SGT Albert Fredrick Cutillo

Army Serial Number: 31-424-549

F Company, 2nd Battalion, 363rd Infantry Regiment, 91st Infantry Division, 5th Army

Branch of Service – United States Army/Infantry

Military Occupational Specialty – Rifleman (745)

Personal Information -

Date of Birth: February 17th, 1918

Address: 24 Angel Street, Mansfield, Bristol, Massachusetts, USA

Color of Eyes: Brown

Color of Hair: Black

Height: 5’6 ½”

Weight: 137 lbs

Basic Training

Albert enlisted on October 21st, 1943 in North Attleboro, Massachusetts. He

reported for active duty on November 11th, 1943. Albert then attended basic

training at Camp Adair, Washington. He received his Tetanus shot on

January 24th, 1944. Albert then stayed with his battalion at Camp Adair until

March, when he and his battalion were ordered to the staging area for

departure at Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia.

Departure for Foreign Service

The 2nd Battalion’s departure was delayed due to

lack of shipping space, but eventually departed

from Hampton Roads, Virginia on April 21st, 1944

and arrived in Mers El Kébir, Algeria on May 10th,

1944, making the 2nd Battalion of the 363rd Infantry

Regiment the last element of the 91st Division to

arrive in North Africa. Barracks at Camp Adair, Benton, Washington

Training in Africa

Upon its arrival in North Africa, the 91st

Division was assigned to the Seventh

Army and was immediately thrust into

an intensive amphibious training

program that was organized to simulate

every possible phase of battle. The six

week training program was based in

Port aux Poules, Algeria, and was

divided into two basic phases:

individual/small unit training and

battalion/regimental landings. There

was training in the organization of boat

teams, wire breaching, debarkation drill, demolition teams, rocket teams, flame throwers, and a

dozen other aspects of invasion technique. Albert and the 363rd Infantry regiment began their

amphibious training on May 19th, 1944 and finished on May 31st. The next day it began preparing for

a mock invasion of the Arzew beaches as the finale to its training and as the prelude to its movement

to the Italian front.

On June 3rd, 1944 the 363rd Infantry regiment moved from Port aux Poules to Mediterranean Base

Section Staging Area No. 2 near Fleurus, where the final plans for the Arzew training landing were

developed. D-Day for the all-out assault against “enemy” positions on the coast of Arzew Bay was

scheduled for June 11th, 1944. It was assumed that the area from Oran to Mostaganem was held by

elements of the German Infantry Division "W" with the "Y" Grenadier Regiment at Oran, the "X"

Grenadiers at St. Cloud, and one Battalion of the "Z" Grenadier Regiment at Mostaganem. The entire

stretch of the beach was strongly fortified with pillboxes, barbed wire entanglements, anti-tank

traps, and strong points. There was also a force of enemy tanks

reported in the vicinity prepared to repel any possible attack.

The Division's mission was to seize the Port of Arzew and the

airport at the town of Renan. Its final objective was the high

ground west of Renan and south of Kleber. The plan called for a

coordinated attack by both the 362nd and 363rd Regimental

Combat Teams, with engineer, medical, AAA, air and naval units

in direct support. Endless landing ships of all types were massed

for the “invasion.” The Division CP was established on the USS

Biscayne while an alternate CP was established on the HMS

Derbyshire.

Troops began embarking on June 9th. The following day was

spent in briefing the commanders and men on the specific plans of the mission. Then, late that same

night, June 10th, the ships moved slowly out of the harbor of Oran under cover of darkness and

steamed silently ten miles out to sea opposite Cape Carbon and the shores southeast of Arzew.

During the night the troops were loaded into small landing craft, while a heavy sea rolled against the

sides of the ships. Forty-five minutes before H-Hour, 4:00 A.M., navy destroyers laid down a heavy

artillery barrage on the beaches. Under this protective covering the first assault teams moved

toward the hostile shore. The 363rd Infantry, getting off to a late start because its landing was forced

Mers El Kébir, Algeria

off course by the wind, attacked at 4:40 A.M. on the narrow "Ranger" beach just south of Cape

Carbon. They landed in 14 waves and when they hit the beach, they struck hard. Within 12 minutes

the first wave had breached the initial wire entanglements at the beach's edge and was moving south

to its next phase line. By the end of the first hour the Regiment had knocked out the enemy pillboxes

with flame-throwers and demolition-charges. By 2:00 P.M. the 363rd Infantry had then moved on the

right flank of the 362nd Infantry and seized the high ground south of Kleber. The operation, viewed as

a whole, was declared a success, and the training went a long way toward hardening the Division for

the combat it was to meet on the Italian front. It was the single toughest period of training that the

Division had undergone.

Arrival in Italy

On June 15th, 1944, Albert and the 363rd Infantry left Mediterranean Base Section Staging Area No. 2

to embark on ships in the harbor of Oran. The next day, on June 16th, Albert and the 363rd Infantry

steamed out of Oran, destined for the small port of Bagnoli near Naples. Albert arrived in Bagnoli,

Italy on June 19th, 1944, and marched with his regiment to staging areas just outside of the town. The

next day, June 20th, the 91st Infantry Division was assigned to the 5th Army. Albert and his regiment

stayed in Bagnoli until June 30th,

when they were ordered to the

vicinity of Civitavecchia, north of

Rome. The troops moved by water

in landing craft from Naples to

Civitavecchia, where they were

then motored to a bivouac area on

Highway 1, approximately 6 miles

north of the town of Montalto.

At 6:00 P.M. on July 2nd, 1944 Albert

and the 363rd Infantry were moved

from the bivouac area towards a

forward assembly area in the

vicinity of the 34th Infantry Division

Headquarters just south of the

Cecina River. They arrived at the

assembly area at 2:00 A.M. on July

3rd. At dawn, Albert and the 363rd Infantry were ordered forward to a new assembly area on the

northern bank of the Cecina River about 3000 yards west of the village of Casaglia. However, as the

363rd approached the town of Cecina they found droves of 34th Infantry Division troops swarming

across the river. In spite of this confusion the 363rd Infantry eventually arrived at the new assembly

area at 11:00 P.M. on July 3rd. It was at this point that Albert came under hostile artillery fire for the

first time, as enemy artillery began raining down upon the new assembly area exacting its share of

casualties. The 363rd Infantry spent the night at this assembly area, and at 9:00 A.M. on July 4th they

moved to a new forward assembly area approximately 3 miles north of their old one. It was at this

point that Albert and the 363rd Infantry received their orders: they were to be attached to the 34th

Infantry Division to gain combat experience.

Landings in Bagnoli, Italy

Baptism by Fire

At 6:00 a.m. on July 5th, 1944, the 363rd

Infantry began its assault towards the

regimental objective: the town of

Chianni, approximately 9 miles north.

The regiment moved north through

the town of Riparabella. After the

regiment had captured Hill 457

approximately 2500 yards north of

Riparabella, F Company was ordered

to take Hill 506, which was 1300 yards

north of Hill 457, in the area of Poggio

Malcousigilo. The company captured

the hill at approximately 2:00 p.m., but

encountered heavy resistance from

enemy entrenched 400 yards north of

Hill 506 near a group of farm buildings

on the forward slope. In the battle for

these houses which lasted from 2:00

p.m. until 5:30 p.m. the company was

torn to shreds, with half of one platoon

and two-thirds of a second becoming

casualties from the strong small-arms

fire as well as the medium and 170mm

concentrations of artillery fire which

the enemy poured on the attack.

When F Company had finally captured

the position at 5:30 P.M., it was

discovered that the Germans had left

15 dead and 3 wounded behind. No

other prisoners than the wounded

were taken. This had been Albert’s

first experience of combat with the

enemy. F Company then dug in on Hill

506 and spent the night there,

preparing for the next day.

On the morning of July 6th, F Company renewed the assault. They rejoined the 2nd Battalion again and

headed north and slightly east towards Hill 507 across the Sterza stream bed, a steep ravine which

made rapid progress impossible. Here they began to come under enemy artillery fire being

directed by observers on Hill 634 (Mt. Vaso), in a vain attempt to stop the attack. At 11:45 a.m. the

battalion had secured Hill 507, which protected them somewhat from the German artillery fire. 2nd

Battalion then received orders to move to the right side of Hill 553, to the right rear of the 3rd

Battalion. The battalion then split up again, with F Company joining Companies E and G in rushing up

the road to Hill 553 under occasional enemy artillery fire. The companies eventually reached Hill

553, and F Company immediately began climbing the eastern side of the hill. They soon found

themselves engaged in an all-day firefight with the enemy. The enemies on the hill were joined just

after dusk by other bypassed individuals and groups of Germans, which caused F Company to suffer

severe casualties as the fighting on Hill 553 continued into the night. Eventually the Germans

withdrew as the 3rd Battalion moved forward and pushed the enemy back. F Company then

proceeded to dig in on the hill. Just after the company had dug in, an enemy artillery barrage began

to fall there. Inside of half an hour 103 shells fell inside the company area which was less than 300

yards square, the first shells killing four men and wounding several more.

Later on, the enemy counter-attacked the 3rd

Battalion and, forcing it to withdraw, continued

their attack until they had once again reached the

forward slopes of Hill 553. Taking advantage of the

darkness, small groups of German snipers

infiltrated between Companies F and E on the right

and by daybreak had cut off all lines of

communication to the rear of Company F. Since the

3rd Battalion was no longer in front of F Company, it

was decided that it would be necessary to attack a

small knoll where the enemy was observed

concentrating. F Company attacked the knoll, and the close coordination between the platoons of the

company enabled the company to capture the knoll without a single casualty. Later, after the attack

was completed, 37 dead Germans were counted along with four machine guns and a powerful radio.

Although this attack had been more than successful, the supply of ammunition was nearly exhausted.

Attempts to replenish ammunition, food, and water during the daylight hours of July 7th resulted in

heavy casualties inflicted on Company F patrols. Due to the short life of a radio battery no contact

was possible with the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Murphy. By taking the battery out of

the radio and laying it in the hot sun it could be charged enough to transmit no longer than one

minute twice daily. At night no contact could be established since the battery once again became

cold. This type of communication lasted through July 6, 7, & 8. It was deemed impossible to spare any

more men for patrols to try to get through for supplies, and Company F then proceeded to set up an

island defense to save the company from an attack from the rear. During these three days the

company had no food or water, and the supply of ammunition had been redistributed so that each

man had no more than one clip of ammunition. The mortars and machine guns had completely

exhausted their supply. It is estimated that 2000 rounds of artillery fire fell on the company in these

three days, causing heavy casualties. Some men with wounds lay in ditches for two days due to the

impossibility of evacuation.

Members of one Company F outpost saw an enemy machine gun fire on a team of litter bearers who

were attempting to reach the Company G area to evacuate several seriously wounded men there.

Each time the German gunners ceased firing the litter team would try to get through, but the second

they exposed themselves the gun chattered again and the team was driven back. At night on July 8th,

1944, Companies F and I attacked from their individual positions on Hill 553 and wiped out several

machine gun emplacements, reducing a major portion of the resistance on the hill. This attack also

resupplied the lacking F Company.

Top of Hill 553

At this point the remaining Germans retreated, and F Company stayed on Hill 553 until

approximately 12:00 P.M. on July 10th, when they headed north to Hill 634 (Mt. Vaso), which had

already been cleared of enemy resistance by the 1st Battalion. The next day, July 11th, F Company

had rejoined the 2nd Battalion, and had advanced north to Hill 601. As the 2nd Battalion column joined

the tail of the 1st Battalion on Rostona Ridge, it was subjected to accurate mortar shelling, which

inflicted many casualties upon the battalion. The advance continued along the rocky winding

mountain trails through rough, scrubby, almost uninhabited country, without other casualties. The

sweat-drenched column moved along slowly, like purposeful ants, down one ravine, across the

stream, filled up their canteens, and began climbing the next hill. Then down across, and up again

and again, struggling under their loads.

At 3:00 A.M. on July 12th, 1944, the 363rd Infantry regiment was removed from the 34th Infantry

Division’s command and was placed back under the command of the 91st Infantry Division. The 2nd

Battalion continued following the 1st Battalion up to Hill 577, where it eventually settled in on July 13th,

1944. It was on this day that Chianni fell to the 363rd Infantry, having been captured by the 3rd

Battalion. The men of the 2nd Battalion rested on Hill 577 for as long as they could. That rest would not

last long however, and at 5:30 A.M. on July 14th the 2nd Battalion was ordered to take Hill 401, halfway

to Poggio Rignardio. By 7:30 A.M. the 2nd Battalion was on Hill 477, the terrain feature overlooking

the objective, Hill 401. By 2:00 P.M. the 2nd Battalion had taken Hill 401, meeting no small-arms

resistance, but losing seven men hit by shell fragments.

