed to ally.

Many top universities havejoined the online rush, offeringsingle courses or specialty degrees.What makes Jones different is its

all-cyber existence, save for somebusiness offices in Colorado.Whatmakes it threatening to traditionalcolleges is its ability to offercourses for an accredited bachelor’sdegree at around $4,800 a year,about half the tuition, room andboard costs at public colleges.

For now, Jones is a fledglingexperiment. Most students drop infor a course or two, with onlyabout 100 seeking degrees.Accreditation may help it thrive.

More important is what accred-itation means to prospective stu-dents. Experts say cyber-diplomascams are growing fast, with a fewe-schools moving offshore andpaying foreign governments in anattempt to buy legitimacy.

Accreditation proves a neededyardstick to measure quality. In thenew world of virtual colleges, it’sgood to know that real, live educa-tors are checking them out.

Criticizing Convergent Arguments (from chapter 8)

1. Adding further considerations

2. Eliminating doubtful considerations

3. Blunting or promoting considerations

Even if we eliminate this pro-consideration, the article cites three other pro elements. The question is then whether the remaining pros outweight thecons. We can criticize the weighting in the article in two ways: blunting the

376 CHAPTER TEN

pro-considerations or promoting the con-considerations. For example, the articlestresses that Jones International University is accredited, but a critic could pointout that mere accreditation need not assure “quality” in education.The accredit-ing organizations determine only that an institution has met a minimum standard.This in itself does not give much support to the conclusion that it offers a “qual-ity” education, only that it is not unacceptably bad education.Alternatively, a criticmight try to promote the counter consideration that the cybercollege, at least at thispoint in time, offers a degree of questionable value for the students, both in termsof employment or graduate education and that is of central importance. Sustainedcriticism of either of these types could shift the balance against the conclusion.

Exercise 10.3 Criticizing Linked and Convergent Arguments

1. The following passages contain arguments that could be interpreted as con-vergent or linked or a hybrid of both. Reconstruct and criticize them.

a.

14. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), 50.

We have now recognized thenecessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which alltheir other well-being depends)of freedom of opinion, andfreedom of the expression ofopinion, on four distinctgrounds, which we will nowbriefly recapitulate:

First, if any opinion is com-pelled to silence, that opinionmay, for aught we can certainlyknow, be true.To deny this is toassume our own infallibility.

Secondly, though thesilenced opinion be an error, itmay, and very commonly does,contain a portion of truth; andsince the general or prevailingopinion on any subject is rarelyor never the whole truth, it isonly by the collision of adverseopinions that the remainder ofthe truth has any chance of

being supplied.Thirdly, even if the

received opinion be not onlytrue, but the whole truth; unlessit is suffered to be, and actuallyis, vigorously and earnestly con-tested, it will, be most of thosewho received it, be held in themanner of a prejudice, with lit-tle comprehension or feeling ofits rational grounds.And notonly this, but, fourthly, themeaning of the doctrine itselfwill be in danger of being lostor enfeebled, and deprived of itsvital effect on the character andconduct: the dogma becoming amere formal profession, in effi-cacious for good, but cumber-ing the ground and preventingthe growth of any real andheart-felt conviction from rea-son or personal experience.14


b.

The splitting of the atomand the unraveling of the DNA double helix representthe two premier scientificaccomplishments of the twenti-eth century, the first a tour deforce of physics, the second ofbiology. . . . If the century justpassing was the age of physicsand nuclear technology itscrown jewel, then the centuryjust coming into view willbelong to biology and its pre-mier technology will begenetic engineering. . . .Whilethe twenty-first century will bethe Age of Biology, the techno-logical application of theknowledge we gain can take avariety of forms.To believe thatgenetic engineering is the onlyway to apply our newfoundknowledge of biology and thelife sciences is limiting andkeeps us from entertainingother options which mightprove even more effective inaddressing the needs and fulfill-ing the dreams of current andfuture generations. . . . thequestion is what kind ofbiotechnologies will we choosein the coming BiotechCentury? Will we use our new insights into the working ofplants and animal genomes tocreate genetically engineered“super crops” and transgenicanimals, or new techniques for advancing ecological agri-

