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Shifting the Terror frame

How 9/11 changed the framing of Terrorist events

Nel Ruigrok*, Wouter van Atteveldt†, Rens Vliegenthart†

*ASCOR † Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Amsterdam Free University Amsterdam

Kloveniersburgwal 48 De Boelelaan 1081

1012 CX Amsterdam 1081 HV Amsterdam

p.c.ruigrok@uva.nl wva@cs.vu.nl, r.vliegenthart@fsw.vu.nl

Abstract

The images of the second plane flying into the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 shook the world and shaped the way terrorism would be reported on in

the years afterwards. Analyzing all articles on terror in 4 newspapers in the US

and UK from 1996 to 2006, we conducted an automated study of the way

terrorism events were framed before and after 9/11.

We found that, especially for the US, 9/11 was the defining moment: both normal

terrorism coverage and event peaks were higher after 9/11; 9/11 caused a

permanent frame shift from diagnosis to prognosis and from the enemy as criminals to focusing on fanatical Muslims as the enemy; and 9/11 was literally

used as the point of reference in describing later terrorism events.

We also investigated the short-term dynamics after a terrorism event, and found

that in the first week there is a peak in frame variation and diagnosis, while the

amount of coverage only peaks in the second or third week, which sees a decrease

in the amount of frames used and a focus on prognosis.

Introduction

The violent terrorist attacks in the last decade form clear examples of Wolfsfeld’s (1997)

argument that events determine media coverage to a great extent. Media on their turn

determine the images that the public receives by selecting certain topics and excluding

others. Being highly dependent on the media as their main source of information

concerning far away happenings, journalists create a “window on the world” (Tuchman

1978: ix) for their audiences.

Besides the influence on the world view of the public in choosing topics, these media give

the events meaning by transforming them into words and images. Especially during a

sudden, dramatic event, people depend on these journalistic choices how to perceive the

event. It is commonly understood that the presentation of events in the news coverage has

a considerable impact on how the audience feel about the particular event being described,

and how we interpret the event and other related issues (Pan and Kosicki, 2001).

From a journalistic point of view an unexpected dramatic occurrence, or key event, can

lower the future threshold for news selection in such a way that occurrences that resemble

the key event are covered more often, increasing the effect the news might have (Brosius

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& Zillmann, 2000). Moreover, the initial news images provide a ready-made framework in

which related and further events can be presented. In this way the initial coverage is turned

into a news icon, that can be defined as “a powerful condensational image, arising out of a

news event” (Bennett and Lawrence, 1995, p.22). For example during the war in Bosnia,

the pictures of the emaciated men behind barbed wire in the ‘concentration camp’ of

Omarska, in which the war was directly compared with the Holocaust, formed such a news

icon. Politicians, the public, and journalists all embarked on a crusade to free the Muslims

from the evil Serbs. This framework reinforced by a congruence of opinion among

journalists, politicians and elites, already provided the interpretations for journalists. The

news coverage of this ‘event’ was highly emotional and portrayed the parties involved in

clearly distinguishable ways, with the Serbs being the bad guys and the Muslims being

their victims. This initial framework caused a stereotyped one-sided news coverage in

western media of the subsequent years of war (NIOD, 2002; Ruigrok, 2005).

Currently the world is confronted with a global conflict in which parts of the Muslim

population play an important role. However, this time not as the victims, but as the culprits

of several attacks to ‘our’ Western ‘values’. The War on Terror, initiated by the United

States after the attacks on 11 September 2001, is widely seen as a conflict between the

Western countries and the Islamitic countries, especially in the Middle East. With the

attacks on the early morning of 11 September 2001 the US was touched right in the heart.

The sensational attacks, with instant coverage making millions around the globe witness of

the second plane flying into the WTC building, destroyed many lives and disrupted the

entire society. The news about the events found its way into every local rag around the

world. Not only was the news covered everywhere, the coverage was accompanied with

highly emotional language and images. Moreover, the portrayal of the protagonists were

clear, with the terrorists of Al Queda being the ‘bad guys’ and the Americans being the

‘good guys’ (Seib, 2004). The tone was set within the first days and caused similar

coverage after de US decided to bomb Afghanistan and declared the War on Terror against

all terrorists and the ‘Rogue states’, sponsoring or protecting them. In the running up to the

Iraqi war the news coverage continued within this initial frame (Aday, 2005).

Terrorism, however, was not a new phenomenon in 2001, and the US had been hurt

before, with the bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the suicide

bombing on the Navy guided missile destroyer USS Cole in 2000. In fact, according to

American statistics there has been an estimate of 400 terrorist acts per year in the 90s

(Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2001).

This raises the question what differential consequences events can have on news coverage,

not only looking at the 9/11 attacks but also before these attacks and afterwards. We

compare its effects on news framing with other events and investigate whether it has been

really such a ‘world changing’ happening. More specifically, we are interested if the

attacks following 9/11, such as the Bombs in Bali, the Train in Madrid and the Subway in

London reinforced or weakened the existing frames. Or to put it differently: which events

caused a shift in the frames in the news, and were these shifts durable or permanent? In

this study we will look at news coverage about terrorism and Islam in US, British and

Dutch newspapers from 1996 to 2007. Using associative framing we will determine the

way in which a number of terrorist attacks caused shifts in frames concerning terrorism,

the perpetrators, the causes and remedies.

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Theoretical Considerations

Associative framing

The study of framing gained an important place in the field of communication research

and became the most studied concept in the recent years. One of the most common

definition of framing is provided by Entman (1993) who describes framing as selecting

“some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,

in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral

evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." The definition

shows already the multi-facet aspect of framing research. It is about selection, salience,

and recommendation, including not only the communicator but also the audience. As

Entman (1993) points out there are at least four locations of framing that can be studied:

the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture. Frames as found in texts, news

frames, form the core interest of numerous mass media studies. Cappella and Hall

Jamieson (1997, p.39-40) describe news frames as “those rhetorical and stylistic choices,

reliably identified in news, that alter the interpretations of the topics treated and are a

consistent part of the news environment.” Examples of news frames are for example

‘strategic’ or ‘game’ frames which are often found in coverage of political campaigns

(Patterson, 1993). Other examples of news frames are ‘conflict’ and personalization

frames (Price & Tewksburry, 1997) or episodic versus thematic frames as distinguished by

Iyengar (1991).

