Outlines of PYrrhonism

Book I of Three

Conte¡ts of Book I

1. The Mai¡ Difereûce belween the Philosophies

2- The Accounts of Skepticism

3. The Nomenclature of the skePüc way

4 W¡at Skepticism Ts

5. The Skeptic

6. The Origios oî Skepticisú -? Does the Skeptic Dogma¡zeis Doe.s the Skeptic Have a SYsteú /

i. óää ,i" i*"'pti" r¡eorize about Naturc'l

10. Do t-he Skeptics Deny App€arancesr

11. The Critelion of the Skeptrc.wa^y

12. What Is the Coal of SklPtYY/13. The General Modes oi ¿Poct¡¿

14. The Ten Modes15. The Five Modes

iÍ. ilålitîilii ."rutirg reople who Glve ca'sar ExPlanatiots

18. The SkePtic Sloga¡s

19. The "Not More' Slogar

?î. "i""åff ìl'l,ü'i ""ssibre,"

"Mavbe"

22 "I Withold Assent"

23. "l Detemine Nothing'24. "EverFhing ls lnde(erm'nate ... .,t< 'F prvrhins Is NoD-apptehenslÞle

íì. "iHiìll'-"ttìi'-""lii";*a -¡ Do Not Appreheod"

;;. ';;Ë".;-ú;""t ao Equal Arsumeû¡ ls opposed''

28. More about the sk"pti1,s.loF.l- .t '"râclitean

pbilosophy29. rhat rhe SkePtic 1ry"I P'u"'"'

n'1',5;;;;ii"ui pr' o'oóuyì0. Wherein Skepticism Differs lrom the

iT ttl'n.;; il.lnit"t'" Differs from the cvreratc wav-

åi. *i,ii"." ilõ,'""" g".:.' l'"T lll T'j'Í"'iüJol"Ioo,i3. wherein Skepticism Di-sers Irom tnr

li. i"'iiiii; il;åt"" "mpiricism

Is the same as skepticism

8E

Outlines of P!fthonism, Book I 89

1. The Main Difrerence between the Philosophies

Wllen people search for somethiûg, the likely outcome is that either they findit or, Dot fitrding it, they accept that it canriot be found, o¡ they continue tosearch. So also iû the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some peoplehave clairred to have foutrd the truth, others have asserted that it cannot beapprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that they havefound it a¡e the Dogmatists, properly so called-fo¡ example, the followers ofAristotle and Epicu¡us, the Stoics, aad certain others. The followers ofCleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Acadeúics, have asse¡ted thatit catrnot be apprehended. The Skeptics coDtinue to search. Hence it is withreason that the maio tt?es of philosophy are thought to be thlee in riumber:the Dogmatiq the Academiq and the Skeptic. Conceming the fl¡st two it \'¿illrbest become othe¡s to speak; but concerning the Skeptic Way we shall now.gi-ve an outlitre accou¡tt, stating in advance that as ¡egards ÃoDe of the thingsthat we are about to say do we firrnly maintait that matters are absolutely as

,stâted, but in each instance we are siûply reporting,like a chroniclet, what now

::: 2. The Accounts of Skepticism

iþne account of the Skeptic philosophy is called "gerieral"; the other, "specmc'. 5

to us to be the case.

the general account we set forth the chaÉcte¡istic traits of Skepticism,jng its basic idea, its origins, a¡guments, c¡iterion atrd goal, as well as the

modes ol epochè fsuspension ol jìrdgme¡t]. and how we take tbe Skepticstatements, and the distirictjon between Skepticism arid the competing philos-

ln the specific accoutrt we state objections to each part of so-called ¡y." Let us, then, first take up the geûeral accourit, beginnitrg the

'A'ith the various terms for the Skeptic Way.

3. The Nomenclatu¡e of the Skeptic Way

Way is called Zetetic l"questionitg"] from its activity in qùestion-

inquiring, Ephectic l"suspensive"] from the patrros that arises conce¡n-

subject of inquiry, Aporetic l"itrclined to a?o¡iøi"] eithe¡, as some say,-being puzzled aod questioning about eve¡ythiûg or f¡om its being at

as to whethe¡ to asseot ot dissent, and Pyr¡honeaD becâuse it appears

Fyûho applied himself to Skepticism mo¡e vigorously and conspicu-his predecessors did

!]i.- i,r . 4. What Skepticism Is

Way is a disposition to oppose phetrome[a and rioumeûa to oDe

4ry way whateve!, v¡ith the result that, owing to the equiPollenc€

ihi[gs and statem€Dts thus opposed, we are broltght frrst to epoch¿

90 S¿xtus Empiicus

e and theÀ lo atataxia. We do not apply the term "disposition" in any subtle

sense, br¡t simply as cogrlate with 'to be disposed." At this Point we are takingas phenomenâ the objects of sense perception, thr¡s contrastiûg them with the

noumena. The phrase "in any way whateve¡" can modify both the word

"disposition ' (so as to make ùs take that word in a plain sense, as we said) and

the phrase "to oppose pheriomeûa alld noumena"; for since we oPpose these invarious ways phenomena to phenomena, ooumena to noumen4 or alúer-

nando phenomena to noümen4 w€ say "in any way whatever" in order toi¡clùde all such oppositions. or we cao apply 'Io any way whateve¡" to"phenometra aûd noumena"" in olde¡ that we Ìnay not have to inqr¡ire how thephenomeûa appear o¡ the noumelÌa are thought, but may take these te¡ms in

10 their plain senses. By "opposed" statemeûts we siúply mearl inconsistent ones,

not necessarily affi¡mative and ûegative. By "equipollence" we mean equality

as regards credibility and the lack of it, that is, that to one of the inconsistent

statements takes precedence ovel any othel as being morc credible Epochè is

a state of the intellect on account of ùhich we ûeither deûy ûor affirm anything

Atataxia is atr uttroubled a¡d t¡anquil condition of the soul. In ou¡ rema¡ks

on the goal of Skepticism we shall come back to the questiod ofhow ataraxitte¡ters the soul alo1g wilh ePochè.

5- The Skeptic

11 The deÂnition ol the Pyrrhonean philosopher is implicitly contained it that ofthe Skeptic Way: he is the persoû who has the a.fo¡ementioned disposition

.

6. The Origins of SkePticisrn

o We say that the causal origin of the Skeptiç Way is the hope of attainirg ;

ataraxia. Cert¿;in tøletted people, upset by anomaly in "the facts" and at a loss i

as to which of these "facts" deserve assent, endeavo¡ed to discover what is true 1

in them and what is false, expecling lhat by settling this they would achieve

ataraxia. But tbe ûain origiú of Skeplicisñ is the Prâctice of opposing to each

Outlikes of PJ)fthoniht, Book I gl

T:*'-.t .l determine ¡orhing" or any of the others of which we shail speaklaler. ¡or the dogmarizer propounds as cerrainly the lhings abouL whicb he is.sai9.io

b: docm?tiz1¡g, bur the Skepric does ooi put forwãrd rh"* il;;;. ;;holding absolutely. He co¡side¡s that, just as the-,,AlI things ur" ¡ut.";".toe;says that togethff with the othe¡ things it is itself false, ^ a*. tfr" ,i.!^,'Nothing is true," so also the ,'Nothing

mo¡e,, slogan says tnat lt itseU isïomore the case thari its opposite, and thus it applies io itseú along wittr the rest. rsWe say the same of the other Skeptic slogani. So tha¡ since the-A"g-"tir"r1,one who posits tbe conrent of his dogmas as being true, while tle Skeoticpresents bis skepr ical slogans as impticitly self_appliàble, rhe Skeptic sho-utdtrot be said to

_dogmatize the¡eby. But the mosì-imporÉant poiûi is. that-;putti¡g forward these slogans be is saying what seems ro fri- to O" r["ãr.and ¡s reporling his pa¡l¡os lvithout belief, not firmly maintaining anythingconcerÀing what exists externally.

r, 8. Does the Skeptic Have a System?

slalement ao equal statemenl: it seems [o us that doing tbis b¡ings a¡ eod ro

dogmatizing.

13 When we say that the Skeptic does riot dogmatize we are not Dsing the

"dogma" as some do, in its mo¡e comúon meadng, "something that

merely agrees to", lor the Skeptic does give assent to the P¿rh¿ that âle lor

rporhtrtby a phantasia; for example, when feelirig hot (ol cold) he wouldsay "I seem ûot to be hot (o¡ cold)." But when we asselt that he does

dogmatize, we use "dogma" in the sense, which others give it, of assent'tõ'

7. Does the Skeptic Dogmatize?

14 asserts to lrothing that is non-evidett. Not evet in puttiog fo¡ward theof the non-evident matters investigated by the sciences For the

slogaûs aboùt nonevident things does he dogmatize-slogans like

; ye proceed iû the same way when asked whether the Skeptic has a systeûr. If 16i:o..ilp defines a system as an attachment to a number of dogmas thæ ugr"" .i¡,ltf,t, glr9.,-another and with appeannces, and defines a dog[ra as ".;.*";ì;1; lo¡nething nor-evident, we shall say that the St"pti" aoã.

"ot tu* u.y.t"-.,_Bìlt if one says tbat a system is a way of tfà that, in acco¡da¡J with rz

appearaDces, lollows a cerlain ral.ionale, wbe¡e that ratio¡ale shows bow it ispossrble to se€m to live rightly (..righlly'. being taken, not as ¡efenins onlv ¡ovrrtue. bul i¡ a more ordioary sense) and tends ro produce the dispo-sitioÁ tå

. suspend Judgme¡t, the¡ we say that he does have a system. For we do follou¡ationale that, in accord with appearaDces, points us towa¡d a life in:y r¡¡ith the customs of oÙI country aûd its laws aDd institutiotrs. aûd

oul own particular pat¡r¿.