At the same time the 2nd Battalion sent out some patrols in the direction of Bagni, probing for the

enemy who seemed to have made an organized withdrawal from the sector. At 6:00 P.M. the 363rd

Infantry was given new orders to continue their attack towards Pontedera on the Arno River ten miles

to the north. By 7:00 P.M. the 2nd Battalion, in a column of companies (F Company leading) had

reached Colle Montanino, a mile south of Bagni. The 2nd Battalion then continued northeast from

Colle Montanino on the road until it joined the Chianni-Bagni road a half mile south of town and fell in

line behind the leading 3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion then assembled in an area about one-fourth of

a mile southeast of Bagni which had been captured by the Regiment the day before. This whole

territory had been heavily mined by the Germans before they pulled out, and caused several

casualties both in the 363rd Infantry and in other units which assembled or passed through that area.

The 363rd Infantry then went into Division reserve in and around the town of Bagni di Casciana.

During July 15, 16, & 17, 1944 the 363rd Infantry had their first relaxation and hot meals in two weeks.

They bathed in mineral baths for which the town was named, held church services, and reorganized

to continue the attack. Their location at this time was eight miles due east of the large seaport of

Livorno (Leghorn) which was still occupied by German forces.

To the Arno

In the afternoon of July 17th, 1944, Task Force

Williamson was born. Attached to the 34th

Infantry Division, it was mainly comprised of the

363rd Infantry, with some reconnaissance and

engineer battalions as well. The mission of Task

Force Williamson was to make an end-around

play and capture Livorno (Leghorn) – flanking

the city by an attack west while the 34th Infantry Division continued north. At 8:20 P.M. the 363rd

Infantry’s 2nd Battalion entrucked and drove black-out to the Task Force Williamson assembly area

eight airline miles east of Livorno (Leghorn) in the vicinity of Crocino. 25 minutes after the task force

elements had closed into the assembly area at 2:10 A.M. on July 18th, the order was given that the

attack on Leghorn was to begin at 3:30 A.M.

The plan called for a rapid envelopment with one battalion moving along the high ground which led

to the seaport, protecting the left flank of the remainder of the task force which would use the most

direct route by road – 12 ½ miles. Word had come down – “bypass any large resistance – and push

on rapidly.” At 11:45 A.M. on July 18th, 1944 they moved out and joined the rearmost elements of the

1st Battalion, who were moving on foot along the unimproved road leading north. After a mile and a

half the road forked, the left fork following a valley into the seaport of Leghorn. By 2:45 P.M. both the

1st and 2nd Battalions advancing west along the road and the 3rd Battalion pushing across country

were in sight of a church on the road near Il Casone. The 2nd Battalion then moved to an assembly

area about 4000 yards east of Highway 1 at C. Campo al Melo and spent the night there.

At 6:10 A.M. the next morning, the 2nd

Battalion entered Leghorn, occupying from

the 1st Battalion area to the waterfront. The

Germans had withdrawn from the city

before the Americans had arrived, so there

was little to no resistance. Once in Leghorn,

the 2nd Battalion out-posted and sent patrols

throughout the dock area, finding barbed

wire, rock barricades, and anti-tank mines

strewn about quite thickly, but not planted.

At this time the 363rd Infantry command post

moved into Leghorn and made plans to

continue the thrust north to the Arno River

and Pisa, ten miles away. Two main roads led out of Leghorn to the north: the coastal highway to

Marina di Pisa, a small city located at the very mouth of the Arno River; and Highway 1, which led

directly northeast to the city of Pisa, generally following the railroad tracks which also joined the two

cities. About two miles north of Leghorn on Highway 1 where it crossed a series of five large canals

and several smaller ones, Highway 67, the main route to Florence, branched off to the east generally

following the northernmost of the larger canals. While the Germans had pulled out of Leghorn right

before the Americans had arrived, they had not withdrawn far. They had pulled back north over the

five large canals, exploded the charges already set under the bridges over the canals, and had taken

up positions to oppose any further American advance. Meanwhile, their artillery shelled the lost port

and vicinity.

On July 20th the entire Task Force Williamson was relieved of out-posting the city, and the 2nd

Battalion moved back to its old assembly area several miles east of Leghorn, which it had occupied

the night of July 18th. On July 21st the 2nd Battalion moved up into an assembly area close to the five

canals, which had already been captured by the 1st Battalion the night before. The 2nd Battalion then

moved forward to another assembly area just north of the Tombolo Railroad Station (Stazione

Tombolo) 3000 yards north of the 5 canals. However, German machine gun fire held up the 2nd

Battalion’s advance. Therefore, the battalion cut off Highway 1 up which they had been advancing in

Poker near a street barricade in Livorno, Italy

an approach-march formation, swung east 1200 yards north of Stazione Tombolo, then took another

left turn to meet the highway again at the overpass at Fte. Sofina, 5000 yards south of the city of Pisa.

Here the 2nd Battalion went into an assembly area with Companies C, A, and B of the 1st Battalion

echeloned along the road to the front and to the left on the third phase line, and sent patrols toward

Pisa, which they had been ordered to take.

The jump-off for Pisa was set at 3:00 A.M. on July 23rd, 1944. The 2nd Battalion jumped-off as

scheduled for Pisa at 3:00 A.M. F Company, with a platoon of H Company heavy machine guns,

attacked under light enemy resistance to the east of the highway. F Company was soon in positions in

and around the airport buildings, and immediately sent patrols forward on the eastern side of the

highway. These patrols ran into enemy forces on the outskirts of Pisa. Meanwhile, as F Company,

along with G and H Companies, crossed the airport from the southeast to the northwest corner, a

previously located enemy machine gun in the northwest corner opened fire. The fire was high and

no casualties were suffered as the companies continued across, arriving in position at 4:30 A.M., July

23rd, 1944. The fighting continued at the airport as the sun rose. Friendly supporting artillery was

used but the enemy was well concealed and it was difficult to spot his positions. Enemy artillery fired

scattered rounds at the airport and airport buildings but inflicted no casualties. At 11:30 A.M.

Companies E and F assaulted the enemy positions at the airport, forcing the German withdrawal.

Before leaving, the enemy flooded the canals, thus hampering (but not halting) the advance. Once

these positions were overrun Companies E and F continued into the city of Pisa meeting only

sporadic sniper fire and no organized resistance. Both companies proceeded to their prearranged

sectors along the Arno River, setting up final protective lines and sending patrols down to the river

banks. The entire 2nd Battalion was completely closed into southwestern Pisa by 3:00 P.M. on July

23rd.

During the organization of the

2nd Battalion sector in Pisa

enemy snipers were active.

Starting when the advance

elements moved in until the last

man left, heavy artillery and

mortar fire from north of the

Arno fell on the positions,

killing two men and wounding

nine more. At 3:00 A.M. on July

24th, 1944 the 2nd Battalion was

ordered to withdraw from Pisa

and return to the assembly area

near the overpass at Fte. Sofina from where it had jumped off for Pisa. This move was made down the

highway under enemy artillery and sniper fire, besides that of the enemy patrols which were still

operating in the sector at this time. The battalion closed into its assembly area just prior to dawn on

July 24th. On July 29th Task Force Williamson was relieved of its attachment to the 34th Infantry

Division and returned to the control of the 91st Infantry Division, and at 6:00 A.M. on July 30th, 1944,

the 2nd Battalion rejoined the rest of the 363rd Infantry and was ordered to concentrate with the rest of

the division in the Colleoli-Balconevisi area closing in from July 29th to August 2nd preparatory to

relieving elements of the 88th Infantry Division then out-posting the Arno River in that sector some 40

miles by road east of Pisa.

363rd Infantrymen on patrol in Pisa

They arrived at their assembly area near Balconevisi where the command post was set up in a castle

formerly used by the Germans as a hospital. Upon closing in this area the 363rd Infantry was attached

to the 88th Infantry Division whose 350th Infantry command post was then located at Barbialla, three

miles southeast of Balconevisi. The orders given to the 2nd Battalion on July 30th ordered them into

position along the boundary between the Fifth Army and the British Eight Army to the right rear of

the 362nd Infantry which occupied the river positions. The 2nd Battalion relieved the 350th Infantry the

night of July 30th-31st, all the while maintaining contact with the Eighth Army and the 362nd Infantry.

The 2nd Battalion occupied the positions facing northeast on the Fifth-Eighth Army boundary from the

night of July 30th to 12:00 P.M. August 12th southeast of San Miniato. Elements of the 2nd Battalion were

in the towns of San Quintino and Campriano with a platoon of anti-tank guns; and along the

unimproved road from Corniana past the church and cemetery to Mellicciano a mile and a half

southeast. The battalion command post was located a thousand yards to the rear or southeast of these

positions at Fornace. From this reserve position, the 2nd Battalion set up training schedules – mostly

tactics, extended-order drill, physical training and sports – had their duffel bags trucked up from

Bagni di Casciana, took showers and filled out absentee ballots for national and state elections to be

mailed back to the States. On August 12th the 2nd Battalion was relieved of its outpost positions on the

Army border and moved into the Balconevisi assembly area. During darkness on August 13th the 2nd

Battalion moved out of the Balconevisi assembly area and up to the line of supports along the railroad

embankment to relieve the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 362nd Infantry on the extreme left of the

363rd Infantry

sector. The 2nd

Battalion

command post

was moved to

Montopoli, while

the 363rd Infantry

set up their

command post in

Monte Biccheri,

the former

location of the

362nd Infantry

command post, at

6:00 P.M. on

August 13th. More

strong-points

were advanced

beyond the

railroad embankment by the battalion on the nights of August 13th-14th in addition to the planting of

home-made trip flares and booby traps. It had been decided that the 363rd Infantry would send

patrols to the river and would also establish these strong-points to stop or trap enemy patrols. F

Company was along the tracks in their left sector so close to the river that no further outposts needed

to be sent out.

The Arno River was low and fordable in August, only two feet deep in places, and each night German

patrols would cross at different points to probe the defenses, attempt to determine the strength, and

take prisoners to be questioned concerning the possibilities of the Allies forcing a river crossing.

These patrols were either engaged and killed, captured, or driven off when detected. The enemy

across the river could be spotted too if he moved around much in daylight and his installations

located. A patrol from F Company found several of their communication lines cut plus fifteen box and

one Schü mines strewn in the vicinity. The 363rd Infantry then received orders that they were to be

relieved by elements of the 85th Infantry Division by 4:30 A.M. on August 17th, 1944. Patrols continued

their normal activity until this time, to reinforce all security measures taken to disguise evidence of a

relief. By the ordered hour the relief was completed under heavy harassing mortar and artillery

concentrations. The only casualty was from an F Company patrol which operated along the river

bank as usual, this time encountering enemy fire which separated the patrol. One man known to be

wounded was lost. That night, the 363rd Infantry moved by motor convoy in five serials to a rear

training area near Certaldo, arriving just before dawn on August 18th. Because the new area had

been thickly planted with Schü mines it was necessary for advance parties to be accompanied by

ammunition and pioneer and anti-tank mine sweepers who went over the bivouac areas prior to the

arrival of the troops. In the blackout move over unknown narrow shell-pocketed dirt roads a 2 ½ ton

truck, one 1 ½ truck and one jeep overturned, killing one man and injuring seventeen others. The

363rd Infantry remained in the assembly area from August 18th to September 4th, engaged in training,

rest, recuperation and reorganization. Throughout their stay in Certaldo the 363rd Infantry was

subjected to almost nightly visits from the Luftwaffe, although 30 miles behind the lines. Just before

the midnight of August 28th-29th a lone German plane familiarly known as “Bedcheck Charlie” or

“Herman the German” flew over and dumped his load of bombs on Certaldo causing ten or twelve

sharp explosions and starting half a dozen buildings blazing from incendiary bombs. While military

police and fire-fighting units attempted to get things under control and ambulances stood by, Charlie

turned around and headed for Poggibonse, strafing and bombing a motor convoy two miles out of

Certaldo. One gasoline truck was hit and overturned, but after twenty minutes the convoy had re-

formed and was on its way again. As far as what could be ascertained in Certaldo there were no

casualties except a few persons injured by flying bricks; no one was seriously hurt. Deemed the most

important phase of the training at Certaldo was an extensive course in river crossing, conducted

jointly with the 316th Engineer Battalion, wherein each infantry battalion made a crossing of the Elsa

River near Certaldo. Together with company and battalion attack problems this training could only

suggest one thing – the 363rd was going to help in forcing a crossing of the Arno in the near future.

However, the British crossed first, in the vicinity of Florence. The 363rd was then ordered to an

assembly area. The 363rd Infantry moved from the training area near Certaldo by truck, with the 2nd

Battalion leaving first. Crossing the initial point ad midnight, traveling in close column blackout at ten

miles per hour with no route signs posted because of security, the units closed into the new assembly

area by 5:00 A.M. on September 5th. This area was just east of Bagni a Ripoli overlooking the south

bank of the Arno. The entire Division was now assembled in the Area between Florence and the town

of Pontassieve, on the south side of the Arno.

