Single-Shell Tank Structural Integrity Assessment · PDF fileSingle-Shell Tank Structural...

RPP-PLAN-61510 Revision 0

Single-Shell Tank Structural Integrity Assessment Plan

D. J. Washenfelder A E M Consulting, LLC

J. R. Gunter T. J. Venetz Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC

Date Published XXXX 2017

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection

Contract No. DE-AC27-08RV14800

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RPP-PLAN-61510, Rev. 0

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order – Tri-Party Agreement (TPA)1 Change Request M-45-10-01 established Single-Shell Tank (SST) Integrity Project interim milestones and targets in January 2011. Interim milestone M-045-91I established the requirement for a second SST structural integrity assessment to be completed by September 30, 2018.

DOE shall provide, to Ecology, an IQRPE certification of SSTs structural integrity for the remainder of the mission, or for such time as the IQRPE believes he/she can reasonably certify. The analysis supporting the certification shall be performed in accordance with the requirements identified for analysis in WAC 173-303-640(2)2 and will include a due diligence review of RPP-10435.3 IQRPE certification of the SST leak integrity is not required. A work plan and schedule for additional integrity assessment activities will be submitted as a change package to cover any time period between the end date of the IQRPE certification and the end date of the mission.

This plan provides guidance for the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment necessary for continued safe storage of waste in the SSTs. The assessment will be completed by an Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer (IQRPE) in accordance with an IQRPE plan that addresses all elements of the structural integrity assessment needed to fulfill the requirements of TPA interim milestone M-045-91I. The integrity assessment is being completed on behalf of the owner, the U.S. Department of Energy. The 2018 SST structural integrity assessment will use the results of the 2002 structural integrity assessment as a fixed, reference baseline for purposes of assessing the SSTs, and will use both structural analyses and structural field evaluations that have been completed for the SSTs during the period from July 1, 2002 to present.

1 Ecology, EPA, and DOE, 1989, “Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order – Tri-Party

Agreement,” 3 volumes., as amended, State of Washington Department of Ecology, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Department of Energy, Olympia, Washington.

2 WAC 173-303-640(2), “Assessment of Existing Tank System’s Integrity,” Washington Administrative Code, as amended.

3 RPP-10435, 2002, Single-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.


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CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ...................................................................... 1-1

2.0 2018 SINGLE-SHELL TANK STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT SCOPE .............................................................................................................................. 2-1 2.1 Single-Shell Tank System Components List .......................................................... 2-2

2.1.1 100-Series and 200-Series Tanks .............................................................. 2-2 2.1.2 Retrieval Equipment.................................................................................. 2-3 2.1.3 Air Ventilation Systems ............................................................................ 2-3 2.1.4 Inactive/Not-in-Use Ancillary Equipment ................................................ 2-3

2.2 Single-Shell Tank Integrity Assessment Plan Organization .................................. 2-4

3.0 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT EXCLUSIONS ................................................................. 3-1

4.0 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT ............................................ 4-1 4.1 2002 Single-Shell Tank Interity Assessment Report Due Diligence ..................... 4-1 4.2 Integrity Assessment Report Certification ............................................................. 4-2

5.0 FACILITY DESCRIPTION.............................................................................................. 5-1 5.1 Single-Shell Tank Construction Sequence Photographs ...................................... 5-14 5.2 Operating History ................................................................................................. 5-23

6.0 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES ......................................... 6-1 6.1 Structural Evaluations and Loading Conditions ..................................................... 6-1 6.2 Concrete Exposed to High Temperatures ............................................................... 6-4 6.3 Concrete Exposed to Tank Waste .......................................................................... 6-5 6.4 Tank C-107 Tank Dome Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Condition .................... 6-6 6.5 Tank A-106 Sidewall and Footing Concrete Condition ......................................... 6-8 6.6 Tank SX-108 Sidewall and Footing Concrete Condition ..................................... 6-11 6.7 Tank SX-115 Sidewall and Footing Concrete Condition ..................................... 6-12 6.8 Dome Deflection Survey Program ....................................................................... 6-13 6.9 Dome Load Control .............................................................................................. 6-18 6.10 Single-Shell Tank Dome Structural Video Inspections ....................................... 6-22 6.11 Single-Shell Tank Liner Corrosion Chemistry ..................................................... 6-32

7.0 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 7-1

APPENDICES

Appendix A – 2002 Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer Integrity Assessment Conclusions and Uncertainties ......................................................... A-i

Appendix B – Single-Shell Tank System Post-June 2002 Events with Structural Integrity Implications.......................................................................................................... B-i

Appendix C – Single-Shell Tank Management Assessments (January 2002 to April 2017)...... C-i


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FIGURES

Figure 5-1. Type and Capacity of Single-Shell Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks ............... 5-2 Figure 5-2. Single-Shell Underground Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks ............................ 5-3 Figure 5-3. Typical 100-Series Type II 530,000 Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser

Configuration for B, BX, C, T, and U Farms Tanks ............................................ 5-3 Figure 5-4. Typical 100-Series Type III 750,000-Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser

Configuration for BY, S, TX, and TY Farms Tanks ........................................... 5-4 Figure 5-5. Typical 100-Series Type IVA 1-Million Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser

Configuration for SX Farm Tanks ....................................................................... 5-5 Figure 5-6. Typical 100-Series Type IVB 1-Million Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser

Configuration for A Farm Tanks ......................................................................... 5-6 Figure 5-7. Typical 100-Series Type IVC 1-Million Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser

Configuration for AX Farm Tanks ...................................................................... 5-6 Figure 5-8. Typical 200-Series Type I 55,000-Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser

Configuration for 200-Series Tanks in B, C, T, and U Farms ............................. 5-8 Figure 5-9. Placement of Reinforcing Steel in Base Showing Wall Dowels (TX Farm) ..... 5-14 Figure 5-10. Pouring of Concrete in Base Slab Showing Wall Dowels Around the

Perimeter ............................................................................................................ 5-14 Figure 5-11. Base Slab Construction ...................................................................................... 5-15 Figure 5-12. Construction of Steel Liners .............................................................................. 5-15 Figure 5-13. Base of Liner with View of Sloping (Dish-Shaped) Base Slab ......................... 5-16 Figure 5-14. Tanks in Various Stages of Construction Showing Hydrostatic Testing of

Liner ................................................................................................................... 5-16 Figure 5-15. View of Liner Coating and Wood Forms for Dome Concrete........................... 5-17 Figure 5-16. View of Wood Forms and Wall Reinforcing Steel ............................................ 5-17 Figure 5-17. Placement of Dome Reinforcing Steel After Wall Concrete Has Been Poured 5-18 Figure 5-18. View of Reinforcement Steel in the Haunch Region ......................................... 5-18 Figure 5-19. Placement of Dome Reinforcing Steel ............................................................... 5-19 Figure 5-20. View of Dome Reinforcing Steel Showing Square and Deformed Round

Bars .................................................................................................................... 5-19 Figure 5-21. Pouring of Dome Concrete ................................................................................ 5-20 Figure 5-22. Removal of Exterior Forms from Dome Concrete ............................................ 5-20 Figure 5-23. Voids in Concrete Created During Construction ............................................... 5-21 Figure 5-24. Voids in Concrete Created During Construction Showing Reinforcing Steel ... 5-21 Figure 5-25. Interior of Tank Dome Showing Construction Flaws and Visible Form Lines . 5-22 Figure 5-26. Interior of Tank Dome Showing Repair of Construction Flaws ........................ 5-22 Figure 5-27. Interior of Tank Dome Showing Dome Penetrations and Repair of

Construction Flaws ............................................................................................ 5-23 Figure 6-1. Tank C-107 Plug with Core Locations Marked ................................................... 6-7 Figure 6-2. Nondestructive Evaluation of Tank A-106 Dome ............................................... 6-9 Figure 6-3. As-Found Condition of Tank A-106 Sidewall with Reinforcing Steel

Locations Marked ................................................................................................ 6-9 Figure 6-4. Tank C-106 Type II SST Post-Thermal Creep Dome Deflection Under

Uniform Surface Load with Best-Estimate Concrete Properties ....................... 6-14 Figure 6-5. Tank C-106 Type II Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform

Surface Load ...................................................................................................... 6-15


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Figure 6-6. Type II Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load ..... 6-16 Figure 6-7. Type III Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load ... 6-16 Figure 6-8. Type IV Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load ... 6-17

TABLES

Table 5-1. Single-Shell Underground Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks ............................ 5-1 Table 5-2. Summary of Single-Shell Tank Properties for Structural Concrete, Grout

Concrete, and Asphaltic Waterproofing Membrane for Type I and Type II Tanks .................................................................................................................. 5-10

Table 5-3. Summary of Single-Shell Tank Properties for Structural Concrete, Grout Concrete, and Asphaltic Waterproofing Membrane for Type III Tanks ........... 5-11

Table 5-4. Summary of Single-Shell Tank Properties for Structural Concrete, Grout Concrete, and Asphaltic Waterproofing Membrane for Type IVA, Type IVB and Type IVC Tanks .......................................................................................... 5-12

Table 5-5. Single-Shell Tank Codes and Material Properties for Steel Liners ................... 5-13 Table 6-1. Single-Shell Tank Post-2002 Structural Analyses ............................................... 6-3 Table 6-2. Evaluations of Thermal Operating Loads ............................................................ 6-5 Table 6-3. Investigations Supporting Reduction in Number of Single-Shell Tank

Assumed Leaking Tanks ...................................................................................... 6-5 Table 6-4. Effects of Moisture and Waste on Single-Shell Tank Concrete .......................... 6-6 Table 6-5. Tank C-107 Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Properties ...................................... 6-8 Table 6-6. Tank A-106 Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Properties (2 pages) .................... 6-10 Table 6-7. Tank SX-108 Concrete Footing Sample Results ............................................... 6-12 Table 6-8. Tank SX-108 Concrete Footing and Sidewall Evaluation ................................. 6-12 Table 6-9. Tank SX-115 Concrete Sidewall Evaluation ..................................................... 6-13 Table 6-10. Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Surveys and Load Control Logs .............. 6-18 Table 6-11. Single-Shell Tank Dome Loading Management Program Elements ................. 6-19 Table 6-12. Single-Shell Tank Dome Load Control Technical Bases (2 pages) .................. 6-19 Table 6-13. Single-Shell Tank Farm Route Map Drawings (2 pages) .................................. 6-21 Table 6-14. Single-Shell Tank Visual Inspection Reports .................................................... 6-23 Table 6-15. Single-Shell Tank Video Inspections with Dome Interior Surface Structural

Notations (3 pages) ............................................................................................ 6-23 Table 6-16. Single-Shell Tank Video Inspections with Water Intrusion Notations

(2 pages) ............................................................................................................. 6-26 Table 6-17. Concrete Dome Cracking Origin, Significance, and Mitigation (2 pages) ........ 6-28 Table 6-18. Single-Shell Tank Visual Inspection Dates January 2009 – April 2017

(2 pages) ............................................................................................................. 6-30 Table 6-19. Single-Shell Tank Waste Chemistry Simulant Tests ......................................... 6-32 Table 6-20. Single-Shell Tank Waste Chemistries with a Propensity for Localized

Corrosion............................................................................................................ 6-33


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TERMS

Abbreviations and Acronyms AC administrative control ACI American Concrete Institute AOR analysis of record ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials AWWA American Water Works Association CTL Group Construction Technology Laboratories D/C demand/capacity DOE U.S. Department of Energy DSA documented safety analysis DST double-shell tank Ecology State of Washington Department of Ecology FY fiscal year HFFACO Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order IMUST inactive miscellaneous underground storage tank IQRPE Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer MOP Management Observation Program MUST miscellaneous underground storage tank ORP U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection OSD operating specification document PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory QA quality assurance RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act RCW Revised Code of Washington SSC systems, structures, and components SST single-shell tank SSTIP Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project TPA Tri-Party Agreement TSR technical safety requirement USQ unreviewed safety question WAC Washington Administrative Code WRPS Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC

Units oF degrees Fahrenheit µ micron Ci curies ft feet ft3 cubic feet g gram gal gallons in. inch


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in.2 square inch kgal thousand pounds ksi kilopound per square inch lb pound lbf foot-pound mg milligram Mgal million gallons min minute w.g. water gauge yr year


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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In August 2001, Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (HFFACO) – Tri-Party-Agreement (TPA) (Ecology et al, 1989) Change Request M-23-01-01 established requirements necessary for determining the structural integrity of the single-shell tank (SST) system. TPA milestone M-23-24 required the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) to prepare an SST system structural integrity assessment report and associated certification and determination by June 30, 2002. The report was to document and assess the integrity of the SST system comprising 149 SSTs and associated ancillary equipment pursuant to the requirements of 40 CFR 265.191, “Assessment of Existing Tank System’s Integrity.” The report would be certified by an Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer (IQRPE) using the following statement:

I certify under penalty of law that I have personally examined and am familiar with the information submitted in this document, and all attachments, and that, based on my assessment of the plans and procedures utilized for obtaining this information, I believe that the information is true, accurate, and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for submitting false information, including the possibility of fine and imprisonment.

The assessment was limited to the 149 100-series and 200-series SSTs and the “active/in use” ancillary equipment used for waste transfers. At the time of the assessment, the active/in use ancillary equipment consisted of 18 underground pipelines and 45 pits. The ancillary equipment supported the double-shell tank (DST) system and is listed for that purpose in the table of disposition of DST system components not in use beyond June 30, 2005, included in Attachment 1 to ORP Letter 00-OSD-175 (Clark, 2000). The attachment satisfied TPA milestone M-48-07, which required ORP to submit a disposition plan for all DST components not in use post-2005, corresponding to Action 5 of State of Washington Department of Ecology (Ecology) Administrative Orders 00NWPKW-1250 and 00NWPKW-1251 (Silver, 2000a/b).4

By June 2006, the remaining SST system ancillary equipment supporting the DST system had been stabilized and isolated and was now classified as “inactive/not-in-use.” The Letter 00-OSD-175 attachment was revised to reflect the post-June 2005 equipment status and submitted to Ecology in June 2006 (Schepens, 2006).

The 2002 integrity assessment report (RPP-10435, Single-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report) concluded that the reinforced concrete tank structures had an adequate collapse margin, justifying continued safe storage of the waste through 2018, the remaining period of SST waste storage. However, given the tank leak history and current condition of the tank liners, long-term leak integrity for the liquids remaining in the tank could not be proven for any of the SSTs. After RPP-10435 was issued, ORP declared that the SSTs and their ancillary systems were unfit for use due to the inability to demonstrate leak tightness (Rasmussen, 2002). The 2002 IQRPE integrity assessment conclusions and recommendations are summarized in Appendix A.

4 Administrative Orders 00NWPKW-1250 and 00NWPKW-1251 are identical; one was issued to DOE

Richland Operations Office and ORP; the other to CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., the tank farm contractor in 2000.


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At the time of the 2002 integrity assessment, the TPA M-45-05 SST waste retrieval completion milestone date was September 30, 2018, and the TPA M-45-06 SST closure completion milestone date was September 30, 2024 (HNF-2944, Single-Shell Tank Retrieval Program Mission Analysis Report, Appendix C, Table C-1).5 However, following negotiations during 2007 – 2009, changes were made to the TPA M-45 milestone series. The SST closure date was extended from 2024 to 2043 reflecting continuing difficulty achieving the retrieval rate needed to meet the 2018 schedule.6

In addition to extending the completion schedule, TPA Change Request M-45-09-01 added a new milestone that created an SST Structural Integrity Expert Panel. The panel would evaluate the existing condition of the SSTs, and make recommendations for additional evaluations and program elements that would be needed to sustain the SST structural integrity for an extended period of time.

The Expert Panel made 33 recommendations based on the proceedings of two workshops. The panel further identified 10 of the 33 as primary recommendations; these and six secondary recommendations formed the basis of what has become the Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project (SSTIP) (RPP-RPT-43116, Expert Panel Report for Hanford Site Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project; RPP-RPT-45921, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Expert Panel Report; RPP-PLAN-45082, Implementation Plan for the Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project).

During October through December 2010, DOE, Ecology, and Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS, the Tank Operations Contractor) negotiated a series of candidate TPA interim milestones and targets based on the panel’s recommendations. The panel’s recommendations were categorized as either Phase I or Phase II:

• Phase I – Recommendations having sufficient information available to formulate meaningful milestones at that time

• Phase II – Recommendations dependent on information that would be developed during Phase I milestone execution and would be considered for milestones at a later date (TPA Change M-45-10-01, TPA interim milestone M-045-91H).

TPA Change Request M-45-10-01 established the new SSTIP interim milestones and targets in January 2011. Interim milestone M-045-91I established the requirement for a second SST integrity assessment, to be completed by September 30, 2018:

DOE shall provide, to Ecology, an IQRPE certification of SSTs structural integrity for the remainder of the mission, or for such time as the IQRPE believes he/she can reasonably certify. The analysis supporting the certification shall be performed in accordance with the requirements identified for analysis in WAC 173-303-640(2) and will include a due diligence review of RPP-10435. IQRPE certification of the SST leak integrity is not required. A work plan and schedule for additional integrity assessment activities will be submitted as a change package to cover any time period between the end date of the IORPE certification and the end date of the mission.

5 TPA Change Request M-45-09-01, dated October 5, 2010 6 For example, by the end of fiscal year 2016, only 15 of the 149 SSTs had been retrieved.


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2.0 2018 SINGLE-SHELL TANK STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT SCOPE

The purpose of this plan is to describe boundaries, elements and exclusions for the TPA M-045-91I interim milestone SST structural integrity assessment, the basis for exclusions, and additional evaluations and program elements that have been undertaken since the 2002 integrity assessment to sustain the structural integrity of the SSTs for an extended period of time.

The assessment will assess the ability of the “RCRA7 non-compliant” SSTs to store dangerous waste for an extended period of time. The assessment will use the regulations, design and construction standards, post-construction structural analyses and the SSTs’ structural monitoring and data collection process as a basis for determining the ability of the tanks to remain structurally sound.

At a minimum, this assessment must consider the following with respect to the structural integrity of the 149 SSTs:

• Design standards, if available, according to which the tank system was constructed

• Dangerous characteristics of the waste(s) stored in the SSTs

• Documented age of the tank system, if available (otherwise, an estimate of the age)

• An estimate of remaining useful life of the system, if practical

• Results of internal inspection, or other tank structural integrity examination

• A due diligence review of RPP-10435 identifying any latent structural integrity assessment elements that either were not evident 16 years ago, or did not seem applicable at the time of the assessment, to be addressed in the 2018 assessment. At the time of the 2002 assessment, SST waste storage was predicted to end in 2018 and the tanks would be closed by 2024. Sixteen years later, current modeling predicts that the SSTs will continue to store at least some waste for the foreseeable future.

This plan supports the structural integrity assessment necessary for the continued operation of the “SST system.” For purposes of the assessment the “SST system” includes only the 100-series and 200-series tanks. Ancillary equipment and leak integrity are excluded from the assessment per agreement with Ecology during TPA milestone negotiations (TPA 2011 Change Package M-45-10-01).8 The assessment is being completed by the SST operator, WRPS, for the owner, DOE.

The assessment will review the SST analyses performed from June 12, 2002, through July 31, 2018 (the time period since completion of RPP-10435). Additional analysis may be considered, although the scope does not primarily require new analysis of components or reevaluation of prior IQRPE work.

A cross-reference matrix will be included as an appendix to the integrity assessment report to demonstrate how the requirements identified in this section have been met. The matrix will be revised during preparation of the assessment to reference applicable documents used by the

7 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 USC 6901, et seq. 8 The SSTs were declared unfit for use in 2002 because their leak integrity could no longer be assured

(Rasmussen, 2002).


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IQRPE. The matrix will ultimately provide a summary assessment of compliance, including cross-reference to the document(s) that demonstrate meeting the requirements.

The IQRPE will determine the topics, checks, and extent of analyses necessary to independently demonstrate that the SSTs’ structural integrity satisfies the structural provisions of the State of Washington dangerous waste regulations contained in Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-640(2), “Assessment of Existing Tank System’s Integrity,” for existing tank systems. In addition to the requirements of WAC 173-303-640(2), the integrity assessment must include the following elements:

• A site map of the facility showing the location of the tank system

• A sketch of the tank system; locations of specific items inspected should be clearly indicated and cross-referenced in the results of the integrity assessment.