9. Does the Skeptic Theo¡ize about Nature?

ieply in the same vein if asked rvhethe¡ the Skeptic needs to theorize about lBrre. On the one ha¡d, if tbere is a questioo ofÐãking an a.sertion with 6imìde¡ce about any of tbe matters dogmalically treated iD physical theory.Io not úeorizei bul. o¡ rhe otber baúd. in rbe cou.se of oóposine to eveiu:menl an equal statement. and in connection *jth otaroríà, *.-do tou"úi physical_theory. This, too. is the way we approacb lbe logical and eth¡cals of so-called "pbilosophy."

llv,hþ claim that the Skeptics deny appeararces seem to me rlot to have tewhat we say. For, as we stated above, we do nor rejecr rhe things thatj rn\,olunta¡ily to assebl in acco¡d with a passively rcÆei\ed phanrasia,9çè êre appearances. A¡d when we queslion whether the external objeci

10. Do the Skeptics Deny Appearances?

1t¡

ll

ï

.: t,gT Sextlß Empiri s

is such as it appears, we g¡ant that it does appear, and we are.not raisi¡g. a

"""iø. "Uoli the appelance but rather about what is said about the

äi""äi-"i t¡* r. ¿¡r,i¿nt from raising a questiod about the appearance itself-

, Ëo', "*u*pi",

t¡" noney appears to us to be sweet This we gratt' fol we seûse'' iri" rl""üÃ. n", *hihei it ;s sweet *e question insofa¡ as this has to do with

üii iphitosopnicall theory, for that theory is ûot the- appearaûc€' but soúe-

ttrinisaid about the appea¡ance. And even when we do present alguments ú;;;tñ;; ,h"

^pp#aoces. we do not put these forward with tbe inteûlion

oi àenvine the appèaraûces bul by way of poinliúg oul the preciprtancy ol üe

Dognãtisìs: for-ii the theory is so decePtive as to all.but tlll+ u*11,t1"

aDD-ea¡ances from under our very eyes' should we úot distrust it rn rega¡d 10

tíe non-evident. and thus avoid beiDg led by it iûto Preclpltate Judgmentsj

11. The Criterioo of the SkePtic t ay

2l That we hold to the app€arances is obvious f¡om what we say about the" ;t;;;;;ii;" skeptlc wav. The word "c¡itedon" is used in two wavs: fi¡st'

iåiüt" "¡"¡ã that is assúmed in contection with belief about oÌistetrc€ or

"î.J,i"t"", *Jan"t we shall discuss in our objectiors; ¿nd s€rond'.fo¡ the

"lìã¡.ì åi"i,,iã", ry atteûtion to which in the condr¡ct of daily life we do some

" ;hi;;;J;t",úeÁ; it is of the latter that we are noù speaking Accordinglv'" *i'tã"ì'úãiiit" *iterion of the skeptic way ¡s the appeatatrce- in effect us¡ng

,ffìä'¡;;;ú;;-iä"t^¡o- ¡o' "¡u this appearance lies in feeling and

involunta¡y p¿t¡os it ii not open to questiotr Thus nob:dy'J tltrn1{,.d]11Ìtes

ãioìi wt"in"t ttt" "*t"mal

object appears this way or that' but lather abor¡t

whether it is such as it appea$ to be'

tt t"-ü;dt"g. ;h" uìp"-äo""r, tt"n, *e live without beliefs b*

]9 i*:ld, Tith'- th";t;;;y ,"gtn "r,

of life, since we caûnot be wholly inactive A¡d this

"rãn^." t"Lt",i of life seems to be fourfold: one pa¡t has to do with the

;;ä;¿ ;i";", ;;ther with the compulsion of the pd¿å¿' arioth€¡ with the

iä¿f"g ¿.*t of laws and customs, aod a fourtb *ith .ti"ru"i:i ]:-i:'-t-:'dzo

"ruftr. Ñutor"', goidaoce is that by which we are Daturally capable ol sensalon

^ itäiiã"gr'i' ""i'ì"itr.n i the párha ls that bv which hunser drive' i'i:-f.*d

ã"ã ñitJ -*". ìt drink; the handing down of customs a¡d laws is th¿t bv

î¡l"iti" "*"p, ,ft" piety in the cond-uct of life h good aDd impt:ty 9Ti-*d

instruction in ârts anJ crafts is that by which we are not iDactive ln whlcnever

"iä"." *"

""q"1*. And we say all these things without beliel

12. What ls the Goal of SkePticism?

Outlínes ol Pyrhoki.st l, Book 1 93

philosophize with the aim of assessing his phantasíai-that is, of determiningwhich a¡e t¡ue and whioh a¡e false so as to achieye ataraxia-he landed in acontoversy between positions of equal strcûgth, and, beiûg unable to resolveit, he suspended judgnent. But while he was thus suspendiûg judpent the¡efollowed by chance the sought-after ataraxi¿ as legards beliel For the personwho believes that something is by nature good o¡ bad is constaritly upset; whenhe does not possess the thi¡gs that. seem to be good, he thinks he is beingtormented by thiogs that are by nature bad, and he chases after the thiogs hesupposes to be good; then, when he gets these, he falls into still more tormeDtsbecause of i¡¡¿tional and immode¡ate exultation, and fearing any change,_hedoes absolutely eve¡ything in o¡der not to lose the thiûgs that seem to himgood. But the pe$on who takes ro positioû as to what is by riature good o¡bad neithe¡ avoids nor pursues iritensely. As a result, he achieves ofaraxia.

Indeed, v,¡hat happened to the Skeptic is just like what is told of Apellesthe painte!. For it is said that onc€ upotr a timq when he was painting a horsearid wished to depict the horse's froth, he failed so completely that he gave upand threv his sponge at the picture-the sponge on which he used to wipe thepaints from his brush-and that in striking the pictu¡e the spo¡ge producedthe desired effect, So, too, the Skeptics were hoping to achieve dtataxia by¡esolving the anomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being uqabl€ to dolhis, they susperided judgment. But then, by chance as it we¡e, when they weresùspending judgnent lhe atdraxid followed, as a shadow follows the body. Wedo not sùppose, of cou¡se, that the Skeptic is wholly untroubled, but we do saythat he is t¡oubled ody by things uravoidable. Fo¡ we ag¡ee that somettneshe is cold and thirsty and has various leelings like those. But even in such cases,

whereas ordiûary people are a.frected by two circumstances-namely by the

?at¡r¿ themselves ard not less by its seeming that these conditions are by naturebad. the Skeptiq by eliminatirg the additiona.l belief that all these things arc

.tratu¡ally bad, gets off mole moderately here as well. Because of this we saythat as rega¡ds belief the SkeptiCs goal is ataraxia, but in rega¡d to thitrgs

unavoidable it is havitrg r[oderate pathë. But some notâble Skeptics haveadded "suspension ofjudgmeût dudtg iûvestigations" to these.

:s AJte¡ these remarks, our next task is to explain the goaj of the Skeltic -way" Ñ; ;;;;;; or end js that for the sake of wbich everything is dooe.or '

i-*¿*"¿l trttt L, ìt tom, i, oot don" ot "onsidered

for the sake of aoything '

;* ;;, i;it ,h" tffi"tt otj""t or *'" ¿"ti'"' we alwavs sav that as regardì! ¿1j

úîr]Liä" Àt"p,i"'t goal is ataraxia, arrd that as regards things that'âre iìi

26 uriavoidable it is havhs ^.u*^'"'Ttiål åii'n"" irt" ìt"pìrJt"tì"t to'lil

Since we have been sayiry that ataraxía follows on suspending judgmett about.everything, the trext thing woùld be to explain how we teach this suspensiot.

:1:.;,Roughly speaking oûe may say that it comes about through the opposition ofiìt':things. lve oppose phenomena ¡o phenomena o¡ noumeûa to ¡louûen4 o¡i';øbetnaniLo. For iûstance, we oppose phenomena to phenome¡a wheri we say

l¡liat the same tower appears round from a distance but squate from close up;t;and.noumena to noumena when, in rcply to one who i¡fers the e)cisterce ofldivine p¡ovidence f¡om the o¡de¡ of the heavenly bodies, we oppose the fact

,$at.often the good fa¡e ill ard the bad fa¡e well, and deduce ftom this thattäliyine providence does not exisq and noumena to phenomena, as whetr

iiAnaxago¡as argued, in opposition to snow'$ beiûg white, that snow is f¡oze¡

94 Sextus EmPiric s

water alld watel is dark in color, and the¡efore slow is dark in color' O¡, with

a different cotc-€pt of oppositiotr, we som€times oPpose presett things to

present things, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes prcsett things to

ihings past or to things future; for example, when somebody 9ti"g: oP. un

14 argu;e; that we a¡e not able to ¡efute, we say to him: "Just as before the birth

oith" p"..on who introduced the system which you follow, the a¡gument

supporiing that system did not yet appear sound although it really waq so also

it is possible that ìhe opposite of the algument you now adva¡ce is really sound

despìte its not yet appearing so to us, and hence we should not yet assent to

this argumetrt that now seems so stlong."¡s Bui in order that we may more accurately uûderstand these oppositions,I

shall set down the modes ol a¡gume¡ts by means of which suspension ofjudgtrent is brought about, without, however, maintainhg anythiûg about'their

number o¡ their fo¡ce. For they may well be unsound, and there may be

more thaD the ones I shall meDtion.

14. The Ten Modes

36 The older Skeptics, accoldiûg to the usual accoutt, have haÀded down soúe

modes, ten io numbet, through which it seems that suspeßion ofjudgment is

b¡ought about, and which they also syûonymously call "argume¡ts" or

"poirits." And these modes arc as follows: frrst, there is the one based ofi the

vàriety of animals; second, the one based¡n the differences añong human

beings; thi¡d, that based ori the dife¡eEces iû constitutioû of the seûse orgâns;

fourih, on the ctcumstânces; flfth, on positions, distances a¡d locatio¡ls; sixth,

3? on ailmixtures; seventh, oo the quantity and constitutiot of the external

objects; eighth, o relativity; ninth, on th€ f¡equeÂcy or infrequency of occÙî-

r"nce; andlenth, oo ways of life, customs and laws, rnythic beliefs and dogmatiÒ

æ opinions. lVe aáopt this order without prejudice.- Superordinate to these are three modes, oûe based on what does the

jÌrdging another based on ' hal is jì¡dged, and a third based on both The first

iorri oi ttt" tet modes are subordinate to the mode based oû what does thpjudging for that is either ari admal or a human being or a sense and is in some

circ-um-lance; the sevgnth aÀd teûth modes a¡e refer¡ed to the mode based on

stagnant water, like mosqùitoes, some fro¡n v¡ine that is tu[rin& like grats,some from earth, like [...], some ftom slimq like frogs, some f¡o-í mudl lùeworms, some frorn donkeys, like dung-beetles, some from greens, Iike cateroil_lars, somefrom fruit,like the gall insects in the wild fig treel some lr;;;ìü"g

"animals, like bees from bulls and waspJ from horses. -Of

animal, proão""à:Uyinte¡cou$e, some, the majority, come from homogeneous parentsi ;t;ih"r",like mules, Ρom_hete¡ogeneous pareots. Again, of ãnimals in genert:;;;;."bom viviparously. like-

-human beitrgs; others oviparously, fiËe firã.; unJ rtiU *

otbe$ just as lumps offlesh, Iike bears. So one would expect these áissimilar_ities and diferenc€s of origià to result in gre at colta:rrety o1 path¿,"o;i.ib-;"gincompatibilitt disharmony, and conflicì,

44Howeve¡, it is the differeDces amon€ the most impo¡tart pa¡ts of the body,

especially those naturally frtted fo¡ judging and sensìng, tnui "u" o.oão"" ù"

greatest conflicf ofthe phantasiaL Thùs, Thlngs tbat appiar wbite tá us a¡e sai¿to be_yellow by people wirh jauûdice, and reddish by tnose wittr iloåãJoteyes, Sinc€, then, some animals have yellow eyes, others bloodshot eyes. otler"white, atrd still othe¡s some othe¡ colãr, it is fii"¡y, I i¡¡r,t,-U"ì1Ë;;;:#;"of colors witl be difeÌenr. Furthe¡, if we look long aad dxedly at inïrríáì¿ *then stoop down to a book, the letters seem to us golden and moviog urouoa.Sincg then, some animals have by ¡atu¡e a lusterif the eyes aad;i

