Will Jordan

11/3/14

Shehong Chen

Chinese Foreign Policy: At a Glance

Chinese (Sino)-Indian diplomatic relations of the 1950s: Revised

During the 1950s there was a sense of duty to fulfill wishful and positive

diplomatic relations between China and Indian; however through this decade a mounting

discord within the two countries ensued. The Sino-Indian relations of the 1950s would begin

cordially but end acrimoniously in 1959 as a bitter border conflict ensued resulting in nearly

three thousand casualties. Being at best idealistic or at the very worst unrealistic, the

diplomatic relations between these Asian strongholds were mutually beneficial until 1959—a

year on the verge of an era dominated by western imperial warfare and soviet expansion.

Moreover, the 1950s were a time in which China was subject to the fledgling authority of the

People’s Republic of China (PRC)—(the PRC stands for People’s Republic of China; the victors of

the Chinese Communist revolution of the 1940s, which ousted to Taiwan the incumbent ruling

government, Republic of China). India on the other hand was also new to national sovereignty;

in the year 1947 it had liberated itself from the imperialist rule of the British Empire. Gradually,

as the 1950s would unfold contention began to mount between China and India over territories

to India’s northern border, including the lands north of India; territory around Nepal and

China’s newly annexed Tibet. At a glance this topic sheds light on a much neglected part of cold

war history: the story of two new Asian governments vying for control at a time when western

influence struggled to maintain precedence in the third world amidst the rise of communism.

Above all, the main issue at hand concerning Chinese-Indian diplomacy during the 1950s

was Tibet and how India would respond to the PRC’s assertive military presence in that land. In

the advent of the 1950s, the PRC was committed to assert control over Tibet and to ‘liberate’

the primitive Tibetans from their old religious practice of Lamaism (a Tibetan form of

Buddhism) and the power structures of feudalism. In Tibetan society there existed a medieval

like political-social class system which the PRC deemed obsolete compared to their newly

embraced creed of communism. Soon after the PRC’s rise in 1947 the Tibetan government

acknowledged Chinese rule in their land; a formal decision made with the guidance of the PRC

and the presence of Indian diplomats. The Tibetan government adhered to accept China as a

father nation--although still maintaining their own social customs; a diplomatic treaty when

into effect with the support of the Indian government in May of 1951.

The Tibetan issue would further reveal India’s contradictory stance on diplomacy, for

instance: playing the role of beneficiary to previously signed British treaties even as a ‘liberated’

and passive nation. This issue is one of many that exist throughout history: It starts as clash of

old diplomatic treaties then turned into warfare; the blowing of smoke in another’s ass, the

stroke of the pen, all in the middle of an uprising of political ideals-- some promising a utopian

society, others just money, liquor and ‘nice things.’ Moreover, In 1950 India’s military might

was weak. Decades under British oppression and liberation through peaceful resistance,

combined with abject poverty and a rigid, unforgiving class system made India anything but an

imposing military figure in the cold war. In fact, the nation’s leaders hadn’t the will to side with

any of the ‘Two Camps’ (The USA or the Soviet Bear). The Serving prime minister at the time,

Jawaharlal Nehru took a neutral and very passive stance with China by “Informing Chinese

leaders that India had neither political nor territorial ambitions, nor did it seek special privileges

in neighboring Tibet, but that traditional trading rights between both countries must continue,”

(Alastair Lamb expresses in his work the China-India Border: Origins of Disputed Boundaries.) As

early as 1951, India was compliant to the emerging power of communist China.