culture and more humane ani-mal husbandry practices? Willwe use the information we’recollecting on the humangenome to alter our geneticmakeup or to pursue newsophisticated health preventionpractices? . . . Since it is impos-sible to be clairvoyant andknow all of the potential rami-fications and consequences thatmight accompany the manynew technologies we mightwant to introduce, we shouldattempt to minimize regretsand keep open as many optionsas possible for those who comeafter us—including our fellowcreatures.This means thatwhen choosing among alterna-tive technological applications,we are best served by takingthe less radical, more conserva-tive approach—the one leastlikely to create disruptions andexternalities.“First, do noharm” is a well established andlong revered principle in med-icine. . . .Which of the twocompeting visions of biotech-nology—genetic engineeringor ecological practices and pre-ventive health—is more radicaland adventurous and mostlikely to cause disequilibriumand which is the more conser-vative approach and least likelyto cause unanticipated harmdown the line? The answer, Ibelieve is obvious.15

15. Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century: Harnessing the Gene and Remaking the World (New York:Tarcher/Putnam, 1998), 231–234.

378 CHAPTER TEN

c.

16. Editorial, Omaha World-Herald, 27 October 1999. Reprinted with permission.

A Web site auctioning theeggs of fashion models pro-motes an unhealthy idea. Itencourages parents to fixate ontheir child’s physical appear-ance.

Ron Harris, a fashion pho-tographer, organized the auc-tion. Bids start at $15,000 andcan go as high as $150,000.Harris characterizes the sale ofmodels’ eggs as “Darwin at hisvery best.”American society isobsessed with celebrity beauty,Harris says in trying to justifythe sale.At the Web site, hewrites:“If you could increasethe chance of reproducingbeautiful children, and thusgiving them an advantage insociety, would you?”

He also states:“It is not myintention to suggest we make asuper society of only beautifulpeople.This site simply mirrorsour current society in thatbeauty always goes to the high-est bidder.

The commercial aspect ofHarris’ enterprise isn’t sounusual. Sperm has been avail-able essentially as a commodityfor years now.The most noto-rious example is the geniussperm bank which includeddonations form WilliamShockley, a Nobel Prize-winning scientist. Harris says,

in fact, that he plans an onlineauction of sperm in the future.

It’s also true that womenwho donate their eggs deservemonetary compensation forinconvenience and discomfortthey experience as a result ofhormone treatments and physi-cal removal of the eggs.A pay-ment in range of $2,500 to$5,000 is most common.

The last thing Americansociety needs, however, is theshallow beauty worship Harrispromotes. Harris is encourag-ing parents to engineer adesired appearance for theirchild—hardly a healthy philos-ophy around which to build afamily.There’s no guarantee,after all, that the children pro-duced through Harris’ projectwill meet the parent’s expectedstandards of beauty. If the par-ents wind up with a boy or girlthey considered an ugly duck-ling, the child could beweighed down by horribleburden.

Harris’ beauty-obsessedrhetoric would have the worldimagine that people with less-than-perfect features are some-how inferior. But modestphysical attributes needn’t stopindividuals from achievinggreatness. Consider the greatgood accomplished by

The Price of This Beauty Is Too High16


d.

Abraham Lincoln, whose phys-ical appearance was such thathis political foes derided him asan “ape.”Albert Einstein hadpuffy hair, yet he turned mod-ern science inside-out with hisrevolutionary thinking. GoldaMeir may not have been abeauty queen, but she provedto be a strong leader of Israel.

Parents often discover thattheir child falls short in one

regard or another, or that theirchild has developed interests fardifferent from what the parentshad expected—and yet the par-ents’ love remains undiminished.

Harris urges parents to lookon their children as physicalobjects.Well-adjusted parents,however, regard their offspringas individuals—precious yetimperfect individuals.And theylove them for what they are.

“The so-called zero-tolerance policy is withoutmercy and without sensitivity,”the Reverend Jesse Jacksondeclared last week, protestingthe Decatur, Illinois, schoolboard’s decision to expel sixstudents for inciting a melee ata football game. Jackson is notalone in his view.TheAmerican Civil LibertiesUnion, civil rights leaders, andothers on the left also wantzero-tolerance laws abolished.Illinois Representative BobbyRush is calling for congres-sional hearings on their legal-ity; he’s even asked U.S.Attorney General Janet Renofor an investigation.

And it’s true that zero-tolerance laws are sometimesflawed in design or execution.