• Results of the structural integrity assessment; the results should clearly state if the SSTs have sufficient structural strength and compatibility with the waste being stored or treated

• Consideration of the conclusions and uncertainties identified in RPP-10435, Section 4.0, with respect to the intervening time period between assessments and the expectations for continued waste storage

• An estimate of remaining useful life of the SSTs, if practical

• A recommended schedule and work plan for future SST integrity assessments, “to ensure that the tank retains its structural integrity and will not collapse, rupture, or fail”. The basis for the recommendation must be included in the report in order to determine how changes of circumstances might affect the periodicity of future integrity assessments.

• A statement by an IQRPE certifying the results of the integrity assessment. This certification must be according to WAC 173-303-810(13)(a), “Certification.” The IQRPE’s signature and stamp must be placed below the certification statement.

• Exceptions taken to WAC 173-303-640(2) in order to certify to WAC 173-303-810(13)(a) must be identified in the assessment report.

Ecology issued Publication 94-114, Guidance for Assessing and Certifying Tank Systems, as supplemental guidance for completing an integrity assessment for existing tank systems by Washington State dangerous waste regulation permittees. The document contains examples of integrity assessment content and conduct.

2.1 SINGLE-SHELL TANK SYSTEM COMPONENTS LIST Tables 1 to 10 of WA7-89000-8967, Part V, Closure Group 4, “Single-Shell Tank System RCRA Dangerous Waste Permit Application Part A Form,” list the tanks and ancillary equipment that make up the SST system. The tables will be incorporated into the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment by reference. Only the 149 100-series and 200-series tanks listed in Table 1 are included in the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment.

2.1.1 100-Series and 200-Series Tanks The 100-series and 200-series SSTs will be assessed for structural integrity as an existing “tank system” (i.e., determining that, “...the tank system is adequately designed and has sufficient structural strength and compatibility with the waste(s) to be stored or treated, to ensure that it


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will not collapse, rupture, or fail” [WAC 173-303-640(2)(c)]). An analysis of record (AOR) completed in 2015 did not reveal any significant deficiencies with the structural integrity of the SSTs, and demonstrated that each of the 149 SSTs currently satisfies the structural design requirements of American Concrete Institute (ACI) 349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Structures (RPP-RPT-49994, Summary Report for the Hanford Single-Shell Tank Structural Analyses of Record – Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record).

The leak integrity of the 100-series and 200-series SSTs will not be assessed, in accordance with the instruction provided in TPA interim milestone M-045-91I. Management of leaking SSTs pending retrieval and/or closure, and after retrieval completion, is described in RPP-9937, Single-Shell Tank System Leak Detection and Monitoring Functions and Requirements Document.9

2.1.2 Retrieval Equipment Retrieval systems are excluded from the SST structural integrity assessment. Retrieval management of SSTs is established by Appendices H and I of the TPA Action Plan (HFFACO attachment). Individual retrievals are controlled according to a tank waste retrieval work plan approved by Ecology. Following retrieval completion, a retrieval completion certification is submitted to Ecology, and within 12 months of retrieval completion, the retrieval data report is submitted.

2.1.3 Air Ventilation Systems

Air ventilation systems used on the SSTs (forced air and passive) are excluded from the assessment. These systems are regulated under Hanford’s Air Operating Permit and are not used for the storage of RCRA dangerous waste.

2.1.4 Inactive/Not-in-Use Ancillary Equipment Inactive/not-in-use ancillary equipment, including miscellaneous underground storage tanks (MUST), diversion boxes, pump pits, valve pits, process vault tanks and sumps, underground pipelines, hose-in-hose transfer lines awaiting removal and disposal, and process equipment mounted in tank risers and pits, is no longer classified “mission essential,” as defined in RPP-9937, and is excluded from the integrity assessment.10

• Inactive/not-in-use equipment is defined by RPP-9937 as: “A component with no current and no expected mission in safe storage or transfer of single-shell tank system waste. Inactive/not-in-use components may and do contain waste.”

• Mission essential equipment, as defined by RPP 9937, consists of: “Those systems, components, and structures where it would be typical for waste to be moved in or out of the system to meet a current or expected mission.”

9 RPP-9937 describes the waste management practices applicable to the SST system during the interim storage

period until the SSTs have been closed, except for the time when an SST is in retrieval. During retrieval, the SST is managed according to Appendices H and I of the TPA Action Plan. RPP-9937 is a primary TPA document requiring Ecology approval of changes.

10 RPP-9937, Section 4.1.2 B., “Miscellaneous Underground Storage Tank Implementing Requirements,” and Section 4.1.2 C, “Vessels and Cells in Miscellaneous Structures Implementing Requirements.”


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Inactive/not-in-use ancillary equipment structures that may affect the structural loading of the SSTs, such as concrete pump pits and sluice pits, will be assessed for effect on structural integrity of the SSTs.

2.2 SINGLE-SHELL TANK INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT PLAN ORGANIZATION

The 2018 SST structural integrity assessment plan is organized as follows:

• Section 1: Introduction and Background – Summary of the project scope, integrity assessment requirements, and history of past assessment activities

• Section 2: Integrity Assessment Scope – Description of the project scope, including the objectives of the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment and the boundaries of the assessment

• Section 3: Integrity Assessment Exclusions – Description of ancillary components and systems excluded from the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment

• Section 4: Structural Integrity Assessment Report Development – Structural integrity assessment report development and IQRPE requirements for certification of the SST structural integrity assessment per TPA interim milestone M-045-91I

• Section 5: Facility Description – Design information, including the design codes and standards for the system, the original basis of design, summary of the structural analysis of the system, structure waste compatibility information, primary and secondary containment features, and ongoing structural inspection activities

• Section 6: Structural Integrity Assessment Activities – Integrity assessment activities necessary to certify the system

• Section 7: References.

This plan supports the structural integrity assessment necessary for continued storage operation of the SST system. The assessment is being completed for DOE.

The assessment reviews the analyses performed from July 1, 2002, through September 30, 2018 (the time period since certification of RPP-10435, the 2002 SST integrity assessment). Additional analysis may be recommended, although the scope does not primarily require new analysis or reevaluation of prior IQRPE work, except for a due diligence review of the earlier integrity assessment documented in RPP-10435.

The IQRPE will determine the topics, checks, and extent of analyses necessary to independently demonstrate that the SST system meets the standards stated in TPA interim milestone M-045-91I and the structural provisions of WAC 173-303-640(2) for existing tank systems.

A cross-reference matrix will be maintained during the assessment to ensure that the structural integrity provisions of WAC 173-303-640(2)(c) are being comprehensively evaluated. The matrix will be revised and updated as the assessment progresses to reference applicable documents used by the IQRPE in his/her structural integrity determination. The matrix will ultimately provide a summary assessment of SSTs’ conformance with the structural integrity provisions of WAC 173-303-640(2)(c) and their capability for continued safe storage of the


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waste, and the documented evidence/basis for the assessment conclusions. The matrix will be included as an appendix to the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment report.


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3.0 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT EXCLUSIONS

The following ancillary equipment is excluded from the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment, except to the extent that they contribute to the 100-series and 200-series SST structural loading.

Retrieval Systems Retrieval systems are excluded from the SST structural integrity assessment. Retrieval management of SSTs is established by Appendices H and I of the TPA Action Plan. Individual retrievals are controlled according to a tank waste retrieval work plan approved by Ecology. Following retrieval completion, a retrieval completion certification is submitted to Ecology, and within 12 months of retrieval completion the retrieval data report is submitted.

Ventilation Systems

Air ventilation systems used on the SSTs (forced air and passive) are excluded from the assessment. These systems are regulated under the Hanford’s Air Operating Permit and are not used for the storage of RCRA dangerous waste.

Inactive/Not-in-Use Ancillary Equipment

Tables 1 to 10 of WA7-89000-8967 list the tanks and ancillary equipment that make up the SST system. Only the 149 100-series and 200-series tanks listed in Table 1 are included in the SST structural integrity assessment work scope. Ancillary equipment listed in Tables 2 to 10 is excluded from the SST structural integrity assessment, except for its contribution to SST structural loading.

Utilities and Services SST farm utilities and services, including chemical supply skids and piping systems, instrument and plant air supply lines, water skids and electrical power are excluded except for their contribution to SST structural loading.

Single-Shell Tank Leak Detection and Monitoring SST leak detection and monitoring requirements and minimum waste surveillance frequencies are specified in RPP-9937. The leak detection and monitoring equipment, including waste surface level monitoring devices, internal liquid observation wells, and external drywells, are excluded from the SST structural integrity assessment.


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4.0 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT

The IQRPE assessment will be performed by addressing each task identified within this plan. The resulting 2018 SST structural integrity assessment report will be submitted to WRPS and ORP for approval.

The reference media cited in this plan and listed in Section 7.0 (e.g., drawings, design calculations, technical reports, technical evaluations, and work orders) will be provided to the IQRPE to support the integrity assessment.

4.1 2002 SINGLE-SHELL TANK INTERITY ASSESSMENT REPORT DUE DILIGENCE

A due diligence review of RPP-10435, the 2002 SST structural integrity assessment, will be performed during the initial phase of the 2018 integrity assessment. The review will identify any latent structural integrity assessment elements and any additional emphasis of historical structural integrity assessment elements now apparent that may not have been evident 16 years ago due to changed circumstances.

The due diligence review will be performed by subject matter experts familiar with WAC 173-303-640(2) structural integrity provisions for existing tank systems. The following context for the 2018 assessment should be considered:

• The SSTs service life has been extended from 2018, the date used in the 2002 report, to 2067 or later.

• Measured material properties of recent concrete structure samples exceed the original construction specifications.

• Field and laboratory examinations have found no evidence of environmental deterioration of the external surface of the concrete structure.

• Some SST concrete sidewalls and foundations will become chronically exposed to waste solutions during the remaining service life as steel liners fail and surface water intrusions redissolve stored waste.

• Administrative orders, consent decrees, court orders, and formal agreements with the Washington State, or material changes in content or interpretation of Washington State dangerous waste regulations or the HFFACO may have influenced the content of an acceptable structural integrity assessment since the 2002 assessment.

At completion of the due diligence review, a summary information report will be prepared (1) describing the due diligence approach, the lines of inquiry, and the subject matter expert participants, and (2) identifying recommended changes from the 2002 integrity assessment approach, its content, levels of inquiry and emphasis, if any, necessary to prepare a reasonable 2018 SST structural integrity assessment.


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4.2 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT REPORT CERTIFICATION

At the conclusion of the 2018 SST structural integrity assessment, the IQRPE may choose to certify the structural integrity of the 100-series and 200-series tanks in part or in its entirety. The IQRPE will be required to maintain a direct supervisory role over the development of the integrity assessment report or any other document that requires certification with the professional engineer’s stamp/seal. In addition, the assessment report bears the stamp of the IQRPE, as the report was prepared using qualitative engineering judgment and specifies engineering-related criteria in accordance with the prevailing laws related to registered professional engineers in Washington State.

The following certification language from WAC 173-303-810(13)(a) must be used:

I certify under penalty of law that this document and all attachments were prepared under my direction or supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure that qualified personnel properly gather and evaluate the information submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person or persons who manage the system, or those persons directly responsible for gathering the information, the information submitted is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true, accurate, and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for submitting false information, including the possibility of fine and imprisonment for knowing violations.


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5.0 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

The 149 SSTs are located in 12 tank farms at the Hanford Site (Table 5-1). 133 of the tanks are 75-ft-diameter tanks with nominal capacities of 530 kgal, 750 kgal, and 1 Mgal (100-series tanks). Sixteen of the tanks are 20-ft diameter tanks with a capacity of 55 kgal each (200-series tanks). The basic configuration of all of these tanks is a reinforced-concrete tank structure lined with a carbon steel liner (Figure 5-1). In all of the SST designs, the steel liner provides the primary waste containment barrier and is structurally independent from the reinforced-concrete tank. In the following descriptions of the tanks and tables/figures, the dimensions are typical; for precise dimensions, the design drawings of record should be consulted. Additional information on tank design details is provided in Appendix A of RPP-10435.11

Table 5-1. Single-Shell Underground Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks

Tank farma Year built Number of

tanks Tank capacity

(gal) Tank liner

diameter (ft) Nominal waste

depth A 1953-55 6 1,000,000 75 30-ft - 3⅛-in.

AX 1963-65 4 1,000,000 75 31-ft - 511/16-in. B 1943-44 4

12 55,000

530,000 20 75

24-ft - 6-in. 17-ft

BX 1946-47 12 530,000 75 17-ft BY 1948-49 12 750,000 75 23-ft - 85/16- in. C 1943-44 4

12 55,000

530,000 20 75

24-ft - 6-in. 17-ft

S 1950-51 12 750,000 75 23-ft - 81/16-in. SX 1953-55 15 1,000,000 75 30-ft - 105/16-in. T 1943-44 4

12 55,000

530,000 20 75

24-ft - 6-in. 17-ft

TX 1947-48 18 750,000 75 23-ft - 85/16-in. TY 1951-52 6 750,000 75 23-ft - 81/16-in. or

23-ft - 89/16-in. U 1943-44 4

12 55,000

530,000 20 75

24-ft - 6-in. 17-ft

a Information taken from WHC-MR-0132, A History of the 200 Area Tank Farms, except operating depth, which is depth from the tank bottom center to the liquid surface level (when available) or bottom of the outlet nozzle as represented on tank drawings (liquid surface level for 241-B, C, T, U Farm tanks from D-2 and D-20; liquid surface level for 241-BX Farm from H-2-602; 241-TX Farm assumed the same as 241-BY Farm due to lack of a drawing with nozzle detail; bottom of outlet nozzle for 241-BY Farm from H-2-1313 and H-2-1318; bottom of outlet nozzle for 241-S Farm from H-2-1783 and H-2-1789; bottom of outlet nozzle for 241-TY Farm from H-2-2244 [shows height from top plate to outlet nozzle centerline as 14 in.] and H-2-2250 [shows height from top plate to outlet nozzle centerline as 14½ in.]; liquid surface level for 241-SX Farm from H-2-39511; liquid surface level for 241-A Farm from H-2-55911; bottom of inlet nozzle for 241-AX Farm from H-2-44562 and H-2-44635). Full drawing references are provided in Section 7.0.

11 This section and Section 6.1 are transcribed verbatim from RPP-46305/PNNL-19403, Single-Shell Tank

Inspection Program, Rev. 0, except for minor technical corrections, and editorial and formatting changes.


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SST Type I, 55 kgal

SST Type II, 530 kgal

SST Type III, 758 kgal

SST Type IVA, 1 Mgal

SST Type IVB, 1 Mgal

SST Type IVC, 1 Mgal

Figure 5-1. Type and Capacity of Single-Shell Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks

The first generation of SSTs (located in B, C, T, U, and BX Farms12) was constructed between 1943 and 1947 (Figure 5-2). These large 55,000 gal and 530,000 gal storage-tanks followed the American Water Works Association (AWWA)13 construction practices. The ¼-in.-thick steel liners were all built using American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)14 A7 carbon steel.

The Type I 20-ft diameter 55,000 gal capacity tanks in the B, C, T, and U Farms, are reinforced-concrete, vertical cylinders with 1-ft-thick slab roofs, and are lined with ¼-in.-thick cylindrical steel liners. The concrete tank structure consists of a 6-in.-thick base slab and a 1-ft-thick cylindrical wall that rests on a circular footing that is an integral part of the tank and base slab. These tanks have a sidewall height of 25-ft. The first radioactive process waste was routed to tank storage in December 1944.

12 Throughout this document, individual tanks and tank farms are referred to without the “241-” preceding the

tank/tank farm designator (e.g., Tank 241-C-102 is referred to as Tank C-102, and 241-B Tank Farm is referred to as B Farm).

13 AWWA is a registered trademark of the American Water Works Association, Denver, Colorado. 14 ASTM is a registered trademark of ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.


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Figure 5-2. Single-Shell Underground Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks

The Type II 75-ft diameter tanks with a nominal capacity of 530,000 gal have a 1-ft-thick, approximately 16-ft 8-in. high cylindrical reinforced-concrete wall that rests on a 2-ft-thick reinforced-concrete cylindrical footing (Figure 5-3).

Source: RPP-46305 | PNNL-19403, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Inspection Program, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

Figure 5-3. Typical 100-Series Type II 530,000 Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser Configuration for B, BX, C, T, and U Farms Tanks


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The footing gradually tapers to a 6-in.-thick reinforced concrete basemat foundation. The basemat foundation is dish-shaped and lined with a 2-in.-thick layer of grout and a ⅜-in.-thick layer of asphaltic waterproofing membrane. A 15-in.-thick shallow elliptically shaped dome rests on the cylindrical wall. A ¼-in.-thick steel liner lines the bottom and sidewall of the tank. In the lower region of the tank near the intersection of the base and sidewall, the liner is 5/16-in.-thick and has a 4-ft radius knuckle. The operating depth of these tanks is 17-ft. The tanks in the BX Farm were also built to similar design specifications, with the exception that the bottom steel liner thickness was increased to ⅜-in.

The second generation of 75-ft diameter SST designs is represented by the Type III 758,000 gal tanks in the BY, S, TX, and TY Farms, constructed between 1947 and 1952 (Figure 5-4). The SST liners were constructed from ASTM A283 or A285 Grade B or C carbon steel. The construction of the steel liners followed AWWA until 1951, after which the steel liners were designed to the American Society of Mechanical Engineering (ASME)15 Boiler and Pressure Vessel codes and standards. These tanks were similar to the 530,000 gal tanks, but the reinforced-concrete wall is 15-in. thick and 22 ft 8¾-in. high and rests on a 3-ft-thick footing. The dish-shaped concrete foundation tapers from 3-ft thick at the edge of the tank to 6-in. thick at the center of the tank. The bottom and knuckle region of the tank is lined with a ⅜-in.-thick steel liner, and the wall is lined with a combination of a 5/16-in. and ¼-in.-thick liner.


Figure 5-4. Typical 100-Series Type III 750,000-Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser Configuration for BY, S, TX, and TY Farms Tanks

15 ASME is a registered trademark of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York.


5-5

The third generation of 75-ft diameter SST designs is represented by the Type IVA, Type IVB, and Type IVC, 1-Mgal tanks in the SX, A, and AX Farms, respectively. The 1,000,000 gal SSTs were constructed between 1953 and 1965. The liners were constructed from ASTM 283 or A285 Grade B or C, or ASTM A201 Grade B carbon steel. These tanks are similar to the previous two tank designs, but the cylindrical reinforced-concrete walls are 32-ft high and rest on a 2-ft or 3-ft-thick reinforced-concrete footing. The walls are 2-ft thick from the tank base up to a height of between approximately14-t and 20-ft, depending on the tank farm. Above this height, the wall thickness tapers to 15-in. over a length of 5-ft or 6-t, depending on the tank farm. Above this taper, the wall thickness remains constant at 15-in. The concrete wall transitions to a reinforced concrete haunch region that supports the 15-in.-thick concrete dome.

The Type IVA tanks in the SX Farm have a dished base (Figure 5-5), while the Type IVB tanks in A Farm (Figure 5-6) and the Type IVC tanks in AX Farm (Figure 5-7) have a flat base foundation. The dished-concrete base for SX Farm tanks is 1 ft-11 in. thick at the perimeter of the tank and tapers to 8-in. at the center of the tank. The flat base foundation for the A Farm tanks is 2-ft thick at the edge, and then at a tank radius of 34 ft-6½ in. tapers to a thickness of 6-in. The flat base foundation for the AX Farm tanks is 3-ft thick at the edge, and tapers to a thickness of 18-in. beginning at a radius of approximately 33 ft-6 in. from the center of the tank.