With respect to the occurrence of framing at different levels we see a distinction in studies

examining media frames and research into audience frames (Cappella and Jamieson 1997;

Entman 1993; Scheufele 1999). The former branch of research focuses on how issues are

presented in the news (Norris 1995; Patterson 1993; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000) while

the latter branch of research focuses on how individuals perceive and interpret issues

presented to them (Domke, Shah, and Wackman 1998; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997;

Price, Tewksbury, and Power 1997; Rhee 1997; Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese

1999). A combination of these branches is found in few studies examining both media

frames and the effects of these frames on the public (e.g. Cappella and Jamieson 1997;

Iyengar 1991; Neuman, et al. 1992). This points towards two separate questions within the

study of framing: “What are frames?” and “How are frames transferred between media

and audience?” A third important question, however, is largely neglected. This question is

“Where do frames come from?” and deals with the origins of framing and frame variation

(see Snow et al., forthcoming). In this paper, we do not specifically address the effects of

framing, but rather focus on its origins and more specifically the role of key events in the

process of frame building and framing shifts. Before discussing this, some conceptual

clarification of the fuzzy concept of framing is required.

News Frames, Equivalency Frames, and Emphasis Frames

With respect to the question of what frames actually are, research shows a distinction

between equivalency frames and emphasis frames. ‘Equivalency Frames’ present an issue

in different ways with “the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases”

(Druckman 2001: 228), causing a major change in audience preference when the same

problem is presented in different wordings, such as rescuing some versus sacrificing others

(Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Emphasis frames, later

called “issue framing” (Druckman 2004), on the other hand, highlight a particular “subset

of potentially relevant considerations” (Druckman 2004: 672). In line with Entman’s

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definition, issue framing can be defined as a process of selecting and emphasizing certain

aspects of an issue on the basis of which the audience can evaluate the issue described or

the protagonists associated with the issues.

We will focus on issue framing rather than equivalency framing, since we are interested in

the relationship between different concepts and their attributes, rather than in the different

descriptions of a certain concept. Issue frames form a substantial part of the research on

news frames. Cappella and Jamieson (1997: 39-40) describe news frames as “those

rhetorical and stylistic choices, reliably identified in news, that alter the interpretations of

the topics treated and are a consistent part of the news environment.” Examples of news

frames are ‘strategic’ or ‘game’ frames, which are often found in coverage of political

campaigns (Patterson 1993). Other examples of news frames are ‘conflict’ and

personalization frames (Price and Tewksbury 1997) or episodic versus thematic frames as

distinguished by Iyengar (1991). Within the context of social movements Snow and

Benford (1988) distinguish three forms of frames that can be found in news coverage.

Diagnostic framing involves the identification of an event or social problem that is in need

of change. Prognostic framing proposes a solution to the observed problem and proposes

types of action. Finally, motivational framing represents a call to action as well as the

rationale for engaging in the proposed action. This research is in line with Entman’s

definition with respect to the “problem definition” and “causal interpretation, moral

evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” and can also be

considered within conflict situations. As Eilders (2000: 426) concluded in here research

into news coverage about the Kosovo war “Taken together, all newspapers called attention

to the prognostic aspects of the war. Diagnostic and identity-related aspects attracted little

attention” (Eilders, 200: 426).

The framing process

The second question mentioned above—How are frames transferred from the media to the

audience?—also leads to a number of different hypotheses. Some researchers consider

framing as a linear transfer of salience process, straight from the sender into the audience

(Eagley and Chaiken 1998; Zaller 1992; Zaller 1994). Other researchers, however,

consider the framing process as an interaction between message content and the

interpreter's social knowledge. This interaction process leads to a construction of a mental

model as a resulting state of interpretation (Rhee 1997). Besides the creation of these

mental models, the framing process can trigger a mental model or frame that already exists

within the receiver’s perception. Graber (1988) describes the way people use schematic

thinking to handle information. They extract only those limited amounts of information

from news stories that they consider important for incorporation into their schemata. Snow

and Benford (1988) state in this respect that media frames and audience frames interact

through ‘frame alignment’ and ‘frame resonance’ (see also Snow et al. 1986).The

construction of mental models, schemata or frames is a central part of the cognitive

approach to framing (D’Angelo, 2002). Grounded in cognitive psychology, the approach

uses the associative network model of human memory (Collins and Quillian 1969),

proposing that the concepts in semantic memory are represented as nodes in a complex

hierarchical network. Each concept in the network is directly related to other related

concepts. Minsky (1975) connected this view to framing when he defined a frame as a

structure containing various pieces of information. These discursive or mental structures

are closely related to the description of a schema, which is “a cognitive structure that

represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the

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relation among those attributes,” (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 98). These cognitive structures

are based on prior knowledge (Fiske and Linville 1980).

Associative framing: the common denominator

As discussed above, framing study contains many perspectives and research lines. We

perceive, however, a common denominator in that many studies base the idea of a frame

on associations, either between concepts, concepts and attributes, or on more complex

networks of concepts. In this study, therefore, we will focus on what we call ‘associative

framing.’

Associative frames consist of associations between concepts and other concepts, where

‘concepts’ is a general term that can denote actors, issues, and attributes. From the point of

view of the cognitive perspective, these frames refer to the earlier described schemata of

interpretation (Goffman 1974), and the main associations in a message can be seen as its

“central organizing idea” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987).