On the night of September 5th the 363rd Infantry moved out on foot, crossed the Arno River and

climbed back into the mountains north of Florence. Here it assembled in an area surrounding the

town of Monteloro about seven miles northeast of Florence. The regiment closed here at 5:00 A.M. on

September 6th, 1944. The regiment stayed at Monteloro until the night of September 9th, when the

363rd Infantry moved up to Bivigliano on foot and by truck, closing into the forward assembly area

with the remainder of the Division at 1:00 A.M. on September 10th. At 5:30 A.M., the 2nd Battalion

attacked on the left – crossed the line of departure and moved on foot towards the Sieve River five

miles to the north, meeting little or no resistance; all indications were that the enemy was pulling

back to his Gothic Line position, leaving only local security or none south of the Sieve. The 2nd

Battalion cut north and west through its sector joining with Highway 65, the Florence-Bologna

railroad which had been systematically demolished by the enemy, and the tributary Carza which

flowed into the Sieve at San Piero. These three, the highway, railroad, and stream, were intertwined

from the top of the terrain watershed to just south of San Piero where Highway 65 forked sharply to

the northwest through Futa Pass, and Highway 6524 (to San Piero-Scarperia-Firenzuola and Imola)

continued north through Il Giogo Pass. This Highway 6524 was to become the main supply route of

the 363rd Infantry for the next several days until the Gothic Line was broken. The 2nd Battalion

reached the river line 2000 yards to the west near Cafaggiolo by 3:00 P.M., and immediately began

conducting reconnaissance of the river bank. The 363rd Infantry then planned two river crossing

sites: one in the 2nd Battalion sector in the vicinity of Cafaggiolo, and the other in the 1st Battalion

sector at San Piero. The 363rd Infantry command then ordered the Sieve River crossing to begin at

10:00 P.M. on September 10th. The first objective of this assault was the Il Giogo position of the Gothic

Line protected by the mountains Monticelli and Altuzzo and guarded by the 4th Fallschirmjäger

Division of the Luftwaffe.

The Gothic Line

After the Sieve River crossing on the

evening of September 10th the 2nd Battalion

had followed the advance of the 3rd

Battalion to Fagna on September 11th.

While the rest of the battalion assembled

here, F Company, under Captain Eugene E.

Crowden, moved into bypassed Scarperia,

finding the town vacated by the enemy.

Positions were set up and manned 300

yards north of the town astride from the

highway. The Regimental command post

opened in Scarperia immediately after F

Company had cleared the town. During the

night of September 11th-12th the battalions

improved their communications.

The next day, September 12th, the rest of

the 2nd Battalion joined F Company in

Scarperia. Just before daybreak on

September 13th, the 2nd Battalion moved up

near Ponzalla and prepared to attack on the

right of the 1st Battalion on September 14th.

After a bombing of Monticelli by the Army

Air Corps, the 2nd Battalion attack began. At

11:15 A.M. on the morning of September

14th, 1944, F Company left Ponzalla in

column for Casacce by way of the ridge

Poggio al Pozzo, using the path on its western side leading by the settlements of Cerliano and

Vitartali.

Here on the trail Captain Crowden, leading F Company, met the halted C Company at 5:00 P.M.,

found Captain Hayes in command and made arrangements to pass through. F Company met no

resistance as they moved on up the ridge which the enemy had prepared for defense but had not

occupied because of the pressure exerted on the left and right by the attacks of the 1st and 3rd

battalions, respectively. It was getting dark as the leading 3rd Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant

Robert C. Hatcher, reached the first break in the brush-lined path; here the platoon found what had

been a bridge across a ravine. It was now just a pile of rubble lying in the bottom of the ravine.

Lieutenant Hatcher led his platoon across safely with the exception of a Medical Corps man who was

at the rear of the group and stepped on a Schü mine. The platoon and the rest of the company halted

on the southern side of the ravine hit the dirt upon hearing the explosion as the now alerted Germans

opened fire from their defensive positions strung around Monticelli. Under the machine-gun fire

another aid man from the 2nd Platoon ran to rescue his wounded comrade and stepped on a mine

himself. Two other 2nd Platoon men went to evacuate the aid men and also stepped on mines.

There were now four men in the minefield. Staff Sergeant Ernest L. Johnson, Private First Class Boyd

Rittenberry, and Corporal Willard R. LaMarche from the 2nd, 1st, and Weapons Platoons respectively,

volunteered to go into the minefield and rescued two of the men. Joined by Private First Class

Michael O’Niell, they returned to evacuate the other two when both Rittenberry and LaMarche

stepped on mines. They brought LaMarche out, but permission was refused for them to go back into

the minefield after the others. Instead, the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon was called forward and

brought mine detectors to clear a path through which evacuation could be made without further

casualties. Helping to clear and mark the minefield, Sergeant Wilber I. Merx of the A&P Platoon also

stepped on a mine and was blown into the ravine. Upon the removal of the last wounded man from

the minefield, which was still under fire, the 2nd Platoon, commanded by First Sergeant Russell M.

McKelvey, was ordered by Captain Crowden to move 100 yards down the ravine to the far right side

to contact Lieutenant Hatcher’s platoon already across, and to reorganize. The rest of the night was

spent in clearing the minefield and marking it with engineer tape to prevent further casualties.

The remainder of F Company crossed the ravine early the next

morning, September 15th, and prepared to continue the attack up

Monticelli. After completing the crossing of the minefield that

morning F Company had attacked up the slope with Lieutenant

Hatcher’s 3rd Platoon on the right, First Sergeant McKelvey’s 2nd

Platoon on the left, meeting heavy resistance in the form of an

estimated eight enemy pillboxes across their front. Machine-gun

fire from these emplacements caused serious casualties, especially in the right platoon which was cut

down to nine men and a sergeant. Lieutenant Hatcher was one of those who lost his life. Captain

Crowden committed his reserve 1st Platoon to the right to relieve the handful of the 3rd Platoon which

was then withdrawn 100 yards to the rear of the 1st and 2nd Platoons. The company mortars had been

emplaced and the two light machine guns attached to the 2nd Platoon; now the company got down to

the dirty business of systematically knocking out the emplacements which faced them.

The next day, September 16th, F Company began to receive heavy fire from the left front, which held

up the attack. The company could not advance more than 300 yards from the line of departure during

daylight, and the attack was held up until nightfall. As nightfall came, the company continued its dirty

business of knocking out the enemy emplacements on Monticelli.

The next day, September 17th, Sergeant

McKelvey began inching his platoon forward

by fire and movement. One of his squad

leaders went down and the assistant was

killed almost immediately as he went to take

command. Sergeant McKelvey wormed over

to the squad, reorganizing it. “We just

couldn’t move,” explained Private Glen H.

Wells, “because we were getting o much fire

from the pillboxes. Sergeant McKelvey told us

to hold up and he began moving forward

himself – the tracers were cutting right over

him. Then he had to crawl through the wire.”

One bullet tore two holes in McKelvey’s

helmet as he worked his way through the barbed wire and disarmed an S mine while the squad kept

trying to button up the enemy emplacement. “Private James R. Wixon was firing at the machine gun

but he was killed,” continued Private First Class Theodore J. Drozdowsi. “Sergeant McKelvey kept

moving and when he got close enough he threw a Molotov Cocktail, then ran and jumped into the

pillbox. I heard him hollering at the Germans and the next thing I knew five Jerries came running out

of the hole with Sergeant McKelvey behind them. He sent them back and we never had any more

trouble from the pillbox after that.” Sergeant McKelvey was later commissioned as a second

lieutenant. He was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for this action.

While the mountain of Monticelli was captured at this point by members of K Company, F Company

was still faced with the network of fortifications that they had been reducing for the past several days.

Eventually as the fight progressed

throughout the night the remaining

German elements withdrew, and

Monticelli was officially secured. On the

morning of September 18th F Company,

along with the 363rd Infantry remained

dug in on Monticelli and continued the

evacuation of their wounded.

The next day, on September 19th, 1944, F

Company rejoined the 2nd Battalion and

moved to the town of Rifredo along the

road to the right flank of the 3rd Battalion,

to aid them in an attack if necessary. En

route to Rifredo in the Il Giogo Pass the

men of F Company came under enemy

artillery fire, and Albert Cutillo was

wounded in the left leg by shrapnel and was awarded the Purple Heart for this injuries. Albert was

then sent to the hospital for 10 days and was released on September 29th, 1944.

German trenches in the Gothic Line

Il Giogo Pass on the road to Rifredo

Up Highway 65: the North Apennines Campaign

Upon his release from the hospital, Albert rejoined his old battalion in Traversa, where the men were

being given the opportunity to bathe, obtain fresh clothing, and to eat hot meals. However, in the

early morning hours of September 30th the 2nd Battalion moved out of Traversa to pass through the 3rd

Battalion positions in order to attack the next enemy position abreast of the 1st Battalion: Montepiano.

The 2nd Battalion was delayed, but eventually arrived in position near Panigali at 6:00 A.M. Here they

rested for the night, and at 6:00 A.M. on October 1st the battalion jumped off. However, F Company

did not join the assault until 9:00 A.M., when they moved up from Panigali to the more convenient

rear slope at Villa di Mezzo.

The 2nd Platoon of F Company then

received orders to move out of its

position to clear the way for the

advance of the company up a

slope wooded with low, straggly,

evergreen growth which led up to

Montepiano between the already

committed E and G Companies.

After an unopposed advance of

over 400 yards, the platoon leader

became suspicious of a trap and

halted the platoon. At this point the

enemy opened up on the advance

elements with machine guns.

Heavy casualties incurred during

the previous fighting had brought

many replacements into the

platoon who were in their third

and fourth day of combat. One of

these was Private Howard E.

Weaver, who was acting as one of

the lead scouts of the 2nd Squad

which was in front of the platoon.

The initial burst from the German

guns passed directly over his head

and killed both the squad leader

and the assistant squad leader

behind him. The squad

immediately hesitated in its

advance and took cover. As the

men lay under the machine gun

fire in the evergreens the platoon

leader called over asking if there

were someone present who could

take command of the squad.

Private Weaver, on his fourth day of action, answered, “I’ll take over, sergeant. I know what to do.”

He got up in the face of the machine gun fire, reorganized the squad, steadied the men, and

continued the advance up the hill at the front of his squad. Entering a clump of bushes, Weaver

located a well-camouflaged enemy machine gun emplacement by exposing himself to the fire.

Cautiously crawling to within 35 yards of it, he pulled the pin out of a grenade and let fly. The

grenade hit and rolled into the position, killing one German and wounding another. After sending his

prisoner to the rear, Weaver gathered his squad and again started up the hill. A hundred yards

father another gun opened up. The action was repeated; Weaver exposed himself, located the gun,

threw a grenade, this time from 25 yards, and captured the gunner and his assistant. The squad

continued up the hill. Near the crest Weaver came to a road with a high bank which looked like good

cover for his men. Going forward alone to investigate, he walked down the road a bit. Here he

spotted a German sniper hidden in one of the trees. Weaver’s rifle cracked and the German tumbled

to the ground. He moved the squad into the cover of the bank and went forward again to investigate

a house on the crest of the ridge, the company’s objective. Entering the house he found two more

snipers whom he captured, making a total of two killed and five prisoners taken by Weaver

personally in the short time since he assumed command of the squad. Weaver was awarded the

Distinguished Service Cross for the action, and was later commissioned as a second lieutenant.

In answer to a call for a scout, Private Marvin D. England, who had also been in the platoon only four

days and was already leading the 1st Squad, moved forward. Although his platoon leader intended

that he only go a short way forward, England crawled on until he almost fell into an enemy machine

gun emplacement. For some reason the German gunners didn’t notice him, so England retreated

about 25 yards and lobbed a grenade into the position; destroying it. Upon his return to the platoon,

England led his squad farther up the hill where they encountered a second enemy gun. He left the

squad in the cover of one of the stream banks running down the slope and went forward alone. He

located the position, and destroyed it with another accurately placed grenade. The 1st Platoon, in

command of Staff Sergeant Ernest L. Johnson, had advanced even with the 2nd Platoon in its fight up

the slope towards Montepiano and, after taking a group of houses on the outskirts of the town of

Monghidoro just to the east of the hill, went inside to investigate. In the kitchen they found faggots

burning in the stone fireplace under a metal pot of water which was at the point of coming to boil. On

the table was a chicken all cleaned and ready for the pot. This was manna from Heaven to the ever

hungry GIs who had been existing on emergency K rations too long and were tired of them. The

Germans whom the platoon had chased out of the house left in such a hurry that they evidently forgot

to mention the fact to their headquarters, for presently a lone German runner came down to the

house with a message. Private Edward Poy, one of the guards, concealed himself until the runner was

at the door, then took him prisoner and brought him into the house. Shortly after this the guards

sighted a loaded pack train of three mules moving down the road, which Sergeant Johnson soon

brought under small-arms fire. “That was a sight,” he said. “We knocked one mule down and saw a

second take off. Two Krauts were trying to get the third mule across an open field to some cover. One

man was dragging on the reins for all he was worth while the other was pushing the mule just as hard

from the rear. They couldn’t budge him. We soon put a stop to that. After we had eliminated the

Jerries the mule made its way down the slope to our position – so we took it prisoner too.” When

inventory was taken the mule had donated 56 cans of salmon and sardines, 30 loaves of bread, 3

gallons of butter, and several cans of beef to the Allied cause. These were divided up between the

squads and the mule was given some water for its services. When the German runner was offered

some of the captured rations he refused, saying that he’d been eating that stuff too long and was tired

of it – he chose a K ration.