Figure 5-5. Typical 100-Series Type IVA 1-Million Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser Configuration for SX Farm Tanks

TANK HAUNCH


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Figure 5-6. Typical 100-Series Type IVB 1-Million Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser Configuration for A Farm Tanks


Figure 5-7. Typical 100-Series Type IVC 1-Million Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser Configuration for AX Farm Tanks


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The bottom and sidewall of the tanks are lined with a ⅜-in.-thick steel liner. In the SX Farm tanks, the weld connecting the sidewall plate to the bottom is a 5/16-in. double-fillet weld. This was changed to a full-penetration bevel-groove weld for the A Farm tanks.

Except for tanks in the AX Farm, all of the 75-ft diameter SST liners rest on a 2-in.-thick layer of grout, which rests on a ⅜-in.-thick three-ply asphaltic waterproofing membrane consisting of a layer of asphalt (ASTM D449-89, Standard Specification for Asphalt Used in Dampproofing and Waterproofing), a layer of bitumen-saturated cotton fabric (ASTM D173-94, Standard Specification for Bitumen-Saturated Cotton Fabrics Used in Roofing and Waterproofing), and a layer of asphalt primer (ASTM D41-94, Standard Test Methods for Operating Characteristics of Reverse Osmosis and Nanofiltration Devices). Directly underneath the three-ply asphaltic waterproofing membrane is the concrete foundation. The AX Farm tanks do not have the grout or asphaltic membrane lining the base foundation. Instead, the steel liners of the tanks in the AX Farm are in direct contact with the concrete tank structure, and there is a grid of 5½-in. wide and 2½-in. deep drain slots throughout the base foundation. This grid of drain slots collects potential tank leakage and diverts it to a leak detection pit. The grid also served as an escape route for free water that formed from the concrete grout during initial tank heating.

The ceilings of the domes on the 100-series 75-ft diameter tanks and the underside of the concrete cover on the 20-ft diameter tanks were given at least three applications of magnesium zinc fluorosilicate wash after the concrete had cured at least two weeks. According to construction specification HW-1946, Specification for Composite Storage Tanks – Bldg. #241 at Hanford Engineer Works, full saturation of exposed surfaces was to be obtained. The magnesium zinc fluorosilicate sealer was used to fill the pores of concrete to prevent penetration by chemical vapors incompatible with the reinforced concrete and to improve the resistance of the concrete to waste vapors.

A typical 200-series Type I 55,000 gal SST and riser configuration for 200-series tanks in the B, C, T, and U Farms is shown in Figure 5-8. Table 5-2 through Table 5-4 summarize the SST properties for structural concrete, grout concrete, and asphaltic waterproofing membrane for Type I and II tanks, Type III tanks, and Type IVA, IVB, and IVC tanks, respectively. Table 5-5 lists the applicable SST codes and material properties for steel liners.


5-8


Figure 5-8. Typical 200-Series Type I 55,000-Gallon Single-Shell Tank and Riser Configuration for 200-Series Tanks in B, C, T, and U Farms


5-9



5-10

Table 5-2. Summary of Single-Shell Tank Properties for Structural Concrete, Grout Concrete, and Asphaltic Waterproofing Membrane for Type I and Type II Tanks

Tank farm Tank no. Construction

date

Hanford construction and

design specification

Three-ply asphaltic waterproofing membrane, grout concrete and drain gap dimensions (refers to the membrane and grout between

the steel liner and the concrete vault) ACI normal-weight concrete properties at

temperatures of 70 and 400oF Poisson's ratio for basemat concrete

Three-ply asphaltic waterproofing

membrane thickness Grout thickness Drain clearance,

air gap size

Basemat foundation thickness

Specified 28-day compressive strength, fc' (103 lbf/in.2)

Moduli of elasticity, Ec (106 lbf/in.2)

Weight density (lbf/ft3)

70oF 400oF 70oF 400oF 70o and 400°F

200-Series Type I 20-ft Diameter 55,000-GallonTanks B C T U

201-204 1943-44 HW-1946a None 1-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-58 (RPP-10435,b Section A4.2.1)

ACI 318-89c 145 0.15

3 1.89 3.12 2.03

100-Series Type II 75-ft Diameter 500,000-Gallon Tanks B C T U

101-112 1943-44 HW-1946a ⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-58 (RPP-10435,b Section A4.2.1)

ACI 318-89c 145 0.15

3 1.89 3.12 2.03

BX 101-112 1946-47 GE (1946)d per pg. 32 of

HW-24800-35e

⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-55 and 57 (RPP-10435,b Section A4.2.1)

ACI 318-89c 145 0.15

3 1.89 3.12 2.03 Source: Table 2.2 of RPP-46305 | PNNL-19403, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Inspection Program, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

a HW-1946, 1943, Specification for Composite Storage Tanks - Bldg. #241 at Hanford Engineer Works, Project 9536, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. b RPP-10435, 2002, Single-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington. c ACI 318-89, 2011, Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete and Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan. d GE, 1946, Specifications for Construction of Composite Storage Tanks, Hanford Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington (copy unavailable). e HW-24800-35, 1953, Design and Construction History Project C-163, 241-TX Tank Farm 200 West, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

ACI = American Concrete Institute. PCA = Portland Cement Association.


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Table 5-3. Summary of Single-Shell Tank Properties for Structural Concrete, Grout Concrete, and Asphaltic Waterproofing Membrane for Type III Tanks


dates



Three-ply asphaltic waterproofing membrane, grout concrete, and drain gap dimensions ACI normal-weight concrete properties at temperatures of 70 and 400°F

Poisson's ratio for basemat concrete



air gap size


Specified 28-day compressive strength, fc'

(103 lbf/in2) Moduli of elasticity, Ec

(106 lbf/in2) Weight density

(lbf/ft3) 70oF 400oF 70oF 400oF 70oF and 400oF

100-Series Type III 75-ft Diameter 750,000-Gallon Tanks TX 101-118 1947-48 GE (1946)a per

pg. 32 of HW-24800-35b

⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-55 and 57 (RPP-10435,c Section A4.2.2)

ACI 318-89d 145 0.15

3 1.89 3.12 2.03 BY 101-112 1948-49 HW-3783e ⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-55 and 57

(RPP-10435,c Section A4.2.2) ACI 318-89d 145 0.15

3 1.89 3.12 2.03 S 101-112 1950-51 HW-3937f ⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-55 and 57


3 1.89 3.12 2.03 TY 101-106 1951-52 HW-4696g ⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-55 and 57


3 1.89 3.12 2.03 Source: Table 2.2 of RPP-46305 | PNNL-19403, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Inspection Program, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

a GE, 1946, Specifications for Construction of Composite Storage Tanks, Hanford Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington (copy unavailable). b HW-24800-35, 1953, Design and Construction History Project C-163, 241-TX Tank Farm 200 West, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. c RPP-10435, 2002, Single-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington. d ACI 318, 1989 (2011), Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete and Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan. e HW-3783, 1948, Specifications for Construction of Additional Waste Storage Facilities, 200 East Area, Bldg. 241-BY, Project C-271, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. f HW-3937, 1949, Specifications for Construction of Waste Disposal Facilities 241-S, 216-S, 207-S 200 West Area, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. g HW-4696, 1951, Specifications for Construction of Waste Disposal Facilities 241-BZ and TY Tank Farms 200 East and West Areas, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.



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Table 5-4. Summary of Single-Shell Tank Properties for Structural Concrete, Grout Concrete, and Asphaltic Waterproofing Membrane for Type IVA, Type IVB and Type IVC Tanks


dates



Three-ply asphaltic waterproofing membrane, grout concrete, and drain gap dimensions ACI normal-weight concrete properties at temperatures of 70 and 400oF

Poisson's ratio for basemat concrete



air gap size


Specified 28-day compressive strength, fc'

(103 lbf/in2) Moduli of elasticity, Ec

(106 lbf/in2) Weight density

(lbf/ft3) 70oFand 400°F

70°F 400°F 70°F 400°F 3 1.89 3.12 2.03

100-Series Type IVA, Type IVB and Type IVC 75-ft Diameter 1-Million Gallon Tanks SX 101-115 1953-55 HWS-4957a ⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-55 and 57 ACI 318-89b 145 0.15

3 1.89 3.12 2.03 A 101-106 1953-55 HWS-5614c ⅜-in. 2-in. None 6-in. PCA ST-55 and 57 ACI 318-89b 145 0.15

3 1.89 3.12 2.03 AX 101-104 1963-65 HW-4798-Sd

HWS-8237e None 2-in.

(below the foundation)

3½-in. x 5½-in. H x W

12-in. ACI 318-56f ACI 318-89b 145 0.15 4 2.52 3.61 2.35

Source: Table 2.2 of RPP-46305 | PNNL-19403, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Inspection Program, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington. a HWS-4957, 1953, Specifications for Waste Disposal Facility 241-SX, In accordance with addenda Contract No. AT(45-1)-688, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. b ACI 318, 1989 (2011), Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete and Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan. c HWS-5614, 1953, Specifications for PUREX Waste Disposal Facility, Project CA-513-A, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. d HW-4798-S, 1962, Standard Specification for Placing Reinforced Concrete, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. e HWS-8237, 1963, Specification for PUREX 241-AX Tank Farm, Project CAC-945, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington. f ACI 318, 1956 (2011), Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete and Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan.



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Table 5-5. Single-Shell Tank Codes and Material Properties for Steel Liners

Tank farm

Tank no.

Const. dates

2018 tank age (yr)

Hanford construction and design

specificationa

Steel design code

Steel liner thickness Steel liner materiala

B C T U

201-204 1943-44 74 HW-1961 AWWA 1/4-in. A7-39 (inferred from HW-14946)

B C T U

101-112 1943-44 74 HW-1946 AWWA 1/4-in., 5/16-in. knuckle

A7-39 (M-B-M, Drawing D-2)

BX 101-112 1946-47 71 HW-7-5264 AWWA 1/4-in., 5/16-in., 3/8-in.

A7-39 (H-2-602)

TX 101-118 1947-48 53 HW-3061 AWWA 1/4-in., 5/16-in., 3/8-in.

ASTM A285-46 (H-2-809)

BY 101-112 1948-49 52 HW-3783 NRA 1/4-in., 5/16-in., 3/8-in.

ASTM A283-46, Grade A, B, C, or

ASTM A285-46, Grade A, B, C S 101-112 1950-51 50 HW-3937 NRA 1/4-in.,

5/16-in., 3/8-in.

ASTM A283-46T, Grade B

TY 101-106 1951-52 49 HW-4696 ASME 1/4-in., 5/16-in., 3/8-in.

ASTM A 283-49T, Grade B

SX 101-115 1953-55 47 HW-4957 NRA 3/8-in. ASTM A283-52T, Grade A, B A 101-106 1953-55 46 HWS-5614 ASME 3/8-in. ASTM A283-52T or

ASTM A285-52T, Grade B, C AX 101-104 1963-65 37 HW-4798-S

HWS-8237 ASME

Sec. VIII 3/8-in. ASTM A201-61T, Grade A

(516 Gr. 55)

Source: Table 2.1 of RPP-46305 | PNNL-19403, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Inspection Program, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

a Full references are provided in Section 7.0. ASME = American Society of Mechanical Engineers. AWWA = American Water Works Association.

NRA = Not Readily Available from onsite records reviewed to date.


5-14

5.1 SINGLE-SHELL TANK CONSTRUCTION SEQUENCE PHOTOGRAPHS A historical perspective of SST construction is provided in Figure 5-9 through Figure 5-27.


Figure 5-9. Placement of Reinforcing Steel in Base Showing Wall Dowels (TX Farm)


Figure 5-10. Pouring of Concrete in Base Slab Showing Wall Dowels Around the Perimeter


5-15


Figure 5-11. Base Slab Construction


Figure 5-12. Construction of Steel Liners


5-16


Figure 5-13. Base of Liner with View of Sloping (Dish-Shaped) Base Slab


Figure 5-14. Tanks in Various Stages of Construction Showing Hydrostatic Testing of Liner


5-17


Figure 5-15. View of Liner Coating and Wood Forms for Dome Concrete


Figure 5-16. View of Wood Forms and Wall Reinforcing Steel


5-18


Figure 5-17. Placement of Dome Reinforcing Steel After Wall Concrete Has Been Poured


Figure 5-18. View of Reinforcement Steel in the Haunch Region


5-19


Figure 5-19. Placement of Dome Reinforcing Steel


Figure 5-20. View of Dome Reinforcing Steel Showing Square and Deformed Round Bars


5-20


Figure 5-21. Pouring of Dome Concrete


Figure 5-22. Removal of Exterior Forms from Dome Concrete


5-21


Figure 5-23. Voids in Concrete Created During Construction


Figure 5-24. Voids in Concrete Created During Construction Showing Reinforcing Steel


5-22


Figure 5-25. Interior of Tank Dome Showing Construction Flaws and Visible Form Lines


Figure 5-26. Interior of Tank Dome Showing Repair of Construction Flaws


5-23


Figure 5-27. Interior of Tank Dome Showing Dome Penetrations and Repair of Construction Flaws

5.2 OPERATING HISTORY

The 149 SSTs were constructed from 1943 to 1965 and operated as waste receivers from 1944 to 1980. The last SST was deactivated on November 21, 1980. Deactivation removed the remaining supernatant liquid down to pump suction, leaving typically 12-in. to 18-in. of liquid, roughly 33,000 to 49,500 gal. At the end of November 1980, the SST waste inventory was 39,384 kgal, and the SSTs could no longer accept new waste.16

While deactivation was underway, two prototypical jet pumps and saltwell screens were installed in Tanks BY-107 and S-111 to determine if the interstitial liquid contained in the solid waste phase of the SSTs could be removed at low enough rates to match the migration rate of liquid from the surrounding waste matrix into the saltwell screen. The effort was initially identified as “Phase II” saltwell pumping, then renamed, “interim stabilization.”

Phase I, “primary stabilization,” or “open hole” saltwell pumping had employed small vertical turbine pumps inserted into cavities sluiced into the solid waste to remove the interstitial liquid. However, the turbine pumps’ removal rate greatly exceeded the migration rate of interstitial liquid into the cavity, resulting in brief periods of operation separated by extended periods of downtime waiting for the cavity to refill. Frequent pump pluggage and suction loss resulted in

16 RHO-CD-14, Waste Status Summary November, 1980, provides SST volumes after completion of

deactivation pumping.


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volumes of backflush and priming water being added to the tanks that soon exceeded the amount removed.

In the late stages of Phase I, the two prototype jet pumps demonstrated that interstitial liquid removal rates as low as 0.05 gal/min could be achieved before pump priming volumes surpassed further removal gains. Following success with the prototypes, interim stabilization selection criteria were established to determine which SSTs would benefit from the jet pumps (RHO-CD-1273, Criterion for Selection of 100 Series Tanks to be Jet Pumped). In 1984, the Tank Farm Operating Contractor at the time formally proposed adoption of the interim stabilization endpoint completion criteria as <50,000 gal of interstitial liquid, <5,000 gal of supernatant liquid, and a production rate of ≤0.05 gal/min (Lorenzini, 1984). A major mechanical failure before reaching ≤0.05 gal/min completion criterion would require repair or replacement and restart. A major mechanical failure before reaching ≤0.05 gal/min completion criterion in a tank with <50,000 gal of interstitial liquid would require engineering evaluation to determine the feasibility of further pumping. DOE concurred with the completion criteria (Lawrence, 1984). Jet pumps were eventually installed in 67 SSTs (HNF-SD-RE-TI-178, Single-Shell Tank Interim Stabilization Record, Rev. 9). Between 1978 and 2005, 147 SSTs were stabilized, 67 by jet pumping and the remainder either administratively or by supernatant liquid removal (HNF-SD-RE-TI-178). The last SST interim stabilization, Tank BY-106, was completed on June 27, 2005. Following a pump dilution water hose failure on July 27, 2007, that spread radioactive contamination during Tank S-102 retrieval, retrieval was terminated and the tank contents restabilized. Restabilization was completed on May 13, 2010. Between SST deactivation in November 1980 and SST interim stabilization in June 2005, an estimated 7.9 Mgal of supernatant and interstitial liquid were removed from the SSTs.17 Interim stabilization removed the last SST liquids that were economically pumpable. Waste retrieval of the solid wastes left in the SSTs began with modified sluicing in Tank C-106 on November 18, 1998, followed by the other C Farm tanks, beginning with vacuum retrieval in Tank C-203 on June 30, 2004 (RPP-RPT-26475, Demonstration Retrieval Data Report for Single-Shell Tank 241-C-203), and saltcake dissolution retrieval of waste in Tanks S-102 and S-112 on December 6, 2004, and September 26, 2003 (Lyon, 2008, and RPP-RPT-27406, Demonstration Retrieval Data Report for Single-Shell Tank 241-S-112). As of February 28, 2017, 2,736,200 gal of waste have been retrieved. The remaining volume of waste in the SSTs is 28,498 kgal, consisting of 116 kgal of supernatant liquid, 8,344 kgal of sludge, and 20,039 kgal of saltcake. About 2,713 kgal of drainable interstitial liquid is trapped in the sludge and saltcake (HNF-EP-0182, Waste Tank Summary Report for Month Ending February 28, 2017).18 About 52.7 percent of the tank waste inventory is stored in the 149 SSTs, with the remainder in the 28 DSTs. The SSTs hold 84.1 percent of the saltcake, 77 percent of the sludge, and 44.1 percent of the radionuclide inventory (Washenfelder, 2017). As of February 28, 2017, 61 SSTs are classified as “assumed leakers,” although the real number is probably closer to

17 The estimated volume was determined by the difference between the reported June 30, 2005 and the

November 30, 1980 SST waste volumes, adjusted for Tanks C-106, S-102, and S-112 retrieved volumes (226, 422, and 584 kgal, respectively) during that time period.

18 The volume of drainable interstitial liquid is included in the reported sludge and saltcake volumes.


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25 SSTs that have actually leaked. One SST, Tank T-111, is believed to be actively leaking. There are 19 SSTs with small surface water intrusions that have been observed during in-tank video inspections, and seven tanks with evidence of past intrusions based on increases in surface pool size, dome interior surface streaking, and other evidence (HNF-EP-0182).


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6.0 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES

The IQRPE will assess the SST system structural integrity by evaluating the information gathered to meet the requirements identified in Section 2.0. A cross-indexed matrix will be used to demonstrate how the requirements in Section 2.0 have been met. The matrix will be revised as the integrity assessment proceeds to reference applicable documents and then be included as an appendix to the 2018 integrity assessment report.

Additional information supporting key elements of the SST integrity assessment is provided in the following subsections.

6.1 STRUCTURAL EVALUATIONS AND LOADING CONDITIONS

The structural integrity assessment will review the processes used for structural evaluations, including determination of credible loading conditions. The evaluation will also review the engineering codes referenced for construction and in design, to the extent that these reviews were completed during previous integrity assessments, in order to determine the existing design margin and fitness-for-use of each structure. Where archived codes are not available, current equivalent codes can be used.

One of the SSTIP Expert Panel’s primary recommendations was to perform a detailed structural integrity analysis of the SSTs. WRPS and ORP commissioned Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to perform this structural integrity AOR for the Hanford SSTs. An AOR was completed for each of the four SST designs. RPP-RPT-49994 summarizes the engineering methods used in the SST AORs and the major conclusions from those analyses. Finite element analysis was used to predict the structural response of the SSTs to the historical thermal and operating loads, plus design basis seismic loads.

Bounding thermal histories were established from waste temperature records and applied to the model, including the thermal degradation of concrete modulus and strength, plus cracking due to differential thermal expansion while under in situ static loads. PNNL contracted with Becht Engineering to evaluate the dynamic response of the tanks to a design basis earthquake. The degraded stiffness of the reinforced concrete was also incorporated in the seismic analysis. The combined response to static and seismic loads was then evaluated against the design requirements of ACI-349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Structures, for nuclear safety-related concrete structures. The AORs determined that, including the bounding effects of their operating histories, each of the four major tank designs satisfied the ACI-349 structural design requirements.

The historical tank farms operating records provided valuable information on the temperature distributions during high-temperature events such as the self-boiling of high-heat wastes. Although waste temperatures as high as 594°F were recorded during the early SST operations, these temperatures were confined to the center region of the tank near the floor. The boiling point of the SST liquid wastes was in the range of 220°F to 250°F. The temperatures suggested that thermal degradation of the concrete strength and stiffness in the footing and wall were limited by the moderate temperatures that were reached.