As mentioned previously, in this paper we follow the distinction in diagnostic, prognostic

and motivational framing as has been proposed by Snow and Benford (1988) for the study

of social movements’ communication to their (potential) participants. Previous studies

have found this distinction of conceptual utility for the study of newspaper coverage as

well (Snow et al. forthcoming, Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007), though motivational

framing elements are strongly connected to the specific aims and goals of social

movements and are far less present in media coverage. Therefore, we limit ourselves to a

division in diagnostic and prognostic framing elements. This division neatly fits in the

associative framing approach, since both diagnostic and prognostic framing elements are

well represented in a network of associations between concepts.

Framing Terrorist events

In their seminal work into media events Dayan and Katz (1992, pp.196/197) define events

as “dominating televised occasions based on interruption and withdrawal from routine

broadcast schedules.” Overall studies show that major dramatic events increase media

coverage to a great extent. Moreover, media coverage goes beyond the actual event toward

all kinds of related topics (Kepplinger & Habermeir, 1995; Lawrence & Bennett, 2000;

Vasterman, 2005). Besides the increased attention paid to the event, the event might also

change the way in which the issue is portrayed in the media. They can be seen as “critical

discourse moments” in which media can reframe the event and the related issues (Chilton,

1987; Gamson, 1992). Brosius and Eps (1995) for example, studied the impact of four so-

called “key events” on news selection in the case of violence against aliens and asylum

seekers in Germany. They found that the amount, as well as the shape, of coverage

increased significantly after these key events. According to Brosius and Eps (1995: 407),

key events have a prototyping quality, giving dramatic events meaning by constructing

them within a simplified framework. Such frameworks will reduce ambiguity, evoke

myths or prejudices, establish associations, and reinforcing culturally based ideas (Becker,

1995; Kitzinger, 2000). The effect of these tendencies according to Kepplinger and

Habermeier (1995, 389) is that event-based coverage creates ‘the false impression that

events accumulate and problems become more urgent. ’

Studies into news events show that within a short time span, with repeating coverage in all

major media outlets specific news coverage can easily become a news icon, a prototype

(Brosius and Eps, 1995; Bennett and Lawrence, 1995). Such icon is capable of condensing

the issue at hand with all its complexities into one striking image. With respect to the news

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coverage a news icon provides journalists rich narrative material (Hoskins, 2006; Aday,

2005). One of the characters of a news icon is the fact that this coverage survives the

initial story and reappears in a wide variety of related news contexts. In these cases the

news icon will serve as a definitional cue for new events. As a consequence news icons

can trigger or reinforce existing frames, such as patriotism, or military supremacy. With

news media routinely drawing upon past images, video, phrases, people, places and

events, as well as other media, to locate and to shape what today passes as ‘news’

(Hoskins, 2006), icons can over time turn into media templates. Media templates as

Kitzinger (2000) argues differ from icons in that they are “defined by their retrospective

use in secondary reporting rather than contemporaneous coverage”. Media templates

therefore explain current events, by referring to an ongoing problem “Templates are used

to highlight patterns in particular issues or social problems.” (Ktizinger, 2000, 76).With

respect to the Bosnian war the pictures of the detention camps became a news icon and

media template, while with respect to the war on terrorism the second plane flying into the

WTC tower fulfilled this role for future coverage.

Terrorist events: the impact of 9/11

9/11 caused a major shift in the framing of terrorist attacks. A study into the news

coverage of a Swedish newspaper about terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,

and Madrid in 2004, showed a significant difference in the amount of attention paid to

both events (Persson 2004). Madrid received far more attention than the African countries.

Moreover, the study reveals differences in the interpretation of the events. Kenya and

Tanzania were framed as a tragedy and crime, while Madrid was a moral outrage everyone

should care about; terrorism was labeled as something ‘new,’ ‘Islamic’ and ‘global’, The

description of the causes of terrorism remained very limited in the news (Persson 2004:

36).

Whereas the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were covered with a focus on the causes as

well as the actions to take afterwards, the coverage about 9/11 focused more heavily on

the actions to take as retaliation. Addressing the nation on September 20, President Bush

said, ‘‘On September 11th, [the] enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our

country’’ (Bush, 2001, para. 12). With the American government pleading for a war on

terror we see this reflected in the news coverage. As Ryan (2004) found while studying the

editorials of 10 newspapers in the US, the most important remedy after 9/11 was put in a

‘war on terrorism’ frame. No editorials argued against military intervention or took the

time to discuss the possible consequences of such action. Other research found the same

patterns. Marvin Kalb and Stephen Hess (2003: 2) argue that the horrific events 9/11

instantly created a new focus on American national purpose, forcefully articulated by the

president, and a new framing device for the media: The war on terrorism. Norris et al

(2003: 4) argue that 9/11 is a “symbolizing critical culture shift in the predominant news

frame used by the American mass media for understanding issues of national security etc.”

(Norris et al 2003: 4).

In line with Bird’s argument (1990: 380) that journalists perform the role of storytellers

that use ‘general themes’ and put them into ‘established formulae’, researchers found that

the subsequent news coverage about terrorism was framed within certain master frames.

9/11 became a media template providing the framework in which terrorism is perceived.

In line with other studies into key events (see Kepplinger and Habemeier, 1995; Brosius

and Eps,1995), related topics also saw a change in the coverage. Ross and Bantimaroudis

(2006) for example found that that The New York Times covered Israel and the Palestinian

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territories more frequently and in more diverse ways in the 6 months after September

2001.

The media template of the War on Terror was also found in the news coverage when the

US was preparing to go to war in Iraq. President Bush justified this initiative claiming that

Saddam Hussein was implicated in the 9/11 attacks on the United States and had not

complied with United Nations (UN) requirements about weapons inspections. In addition

he stated that Hussein still possessed numerous weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that

he planned to use against the United States as well as deliver to terrorists. Fitting perfectly

well in the template, these views were taken over easily by the media, without counter

arguments. As Fried (2005: 131) concluded in her study into the news coverage of

newsmagazines in the running up to the Iraqi war “Terrorism and Americans’ fears about

it provided a substantial context to coverage of Iraq before the war.” The New York

Times even apologized recently for its one-sided news coverage in the build up to the Iraqi

war. Ombudsman Daniel Okrent (2004) states that the newspaper “fell for

misinformation,” and concluded that “the failure was not individual, but institutional.”