-;;;"aÌd qùiok st¡eam of light, so as even to be able to see at niglit, we sfr""f¿ op""tthat extenal objects would not affect them ana us in ïá ,"-" *ãu. ã"¿ .,.illusionists,.by treating lamp wicks with coppe¡ rusr un¿

"uttf" nr¡ iotl _åi". the. by.staûde¡s

_appear now copper-colo¡eã -and

now blac( jusi U, " JiÀt

sprinkling of the mixture. It is surely a¡l rbe more ,"urooäbl" ai";, H;"i diff€rirg humo¡s a¡e mixed in the eyes of admals, these ,rrmal.;ili ;;;"'| dilerÌtrg phantasiai of the external objects. Also, when we pres. ,h" "yeîuX;n

n,I one side,.thc forms, shapes and sizes of the things seen "p;; "i;;;;d ";,1 na¡rowed. So it is likely that those a¡imals ttuituue

"táogut"a a.ã-;l"r,irg

. pupils (e.g.,.goats, cats, a¡d sucb) will in theu phantasíai expíien"" m" "-ìãi""fobJects as djfle¡etrt from atrd unlike what animals with ¡ound pupils take them

;t tô be. Mirrors, too, because of their diferlog "oo.tro"tioo,

,oJ"i ;, ;;;ah" *i.-exterÀal objects as ve¡y short, when the mtro¡ is "on"u*, uo¿ ,ãln"tir""r-ã"

lo¡g and narrow. when it is co¡vex. And some show the hlr^¿ "ftfr"-."Â""t"¿- lir::.ut tbe bottom. a¡d rhe feet at rhe top. Since, then, some of the organs ar

' oi.stght a¡e bulging with convexity and othe¡s a¡e quite concavq while-still..,

othe¡s a¡e i¡ a-flat pla¡e, it is likely that because of thiì the pla ntoíioi, too, *"va.ious,_ a¡d that dogs, fish, Iions, buman beings, and locuìts do noi s"" th"- same fhtngs ¿¡s equaL i¡ size o¡ simila¡ in shapq but iD each case what is seen

. dêpends on tbe imprint created by the eye tbar receives rhe appearatrc€.' . The same a¡gl¡meot holds for the othe¡ senses as we[, Fo'riow could onc so

:'.py: with rega¡d to touch, tbar animals are similarly aflected whether their;-rsu¡laces conslst of shell, flesb, needles, feathers, or scales? And, as regards

, .heaûn& how could one say that pe¡c€ptioÀs are alike in animals with a very

;":rl,a,Irow Îìrgfto¡y :a_Dat and i¡ those with a very wide otre, or in those with hairv

'rëárs a¡d those with ears that are hairless? lûdeed, even we find ou¡ hea¡íns,l.f_"rt"a oo" way wben ou¡ ears are plugged atrd another *uy *fr"o i"-*Ë

what is judged; afid the flfth, sixth, eighth, and niûth are referred to th" o1" .,,i

3e that is b;eã on both. These three in tu¡n a¡e ¡eferred to the ¡elativity mode' i

making it the most generic, with the th¡ee as specific and the ten as subordi-l

nate. We offe¡ the foiegoirlg comments, as Plausible, coûcerning their ûuúbei;

concêrning thei¡ co¡tent, we say the following : |ia0 The Êrst argument, as we were saying. is rhat according to which l'he same-

pnoiÀioi do iot arise from the sarnJ things because óf the difie¡ence fänimals. This we coûclude from the di-ffe¡ence iD the ways animalsilalé'

4¡ produced aûd from the variety -,r." "rt*itt* .iã"Jto¿i'"t Àt "o""¿iü

th€ ways they are proarr""¿, .o-" uo'irîilit" ft"ã"""J *itrt""t "exual uiigii

^nd oihers flom ãtercou¡se. And, of those produced without sexual unió.!¡1

Outlihes of Pyfthonirm, Book I 95

some come ftom fire, like the tioy creatures that'apped in ovens, some

g6

sr them ordinarily. Smell, too, will differ according to the variety of a-nimals Fo¡

if *" orrr."lv". are afected in one way wben we have a cold with a lot of

ohl""rn. uod jn another way wheú the parts abour the head are ûlled with an

ã"""í, áf Uloo¿ tlo t¡e lattei case being repelled atrd feeling virtually assaulted

by tnings that seem to othe¡s to smell sweet), then, siûce some -animals.

are

nåUby in¿ phlegrnatic by natu¡e, others very ¡ich in blood, aÁd still others

lave â predàminant excæss of yellow or black bile, it is reasonable to suppose

,, in"tttirrrtut"t odiferous things appear differently in each case So, too' with'- ine ob¡ects of tast", since someãnimals have rough and dry toÂgues alrd othels

very moist. Ard when in a fever we ourselves have relatively dry torlgues' we

"ãri i¿", ttt" too¿ of"¡ed to us to be eartby. bad tasting' and bitter' and we-feel

thus because of the differing stÎetrgth of the humors said to be io us slnce' theû'

ihe admals too have differing organs of taste, with difrerent humors prodomi-

r, oãi"g,ã"y *ouf¿ get difering taste phat¡tasìai of the external.objects For' just

as the same food, when digested, becomes in onc place â vein' ÚÌ aDother an

.t"if, i" unotn"i u uone, and in still aûother â tendot, aûd so on' sho$¡ing a

¿itre¡ne disoosition depending on the diffe¡ence of the parts receivitg it; and

þ;;;i;;;;,;t" *¿ trre same ¡ form, when applied to trees ¡ecoúes. ba¡k

in-å"" pfu"",'Ut*on in adother, and blossolí in aúothe¡ and tlrus fûally frg'

" p.-"g.ã"",é, *¿ each ofthe other f¡uits; a¡d just as oÚe aDd. the sarne breath

àf thJmusician, when blow¡ into a flr¡te becomes here a higb riote aûd tberc

"-fáî "ã,", ani the same st¡oke of the ha'ûd oû th€ ly¡e p¡oduces- he¡e a bass

sound and'the¡e a t¡eble one; so, too. it is likely that the extemal objects are

perceived differently depending on the ditreriog rnakeups of ttle ammals navlng

Soit s EmPfuicus

Ihe Dhontosia¡.

" -'- Ë;;-;;;* see rhis more clearly lrom the preferences and aversio¡s. of

animals. Thus, perfum" ,""-, u"ry pi"u'*t to humari- beings but intolerable

to dung beetles ànd bees, and the applicatio¡ of olive oil is benefìcial to huúan

¡";nn."U"t titl. *uros aqd bees Anã to human beings sea water is unpleasant

r, ;ä;;;;i;;;;;.'to à¡oh *ttll" ,o nsh it is most pleasant and potable A¡d""

pieì ;",hã ã"t" ltappily ir the worst stirking mud than in clear and Pure

water. An{ of a¡imals, some eat grass a¡d otliers eat bushes' some eat wood '

*ã ãtft"tt'.""¿t or meat or milk, soúe like thei¡ food aged and others fresh;'

ils'oi;lik;l; raw and othe¡s iike it prepa¡ed bv cookiûg And in general

tfr" tftittg, tftut are pl€asant to some anlmals ale unpleasaÛt' repugnqt an{ ;;

r """"

poiiãt"., to oihers. Thus, hemlock fattens quails and hyoscyamus fattens

oiss. ^a¡d piss enioy eali¡g salamanders, as the deer etjoy eati¡g poisonous

itãuiur"r uo-¿ s*jlo*s e4ioy blister-beetles A¡ts a¡d rnosquitoes' wheo

,*"fi.""¿îy ft"-"" beingi iroduce discomfort aûd stomach ache' whereas '

iÀ" .n"-ùã¡, ii.n" feels sõmehow weak. is streogthened bf licki¡g them uP ':ì

s, iì" udde, i, stop"Êed by the mere touch of a bra¡cb of oak' and the bat bv a

leaf of the plane tree. frt" U"pr'uîì?-' il" ram' the 'lio¡

the roosier' '

ã-å.",t"t.'tft" crackling of buisting beans, the tiger the sound of a drum

etiliì. p"*itl" . give Iurther examples, br¡t-that we úav ¡tllÎT-i"Í''lorotix tbai necessary -if the same things ale unpleasant to some but Pl:as,llti"

",¡".., *¿ if tbå pbasure and uDpleasantness lie ià the Påa[lasidi' then

äf""*ä-¡. t"*iíi drfrerelt phanio"iøi from the ext€ûial objects :"i.

Outlites oJ Pjrrhohism, Boolc I 97

But if the same thirigs do appea¡ differently because of the diffe¡ence of ssanimals, then we shall be in a position to say how the external object looks to,s, but we shall suspend judgment on how it is in nature. For we shall not beable to decide betwe€¡ ottl phantasia¡ and those of the othe¡ admals, since weare pa¡t of the dispute and thus a¡e in need of someone to make the decision, 60

rather than competent to passjùd8meût ourselves. Besides, we shall not be ableto give preferencq whether with or without proof, to our pñalrasi¿i over thoseof the non-¡ational animals. For in addition to the possibility of there beingÃo such thing as a p¡oof, as we shall point out, any pu¡pofed proof will eitherbe apparent or not apparent to us. A¡d il on the one ha¡4 it is not appa¡ent,then we shall not accept it with confidetrce. But if, ori the othe¡, it is apparentto us, thetr since what is apparent to animals is the ve¡y matte¡ in question,rand the proof is appa¡ent to us animals, the proof itself will be in questiotr as 61

.to ' hethe¡, as appa¡eût, it is t¡ue. But it is absurd to try to settle the matte¡itr question by meam of the matter in questioû, siûce the same thhg wil beboth c¡edible and Àot c¡edible, which is impossible-c¡edible insofa¡ asrtending to prove, not credible insofa¡ ¿s needing proof. Therefore, we shall nothave a proof justifying us in preferring o|ur own phøntasiai to those of theso-called "troû-rational" animals. lf, thercforq the phãntasiai diffe{ because ofthe differe¡c€ of aûimals, and it is impossible to decide between them, then itis necessaÌy to suspetrd judgment conceming the.extemal objects., But for good measu¡e we go otl to match up the so-called "nori-¡ational', 62

,animals {¡ith human beings as regards phøûtasíai. For, after our seriousla¡guments, we do not consider it unseemly to poke a little fuû at theiDopatists, wrapped as they a¡e, in the fog of thei¡ discussions with them-iselvos. We usually take the non-rational animals as a group when comparing:them {,ith human beings, but since in gropitrg for an a¡gument the Dogmatists 63'Say that the comparison is unfair, we shall for even more good me¿lsure carry:öur joking still further and base the argument on just one animal-the dog, ifryou.will-which seems to be the humblest of all. Fo¡ we shall frnd that evetrj¡ this case the animals that a¡e the subject of the a¡gument a¡e not inferior tooüselves as ¡ega¡ds the c¡edibility of the appearunces.ì,'r, -So, then, the Dogmatists acknowledge that thi$ animal diffe¡s from us in 6a