This information was also consistent with the later sidewall coring of Tank A-106 (the highest temperature tank), which produced cores throughout the height of the wall that had compressive


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strengths greater than twice the 3 ksi design minimum-required strength specified for the A Farm tanks (RPP-RPT-58254, Concrete Core Testing Report for the Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project). The reinforced concrete sections in the dome, haunch, wall, footing, and base slab of the SSTs were evaluated using ACI-349. The ACI-349 load combinations LC1 (factored static loads), LC4 (unfactored static plus seismic loads), and LC9 (factored static plus factored thermal loads) were each evaluated for a matrix of best estimate, lower-bound, and upper-bound material property combinations. The SST AORs showed that the demand/capacity (D/C) ratios for the ACI evaluations are all less than 1.0 in the dome, haunch, wall, and footing for all of the material and load combinations evaluated for each of the four tank types.

Under peak temperature conditions, other locations in the bottom slab near the tank center have D/C ratios greater than 1.0. This indicates that crushing and cracking of the slab may have occurred from radial thermal expansion, followed by contraction under the bounding thermal histories. However, the bottom slab is supported on soil, so the cracking and displacements are displacement-controlled. Therefore, cracks in the bottom slab do not affect the structural stability of the tank dome, wall, and footing.

The finite element tank models used in the AORs typically simulate single tanks surrounded by soil. Most of the 75-ft diameter SSTs are positioned in arrays with a center-to-center spacing of 102-ft, so that adjacent tanks are separated by soil extending more than a minimum 50 percent of the tank radius separation necessary to isolate tank-to-tank interactions. However, the four AX Farm tanks have an east-west spacing of only 90-ft, which gives a tank-to-tank separation of only 28 percent of the tank radius. A tank-to-tank interaction study was conducted to evaluate the structural interaction of these closely spaced tanks and to determine if adjustments were required to the single-tank models to account for tank-to-tank interaction effects. Detailed finite element models with two adjacent tanks were developed to evaluate the variation of thermal, operating, and seismic loads around the perimeter of the tanks. The thermal and operating loads analyses and the seismic analyses show that demands in certain areas of the tank increase as the tanks are positioned closer together. The maximum D/C ratios around the circumference of the tank were almost always higher for the 90-ft tank spacing than for the 102-ft spacing; however, the differences were small enough that single tank-to-tank interaction adjustment factors were developed.

The tank-to-tank interaction study showed that the maximum D/C ratio was less than 0.85 in the dome, haunch, walls, and footing of the AX Farm tanks for all of the analysis cases that were evaluated. The largest D/C ratio differences from tank-to-tank interaction do not occur at the same locations and load combinations where the D/C ratios are the largest. Therefore, although the tank-to-tank interaction effects were evident in the tank analyses, they were not the dominant contribution to the highest D/C ratios of the Type IVC (AX Farm) analysis. This conclusion supported the use of single-tank models in performing the SST AORs.

Tank dome limit load analyses were conducted to estimate the margin between the current maximum dome load limits and the collapse load limits. The thermal and operating load histories were applied to the static finite element models to establish the present day conditions of the tanks, including the effects of concrete thermal degradation, cracking, and creep. Additional surface loads were applied until concrete crushing or rebar yielding finally occurred.


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The predicted dome collapse load capacities were more than three times the current dome load limits, demonstrating that adequate margin exists between the current dome load limits (RPP-20473, Design and Dome Load Criteria for Hanford Waste Storage Tanks) and the maximum dome load capacities.

A buckling analysis was also conducted for the dome and walls of the four tank types using the ACI-recommended analysis methods for concrete shell structures. The analyses used the 95/95 lower bound concrete strength and the elastic modulus degraded at the maximum temperature in the concrete dome or wall during the operating history. The theoretical buckling load capacities were also reduced by factors that account for construction tolerances; the level of reinforcement, creep, and cracking; and the inelastic behavior of reinforced concrete at high loads. The calculations showed that the reduced elastic buckling load capacities were greater than twice the plastic limit load capacities. The buckling D/C ratios based on safety factors for material strength (rather than elastic collapse) were less than 1.0. Therefore, tank buckling was not the expected ultimate failure mode of the SSTs.

The final conclusion is that the SST AORs did not reveal any significant deficiencies with the structural integrity of the Hanford SSTs. The loads imposed in the finite element analyses were more severe than any service to date or currently planned for the future. The analyses treated the most severe combinations of soil and concrete stiffness and based the structural evaluation on the lower bound concrete strength. The D/C ratios were less than 1.0 for the ACI evaluations in the dome, haunch, wall, and footing for all of the material and load combinations evaluated for each of the four tank types. Table 6-1 lists the post-2002 published SST structural analysis reports. Appendix B lists the SST system post-2002 events with structural integrity implications.

Table 6-1. Single-Shell Tank Post-2002 Structural Analyses Doc. no.a Title Issue date

RPP-11802, Rev. 3B Analysis of Record Summary for Single-Shell Tanks 2015 RPP-RPT-49994, Rev. 0 Summary Report for the Hanford Single-Shell Tank Structural

Analyses of Record – Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record

2015

RPP-RPT-49993, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type I Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis

2014

RPP-RPT-49992, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type IV Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis

2014

RPP-RPT-49991, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Tank to Tank Interaction Study of the Hanford Single-Shell Tanks

2014

RPP-RPT-49990, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type III Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis

2011

RPP-RPT-49989, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type II Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis

2011

RPP-46644, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record – Preliminary Modeling Plan for Thermal and Operating Loads

2010

RPP-46442, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Structural Evaluation Criteria 2010 a Full references provided in Section 7.0.


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6.2 CONCRETE EXPOSED TO HIGH TEMPERATURES

In 1978, non-load-bearing tank dome concrete core samples from A, T, and U Farm tanks were submitted to CTL Group (formerly Construction Technology Laboratories, Inc., a division of the Portland Cement Association) to determine the strength and elastic properties of concretes from Hanford tank farms structures and to evaluate the effects of the service temperature history on these properties. Tests were conducted on concretes from the tank farms to determine strength and elastic properties at room and elevated temperatures.

Elastic modulus, Poisson’s ratio, and compressive and splitting tensile strengths were determined at room temperature and for specimens maintained at 250°F for varying lengths of time. Variables examined in the test program were the effect of temperature, length of exposure to elevated temperature, and geometry of test specimens.

Compressive strength generally decreased after specimens were exposed to heat. Maximum losses were 20 to 33 percent of room temperature strength. Initially, stronger concretes lost a proportionately larger percentage of their strength after exposure than the weaker concrete. In some series, concrete appeared to gain strength after thermal exposure. In other series, concrete initially lost strength, then recovered strength after prolonged heating.

Splitting tensile strength of the heated specimens followed trends similar to those obtained for compressive strength. Highest strength losses were about 40 percent. However, in most cases, considerably less strength deterioration resulted from exposure to heat.

Modulus of elasticity and Poisson’s ratio also decreased after exposure to heat. Greatest losses were about 40 percent of room temperature values, but amounts differed widely among test series. Testing, results, and statistical comparisons are discussed in RHO-C-22, Strength and Elastic Properties of Concretes from Waste Tank Farms.

Transient thermal loading in the dome is associated with tensile fractures in the outer surface. Concrete dome cores removed from Tanks A-101 and SX-107 revealed tensile fractures extending from approximately mid-thickness to the outer surface. Cores taken at radii of 12, 22, and 25-ft all revealed similar cracking patterns, with cracks approximately perpendicular to the two principal stress directions. An examination of the thermal history for Tank A-101 revealed an unusually rapid heat-up period in 1957. A heat transfer analysis modeling the heat-up demonstrated tensile yielding of the steel at various locations. Due to the change in stiffness of the section as tensile fractures appeared, there was a reduction of the actual forces developed by the section in resisting thermal deformations (ARH-R-45, Interim Summary Report Stress and Strength Analysis for Waste Tank Structures at Hanford, Washington). Table 6-2 lists the published SST evaluations of thermal operating loads.

Additional properties tests have been performed on SST concrete cores since 1978, including Tanks C-107 and SX-115, and Tank A-106, the tank with the highest recorded waste storage temperature of any SST. In 2014 a full-depth vertical sidewall core was removed from Tank A-106. The testing indicated favorable results with properties values generally greater, and in many cases significantly greater, than expected in comparison with the values originally specified and those used in structural modeling for the SST AOR for the Type IVB SSTs.


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Table 6-2. Evaluations of Thermal Operating Loads

Doc. no.a Title Issue date ARH-R-45 Interim summary Report Stress and Strength Analysis for

Waste Tank Structures at Hanford, Washington 1969

RHO-C-22 Strength and Elastic Properties of Concretes from Waste Tank Farms

1978

HNF-4712, Rev. 0 Load Requirements for Maintaining Structural Integrity of Hanford Single-Shell Tanks During Waste Feed Delivery and Retrieval Activities

1999

WHC-SD-TWR-RPT-002, Rev. 0A

Structural Integrity and Potential Failure Modes of the Hanford High-Level Waste Tanks

1996

a Full references provided in Section 7.0.

6.3 CONCRETE EXPOSED TO TANK WASTE

As of February 28, 2017, 61 SSTs have been identified as “assumed leakers” in HNF-EP-0182. However, based on investigations completed between 2007 and 2015, the number is probably closer to 25 SSTs that have actually leaked. The remainder of the assumed leakers were misclassified due to overfilling, accelerated evaporation, retained gas releases, or other non-leak phenomena that resulted in unexplained decreases in the waste level or increases in soil radiation readings external to the tank. Table 6-3 lists the reports supporting the expectation that there have been fewer leaking SSTs than previously reported.

Table 6-3. Investigations Supporting Reduction in Number of Single-Shell Tank Assumed Leaking Tanks

Doc. no.a Title Issue date RPP-ENV-33418, Rev. 4 Hanford C-Farm Leak Assessments Report 2007–2016 RPP-ENV-37956, Rev. 2 Hanford A and AX Farm Leak Assessment Report 2008–2014 RPP-ENV-39658, Rev. 0 Hanford SX-Farm Leak Assessments Report 2010 RPP-RPT-42296, Rev. 0 Hanford TY-Farm Leak Assessments Report 2010 RPP-RPT-43704, Rev. 0A Hanford BY-Farm Leak Assessments Report 2011 RPP-RPT-47562, Rev. 0 Hanford BX-Farm Leak Inventory Assessments Report 2011 RPP-RPT-48589, Rev. 0 Hanford S-Farm Leak Assessment Report 2011 RPP-RPT-49089, Rev. 0 Hanford B-Farm Leak Inventory Assessments Report 2011 RPP-RPT-50097, Rev. 0 Hanford 241-U Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report 2011 RPP-RPT-50870, Rev. 0 Hanford 241-TX Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report 2013 RPP-RPT-55084, Rev. 0 Hanford 241-T Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report 2013


As the SSTs age, corrosion will eventually breach all of the steel tank liners, providing a pathway for interstitial and supernatant liquids remaining in the tanks to reach the soil. This


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inevitability of the liner breaches was recognized as early as the 2002 integrity assessment report, which certified the SSTs’ structural integrity but could not assure their leak integrity.

In recent structural video inspections of the SSTs dome interiors, surface water has been observed entering some of the SSTs, adding to the hydraulic head that is available at a liner breach location. Since November 2012, active intrusions have been observed in 19 SSTs, with evidence of recent intrusions observed in seven additional SSTs of the 53 tanks that have been inspected through December 31, 2016.

When the steel liner is breached due to corrosion by the waste material, the reinforced concrete is exposed to the waste solution attack. If the reinforcing steel is corroding, the corrosion products will typically fill a greater volume than that of the original metal. This will subject the concrete to additional stresses, which can eventually cause cracking of the concrete. This process can continue until the reinforcing steel is exposed directly to the corrosive environment, potentially leading to loss of structural strength and integrity.

Early concerns about the effects of waste on the performance of the SST structural concrete in leaking tanks led to numerous laboratory investigations. RHO-RE-CR-8 P, Long-Term Effects of Waste Solutions on Concrete and Reinforcing Steel, prepared by the Portland Cement Association, presents the results of four years of concrete degradation studies that exposed concrete and reinforcing steel, under load and at 180°F, to simulated double-shell slurry, simulated salt cake solution, and a control solution. Exposure length varied from three months to 36 months. In all cases, examination of the concrete and reinforcing steel at the end of the exposure indicated there was no attack (i.e., no evidence of rusting, cracking, disruption of mill scale, or loss of strength). Table 6-4 lists the reports that evaluated the effects of moisture or waste solutions on the concrete in the SSTs.

Table 6-4. Effects of Moisture and Waste on Single-Shell Tank Concrete

Doc. no.a Title Issue date RHO-RE-CR-4 Effects of Moisture Loss Due to Radiolysis on Concrete

Strength 1981

RHO-RE-CR-8 P Long-Term Effects of Waste Solutions on Concrete and Reinforcing Steel

1982

WHC-SD-TWR-RPT-002, Rev. 0A

Structural Integrity and Potential Failure Modes of the Hanford High-Level Waste Tanks

1996


6.4 TANK C-107 TANK DOME CONCRETE AND REINFORCING STEEL CONDITION

Following negotiations during 2007–2009, changes were made to the TPA M-45 milestone series. The SST closure date was extended from 2024 to 2043, reflecting continuing difficulty achieving the retrieval rate needed to meet the 2018 schedule.

In addition to extending the completion schedule, TPA Change Request M-45-09-01 added a new milestone that created an SST Structural Integrity Expert Panel. The Expert Panel was established to evaluate the existing condition of the SSTs and make recommendations for


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additional evaluations and program elements that would be needed to sustain the SST structural integrity for an extended period of time.

The development and prioritization of the recommendations from the SSTIP Expert Panel are documented in RPP-RPT-43116. In Recommendation SI-5, “Test dome concrete and rebar ‘plugs’,” the panel recommended testing concrete cores and rebar samples obtained from a large section of reinforced concrete that needed to be removed from a tank dome to support the installation of retrieval equipment.

During December 2010, a concrete plug was cut and rebar samples were obtained from a 55-in. diameter plug section from the center of the dome of Tank C-107 that had been removed to allow deployment of the mobile arm retrieval system. The concrete cores were removed from the plug on April 4-5, 2011. Of the 22 proposed cores, only 14 were successfully removed due to unexpected rebar interference. The pre-coring layout of the plug is shown in Figure 6-1. Selection of the sites for the cores was based on the need to avoid reinforcement bar and to collect as many cores as possible.

The 14 cores were inspected visually and microscopically at the CTL Group Material Services Laboratory in Skokie, Illinois. The findings from the inspection and petrographic examination indicated that the concrete removed from the plug was in good condition, not in distress, and did not exhibit any deleterious mechanisms that would cause distress.

The cores were then subjected to nondestructive and destructive physical testing. The results of the concrete compression, elastic modulus, and Poisson’s ratio tests exceeded the values for the material properties used as structural modeling inputs for the SST AOR, as discussed in Appendix A of RPP-46442, Single-Shell Tank Structural Evaluation Criteria. The average concrete compressive strength of the cores was more than 2.5 times the original 28-day design strength specified at the time of construction.

The removal of rebar from the plug required demolition of the plug. Dexpan19 nonexplosive expansive grout was used for demolition of the plug. The holes remaining from the removed concrete cores were backfilled with concrete. Once cured past 28 days, the plug was bored to

19 Dexpan is a registered trademark of Dexpan USA/Archer Company USA Inc., Sunland Park, New Mexico.

Figure 6-1. Tank C-107 Plug with Core Locations Marked


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support placement of expanding grout. The expanding grout was then poured and allowed to cure for three days. The broken concrete facilitated removal of the top layer of Tank C-107 rebar.

Nine bundles of rebar were shipped to the CTL Group Material Services Laboratory. Prior to mechanics testing, the rebar pieces were checked and reported to be in good condition, with no observable cracking or defects. Following inspection, sub-lots were created, based on length, and subjected to tension and hardness testing. Forty-eight pieces were tension tested as standard-size metallic specimens, five were subjected to full section rebar testing, 14 were subjected to hardness testing, and two were subjected to impact testing.

Incorporating ASTM A370, Standard Test Methods and Definitions for Mechanical Testing of Steel Products, and A615, Standard Specification for Deformed and Plain Carbon-Steel Bars for Concrete Reinforcement, guidance during testing, the average yield strength of all of the Tank C-107 rebar was 47 ksi. This value was greater than the 40 ksi yield strength for the Grade 40 rebar specified in the original tank construction specification and greater than the value used in structural modeling for the AOR.

The inspections and testing demonstrated that even though Tank C-107 was 67 years old at the time and among the oldest underground radioactive waste storage tanks, the plug concrete and rebar were still in satisfactory condition. Table 6-5 lists the test plan and materials properties reports for the Tank C-107 plug.

Table 6-5. Tank C-107 Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Properties

Doc. no.a Title Issue date RPP-PLAN-48753, Rev. 0 Analytical Test Plan for the Removed 241-C-107 Dome

Concrete and Rebar 2011

RPP-RPT-50934, Rev. 0 Inspection and Test Report for the Removed 241-C-107 Dome Concrete

2012

RPP-RPT-54564, Rev. 0 Inspection and Test Report for the Removed 241-C-107 Dome Rebar

2013

a Full references provided in Section 7.0

6.5 TANK A-106 SIDEWALL AND FOOTING CONCRETE CONDITION

The SSTIP Expert Panel also recommended obtaining and testing a vertical core from the entire depth of the sidewalls for two tanks that have leaked and had been operated at high temperatures for extended periods. The panel maintained that such cores would provide important data about the structural condition of concrete and rebar in the sidewalls. Due to concerns over handling contaminated samples, the panel later recommended that the evaluation focus only on thermal degradation, and a decision was made to proceed with coring a single tank that was exposed to high heat and had not leaked.

Tank A-106 was selected for sidewall coring. Tank A-106 had sustained the highest heat load at 594°F, recorded in 1963 when the tank was nearly full. The tank had also withstood temperatures over 200°F (the point at which concrete begins to degrade) for over 80 months. In addition to Tank A-106, two contingency tanks were selected. The details of tank selection are provided in RPP-49300, Data Quality Objectives for Single Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project.


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Prior to initiating excavation to expose the tank haunch for the sidewall coring effort, a structural analysis was completed to determine possible structural effects resulting from the removal of soils from the dome and haunch areas of the tank and the effects of coring the hole (Figure 6-2). The completed structural analysis was reviewed by an IQRPE to confirm engineering calculations and analyses.

Sidewall coring of Tank A-106 was completed over a two-week period in May 2014. About 38-ft of concrete core were successfully removed, to a depth approximately halfway through the tank footing (Figure 6-3). Rebar was encountered in the haunch, but the number of bars cut did not exceed the defined limit established in the drilling plan. Verticality of the core hole was effectively maintained throughout drilling, with a horizontal deviation at final depth of approximately ⅞-in., significantly less than the 2-in. maximum allowable.

Nondestructive and destructive physical testing of the concrete core specimens was successfully performed by CTL Group. The testing included visual examination and determination of transverse and longitudinal resonant frequency and dynamic modulus of elasticity, pulse velocity, static modulus of elasticity, Poisson’s ratio, and compressive strength. The testing indicated favorable results with values generally greater, and in many cases significantly greater, than expected in comparison with the values originally specified and those used in structural modeling for the SST AOR for the Type IVB SSTs in the A Farm.

Source: Visual Aid, January 21, 2014, Single-Shell Tank (SST) Sidewall Coring Project Overview

Figure 6-2. Nondestructive Evaluation of Tank A-106 Dome

Source: Visual Aid, January 21, 2014, Single-Shell Tank (SST) Sidewall Coring Project Overview

Figure 6-3. As-Found Condition of Tank A-106 Sidewall with Reinforcing Steel Locations Marked


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Petrographic analysis was performed to assess the quality and condition of the concrete and the extent of any deterioration or deleterious reactions occurring within the concrete. The analysis determined that the concrete within the examined core segments was in overall good condition, with a minor amount of microcracking and minor evidence of deleterious mechanisms that did not appear to have significantly affected the overall quality and integrity of the concrete. Overall, the results of the testing did not reveal any deficiencies with the structural integrity of the tank. Table 6-6 lists the reports documenting Tank A-106 core drilling activity and the core samples’ measured concrete and reinforcing steel properties.