With respect to the news coverage before and after 9/11 we expect changes, both in the

amount of news coverage as well as the frames in which the news about terrorism is

covered.

Our first hypothesis deals with the attention for the issue of terrorism and is rather

straightforward. More than any other event the 9/11 attacks dominated the political and

media agenda for a long period in time and therefore, we hypothesize that:

H1a. The amount of attention for terror increases significantly after the 9/11 attacks

H1b. The peaks caused by events after 9/11 are higher than before 9/11

Our second hypothesis considers the shift of framing from diagnostic to prognostic

elements. The initial coverage, right after 9/11, is likely to focus upon the possible reasons

for the attacks and the attribution of blame to certain actors. After a while, the focus is

likely to shift to more prognostic framing, focusing on the question what needs to be done

to prevent similar events to occur in the future (see Snow et al. forthcoming for a similar

argument).

H2. Framing shows a shift from diagnostic to prognostic framing

The third hypothesis deals with the question how 9/11 has altered the framing of the issue.

Here, we hypothesize the icon-function that 9/11 has. This function is likely to be most

present in diagnostic framing, since it functions as a prototype that helps to make sense of

the diagnostic interpretation (‘what happened?’ and ‘what is going on?’) of other events.

Therefore, our third hypothesis is:

H3. Regarding diagnostic framing, with 9/11 being an icon, reference is made to this

event, more significantly than any other preceding attack.

We argue, however, that the icon-function is contingent upon the proximity

(geographically as well as culturally) of the event. More specifically, we expect that for

the United Kingdom the Metro bombings have led to a change in the event that has taken

up the role as main icon:

H3a: for the British newspapers the London attacks will become an icon,

supplanting the news icon of 9/11

Finally we will focus on the aspect of temporality. “Time matters,” as Abbot (2001)

argues and therefore we expect that also frame shifts within the framing of the conflict. In

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the initial phase right after an event, numerous actors will try to bring forward different

interpretations of it. After some time, it is likely that some consensus is reached and some

form of frame-crystallization takes place (Snow et al. forthcoming). Therefore, we expect

that after an initial diffuse picture of numerous frames, in the longer run a limited number

of frames will dominate the news coverage:

H4: After initial a huge number of frames right after 9/11, the variation will decrease

over time

Events and emotions

During recent years we see an overall change in the news coverage of catastrophes,

accidents and awful happenings, focusing more on human aspects of the issue at hand,

including a rise in the emotional aspects of the event. Slattery et al (2001, 298) found “a

marked increase in embedded sensationalism/human interest” while Kitch (2000) argues

that ordinary people’s grievances after a dreadful happening is becoming a news story

itself.

When looking at tragic events, and especially at events becoming a media template, the

coverage is often accompanied by a lot of emotions. Several scholars have argued that

extraordinary tragic events are reported on in a striking similar frame, including an

increased number of human and emotional aspects. Some studies even show a national

consensus and unity born out of mourning together ( Kitch, 2000, 2003; Linenthal, 2001;

Pantti, 2005;Pantti and Wieten, 2005). According to Rosenthal (2003), the news media

represent crises as “crucial catalysts of … collective emotions”

One such striking emotion is fear, which is a powerful emotion. Fear can draw people

together, seeking safety in numbers. A situation in which society faces a common threat,

such as a flood, hard winters, or from other groups, has often had a positive effect on

communities, strengthening bonds that might otherwise have been weak, establishing a

sphere of community where instead there would only have been individuals. The same

effect is found when a society collectively mourns victims, such as a public figure being

murdered. News coverage about such an event can create a feeling of temporary national

consensus, ‘‘a nationwide bereaved community’’ (Linenthal, 2001, p. 111), in an

otherwise devided society (Pantti and Wieten, 2005).

9/11 and emotional coverage

The emotional elements were also traced in the news coverage about 9/11. Studying

journalism about the 9/11 attacks, researchers show that television coverage put a high

level of emotions in the footage with repeated showing of horrific images and citizens'

reactions, and news anchors' controlled but clearly visible displays of emotions (Carey,

2002; Schudson, 2002). With reports live from “Ground Zero” and the Pentagon including

ordinary citizens the content of television coverage included emotionally-involved

individuals. In a comparative study into emotional cues in both newspapers and television

coverage of 9/11 Cho et al (2003) found that in both media emotional cues were found,

even stronger in the television news transcripts. The emotionality lasted in within the

dominant ‘war on terror’ frame. As Clausen (2003: 113) concluded after researching the

coverage of the first commemoration of 9/11: “Stories were framed, angled, geared and

worded to suit the emotional and cognitive framework of audiences at home.” The same is

true for the news coverage of the London attacks. Hoskins (2006: 464) argues that a

significant proportion of the mainstream media reports about the attacks “focused around

the ‘public mood’ of shock, fear and resoluteness.”

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With respect to the framing of the terrorist attacks we expect a change in the emotional

news coverage after the 9/11 attack

H5: The 9/11 attack caused an increased attention to emotional news coverage

regarding the issue of terrorism.