It’s also true that they effec-tively combat perhaps thegreatest crisis in public educa-tion today: the crisis of vio-lence.To call them inherentlyracist is to imply that a strictlydisciplined school, a schoolwhere students learn withoutfear, serves only the interests ofwhites.And it is that proposi-tion, it seems to us, that repre-sents racism of the mostdebilitating kind.

In fact, zero tolerance has aliberal pedigree; it was origi-nally the brainchild of the lateAlbert Shanker’s AmericanFederation of Teachers (AFT).In Cincinnati in 1990, the AFTdiscovered that local teacherswere spending enormousamounts of time dealing withdrugs, guns, assaults, and brawls.

The Fight’s Not Over17

17. Editorial, The New Republic, 6 December 1999. Reprinted by permission of The New Republic, Inc.

380 CHAPTER TEN

“In basically half the classroomsin the city, the teachers could-n’t teach effectively,” said TomMooney, vice president of theunion. In 1991, Cincinnatiresponded but establishingautomatic penalties for studentswho commit violent acts or arecaught with drugs, alcohol, orweapons.Texas followed suittwo years later. In 1994,Congress required states to passzero-tolerance laws or forfeitfederal money.

Since then, counties andcities have extended the list ofzero-tolerance violations.Andwhile these statutes have led tooccasional excesses—such asthe eighth-grade honors stu-dent in Georgia suspended forbringing his French teacher abottle of vintage wine as aChristmas present—in mostcases the laws are working. InTexas, a survey found that from 1993 to 1998, the percentageof teachers who viewed assaultson students as a “significantproblem” dropped from 53 to31. In Baltimore, where schoolshad been rife with violence, anaggressive zero-tolerance lawadopted last spring has pro-duced a 30 percent drop instudent assaults on other stu-dents and a 50 percent decreasein student assaults on teachersand other staff.

But, for the critics, the evi-dence that zero tolerancemakes schools safer is besidethe point.The victims ofschool violence are not theones over whom they lose

sleep.What, they ask, do suchlaws do for the students whoget suspended or expelled?Ruth Zweifler, executive direc-tor of the Michigan StudentAdvocacy Center, says that herstate’s zero-tolerance law“erodes our commitment topublic education. Underneathit is the message that we nolonger believe we need to edu-cate all children.” No; the mes-sage is that we will not, in thename of educating all children,force the vast majority to liveunder conditions that makeeducation impossible. Shanker,a holdover from an age of grit-tier, less therapeutic liberalism,understood this.“Some peo-ple,” he said in 1995,“think ofschools as sort of custodialinstitutions. . . . Or they thinkthe school’s job is socializa-tion. . . .The central role of theschools . . . is academicachievement.We have to betough because basically we aredefending the right of childrento an education.”

Behind the other objec-tions, of course, lies one centralone: that zero-tolerance lawsare racist.The NAACP citesstatistics showing that blackstudents are more likely thanwhite students to be suspendedor expelled.To be sure, when aparticular school singles outblacks and coddles whites,school boards should conduct acareful review. But, in mostcases, the racial disparity inexpulsions is smaller than theracial disparity in arrests for


violent crimes.That AfricanAmerican students may be sta-tistically more likely than otherstudents to commit violent actsis a grave problem thatdemands serious governmentattention to the conditionsunder which African Americanchildren grow up. But to usethat disparity as a reason to tol-erate acts of violence is to con-demn innocent children, manyof them black, to regimes ofterror.To call such a policycompassionate is a profoundlinguistic and moral distortion.

Not so long ago, it wascommon place for liberals tosanction such distortions.

Thankfully, and with greateffort (some of it expended onthese pages), liberalism haslargely rid itself of its propen-sity to equate moral decencywith the indulgence of immoralbehavior. Liberals, by and large,no longer assume that compas-sion means light sentences forcriminals or allowing the able-bodied to claim governmentmoney absent a day’s work.AsDecatur shows, however, thebattle is not completely won.Permissive liberalism, like alldying creeds, has its last bastion.How unfortunate that it is theAmerican school.

Application to Writing

The six-step procedure can be adapted to assist in the writing of a critical essay.The format we recommend can be used to present a critical assessment of almostany discourse that contains an argument—a speech, essay, editorial, letter to theeditor, or even a portion of a conversation.