Table 6-6. Tank A-106 Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Properties (2 pages)

Doc. no.a Title Issue date

RPP-49300, Rev. 0 Data Quality Objectives for Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project

2011

RPP-CALC-53887, Rev. 0 SST-241-A-106 Sidewall Coring, Structural Analysis Dome Loading and 4-in. Plug Removal from Tank Sidewall

2013

RPP-PLAN-47369, Rev. 0 Core Drilling Demonstration Plan for A Single Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project

2011

RPP-PLAN-47370, Rev. 0 Sidewall Core Drilling Plan for the Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project

2013

RPP-PLAN-50182. Rev. 1 Sampling and Analysis Plan for the Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project

2011

RPP-PLAN-50376, Rev. 0 Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project Sampling and Analysis Work Plan

2011

RPP-RPT-50714, Rev. 0 Demonstration Report for the Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project

2011

RPP-RPT-54764, Rev. 0 Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer (IQRPE) Report for Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project

2013

RPP-RPT-58254, Rev. 0 Concrete Core Testing Report for the Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project

2014

RPP-RPT-58116, Rev. 0 Sidewall Core Drilling Report for the Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project

2014

TFC-WO-12-5505 “A-106 Caisson Excavation/Installation/Removal” (Side Wall Excavation and Caisson Installation and Removal Work Instructions)

2013

TFC-WO-13-1060 “241-A-106 Side-Wall Coring” (Sidewall Coring Work Instructions)

2014



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6.6 TANK SX-108 SIDEWALL AND FOOTING CONCRETE CONDITION

Tank SX-108 was built in 1953–1954 and first placed into service in November 1955. The tank received REDOX (reduction-oxidation) salt waste, started self-boiling in June 1956, and was filled to capacity in January 1959. After the waste ceased boiling, the tank supernatant liquid was pumped out in early 1962.

The first significant leak was detected under Tank SX-108 between August and December 1965. After testing the tank for ongoing leaks, the leak was determined to have self-sealed and the tank was returned to service. In March 1967, there was renewed evidence of a leak while the tank was in self-boiling operation, so the tank was removed from service.

The Tank Operating Contractor at that time contracted the Illinois Institute of Technology to conduct field soil tests and develop thermo-mechanical models of the SSTs. These models were to be used to analyze the state of stress in all the SSTs, accounting for active and reactive soil loads, liquid hydrostatic load, vapor pressures, and thermal loadings due to the self-boiling operations. Results of the interim stress and strength analysis report, ARH-R-45, concluded that the combined loads from self-boiling operation with sludge at a temperature of 300°F on the tank bottom would result in cracking of the reinforced concrete tank in the circumferential (hoop) direction. For the SX Farm tanks, this cracking was predicted to extend full depth through the footing from the outer edge, to back under the sidewall a foot or two into the floor of the tank, and a few feet up the sidewall of the tank.

Based on the concrete tensile strength, the cracks were predicted to occur at horizontal intervals of about 2-ft around the perimeter of the footing and lower sidewall. The cracking was caused by the thermal expansion of the bottom of the tanks, which is restrained by the cooler outside toe of the footing and the cooler sidewall concrete. The reinforced concrete tank floor goes into compression as it tries to expand in a radial direction, and the outer part of the floor, footing, and lower sidewall go into hoop tension trying to restrain the thermal expansion.

Analysis results further concluded that the concrete at the junction of the footing and sidewall cracked in tension when the sludge temperature reached 250°F, which then transferred the load to the circumferential reinforcing steel. As the floor temperature increased to 300°F, the cracks were calculated to have opened to apertures of 0.005 to 0.010-in. at temperature. The reinforcing steel remained in the elastic range, so the cracks would close on cooling. Given the results of a preliminary analysis for the SX Farm tanks completed in 1967, a decision was made in late 1968 to sink an 8- to 10-ft diameter caisson down the side of Tank SX-108 near the area of the leak, as reported in Hatch and Oberg (1968). The goal was to examine the condition of the concrete that had been contacted by tank waste and verify the concrete tensile cracking predicted by the analyses.

The caisson was sunk down to the bottom elevation of the Tank SX-108 footing. The lower sidewall of the tank, top of the footing, and edge of the footing down to the footing bottom were exposed. Cracking predicted by the Illinois Institute of Technology analyses was encountered extending downward through the footing and some distance up the tank sidewall. Some of the cracks in the footing toe initiated at the top of the footing, but did not extend full depth.

Two of the concrete core samples taken tested between 5,000 and 6,000 ksi compressive strength. The conditions at the footing are described in ARH-R-43, Management of Radioactive Wastes Stored in Underground Tanks at Hanford.


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A crust ¼ to 1½-in. deep, was chipped from the top of the footing. A sample analysis of the crust is summarized in Table 6-7 (ARH-R-43).

The reports documenting the Tank SX-108 concrete footing and sidewall evaluation are listed in Table 6-8.

Table 6-8. Tank SX-108 Concrete Footing and Sidewall Evaluation

Doc. no.a Title Issue date LET-041068 “Comments on the Proposed Inspection of the concrete Portion

of Underground Storage Tanks” 1968

ARH-R-43, Rev. 2 Management of Radioactive Wastes Stored in Underground Tanks at Hanford

1970

ARH-R-45 Interim Summary Report Stress and Strength Analysis for Waste Tank Structures at Hanford, Washington

1969


6.7 TANK SX-115 SIDEWALL AND FOOTING CONCRETE CONDITION

Between late June and early July 1981, 38 ft-8 in. of approximately 3-in. diameter concrete core was successfully removed from the haunch, sidewall, and footing of Tank SX-115. The cores, the bulk of which were free of contamination, were tested as part of an effort to characterize the long-term structural capacity of the SSTs. These were the first material properties tests performed on load-supporting (haunch and wall) concrete from a waste tank. Earlier core samples had been taken opportunistically from A, T and U Farm tank domes during modifications to the tanks such as the installation of new risers.

In August 1981, 37 core sections were received at CTL Group for testing. The samples consisted of approximately 32-ft of 2.7-in. nominal diameter core in different lengths.

The test program consisted of a visual inspection of all core samples, and the determination of compressive strength, splitting tensile strength, modulus of elasticity, and Poisson's ratio from concrete specimens cut from core sections. A total of 18 Tank SX-115 specimens were used for strength and elastic properties determinations at room temperature. Specimens were cut from core sections such that three test specimens were obtained for each 5-ft of core depth. Four cores were observed to have visible cracks, ranging from approximately 2 to 10-in. in length. Several large aggregate pieces in one core sample were also found to have cracks. No other visible signs of concrete deterioration were observed.

Average material properties values from the Tank SX-115 concrete sample properties were compression strength 3,825 to 6,960 lb/in.2, splitting tensile strength 494 to 933 lb/in.2, modules of elasticity 2.84 to 5.88 million lb/in.2, and Poisson’s ratio for specimens without cracks, 0.15 to 0.26. These values were somewhat less than measured for dome concrete and about the same as earlier controlled laboratory samples. This, combined with an apparent decrease in strength with depth, would appear to confirm the observation that sustained temperatures above 212oF decrease concrete properties.

Table 6-7. Tank SX-108 Concrete Footing Sample Results

Property Concrete sample Normal soil

pH 9.6 7 – 8 NO3

- 0.4 mg/g Significantly less 137Cs 2E-4 µCi/g 0


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The reports documenting the Tank SX-115 concrete sidewall evaluation are listed in Table 6-9.

Table 6-9. Tank SX-115 Concrete Sidewall Evaluation

Doc. no.a Title Issue date RHO-CD-980 Waste Tank Core Drilling Demonstration Results 1980 RHO-CD-981 Waste Tank Core Drilling Test Plan 1980 RHO-CD-1538 Waste Tank 241-SX-115 Core Drilling Results 1981 RHO-RE-CR-2 Strength and Elastic Properties Tests of Hanford Concrete Core

241-SX-115 and 202-A Purex Canyon Building 1982


6.8 DOME DEFLECTION SURVEY PROGRAM

The SSTs were constructed from 1943 to 1965. During this time, horizontal and vertical survey control monuments were installed to record the location and elevations of the 133 100-series SSTs. Benchmarks are installed either to the vertical risers extending from the tank dome to grade, or to the structural concrete pit walls that are located on or directly above the tank domes. The location of benchmarks and control monuments are shown on drawings H-2-2310 and H-2-2500 for 200 East and 200 West Areas, respectively. Over the years, some of these original control monuments were damaged and have been replaced.

The SST domes have been surveyed periodically since the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to TFC-PLN-142, “Dome Loading Management Plan,” SST dome surveys were originally performed to monitor possible excessive dome deflection due to interim stabilization saltwell pumping. The pumping process removed pumpable liquids from the SSTs. In doing so, the equipment that remained in the tank had an accumulation of solid waste attached. The concern was that the waste accumulation on the in-tank equipment could result in additional concentrated dome loading.

Review of the early survey data shows that the benchmarks and monuments were not maintained and were sometimes damaged. Other times, the survey benchmarks were not appropriately marked or were disregarded and left to be covered by foam or some other obstruction. The lack of control and protection of the survey benchmarks and monuments was evident in the missing and sometimes clearly erroneous survey data.

The current Dome Deflection Survey program is documented in RPP-26516, SST Dome Survey Program. The program was established to address the need for a “documented design basis and protocol to conduct single shell tank (SST) dome surveys” (RPP-26516). In accordance with TFC-ENG-STD-39, “Civil Survey for Tank Farm Facilities,” all current civil surveying activities are supervised by a Professional Land Surveyor licensed in the state of Washington. The Professional Land Surveyor abides by the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), Chapter 18.43, “Engineers and Land Surveyors,” and WAC 196-27A, “Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice.”

The survey standard for each tank farm requires a minimum of two control monuments in the area of each tank farm, a benchmark located on perimeter risers on each of the SSTs to monitor tank settlement, and a benchmark located over the tank dome to monitor dome deflection.


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The SSTIP Expert Panel summarized the dome deflection survey activity in RPP-RPT-43116:

Surveys have been conducted on all of the SSTs approximately every two years since the early 1980s. A maximum allowable decrease in the dome elevation of 0.02 ft (0.24-in.), relative to the baseline measurement, has been specified as the acceptable limit for SSTs. Analytical studies summarized in Section 6.4 [of M&D-01-0028-A, Single-Shell Tank In-Service Inspection Recommendations] indicate a safety factor of approximately 3.0 or larger against dome collapse for the in-situ soil overburden load. An evaluation of the safety factor as a function of the increase in dome deflection over initial baseline measurements was conducted on Tank C-106. This evaluation indicated a safety factor of approximately 2.5 for an additional downward deflection of 0.24-in., and approximately 2.0 for an additional deflection of 0.48-in. Thus, adequate safety margin exists if dome deflections do not increase more than 0.48-in.

The allowable deflection is based on the Tank C-106 structural integrity evaluation in WHC-SD-W320-ANAL-001, Tank 241-C-106 Structural Integrity Evaluation for In situ Conditions. Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 show that predicted dome deflection after 45 and 55 years of operation was -0.3-in. for both the best-estimate and lower-bound concrete properties models.

Source: Figure 8.3.2.1-5 of WHC-SD-W320-ANAL-001, 1999, Tank 241-C-106 Structural Integrity Evaluation for In situ Conditions, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

Figure 6-4. Tank C-106 Type II SST Post-Thermal Creep Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load with Best-Estimate Concrete Properties


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Source: Figure 8.3.2.1-6 of WHC-SD-W320-ANAL-001, 1999, Tank 241-C-106 Structural Integrity Evaluation for In situ Conditions, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

Figure 6-5. Tank C-106 Type II Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load

The following subsequent structural evaluations completed in 2010–2014 for the Type II, Type III, and Type IV SSTs confirm the results of the earlier 1999 analysis, as shown in Figure 6-6 through Figure 6-8.

• RPP-RPT-49989, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type II Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis

• RPP-RPT-49900, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type III Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis

• RPP-RPT-49992, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type IV Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis

• RPP-RPT-49994, Summary Report for the Hanford Single-Shell Tank Structural Analyses of Record – Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record


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Source: Figure 11.6 of RPP-RPT-49989, 2011, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type II Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

Figure 6-6. Type II Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load

Source: Figure 11.8 of RPP-RPT-49992, 2014, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type IV Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

Figure 6-7. Type III Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load


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Source: Figure 11.9 of RPP-RPT-49992, 2014, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type IV Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

Figure 6-8. Type IV Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Under Uniform Surface Load

A decrease in benchmark elevation between surveys indicates that a dome deflection may have occurred or other survey errors have occurred. The surveys should be repeatable to ±0.01 ft (±0.12-in.). If a deflection has changed more than ±0.02 ft (±0.24-in.) since the last survey, the survey must be repeated to verify the accuracy of the results.

Tank dome surveys in SST farms with active retrieval or installed interim surface barriers are performed on a 2-year ±4 months frequency due to the amount of activity and dome loading in these farms. All other SST farm surveys are to occur on a 3-year ±4 months frequency.

Dome deflection is determined by subtracting the elevation at the center of the dome from the elevation at the perimeter of the tank. Settlement of the tank can be determined by subtracting the most current elevation at the perimeter of the tank from the first, or oldest, survey elevation at the perimeter of the tank. The reports listed in Table 6-10 chronicle the dome survey program history of the SST tank farms.


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Table 6-10. Single-Shell Tank Dome Deflection Surveys and Load Control Logs

Doc. no.a Title Issue date RPP-26516, Rev. 1 SST Dome Survey Program 2013 RPP-RPT-55202, Rev. 1 Dome Survey Report for Hanford Single-Shell Tanks 2015 RPP-20444, Rev. 1 241-A Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2015 RPP-20445, Rev. 1 241-AX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2015 RPP-20446, Rev. 1 241-B Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2015 RPP-20447, Rev. 1 241-BX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2016 RPP-20448, Rev. 1 241-BY Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2016 RPP-20449, Rev. 1 241-C Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2016 RPP-20450, Rev. 1 241-S Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2016 RPP-20451, Rev. 1 241-SX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2015 RPP-20452, Rev. 1 241-T Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2016 RPP-20453, Rev. 1 241-TX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2016 RPP-20454, Rev. 1 241-TY Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2017 RPP-20455, Rev. 1 241-U Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data 2016

a Full references provided in Section 7.0. Data date: 4/16/2017

The results of the surveys indicate that, although sequential survey measurements have at times exceeded the allowable -0.02 ft (-0.024 in.) dome deflection, neither excessive tank settlement nor excessive dome deflection has occurred. The dome deflection trend plots in RPP-RPT-55202, Dome Survey Report for Hanford Single-Shell Tanks, showing all the tanks for a given farm, indicate similar trends for increasing or decreasing elevations for a given dome survey date, indicating small systematic measurement errors can be present. These trends further indicate that excessive dome deflection and tank settlement are not occurring.20

6.9 DOME LOAD CONTROL

Dome loading requirements provide defense-in-depth against dome collapse of the SSTs. Concentrated loads are managed to maintain the structural integrity of the SST domes. Dome loading requirements are based on RPP-11802, Analysis of Record Summary for Single-Shell Tanks, and RPP-20473, Design and Dome Load Criteria for Hanford Waste Storage Tanks. These load limits are documented in OSD-T-151-00013, Operating Specifications for Single-Shell Storage Tanks.

Dome load controls provide conservative dome deflection/collapse operating margins for the SSTs, including:

• Establish tank safe operating limits for concentrated loads as described in RPP-11802

• Determine unique in-place load conditions on each SST

20 Note that only RPP-RPT-55202 shows both dome deflection and dome settlement analyses. Individual tank

farm reports listed in Table 6-10 only provide dome settlement analyses.


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• Track and control load additions to ensure that the total applied load does not exceed the allowable load limits

• Restrict load additions to the tank until assessment of in-place loading

• Load restrictions do not apply to personnel or equipment carried by personnel.

Table 6-11 lists the reports that document the SST dome loading management program elements, and Table 6-12 lists the reports that document the SST dome load control technical bases. Appendix C lists the management assessments regarding dome load control from January 2002 through the end of April 2017.

Inconsistent maintenance of the individual SST Dome Control logs, and accidental crane and vehicle encroachment into tank exclusion zones were chronic difficulties from the time that dome load controls were implemented until about 2007 when routine tank farm entries in support of the interim stabilization effort ceased. Most SST tank farm entries now occur once each quarter to inspect the condition of weather barriers and obtain miscellaneous tank readings. This has significantly reduced the opportunities for violating dome load controls.

Table 6-11. Single-Shell Tank Dome Loading Management Program Elements

Doc. no.a Title Issue date OSD-T-151-00013 Operating Specifications for Single-Shell Storage Tanks 2016 TFC-PLN-142, Rev. A-1 “Dome Loading Management Plan” 2014 TFC-ENG-FACSUP-C-10, Rev. C-24

“Control of Dome Loading and SSC Load Control” 2016

TFC-OPS-OPER-C-10, Rev. B-28

“Vehicle and Dome Load Control in Tank Farm Facilities” 2016


Table 6-12. Single-Shell Tank Dome Load Control Technical Bases (2 pages)

Document no.a Title Notes Issue Date

RPP-11802, Rev. 3B Analysis of Record Summary for Single-Shell Tanks

Tables 1–16 summarize soil depth, soil density, and revised allowable concentrated load for each of the 149 SSTs; specifies buffer load; permanent, temporary, and transient load thresholds and limits; and exclusion zones.

2015

RPP-16363, Rev. 0 RPP-16363, Rev. 0A

Tank-Specific Allowable Load for Hanford Site Single-Shell Tanks

Revised concentrated load for the tank-specific in-place soil density and overburden that results in demands on the tank structure. Rev. 0A revises soil depth of the T Farm SSTs covered by the T Farm interim surface barrier. RPP-11802, Tables 1 to 12, present revised load limits for 100-series SSTs.

2003 2007

RPP-16660, Rev. 2 200-Series Single-Shell Tank Dome Load Capacity (200 B, C, T and U)

Revised concentrated load for the worst-case soil density and overburden that results in demands on the tank structure. RPP-11802, Tables 13 to 16, present revised load limits for 200-series SSTs.

2004


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Table 6-12. Single-Shell Tank Dome Load Control Technical Bases (2 pages)

Document no.a Title Notes Issue Date

RPP-16746, Rev. 0 Evaluation of Load in Single-Shell and Double-Shell Tank Exclusion Zones

Study demonstrated that soil overburden load is much greater than the maximum allowable concentrated load imposed by the largest mobile crane live load of ~72 tons. However, the 20-ft exclusion zone beyond the outside face of the tank wall for 100-series SSTs and 16-ft for 200-series tanks remained unchanged.

2003

RPP-20473, Rev. 1 RPP-20473, Rev. 1A

Design and Dome Load Criteria for Hanford Waste Storage Tanks

Tables present revised concentrated loads for the tank-specific in-place soil density and overburden that results in demands on the tank structure. Rev. 1A revises soil depth of the T Farm SSTs covered by the T Farm interim surface barrier. RPP-11802, Tables 1 to 16, present revised load limits for individual 100-series and 200-series SSTs.

2004, 2007

a Full references provided in Section 7.0. Data date: 4/21/2017 SST = single-shell tank.

A dome load log is maintained for each SST in accordance with Engineering procedure TFC-ENG-FACSUP-C-10, “Control of Dome Loading and SSC Load Control.” The Tank Operations Shift Office maintains the dome load log of authorized temporary concentrated loads applied over the tank and/or within the 20-ft or 16-ft exclusion zones beyond the outside face of the 100-series and 200-series tank walls, respectively. Transient loads are also recorded in the dome load log, along with a description of the transient load. Transient loads can be estimated, determined by actual weighing, determined from manufacturer’s data, or by some other means of closely determining the weight. RPP-20473 provides guidance for determining transient loads and provides various verified equipment weights.