,se¡sation; fo¡ it perceives more by the sense of smell than we do, being able by¡::.this sense to track wild animals that it ca¡¡ot see, and with its eyes it sees them

more quickly than we do, and its sense of hearing is more acute. Next let us 65

:a:'"ooriside¡ reasoning. One kind of ¡easo¡ing is internal, the other is expressed.

|i.,i-!ìei¡s first look at the inte¡ûal kind. This, according to those Dogmatists who

. at tbe ûlome¡t are our cbief opponents namely, the Stoics-seeús toI .involve the following: acceptance of the familiar arid avoidance of the alien,

;,itk:trowledge of the arts related to this, possession of the virtues pertaiDing toi ;.orie's p¡oper natu¡e and of tbose having to do with the pafl¡¿. Now then, the 66

' .ilog, the animal upo¡ which as an example we decided to base the atgument,what is congenial to him and avoids the ha¡¡nful, hunting for food and.ing before the ¡aised whip. Fu¡thermorc, he has the a¡t, namelyto proyide the cotrgenial. Nor is he without virtue. For certainly if 6'?

is giving to each acco¡ding to his deserts, the dog, who fawff on and

98 S¿xtw Emp icus

guards his family and betefactors but wards ofl straogers and flalefacto¡s,68 would not be lacking in justice. Aûd if he has this vi¡tue, then in view of the

unity of the vi¡tues.he has them all, which the wise tell us is not the case withthe majority of mankind. A¡d we see him valiaût and smart in his defcnding,to which Home¡ bea¡s witoess when he depicts Odysseus as urknown to allthe people of the household but recognized by the dog Argus alone. The dogwas not deceived by the physical changes in the úan, nor had he lost his"apprehensive phantasia," which he clearly ¡etai¡ed better than the human

o beings did. And according to Chysippus, who Ìvas certâinly no f¡iend ofnon-rational animals, the dog even shares in the cælebrated Dialectic. In fact,this autho¡ says that the dog uses repeated applicatioos of the fifth undemo¡-strated argìrment-schema when, arliviûg at a junctu¡e of three paths, aftersniffing at the two down which the qua¡ry did not go, he rùshes off on the thirdwithout stopping to sDiff. For, says this atrcieDt authority, the dog in efectreasons as follows: the animal oither went this way o¡ that way or the other;he did not go this way a¡d he did not go that; therefo¡e, he went the olhe¡.

ro Furthermo¡e, the dog is aware of and can deal with his own p¿¿tl¿¿. Fo¡ whelra thom has got stuck iû hiû, he hastens to ¡emove it by n¡bbing his foot otthe ground and by using his teeth. And when he has a wound anywhere he

gently licks of the accumulated pùs, since diriy wounds are hard to cure. while?r clean ones are easily healed. Indeed, he follows very well Hippocrates' prescrip-

tion; since "ttrmobility cu¡es the footj' wheneve¡ his foot is inju¡ed he holds itup and keeps it undisturbed so far as possible. When he is t¡oubled by humorsthat do not agree with him, he eats grass, and then regurgitates the utcongenial

72 matedal along with it and gets well. Sinc-e, then, it is appareût that the animalupon which as an €xample we have rested the a¡guúett chooses what is

congenial and avoids what is troublesome, a1td possesses the art of obtainingthe coûgenial, and is aware of and able to deal with his own pathè, andfu¡thermore is not \rithout virtue-in which eleúetts consists the perfectionof internal ¡easoning-the dog would tbus far be without defrciency. Which, Isuppose, is why ce¡tain philosophe¡s [the Cynics] have honoled themselveswith the riame of this anirnal.

73 Concerning ¡easoning as exp¡essed exte¡nally it is not necessary at plesentto iûquire, fo¡ even some of fhe Dogmatists have dep¡ecated it as couDtel-productive to the acquisition of virtue, and for this r€ason they used to practicesilence duri¡g their sohooling. And anyhow, supposhg that a person is unableto speak, no one will i¡fer that he is noû-rational. But leavitg these pointsaside, we certaiûly obse¡ve admals, the subject of our disoussion, utte¡ing quite

?4 human sor¡nds-jays, fo¡ instance, and others. Aûd lettitg this too Pass, even

il we do riot uÂderstand the utterances of th€ so-called '1on-¡ational" animalsit is not at all improbable that they are cotrve$ing although rve do ûoturide¡s¡and. For when we hear the talk of barbarians we do not understând

?5 that eithe¡, and it seems to us undiffereDtiated sound. Mo¡eover, we hear dogs

making one sound when they a¡e keeping people away and another {,hen they

a¡e howling, ard oûe sound when they are beateû atd a different orie whe¡thgy are fawning. In general, if somebody weie to stùdy the matter he would

ilir find a great difference of souÂds utte¡ed by this and the other animalsi according to dife¡ert circumstânces, a¡d so fo¡ that reason it inay ¡ai¡ly bet-' said that the so-called "noÀ-ratioûal" animals have theft sha¡e of externa.lly 76lr::' expressed reasonìng. And if they are îeithe¡ hferior to human beings in the. acutene-ss of thei¡ senses ¡o¡ in i¡te¡nal reasoning, noq on top oithat, in, externalll €xp¡essed teasoni¡& then as cooce¡ns phantasíai they are not less 7?

11,i. \ryorthy of beliel than we a¡e. It is also possible to show this, I th;k, by basiog. the argument on each kind of non-rational admal. Fo¡ l.riuo*, *tå *oot¿,. ¡ot say that bi¡ds excel in sh¡ewdness aûd employ externaliy expressed

, reaso¡ing? For tbey have knowledge not only of things present bui_ah; of the

,.,., f.tut", and by p¡ophetic sounds ot some other sigûs they ¡eveal these things. . in adva[ce to people who cao understand them.

:,, .As I pjeyiously indicated, I have made this comparison for good measu¡e, 78

):_. having $umcieDtly showri, I thi¡k, that we cannot prefer our owi phantasiaí Io, those of the ¡on-rational animals, But if the non-àdonal animals a¡e not less

l- worrhy of belief tbaD we are wher it comes to deciding about ph ahtasiai, andi . the phantasiai differ depending on the variety of animals, then although I shall:l_, be able to say bow each of the external objects appearc to me, I shal te forced,Èllì for the ¡easons stated above, to suspend judgorËoi u, to no- it l, in oulu.".!{iiit Such, the¡r, is the first mode oî epoch¿. We said that the second was the ?9ìf,ii., . one based on the difierences among human beings. For even lf irrv"." gràot"¿,,- by way of suppositioo, tbat human beings are

-more to be believeã tîa¡ tneq úoD-rational animals, we shall fiûd that even coûsideration of our own

Outlircs ol Pyrhonßh, Book I 99

. dife¡ences leads to suspension ofjudgment. For human beings are said to beir composed of two eleme¡ts, the soul a¡d the body, atrd we differ ftom onei r aûothe¡ in respect to both of them. As ¡egards the úody, we diffe¡ in form an¿,. coûstitution. The body of a Sc¡thian differs in forûÌ lrom that of an Indian, and ao

. the variation is p¡odìrc€d. they say. by the diffe¡ing relative strengths oî thehumo¡s. Depending on tbis difference in relative stre[gth of the humors the¡earise difering phantasiai, as we poi¡ted oùt in the first mode. So, too, these

. humors produce a great diference in the choicê and avoidanc€ of things.i , external. lndians like some things and we like others, and likin!ã,¡**, if,irg"

is an iodication of receivìng d1îeÅn1 phantasiøi ftom the extãrnal ob.¡ects. ìn sr

. consequence of our peculiarities oI makeup, we di-ffer in such a way that someof us digest beef better thaú ¡ock fish or get diarrhea from tle wáat wi¡e of

, lesbos. There was, it is said, aD old womar of Attica who safely drank thirty.' drams of hemlock, and Lysis took four d¡ams of opium witho"í tr""¡f". Àì¿ sz

Demophon. who waited table fo¡ Alexander, used to shive¡ ir the su¡t or thg_ bath. but felt wa¡m in the shade; the A¡give Athenagoras felt no pain wherl, stuDg by scorpions and venomous spiders; the psyllaians, as they are called,

are not hamted $r'hen bi[en by asps or other snake$ nor are the Egyptia¡Tentyritae harmed by crocodiles. Furlher, the Egyprìans who live a]õne tbe ¡¡Astapous rive¡ opposjte Lake Meroe safely eal scoÍpions, súakes, and thJlike.

" l{¡d_Rufinus ofCbalcis, when he drank hellebore, neithe¡ th¡ew up nor sufrered

. any laxative efect, but be took it and digested it as though it were something, to which he was accustoúed. Chrysermus the Herophilean, if he ever ì.rsed 8a

100 Sextus Ehpitícus

peppe¡, ¡isked a heart attack. And Soterichus th€ surgeotr, wheûeve¡ he smelled

fried fish, got dia¡rhea. Andron the Argive was so immuÃe to thirst that he even

t¡aveled through the Libyan desert without needirg anything to drink. TiberiùsCaesar could see in the dark, and A¡istotle tells of a certain Thasian to whomit seeúed that a humatr phantom was all the time leading hirq a¡ound

85 Since there is so much va¡iatioû among humari beings as regards the

body-and it sùffices to mention only a few of the cases that the Dogûratistsprovide-it is likely that human beings will also differ arnong themselves as

rega¡ds the soul. For the body is a kind of image of the soul, as iodeed tlÌe artof Physiognomy shows. But the greatest indication of the vast arid limitlessdife¡e¡ce in the intetlect of human beings is the inconsisteûcy of the va¡ious

stat€melts of the Dogmatists conceming what may be aPpropriately chosen,

ao what avoided, a¡d so on. The poets, too, have expressed themselves appro-

priately about these things. For Pindar says: -

The crowús aDd t¡ophies ol b¡s storm-fool steeds

Giv€ joy to one; Yet otherc fi¡d it joyTo dwell in go¡geous chambers gold-bedecked;

Somo even ta.ke d€light in voyagingO'er ocean s billows i¡ a speeding barque

Frag. 221 SDell, as translated by Sir J. E. SaÊdys

And the poet says:

One person delights in oDe activify, another in anothel

Odyssey 14 228

Trugedy, too, is full ol such things:

If the same things were beautiful and \¡'ise for everybody,

There would be no disprr*"".ot" *""1:"::"oTXl*

And again,

It is straûge that the same t¡i¡g shoEld b€ pleasing to some

mo¡tals ând hatefuì to others.

Anoû., frag. 462 Nauck

ei Sincæ, theri, choice and avoidatce are in pleasure ald displeasure, anil-

pleasure and displeasure lie in sense aod phohtasia' whe the same things are

"hor"o by so-" i"ople and avoided by oihe$ it is logical for us to i¡fer tbat

these people a¡e ioiaffected alike by ihe same things, sinc€ if they were tþelwould aliie have chosen and avoided the same things But if the same thi$i '

produce different afects depending otr the difre¡ence ãf human behgs, this too

iould ,"asooubly lead to suspension of judgmeot arid we would, peihaps, be '

able to say what each of the "*t"rod

oú¡""i. appea¡s to be, rehlive to'e¿í<ilit'

8s diffe¡ence, but we would not ue a¡teio si'J" *rtài it It io "uíore

For we itiál- t-' "tfr"r

it"" a g¡ve c¡edence to all human beings or to some But if to all;lù!r:

.ftuff æ "tt"ttipti"g

impossibilities and accepiing contradictory stateiíeriis::;

And if to some, let ihe óogmatists tett us to wtroniwe should give assent Theì.