As justification for gaining Tibet, many Chinese conjured a bad history between the two

countries as a point of validation for the PRC’s actions. Historically, the 4 th Qing Emperor of

China, the “Kangxi Emperor” exercised partial control over Tibet in the early 18 th century.” The

Kangxi was part of the Qing dynasty, which would fight with Tibet throughout the 18 th and 19th

centuries. Kangxi was interested “less in Tibet as a territory than as the home of the Tibetan

Buddhist Church which had much influence over the tribes of Mongolia.”(Lamb) Tibet stood as

a religious Mecca and stronghold for keepers of the Buddhist faith. The Kangxi Emperor played

an iconic role in Chinese-Tibetan history when he rescued the Dalai Lama from Turkestani

bandits during the 18th century. He ultimately managed to conquer the Tibetan lands

throughout his rule. Through a vast window of time roughly after the Kangxi’ Emperor’s rule in

1720 up until 1912, China administered much authority over this remote and extreme land

through “the exercise of Chinese representatives supervising government by Tibetan

authorities.” (Lamb)

Notably, India’s role during this time was unique as it was precarious: a newly emerging

country on the cusp of two great expansive empires (USSR and PRC), barely holding on to its

own national sovereignty. China was revolutionary. India was more moderate and neutral. The

PRC’s interests in Tibet drew a line in the sand between each national ethos; India was merely

focused on maintaining a self sufficient economy while China-like the USSR—was proud enough

to assert its might over assumed territories. Comparatively, Indian Diplomacy was soft (a

country that defines peaceful protests); in an effort not to antagonize the PRC most Indians

grew to accept Tibet as being official Chinese territory even if the area had traditionally Indian

parts. However contrarily there were still Indian diplomats who saw Tibet as “More Culturally

Indian based than Chinese.”(Hayes). Regardless of any such sentiment, China’s leaders asserted

to all foreign leaders that Chinese authority in Tibet was warranted on the grounds that it was

their own land to being with. In an effort to keep the peace, China and India continued mutual

friendship; China expressed leniency by permitting Tibetan trade with India.

Interestingly enough, as Indian diplomats were vying to save themselves from China

there were still some who would not ignore the past treaties which Tibet signed with the Great

Britain during the Simla accords of 1914. These series of diplomatic talks had proved to be an

obstruction between the China and India thirty years later. In the 1950s the present condition

of annexation in Tibet, theoretically required the eradication of the precepts entailed with the

Simla accord of 1914. Simla contradicted the status quo because it gave Tibet the opportunity

to expand its territory in traditionally Chinese regions. A line of demarcation named the

McMahon line, which created a new Tibetan Chinese boundary, would favor Tibet and the once

present British Empire while awkwardly undermining Chinese rule. By 1951, the Chinese were

clearly in control over Tibet, but nonetheless the treaty was still in existence. The McMahon

line is a historic point of discussion since it denotes exactly where the British separated British

controlled India from China. The line is comprised of a stretch of hundreds of miles along the

Himalayan foothills. Conclusively, the PRC deemed the treaties at the Simla accord erroneous

which gave them the diplomatic foothold to create military posts and trade routes along

‘traditionally Indian controlled areas.

Simla not only caused discord between China and India, it also furthered disharmony

between the East and the west. Great Britain’s omnipresent tendency to map out the world in

its own image was distasteful to say the least for the PRC. Here as historians we see another

example of the contributing factors for the dichotomy between East and West: Soviet and

British-American: capitalist and communist. Such treaties do prove to create alienation

between the East and West. The Chinese, with all their previous aggressive actions towards the

British (i.e. Boxer Rebellion and Opium trade wars), did not takes the Simla accords lightly. Such

instances prove how the stroke of a pen can cause later problems, even decades after the

stroking is performed. As such, treaties today are doing the same, and like Simla, their negative

side effects won’t come into fruition for another forty years: ensuing war, economic sanctions

and clash of borders.

Eventually it was the discontent over the Simla accords which transformed Sino-Indian

relations into a conflict over territory. Yet the areas under dispute are almost impossible to map

out. Because of the ruggedness and vastness of the Himalayans, the border areas were very

hard to assess throughout the years. In the 1950s, a clear Himalayan topography was very hard

to come by, namely one that separates the land between two mountain systems: the

Karakoram and Kunlun. This is interesting to consider for historians as to how actual physical

terrain hinders diplomacy.