For vehicle travel within the tank farms involving vehicles less than 10,000 lb, an approved route drawing for the traveled areas is required, although a specific route is not required. For heavier loads, the route map drawings listed in Table 6-13 are used to control travel routes.

Historic dome load record data for the 12 SST farms, along with the dome deflection survey data by tank farm, are documented in the reports listed in Table 6-10.


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Table 6-13. Single-Shell Tank Farm Route Map Drawings (2 pages)

Route map drawing number Tank farm


H-14-107608, Sh. 1 Rev. 1

“A Tank Farm Route Drawing A-101, 102, 103, 104, 105 & 106”

H-14-107622, Sh. 1, Rev. 1

“S Tank Farm Route Map”

H-14-107608, Sh. 2, Rev. 1

“A Tank Farm Route Drawing A-101, 102, and 103”

H-14-107622, Sh. 2, Rev. 1

“S Tank Farm Route Map S-101, thru S-106”

H-14-107608, Sh. 3, Rev. 1

“A Tank Farm Route Drawing A-104, 105 and 106”

H-14-107622, Sh. 3, Rev. 1

“S Tank Farm Route Map S-107, thru S-112”

H-14-107608, Sh. 4, Rev. 0

“A Tank Farm Route Drawing Legend”

H-14-107624, Sh. 1, Rev. 1

“SX Tank Farm Route Map”

H-14-107609, Sh. 1, Rev. 0

“B Tank Farm Route Map” H-14-107624, Sh. 2, Rev. 1

“SX Tank Farm Route Map SX-101, thru SX-106”

H-14-107609, Sh. 2, Rev. 0

“B Tank Farm Route Map 241-B-101, 104, 107”

H-14-107624, Sh. 3. Rev. 2


H-14-107609, Sh. 3, Rev. 0


H-14-107624, Sh. 4, Rev. 1


H-14-107609, Sh. 4, Rev. 1

“B Tank Farm, Route Map Tanks: B-103, 106, 109, B-112, B-201, 202, 203, & 204”

H-14-107619, Sh. 1, Rev. 1

“T Tank Farm Route Map”

H-14-107609, Sh. 5, Rev. 0


H-14-107619, Sh. 2, Rev. 0

“T Tank Farm Route Map 241-T-101, thru T-106”

H-14-107615, Sh. 1, Rev. 5

“AX Tank Farm Route Drawing AX-101, 102, 103 & 104”

H-14-107619, Sh. 3, Rev. 1

“T Tank Farm Route Map 241-T-107 thru T-112, T-201 – T-204”

H-14-107615, Sh. 2, Rev. 3

“AX Tank Farm Route Drawing AX-101, and AX-102”

H-14-107621, Sh. 1, Rev. 0

“TX Tank Farm Route Map”

H-14-107615, Sh. 3, Rev. 3

“AX Tank Farm Route Drawing” H-14-107621, Sh. 2, Rev. 0

“TX Tank Farm Route Map TX-101 thru TX-108”

H-14-107615, Sh. 4, Rev. 2

“AX Tank Farm Route Drawing Legend”

H-14-107621, Sh. 3, Rev. 0

“TX Tank Farm Route Map TX-109 thru T[X]-115”

H-14-107610, Sh. 1, Rev. 0

“BX Tank Farm Route Map” H-14-107621, Sh. 4, Rev. 0

“TX Tank Farm Route Map TX-116 thru TX-118”

H-14-107610, Sh. 2, Rev. 0

“BX Tank Farm Route Map 241-BX-101, 104, and 107”

H-14-107620, Sh. 1, Rev. 2

“TY Tank Farm Route Map”

H-14-107610, Sh. 3, Rev. 0


H-14-107620, Sh. 2, Rev. 0

“TY Tank Farm Route Map, TY-101 and TY-102”

H-14-107610, Sh. 4, Rev. 1


H-14-107620, Sh. 3, Rev. 0

“TY Tank Farm Route Map TY-103 & TY-104”

H-14-107610, Sh. 5, Rev. 0


H-14-107620, Sh. 4, Rev. 0

“TY Tank Farm Route Map TY-105 & TY-106”

H-14-107611, Sh. 1, Rev. 0

“BY Tank Farm Route Map” H-14-107625, Sh. 1, Rev. 2

“U Tank Farm Route Map”

H-14-107611, Sh. 2, Rev. 0

“BY Tank Farm Route Map 241-BY-101, 104, and 107”

H-14-107625, Sh. 2, Rev. 0

“U Tank Farm Route Map U-101, U-102, & U-103”

H-14-107611, Sh. 3, Rev. 0


H-14-107625, Sh. 3, Rev. 1


H-14-107611, Sh. 4, Rev. 0


H-14-107625, Sh. 4, Rev. 2


H-14-107611, Sh. 5, Rev. 0


H-14-107625, Sh. 5 Rev. 1

“U Tank Farm Route Map, U-110, U-111, & U-112”


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Table 6-13. Single-Shell Tank Farm Route Map Drawings (2 pages)



H-14-107612, Sh. 1, Rev. 13

“C Tank Farm Route Map”

H-14-107612, Sh. 2, Rev. 3

“C Tank Farm Route Map C-101 thru C-106”

H-14-107612, Sh. 3, Rev. 8


H-14-107612, Sh. 4, Rev. 10


H-14-107612, Sh. 5, Rev. 0


H-14-107612, Sh. 6, Rev. 5


Source: TFC-OPS-OPER-C-10, 2016, “Vehicle and Dome Load Control in Tank Farm Facilities” Rev. B-28, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

6.10 SINGLE-SHELL TANK DOME STRUCTURAL VIDEO INSPECTIONS Remote visual inspection is used to perform qualitative in-service inspections of the interior concrete surfaces of the SSTs. These inspections provide a general assessment of the condition of the tank. The focus of the structural portion of the inspection is the reinforced concrete dome and the presence of cracking, rust stains, and spalling.

Visual inspections of the SSTs began in the early 1970s using still photography. The camera assembly and housing were lowered into the tank headspace and positioned to begin a series of photographs. The strobe lamps in the camera housing were used to illuminate the tank wall surface just prior to capturing the photograph. The use of still photography proved to be an effective way of capturing the necessary detail over a large area in a relatively short period of time. In 1993, remote video cameras with pan-tilt-zoom capability replaced the still cameras.

As of April 18, 2017, 53 of the 149 SSTs have received visual inspections following the SSTIP Expert Panel’s Recommendation SI-4, “Perform Non-destructive Evaluation of Concrete” (RPP-RPT-43116). The SST visual inspections are compared against previous in-tank photographs and videos to identify changes. The results of the inspections are compiled and issued as a report after the end of each fiscal year. Table 6-14 provides a compilation of the annual reports; Table 6-15 summarizes the structural inspections that have been completed; and Table 6-16 lists the structural inspections that observed surface water intrusions entering the tanks.


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Table 6-14. Single-Shell Tank Visual Inspection Reports

Doc. no.a Title Issue date RPP-PLAN-46847, Rev. 2

Visual Inspection Plan for Single-Shell Tanks and Double-Shell Tanks

2015

RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0 Fiscal Year 2010 Visual Inspection Report for Single-Shell Tanks

2010

RPP-RPT-50799, Rev. 2 Suspect Water Intrusion in Hanford Single-Shell Tanks 2015 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0 Fiscal Year 2011 Visual Inspection Report for Single-Shell

Tanks 2012

RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0 Fiscal Year 2013 Visual Inspection Report for Single-Shell Tanks21

2015


2015


2015

RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft] Fiscal Year 2016 Visual Inspection Report for Single-Shell Tanks

TBD


Table 6-15. Single-Shell Tank Video Inspections with Dome Interior Surface Structural Notations (3 pages)

Tank Doc. no.a Notation Date

A-105 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

Horizontal linear anomaly in the dome, most likely resulting from a construction patch. Vapor space reaction causing accumulation of crystalline salt on in-tank equipment.b

9/27/2010, 9/28/2010

A-106 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

Horizontal linear anomaly in the concrete at the same elevation encircling the tank dome. Appears to be a stable cold joint from the original construction.

8/12/2010

AX-102 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

Horizontal linear anomaly in the concrete at the same elevation encircling the tank dome. Appears to be a stable cold joint from the original construction.

10/14/2010

AX-103 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0

An accumulation of what appears to be salt is present at one dome location.

9/13/2011

AX-104 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0

Rebar is exposed rebar as a result of surface degradation of the concrete dome. Appearance has not changed since 1983 inspection.

6/26/2011

BY-106 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0

Several ~1-ft diameter spall marks on the dome. These marks might have occurred during construction, although the disturbed concrete does not have the discoloration of the surrounding undisturbed concrete. Such marks have not been observed to date in other SSTs.

3/24/2014

BY-110 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

A surface accumulation of material and a checkered concrete surface pattern are evident close to the center of the tank dome.

7/18/2010, 6/25/2015

21 SST inspections were suspended during FY2012 due to lack of funding.


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Tank Doc. no.a Notation Date C-101 RPP-RPT-51404,

Rev. 0 An apparent concrete patch made during original construction is visible on the dome surface.

6/01/2011

C-112 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0

A patch of salt or deteriorated grout noted as separating from the dome surface.

7/27/2011

S-101 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

Uniformly distributed spotting evident on concrete dome surface. 9/12/2010

S-103 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

Streaks on concrete dome surface originating at dome apex and continuing down the side. Liquid appears to have entered the tank, causing the streaking. At another location, a small void is evident in the dome’s concrete, possibly a construction artifact.

9/14/2010

S-104 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

Surface spots in concrete surface giving appearance of pitting. 8/26/2010

S-106 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0

Several locations on a circumferential form lines in the northwest region that could either be cracks or overlap of several concrete pours.

3/24/2014

S-108 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

Apparent voids at junction between dome slabs. One ridge between adjacent slabs, possible an accumulation of material. This is the first tank inspected with this type of anomaly.

9/16/2010

RPP-RPT-58849, Rev. 0

Reported in 1980 as having circumferential spalling around the haunch above the lead flashing. The 2015 video images suggest either an indentation due to spalling or an optical illusion created by a raised surface of accumulated salt.

7/6/2015

SX-107 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0

Four individual splatter patterns are visible on the dome directly above the airlift circulators in the tank. These patterns are thought to be from waste eruptions from the airlift circulators operating in low waste level conditions inside the tank.

8/31/2011

T-102 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0

Areas of visible discoloration are likely from spalling of patches to the tank dome during original construction. Area should be reinspected for changes in the size and shape of the spalled area.

1/31/2011, 9/23/2014

T-111 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0

The anomaly on the southeast haunch of the tank is still an unknown, but appears to be some patch from construction. The anomaly may be an intrusion location.

2/11/2013 – 12/31/2013 (4x)

T-112 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0

Voids or a salt layer deteriorating the surface of the concrete dome. Area should be reinspected for changes in the size and shape.

7/20/2011

TX-101 RPP-RPT-51404, Rev. 0

Small section of surface spalling visible on the concrete dome likely from a weak spot from original construction. Area should be reinspected for changes in the size and shape.

7/1/2011

TX-114 RPP-RPT-58849, Rev. 0

A number of steel plates are embedded in the concrete dome. These plates appear to have been placed above the wood form lines and were left in place when the plates could not be easily removed.

4/22/2015

TX-115 RPP-RPT-58849, Rev. 0

Two small clumps of dark material similar to axle grease are visible adhering to the dome. The clumps are unlikely to have remained in place since tank construction around 1950. The tank has an asphaltic membrane on the outside of the concrete shell, but the clumps do not have the appearance of flowing through a hole.

5/26/2015


6-25


Tank Doc. no.a Notation Date TX-117 RPP-RPT-58849,

Rev. 0 A vertical crack in the dome was reported during the 1969 inspection. Camera placement during 2015 prevented viewing the crack location. Reevaluation of the 1969 photos suggests the crack is actually a small riser stain.

5/6/2015

TY-102 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0

Small crack (possibly two) in the west-northwest region of the dome.

3/7/2014

U-104 RPP-RPT-48194, Rev. 0

A linear anomaly is present in the concrete below the haunch parallel to the edge of the steel liner. A second anomaly, probably a cold joint or minor crack, is visible in the haunch.

8/17/2010

U-105 RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft]

Riser 18 is a 42-in. add-on riser. There is a large rust stain running down the wall from the riser, along with exposed rebar and part of what looks like a riser support plate. The riser should be structurally evaluated before placing any heavy object on the riser flange.

11/3/2016c

U-111 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0

Possible small crack in the dome, located in a line that goes around much of the tank circumference. This line is seen in other SSTs and has been assumed to be due to construction finishing or in-tank activities. This is the first tank in which a crack has been observed in such a line.

7/24/2013 – 2/19/2014

(3x)

a Full references provided in Section 7.0. Data date: April 13, 2017. b WRPS-1100725, “Ammonium Nitrate in Tank 241-A-105,” provides a discussion of crystalline salt accumulating on the

interior surface of Tank A-105 (Reeploeg, 2011). c Visual inspection completed during FY 2017; results will be reported at future date.

FY = fiscal year. SST = single-shell tank.


6-26

Table 6-16. Single-Shell Tank Video Inspections with Water Intrusion Notations (2 pages)


A-101 RPP-RPT-58849, Rev. 0

Liquid level increase that could be due to either an intrusion or retained gas growth. There is a large quantity of retained gas in the tank. No evidence of recent intrusion.

7/16/2015

A-102 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0

Active intrusion observed. Intrusion evaluation documented in RPP-RPT-50799.

1/21/2014

A-103 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0

No active intrusion observed. Insufficient level change to confirm an intrusion. Intrusion evaluation documented in RPP-RPT-50799.

6/11/2013, 1/15/2014

B-201 RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft]

Active intrusion observed. Water droplets visible. Level change evaluation supports intrusion evidence.

2/1/2016a

B-202 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


1/28/2014

BX-101 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0

Active intrusion observed. 3/11/2013

BX-103 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0

No active intrusion observed but confirmed by level change and liquid pool.

3/25/2013, 3/28/2013

BX-110 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0


2/27/2013

BY-101 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0


11/27/2012, 12/20/2012

BY-102 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0


BY-105 RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft]

Conflicting evidence for presence or absence of intrusion. Surface and interstitial liquid levels are inconsistent with images from 2000 and 2006 inspection videos.

11/10/2016b

S-105 RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft]

Evidence of unobserved intrusion. Surface pool is being periodically replenished based on level change evaluation, location of pool beneath pump pit drain, and stability of pool size compared to 1989 photographs.

10/24/2016b

S-106 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


3/24/2014

S-111 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0


4/17/2013

SX-102 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


11/21/2013

SX-104 RPP-RPT-58849, Rev. 0

A number of unexplained several inch wide, roughly vertical markings on the liner that could be due to water dissolving salt on the liner. If the markings are due to water dissolving salt, then it is entering the tank through small breaches in the liner.

6/30/2015 – 7/1/2015

SX-106 RPP-RPT-55951, Rev. 0


T-101 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


3/10/2014


6-27

Table 6-16. Single-Shell Tank Video Inspections with Water Intrusion Notations (2 pages)


T-107 RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft]


1/4/2016b

T-111 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


2/11/2013 – 12/31/2013 (4x)

T-201 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


3/26/2014

TX-108 RPP-RPT-58849, Rev. 0

Intrusion has occurred since the last photos were taken in 1989. Interstitial liquid level neutron scans were discontinued in 1994, so there is no data indicating when the intrusion may have begun or halted.

3/18/2015

TY-102 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


3/7/2014



11/1/2016c


No active intrusion observed but confirmed level change evaluation and liquid pool increase.

11/3/2016c

U-111 RPP-RPT-58239, Rev. 0


7/24/2013 – 2/19/2014 (3x)

Data Date: April 13, 2017 a Full references provided in Section 7.0. Data date: April 13, 2017. b Visual inspection completed during FY 2016; results will be reported in RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft]. c Visual inspection completed during FY 2017; results will be reported at future date.

FY = fiscal year.

The inspections use ACI 201.1R-08, Guide for Conducting a Visual Inspection of Concrete in Service (July 2008 version) nomenclature to describe concrete anomalies observed during the visual inspections. ACI 201.1R-08 segregates problems into cracking, distress, textural features, and phenomena, which are further divided into numerous subcategories with a definition and description of each subcategory.

Because of the inability to physically inspect the concrete dome and the limitations of remotely operated video cameras, attaining the degree of specificity called for in ACI 201.1 R-08 for a concrete inspection is not practical, nor is it practical to accurately describe all the distress patterns observed to the degree expected for a formal concrete physical inspection. Anomalies identified during visual inspections are limited to the following categories and a description included in the annual report.

• Cracking – ACI 201.1R-08 calls for reporting crack width and segregates cracks into one of 13 patterns. The targeted minimum detectable crack width during visual inspection is 1/16-in. However there is no ability to measure a crack width in an SST dome except by comparison if there is an item of known dimension nearby. Detectable cracks are included in the annual report.


6-28

• Distress – ACI 201.1R-08 segregates distress into 21 subcategories, with some of those further subdivided. Evidence of dusting, chalking, efflorescence, joint spalls, and joint leakage, scaling, and spalling is described in the annual report.

• Textural features and phenomena – ACI 201.1R-08 segregates textural features and phenomena into 16 subcategories. The presence of air voids, discoloration, staining, and stalactites is documented in the annual report.

• White material on tank dome – ACI 201.1R-08 describes several examples of distress that could result in white salts as:

– Chalking – “Formation of a loose powder resulting from the disintegration of the surface of concrete or an applied coating, such as cementitious coating”

– Dusting – “The development of a powdered material at the surface of hardened concrete”

– Efflorescence – “A deposit of salts, usually white, formed on a surface, the substance having emerged in solution from within either concrete or masonry and subsequently been precipitated by a reaction, such as carbonation or evaporation”

– Joint leakage – “Liquid migrating through the joint” (such as a construction form joint).

Table 6-17 summarizes the observed SST concrete dome cracking conditions, cause, mitigation, and significance.

Table 6-17. Concrete Dome Cracking Origin, Significance, and Mitigation (2 pages) Observed dome cracking condition Possible cause Mitigation Significance

Wavy lines following the rebar patterns (meridional and hoop lines). Usually corrosion-induced cracks are accompanied by some rust-colored staining. For more advanced corrosion, the cracking is accompanied by significant spalling along the length of the crack.

Reinforcing steel corrosion

• Increased inspection frequency to expand the crack database and monitor for changes

• Selective evaluation • If corrosion is extensive,

additional dome load limitations may be necessary

High

Vertical cracks in the haunch region that occur at about 25% of the dome capacity. Cracks due to a dome overload would be expected to occur in several places around the haunch circumference.

Dome overload • Monitor for changes by increasing inspection frequency

• Additional dome load limitations may be necessary

High

Cracking in local dome regions adjacent to one of the larger risers. The cracks would likely radiate out from riser shear stud locations.

Local riser overload

• Monitor for changes by increasing inspection frequency

• Additional load restrictions on the associated riser

Moderate

Relatively long and more open cracks than a shrinkage crack. The number of cracks should be relatively few.

Differential settlement


Moderate


6-29

Table 6-17. Concrete Dome Cracking Origin, Significance, and Mitigation (2 pages) Observed dome cracking condition Possible cause Mitigation Significance

There are several types of crack mechanisms associated with construction quality. Local cracking with no other obvious explanation may be in this category.

Construction imperfection


• Additional action depends on the extent of the cracking

Moderate

Random crack pattern. Thermal stress • Monitor changes by increasing inspection frequency

Low

Relatively long crack that follows a path that associated with the concrete pour sequence.

Cold joint • Monitor for changes by increasing inspection frequency

Not significant

Cracks in concentric circles outward from the dome center.

Shrinkage • Monitor for changes by increasing inspection frequency

Not significant

Source: M&D-01-0028-A, 2002, “Single-Shell Tank In-Service Inspection Recommendations” Rev. DRAFT, M&D Professional Services, Inc., Richland, Washington.