Platonist will say "to Pþtã" and the Epicu¡ean "to Epicurus,; and the others.l

Outlines of Pyfthottish, Book 1 101

analogously, and thus with theft unsettled disputes they bring us again to 8e

suspension ofjudgment. Anyone who says that we ought to give assent to themajority view is making a childish proposal, for no one is able to approach thewhole huma¡ ¡ace and by talking with them find or¡t what pleases the majority.Ind€ed, there may be peoples of whom we know nothing but among whomatt¡ibutes that arc most rare amotrg us are commor! while the attdbutes mostcommor amoÃg us are lare among them; so that, for example, most of themfeel no pain when bitten by spiders, while a few, on rare occasions, do; andaûalogously with the other "idiosync¡acies" previously mentioned. Of necessity,the¡efo¡e, suspension ofjudgment comes in agaia, via the differences of humanbeings.

While the Dogmatists egoistically claim that in deciding the facts p¡efer- eo

ence ought to be given to themselves above all othe¡ human beings, we realizethat this claim of theirs is inappropriate since they themselves are part of thedispute. Ä¡d il giving prefe¡eîce to themselv€$, they make a decision about theappearances, by ent¡usting the decision to themselves they beg the questionbefore the deciding is begun. In any case, in order to aûive at suspension of or

jirdgment by an argumeût dealitrg with only one pe¡soû-thei¡ Ideal Sage, forexamplq who i$ expert at iDterprcting dreams-we take ùp the thi¡d mode inthe list.

This mode is the ooe that we say is based on the difrerence of the senses.

That the senses difer f¡om one another is obvious fiom the start. For instance, 92

to the eye it seems that paintings have hollows and p¡oninences, bùt not tothe touch. And for some people horiey seems pleasant to the tongue butuÃpleasant to the eye; consequently, it is impossible to say without qualifrca-tion whether it is pleasant or unpleasant. And likewise in the case of perfume,fo¡ it pleases the sense of smell but di$pleases the taste. So too with spurge 93

juice: since it is pai¡ful to the eyes but pairless to all the Ést of the body, wewill not be able to say without qualfication whethe¡, insofd as its natr¡re is

concerned, it is painful or painless to bodies. And ¡ain watel is beoeflcial to the,élíes;but it is rough on the wind pipe and lungs, as is olive oil despite its beiûgrsgothing to the skiÃ, The sting-ray, when it touches the extremities, ptoduceslriú:iilbness, but it can touch the rest of the body harmlessly. Hence we shall notiliggble to say how each of theae thitrgs is in its natu¡e, but only how it appea¡stò tie in each instance.

ill.iMore examples can be given, but in o¡der not to delay carrying out the e4

,:,ip-ujpose of our essay, the following poiot reeds to be made. Each thing that

i"ià,ilþga¡s to us in sensation seems to affect us as complex; for example, the apple

iiþenis smooth, f¡agraût, sweet, yellow. But it is Âot evident whether it ¡eally

ilÈ¡ç'¡¡"!" a¡d only these qualities, o¡ whether, havirg only one quality, it

âgain whether it has more qualities than are apparent but some of them dodifferctrtly depending on the different constitutions of the sense o¡gans,

us. That it has one quality could be argued on the basis of what we 95

y said about the food takeà up by the body ard the water taken up

rhe apple, too. may be of one form but appear diflerently because of the

:rence of the sense orga¡s through which it is perceived. And tbar the apple e6

,trçe aqd th€ aiÏ breathed into flutes and pipes and similar instruments;

102 SexlÆ EmPìricus

has more qualities than those that appear to us, we call reaso[ as follows'

Suppose thàt someone is bor havi[g the senses of touch, smell, arld taste'.bÙt

can ieithe¡ hear.ror see. Then he will assume that the origin of his pe¡c€ptions

i. rÀi ."*aftitg visible o¡ aùdible, but that il has only those three tyPes of

" quJty *fti"ft ft"-is capable of perceiviûg- A¡d it js possible that we' with only

óur five s"rrses, p"roeive only those qùalities of tbe apple that-we are fitted to

perceive, and thát perhaps the¡e are other qualities, affecting other serse organs

i"hi"tr *" lu"t und tor w-hich we consequently cannot perceive any correspond-

itrg objects.,, "

Br.it outoa", aomeoûe may say, has made the senses exactly p¡oportiotrate

to the objects ol sense. But what is this "nature", seeing that the¡e is so much

unr""o1uá cont¡oveßy among the Dogmatists concerning its very existe¡ce?

For anyone who decides this question, that is, whether ûatì¡re exists-' will have

no credlb ity with them if he ii an ordinary person, while if he is a -philosopher

he witl be párt of the cotrtroversy and instead,of being a judge will be subject

" iã ¡"¿ì-"åt n-.elf. So that if ii is possible that only those qualities.exist in

the ap-ple which we seem to perceive, or that thele are more thån th€se' o¡

alain ttrat the.e are not even ;he ones that afect us, what the apple is like will

bé no¡evident to us. The same atgument holds also in the case of the othel

objects of sense. ADd sitce the senses do not apprehend the external objects'

th; intellect is not capable of doing so eithe¡, so that this argument, too' seems

conducive to suspension ofjudgment conceúing the exte¡ûal objects'

100 In o¡de¡ thaiwe shall be abie to reach suspeûsio ofjudgment when basing

the a¡gument on each single sense or eveD drisrega¡ding the senses' we take up

fu*hei the fou¡th mo<le of epoch¿- "lhiß is the oûe desc¡ibed as "based on

circumstances," where by "cirãumstances" we mearr coÂditions We say thât itis concerned with being in a natural or unnatural condition, with being awake

or asleep, with dependence on age, on being in motion o¡ at rcst' on hating or

iouit g, å" t"i"g in need or satiited, on being druûk or sobe¡, on p¡edisposi-

ror tioosion beinfcourageous or fearful, on being dist¡essed or cheerful Thus'

i"¡irÉ "tr"",

uã in disslmilar ways depending on whether we are in a natu¡al

oi uinatu¡al condition, as when people who are deli¡ious or possessed by a

!ãd seem to hear spirits but we dã not. Simila¡ly, those people.ofteû say that

ih"y p"t""iu" odo¡s^ of sto¡ax o¡ frankincense o¡ some such thiîg' and much

elsi ioo, although we do ûot sense them. And the same wâter that seems to u's

to be lukewarm seems boiling hot when poured on an inflamed place And the

Outlínes of Pyrhonßm, Book 1 103

in ari unnatural state have the Âature of the healthy aîd iû a tratural state thatof the sick; so that c¡edeÃce should be givel to these last, too, as beiqg in arelatively natural state.

Dtñerct\t phafltasiai come about, too, depending on whether we are asleep

or awake. Fo¡ when we a¡e awake we do not inagire lou phantazometha-lwhat:we imagine when we are asleep, nor when we are asleep do we Ìnagine whatwe imagine when awake, so that whether the phantasiai are tbe case or arc'r,olthe case is not absolute but ¡elative, that is, ¡elative to being asleep or awake.It is fair to say, then, that when asleep we see things that arc not the case iûthe waking state, though not absolutely not the case. Fo¡ they ale the case inour sleep, just as what we see in or¡¡ waking state is the casq though not inour sleep.i DepetrdiDg on age, too, difercrt phantasiai arise, since lhe same ai¡ seemscold to the aged but tempe¡ate to those who are in their prime, and the same

çolor appears faint to olde¡ people but vivid to those in their primq and.likewise the same soùnd appears faint to the forûer bùt clearly audible to the

I ,latter. And people of diflering ages a¡e moved in difrerent ways depending on- thei¡ choices and aversions. For instance, child¡en a¡e interested in balls and. rhoops, but people iû their prime p¡efer othe¡ thiûgs, and the elderly still oth€rs.I fr'om this we conclude that, also depending on diffe¡ences of agg dife¡ing

þhantasiai attse Èo¡ln the same extemal objects.ir ì,. ..Objects appear dife¡eûtly, too, depending oû whether otre is in moûon o¡:t at'rest. For things that we see as statioDary whe¡ we a¡e at ¡est seem to be

f imoiing when we are sailing by. Depeoding on liking and disliking, also: for,lrrsòrne people a¡e completely repelled by pork, while otheß eat it with the:lr'i¿reatest of pleasure. Whence Menarder, too, said:

same coat appears tawny-o¡aÂge to people with bloodshot eyes b]¡t not to me

ro¡ Also, the same hon"y upp.ur. .*""t to 'ne

but bitter to the jaundiced Further'--- r ,ìà"".t ."y. arrai uo inte.mingliog ài

""ttuitt norno* pioduces' in- persohs ;

who ar" in an unnatural condition, ;dd phantasiai of the external objectst it ri

mort b" ."pLi"a tnut .ince healthy people, too, have intenningled humors'-it is '

fo..itfe tnut the external objecti are in ûature such as they appear to thòs'el l

i"^on, *no are said to be in an unnatu¡al state, but that these humo¡s a¡Þ't

;aking the extemal objects appea¡ to the healthy people to be othgt tnan tfe1,¡

*, u.". ni to giu" the power of Jtering the external objects to some humors but i

iot to oth"i, l. arbitrary; since jusl as the healtþ in a natural state have "tþfi

naturc of the healthy anà iq an unnatu¡al state th;t of the sick, so too the siilrkir

:iir.

n.:1

ìt

Look how his face appears Dow that hehas come to t¡is like aD animal!It is acting jusdy that makes us fair.

Frag. 518 Kock

':$!lti!wine that appears sou¡ to people who have p¡eviously eaten dates or figs1ii'èe'ms sweet to those who have eaten nuts or chickpeas; and the vestibule ofi;iidibàthhouse is warm to those entering f¡om outside aûd cold to those

when we a¡e drunk. And depending on predispositions: since the rro

il they have speÂt some time in it. And depending oû being afraid o¡ 1r1

hòt at all so to the bold. And, finally, depending on being distressed oriou¡ageous: sirce the same thing seems frightful aDd terrible to the timid

)¡,f.ul: sirice the same thitrgs that are annoying to people who are distressedple¿lsant to those who a¡e cheerful.