Anyway, since at one time British India had influence over the remote Himalayan states

such as Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and Ladakh—some which are regions that fell into the tributary

Chinese system. At the height of British hegemony, the leaders of these states would often

forego any mention or respect to their Chinese superiors in order to coax the British.

Throughout the early 20th century, these Himalayan states “engaged in major conflict interests

by their dual allegiance to both Great Britain and China.” (Lamb) The rulers of the Himalayan

states of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal for instance all “possessed Chinese official rank; but this did

not deter them from accepting, even seeking, British decorations and membership in the British

order of chivalry.” Riding the coat tails of the British Empire—even becoming a warrior of her

majesty’s forces; i.e. the Ghurkas (who still serve the UK armed forces today)—was much more

interesting to many of the natives of these lands than obedience to China.

The British had control and order through military might as well as an appeal that

brought many young men from shanty towns to fight for the Empire that never sets. Great

Britain’s influence over Sikkim for instance was under British control from 1890 till several

decades after-- despite previous Chinese or even Tibetan claims to ownership. By the 1890s, a

series of talks called the Anglo-Chinese Convention recognized British supremacy in Sikkim.

These treaties demonstrate the rising complications in the third world which ensued once an

empire lost its hold. Even when the British lost their prized Jewel, there were residual conflicts

concerning lands such as Sikkim. Indians claimed control over such lands by antiquated British

rule and yet the Chinese claimed control by the failure of the British Empire.

During the 1950s, a pivotal move in the affairs of global politics was the Bandung

conference of 1955. This series of talks was an effort to further nationalism in African-Asian

countries in order to counteract foreign—namely western--influences; a move that in some

cases allowed soviet influence to take its hold on Asian and Africa countries. India’s role during

the 1955 conference gave an example of how a third world country can liberate itself from the

hegemony of the west. In Asia liberation through nationalism would save a country from the

domination of the west, or perhaps the Soviet Union. However, India—although it symbolized

liberation—chose a more neutral, non direct manner of diplomacy. India’s leader Nehru pushed

for a “neutralist policy” which had the advantage of being politically flexible. This allowed India

to not solely align itself with one particular side of the Cold War Camps (USA vs. Soviet Union).

India’s claim to land by virtue of previous imperialist rule--while embracing the doctrine

of liberation from Western imperialism—was proving to be contradictory, or at worst

hypocritical. India was losing credibility and revealing itself as a soft diplomatic figure. After the

Bandung conference in 1955, Indian leaders seemed at best unsubstantial to the PRC. Bandung

proved to be a tipping point for Sino-Indian diplomacy. India, although might have been newly

independent could still be used as a neutral strategic point in exchange for aid by the west

because of its non aliment policy. India played the role of an Asian country that could still keep

peace and trade without choosing to embrace communist doctrine or western rule. This form

of diplomacy was would not win over PRC officials, many of whom fought a bitter civil war in

the latter half of the 1940s--amidst the aftermath of over ten years of savage warfare ushered

by the fanatical Japanese.

The Chinese treated the present state of Indian politicians as a democratic work in

progress; although there were differences, both countries could relate with one another in how

they met and struggled with new forms of political paradigms. Chinese being a communist

country and India being an offshoot form of capitalist democracy, yet both are neighboring

each other, both deriving from humble and impoverished origins. Despite these similarities, the

PRC saw India as a country that lacks a “fundamentally different course of action in

government” (Hay). India lost validity in the eyes of its foreign critics as it held the stigma of

being a follower to western ideals. But in truth there was little that India could do since it

lacked the economic and military power. The result of which: India’s Prime Minister Nehru

Signed a compromised policy of neutrality closely based on British liberal democracy, while

branding India as neither Western nor Communist.

Despite the criticisms PRC officials held towards the Indians. Both countries were

symbols of Asian nationalism and solidarity during the 1950s; they both represented the spirit

of Asian resurgence; their “resentment of the of the great power’s reluctance to allow Asian

problems to be settled by Asians, the resistance to Western attempts to build up spheres of

influence in Asia.”