As the attack continued north of Villa

di Mezzo, however, F Company was

fired on by a strong German outpost

holding C. Trapoggio, a group of

buildings midway between the

company and Montepiano. F Company

returned the fire and a fierce fight

developed which lasted all the rest of

that day and far into the night during

which time the advance was held up

and six more Germans taken prisoner,

one of them wounded. With the

advance of the companies the 2nd

Battalion command post displaced

forward to a house located about 400

yards below the enemy-held

objective. Here it was subjected to

heavy artillery, mortar, machine-gun,

and sniper fire. The house was in such

an advantageous and exposed position

that Captain Henry Chase-Dunn,

attached liaison officer from the 347th

Field Artillery Battalion, was

supporting Companies E, F, and G in

their attack by directing artillery fire

from a window on the third floor of the

command post.

Small-arms fire was hitting the wall of

the house and occasionally the window

frame, the glass itself having long ago

succumbed to concussion. In fact

Chase-Dunn was several times

knocked away from the window by

exploding shells as he corrected much

needed fire on the bitterly resisting

enemy. The results of this fire direction prevented any effective German counterattack from forming

and also greatly disorganized the enemy defenses. Sometime during the early morning of October

2nd the German outpost holding up F Company from C. Trapoggio found it prudent to pull back and

join the rest of their outfit. With this pressure lessened, F Company pushed forward with E Company

and by 1:00 P.M. all three companies were forming a ring around Montepiano, had thrown back one

German attempt to counterattack, and were planning a coordinated attack on the objective for that

evening. As darkness closed in on Montepiano so did G Company from the south, F Company from

the southeast, and E Company from the east, behind a curtain of artillery fire. The enemy was

reluctant to give up this commanding terrain and fought bitterly, but the ring tightened yard by yard.

At 9:00 P.M. G Company radioed headquarters that the Regimental objectives had fallen. It was the

first company on top of Montepiano. Shortly after, Companies E and F made physical contact with G

Company and the hill was secured against counterattack.

The next morning after taking Montepiano, October 3rd, the 2nd Battalion had also attacked in a

column of companies, with a platoon of five tanks attached, headed for Roncastaldo, halfway between

Montepiano and Loiano. F Company led the way with Companies E and G following. By 11:35 A.M. F

Company was in Roncastaldo with orders to proceed up the road which ran through Roncastaldo and

secure the road junction where it joined the highway (Road Junction 714). All neighboring units were

approximately on the east-west line running through Roncastaldo and engineers had been as far

north as that on the highway without meeting any of the enemy. The road junction was secured by

nightfall, with the battalion command post moving to Ca di Bonzi. The 2nd Battalion, with the

exception of E Company, then occupied Loiano for the three days the Regiment was in reserve for

the division, shortly after it had been captured by the 362nd Infantry. During the rest, showers and

clothing exchanges were available. It was here in Loiano that Albert qualified as a Sharpshooter with

the M1 Garand rifle on October 5th, 1944. As the fall weather was becoming quite chilly, especially

after sundown, and there were frequent rains, wool sweaters, new field jackets, and sleeping bags

were issued, the latter for the first time.

On October 9th at 1:00 P.M. the Regiment moved out of the reserve areas into forward assembly

areas and prepared to attack with one battalion, at 6:00 A.M. the following morning, in a new sector

to the right of the highway and the 362nd Infantry. As the move was made in progress battalion and

company commanders were forward making a reconnaissance of the Division right sector where the

363rd Infantry was to assist the 338th Infantry in the capture of a 638-meter Mt. delle Formiche, then

push the attack northwest in the Division sector. By suppertime on October 9th the entire regiment

had closed in forward assembly areas. The terrain which faced the 91st Division in October was the

most precipitous of the whole Apennine area in the vicinity of Highway 65. On the highway was the

desperately defended town of Livergnano. Beginning at Livergnano on Highway 65 and extending

east for a distance of 2000 yards was an escarpment which averaged approximately 1500 feet in

height. This cliff was honey-combed with caves hollowed out by the natives and taken over by the

enemy for positions and living quarters; this, coupled with its almost vertical face and field of

observation, made a natural fortress with every advantage, and its admirable defense qualities were

exploited by the enemy in his delaying action. Almost as an extension of the escarpment, Mt. delle

Formiche, shaped like a huge ant hill, rose to the immediate east with the heavy-walled church of

Santa Maria di Zena on its peak. The escarpment dominated the territory east of the highway for

miles to the south. At the foot of the escarpment flowed a small stream, the Rio dei Cani, which

chopped up the gently rolling farmland immediately below into rough gullies and draws which were

pounded constantly by enemy mortars from atop the escarpment. Where the escarpment turned

north as it approached Formiche, so did the stream joining the tributary Zena and eventually flowing

into the Po River far to the north.

The 363rd Infantry, after extensive reconnaissance of the terrain, committed the 2nd Battalion on

October 10th in order to fulfill the mission of helping the 338th Infantry, 85th Division, on the right, in

the capture of Formiche. At 8:00 A.M. the morning of the attack E Company, followed by G Company

moved out of the assembly area near Barbarola towards the settlement of Fornace on the northwest-

southeast line of departure, contacted elements of the 338th Infantry, and with F Company on their left

rear pushed forward, meeting light enemy resistance. By noon the resistance began to increase

although by this time appreciable gains – up to 1100 yards – had been made. F Company was

proceeding to the farm Fornacetta where it was met by machine-gun and small-arms fire which held

up the advance. The 1st and 2nd Platoons immediately engaged the enemy in a fire fight to cover the

3rd Platoon as it moved up to outflank the farm and positions surrounding it. One man, while closing

in on the house, was shot in the head as he ran across an open stretch but was found to be still alive

by the aid man, Staff Sergeant Arthur L. Godfrey, who ran 50 yards through machine-gun and rifle

fire to his side when he saw him fall. After dragging him to a shell hole and giving first aid, Godfrey

pulled the wounded man out of the hole and dragged him back the 50 yards out of the danger zone

alone to where he could be evacuated to the aid station by litter team. This was the only casualty.

F Company then moved forward

to continue the attack in the left

half of the battalion sector at 3:35

P.M. towards Bigallo. This lone

farmhouse was located in the

shadow of the escarpment where

the cliffs turned north to follow the

Zena stream bed. It was one of the

places which was strategically

important to the enemy defending

one of the two possible routs

which would eventually lead

troops above the escarpment. The

other route led straight up over

the escarpment. By 8:50 P.M.,

however, F Company’s daylight

attack against Bigallo was held up

and Lieutenant Colonel John W.

Angell, commanding the 2nd

Battalion, requested permission to

attack further under cover of

darkness using two companies

abreast, F Company on the left to

continue for Bigallo, and E

Company on the right. At 9:00

P.M. the attack started. Five and a

half hours later an F Company

patrol had reached Bigallo.

With the substantial 363rd Infantry

gains that had been made in

flanking Formiche, the 338th

Infantry secured positions well

forward on that hill by dark on

October 12th, and although Formiche was still very much in enemy hands, the mission assigned to the

2nd Battalion, 363rd Infantry had been completed and it was ordered to assemble in the vicinity of Ca

Parisi as Regimental reserve by 5:00 P.M., October 13th. On October 16th the 2nd Battalion was

brought up from reserve and F Company took over the C Company positions on Hill 368 while the

rest of the Regiment continued the attack. Eventually the Regimental objectives were achieved and F

Company, along with the entire 2nd Battalion, was moved to reserve areas below the escarpment. In

their reserve positions below the escarpment the 2nd Battalion, along with the entire 363rd Infantry

Regiment, was getting a well deserved rest. For two weeks they had been on the go, under the

mental and physical strain of combat, had received few hot meals because of the poor roadnet

combined with the rainy weather, and had no means of relaxation except an occasional cigarette.

Now they were able to take showers, see moving pictures, and drink beer. Rations of candy, toilet

articles, and clean clothes were available – but the main thing was the chance to relax. The supply

road which was used by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions was in very bad condition due to the continued

rains and excessive usage.

Therefore, on October 28th, the two battalions moved to more easily accessible areas near Barbarola.

These positions were to be employed for counterattack in case of a German breakthrough; In

addition they possessed more houses in which men could be billeted. The regiment then received

orders to contact the 135th Infantry of the 34th Division with the view of taking over their positions just

to the west of the 361st Infantry highway area the night of November 1st, 1944.

The Winter Line

The relief of the 135th Infantry in the

defensive positions to the left of the

highway went off smoothly and

without casualties by 10:00 P.M.,

November 1st, and for the first time

since entering combat the 363rd

Infantry was not attacking. Very little

enemy fire fell in the area during the

change; obviously the enemy never

expected a relief of units that night.

Once in the new positions (the

2ndBattalion, 363rd Infantry relieved

the 3rd Battalion, 135th Infantry), a

plan was set up based on the

information that the Regiment would

be taken off the line around

November 20th. The 1st and 3rd

Battalions would each be in reserve

in Anconella for ten days, and,

although the 2nd Battalion, now

commanded by Major George

Kotchik, would remain on line, it

would rotate one company to a

Regimental rest camp set up in the

town of Loiano every five days. Both the reserve position in Anconella and the rest camp at Loiano

provided opportunities for showers, clothing exchange, and respite from combat. This plan was

carried through.

The regimental sector, approximately a mile in width to the west of the highway and Livergnano, was

organized defensively with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions on line. The 2nd battalion had E and G

Companies on line from right to left, with F Company in reserve. Running diagonally across the new

Regimental front was the Savena River, normally a peaceful and well behaved stream about the size

of a medium creek and capable of being waded easily. The last days of October and the first of

November, however, were abnormally cloudy and rainy, and the Savena, swollen to twice its width

and depth, became a raging torrent. According to the amount of rain the stream would day by day

range from a sweeping body of water 50 to 70 feet wide to rapids with sharp rocks jutting above the

surface, making foot-bridges impractical.

Harassing missions were fired at night on trails and locations known to be used by the enemy either

for resupply or as outpost positions. The enemy, of course, was doing the same thing, and the days

melted into each other with a steady diet of watching and firing artillery at the enemy all day and

receiving some of his artillery in return; at night, going out on a patrol to probe and see whether this

or that house was occupied by Germans, or to occupy an outpost position and beat off an enemy

attempt to probe the 363rd Infantry lines. Sleeping was done in between. Usually the positions were

in at least platoon strength. From these platoon positions outposts were stationed to observe and

guard against attack. Shifts were changed at night. Any movement at all in the Regimental sector had

to be done after dark, or receive enemy artillery and reveal troop positions. As far back as

Anconella, where the reserve battalion and the Regimental command post were located, daylight

movement was kept to a minimum.

The road to the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, which passed through Anconella, then forked, one branch

going to La Valle, the other to Villa le Croce, had at the fork a road guard who saw that no one,

regardless of rank or importance of mission, went any farther toward the front lines. The reason for

this was not only that whoever traveled the road in daylight would draw artillery and long-range

machine-gun fire, but also that the enemy would lay harassing missions on the road after dark and

would suspect the strength with which the sector was held. After dark the road was used to resupply

the forward battalions. Jeeps and trailers of the respective companies formed into small convoys

under the battalion S-4 (supply officer). They carried hot supper, cold rations or groceries from

which breakfast and lunch the next day could be cooked (by those units fortunate enough to be in

such a position that it was safe and practical to have their kitchens right with them) ammunition, new

shoes for those who had worn theirs out, new socks for all, perhaps another machine gun to replace

one which had been hit by shell fragments, batteries for the radios, and of course the eagerly

awaited mail and the daily Stars and Stripes. After delivering the supplies and picking up the list of

what was needed the following night, the convoy would return to the kitchen area near Service

Company at Loiano on the highway.