It is often effective to arrange a critical essay into four parts: an introduction,a reconstruction of the argument to be criticized, a critical assessment of theargument, and a conclusion. Although this structure is not a formula to followblindly, it is a model that can be adapted to a variety of writing tasks.

The introduction should convey the importance of the critical discussion tofollow. A good way of doing this is to relate the particular essay, speech, or what-ever to some broader issue on which the argument at hand has some bearing.One way of unifying your essay is to move in the introduction from a broad topicof concern to the particular issue at hand, and then to move back to the broadarea of concern in your conclusion.

The reconstruction of the argument should begin with a paraphrase (or quota-tion) conveying the argument in unreconstructed form.This paraphrase shouldbe done as succinctly as possible to avoid losing the flow of the essay at thispoint.Then you should introduce any necessary implicit statements and give the

382 CHAPTER TEN

complete argument. For purposes of the essay assigned at the end of this section,you may use technical terms such as standard form or implicit premise. But in gen-eral, suit your terminology to the audience for whom you are writing.

The critical assessment should begin with a statement of whether the conclusionof the argument follows from the premises. If it doesn’t, demonstrate this to thereader as clearly as possible. (Refer to chapter 4 for tips on showing invalidity.) Ifthe argument can be made valid by adding more premises, discuss this in either thereconstruction or the critical portion. Next, discuss whether the premises areacceptable. Remember to criticize specific premises, one at a time. If you decidethat the premises are acceptable, you should still try to raise criticisms you thinkmight be made by an intelligent reader and reply to these criticisms on behalf ofthe argument. If a vague or ambiguous term occurs in more than one place in theargument, use the techniques described in chapter 7 to explain how different inter-pretations of the meaning of this term will affect the argument.

The conclusion should restate briefly your final assessment of the argument.If you reject the argument, you could attempt to explain here why the arguermight have been persuaded by it even though it is a bad argument.You could alsoreturn in your conclusion to the broader concerns you raised in your introduc-tion—the importance of the issue, what position now seems reasonable in regardto it, and so forth.

To get a better idea of how this format can be used, read the followingexcerpt from a speech on the subject of crime and its causes and the sample crit-ical essay that follows it.The sample essay criticizes an argument from the speech.

OUR PERMISSIVE SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Violence is no longer the manufactured melodrama of the theatrical arts. It hasbecome part of our everyday life—gruesome tragedies, perpetrated against ournext-door neighbor, our family and our friends, personally touching each of us.Mathematically, one out of every five families will have a major crime commit-ted against some member of that family.

Crime is the product of flesh and blood individuals—individuals who chooseto satisfy their carnal, fiscal and physical desires by denying the rights of others. . . individuals who willfully choose to assault the person or take over the prop-erty of other human beings.

Aided, I might add, by accomplices.Accomplices who have contributed to therise in crime.These friends of the felon are the professional apologists, the excusemakers, the contemporary environmentalists, the behaviorists . . . those peoplewho are more interested in bleeding hearts than bleeding victims.They are theones who blame everybody and everything, except the responsible individual.

Advocates of this philosophy reside in the present Department of Corrections,including its Division of Parole, and also within the probation departments ofour counties. It is taught in our universities and colleges as modern penology and


promoted as fact, not theory.This social philosophy is especially attractive to thosewho dislike the competition of the American way of life—the kind of life wherea man is responsible for his own actions.The concept that man controls his owndestiny and is accountable is anathema to the Socialist mind.

One point that apologists rarely explain away is why, for every criminal whocomes from a slum area, are there thousands from the same area who hold jobs?Why, for every under-educated criminal, are there thousands of successful individ-uals who made it with less education? Why, for every unemployed criminal, arethere thousands who never had to resort to crime as a means of survival?

I was raised in a factory town on the south side of Chicago, a tough neigh-borhood, what some would call an economically deprived area by today’s stan-dards. I dropped out of high school after only two years and joined the Navy tofight for my country in the Second World War. I also came from a broken home.So, I was a high school drop-out, from an economically deprived area and abroken home. I must assume that all those with the same background will growup to be senators.

It isn’t society nor environment that commits crimes. Criminals commitcrimes . . . individuals. Criminal individuals commit crimes.18

IS THE ENVIRONMENT THE CAUSE OF CRIME?