Framing the other

When talking about tragic events that might cause fear and other related emotions, part of

the news coverage immediately turns towards the human side of the happenings, both the

culprits and the victims. As we saw in the example of the Omarska detention camps, the

distinction between good guys and bad guys was easily made and continued on in

subsequent news coverage. A news event therefore has the power to define this distinction

“through priming or framing, events might also guide the positive or negative evaluation

of issues or persons” (Brosius and Eps, 1995: 408). Often the scapegoating starts when

people feel threatened by the events and the fear of new future events. Glassner’s (2003)

provides clear examples of this reciprocal relationship. The diagnoses of the external

threat often employ the devise of scapegoating to demonstrate the immediacy and

relevance of the danger. In describing the scapegoat, news media tend to use simplified

images, creating a distinction between the victims and culprits, by portraying the latter as

‘others’. Enemies and villains are the most extreme form of the Other, and they are

frequently portrayed as evil to make them easier to hate (Harle, 2000, pp. 11-2): ‘‘The evil

Other is, actually, the enemy of God, and the war against it is a holy war’’

9/11 and framing the other

After 9/11, journalists embraced enthusiastically the new framework of ‘war on terror’, in

order to interpret the ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of a state. Studies investigated the portrayal

of Muslims in the media before and after 9/11 and found different results. Nacos and

Torres-Reyna (2003: 151) found a shift from “limited and stereotypical coverage in the

pre-9/11 period to a more comprehensive, inclusive, and less stereotypical news

presentation.” The researchers found that not only more access was granted to Muslims,

they also found a difference in the content of the news. Whereas the media associated

Muslims with negative and stereotypical topics before 9/11, afterwards they focused on a

bigger range of topics. Moreover the researchers found a shift from episodic framing

towards more thematic framing patterns. As one expert in the field pointed out as early as

1981, the cultures and peoples of the Middle East “are not easily explained in quick two-

minute network news stories” (Shaheen 1981).Other researchers, however, argue that after

the initial period of disorientation, news coverage recaptured the old frames in which they

shaped the news about Arabs, associating them with violence, terror and Islam (Karim

2002: 12; see also Persson 2004). These findings are in line with the research of Brosius

and Eps (1995) and the stereotypes of asylum seekers in Germany.

Research into the news coverage of the Bali bombings show the same pattern, with a

portrayal of the bombers as terrorists and as a continuous threat. They were also portrayed

as militants, and Muslim radicals. The tone of the stories indicated that the enemy was

identified as members of Al Qaeda, 'Muslim hardliners', 'religious fanatics', and 'Muslim

radicals'.

Researching the news coverage about Bin Laden after the attacks Winch (2005) concludes

that the Al Qaeda leader was mainly described in news reports as a savage, uncivilized and

barbarian.

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In line with these researchers we expect an important shift of the frame in which the

perpetrators of attacks are covered.

H6: 9/11 caused a major shift in the news coverage about the perpetrators of terrorist

attacks from criminals towards Islamic fanatics causing a threat to the world.

Methodology

This study analyzes the coverage of the issue of Terrorism in the United States and the

United Kingdom from the 1st of January 1996 until the 31

st of December 2006. For each

country, we analyzed two newspapers, one ‘quality’ broadsheet paper (the Washington

Post and The Guardian) and one ‘popular’ newspaper (the USA Today and The Sun), and

included all articles in the Lexis Nexis database that included ‘terror*’, i.e. any word

beginning with ‘terror’, yielding a total of 87452 articles. Table 1 shows the amount of

articles and total frequency of ‘terror*’ words per medium per year.

Table 1: Numbers of hits and articles containing ‘terror*’ in the studies period

UK US

The Guardian The Sun1 USA Today Washington Post Total

Year N Freq. N Freq. N Freq. N Freq. N Freq.

1996 1117 3755 560 2116 1372 6100 3049 11971

1997 929 2672 370 1171 1071 4560 2370 8403

1998 1406 4630 422 1720 1335 6307 3163 12657

1999 1190 3805 356 1121 1428 5131 2975 10058

2000 992 3034 654 1152 285 1102 1272 4816 3203 10104

2001 2670 12380 1857 4558 2483 12109 6996 35352 14006 64399

2002 2886 12691 1650 4064 2583 12501 8290 39175 15409 68431

2003 2608 11414 1376 3293 1654 8131 6182 29087 11820 51925

2004 2678 12907 1571 3975 1671 7920 5805 27986 11725 52788

2005 2831 15009 1496 3647 1037 4840 4512 20969 9876 44465

2006 2921 13708 1648 3950 1114 5123 4173 19298 9856 42079

Total 22228 96005 10253 24640 12535 57854 42436 198781 87452 377280

Frame Definitions

Except for the first hypothesis, all hypotheses depend on the use of certain frames in

covering terror. As explained in the previous section, we use associative framing, meaning

that we are looking for the association between terror and other concepts. Table 2 gives an

overview of the concepts used. We categorized these concepts into three main categories:

Diagnostic and descriptive concepts; prognostic concepts; and reference events. The

diagnostic concepts are subdivided into three subcategories: factual descriptions (what

happened); sensational or emotional descriptions, focusing on violence and grief; and

depiction of the Enemy.

Operationalization

The measurements in this study follow the Associative Framing method described in

Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt (2007). The core notion of this method is that a unit of

1 The Sun was not included in Lexis Nexis until 2000, but since the period before 9/11 is mainly used for reference

purposes and we are not interested in differences between newspapers we do not think this is a real problem.

11

measurement (a document) mentions a number of concepts. Since we wanted to study

direct associations with terror, we used the paragraph as unit of measurement.

The visibility of terror in a certain period can then be defined as the chance of reading

about terror in a random document, which is the weighted average reading chance of terror

over all paragraphs in that period. The reading chance in a paragraph was based on the

frequency of references to that concept, and we weighted all paragraphs by their position

in the article, the page number of the article in the newspaper, and the weekday of the

newspaper, based on a small survey of advertising costs (Van Atteveldt et al, 2006 p.12).

The association between terror and another concept is defined as the chance of reading

about that concept given that one reads about terror in a random paragraph. This is equal

to the proportion of paragraphs about terror that are also about that concept, where

‘aboutness’ is probabilistic. Effectively, the association is the weighted average of the

probability of seeing both the concept and terror in a paragraph divided by the visibility of

terror.