àni beings a¡e in oÂe coDditioû at one time alÌd a¡other at atother,eâch extemal objecl appears to each person is easy to say, I suppose,

the¡efore, thole is so much anomaly depending on conditions, and rrz

107

104 Sextul Emp i.as

but not how it is, sinc€ the anomaly is u[resolved. For anyone resolving itis eithe¡ in one of the aJorementioned conditiotrs o¡ is in no condition atall. But to say that he is itr no condition at all-for examplg treither healthynor sick, neithe¡ in motion nol at rest, nor of any particular agq aûd devoidof the other conditions as well-is completely absu¡d. But if he, being in somecondition, makes a decisior about the p¡dr,rasi¿i, he will be pa¡t of the dispùteand in other ways not a pure or fair judge of the exte¡nal objects, because hehas been contaminated by the conditions he is in. The waking pe¡son c¿ìnnotcompate fhe phantasíoi of sleepers with those of people who ale aìrake, nor canthe healthy percoû compare those of the sick with those of the healthy. For weassert to thirgs that are in the p¡esent and move us in the pre$ent, more thanto thi¡gs that arc rot in the preseol

In anothe¡ way, too, the aromaly of such phanta.si,,i is unæsolved. Foranyone preferring one phantasiø. to anothe¡ or one circumstatrce to aûothereilher does tbis without maki¡g a decision and without giving proof, or bymaking a decision and givi¡g proof. Bu[ he will not do it wilhout these mea¡s,for then he will not be credible, nor will he do it with them, either. For if hemakes a decision abott tbLe phantasiaL he wìIl certainly decide by means of acriterior. And ce¡tainly he will either say that this criterion is true o¡ that it isfalse. But if he says that it is false, he v¡ill not be qedible. And if he says thatthe criterior is true, either he will say this {,ithout proof o¡ he will say it withproof. Again, if he says it without plooq he will not be credible; but if withproof, the proof will ce¡tai¡ly need to be t¡ue if he is to be c¡edible. When hèamrms the truth of the p¡oof which he is taking to establish the credibility ofthe criterion, will he have made a decision abot¡t this ot lrot? Ifhe has trot madethe decision, he will ûot be c¡edible; and if he has made the decisior! then it isobvious that he will say that he has decided by means of a c¡iterion, in orderthat it may be maintaired, and the critedoD has Âeed of a p¡oof, in o¡der thatit may be shown to be t¡ue. Arid neithe¡ is it possible for a proof to be soundwithout the pdo¡ existence of a t¡ue c¡iterion, nor for a crjterion to be truewitbout the previously confirmed prool And rhus the crilerion and the prooffall into the cûcularity type o1 aporía, in which both a¡e found not to becredible; for each, while it awaits the credibility of the othe! is equallyiûüedible with the other. Therefo¡e, if nobody, with or \¡'ithout a pioof andcriterion, is able to give one phantasia prefereDce over anothe¡, then thedifeljng phantasíai that arise deperding on the different conditions will beundecidablel so tbat this rdode. loo, leads to suspeDsioo ofjudgment coDcem-ing the nature of the external objects.

t14

t17

Outli etr of Pyfthonisn, Book I 105

appea¡s broken when it is in th€ water and st¡aight when it is out, and the eggsoft when it is ir the bi¡d but hard when it is ir the air, and the ligure liqriãin the lynx but hard in the ait and coral soft in the sea but hard in the ai¡, àndsound appeats orle way in a pipe, anothe¡ in a flute, and still another when itis simply in the ai¡.

And depending on positions: the same portrait appeaß smooth when tiltedback, but when tilted fo¡ward a certaiû amount it seems to have depths andpromìnences. And the necks of pigeons appear diffe¡ent in colo¡ dep"rraing ònthe different argles of iriclinatio[.: The¡efo¡e, sincæ eve¡ything apparent is viewed ir some location and f¡omsome.distatrce and in some position, each of which produces a great deal of\ar]rafion ii the pha tas¡¿i, as we have rema¡ked above. we shall be forced alsô

118 The ñfth argume¡t is that depeÃding on positions, distances, and locations:Fo! depending oî each of these, the same things appea¡ dife¡ent-f<iiexample, the same stoa viewed from either end appea¡s tapering but from themiddle completely symmetrical, and from afar the sa.ûre boat appeârs small anil:j

¡ourd from afar but square frorn close up. ..iri(1e These depend oo distances. But depending on locations: the same laúp-

light appears dim in the suffhine br¡t bright in the da¡k, and the same oá.1

stationa¡y but ftom close up large and in motion, and the same tower appeârò;l

by tbis mode to have ¡ecourse to suspension ofjudgmeut. And anyone wishing' _ to glve prefe¡ence to some of these prraht¿siai will be attemptiûg the impossible.I For if he makes his assertio simply ard without proof, he will not b€ credible;i|.,ìwlìereas, supposing that he wishes to use a prooi if he says that the proof is

. false he will co¡fute himseif, while iI he says ihat ii is true úe will need a proofof its being true, and again a proof of that, since it too mu$t be t¡ue, and so

, on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to produce infinitely many proofg and so. he will not be able by means of a proof to give one pftantasia ptefeleîce oyet

atother. Ard iI one cannot decide aboùt the afo¡eme[tioned pft antasiai etthel¡::$tjth o¡ vitbout a proof, suspension ofjudgrnent results; for, I supposg of any;l¡iven thing we are able to say of what so¡t, relative to its pa¡tiolla¡ positior\ì,;distãnce, and place, it appeals to bq but fo¡ the above teasoDs we cannot stateiro.f:¡rhat so¡t it is in its natu¡ei:tii:i, The sixth mode is the one that depends on admixtu¡es and acco¡ding toi'¡víhich.we conclude that, since no¡e of the extertral objects affects us by itselfþ.ut,.âlways in combination with something, it is pe¡haps possible to say whatìJhe¡iixtuæ of the exte¡nal object and that together with which it is obse¡ved

Jike;.but we cannot do the same fo¡ the exte¡nal object coûsidered by itself..obyious f¡om the stal, I thitrk, that none of the exte¡nal objects afrects usitçsll but always does so in combination with something, and that

oJ one hue in warm ah and as of anothe¡ in cold ai¡, and so we cannot say

120

otr this it is observed as diffe¡erit. Thus, oùr own complexion is seen

two kinds of air. Further, the same sound appears one way in thin air and

complexion is in naturq but oûly how it looks together with each of

,i in dense ai¡, and spic€s a¡e mo¡e pungent in the bathhouse and irr thean-in very cold ai¡, and the body is light when imme$ed iri wate! butin:air-

tliflolder to get away f¡om just exte¡nal admixtu¡es: our eyes contatr within

\22

,ùe'pe¡ceive, and because of this the jarndic€d see eve¡ything yellow, while

both meñb¡anes and liquids. Sinc€ things seen are not obseruedthese, they will rlot be accu¡ately app¡eheÃded, for it is the mixtu¡e

with blood in the eyes see things as bloodred. And since the same sound

rjltinding, and of ore quality in clea¡ air and anothû in murky air, it is

:of oÍe.quality in open places arid of aûother in places that ate narrow

\24

106 Sextus Empiricus

likely that we do ûot perceive the sound iû aod of itse4 fol the ears have

,rarrâw and wioding pa_ssages and are contaminated by vaporous effiuvia said

12? to be conducted fiom púc"s a¡ound the head Moreover, since there are

substa¡ces in the trostrils and in the a¡eas of tast€, we Perceive the objects of

iasìe and of sme together with these and not in and of themselves Thelefore'

becaùse of the admixtures the senses do lot percÆive precisely how the exteñal

objeots are.Lza Nor does the iûtellect do so either, especially shce its guides, the seûses'

go wro[g; perhaps it too contributes some special admixtu¡e of its own to the

ieports õi itr" sàses; fo¡ we observe that there ale humors situat€d around

each of the places in which the Dogmatists suppose that the ruling part of the

soul is located, whether the braií or the heaf or whatever palt of the animâl

anyone waats io put it ifl. And so by this mode also we see that, being unable

to say anythiûg;bout the nature of the extemal objects, we are fo¡ced to

suspension ofjudgmedt t

,rn 'Th" seventh iode, w€ said, is that depending otr the quattity and

constitution of the exterûal objects, giving "constitution' its common meaning'

ramely, combination lt is obvious that by this mode, too, we are forced to

susp"ná judgment about the nature of the objects For example, shavhgs. of agoáth tðrn appear wnite when observed by ihemselves and ûot in combina-

iion, tut when ìhey are combitred in the substanc-€ of the hom they look black'

,loi inalv,a"A nfing. of a piece of silver appea¡ black, but whetr udted wil¡ßo the whole they affect us as white. And pieces of Taer¡arean ma¡ble look wl¡itq :

when they arË poüshed, but combined in the whole stone they appear yellow'

ÀJ gt"iá. of ånd whén scattered appear rough, but when gathered togethe¡ lr

in a ãune they aflect our senses as ioft. And hellebore, taken when fine and 11.

131 light, tends tó choke one, but tot when coarse And wine, when dn¡¡k in l

À"oderation, strengthens r¡s, but when taken iû excess, disables the body And 'l:i

food, similarly, exhibits diffe¡ent p.**. ã"p*¿i"s'"n the amounti often' -ìinOeea, ty being taken in too great qua¡tily ¡t brings rhe body dowo with

Úz indigestion and -dia¡rhea.

So he¡e, too, we shall be able to say-of what-qualiti ::L

the ;h¿ving of ho¡n is, and of what quality the combinatioû of many shaviûgs ..1.1

li un¿ ttt"iuttt" fot ttte particle of silver and the combination of many paficles' riì:

arid fo¡ the bit of Taerrur"ur, ,ou.¡t" uJ iL" combinâtion of many bii, and wc iìiican make relative statements in the c;se of the grains of sand and the hellebo¡elirj

to lead us arourid to suspension ofjudgment, fo¡ we are ùqable to say aûythingwithout qualification about the nature of the external objects.

The eighth mode is the one based on relativity, where we coûclude that, t3since everything is ir ¡elatioû to somethiûg, we shall suspeqd judgment as towhat things are in themselves and in their rature. But it must L ãoticed that

. herg as elsewherq we use ..are,'for .,appear to bg,'saying in efrect ,tverythingI .appears in relatioû to something.,' But this statemeni hai two senses: ûrst, as

implying r€lation to what does thejudgiúg, fot the objeot tbat exists extemallyand-is judged appears in ¡elation to what does theJudging, and second, as

l. implying relation ro the things obse¡ved togethe¡ wirh-it, ;s, ió, "*u-pt",

w¡ut.,, is on the right is in ¡elation to what is on the left. And, indeed we haive taken r:r'i ., iûto accou¡t earlier that everything is in rclation to somethirrg,'fo, "ru*pl",

u.iltf,,reeards what does the judging, that each tbi¡g appears in rðlation to tìris o,¡.'1,.

that aninal or person or seme aûd i¡ ¡elation tã such and such a circumsiã"e;a¡d as rega¡ds tbe Lhi¡gs observed together wiLh ir, tfrur

"u"f, tUi"g upf"u., in

relation to this or that admixture o¡ manner o¡ combioation or!*rrtity o,l:i,:. ,posrhon.