India’s non violent resistance towards Great Britain and its ethos proved to be

contradictory with China. The five principles of peaceful coexistence, or the Pancha Sheela (in

Punjabi terms) are worth noting since it expresses the spirit of the Indian people and how such

non aggression played out with China. (1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity

and sovereignty; this implies that Indian’s were obligated to respect the PRCs handling of Tibet.

(2) Mutual non aggression: meaning that both countries should peacefully resolve border

issues, despite it having little effect. (3) Mutual non interference in each other’s internal affairs.

(4) Equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence; this sort of soft ball diplomacy—

although idealistic in a dangerous world—was not effective amidst a time of military expansion

and shifting nation-states. These principles were a set of commandments for Asians to form

peaceful relations despite how violent and hostile the world was growing to become.

India prime minster Nehru idolized the five principles of peaceful coexistence declaring

on May, 15th 1954 t:”if the these principles were adopted in the relations of various countries

with one another, a great deal to the trouble of the present day world would disappear. To

Nehru these tenets were integral to the process of maintaining peace in Asia, especially while

many countries were beginning to side with any of the two rising powers after world war two.

Yet not all Indian diplomatic critics of the time felt the same way regarding China and

the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.’ The leader of Nehru’s opposition, Archarya

Kripalani, always opposed India’s governmental policy in relation to China. In fact, he bitterly

disagreed with the five principles and China’s role in Tibet stating:

“Tibet is culturally more akin to India than it is to China, at least

Communist China, which has repudiated all its old culture under

communism. I consider this as much a colonial aggression on part

of China as any colony aggression indulged in by Western

nations… I say China’s occupation of Tibet is a deliberate act of

aggression.”

Mr. Kripalani even “apostrophized the five principles as born in sin.” Notwithstanding, it was

Nehru’s positive affirmation of the five principles that most Indians agreed with. Likewise PRC

leader Zhou Enlai reciprocated Nehru’s idealistic talk during his visit to India in 1955 whereupon

he received a tumultuous and friendly welcome. It was during this visit that the phrase “Hindi-

Chini bhai bhai”—India and China are brothers—was coined. (Patterson).

However ideal the Bandung conference and the five principles of peaceful coexistence

were being advertised, it was not enough to resolve the Tibet issue. Indian leaders dismissed

Tibet as being resolved while Chinese diplomats accused them of pushing the issue aside.

Eventually such procrastination resulted in a border military conflict as the Chinese were

building military posts and roads within ‘Indian’ areas of the Tibet: the result was a three year

war from 1959 to 1962 with nearly 800 dead Chinese and 1350 Indian casualties. Nehru’s

favor to support old outdated British treaties and pacifist ideologies were not enough win over

PRC premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai’s official stance was that no government—be it before or

after the birth of the PRC- had accepted the McMahon line as legal; the agreements of the 1914

Simla accords, were nothing short of illegal. Zhou Enlai, offered that “China would relinquish its

claim to much of India’s northeast region as an exchange for India to abandon its claim to

Tibetan land.” (Patterson) Precluding to war, the Indian government refused on the basis of the

proposal being humiliating and unequal.

This fledgling era of Chinese diplomacy demonstrates how the exaltation of previous

treaties and ideals can be ignored for the gain of a more assertive nation: in this case China’s

mettle to assert control in previous controlled British lands. The 1950s were a fresh age for

ideal politics; a period after years of fascism and fanatical military expansion. Contrary to such

fresh ideas as the five principles, or taking a neutral stance towards Two Camps, for India and

many of the world’s countries through the Cold War, such sentiment proves to be merely

theoretical. More imperative is the ability to act boldly amidst a changing world not matter how

unpopular the act may be in a time of complacency.

Works Cited

Hay, Stephen N. 1970. Asian ideas of east and west: Tagore and His Critics in Japan,

China and India. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts

Lamb, Alastair. 1964. The China-India Border: the Origins of the Disputed Boundaries.

Oxford University Press: London, England.

Patterson, George N. 1963 Peking vs Delhi. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc: 64 University Place

new, N.Y., USA