This measure of association is related to more traditional measures of association such as

cosine distance, correlation, and χ2 values, but it differs substantively on two counts. First,

this is a deliberately asymmetric measure since, for example, Hamas might be strongly

associated with terrorism while terrorism is more strongly associated with other concepts

such as Al Qaeda. Second, we are not interested in associations compared to what one

would predict based on independent distribution but rather in the associations themselves.

If all articles are framed in a dominant frame, say, the patriotic frame, this still means that

the individual articles are framed that way. Apart from these desirable substantive

features, using this asymmetric measure has the convenient methodological property that

all associations of a concept can be calculated based only on the articles in which that

concept occurs, while symmetric measures such as correlation would also require all

articles containing the concepts with which the first concept might co-occur.

Table 2 : Concepts used in the study

Diagnosis Enemy

Islam / Fundamentalism

Rogue States Criminals

Factual description

Event description

Motivations

Sensational Description

Human Interest Violence

Mourning

Prognosis War on Terror

Intelligence / Counterterrorism

International Cooperation Patriotic Unity / Religious Terms

Fear

Civil Rights

Reference Events Oklahoma Bombings

USS Cole

9/11 attack Bali bombing

Madrid bombing

London bombing

12

Results

Visibility of Terror

Figure 1 shows the monthly visibility of terror during the whole research period, split by

country. Immediately obvious is the peak for September 2001, especially in the American

newspapers. Peaks for the other events can also be seen, both before 9/11 (the Embassy

bombings) and after (the Madrid, Bali, and London bombings).

2006,11

2006,09

2006,07

2006,05

2006,03

2006,01

2005,11

2005,09

2005,07

2005,05

2005,03

2005,01

2004,11

2004,09

2004,07

2004,05

2004,03

2004,01

2003,11

2003,09

2003,07

2003,05

2003,03

2003,01

2002,11

2002,09

2002,07

2002,05

2002,03

2002,01

2001,11

2001,09

2001,07

2001,05

2001,03

2001,01

2000,11

2000,09

2000,07

2000,05

2000,03

2000,01

1999,11

1999,09

1999,07

1999,05

1999,03

1999,01

1998,11

1998,09

1998,07

1998,05

1998,03

1998,01

1997,11

1997,09

1997,07

1997,05

1997,03

1997,01

1996,11

1996,09

1996,07

1996,05

1996,03

1996,01

Date (year.month)

2500,00

2000,00

1500,00

1000,00

500,00

0,00

Vis

ibilit

y o

f T

err

or

us

uk

country

Figure 1: Visibility of terror over time in American and British press.

In both countries, overall visibility of the Terror issue is higher after 9/11. Between 9/11

and the London bombings this visibility is substantially higher in the US, where the peak

from 9/11 decays quite slowly. After London there is a small rise in the base level of terror

visibility in the British papers, catching up with the American visibility.

It is also interesting to focus on the dynamics immediately after each event. Figure 2(a)

shows the average visibility of terror from two weeks before each event until 9 weeks

after. Quite obvious is the higher value of the American peak, but both lines follow the

same pattern: a strong increase from week 0 (the natural week containing the event) with a

peak at weeks 1, 2, followed by a slow decline.

Figures 2 (b) and (c) show the visibility dynamics around the different events in the UK

and US, respectively. All events follow more or less the same pattern, with one main

exception: in the UK, the embassy bombings does not peak before week 3. This might be

partially caused by the fact that it occurred on a Friday, making week 0 more the ‘week

before’ than the ‘week of’ the event; note however that this does not happen in the US,

and that the peak is in week +3 rather than +1, so this can only explain part of the

discrepancy.

13

From these results, it is clear that terror coverage is strongly event driven: peaks of around

a month after each event, with relative silence in between. Before 9/11 there is hardly any

news not directly related to an event, while afterwards there is a higher ‘base level’ of

newspaper coverage mentioning terror. Moreover, the peaks after 9/11 are higher,

although whether this is caused by the proximity and scale of these events or by the

salience of 9/11 as media template is unknown. These findings confirm hypotheses H1a

and H2b.

Variance in framing

The variance in framing is computed as the entropy of the distribution of frames per time

period. Since the entropy is maximal if all frames occur with the same frequency and zero

if one frame is completely dominant, this is a useful measure of the use of a variety of

frames in reporting. Figure 3 shows this entropy over the whole research period.

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

4,80

4,60

4,40

4,20

4,00

3,80

Sum

ent

us

uk

country

Figure 3: Variation (entropy) of frame use over time in American and British press.

It is interesting to note that, similar to visibility, the lines for the UK and US more or less

follow each other before 9/11 and after London, and are apart between these events.

Interestingly, the entropy for the UK is higher in this period while the visibility was lower:

800,00

600,00

400,00

200,00

0,00

country: us

london

madrid

bali

9/11

USS cole

ambassades

period2250,00

200,00

150,00

100,00

50,00

0,00

Mean

vis

ter

us

uk

country250,00

200,00

150,00

100,00

50,00

0,00

country: uk

150,00

100,00Su

m v

iste

r

(a) (b) (c)

Figure 2: Visibility of terror in the weeks following an event

(a) averaged over all events; (b) and (c) per event

14

apparently the US reports more often on terror but using fewer different frames. Another

interesting finding is that the overall entropy does not change much over time: even

though visibility after 9/11 is much higher than before, this does not lead to more variation

in the use of different frames until the final years of our study.

Again, it is interesting to consider the short-term dynamics in the weeks after the event.

Figure 4(a) shows the entropy per country from two weeks before until 9 weeks after the

event averaged over the major events. Both countries display a remarkably similar pattern:

a peak at week 0 (the natural week in which the event occurs), followed by a decline. It is

very interesting that the entropy peaks in week 0 while the visibility peaks only 1 or 2

weeks later: apparently, the first week is a chaotic week in which the event is reported on

from multiple angles, while the bulk of the coverage happens in the two weeks after that,

with the frame more crystallized. Figure 4(b) shows the entropy for 9/11 rather than

averaged over all events, which follows this general pattern.