In his speech “Our Permissive System of CriminalJustice,” Senator H. L. Richardson expresses hisanger toward those who claim that the environment,rather than the individual criminal, is responsiblefor crime. He believes not only that this theory isfalse, but also that people who propose it haveaided criminals and helped crime to flourish. Itcan be questioned whether this theory has reallycontributed to a rise in crime, but I will limitthis essay to the question of whether Richardsonhas given us grounds for believing that the environ-ment is not the cause of crime.

Richardson’s argument is essentially that noteveryone from a “slum area” is a criminal, so it isnot the slum area that is the cause of crime. Thisargument contains the implicit premise that if slumareas did cause crime, then everyone from a slumarea would be a criminal. If we add this premise,the argument can be stated as follows:

18. Excerpts from a speech by California Senator H. L. Richardson,“Time to Reaffirm Basic TruthsAbout Crime,” Human Events, 31 August 1974, 18–19. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

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1. If slum areas caused crime, then everyone from a slum

area would be a criminal.

2. Not everyone from a slum area is a criminal.

∴ Slum areas do not cause crime.

Supposedly, Richardson would make this same argu-ment about other environments besides slum areasthat might be thought to cause crime. Otherwise, hecould not come to his general conclusion that theenvironment does not cause crime. If we put hisargument in a more general way, it would look likethis:

1. Given any environment, if that environment caused

crime, then everyone from that environment would be

a criminal.

2. Given any environment, not everyone from that environ-

ment is a criminal.

∴ No environment causes crime.

Both of these arguments are valid, but it is doubt-ful that all their premises are true. Considerpremise 1 of either argument—that if slum areas (orsome other environment) caused crime, then everyonefrom that area would be a criminal. There is asense of cause in which we would say that one thingcaused another even if it did not always producethis effect. For example, we say that drunken driv-ing causes accidents even though people sometimesdrive while drunk without having an accident.Similarly, those who say that slum areas causecrime might mean that these areas tend to producecriminals, and are therefore at least partiallyresponsible for crime. It would not follow thateveryone from a slum area must be a criminal.

As was stated earlier, Richardson must make hisargument a general one about any environment if hewishes to come to the general conclusion that noenvironment causes crime. The second premise of thisgeneral argument is: Given any environment, noteveryone from that environment is a criminal. It isnot at all obvious that this premise is true.Suppose we take a poor neighborhood as an exampleof an environment. Many people from this environment


will not be criminals. But suppose we narrow downthe environment further by considering only thehomes of male teenagers who have friends who commitcrimes regularly. Now a larger percentage of thepeople from this environment will be criminals liketheir friends. And we could continue to narrow downthe environment to include only teenagers who hadbeen treated brutally as young children, and so on.It is at least possible that we would end updescribing an environment that always produced criminals.

The issue of whether the environment is the causeof crime is an important one. The attitude we takeregarding it affects the course of action we wouldrecommend in combating crime. There may be grounds,other than those that Richardson provides, forbelieving that the environment is not responsiblefor crime. It is also possible, as our first criti-cism suggests, that Richardson has presented us(and himself) with a false dilemma in assuming thateither the environment is wholly responsible or theindividual is wholly responsible. Perhaps it washis eagerness not to let individual criminals “offthe hook” that prompted him to argue that the envi-ronment has no causal role in producing criminals.This essay has shown that whatever his motive foradvancing it, Richardson has not given us suffi-cient reason to accept his conclusion.

Exercise 10.4 Writing a Critical Essay

Using the recommended format, write an essay criticizing one of the followingselections (or another appropriate editorial or essay).A number of arguments arepresented here, but most of the premises and conclusions are unstated or notclearly stated. Read the editorial carefully several times before you attempt toreconstruct an argument from it.

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19. Copyright 1990 by Stephen Chapman. Reprinted by permission.

There is good news and badnews about cocaine.The badnews is that captive monkeysgiven unlimited access to thestuff will spurn everything elseto get high, until they die ofstarvation.

The good news is you’re nota monkey. In a society of lowerprimates, which are incapable ofprudent restraint in the use ofmind-altering substances, legaliz-ing cocaine and other illicitdrugs would probably be a badidea.When it comes to humans,the issue looks a bit different.

We know that a 20-yeargovernment effort to stamp outillicit drug use has been a colos-sal failure.We know it has swal-lowed vast amounts of money,prison space and police time.We know it has spawned epi-demics of violent crime in theinner city, much as Prohibitionsparked gangland wars.