In addition to these possible sources of material on the concrete surface, salt on the tank dome could also be present due to:

• Waste salts from operation of an airlift circulator • Salts from chemical decontamination performed in a riser or pit • Salts from waste solution mists depositing and drying on the dome • Salts from in-tank activities splashing up on the dome • Formation of crystalline salt deposits on interior surfaces from vapor phase reactions.22

Following deactivation in November 1980, the SSTs were “partial interim isolated” to prevent inadvertent rainwater and snowmelt entry into the tanks. After partial interim isolation was completed, only the tank penetrations needed for interim stabilization saltwell jet pumping were accessible. A tank was categorized as “interim stabilized” once <5,000 gal of supernatant liquid, and <50,000 gal of drainable liquid (including any remaining supernatant) remained in the tank, and the jet pumping removal rate was <0.05 gal/min. Following interim stabilization, the remaining accesses to the tank were sealed, and the tank became “interim isolated.” An SST was considered interim isolated when all accesses not required for long-term leak detection monitoring had been sealed in a way that provided at least one barrier from inadvertent liquid entry. The barrier had to be capable of withstanding a 12-in. w.g. differential pressure and have a predicted lifetime of 20 years. The isolation method had to allow for reentry if further stabilization activity was required and for eventual waste retrieval.23

22 WRPS-1100725, “Ammonium Nitrate in Tank 241-A-105,” provides a discussion of crystalline salt

accumulating on interior surface of Tank A-105 (Reeploeg, 2011). 23 SD-WM-TI-097, Criteria for Interim Isolation of Radioactively Contaminated Tank Farm Facilities at

Hanford, and RHO-CD-1161, Stabilization and Isolation Program Plan, provide additional information on isolation requirements and activities. The interim isolation activities were parsed among eight isolation construction projects.


6-30

Isolation barrier installations began in the early 1980s. Many of the barriers have exceeded their 20-year design life, and as a result, rainwater and snowmelt-fed intrusions into the SSTs are becoming common. A continuing water intrusion will eventually reverse the interim stabilization waste status of the SST, increasing the hydraulic head in the tank, and increasing the potential for waste loss to the environment. In tanks containing waste layers with aggressive corrosion characteristics, an intrusion eventually brings the redissolved waste in contact with the steel liner, accelerating the liner corrosion rate, reducing the remaining integrity lifetime of the liner, and increasing the likelihood of long-term contact between the waste and the concrete structure.

Beginning in November 2012, the presence of active water intrusions and evidence of past intrusions were evaluated during visual inspections. Table 6-16 lists SSTs with active surface water intrusions entering the tank that have been observed during visual inspections and SSTs with evidence of past intrusions. Since meteorological water is seasonal, it is possible that other SSTs might have water intrusions that were inactive when the visual inspection was conducted.

Between October 1, 2012 (the date that the current round of SST visual inspections began) and November 10, 2016, 62 visual inspections have been completed on 53 SSTs. The intention is to complete visual inspections of all 149 SSTs every ten years. Table 6-18 lists the SST visual inspection dates from January 2010 through April 2017.

Table 6-18. Single-Shell Tank Visual Inspection Dates January 2009 – April 2017 (2 pages)

Tank Inspection

date Tank Inspection



date

A-101 7/16/2015 BY-101 11/27/2012, 12/20/2012

S-110 − TX-104 7/12/2011

A-102 1/21/2014 BY-102 12/28/2012 S-111 4/17/2013 TX-105 − A-103 6/11/2013,

1/15/2014 BY-103 2/25/2014 S-112 − TX-106 −

A-104 − BY-104 − SX-101 9/15/2010 TX-107 − A-105 9/27/2010,

9/28/2010 BY-105 11/10/2016b SX-102 11/21/2013 TX-108 3/18/2015

A-106 8/12/2010 BY-106 3/24/2014 SX-103 − TX-109 − AX-101 9/7/2011 BY-107 − SX-104 6/30/2015,

7/1/2015 TX-110 −

AX-102 10/14/2010 BY-108 − SX-105 − TX-111 9/14/2016 – 9/15/2016a

AX-103 9/13/2011 BY-109 − SX-106 4/15/2013 TX-112 6/7/2013 AX-104 6/26/2011 BY-110 7/18/2010,

6/25/2015 SX-107 8/31/2011 TX-113 10/11/2016 –

10/12/2016b B-101 2/1/2016a BY-111 1/8/2013 SX-108 − TX-114 4/22/2015 B-102 8/2/2010 BY-112 − SX-109 − TX-115 5/26/2015 B-103 − C-101 6/1/2011 SX-110 − TX-116 10/5/2016b B-104 − C-102 − SX-111 − TX-117 5/6/2015 B-105 − C-103 − SX-112 − TX-118 − B-106 − C-104 − SX-113 − TY-101 −


6-31

Table 6-18. Single-Shell Tank Visual Inspection Dates January 2009 – April 2017 (2 pages)

Tank Inspection




date B-107 − C-105 − SX-114 − TY-102 3/7/2014 B-108 − C-106 − SX-115 − TY-103 5/12/2015 B-109 2/11/2014 C-107 − T-101 3/10/2014 TY-104 − B-110 − C-108 − T-102 1/31/2011,

9/23/2014 TY-105 4/22/2013

B-111 9/22/2011 C-109 − T-103 − TY-106 − B-112 − C-110 9/7/2010 T-104 − U-101 − B-201 2/1/2016a C-111 − T-105 − U-102 11/1/2016b B-202 1/28/2014 C-112 7/27/2011 T-106 − U-103 − B-203 5/1/2013,

5/20/2013 C-201 − T-107 1/4/2016a U-104 8/17/2010

B-204 5/23/2013 C-202 − T-108 − U-105 11/3/2016b BX-101 3/11/2013 C-203 − T-109 − U-106 7/14/2011 BX-102 − C-204 − T-110 1/04/2016a U-107 − BX-103 3/25/2013,

3/28/2013 S-101 9/12/2010 T-111 2/11/2013 –

8/25/2015 (5X)

U-108 −

BX-104 − S-102 − T-112 7/20/2011, 4/7/2016

U-109 −

BX-105 − S-103 9/14/2010 T-201 3/26/2014 U-110 − BX-106 6/24/2015 S-104 8/26/2010 T-202 − U-111 7/24/2013,

7/25/2013, 2/19/2014

BX-107 − S-105 10/24/2016b T-203 4/23/2013 U-112 − BX-108 − S-106 3/24/2014 T-204 4/25/2013 U-201 − BX-109 − S-107 − TX-101 7/1/2011 U-202 − BX-110 2/27/2013 S-108 9/16/2010,

7/6/2015 TX-102 − U-203 −

BX-111 8/8/2014 S-109 7/17/2013 TX-103 9/15/2016a U-204 − BX-112 −

Data Date: 4/13/17 a Visual inspection completed during FY 2016; results will be reported in RPP-RPT-59272 [Draft], Fiscal

Year 2016 Visual Inspection Report for Single-Shell Tanks b Visual inspection completed during FY 2017; results will be reported at future date.

Of the 53 SSTs inspected to date, 19 tanks (about 35 percent) have confirmed intrusions. An additional eight (15 percent) of the 53 SSTs show evidence of past intrusion, although an intrusion was not occurring during the visual inspection. Many of the 53 tanks were selected because leak detection and monitoring surveillance data suggested an intrusion had occurred. The intrusions are not likely to be occurring at the same frequency in the remaining 83 SSTs that have not been inspected. However, as the barriers protecting the SSTs from inadvertent water additions age, more frequent and potentially larger and more sustained intrusions are likely to occur.


6-32

6.11 SINGLE-SHELL TANK LINER CORROSION CHEMISTRY

The waste acceptance envelope for waste receipts into the SSTs and DSTs has been gradually tightened since the first production waste was received in 1944. The current waste acceptance envelope was adopted in 1984 and, with the exception of specific waste type dependencies, has remained stable.

During the early operating years, SST waste receipt composition limits were sometimes relaxed to strike a balance between the extent of neutralization necessary to minimize corrosion of the mild steel liners and the chronic shortage of waste storage space. Corrosion testing of SST liner steel has been performed numerous times over many decades. Most corrosion testing focused on corrosion rates at the higher temperatures and storage conditions that no longer exist in the SSTs. A compilation of these historical reports and a summary of results of the past SST corrosion testing are provided in ARH-ST-111, Compilation of Hanford Corrosion Studies.

The SSTIP Expert Panel recommended that the corrosion behavior of “noncompliant” SST waste simulants be examined at 25°C. Noncompliant wastes are those that fail to meet current DST temperature, nitrite, nitrate, and hydroxide concentration corrosion control limits. The examinations would provide information on the potential for pitting, cracking, and corrosion at the liquid-air waste interface or corrosion of the liner in the vapor space. A primary reason for screening the SSTs using the DST corrosion controls was that the DSTs managed with these controls have shown no sign of promoting general, localized, or environmentally assisted cracking corrosion. These same corrosion mechanisms are typically also present in the SSTs

Noncompliant waste layers were identified using DST chemistry control limits listed in OSD-T-151-00007, Operating Specifications for the Double-Shell Storage Tanks. Applying the DST limits, adding a nitrite inhibition limit, and adjusting the population for some higher waste storage temperatures identified 39 layers in 26 tanks that required testing; two additional tanks required tests at 40°C.

During FY 2013 and FY 2014, stress corrosion cracking and localized corrosion tests were conducted on SST waste layer simulants that were considered representative of the various waste chemistries that were noncompliant. Tanks containing those wastes are listed in Table 6-19.

Table 6-19. Single-Shell Tank Waste Chemistry Simulant Tests

Tank

Conducted tests Localized corrosion

test Stress corrosion

cracking test

B-101 B-107 B-203

BX-110 S-104 T-102 T-110

TX-116 TX-117 U-106 U-203


6-33

No evidence of stress corrosion cracking was observed in any of the tests; however, evidence of localized corrosion in the form of pitting and crevice corrosion was observed in the seven tanks listed in Table 6-20.

The stress corrosion cracking results and select localized corrosion results are documented in RPP-RPT-56141, FY2013 DNV DST and SST Corrosion and Stress Corrosion Cracking Testing Report and RPP-RPT-58300, FY2014 Corrosion Testing Report. Localized corrosion testing results are summarized in RPP-RPT-57096, Examination of Simulated Non-Compliant Waste from Hanford Single-Shell Tanks.

Table 6-20. Single-Shell Tank Waste Chemistries with a Propensity for Localized Corrosion

Tank Pitting corrosion Crevice corrosion B-107 B-203

BX-110 S-104 T-110

TX-116 TX-117


7-1

7.0 REFERENCES

40 CFR 265.191, “Assessment of Existing Tank System’s Integrity,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

ACI 201.1R-08, 2008, Guide for Conducting a Visual Inspection of Concrete in Service, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan.

ACI 318, 1989 (2011), Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete and Commentary, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan.

ACI-349, 2007, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Structures, American Concrete Institute, Farmington Hills, Michigan.

ARH-R-43, 1970, Management of Radioactive Wastes Stored in Underground Tanks at Hanford, Rev. 2, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

ARH-R-45, 1969, Interim Summary Report Stress and Strength Analysis for Waste Tank Structures at Hanford, Washington, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois.

ARH-ST-111, 1975, Compilation of Hanford Corrosion Studies, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

ASME, 2017, ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York.

ASTM A201, 1961 (W1967), Specification for Carbon-Silicon Steel Plates of Intermediate Tensile Ranges for Fusion-Welded Boilers and Other Pressure Vessels, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.

ASTM A283, 1946/1949/1952 (2012), Standard Specification for Low and Intermediate Tensile Strength Carbon Steel Plates, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.

ASTM A285, 1946/1952 (2012), Standard Specification for Pressure Vessel Plates, Carbon Steel, Low- and Intermediate-Tensile Strength, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.

ASTM A370, 2017, Standard Test Methods and Definitions for Mechanical Testing of Steel Products, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.

ASTM A615, 2016, Standard Specification for Deformed and Plain Carbon-Steel Bars for Concrete Reinforcement, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.

ASTM D41, 1994 (2014), Standard Test Methods for Operating Characteristics of Reverse Osmosis and Nanofiltration Devices, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.

ASTM D173, 1994 (2011), Standard Specification for Bitumen-Saturated Cotton Fabrics Used in Roofing and Waterproofing, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.

ASTM D449, 1989 (2014), Standard Specification for Asphalt Used in Dampproofing and Waterproofing, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.


7-2

Clark, C. E., 2000, “Transmittal of Administrative Orders No. 00NWPKW-1250 and No. 00NWPKW-1251 Action 5 Report,” (Letter 00-OSD-175 to M. A. Wilson, Program Director, December 18), U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, Richland, Washington.

Ecology, EPA, and DOE, 1989, “Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order – Tri-Party Agreement,” 3 volumes., as amended, State of Washington Department of Ecology, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Department of Energy, Olympia, Washington.

GE, 1946, Specifications for Construction of Composite Storage Tanks, Hanford Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington (copy unavailable).

Hatch, P., and G.C. Oberg, 1968, “Comments on the Proposed Inspection of the Concrete Portion of Underground Storage Tanks,” (Memorandum LET-041068 to H. P. Shaw, April 10), Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-602, 1947, “Composite Tank Typical Details Concrete 241-BX,” Rev. 8, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-809, 1947, “75-Foot Tank Steel Plate Details,” Rev. 0, Bldg. No. 241-TX, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-1313, 1950, “75-Foot Tank Steel Plate Details,” Rev. 4, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-1318, 1949, “75-Foot Tank Nozzle & Piping Details,” Rev. 2, Bldg. No. 241-BY, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-1783, 1972, “75-Foot Composite Storage Tank Sections,” Rev. 3, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-1789, 1949, “75-Foot Tank Nozzle & Piping Details,” Rev. 3, Bldg. No. 241-S, Hanford Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-2244, 1951, “75-Foot Composite Storage Tank Sections,” Rev. 2, Bldg. No. 241-TY, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-2250, 1951, “75-Foot Tank Nozzle & Piping Details,” Rev. 3, Bldg. No. 241-TY, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-2310, 2008, “Monument Layout 200-E Area,” CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Richland, Washington.

H-2-2500, 2011, “Monument Layout 200-W Area,” Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

H-2-39511, 1975, “75-Ft Storage Tanks Composite Section Waste Disposal Facility 241-SX,” Rev. 3, Hanford Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-44562, 1975, “Structural Waste Storage Tanks Composite Section and Details,” Rev. 4, Bldg. No. 241-AX, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

H-2-44635, 1962, “Process Waste Lines Sections & Details,” Rev. 3, Bldg. No. 241-AX, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.


7-3

H-2-55911, 1956, “Waste Storage Tanks Composite Section,” Rev. 1, Bldg. No. 241-A, Hanford Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HNF-2944, 1998, Single-Shell Tank Retrieval Program Mission Analysis Report, Rev. 0, Lockheed Martin Hanford Corporation, Richland, Washington.

HNF-4712, 1999, Load Requirements for Maintaining Structural Integrity of Hanford Single-Shell Tanks During Waste Feed Delivery and Retrieval Activities, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HNF-EP-0182, 2017, Waste Tank Summary Report for Month Ending February 28, 2017, Rev. 350, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-RE-TI-178, 2007, Single-Shell Tank Interim Stabilization Record, Rev. 9A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

HW-7-5264 1946, Project Proposal Additional Underground Waste Tank Facilities 241-B-Tank Farms, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-1946, 1943, Specification for Composite Storage Tanks - Bldg. #241 at Hanford Engineer Works, Project 9536, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-1961, 1943, Specification for 20 Foot Diameter Composite Storage Tanks – Bldg. #241 at Hanford Engineer Works, Project 9536, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-3061, 1949, Paragraph D. Steel Tank Lining of Part IX of Specifications for Construction of Composite Storage Tanks, Bldg. 241-TX, Project C-163, Hanford Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-3783, 1948, Specifications for Construction of Additional Waste Storage Facilities, 200 East Area, Bldg. 241-BY, Project C-271, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-3937, 1949, Specifications for Construction of Waste Disposal Facilities 241-S, 216-S, 207-S 200 West Area, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-4696, 1951, Specifications for Construction of Waste Disposal Facilities 241-BZ and TY Tank Farms 200 East and West Areas, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-4798-S, 1962, Standard Specification for Placing Reinforced Concrete, Hanford Works Standards Committee, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-4957, 1953, Specifications for Waste Disposal Facility 241-SX, In accordance with addenda Contract No. AT(45-1)-688, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-14946 1949, A Survey of Corrosion Data and Construction Details, 200 Area Waste Storage Tanks, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HW-24800-35, 1953, Design and Construction History Project C-163, 241-TX Tank Farm 200 West, Hanford Engineer Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.


7-4

HWS-5614, 1953, Specifications for PUREX Waste Disposal Facility, Project CA-513-A, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

HWS-8237, 1963, Specification for PUREX 241-AX Tank Farm, Project CAC-945, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

Lawrence, M. J., 1984, “Waste Management Programmatic Change,” (Letter 24904 to P. G. Lorenzini, General Manager, Rockwell Hanford Operations, July 10), U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington.

LET-041068, Comments on the Proposed Inspection of the concrete Portion of Underground Storage Tanks

Lindholm. M. A., and K. W. Smith, 2016, “Waste Designation for 241-AZ-301 Condensate,” (Letter 16-TF-0071, to A. K. Smith, Program Manager, State of Washington Department of Ecology, July 5), Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, and U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, Richland, Washington.

Lorenzini, P. G., 1984, “Waste Management Programmatic Change (Contract DE-AC06-77RL01030),” (Letter to A. G. Fremling, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, June 19), Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

Lyon, J. J., 2008, “Re: Restart Retrieval Dates for Single-Shell Tanks (SST) S-102, C-108, C-109, and C-110,” (Letter 0802521 to S. J. Olinger, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, October 13), State of Washington Department of Ecology, Richland, Washington.

M-B-M, 1944, “Half Section at Centerline of 75-ft Tank, Drawing D-2,” Contract No. 869, Project 9536, Drawings/Blue-Print File 73550 – Tank Details, Morrison-Bechtel-McCone, Richland, Washington.

M&D-01-0028-A, 2002, Single-Shell Tank In-Service Inspection Recommendations, M&D Professional Services, Richland, Washington.

OSD-T-151-00007, 2016, Operating Specifications for the Double-Shell Storage Tanks, Rev. 19, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

OSD-T-151-00013, 2016, Operating Specifications for Single-Shell Waste Storage Tanks, Rev. 7, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

Publication 94-114, 2014, Guidance for Assessing and Certifying Tank Systems, State of Washington Department of Ecology, Olympia, Washington.

Rasmussen, J. E., 2002, “Submittal of M-23-24 Single-Shell Tank (SST) System Integrity Assessment Report,” (Letter 02-OMD-036 to M. A. Wilson, State of Washington Department of Ecology, June 27), U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, Richland, Washington.

RCW Chapter 18.43, “Engineers and Land Surveyors,” Revised Code of Washington, as amended.

Reeploeg, G. E., 2011, “Ammonium Nitrate in Tank 241-A-105,” Memorandum WRPS-1100725, Rev. 1, to N.W. Kirch, T. G. Goetz, and J. S. Schofield, April 25), Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


7-5

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 USC 6901, et seq.

RHO-C-22, 1978, Strength and Elastic Properties of Concretes from Waste Tank Farms, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-CD-14, 1980, Waste Status Summary November, 1980, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-CD-980, 1980, Waste Tank Core Drilling Demonstration Results, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-CD-981, 1980, Waste Tank Core Drilling Test Plan, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-CD-1161, 1980, Stabilization and Isolation Program Plan, Rev. 0, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-CD-1273, 1981, Criterion for Selection of 100 Series Tanks to be Jet Pumped, Rev. 0, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-CD-1538, 1981, Waste Tank 241-SX-115 Core Drilling Results, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-RE-CR-2, 1982, Strength and Elastic Properties Tests of Hanford Concrete Core 241-SX-115 and 202-A Purex Canyon Building, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-RE-CR-4, 1981, Effects of Moisture Loss Due to Radiolysis on Concrete Strength, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RHO-RE-CR-8 P, 1982, Long-Term Effects of Waste Solutions on Concrete and Reinforcing Steel, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington.