But it is also possible to prove by a special argur¡enl that everytbi¡e is i¡ r¡r¡elatio¡ lo somethitrg, as follows. Do rhe things lhat are wbat they aie byiirtu.oJ a dife¡ence difie¡ f¡om the rhings that a¡ùn ¡elalion to ,.-áf,i"g, '",

"*f,.-Iftbey.do¡otdiffer,the¡theJrooareinrelationtosomething;ifthey-áodiffer,then, sinc€ whateve¡ difre¡s is io ¡elation to something (for ii is ca[ed wtrat it

,.1. ,rs. û relaJlon to_that fÌom which ir differs), the thitrgs that are what they a¡e by

,:.;...:ft* ol a diff- e¡e¡ce a¡e i¡ ¡elation to something. A¡Id, accordinj to the 138

, Dogmaústs, of things that ate, some are summa genera, othe* a¡i infrmoe

^,,.. ., "l:"i"",-und

othe¡s are ge¡era and species. But all tÀese are relative. Agiu, of'],',ithl¡gs that a¡e, soûe are pre-evideût and others are non_evident, as they say;Ë. the appeara¡ces signify, and tbe ron-evident things are signified by their' appearances. Fo¡, according to them, ..the appea¡atrces a¡e a view óf thei'1t. :rioD-evident." But, what signifies and what is signifred are relative. Therefore, llei¡ everythingis ¡elative. Moreover. of things that are, some ate similar and othersH/,,'.af.e

d$slt ta¡,^aûd some are equal aod others are unequal; but these thiqgs a¡e

ili,.llîl9oy9; tberelore, everything is relative. And even the person who says rhat#1.

.not all things are relarive coDfirms the relativity of all things, for Ly theS:r êrgùmeúts he opposes to us he shows thal the very relativity of all things is

ard the wiÂe and the food, too, but we still cannot state the absolute natulellôfi$

it "

tniog, L""uo." oi the unorîaly ol phantr¡Jiai depending orr combiûationll l :ili

ß3 It s;ús that in general evet beneûcial things become harmîul whet they..'i

are used in immoderà'te quantities, and the things that seem hu¡tful when takel ,,,¡

in excess a¡e harmless in small quantities The best indication of this point is. -i

what is observed in regard to th" pow"r. of medicines, in which the"ex49t¡:l,,{

mixing of the simple diugs produces a compound that is bereficial' 'b:¡tl'l -hèiììl{

occasiónal slightest error in weighiug, when overlooked, nakes it not otrly'.not'i

beûefrcial but even qìrite hurtful afld often poisotous - -. 'ii li,i

ti4 So the argument relathg to quatrtities and corstitutions rnuddlesilþ.gi]

existence of thã external objeJs Consequently this úode too may be expeôffi

Outlines of Pyrùonism, Book t IO7

135

il.Now, when we have showtr that all thirgs ate relative, the obvious ¡esult 140ï.hátias concerns each external object we sÀall not be abie to stat" t orv it l.

-

¡itd!,o\in rûatu¡e and absolutely, but only how, iq ¡elation to somethiûg, itþ-g¿¡s,to be:It follow$ that we must suspeld judgment about th" "ut;;;;iðilbiþcts.

ve to us aDd not unive¡sal.

Ih iòbnnection with the mode based oû the constancy or infrequency of r+ri!,!li:nce; which"we say is the ninth in order, we considár su"f, it"*"ãJtfr"

- -

¡r The sun is ce¡tainly a much mo¡e ma¡velous thing than a comeL Butsee the sun all the time but the comet only infrequently, we marvel at

come! so ñuch as even to suppose it â divine ponent, but we do qotbing

108 SerÍus Emqìricus

like that for the suû. If, however, we thought of the sun as appeariog

iniequently and setting infr€queotly, aDd a's illuminating ever¡4hing¿ll at once

-Jìrt"t.'t¿¿"¡y betg ectipsed, we would frnd much to ñawel at in the

142 mattet. And earthquakes arc trot equally t¡oublesome to the pelsoo.who is- -

"*pe.l"n"lng one fo¡ the fi¡st time and to the persoo who has become

aciustomeito them. And how ma¡velous is the sea to th€ person who sees it

i*,¡¿ãi., tiúe! And a beautilul humari body that is seeû suddedy and for

,, ift" nìrt dme excites us more that if it were to become a customaly síght'

Things that arc rare seem p¡ecious' but thiúgs tbat ate familiar and easy.to get

il;;i;à""d, if we thought of water as ra¡e, how much more precious it*.Jã .p-p". it"t tU the tlings lhat do seem pr€cious! Aûdif we.nouctl: c:ld,iÃpfy ,iätt"."¿ oo tn" Srou¡¡ lke stones, to whom do we thiûk it would then

be precious and worlh hoardiog awa/t,n I ir""",,f,*,,ft" same thingl depending on whether they-occur frequently

or infrequently, seem at oûe tiñe marvelous or preøous and at another trme

r"r, *";tf". íúat we shalt perhaps be able to say how each of these appea¡s

*-fti"ü ã""o.. ft"qo"ntly oi when it occurs infrequetrtly, but thal ve shall not

¡"'"-if" a .i","*iift"ut'qualifrcation'how each o{ the extemal objects is And;

accordingly, via this mode too we withhold asseit as regards them'

t.r ---ïil-;#,h

;od€, which is principally coÂcemed with ethics' is.the one' -

¿"p*ãng oi *uy, áf üf" urrd oo "otioms,

laws, mythic beliefs' and dogrnatic

ü;;;i;i;., A way of life is a chosen basis for living or fo¡ some particulâr

ac^tån, adopted by one person or many-for example'. by DLogeo¡1 9r the

*u ià"o¡uor. ¡ law-is a written ugt""m"ot uloong the citizens' the r¡iolator of

which is punished; a custom or common praotice (for there is ûo difle¡encÐ is

tn" i.ti'""""p,*"" Uy a number of people of a certaio way of acting' rdlere

the violato¡ ii not in all cases punished: thus, there is a law ag¿Lrtìst adu]tery'

ut "ri i"tì,lti"" custom not ù have inte¡cor¡rse with a woman in public À-

.¡li" belief is the acceptance of things that a¡e not the case.and a¡e

Àãtional-such ur, u-oog others, the myths about Cronus-ard in which

-^rru oeoole olace credence. And a dogmátic supposition is the acceptance of

;;;ñ;',;; ;;; to be established bv anâlosv or some kind of proof' such

^ lftu, ift"t" a¡e atomic elements of things, or bomoeomeries lu]timate

Outli es of Pyfthonitm, Book I 109

a mythical belief to a mythical belief when in oûe place w€ say that accordingto myth Zeus is the fathe¡ of men and gods, while in anothe¡ we say that it isOceanus, refelfiûg to the line:

OceaDus, the source of the gods, and Tethys, the mother.

lliad 14.201

And we oppose dogmatic opinions to oûe another when we say that somepeople âssert that there is just one element and othe¡s that thete are infitritelymany, and that some asse¡t that the soul is mo¡tal and others that it isimmortal, and that some asse¡t that our affai¡s aÌe ar¡anged by divirieprovidence while othets asse¡t that they are trot.

We also oppose custom to the other items-to law, for examplq when wesay that among the Persians sodomy is customa¡y but among the Romans itis p¡ohibited by law; and with us adultery is p¡ohibited, but amo¡g theMâssagetae it is by custoú treated as a matter of indiference, as Eudoxr¡s ofClidos repo¡ts in the first book of his Tlauels; aDd v/ith us it is forbidde¡ tohave inte¡cou¡se with one's mothe¡, whe¡eas with the Pe¡sians this sort ofma¡riage is very much the custom. A¡d amotrg the Egyptians men marry theirsiste$, which for us is prohibited by law. Custom is opposed to way of lifewhen, whereas the majority of men have intercou¡se with thei¡ wives in someplace apart, Crates did it with Hipparchia in public; and Diogenes went arourdwith shouldeß ba¡e, while we dress itr the ùsùal way. AfId custom is opposedto'mythical belief, as when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, it

nârticles of matlerl, o r minima. or other Things'"- n"ã *" oppoå each of these ilems sometimes to itself and sometimes to

"o"n oitl" oil"rs. po, example, we oppose custom to custom thus:::9:91 Ìj

the Ethiopians tattoo thei¡ babies, but we do not ADd the PerslaDs thldc rt : ìi:

;;;"ri;i;;";. brightly colored garmetrts that reach to the feeti but:w.e . lããrìiJ".î ""¡"""-ttfr

urrd *h"."u, in" Iodians have intercoüse with women ¡ljt -""hi"l

-ã.t othe¡i consider this shameful we oppose law to law thqs;: itl

i-ãr" iìt" n"ã-,, ¡" who gives uP his patrimony does not pay åis fatheis

àebts;-br¡t among the Rhodians he always pays rhem; aod^among lo" 'il".::icythia there was a law that foreþers were to be sacriñced to Artemß' bul :i-'

Ï*Ï-:':;ltÉ*'l:,tt*a*+:*ir*rîli*:Ëffi

148

,',¡ We oppose way of life to law when, though there is a law against stdki¡glarf¡ee a¡d well-bo¡n man, the paÃc¡atiasts hit one ariother because of their way

life; and whe& though homicide is fo¡bidden, the gladiato¡s kill one another|the same ¡easor. Further, we oppos€ mj¡thical belief to way of lile when we

;Io:do, eveû to a mode¡ate deg¡ee, whe¡eas He¡acles's way of life was noble. We rsg

out that the myths say that Heracles iD the house of Omphale "cardedendured slaverf' and did these things which nobody would choose

.eìoì¡s way of life for the sake of glort on the supposition that glory is good,ùle many philosophers dog¡atize that it is aû evil thing. A¡Id we oppose lawllnythical belief whetr the poets present the gods as placticing adultery andComy, while with us the law prohibits doing these thirigs; and we oppose lawilogûratic opinior when the Ch¡ysippeans say that inte¡course with mothersiJbibtersì is a matter of indiFerence, while the law prohibits these things.

way of life to dogmatic supposition when athletes undertake an

; we oppose mythical beliefto dogmatic sùpposition wheû the poets say

came down and had intercourse with mortal women, whe¡eas this is

159

110 Sextut Et lpiticus

162 deemed by the Dogmatists to be impossible; and the poet says that Zeus,

becaùse of grief over Sarpedon,

Let fall a shower of blood upon the earth,

Iliad 16.459

while it is a dogma ofthe philosophers that the divinity is impassive; and when

the philosophers reject the myth of the hippocentaus, while offe¡ing us the

hippocentaur as a pa¡adigm of nonexistence.163 For each of the foregoing oppositions it was possible lo take many other

exa¡nples, but in a¡ outliDe these will sumce. At any rate, sitce by this mode,

too, so much anomaly in "the facts" has been shown, we shâll not be able tosay how any external object or state of aflai¡s is in its natu¡e, but only how itappears in ¡elatlon to a given way of life or law or custom, and so forth Andso becar¡se of this mode, too, we mùst suspeûd judgment about the trature ofthe extertral "facts." Thus, via all ten modes we end up with suspension ofjudgmen t.