When E Company completed the five

days at the Loiano rest camp it came

back on line, relieving F Company on

the extreme right of the Regimental

area and taking over the positions at

Ca dei Boschi, i Lagla, Hill 375, and

Monte San Ansano on the night of

November 9th, 1944. F Company then

went to Loiano for five days, and upon

its return relieved G Company at Le

Fosse, Campuzzano, Hill 413, and i

Balzi on the left of the 2nd Battalion

sector. On November 17th, Field

Order No. 28, Headquarters 91st

Division, was received, calling for the

relief of the 363rd Regiment by

elements of the 1st Armored Division

on November 21-22-23-24, and plans were made for the change. The 2nd Battalion was relieved by

companies of the 14th Armored Infantry on the night of November 23rd, and joined the 1st Battalion at

a rest center at Montecatini by noon the following day, after an uncomfortable but uneventful eighty-

mile ride.

The Fifth Army rest center here was before the war one of the most frequented health resorts in Italy,

boasting over 60,000 persons a year coming to visit the thermal baths and springs which had been in

use since the fourteenth century. Previous rests were limited to reserve areas in the field, but this

time the Regiment was far from the front lines and in a good-sized city with facilities for a reasonable

amount of comfort. The infantrymen, used to slit trenches or at best a liberated and unusually

tumbledown farmhouse, now enjoyed the luxury of sleeping on cots in nineteen different hotels and

buildings. The rest period began officially on November 24th and was scheduled to last ten days–the

first four strictly for relaxation and freshening up, the remaining days for a six-hour daily training and

rehabilitation course after which the renewal of acquaintances, dancing, parties, movies, shopping

and taking advantage of the hot baths continued.

Highlight of the rest period was the Thanksgiving Day celebration, held two days late on Saturday,

November 25th, so that the cooks would have time to prepare. Mess sergeants, cooks, and their

helpers labored all day Friday and all Friday night in cleaning and roasting 4,375 pounds of turkey in

the hotel ovens. Menus included, besides roast turkey: sage dressing, cranberry sauce, mashed

potatoes, giblet gravy, creamed asparagus, fresh peas, creamed corn, sweet potatoes, walnut cake,

apple, pumpkin, hot mince, or pineapple cream pies, nuts, hard candy, hot rolls and biscuits, coffee,

tea or wine. While the regiment was in Montecatini, numerous passes were granted for visits to

Florence, Rome, Leghorn and Pisa. This was the first time in several weeks that a Rome quota had

been offered, and the first time that enlisted men were permitted to visit the Eternal City. Besides

entertainment and amusement, however, there was also serious training from 8:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

daily, emphasizing useful and practical subjects. The schedule included preparation and use of

range cards, the making of overlays and sketches, field hygiene, German and American mines and

booby traps, laying a hasty minefield, artillery fire-control methods, radio procedure and message

writing, small unit tactics, tactics of the German Army, first aid, radio theory, switchboard operation,

Loiano, Bologna, Emilia-Romagna, Italy

code practice, wire ties and splices, voice procedure, use of winter clothing, range firing, close-

order drill, military discipline, marches and physical training. The training continued until December

3rd. Despite the pleasures of the rest center, the war had not been forgotten and plans were being

studied for an attack whose objective was the city of Bologna, the Po Valley, and the end of the war in

Italy. A quartering party was sent to Villanova on December 2nd to prepare for the Regiment’s move

from Montecatini, and by 5:00 p.m. on December 4th the 363rd Infantry had closed in.

The attack order, issued December 5th, advised that II Corps would attack in conjunction with IV

Corps and British XIII Corps with the maximum of initial surprise and in such strength so as to seize

the objectives assigned rapidly and hold them securely against the inevitable early strong enemy

counterattacks, then continue to man successive positions until the subsequent objectives were

secure. The 91st Division would attack on D plus 1 at H-hour (both as yet unnamed) with two

regiments abreast, the 363rd Infantry on the right, 362nd Infantry on the left. The 363rd Infantry would

assemble near the town of La Guarda then attack through the unit then holding the line to the

immediate west of the highway towards Mt. Posigliano. While the regiments made plans for the

attack and the repulsing of the counterattacks throughout the following two weeks, the training

schedule continued. Three firing ranges were set up near where the 363rd Infantry had cracked the

Gothic Line three months earlier. Monticelli Range was used for all weapons, East Range primarily

for small arms, and West Range for mortars, on days when the weather, which continued generally

cloudy and cold, with an occasional light hail or snowfall, permitted.

Christmas week the mail began to arrive by the truckloads. An evergreen tree was cut and trimmed

with colored lights; a sign read “Merry Christmas from the men and officers of the 363rd Infantry”.

Holly wreaths decorated windows, tents, and mantelpieces. A loudspeaker amplified Christmas

hymns and carols and a Christmas formation was planned for December 23rd, but an order for the

Regiment to move up to La Guarda the afternoon of December 24th and attack through the 361st

Infantry caused all Christmas activities to be moved up for twenty-four hours. The formation was

cancelled. The traditional holiday dinner of golden brown roast turkey with chestnut dressing and

giblet gravy, creamed mashed potatoes, candied yams, buttered green beans, and peas, hot mince

pie, fruit cake, coffee, chocolate, wine and cigars was served at noon on December 24th. Prior to this

the personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply sections had moved up the highway to La Guarda

and Loiano for reconnaissance and planning for the move and quartering of the Regiment.

Reconnaissance for the attack had been carried on by the battalion commanders and their staffs and

company commanders since the receipt of the first attack order. In fact, a group of men had been

moved forward to Loiano at that time under Lieutenant Fabian E. Allen, for the purpose of

gathering more information of the enemy for the Regiment’s future attack. Every patrol sent out

by the Division in the last two weeks in December was made up entirely or in part of 363rd

Infantrymen. Before the remainder of the Regiment could move out the afternoon of December 24th,

however, Lieutenant Shaw called back from Division headquarters (then located south of Loiano),

saying that a change in plans had been made and the 363rd Infantry was to remain at Villanova

pending the issue of a new Division field order. This was good news to the squads, platoons and

companies getting ready to board trucks for the cold forty-mile ride to the lines, so they took off their

packs and prepared to celebrate a second holiday on Christmas Day. The festivities were repeated.

Two days after Christmas the expected field order was received at Villanova, instructing the 363rd

Infantry to reassume control of the sector it had vacated to the 1st Armored Division, and again

occupy defensive positions. The 363rd Infantry moved from Villanova up Highway 65, where well-

forward supply dumps and installations including field hospitals told the story of the intended all-out

attack which was not yet to be. The night of December 27th the 2nd Battalion moved to Anconella

prepared to execute the counterattack plans which had been readied. All elements of the Regiment

were in position by 1:00 a.m., December 28th; the only incident of the relief was that it was carried

out under light enemy machine-gun and mortar fire which caused no casualties. Control of the area

was assumed at 7:00 a.m., as ordered. Again the daytime observation and engagement of the enemy

by mortar, cannon, and artillery, and the

nighttime patrolling were resumed.

Supplies continued to be brought up only at

night and all daylight movement was kept at

a minimum. The supply crews took about

two hours for a round trip to one of the

outposts and on the way encountered

obstacles of every sort ranging from enemy

patrol actions to snow and ice. In many

places the paths narrowed to a few feet

separating a steep embankment from a

sharp cliff, and a slip there meant that either

a man or his load of K rations or water,

perhaps both, would go over the cliff.

Contact was maintained each night with the

units to the left and right by the nearest company, and internal contact was kept between companies.

Usually this was done by patrol. An unusual application of smoke for screening purposes at night by

the enemy was forced by the moonlight reflected brilliantly off the white snow. This, coupled with

the “artificial moonlight” of the Allies-many strong searchlights directed over the enemy’s lines at an

angle until the entire front looked like a gigantic Hollywood premiere-made the landscape as bright

as day and the use of smoke at night quite logical. The artificial moonlight, of course, could be turned

off when it interfered with patrol or supply activity.

While enemy patrolling had been active up to date, very little probing activity was felt the nights of

December 30th & 31st, and the Germans had a reason for it. Only two enemy patrols were seen and

these made no effort at concealment but were careful to do their patrolling in places where they

couldn’t be engaged by artillery. The night of December 30th the Germans had quietly set up a loud-

speaker in front of B Company’s positions. At about 9:00 p.m. with a martial air as background, a

voice in English welcomed the 363rd Infantry back to the line-by name. However, Lieutenant Charles

Murphy of B Company got several of his men together and outlined a plan for a little ambush party to

be held at 9:00 p.m., December 31st. The broadcast the second night was a half hour late, but from

the same positions as the night before. “Men of the 363rd------,” the voice began. Hand grenades

exploded around the loud-speaker thrown by Murphy and his ambush party, and the voice ceased.

The music had been spoiled for the night, but there were certainly enough fireworks to please the

men of the 363rd Infantry. Promptly at midnight, when 1945 began, the Germans started to fire all

small-arms weapons in their possession up in the air, presenting the allies with a startling and

beautiful pattern of red and orange tracers against the black sky and, also with that, the exact

position of every machine gun and rifle that fired. A few minutes later, while the display was still

sketching designs in the night, the 347th Field Artillery opened fire at the revealed positions of

Germans. With the 91st Division having what the enemy probably considered a perverted sense of

humor as evident by their directing fireworks at them, the celebration quieted down somewhat, but

not altogether.

As prisoners were extremely scarce – none had been taken by the 363rd Infantry since October 24th –

the Division Intelligence Officer had called Regiment earlier in the afternoon saying that a II Corps

order had been issued directing that two prisoners a week would be taken by each regiment on line.

On January 1st, 1945 F Company went into 2nd Battalion reserve in Anconella, until the night of

January 4th, when F Company, with one platoon of H Company, relieved the positions across the

Savena River occupied by L Company which marched back to Anconella and assumed the reserve

mission. The platoon of heavy machine guns which had been attached to F Company reverted back

to 2nd Battalion control.

Just before midnight on January 6th, 1945, a

German patrol of eight to ten men approached

the La Piana outpost of F Company and

opened fire. Visibility at the time was about 15

yards – hardly the optimum for rifle accuracy.

The outpost commander contacted a mortar

battalion firing supporting missions from

Molinelli and requested 4.2-inch and 60mm

mortar fire within 100 yards of his position. A

repetition of three white phosphorus shells

every few minutes fired in rapid succession

illuminated the outpost area sufficiently for the

F Company infantrymen to spot the enemy in

the light and drive them off with effectively aimed rifle fire. F Company was then attached to the 3rd

Battalion, as the 2nd Battalion was placed in reserve. The first indication that the 363rd Infantry was to

come off the line was through information received on January 16th, that the Regiment would go back

to Villanova for six days then to the rest center at Montecatini for seven days, but later word put the

Regiment in the vicinity of Monghidoro and Piamaggio instead of Villanova for the first six days to

work on defenses for the Intermediate Line followed by seven days at Montecatini then six days at

Villanova. F Company reverted to 2nd Battalion control when 3rd Battalion reached their assembly

area at 11:30 p.m. on the night of January 23rd.

As relieved, the 363rd Infantry battalions moved into assembly areas along the lateral road running

west from Ca del Costa and Highway 65 past Montepiano to Farne. Here they spent the six days

digging gun and personal emplacements, laying barbed wire and planting mines as part of the

Intermediate Line before closing into Montecatini by 3:00 p.m., January 31st. There was no training at

Montecatini. A quartering party left Montecatini on February 5th to prepare for the Regiment’s move

to the town and vicinity of Gagliano between Villanova and Scarperia the following two days for a

six-day period of training. The 363rd Infantry then relieved the 133rd Infantry, 34th Division of its

positions to the east of Monte Belmonte and the escarpment in the Idice River valley, which was

scheduled for the night of February 12 – 13.

The territory into which the 363rd Infantry now moved was bisected by the Idice River, a shallow,

winding stream flowing north past the east side of Mt. delle Formiche, and in some places as wide as

100 yards. To get to the sector it was necessary to go up the highway to the town of Filigare, where II

Corps had its command post and turn right on “Easy Street”, a rough, twisting, climbing,

descending, corduroyed, gravel and mud engineering miracle that had been constructed to lead

those areas off the main supply route, Highway 65. Its name satirized both the conditions under

which it was built and the experience of riding over it. The Idice Valley area in which the 363rd

Infantry found itself after traveling the five roller-coaster miles of Easy Street was known familiarly as

Death Valley. It was a drab, weary, war-torn, muddy, colorless, desolate streambed through which

the road sometimes led, at other times climbing the slate-grey cliffs through which the road

sometimes led, at other times climbing the slate-grey cliffs which bordered the stream and crossing

over more Baileys that bridged gaps blown by the Germans in the road shelf. Although the Idice was

now shallow and narrow it had recently overflown its banks and upon receding had left a foot of

thick, gooey mud over everything in the valley. In this mud and scattered throughout the area was

the debris of war – cardboard shell containers, German Riegel, Teller and Schü mines which had

been placed in the bed against the Allies using it as a route of tank approach, and which were now

stuck in the mud at odd angles, parts of planes that had crashed, a German body or part of one just

uncovered, dead branches and small tree trunks washed along, then let high when the water

receded. The 2nd Battalion was on the western sector, with the stream generally acting as the

boundary.