RPP-9937, 2014, Single-Shell Tank System Leak Detection and Monitoring Functions and Requirements Document, Rev. 3E, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-10435, 2002, Single-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-11802, 2015, Analysis of Record Summary for Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 3B, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-16363, 2003, Tank-Specific Allowable Load for Hanford Site Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-16363, 2007, Tank Specific Allowable Dome Load for Hanford Site 100-Series Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-16660, 2004, 200-Series Single-Shell Tank Dome Load Capacity (200 B, C, T and U), Rev. 2, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-16746, 2004, Evaluation of Load in Single-Shell and Double-Shell Tank Exclusion Zones, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-20444, 2015, 241-A Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


7-6

RPP-20445, 2015, 241-AX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20446, 2015, 241-B Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20447, 2016, 241-BX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20448, 2016, 241-BY Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20449, 2016, 241-C Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20450, 2016, 241-S Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20451, 2015, 241-SX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20452, 2016, 241-T Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20453, 2016, 241-TX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20454, 2017, 241-TY Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20455, 2016, 241-U Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20473, 2004, Design and Dome Load Criteria for Hanford Waste Storage Tanks, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-20473, 2007, Design and Dome Load Criteria for Hanford Waste Storage Tanks, Rev. 1A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-26516, 2013, SST Dome Survey Program, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-46305 | PNNL-19403, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Inspection Program, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-46442, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Structural Evaluation Criteria, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-46644, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record – Preliminary Modeling Plan for Thermal and Operating Loads, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-49300, 2011, Data Quality Objectives for Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


7-7

RPP-CALC-53887, 2013, SST-241-A-106 Sidewall Coring, Structural Analysis Dome Loading and 4-in. Plug Removal from Tank Sidewall, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-ENV-33418, 2016, Hanford C-Farm Leak Assessments Report, Rev. 4, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-ENV-37956, 2014, Hanford A and AX Farm Leak Assessment Report, Rev 2, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-ENV-39658, 2010, Hanford SX-Farm Leak Assessments Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-PLAN-45082, 2010, Implementation Plan for the Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-PLAN-46847, 2015, Visual Inspection Plan for Single-Shell Tanks and Double-Shell Tanks, Rev. 2, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-PLAN-47369, 2011, Core Drilling Demonstration Plan for A Single Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-PLAN-47370, 2013, Sidewall Core Drilling Plan for the Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-PLAN-48753, 2011, Analytical Test Plan for the Removed 241 C 107 Dome Concrete and Rebar, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-PLAN-50182, 2011, Sampling and Analysis Plan for the Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-PLAN-50376, 2011, Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project Sampling and Analysis Work Plan, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-26475, 2005, Demonstration Retrieval Data Report for Single-Shell Tank 241-C-203, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-27406, 2005, Demonstration Retrieval Data Report for Single-Shell Tank 241-S-112, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-42296, 2010, Hanford TY-Farm Leak Assessments Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-43116, 2009, Expert Panel Report for Hanford Site Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-43704, 2011, Hanford BY-Farm Leak Assessments Report, Rev. 0A, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-45921, 2010, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Expert Panel Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-47562, 2011, Hanford BX-Farm Leak Inventory Assessments Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


7-8

RPP-RPT-48194, 2010, Fiscal Year 2010 Visual Inspection Report for Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-48589, 2011, Hanford S-Farm Leak Assessment Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49089, 2011, Hanford B-Farm Leak Inventory Assessments Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49989, 2011, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type II Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49990, 2011, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type III Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49991, 2014, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Tank to Tank Interaction Study of the Hanford Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49992, 2014, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type IV Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49993, 2014, Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record Hanford Type I Single-Shell Tank Thermal and Operating Loads and Seismic Analysis, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-49994, 2015, Summary Report for the Hanford Single-Shell Tank Structural Analyses of Record – Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project Analysis of Record, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-50097, 2011, Hanford 241-U Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-50714, 2011, Demonstration Report for the Single-Shell Tank Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-50799, 2015, Suspect Water Intrusion in Hanford Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 2, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-50870, 2013, Hanford 241-TX Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-50934, 2012, Inspection and Test Report for the Removed 241-C-107 Dome Concrete, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


RPP-RPT-54564, 2013, Inspection and Test Report for the Removed 241-C-107 Dome Rebar, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


7-9

RPP-RPT-54764, 2013, Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer (IQRPE) Report for Single-Shell Tank 241 A 106 Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-55084, 2013, Hanford 241-T Farm Leak Inventory Assessment Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-55202, 2015, Dome Survey Report for Hanford Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


RPP-RPT-56141, 2014, FY2013 DNV DST and SST Corrosion and Stress Corrosion Cracking Testing Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-57096, 2014, Examination of Simulated Non-Compliant Waste from Hanford Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58116, 2014, Sidewall Core Drilling Report for the Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


RPP-RPT-58254, 2014, Concrete Core Testing Report for the Single-Shell Tank 241-A-106 Sidewall Coring Project, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58300, 2015, FY2014 Corrosion Testing Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-58441, 2016, Double-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report (DSTAR), Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


RPP-RPT-59272, 2017, Fiscal Year 2016 Visual Inspection Report for Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. Draft], Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

Schepens, R. J., 2006, “Completion of Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (HFFACO) Milestone M-48-07 Requirements for Isolation, Stabilization, and Monitoring of Double –Shell Tank System Components,” (Letter 06-TPD-042, to J. Hedges, State of Washington Department of Ecology, June 27), U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, Richland, Washington.

SD-WM-TI-097, 1984, Criteria for Interim Isolation of Radioactively Contaminated Tank Farm Facilities at Hanford, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.


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Silver, D., 2000a, “Failure to Comply with Major Milestone M-32 of the Tri-Party Agreement; Administrative Order No. United States Department of Energy 00NWPKW-1250,” (Letter to R. French, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection; K. Klein, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office; and M. P. Delozier, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., June 13), State of Washington Department of Ecology, Olympia Washington.

Silver, D., 2000b, “Failure to Comply with Major Milestone M-32 of the Tri-Party Agreement; Administrative Order No. CH2M Hill Hanford Group 00NWPKW-1251,” (Letter to R. French, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection; K. Klein, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office; and M. P. Delozier, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., June 13), State of Washington Department of Ecology, Olympia Washington.

TFC-ENG-FACSUP-C-10, 2016, “Control of Dome Loading and SSC Load Control,” Rev. C-24, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-ENG-STD-39, 2017, “Civil Survey for Tank Farm Facilities,” Rev. A-3, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-OPS-OPER-C-10, 2016, “Vehicle and Dome Load Control in Tank Farm Facilities,” Rev. B-28, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-PLN-142, 2014, “Dome Loading Management P,” Rev. A-1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-WO-12-5505, 2013, “A-106 Caisson Excavation/Installation/Removal,” Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-WO-13-1060, 2014, “241-A-106 Side-Wall Coring,” Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

WA7-89000-8967, 2011, “Single-Shell Tank System RCRA Dangerous Waste Permit Application Part A Form,” Part V, Closure Group 4, Rev. 13, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland, Washington.

WAC 173-303-640, “Tank Systems,” Washington Administrative Code, as amended.

WAC 173-303-810, “General Permit Conditions,” Washington Administrative Code, as amended.

WAC 196-27A, “Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice,” Washington Administrative Code, as amended.

Washenfelder, D., 2017, “SST Waste Inventory,” (personal communication with J. S. Schofield, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, March 24), AEM Consulting, LLC, Richland, Washington.

WHC-MR-0132, 1990, A History of the 200 Area Tank Farms, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.


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WHC-SD-TWR-RPT-002, 1996, Structural Integrity and Potential Failure Modes of the Hanford High-Level Waste Tanks, Rev. 0A, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

WHC-SD-W320-ANAL-001, 1999, Tank 241-C-106 Structural Integrity Evaluation for In situ Conditions, Rev. 0/0A, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.


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A-i

APPENDIX A 2002 Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer Integrity Assessment

Conclusions and Uncertainties


A-1

The last integrity assessment of the single-shell tank (SST) system was completed in June 2002. The assessment concluded:

The fact that all 149 SSTs have operated with no indicators of significant structural damage for an average tank life of about 50 years is a very positive indicator of structural integrity. Specifically, over 20 years of dome elevation measurements have shown no measurable evidence of tank dome subsidence, indicating that the tanks remain structurally stable. Evaluations of over 4,000 in-tank photographs and videotapes have consistently shown no indication of major structural degradation for the visible portions of the tanks. The undersides of all domes (most important structural component in the larger tanks) are fully visible and no indicators of significant structural degradation were found.

Although the integrity assessment made no recommendations, several structural integrity uncertainties were identified (Section 4.0, “Conclusions” of RPP-10435, Single-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report). These uncertainties included:

1. The primary issue emerging from the waste compatibility evaluation is the potential for concrete degradation adjacent to tank leak paths. Although efforts were undertaken to characterize the tank leak paths, the very limited access does not permit visual inspections. Based on inference from dome surveillance data, the concrete damage is likely to be local in nature. Whatever the extent of damage to the footing and base concrete, the dome surveillance data shows no indication of dome instability. There was no notable difference in the dome surveillance data for the tanks with significant leaks and the tanks with no detected leaks.

2. The scale model testing1 and structural analyses indicate that the dome surveillance activities provide early indicators of dome collapse due to the relatively ductile dome configuration (heavily reinforced). Specifically, the current dome elevation screening criteria of 0.02-ft (0.25-in.) [sic] deflection is very small relative to the several inches of deflection associated with failure. Significant cracking is also predicted at a fraction of the dome failure loads, indicating that large-scale cracking provides a visual precursor to dome failure. To maintain sufficient confidence in the SST structural integrity for future operations, a deliberate in-service surveillance and corresponding structural evaluation program are required.

3. Due to the limited amount of inspection data, the caustic chemical damage to the tank basemat and footing concrete, in leaking tanks, cannot be defined with high confidence. The conclusion that the concrete damage is local in nature cannot be proven, but is inferred from dome surveillance data and leak investigations.

1 A 1:10 scale model was prepared to study the structural performance characteristics of the Type IVB

100-series SSTs under strains, displacements, and cracking at load levels ranging from normal service conditions to failure. The intention was to use the results from the scale model tests to benchmark results from theoretical modeling of the same load conditions. Results are reported in ARH-R-47, Model Tests of Waste Disposal Tanks for Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company.


A-2

4. The long-term SST structural integrity predictions are based largely on the relatively benign future operating conditions, when compared to the more aggressive operating conditions of the past. Because operating conditions during future retrieval and closure operations are not fully defined, some uncertainty remains in future tank environments through closure. This statement is especially true for “closure” since SST closure has yet to be defined. As the load conditions associated with future operations become more clearly defined, confirmation will be needed that the loads fall within the existing analysis envelope or additional analyses will be necessary.

5. A review of the design requirements and performance history of the pits evaluated in this assessment indicate that the pits are sound and compatible with the waste being handled. Visual and remote inspection of the interior of several of the pits evaluated in this assessment and of similar Hanford pit structures have shown no major structural deficiencies that would indicate that collapse is eminent. Localized areas where the coating is degraded have been noted, depending on the age of the pit.

References ARH-R-47, 1969, Model Tests of Waste Disposal Tanks for Atlantic Richfield Hanford

Company, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

RPP-10435, 2002, Single-Shell Tank System Integrity Assessment Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington


A-3



B-i

APPENDIX B Single-Shell Tank System Post-June 2002 Events with Structural Integrity Implications


B-1

Table B-1. Single-Shell Tank Post-June, 2002 Events with Structural Integrity Implications

Occurrence Report No. Event date Title Description

EM-RP--CHG-TANKFARM-2002-0019

2/7/2002 (Closed

11/18/2002)

“A Discrepancy Was Noted in the Dome Load Log for 241-S Tank Farm – Near Miss to a TSR Violation”

Allowable load margin calculation error allowed the tank temporary load limit to be exceeded three times; however the TSR upper load limit of 200,000 lbf was not exceeded. When S Farm tank allowable loads were established in 1998, the Tank S-102 surface condenser hatchway load was calculated as -6,298 lbf (a credit for displaced soil), or 12,296 lbf for the two condenser hatchways on the tank. Allowable load margins calculated later for Tanks S-101 (two hatchways), S-104 (two hatchways), S-105 (two hatchways), S-108 (two hatchways), and S-109 (one hatchway) used the -12,296 lbf Tank S-102 value as the value of a single hatchway, and mistakenly doubling the credit for the other tanks. None of the other tanks were affected by the error.


2/21/2002 (Canceled 9/17/2002)

“Crane Accesses Tanks 241-S-110 and 241-S-111 Exclusion Area Without Prior Approval”

During travel through S Farm to set up for a liquid observation well installation in Tank S-107, two cranes and a water truck passed through the dome-load exclusion zones extending 20 ft out from the perimeter of Tanks S-110 and S-111 without updating the dome load log for either tank. (According to Drawing H-2-1774,a the tanks are located on 102-ft centers, leaving 27-ft between structures. Therefore, any equipment travel between S Farm tanks, as described in this occurrence, would require dome load log updates.) Dome load controls were required by HNF-IP-1266,b Chapter 5.16, at the time of the occurrence. The Dome Load Control Program was later recategorized as a defense-in-depth measure.


6/5/2002 (Canceled

09/17/2002)

“Discovery of Equipment Located on the Dome of Tank 241-S-105 That is Not Listed in the Dome Loading Log Resulted in Procedure Violation (USQ)”

The weight of additional equipment placed on Tank S-105 was entered on the work package work record, but the Tank S-105 dome load log was not updated. This event was similar to others identified in Occurrence Reports RP--CHG-TANKFARM-2002-0019, RP--CHG-TANKFARM-2002-0024, and RP--CHG-TANKFARM-2002-0080 (a DST occurrence report describing a loaded concrete truck parked within the Tank AN-103 exclusion zone); resolution of this event was bounded by the corrective actions for the others. This occurrence report was canceled.

a H-2-1774, 1949, “General Layout Waste Disposal Facility 241-S,” Rev. 6, Hanford Engineering Works, General Electric Company, Richland, Washington.

b HNF-IP-1266, Tank Farms Administrative Control Procedures, as amended, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC Richland, Washington. TSR = technical safety requirement. USQ = unreviewed safety question.


C-i

APPENDIX C Single-Shell Tank Management Assessments (January 2002 to April 2017)


C-1

Table C-1 lists the SST management assessments of dome load control from January 1, 2002 through May 1, 2017.

Table C-1. Single-Shell Tank Management Assessments – Dome Load Control (January 2002 – April 2017) (2 pages)

Report no.a Title Date Description Status RPP-19747, Rev. 0

Engineering Management Assessment Dome Load Control Program FY2004-ENG-M-0011

2004 Assessment of adequacy of Dome Load Control Program elements implementation following 2003 PAAA fine for lack of timely correction of identified shortcomings.

Five findings, 22 observations: • Dome load controls not

yet applied to 25% of SSTs

• Unrecoverable technical references

• Ambiguous responsibilities for Dome Load Records / Dome Load Logs completion / verification.

RPP-21916, Rev. 0

Engineering Management Assessment of the Tank Farms Dome Load Controls Program (FY2004-ENG-M-0163)

2004 Assessment of Dome Load Control program completed four months after RPP-19747 assessment.

Review of PERs between 2003 and May 2004 showed significant reduction in dome load control violations following implementation of PER-2004-0480 corrective actions..

RPP-RPT-24987, Rev. 0

Dome Load Control Management Specialty Assessment Report

2005 Assessment to determine if PER-2004-0480 corrective actions were effective.

One finding; seven observations: • Engineering level-of-

effort tasks not included in schedules

• Simplify dome load accounting by exempting small loads

• Maintain existing dome and exclusion zone markers; consider expanding to underground piping and ductwork

• Conduct 3rd party review of program; establish formal communications with crane and rigging crews


C-2

Table C-1. Single-Shell Tank Management Assessments – Dome Load Control (January 2002 – April 2017) (2 pages)

Report no.a Title Date Description Status

RPP-ASMT-27757, Rev. 0

Engineering Management Assessment of the Dome Load Program

2005 Assessment to determine if dome load controls specified by RPP-13003, Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis, are adequately implemented and to identify areas for improvement.

One finding; six observations: • Loads placed on domes

and frequently removed from domes without Dome Load log entries

• Exclusion zone markers not being replaced

• No interim checks on dome load control effectiveness between management assessments.

RPP-ASMT-36127, Rev. 0

Dome Loading Controls Safety Management Program Management Assessment (FY2008-ENG-M-0103)

2007 Assessment to determine if dome load controls specified by RPP-13003, Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis, are adequately implemented and to identify areas for improvement.

Two findings; 20 observations, including: • Reviews of dome

deflection surveys not performed; dome load record documents not updated

• Survey monuments and benchmarks damaged violating deflection/settlement requirement of two markers per SST; repairs still not initiated

• Clarify PER generation thresholds for Dome Load Log omissions and errors

• Perform in-tank structural inspections

a Full references provided at the end of the appendix. Data date: May 1, 2017


C-3

References HNF-IP-1266, Tank Farms Administrative Control Procedures, as amended, Washington River

Protection Solutions, LLC Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, 2016, Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements, Rev. 7Z, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

OSD-RAP-58754, 2015, 241-T Dome Survey OSD Recovery Action Plan, Rev. 2, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

OSD-RAP-58755, 2015, 241-TX Dome Survey OSD Recovery Action Plan, Rev. 2, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

OSD-T-151-00013, 2016, Operating Specifications for Single-Shell Waste Storage Tanks, Rev. 7, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-11802, 2015, Analysis of Record Summary for Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 3B, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-11803, 2006, Analysis of Record Summary for DCRTs, Catch Tanks, and IMUSTS, Rev. 1, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-13033, 2017, Tank Farms Document Safety Analysis, Rev. 7-B, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-16363, 2007, Tank Specific Allowable Dome Load for Hanford Site 100-Series Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-16364, 2003, Tank Specific Dome Loads for Hanford Double-Shell Tanks, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-16660, 2004, 200-Series Single-Shell Tank Dome Load Capacity (200 B, C, T and U), Rev. 2, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-16746, 2004, Evaluation of Load in Single-Shell and Double-Shell Tank Exclusion Zones, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-16903, 2004, Dome Load Capacity for 301 Catch Tanks 241-B-301, C, T, and U, Rev. 2, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-19747, 2004, Engineering Management Assessment Dome Load Control Program FY2004-ENG-M-0011, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-20444, 2015, 241-A Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20451, 2015, 241-SX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-20452, 2016, 241-T Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.


C-4

RPP-20453, 2016, 241-TX Tank Farm Historic Dome Load Record Data, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-21916, 2004, Engineering Management Assessment of the Tank Farms Dome Load Controls Program (FY2004-ENG-M-0163), Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-25782, 2007, DST Dome Survey Program, Rev. 0A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-26516, 2013, SST Dome Survey Program, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-33431, 2005, Design Analysis for T-Farm Interim Surface Barrier (TISB), Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-33431, 2007, Design Analysis for T-Farm Interim Surface Barrier (TISB), Rev. 0A, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-ASMT-27757, 2005, Engineering Management Assessment of the Dome Load Program, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-ASMT-36127, 2007, Dome Loading Controls Safety Management Program Management Assessment (FY2008-ENG-M-0103), Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-CALC-35333, 2007, Impact of Increasing Tank Radius by One Foot on Dome Load Calculation in RPP-33431, Rev. 0, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-24987, 2005, Dome Load Control Management Specialty Assessment Report, Rev. 0, CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-46804, 2010, Project W-566 Waste Feed Delivery – Transfer Line Upgrades 241-SY Transfer Line Replacement Process Hazards Analysis Report, Rev. 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

RPP-RPT-55202, 2015, Dome Survey Report for Hanford Single-Shell Tanks, Rev. 1, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TCF-ENG-DESIGN-C-10, 2016, “Engineering Calculations,” Rev. B-10, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TCF-ENG-DESIGN-C-32, 2017, “Utility Calculation Software Management,” Rev. H-2, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-ENG- FACSUP-C-10, 2016, “Control of Dome Loading and SSC Load Control,” Rev. C-24, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.

TFC-OPS-OPER-C-10, 2016, “Vehicle and Dome Load Control in Tank Farm Facilities,” Rev. B-28, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington

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