What we don’t know iswhat would happen if drugswere legal.Would we becomea nation of zombies—a “citi-zenry that is perpetually in adrug-induced haze,” as drugczar William Bennett predicts?

Bennett says we don’t haveto try legalization to knowhow horrible it would be:“Wehave just undergone a kind ofcruel national experiment in

which drugs became cheap andwidely available:That experi-ment is called the crack epi-demic.”

But what keeps clean-livingcitizens like Bennett frombecoming crackheads? Is it thefear of jail? If crack were sold ata legal outlet around the corner,would he pick up a case? WouldMiss America?

Would you? Not likely.A pollsponsored by the Drug PolicyFoundation asked Americans ifthey would try illicit drugs ifthey were legal. Of those whohad never tried marijuana before,only 4.2 percent of those ques-tioned said they would try it.Fewer than 1 percent of thosewho had never used cocaine saidthey’d take it out for a test drive.

That 1 percent can be mightilygrateful to Bill Bennett for deter-ring them.The other 99 percentgain essentially nothing from thedrug war. In fact, if they live in theinner city, the drug war puts themin danger every day by reservingthe business for violent people withlots of guns and ammo.

The poll confirms the fewexperiments with drug tolerance.After the Netherlands practicallylegalized marijuana in 1976, its usedeclined. In the various U.S. statesthat decriminalized marijuana inthe 1970s, pot grew less popular.

Legal Drugs Unlikely to Foster Nation of Zombies19

by Stephen Chapman

1.


Even if everyone weretempted to sample the newlylegal drugs, very few would imi-tate monkeys.The government’sNational Institute on DrugAbuse says 22 million Americanshave used cocaine at least once.Of these, 8.2 million have used itin the last year. Just 862,000 useit every week.That doesn’tsound like a ferociously addictivedrug.

When it comes to crack, asmokable form of cocainewhich is allegedly more tena-cious in its hold, no one knowsexactly how many addicts thereare. But NIDA says fewer thanone in every five of the 2.5 mil-lion people who have tried itare regular users, blasting off atleast once a month. Bennett’s“epidemic” has afflicted nomore than one American inevery 500.

Crack is supposed to beuniquely destructive becauseof the severe damage it does tofetuses. Propagandists for thedrug war claim that 375,000“crack babies” are born everyyear, requiring billions of dol-lars in extra medical care. Butthe government says there arefewer than half a million peo-ple who smoke crack regularly.Apparently we’re supposed tobelieve that four out of everyfive of them give birth eachyear.

In fact, despite being cheapand widely available, crack hasn’tproduced mass addiction.Whynot?

The best explanation comesfrom Dartmouth neuroscientistMichael Gazzaniga in a recentinterview in National Reviewmagazine. Only a small portion ofthe population is inclined toabuse drugs (including alcohol),and these people will systemati-cally wreck themselves withwhatever is at hand, he says. Butthose who aren’t prone to abusewon’t become addicts regardlessof what drugs are legally available.

“In our culture alone,” saidGazzaniga,“70 percent to 80percent of us use alcohol, andthe abuse rate is now estimatedat 5 percent to 6 percent.We seeat work here a major feature ofthe human response to drugavailability, namely, the inclina-tion to moderation.” Peopleallowed to make free choicesgenerally make sound ones.

But a recognition thathumans can use freedom wiselyis not one of the distinguishingtraits of those behind the drugwar who can imagine all sorts ofcosts from legalization but can’tsee the real ones from prohibi-tion. If the citizenry everemerges from the haze producedby the drug war, it may realizethat the greatest harms are theones we’ve already got.

388 CHAPTER TEN

2.

The world’s most reasonable-sounding but dumb idea is theone that advocates solving thecountry’s drug problem by legal-izing drugs.

Its fundamental flaw is thepremise that the drug problem isnot one of drug use but of drugprohibition.The reality is other-wise: drug use is the core drugproblem. Legalization cures theproblem of prohibition at thecost of more drug use.

Legalization advocates empha-size the high cost of maintainingthe prohibition of such drugs asmarijuana, cocaine, PCP andheroin.The costs of prohibitionare high and rising. But thedebates about legalization gener-ally overlook the costs attributedto drug use itself in the lostpotential and the lost lives.A fewpeople die now in Americabecause they cannot get drugscheaply. Far more die and sufferbecause they can, despite prohi-bition. Fourteen millionAmericans now pay $100 billiona year for illicit drugs. Howmany more Americans wouldconsume how much more ifdrug prices were cut by 90 per-cent or more as the legalizationadvocates propose?