F Company had one platoon in C. Colina, one in Poggio, and one between Poggio and C. Ronco

Coresa just north of Mt. delle Vigna and Mt. Ceresa. At this point the regiment was facing elements of

the 576th Regiment of the German 305th Division, which had relieved its brother, the 578th Regiment,

the night of February 3 – 4. The 5th Company, 576th Grenadier Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant

Schindler, was located at C. Carrara where twenty men with one light machine gun and two heavy

machine guns formed the company command post. Three outposts were placed 300 yards south of

the command post – which put them close to the Company E positions around Hill 368 and the F

Company positions at C. Collina. These outposts consisted of one group of 6 men armed with a light

machine gun in addition to personal weapons, a second group of 14 men with two light machine guns

in addition to personal weapons, and a third group of 36 men, weapons other than personal weapons

unknown. The 3rd Company was to the west of the 5th Company, with the 2nd Company outposting Hill

357 just west of the F Company positions at C. Collina.

While daylight observation and firing was carried on and night patrols probed for more information,

the plans for the raids on the known enemy positions were worked over and changed as new

information and intelligence was accumulated. On the night of February 15th, four listening posts

were set up and contacts were maintained between companies. Two Intelligence and

Reconnaissance Platoon men confirmed the reported enemy positions on hill 357 near the F

Company C. Collina outpost by drawing fire and allowing the Germans to roll hand grenades down

on them. A short time later the enemy placed three rounds of 120mm mortar within 40 yards of

Collina and sent a patrol estimated at three men armed with a machine pistol and rifles and

supported by the mortars to harass the position. F Company took up the fight and dispersed the

patrol with rifle and the company mortar fire, starting a fire about 200 yards north of the platoon’s

positions. One man was heard moaning in the darkness. Then the moaning stopped. It was believed

that the friendly mortar fire had hit the German ammunition which had been brought forward with

the mortars which supported the attack. The next morning an enemy body could be seen lying

where the action had taken place the night before and arrangements were made to recover it as soon

as it got dark. This body proved to be that of a German first lieutenant of infantry, but contained no

front-line unit markings or military information of importance. On the night of February 16 – 17, a

Company G patrol prepared to attack the German 5th company’s six-man bunker northeast of Collina

to take prisoners. They encountered a German 15 – 20 man patrol between the 5th and F Companies’

outposts and a firefight ensued. The Company G patrol leader fired a flare for prearranged

supporting mortar fire to be laid on the area and withdrew his patrol. His flare must have been the

same color that the Germans were using for the same purpose because immediately after both

Poggio and Collina, F Company outposts, received a heavy mortaring. There were no casualties

suffered from it and the patrol returned safely under the protection of friendly mortars.

On the night of February 18th, while routine contact patrols and five listening posts went out at night

reporting no enemy contact, each accomplishing its mission, the F Company platoon at Poggio was

hit by four enemy bazooka rounds and some small-arms fire, including a machine pistol, from a

German patrol out looking for a fight. F Company retaliated with a barrage from its company mortars

directed on the enemy from the outpost just north of Collina, quieting the German fire. No casualties

resulted in Poggio from this attack but the F Company outpost which had adjusted the mortar

barrage on the enemy patrol was just returning to platoon headquarters in Collina when enemy

mortars hit the town, killing two of the men and wounding a third. Again at 5:50 a.m. the Germans

threw in a mortar concentration between E and F Companies, seriously wounding a man from E

Company who died as he was being carried to an aid station.

Arrangements were made for relief of the 2nd Battalion by the 3rd Battalion, set for the night of

February 27 – 28. This was carried through, and the 2nd Battalion reverted to Regimental reserve in

the towns of Molinetto and Fiumetto. F Company was relieved by K Company. Word was then

received on March 13th that the Regiment was to be relieved the nights of March 21 – 22 – 23 and that

as much information as possible was to be translated into Italian. The Regiment would move back to

the Sieve River Valley for training purposes as instructed in the movement order which arrived

March 17. The move to the Sieve Valley was made without incident, the Regiment closing into the

new area early the morning of March 23rd, getting to work pitching the hospital ward tents which

were allotted one to a platoon. The bivouac area was to the west of Highway 65 and Villanova along

the Villanova-Barberino road bordering the Sieve River.

The Po Valley Campaign

The training at Barberino in the Sieve Valley was pointed toward the day of the attack, the

breakthrough of the defenses which the Germans had been improving since the last of October five

months before, and a rapid infantry-armor thrust across the Po River Valley. Conferences,

demonstrations and practical work with tank and infantry assault teams were arranged with the

tankers who would be with the regiment in the attack, a plan which proved to be of inestimable value

later on when the push materialized. Work in all phases of the attack in cluded company raids, rapid

movements and control, aggressive night patrolling, jumpoffs from the line of departure, movement

through minefields, siezure of objectives, attack of houses, close combat including the bayonet,

combat orders and orientaton.

A schedule for showers was set up with each company

having a half day per week open time to be used for that

purpose. Nightly moving pictures were shown either at

the 1st or 2nd Battalion areas, both of which had natural

outdoor ampitheatres. A softball league was formed and

passes were available to the rest centers at Montecatini,

Florence and Rome. Easter Sunday was April 1, 1945,

marked by typical warm sunny spring weather which had

blessed the training and free time with a noticeable

absence of rain. After dinner D’Artega and his all-girl

orchestra, a USO musical and variety show which had

been playing at the Apollo Theater and Fifth Army rest

center in Florence, entertained the Regiment. A stage was

constructed by the engineers of the 1st Battalion for the

occasion.

The training continued until April 7, 1945 when the order was issued instructing the Regiment to

relieve the 362nd Infantry astride the highway north of Livergnano the night of April 9 – 10, 1945.

After moving up by truck the 3rd Battalion occupied the right of the sector and the 2nd Battalion the

left while the 1st remained in reserve. The 363rd Infantry found itself in the same sector it had

occupied five months earlier when the drive up the highway had stopped. This sector’s west

boundary ran generally north-south 800 yards west of the highway, the other boundary running

paralell about 1500 hundred yards east of the highway.The battalions were seperated by the Rio

Cavinzano, a stream which flowed north on the eastern side of the highway until it passed through

Chow line

the town of Zula on the highway and curved right to include the larger town of Pianoro in the west, or

2nd Battalion sector, before veering across the highway to the northwest.

The 347th Field Artillery Battalion, C Company of the 316th Engineers and C Company of the 316th

Medical Battalion were in direct support of the 363rd. The highway up which the 2nd Battalion was to

atack followed a ridge linbbe to the town of Zula and the lateral road; from there 1000 yards beyond

the most forward outposts the ridge continued northeast on the east of the highway while the road

itself curved down and ran along the western slope of the ridge descending near Pianoro to the

Savena River Valley floor and following the stream north towards Bologna seven miles away – in

sight from the higher peaks in the vicinity. At Villa None, several houses overlooking Pianoro from

the west side of the river and highway, the Florence-Bologna railroad emerged from a long tunnel

and generally paralleled the highway north.

The 363rd Infantry, even before it had come back to the line for the push, had been given the job of

making the main effort for the 91st Infantry Division by attacking up and clearing the highway, the

main and practically the only supply route forward. This entailed taking the high ground, the ridge

along which the road ran, and the extension of the ridge after the road cut off to Pianoro and the

north where it commanded the highway and Pianoro up to the highest part and objective, Mt. Arnigo.

The objectives leading to Mt. Arnigo and the town of Pianoro were echeloned along this ridge cutting

diagonally across the highway north of Livergnano. In the 2nd Battalion sector on the left along the

highway were Hill 367, the southern slope already occupied by elements of Company E (Objective

#1), Hill 387, 400 yards north on the ridge (Objective #2), Hill 357 an equal distance farther north

where the road made a hairpin turn to go around it (Objective #3) and the town of Pianoro 1200

yards north on the highway (Objective #7), the ultimate objective in the first phase of the 2nd

Battalion’s attack.

Mt. Arnigo was the answer to the whole attack. Situated as it was as the last high ground on the

northeast-southwest ridge line, the mountain not only commanded Pianoro, the highway to the south,

and the ground to the south and west including the Savena River bed for miles, but also controlled

the terrain over which the infantry would have to attack from the lateral road north on the east side of

the ridge line, the Rio Cavinzano bed and the naked rolling slopes leading up to the objectives on

the ridge. With this knowledge it was natural that the mountain should be the principal objective of

the main effort of the 91st Division’s attack. When Arnigo fell the town of Pianoro just west of it and

behind the ridge would be untenable, because Arnigo looked right down upon it and for the

Germans to remain inside the town and have American fire poured down on them would be plain

suicide. With Arnigo and the town cleared of enemy the highway would become usable as the main

supply route north, and as the ground from Arnigo fell off into the beginning of the Po Valley to the

immediate north it again would not be good terrain for the enemy to defend and the main road to

Bologna and the Po Valley would be opened. Furthermore, the fall of Arnigo would open the back

door to Mt. Adone facing the 361st Infantry to the west because Arnigo looked down upon the

German-held territory behind Adone. Arnigo was the last mountain between the 363rd Infantry

Division and the end of the war.

Facing the 363rd Infantry and defending the ridge were elements of the German 65th Infantry Division

composed of the 145th, 146th, and 147th Infantry Regiments, a fusilier battalion and possibly an

engineer battalion as fighting troops. The 91st Division intelligence summary issued prior to the

attack reported that according to one prisoner taken from the unit, all rifle companies were re-

organized into two platoons of 28 men each. One of these platoons was the assault platoon and was

equipped with machine pistols; the other platoon had three light machine guns. It was attempted to

have as many Faustpatronen (rocket grenades for use against tanks) as possible with each company.

A heavy-machine gun platoon operated under battalion headquarters and the anti-tank guns were

replaced with bazookas, wile the fusilier battalion had been given more armament and assumed

purely an infantry function. This division was the one which failed to halt the breakout from the Anzio

beachhead. It had fought a delaying action past Rome and the Arno River to the position along

theArnigo ridge where it had been since the previous October when the Allied push was held up,

with frequent periods out of the line. During its appearances at the front the 65th Infantry Division

suffered heavily in losses but the flow of replacements seemed to be sufficient to restore the desired

strength to the organization.

The 91st Division’s plan of attack called for the 363rd Infantry on the right to make the main effort,

securing Mt. Arnigo. With this first phase of the attack completed, it was to continue the attack north

with two regiments abreast without pause, on II Corps order. On the left of the 91st Division was the

88th Division. D-Day was set for April 16, 1945, H-Hour at 3 am. From the time that the Regiment

occupied the positions on line the night of April 9, 1945, activity was confined to the perfection of fire

and attack plans; the removal of friendly minefields as far forward as possible; the preparation of

both Highway 65 and the route from Ontanetta to Barchetta by C Company of the 316th Engineers so

that armor could be brought forward to the front lines; and constant aggressive patrolling to

determine the strength of the enemy, the location of his units, and to keep advised of the possibility

of an organized German withdrawl prior to H-Hour.

Artillery fires began the night of April

11, 1945, when Corps and Division

artillery expended 2484 rounds as the

beginning of a week-long series of

deceptive barrages to confuse the

enemy as to the time and place of the

attack which they could not help but

know was coming. After the

preparation, flares were sent up to

simulate the signal for attack. All the

fires of the Division were massed to

support the infantry. The three

battalions of 105mm howitzers of

Division Artillery were augmented by

fires of the 757th Tank Battalion, one

company of the 804th Tank Destroyer

Battalion, one company of the 100th Chemical Mortar Battalion and one battery of the 432nd Anti-

aircraft Artillery Battalion. The Cannon company and all mortars and machine guns of the reserve

362nd Infantry were initially emplaced for the maximum support of the two attacking regiments. In

addition to these the Division shared with the 88th Division on the left the support of the 432nd Field

Artillery Group (Corps Artillery), made up of 155mm “Long Toms”, 240 mm and 8-inch howitzers. All

these fires were coordinated, with each gun having targets and each target, known or suspected,

Allied Artillery – Po Valley, Italy – April 1945

April 1945

being covered by fire. Maps of enemy positions and emplacements were kept carefully up to date

with flash reports and aerial photographs.

The jumpoff was also to be supported by air attacks. On April 15, 1945 756 heavy bombers were to

bomb targets along Highways 65 and 64 to the west, while 300 medium bombers targeted enemy

gun positions in the sectors of the 88th and 91st Divisons. The first day of the attack, April 16, 1945, the

heavies were to repeat while concentrated fighter-bomber attacks were to be made on Mounts

Arnigo, Adone and Posigliano southwest of Pianoro. First priority for air missions was accorded to

the Division on the first day of the attack and the air-ground liaison jeep, Rover Joe, was assigned to

each of the two assaulting regiments.