In these findings we see an immediate peak with slow decline in frame variance after 9/11,

confirming hypothesis 4. The long term effect of 9/11 is one of less variance than before,

indicating the emergence of a dominant frame, especially in the US. This lasts until around

2005, where the difficulties of the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and the London

bombings cause the lines to converge. Thus, although we confirm hypothesis 4 for the

short term dynamics, the long term dynamics are slightly more complex: a short peak in

frame variance followed by a strong drop and a subsequent slow recovery.

Event references

Figure 5(a) and (b) show the association of terror with reference events for the

investigated media in the UK and US, respectively. In the UK, there are hardly any

references to events except for Lockerbie before 9/11. After 9/11, references to this event

dominate, especially until Bali. After both Bali and Madrid, references to that even peak in

the description phase, but quickly decrease afterwards. Interestingly, references to 9/11

fall after each new event even though it is not replaced by other references. After London,

this event takes over the lead from 9/11 in terms of references, although it is not clear how

this will progress after a future major event.

.09.08.07.06.05.04.03.02.01.00-.01-.02

yw2

4.30

4.20

4.10

4.00

Me

an

en

t

(a)

.09.08.07.06.05.04.03.02.01.00-.01

yw2

4.50

4.25

4.00

3.75

3.50

Me

an

en

t

us

uk

country

(b)

Figure 4: Variation (Entropy) immediately following an event

(a) averaged over all events (b) after 9/11

15

In the US, before 9/11 references are always to the most recent terror event: Oklahoma

until August 98, the Embassy bombings until October 2000, and the USS Cole until 9/11

(the latter in competition with the Embassy bombings). After 9/11, this picture changes

dramatically: 9/11 stays very high as a reference event, peaking at each new event and

staying at a very high level. New events receive a peak as they are described, but do not

strongly function as reference events later.

From these findings we can see that in the American press 9/11 clearly becomes the

reference event for future events, with continuous references to 9/11 and strong peaks with

each new event. For the UK, 9/11 also becomes a strong reference event, but loses

importance after each new event. After London, this new event supplants 9/11 as the most

important reference event, although we do not know what the reference will be for future

events since London was the last major event in the analyzed time period. These findings

confirm hypothesis H3 and partly confirm hypothesis H3a.

Prognosis / Diagnosis

As described in the previous section, we divide the frames into two broad categories:

diagnostic frames (description and sense-making) and prognostic frames (plans and

thoughts about the future). Figure 6 shows the ratio of prognosis to diagnosis for both

countries. At each event, there is a negative peak in prognosis as coverage is spent on

describing the event. 9/11 is a watershed for both the US and British press, after which the

prognosis ratio fluctuates around 1.8 rather than 1. The US rate is higher than the UK rate

after 9/11, and the UK rate drops rather than falls after the London bombings. This finding

confirms hypothesis 2.

(a) (b)

Figure 5: References to other events over time in the UK (a) and US (b)

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

0,12

0,10

0,08

0,06

0,04

0,02

0,00

Su

m a

ss

country: uk

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

0,25

0,20

0,15

0,10

0,05

0,00

country: us

london

bali

madrid

embassies

lockerbie

munic

oklahoma

uss cole

9 11

objid

16

Figure 6: Ratio of Prognosis to Diagnosis in association with terror over time

The dynamics after the individual events are slightly chaotic, but averaged over the

different events a pattern becomes clear, as can be seen in figure 7(a): in the weeks

immediately following an event the ratio of prognosis drops to even as the event is

described, climbing to its pre-event level after the second or third week. There is no clear

peak in prognosis, even when looking at longer time frames. The dynamics for 9/11, as

shown in figure 7(b), paint a different picture: there is no drop in prognosis and prognosis

climbs steadily to the higher level clear from figure 6. This finding indicates that 9/11

played a frame shifting role with a permanent increase in prognostic framing, while the

other events follow a local event logic of diagnosis followed by prognosis.

Diagnosis

Zooming in on the diagnostic framing, we can subdivide this frame into three subframes as

described in the previous section: factually describing the event, sensationally describing

the event (focusing on violence and destruction), and describing the perceived enemy.

Figures 8 (a) and (b) show the relative size of these subframes for the UK and US,

respectively. In both countries, there is a clear shift around 9/11: before that period all

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

2,40

2,10

1,80

1,50

1,20

0,90

0,60

Sum

ass

us

uk

country

(a) (b)

Figure 7: Ratio of prognosis to diagnosis following (a) all events (averaged) (b) 9/11

1,70

1,60

1,50

1,40

1,30

1,20

1,10

1,00

Me

an

as

s

us

uk

country

.15

.14

.13

.12

.11

.10

.09

.08

.07

.06

.05

.04

.03

.02

.01

.00

-.01

-.02

yw2

2.40

2.10

1.80

1.50

1.20

0.90

0.60

Mea

n a

ss

us

uk

country

17

three frames have approximately the same importance, while after 9/11 the description of

the enemy increases markedly. In the US, this is mainly at the expense of sensational

description, while in the UK the factual description loses ground. These findings lead us to

reject hypothesis H5, as sensational description decreases rather than increases in the US

as is stable in the UK.

The enemy frame can be further divided into three components: describing the terrorists as

criminals; as fanatical Islamists; and as rogue states sponsoring terrorism. Figures 9 (a)

and (b) show this subdivision for the US and UK. In the UK, terrorism was mainly seen as

a criminal problem until 9/11, after which Islam quickly gains first place. State-sponsored

terrorism remains low during the whole period. In the US, there is a similar picture:

before 9/11 the three frames are approximately equal, and after 9/11 the Islam frame

quickly gains prominence, especially at the expense of the criminal frame. These findings

confirm hypothesis H6.