The litmus test of any legal-ization plan is what to do with

dangerous drugs such as crackand PCP. Crack, or smokablecocaine, is the only drug prob-lem that is getting worse in theUnited States. Legalizing limiteduse of small quantities of mari-juana or giving IV drug userssterile needles will not dent thecrack problem.

Watch what happens whenyou ask advocates of legalizationhow their scheme would work:they turn silent, or they talkabout how bad prohibition is.Which drugs would be legalized,in what forms, at what potenciesand for whom? Imagine yourjunior high school- or college-age son or daughter, or yourneighbor, dropping into thelocal, government-run packagestore.“A packet of crack, please,some PCP for my date and a lit-tle heroin for the weekend.”

“Yes, sir.Will that be cash orcharge?”

Some legalizers have talkedabout doctors writing prescrip-tions for legalized cocaine,heroin or other drugs.This ideais ridiculous. Doctors don’t andshouldn’t write prescriptions forchemical parties.

Drug abuse treatment, bothpublic and private, is expensiveand a growth industry becauseof the national drug epidemic,

20. © The Washington Post, 1990. Robert L. DuPont, a psychiatrist, has directed the National Instituteon Drug Abuse. Ronald L. Goldfarb is a former Justice Department prosecutor.

Drug Legalization: Asking for Trouble20

by Robert L. DuPont and Ronald L. Goldfarb


not because of drug prohibition.Using drugs such as methadonein the treatment of heroin addic-tion is a far cry from legalization,because methadone is only avail-able in tightly controlled settingsand only for therapeutic pur-poses.This fits with the long-standing U.S. approach, whichallows dependence-producingsubstances to be used in medicalpractice to treat diseases but notoutside medical settings and notfor recreational purposes.

Advocates of legalization pointto the “failure” of Prohibition. Butduring Prohibition—of manufac-ture, not use, of alcohol—con-sumption did decline drastically,and alcohol-related arrestsdropped by half.Thus, laws do cutdrug consumption, prevent newusers and decrease casualties.Correctly or not, society seems tohave made a costly, special dealwith recreational drinking.

The most recent NationalInstitute on Drug Abuse surveyof Americans over the age of 12showed that in 1988 there were106 million alcohol users, 57 mil-lion cigarette smokers, but only12 million users of marijuana and3 million users of cocaine.Allfour numbers were down from1985 levels.Alcohol use dropped6 percent, cigarette use dropped 5percent, marijuana use dropped33 percent, and cocaine usedropped 50 percent. It is not easyto look at these numbers andconclude that prohibition of ille-gal drugs is not working toreduce use or that we are losingthe war on drugs.

The best way to cut the drugmarket is to decrease society’stolerance for illicit drug use.Thatmeans creating painful conse-quences for illicit drug use tohelp the non-user stay clean.There need to be more and bet-ter programs to help the currentdrug users get clean.This coun-try needs less debate on thelegalization of drugs and morediscussion about how best todeter drug users and providedrug treatment.

Law enforcement aimed atthe supply of drugs is an impor-tant but small part of the solu-tion.We do not believe that thedrug problem will be solved bycriminal sanction. No socialproblems are.We agree with theHarlem barbershop owner whosaid the idea that jails stop drugsis “like saying cemeteries stopdeath.”Along with deterring useand punishing sales, we also mustlearn more about causes and pre-vention of drug use.

The battle to end the drugabuse epidemic is likely to bewon or lost in families andneighborhoods, in workplacesand schools. Do we, individuallyand collectively, tolerate or dowe reject illicit drug use? Thedebate about legalization simplydelays the important commit-ment to reject the use of illicitdrugs. It also demoralizes thepeople most committed to end-ing the drug problem by raisingquestions about national supportfor their vital efforts.

Debating legalization is adangerous delusion.Why now,

390 CHAPTER TEN

when only a few months ago thefederal government released newstatistics that showed a 37 per-cent decline in the regular use ofillicit drugs in America, a fall thatincluded every region in thenation, all races, both sexes andall social classes? With that sortof progress in the war on drugs,this is a particularly odd time togive up a battle.