By dark on April 15 all plans for the attack by the Regiment were completed. The offensive which was

destined to break through the enemy’s defense lines, pour out into the Po Valley and end the war in

Italy was about to begin. At 2 am on April 16, 1945 the tremendous artillery preperation began. For

the first fifteen minutes a saturation of all targets was fired, with a half hour of close-in counter-mortar

fires on 61 special targets, and fifteen minutes more on all targets, none of which received less than

30 rounds. All ammunition rationing was lifted and the Division Artillery alone fired 3911 rounds on

the 162 targets; added to this was the Cannon Company’s fires, mortar concentrations, Corps and

adjacent unit artillery, tanks and tank destroyers, the Anti-tank Company weapons, 57mm guns and

.50 caliber machine guns, the heavy machine guns of the weapons companies and the mortars and

light machine guns of the rifle companies themselves.

The first indication of attack was the gun flashes lighting up the horizon at 2 am as the prepatory fires

began, then the brighter, closer bursts of flame as shells found their targets in enemy territory, the

guns patterning across the face of the German-held hills and ridges, the mortars the rear. A .50

caliber machine gun opened fire a few seconds before 3 am, its tracers stitching red and orange

across the jet-black sky, seeming to go slower and slower and almost stop as they reached the peak

of their trajectory. Others joined. Then the heavy and light machine guns opened up, their bright

tracers interweaving and crossing against the night.

The riflemen wet their lips, looked at one another in the dark, and moved forward across the

Regimental front. The 363rd’s Companies E and G along the highway and Companies L and I to the

east of the highway were met by strong enemy fire and minefields as they began their advance. L

Company on the left of the 3rd Battalion zone lost its 1st Platoon leader before it had advanced a

hundred yards toward its objective. F Company, initially in reserve for the 2nd Battalion, moved up

between Companies E and G but by 1 pm all forward movement of the battalion was halted with an

increase of enemy artillery and mortar fire, and because the companies (with the exception of F

Company) had expended almost all their ammunition in the morning’s fighting.

Darkness fell on April 16, 1945 with very little gain against the stubborn resistance and strong enemy

defenses. Casualties were high and only one of the objectives larger than company size had been

taken. Plans were made that night for Companies E and F to launch a simultaneous attack at 11 pm

against Hills 367 and 387 respectively, to extend the line across the highway north of Osteria Nuova,

thus straightening out the front which curved dangerously on the left, then to continue the attack

along the ridge. The companies were now disposed across the Regimental front diagonally from

southwest to northeast, with F Company positioned on the highway about 200 yards north of Hill 367.

On April 17 the 2nd Battalion jumped off at 7:30 am. F Company was positioned in the center of the

battalion sector between Companies E and G. The companies moved toward Hill 387 (Objective #2)

after a friendly artillery barrage had cleared it of German forces. F Company then immediately

occupied Hill 387, where they improved their positions and dug in. After consolidation of the newly

won objectives the companies prepared to continue the attack up the highway to Pianoro the

following morning, April 18, at 4 am.

On April 18, 1945, F Company was

situated in the vicinity of several

unnamed houses on the west side

of the highway near Hill 387 and

500 yards from Zula. Along with

the 361st Infantry on its left the 2nd

Battalion continued its attack at 4

am against Pianoro, with F

Company on the left, G Company

on the right and E Company in

reserve, under an exchange of

enemy and friendly artillery and a

mortar duel, some of which

landed in the midst of the two

companies. F Company was west

of the highway with G Company

on the east. The attack moved

slowly forward in the darkness

while tanks were moving up the

lateral road to Zula, swept the

night before, to support the

infantrymen. By the time F

Company had approached a small

draw 200 yards north of the house

Roncobiancano in the Savena

River bed 1000 yards south of

Pianoro, the tanks were in position

and firing in support of both

battalions. Along the highway, the

2nd Battalion was making

progress. Although contact with G

Company was temporarily lost,

wounded returning along the

evacuation channel thought the

company had gained about 400

yards and was in the area

somewhere around Cantoneria 2,

the hostelry on the highway 500

yards south of Pianoro, and were meeting resistance. F Company, jumping off from Roncobiancano

at 10 am, sent a patrol west to the Savena streambed to look for a mine-free crossing site. The patrol

found no mines and was followed by the 2nd Platoon, leading the remainder of the company which

moved across the stream on an enemy built footbridge north of Roncobiancano and secured a small

group of houses 500 yards southwest of Pianoro without resistance. The company command post

which moved into the houses immediately after their capture, however, was subjected to a heavy

shelling for over an hour from enemy tanks which later proved to be located half a mile farther north

at Villa None overlooking Pianoro. From these houses the 2nd Platoon pushed forward for Villa None

where they came under fire from three houses there, the trenches and dugouts surrounding them,

and the mouth of the Florence-Bologna railroad tunnel just beyond in addition to the tank fire coming

from the farm yard. Here they fought until dark without making much headway. The town of Pianoro

itself had already fallen to G Company, but F Company was still fighting for the village of Villa None

just northwest of Pianoro.

At 10 pm on April 18, 1945 F Company was still bucking the strongly fortified houses and receiving

telling fire from the two Sturmgeschütze tanks in the farm yard. The 1st Squad of the 2nd Platoon set up

a base of fire under the direction of platoon leader McKelvey while the platoon guide Sergeant Lake

grabbed a bazooka and five rounds of ammo and went forward alone. The other two squads were

dispatched in a flanking maneuver to try to get around the fortifications. The 3rd Platoon, commanded

by Lieutenant Borrett, had moved into the center while the 1st Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant

Weaver, came up on the right flank when the 2nd Platoon was originally stopped. Villa None was on a

high hill overlooking the destruction that was Pianoro on Highway 65. Beyond to the east, massive,

rambling, pockmarked Arnigo dominated all in the vicinity. Looking down from Villa None to the

river bed through Pianoro and the highway, then up to Arnigo, there was nothing but destruction.

Villa None itself, composed of three houses, bomb and shell-shattered, hit by thousands of rounds of

small-arms ammunition, was surrounded by reveted trenches six feet deep and three feet wide.

Looking toward Adone, Pianoro, on the river, and Arnigo, Villa None commanded everything.

Skeletons of trees only remained in what was once Villa None’s front yard. A pillbox approximately

10 Feet Square made of 12-inch logs piled above a dugout was near one of the houses. Another,

reinforced with railroad ties, commanded the road junction in front of the houses. Trenches led in

two directions for protection in coming and going. Firing slits commanded the road, highway and

streambed used by F Company for crossing. The road running past the houses and down across the

streambed to Pianoro had a 4-foot bank on the side nearest the houses where the pillboxes were

located, and an almost vertical 50-foot drop into a ravine on the F Company side. Six-foot tall hedges

and an occasional tree grew on both sides. Two driveways branched off up to the houses. Sergeant

Lake maneuvered up to the German tanks and blew up one of them after shooting it four times with

the bazooka. A piece of the destroyed tank disabled the other, its gun still pointing south towards F

Company, 34 rounds of ammunition in the hull. Lake was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

With the tanks knocked out the platoons closed in on the houses. At the same time about two platoons

of Germans in bypassed fortifications launched a counterattack from the right flank of the 2nd Platoon.

F Company’s commander Captain Crowden radioed Lieutenant Weaver’s 1st Platoon to move up on

that flank, and the fight continued all the rest of the night from those positions. In the morning on

April 19 they attacked with the 2nd Platoon concentrating on the houses. After the first trenches had

been taken the squads worked slowly and methodically to clean out the network of passages and

dugouts. The two squads advanced abreast toward the houses with the 3rd Squad commanded by

Sergeant Wells covering the move by fire. Reaching the wall of one house they found six air vents

and voices coming up from the dugout below. After dropping in several grenades the remaining

nine Germans still alive inside surrendered. With information received from these prisoners another

room was located about 25 yards away. Inside this room was an aid station where they found eight

more Germans, including a wounded Sergeant. Throughout the day the 2nd Battalion continued to

mop up the vicinity and take prisoners, while F Company elements had reached as far north as the

railroad tunnel 100 yards above Villa None.

The fierce three-day battle to crack the German 1944-1945 winter line saw as tough and bloody

fighting as had ever taken place in the Northern Italy campaign. The fall of Arnigo and the adjacent

high ground heralded the long-postponed break in the last fanatically defended German line in Italy.

There were other lines to which

the Wehrmacht planned to fall

back and fight, such as the Po

River, the Adige River and the

Brento River, but when the time

came the German armies were

sent reeling north by swift

punches and cut to pieces by the

scissoring hedgehog tank and

infantry tactics of the Allied Fifth

and Eighth Armies. They had

little opportunity even to fight

delaying rear-guard actions,

much less get set and defend a

line. Now began the pursuit and

elimination of the German forces

and the race across the Po

Valley which was destined to

end the war in Italy.

The Pursuit across the

Po Valley

On the afternoon of April 20,

1945 the 363rd went into reserve.

With the main enemy resistance

overcome, the main route of

advance became the roadnet

around and along Highway 64.

For the first time since

September 1944 the 91st Division

was not attacking along Highway

65, which had affectionately and

unnofficially become known as

“Highway 91”.With its battalions

on trucks the Regiment began

the move to the new sector along

the Reno Valley and Highway

6420 on the morning of April 20, arriving at the assembly areas there in the early afternoon. At 2:45

am the 363rd received orders to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of 835460 [just south of

Casalecchio]. By 9:15 am the 2nd Battalion had been trucked through the stream of traffic to a

turnaround on Highway 6420 from where they proeeded on foot to Casalecchio. Meanwhile the 363rd

received their next orders: their objective was an airport northwest of Bologna. At 12:30 am on April

21, 1945 the 2nd Battalion moved out. Field orders for the 363rd arrived that night at 9:20 pm, with

plans for the 363rd to continue the attack to the north, riding tanks and tank destroyers, following the

6th South African Armor and cleaning out all pockets of enemy resistance in the sector. On April 23

the 2nd Battalion was in the process of crossing the Panaro on the foot-bridge while its transportation

was doing the same at Camposanto. After the 3rd Battalion cleared Canaletto and Canalazzo the 2nd

Battalion followed them north. While flights of Allied fighter planes formed an umbrella over the

advancing columns they spotted some German convoys, and the fighter-bombers blasted away on

the Po River banks at the enemy trying to cross. As the 363rd got closer and closer to the river the

roads and ditches were littered with German dead, wrecked and burning trucks, Volkswagens,

carts, dead horses and mules, motorcycles and bicycles. Entire convoys were annhialated and

strewn across the valley. The unbelievable death and destruction amazed even the most hard-bitten

infantrymen.

The Regimental column proceeded the mile and a half north to the road junction where they spotted

another enemy column retreating along the same road as the one they had earlier engaged and

wiped out. Company K went out to meet them and captured 50 prisoners. The column turned left at

the junction and proceeded west to the Fossa Reggiana, then north along the dike-lined canal to the

towns of Fina Vecchia and Il Palazzetto. An enemy 88mm self-propelled gun opened fire from

Fornace la Dogana to the right front, its first round hitting the leading infantry-laden tank in the

column, knocking it out with a clean hole through the front armor. Neither the twelve men riding on

the tank or the crew inside received so much as a scratch. The remaining tanks joined the infantry in

deploying as best they could along the right side of the road and the broad fields there and opened

fire. The dikes and canal prevented the use of the other side of the road. The enemy replied with

heavy machine-gun fire and more self-propelled guns from defiladed positions, some of them inside

barns and houses of Fornace la Dogana firing through doors and windows. The 3rd Battalion tanks

demolished the houses while the small-arms fire kept the Germans pinned inside. In the battle which

lasted until after dark, tank rounds scored direct hits on two of the enemy ammunition stock piles,

setting off, besides the shells and demolitions, thousands of multicolored flares which turned the sky

into a Fourth of July exhibition. The battalion was set up defensively as the fight continued. At least

one self-propelled gun was destroyed as were allt he buildings in the vicinity. Another friendly tank

was knocked out by the same gun which had hit the first. Still, miraculously, no casualties had been

suffered by the Americans. The column remained there all night in a defensive setup.

Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion, following the 3rd Battalion in the column, had dismounted and deployed

also at La Campa behind the fire fight when they saw along the road to their right another German

column moving northwest consisting of several horse-drawn vehicles, five halftrack trucks, three

self-propelled guns, two or three field pieces and four kitchens. The Anti-Tank platoon commanded

by Lieutenant Burton moved out to meet them in the vicinity of Redena two miles to the northeast.