(a) (b)

Figure 8: Diagnostic framing over time for the UK (a) and US (b)

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

0,60

0,40

0,20

Su

m a

ss

rel

country: us

description

sensational

enemy

cl3

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

0,80

0,60

0,40

0,20

0,00

Su

m a

ss

rel

country: uk

(a) (b)

Figure 9: Framing the Enemy over time for the UK (a) and US (b)

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

0,80

0,60

0,40

0,20

0,00

Su

m a

ss

rel

country: uk

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

2004,0

2004,0

2003,1

2003,0

2003,0

2003,0

2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

2001,0

2001,0

2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

2000,0

2000,0

1999,1

1999,0

1999,0

1999,0

1998,1

1998,0

1998,0

1998,0

1997,1

1997,0

1997,0

1997,0

1996,1

1996,0

1996,0

1996,0

0,70

0,60

0,50

0,40

0,30

0,20

0,10

0,00

Su

m a

ssre

l

country: us

rogue states, axis of evil, sponsoring, safe haven, wmd, nuclear

criminelen

islam, fanatici, zelfmoord

cl2

18

Prognosis

Similar to the diagnostic frame, the prognostic frame is divided as explained in the

methodology. Figures 11 (a) and (b) show the relative size of the constituents of the

prognostic frame for the US and UK. In both countries, Patriotic Unity, International

Cooperation and Civil Liberties are very small subframes. Fear about the future has

middle ground with a consistent 15% share of the prognosis frame in both countries. In

both countries, civil liberties and concerns for prisoner abuses increases slightly in the

final years as the result of Abu Ghraib and other scandals.

In both countries, the main discussion is about two possible ways to counter terror:

through intelligence operations, and through war. In the UK, counter-intelligence starts out

slightly higher than war, while in the US they vie for first place. In both countries, the war

on terror gains prominence immediately after 9/11, and remains in first place until halfway

through 2005, two years after the famous ‘end of major combat operations’ proclaimed by

Bush in May 2003. Figure 12 summarizes this by showing the ratio of War to Counter-

intelligence for both countries, underscoring the remarkable similarity of the American

and British newspapers in this regard. There were no clear patterns in the short-term

dynamics after events.

(a) (b)

Figure 11: Diagnosis over time for the UK (a) and US (b)

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

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0,40

0,30

0,20

0,10

0,00

Su

m a

ss

rel

country: uk

2006,1

2006,0

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2004,0

2003,1

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2002,1

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0,50

0,40

0,30

0,20

0,10

0,00

Su

m a

ss

rel

country: us

patriotic unity

fear

burgerrechten, abu graib, guantanamo

international cooperation

intelligence, wiretapping, legislation

war on terror

cl2

19

2006,1

2006,0

2006,0

2006,0

2005,1

2005,0

2005,0

2005,0

2004,1

2004,0

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2002,1

2002,0

2002,0

2002,0

2001,1

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2001,0

2000,1

2000,0

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1999,1

1999,0

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1996,0

1996,0

3,00

2,50

2,00

1,50

1,00

0,50

0,00

Sum

ass

rel

us

uk

country

Figure 12: Ratio of war to counterintelligence as solutions over time

Conclusions and Discussion

In this study we looked at how terror events caused frame shifts in the American and

British press from before the 1998 embassy bombings until after the 2005 London

bombings. Our conclusions are based on Associative Frames found in newspaper coverage

of terror using automatic content analysis.

Looking at the long term dynamics of framing, 9/11 was clearly a defining moment. After

9/11 both the base level of terrorism visibility and the peaks caused by events are clearly

higher than before. Especially in the US, 9/11 became a strong media template, and this

event is frequently referred to in the coverage after 9/11 and peaks with each new terror

attack. In the British press 9/11 was also a strong reference point, but this decreased over

time, finally being supplanted by the London bombings as the main reference event in the

final period of our study. We also found that 9/11 caused a marked frame shift from

diagnostic framing to prognostic framing; and within the diagnostic framing there was a

shift from depicting the enemy as criminals towards depicting them as fundamentalist

Muslims. After 9/11 there was a temporary dominance of the War on Terror as the main

prognostic frame, but this decreased over time as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq bogged

down.

Since this data set contained a number of major terror events both before and after 9/11, it

also offered an opportunity to investigate the short term dynamics of the media coverage

of dramatic events. We found that in general, the wave of media attention to an event is

fairly broad, taking one or two weeks to reach its peak and lasting for at least a month. The

first week is characterized by high frame variation and relatively high attention to

diagnosis. The frame variation drops sharply as the diagnosis is replaced by prognosis and

attention peaks in the second and third week. This complements our earlier findings that

the first week of an event is reported from a fairly global angle, which is replaced by a

more local focus as the media shifts from describing and diagnosis to analysis and

prognosis (Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt, 2007).

Since we only had two newspapers per country, it is difficult to draw many conclusions

between newspaper types or between countries. In most of our analyses, the American and

British media show the same patterns and follow each other fairly closely. We did find

20

some interesting differences, however. Firstly, the visibility effect of 9/11 is smaller in the

British press, and the importance of 9/11 as the main media template diminishes quicker

and is replaced by the London bombings. Second, after 9/11 the UK displays more frame

variation than the American press, but converges again after London.

We believe that these are very interesting results that paint an interesting picture of both

the long term media logic and the short term dynamics of the coverage of terror events.

However, it is important to realize that these results are based on pure frequencies and co-

occurrence counts. On the one hand this shows how powerful this can be as an analysis

instrument if the dataset is very large and the concepts can be clearly identified based on

words. On the other hand, it also means that we should realize the restrictions inherent in

this approach. We know that Muslims are associated with terror more often after 9/11 than

before, but we do not know whether this association is positive or negative, or whether

they are the causes of terrorism, its victims, or neither. It is vital that large-scale frequency

based studies such as this are accompanied by more in-depth analyses to provide the

interpretation of such findings.

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