The problem with drugs isdrug use. Every proposed reformthat makes drugs more availableor acceptable is going to increasedrug use. It would also increasethe suffering and unhappinessthat flows from drug use forboth users and non-users ofdrugs.

Exercise 10.5 Putting It Together in the Classroom:“Fishbowl” Discussions and Critical Exchanges

1. “Fishbowl” Discussions: Modeling Critical Reasoning

This is a group exercise for the classroom. Its objective is to provide practicefor using critical reasoning techniques in everyday discussions.

First, generate a short list of topics that students have actually been dis-cussing recently with their peers, outside of class. From this list, pick a topic ofinterest to the class. Next, a few students who have discussed this issue shoulddescribe how the discussions have gone, recounting as much detail as possible.

At this point, arrange the chairs in the classroom so that all chairs face themiddle of the room, with two chairs in the center, facing each other.This iswhere the students in the “fishbowl” will sit.Two students should be selectedto act out one of the discussions that have been described.

The next step is for those who have observed the discussion to commenton to what extent the dialogue represented good critical reasoning. Studentswho have ideas about how the dialogue might have been improved can nowtake the places of those in the fishbowl, with each participant initially takingthe position of the person he or she has replaced.This process of replacing par-ticipants can be repeated.

The exercise can be concluded with comments from the observers con-cerning which strategies appeared to be most helpful in facilitating the dis-cussion.

2. Participating in a Critical Exchange

A good exercise for displaying your reasoning skills orally, rather than in writ-ing, is a structured, critical exchange on an important issue such as whether a

woman should have the right to have an abortion,whether capital punishmentis ever justified, whether casual sexual relationships are worth pursuing,whether a woman should take her husband’s name when she marries, orwhether drugs should be legalized.

A structured, critical exchange is similar to a formal debate, except for afew crucial features. Most important, the object is not to win but to join withthose participating in the exchange to determine what position is most rea-sonable to hold regarding the issue in question. To build this goal into thestructure of the exchange, a period of time should be allowed, after the par-ticipants take an advocacy role on one side of the issue or the other, for eachperson to explain where she or he really stands on the issue, having consid-ered all the arguments and criticisms raised.

In addition, the arguments presented should be developed cooperativelyin advance of the presentation of the exchange, so that the participants rep-resenting each side can help make all the arguments (including those theywill be criticizing) as strong and worthy of consideration as possible.

Here is a format for a critical exchange involving four people that can beused in an hour-long class period and that allows time for questions and com-ments from the audience. The format incorporates the features mentionedabove, which are aimed at minimizing competition and maximizing insight.

Preparation for the Exchange

1. Meet as a four-person team to decide on a topic. (You can use any of thoselisted above or another of interest to the team.)

2. Decide which two members will take the affirmative side and which two the negative side in presenting arguments on the issue. It is not necessaryto take the side you feel initially inclined to support. Sometimes it is a bet-ter learning experience to argue for the other side.

3. After some brainstorming and background reading, the team shoulddevelop two arguments on the affirmative side and two arguments on thenegative side. The arguments should be briefly stated and tightly struc-tured, so that they can be written on the chalkboard or on a handout sheetfor the audience.

4. As a team, discuss possible criticisms of the arguments. Obvious flaws in thearguments can be spotted at this time, and the arguments can be rewritten.

Presentation of the Exchange

1. Affirmative team. Each member takes about three minutes to present oneargument in favor of the proposition being discussed. (An example of anargument might be: “A woman has the right to do whatever she wants


392 CHAPTER TEN

with her body. A fetus is a part of a pregnant woman’s body.Therefore awoman has the right to have an abortion if she wants.”)

Explain what is meant by each premise and why it is reasonable to believethat premise.

2. Negative team. Each member takes about three minutes to criticize thearguments that have been presented, applying the techniques of criticismlearned in class.

3. Negative team. Each member presents an argument opposing the proposi-tion in question (three minutes each).

4. Affirmative team. Each member criticizes the negative team’s arguments(three minutes each).

5. Concluding presentations. Having considered all arguments and criticisms,each member states where she or he really stands on the issue. Replies tocriticisms and additional reasons can be brought up at this time.

6. Class comments. Class members who have been listening to the exchangeare allowed to make comments or address questions to the participants.

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