After knocking out at least one of the self-propelled guns, a kitchen and a horse-drawn vehicle, they

were recalled. The 2nd Battalion remained at Redena until midnight of April 23 – 24, 1945, at which

time seven tanks were attached and orders arrived to proceed to the Po River ten miles to the north.

Bypassing the 3rd Battalion fire fight the 2nd Battalion cut due west along one of the dirt roads to the

far side of the Regimental sector then turned north again along the roads built on top of the dikes in

the very level and low valley floor. The move was uneventful until dawn, when the armored and

infantry spearhead of the column began running into slight resistance from Germans unable to find a

way back across the river. The Germans eventually surrendered.

Upon reaching the south bank of the Po River the 363rd Infantry was ordered back into Division

reserve. On the following afternoon, April 25, 1945, the 2nd Battalion began crossing the river at 1 pm

on amphibious tractors and ferries brought up for the purpose. The 363rd, still in reserve, followed

the 361st over the river and was ordered to advance on the left of that regiment to the Adige River,

the next water barrierwhich flowed northeast-southwest in the Divison sector ten miles north. The

363rd was then ordered to hit the Adige at Legnago to the right of the 361st Infantry. Reaching

Bergantino across the river from where they had bivouacked, the column of battalions turned north

and headed for Legnago. The 2nd Battalion continued the foot march up Highway 10 all night.

At the town of S. Pietro di Legnago just outside Legnago E Company became the advance guard, with

Companies F, G and H following in that order. Their mission was to force their way into Legnago and

clear it of the enemy who intelligence reports indicated were entrenched in the town and on the

river banks in strength. Advancing in the grey of dawn, the column paused a moment at the junction

of Highway 10. F Company was assigned the task of clearing the town to the right of the highway with

G Company in support. As it neared the banks of the river well inside the town the 3rd Platoon

surprised a group of 50 Germans attempting to cross the river on a barge. Lieutenant Schreibeis

called on the automatic rifle men and a light machine gun to bing fire on the barge as it crept across

the broad stream towards Porto Legnano on the other side. Only four of the enemy escaped up the

opposite bank.

After two hours of maneuvering through the rubble the town of Legnano was cleared and the bridge

destroyed by the enemy was secured. Amphtracs and DUKWs were brought forward for the Adige

River crossing. As the first troops of G Company loaded onto the DUKWs to start the crossing enemy

machine guns on the far bank at Porto Legnano raked the levees on the water under cover of friendly

small-arms fire as soon as they were loaded. By this time the bridge across the Po had been opened

to vehicular traffic. Twelve tanks and four tank destroyers which had been able to cross arrived on

the scene, stuck their guns simultaneously over the levees and opened fire on the enemy bank. One

round was aimed at the German machine gun in the church steeple; a direct hit knocked the gun out

of action. E Company followed G Company, with F Company (which had been in reserve) crossing

next. Elements of F Company used the practically destroyed bridge. All foot troops of the 363rd were

across the Adige River by 6:15 pm on April 26, 1945. As the Regiment rapidly fanned out to protect

the bridgehead the 362nd moved up to cross behind them.

In clearing the town of Porto Legnago some pockets of stubborn resistance were encountered by the

2nd Battalion, bringing the first group of serious casualties to the regiment in the Po Valley. By the

next morning, April 27, all information indicated that the enemy had completely withdrawn to the

northeast and would probably defend 18 miles farther on at the supply town of Sossano. That

morning the 2nd Battalion received orders to move out of its assembly area near Porto Legnago on

foot. The Regimental sector was roughly astride the railroad running through Legnago northeast to

Vicenza. The 363rd Infantry column moved past Minerbe and Cologna during the day almost without

incident. Dusk found the battalions moving into the town of Sossano, where it was decided to set up

an all-around defense for the night.

At 4 am on April 28, 1945 the 363rd was

ordered to be alert and be ready to

push farther northeast towards Vicenza

on trucks to be furnished by the 91st

Division which had not yet been able to

cross the Adige because of the solid

stream of higher-priority traffic on the

now completed bridge. By 4:50 am the

trucks hadn’t arrived. By 5:20 am the

trucks had arrived and the unit was

completely motorized. The 2nd Battalion

was put in the lead as they headed for

Debba. The 363rd Infantry was almost

across the Po Valley. For the first time in

ten days they say foothills with narrow

winding roads impeding the progress of

vehicles. Some 88mm fire was received

during the day and the ground action

was limited, with roads and terrain

slowing down the movement. By

midnight they had reached the town of

Debba, just five miles south of Vicenza,

meeting no resistance at all there where

they spent the night.

Moving out on the morning of April 29,

1945 in column, the 2nd Battalion led as

they passed through Vicenza at 6:20 am

behind the 361st and 362nd Infantry

Regiments up Highway 53 toward the

fourth water barrier ten miles northeast:

the Brenta River. Orders stated that

crossings would be made at a point

between the towns of Carmignano di

Brenta on the southwest side and Fontaniva on the northeast. As the Regiment moved out the

highway was clogged with traffic; as it neared the river jeeps, trucks, tanks, reconnaissance cars and

captured German vehicles – the transportation of the three regiments and attatched units – was

double-banked all the way back to Vicenza waiting to cross the shallow, wide stream to the

bridgehead secured during the night by Task Force George. Because of the congestion on the

highway and crossing site the 363rd left the main road and went into an assembly area on the near

bank in the vicinity of Carmignano di Brenta for a few hours.

That afternoon the Regiment was ordered to ford the river near a blown bridge four miles above the

Division crossing. The bridges across the gravel-bottomed streambed all had been destroyed by

the enemy in his flight to escape north and northeast through the passes in the Alps to Austria. The

Allied air forces had followed them up and made life miserable by keeping these passes, principally

the Brenner, saturated with bombings. The Brenta riverbed too was studded with butterfly bombs

dropped by the air forces to delay the enemy retreat. The stream itself, although over 100 yards

wide, was not deep enough for DUKWs, amphtracs or ponton floats. Therefore vehicles which

couldn’t ford the river under their own power had to be towed across by those that could. Tanks,

tank destroyers, and bulldozers all helped the trucks and jeeps across, but the bulldozers proved the

most effective. At 5 pm the foot troops of the 2nd Battalion started crossing north of the Division site

and marched through the night until dawn where they found the leading elements at the village of

Rossano five miles to the northeast of the river. Here the tanks and troop vehicles joined them. At 8

am the 2nd Battalion moved out of Rossano headed for Riese, another five miles northeast, on trucks

and organic vehicles with two tank destroyers and three light tanks attached, followed by the 1st

Battalion. The leading 2nd Battalion began overcoming scattered small-arms resistance in various

pockets along the route and by noon was engaged in cleaning up the town of Riese where one

hundred more prisoners were taken after slight resistance.

The accumulation of prisoners provided a major problem. Hundreds were herded into temporary

enclosures from which they were evacuated the following day. These were guarded by a few special

police from Regimental Headquarters Company. Word, however, began to spread of a group of 30

Germans armed with automatic weapons who were preparing to attack the inclosure with the object

of freeing the prisoners and continuing resistance. A platoon from E Company was tasked with

guarding the cage. The rumor grew during the afternoon almost in proportion to the number of

additional prisoners being taken. By the late afternoon the inclosure held over 400 Germans.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion arrived in Caselle where a brisk firefight with Italian Partisans

participating occurred. The 2nd Battalion moved up from Riese and the Caselle situation was again

well under control. The entire 363rd Infantry Regiment then closed into the outskirts of Treviso by 8

am on the morning of May 1, 1945, where the Division assembled as Corps reserve and continued to

round up hundreds of Germans in the area.

The war was almost over and everyone knew it. The three days of bloody and fierce fighting to break

inch by inch through the shell the enemy had built around his positions during the long winter

months and the twelve days following during which the 363rd Infantry had knifed swiftly 159 airline

miles from below Bologna to north of Venice and to the foothills of the Alps had broken the back of

the German armies in Italy. Even then surrender terms were being arranged between

representatives of General Von Vietinghof-Scheel and Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff, chief of the SS

and General Plenipotentiary of the Wehrmacht in Italy, and representatives of Field Marshal Sir

Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterrannean, at the King’s palace in

Caserta. The day before, April 30, 1945, General Mark Clark announced that 25 German Divisions in

northern Italy had been destroyed and that German military power had practically ceased to exist.

As the 363rd Infantry moved into Treviso on May 1 contact was made by the British Eighth Army

patrols and the forces of Marshal Tito advancing westward from Trieste. The Fifth Army was within

two miles of the Swiss border. 100,000 prisoners were captured.

The Italian Campaign started on the Salerno beachhead ono September 9, 1943 and ceased on May

2, 1945 with the unconditional surrender of all the German and Italian military forces in Italy and

southern Austria. It was 7 pm on May 2, 1945 when official word reached the 363rd by telephone that

the war in Italy was over. This was an anticlimax because such news had been expected for days. The

appalling destruction of the German military machine strewn across the Po Valley told the story long

before the official news was received. It was evident that it would not be too long before the war on

the Western Front too would be over. The news was accepted quietly and soberly. There were no

large celebrations or parties. It was accepted with relief and thankfulness and work. The 363rd

Infantry was preparing for yet another mission – occupation.

Occupation

The 91st Infantry Divison

was ordered to occupy

the territory known as

Venezia Giulia. The 2nd

Battalion established

itself in the town of

Merna. On May 9, 1945,

V-E Day was officially

recognized and no

training was scheduled.

The 2nd Battalion was

still stationed in Merna

(present day Miren,

Slovenia). Albert’s unit

stayed in Merna for the

rest of his time in Italy. On June 15, 1945 Albert received his Travel Orders: he was going home. He

eventually left Italy on June 21, arriving in the United States on June 28, 1945.

After the War

Albert Cutillo received an honourable discharge from the US Army on July 5, 1945. He had

accumulated 5 months and 18 days of continental service and 1 year, 1 month and 27 days of foreign

service. He had been awarded the Sharpshooter [Rifle], Combat Infantryman Badge, Presidential

Unit Citation, Purple Heart and the European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Ribbon Purple Heart

and the European-African-Middle Eastern campaign ribbon. For his total service of 1 year, 8 months

and 5 days he was paid $300. Albert later went on to use the benefits received from the GI Bill to go

to school and learn how to be a carpenter. He received a Medical Disability Payment of $13.80

monthly for a Nervous Condition (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) and a Left Leg Scar incurred as a

result of his tour of duty. Albert suffered from night terrors for the rest of his life.

Albert’s personal memories of the war followed him as well. When Albert’s sergeant commanded his

men to conduct a suicidal frontal assault on a farmhouse located in a clearing, Albert asked the rest

of the soldiers if they wanted to attack the farmhouse that way. When they said no Albert told the

sergeant to go attack it himself. They eventually ended up outflanking the farmhouse instead.

Another time during a fierce fire fight a young replacement jumped into his foxhole. The bullets

were flying so thick Albert said that anything above ground would get shot, so he instead rested his

M-1 Garand on the edge of the foxhole, blindfiring his weapon. Albert told the replacement next to

him to do the same and not look up, but the kid stuck his head out of the foxhole anyways and was

shot in the head and killed instantly. Later, while on leave Albert won a local dancing contest with an

Italian woman. As his unit was advancing through the mountains of northern Italy, a soldier in his

squad kept taking souveneirs off of the bodies of dead Germans after each fire fight. Albert told him

to stop taking souveneirs because the Germans were booby trapping some of the bodies with

explosives. When the man refused Albert told him he would shoot him himself if he picked up

another souveneir – needless to say the man stopped.

Since Albert spoke fluent Italian he was placed in his company’s reconnaisssance squad as a scout,

tasked with moving out in front of the main force to ask the local Italians where the Germans were

hiding. When Albert would recon a town and the commanders were given their lodgings Albert

would always be given the nicest house, since he was Italian. One time when Albert and another

soldier were scouting a town they talked to the locals who told them where the Germans were

hiding. Albert and the other guy then captured 5 German soldiers that were hiding in a cellar. Albert

said that the German soldiers were just as scared as they were. When their sergeant was killed the

squad made Albert the new sergeant. However, one of Albert’s superior officers denied the

battlefield promotion because Albert was an Italian. Near the end of the war in April – May 1945

Albert witnessed his fellow soldiers commit war crimes by killing unarmed German prisoners. The

soldiers forced the prisoners to run in front of their jeeps while they mowed them down with the .50

caliber machine guns mounted on the vehicles. When Albert eventually came home in June of 1945

he brought with him a German officer’s Luger, which he soon sold shortly after the war’s end.

November 1943 Albert F Cutillo in Uniform Albert F Cutillo in Uniform

Albert F Cutillo’s Military Decorations

(Combat Infantryman Badge, Purple Heart, Sharpshooter [Rifle], Presidential Unit Citation and the

European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Ribbon)

Albert F Cutillo’s DD-214