15. The Five Modes

164 The more recent Skeptics haûd dowtr the following ûve modes of ¿po¿r¡¿: the

f,¡st is the mode based on disagreemenq the second is that based oû infrniteregress; the thi¡d, that based on ¡elativity; the fou¡th, on hypothesis; add the

ros fif¡h is the ci¡cula¡ity mode. The one based on disagreement is that accordi¡gto which we find that, both in ordinary life and among philosophers, withregard to a given topic there has been ¡eached aû ufilesolvable impasse ollaccourt of which we are utable to ¡each a ve¡dict one way ol the other, and

166 we end ùp with suspeosion of judgmeot. The oûe based on inûnite regress is

that in which we say that what is ofe¡ed as suppo¡t for believing a given ,

proposition is itself in Deed of such suPport, a¡d that suppolt is in need of other-

support, and so on ad i¡ûnitum, so that, sitce we have tro place from which to:'ror begin to establish anything, suspensio ofjudgment follows The one based on

relativity is, as we said before, that in which the external object appears this 'way or that way in lelation to the judging sùbject and the thiûgs observed at ,

168 the same time, but we suspendjûdgmeût as to how it is in its tature AÀd thg:rl

oûe based oû hypothesis comes itrto play whetr the Dogmatists, involved ifl a¡ i

i¡finite rcgress, begin with somethidg that they do not establish but that th.eJ.rl

conceming it. For some people say that ody the seDse objects are t¡ue. othersmat only the tbought objects, and still othe¡s that some ofeach. Now, will theysay that the disagreemetrt can be decided o¡ that it cannot? Ifil

"åonot,'i"have the conclùsion that one m¡rst suspend judgment, fo, conc"r;; dj";;.;"_ments that a¡e not decidable otre cannot make an assertion. Oq tn"

"ifr", frî¿,ilit is decidable, theû we wanr to know how it ls to ¡e ¿eci¿J ifrai î" ¿'"ää" ,,

abou! a seose objccr. lor exanrple (foi firsr we shall Our" ,f," urg;"ni;rlì,casej Þy a sense otJect or a thought object? If by a se¡se object, then, since the

::::"^ " _b]:_:lr T" yh?t our inquiry.is about, this'object too wil í""J;";;thi';serse as support. A¡d thal also is a sense object, jt again will need suDÞort.ftom another otre, and so on ad infinitum. nui if we aie to ¿""iå" uuo-íül" ,r,.s.ense objecr by a thoughr object, the¡, $in"" tt

"." i. u ai.ug.""-"ni utãit ìi"

.thqught objects, too, and this is a thought objecr, it also;[ U" i","ø""f9"::,:": To :"q0.1 Bur by vhat wil ir ¡e suiporred? rf by ; rhous;;;;;"ì,ru wu súnllarly l¡volve an inEnite regress: but if by a sense obiect, iheo. sincea mought obJect was used as suppo¡t for a sense object and a iense obiect fo¡a tnoughl obJecl. the circularity mode of epocl¡¿ comes jn.

, )., . But if, to avoid these poiûts, ou¡ iûterlocr_¡to¡ should think to assume 173r sgmething, by consent and {¡ithout demo¡sttation, as a Uu.i io. ¿"-onrüuiing wbat follows, the bypothesis mode coûes into play aûd allow. oo *uu n"iFor iI rbe hypolhesizer is worthy of qedence. *Ë,¡lO ¡" ," 1".. *àä"

"?crede¡ce wtìeneve¡ we hypothesize the opposite. And if what the hypothesizer.i-hylothesizes is_ true, he makes it suspecr Èy tuking ir u, u nyfotl";i:il;;d

"fèsl,l9lisbinc it;tut if it is-false, the undcrpinoi"g, Jr *r" thioii b";ñãitrh;wrr,b€ rotter.I.'rútheJ, iÎhypothesizing co¡tribures somethi;g to ciedibiliry. we rr+mrght as wetl bypolhesize what is in question and not soÃething else üom' which.Lhe, hypolhesizer is goiog to esrablish rhe poinr at i,r;;; ;Jìf;-;

. absu¡d to bypothesize what is in questioû, it will also be absu.d to hypotheszefrpropositioû supero¡diûate to this.

deem worthy of acceptance as ag¡eed upon without question or demonst¡ati9-nìl

169 And the circularity mode occurs whetr what ought to make the case fot,fh":"matter in questiotr has need of support f¡om that vely matteq whence, beingliunable to assume either in o¡der to establish the other, we sùspend judgEq4tÌ

Outlines oÍ Pyrrhoni.tn, Book I tll

about both

rro show in b¡ief as follows. Anything proposed fo¡ conside¡ation is either aThât eve¡y matter of inquiry caû be broughl unde¡ these modes rve shall

object or a thought object, but whicheve¡ it is, there is a

. , T_bat all se¡se objects are relative is evident, fo¡ they a¡e relative to whoeve¡ r7sdoes Lhe sensrng. It is tberefore plaiú lhar any sense objecr that is ÐroDosed rous rs easrly broughr u¡der the 6ve modes. And we reason i¡ tlå same *ruêboul.thoughr objects. For if it js said rbal the djspute js ¡or decidable- ti'e

¡¡:,ç.Êcsity ofsuspendingjì¡dsmeûr about it wilt Ue grantea us. ana iilnã;ìr;Jõ ,r.is goi¡g to be decided, rben if by means of a ,f,"""gf, i ãU¡""i,

"" .iai;ìo.il;.ap ¡ohûte-regress. while ilby means ofa sense object, a circular infe¡ence. Fo¡.w¡en thedrspute rs about the sense object and ca¡no¡ be decided by ûeans oIa.s€nse obJect òecâuse of a¡ i¡finite regress. there will be need oia tboushr

:oÞJect. Just as l-o¡ lhe thought object there will be Deed of a sense object. Èor rrzIqese ¡easons, ag¿un. anyone wbo assume$ somelbing as a hypothesÀ w l beãcti¡g absurdly. FurtheÍ¡ore, rhe thoughl objecß, ,"". *" ;à";";; f.r;;;

;4r9 $o named wlth respect to the people who rhink rhem, a¡d if thev we¡e in¡?!ur-e as_they a¡e said to be, the¡e would be ¡o dispute abour tbem. Henceq\¡e thought objects. too. a¡e brought under the five modes, so lhat in all cases

1r .l

:lecÊs-.sary tor us to suspend judgment aboùL a¡y matle¡ proposed for

ll2 Sextus Emqiricus

Such, then, are the frve modes handed down by the later Skeptics; tbey are

not put forward by way ofth¡owing out the teû modes, but itr o¡der [o coûbatthe precipitancy of the DogrEatists in greater detail by means of both togethe¡

1.6. The Two Modes

rrs They also hand dowlr two other mod€ s oî epoche. For sifice eve¡ythitg that isapprehended is eithe¡ app¡eherided through itself o¡ th¡ough soûething else,

by pointing out that what is appreheûded is apprehe¡ded neithor through itselfno¡ th¡ough aûythi¡g else they p¡oduce oporiøi, øs they supposq about

ever,'thing. That Âothitg is apprehended through itself is apparetrt, they say,

from the dispìrte amolÌg the physical scientists conceming not only all sense

objects but also, I think, all thought objects-a dispute that is trot decidable

since we canriot use eithe¡ a seflse object o¡ a thought object as a criteúon, forl?e anythi¡g we take will be io dispute and hence not credible. And the followi¡g

is the reason why they do not agree that something can be apprehended

through somethiog els€. If that through which something is app¡ehended must

in every case be apprehended through something else, they encounter the

circularity or infinite regress modes of epocrtz. B¡¡t if somebody should \¡¡ish totake ¿s apprehended th¡ough itself somethitg through which something else is

apprehended, he runs up against the fact that fo¡ the aforementioûed reasons

riothitrg is apprehetded through itself. So we ¿re at a loss as to how the thiiÌÉin question could be apprehended eithe¡ on the basis of itself o¡ on that ofsomething else, since there is no apparetrt crite¡ioo of truth or of apprehension

and since signs, even apart f¡om p¡oof, are eliminated, as we shall show later:'It will suffice for the ptesetrt to have said thus much about the modès

leading to suspensio¡ ofjudgment.

1?. Some Modes for Refuting People Who Give Causal Explanations 1

r8o Just as we hand down ttLe modes oî Eqoch¿, so some people set forth modès

similarly to the appearances, it is also possible that they come about, nolsimilarty, but io a way pecuiiar to themselves. The ñfth mode is that acco¡dingto which practically all the causal explainers give accounts based on thei¡ own

., particular hypotheses about the elements and not otr coúmoû artd gene¡allyiiÌ; , ageed approaches. The sixth is that accorditg to which they often acc-ept what

- fits in with tbei¡ owo particular hypothe{es but reject whai is equally credible.... but does not so fit in. A.ccording to the seventh, they assign causes that conflict

by which we ptoduce aporia about particular câusal explanations, therebji:igiving a jolt to the Dogmatists since they pride themseJves especially oû these'

Áeneiide.mus, i¡deed. hãnds down eigiL modes by ñeans of wbich he thi¡ks r'o

18r ¡efute and exposo as unsound eve¡y dogrnatic causal explanatioo. The t¡Stl óf:l

these, he says, is the mode according to which causal expla¡atioûs in geneialil

"onóro"d à ih"y ure with what is ãonevideot, get oo agreed-upon corfrrmàl,¡j

tion from the appea¡¿rnces. The seco¡rd is that according to which, althoulh I

there is olten aþthora of ways of giving a causal explariation of what is:irlf:

tz question, some pìople give sucú an eiphnätion in one way only. According'tciitie third, they iefei orde¡ly thirgs to câùses that exhibit no order. AccordinÊJ

-.. trot only with the appea¡ances but even v¡ith their own hypotheses; while'r;. according to the eighth it frequeotty happens that when the things unde¡;i .-investigatiod and the thi¡gs seemingly appa¡eût are equally puzzling, th€y'-. const¡uct thei¡ doctrine about the eqùally puzzling oD the basis of the equally.. puzzbng. No¡ is it impossible, Aenesidemus says, that some should fail with

Oullines of Pjrrhofüsm, Book I 113

lo the fourth, whetr they have apprehended how the appearances come âbouti

they think they have apprebended how the thiúgs thal are not appea¡ances

their causal explanations oû the basis of ce¡tain mixed modes dependent onthe foregoiDg ones.

come about, whereas although it is possible that these latter come a

' . Possibl¡ too, the f,ve modes of epochè suffice against the causal explana-, tioûs. Fo¡ aûy cause that somebody p¡oposes will either be compatible with allt.i p.hilosophical systems ard v¡ith Skepticism and with the appearances, or it willil ìióii And that it will be thus compatible is impossible, I iuppose, fo¡ there is

iìì{i.sagreement about all the appea¡ances and nonevident thirgs. But if there is'.iliiagreement about the proposed cause, the p¡oponent v¡ill be asked fo¡ the¡ôâuse:of it, atrd if he takes an appeatance as the cause of an âppe ataíc,E o1 ø.

.non-evident rbing as the cause of a non-evide¡t thi¡g. he will land i¡ an i¡finite¡egress. and in a cifcular i¡Jerence if he takes them ahernondo. At:td iI he makesã stand somewhere, either be will say tbat he bas established lbe cause as such

ì:ií.relatioD to what was said befo¡e, thùs trtroducing "in relatio¡ to" andiçliminating "in naturc," o¡ else he rvill take something as an hypothesis and'qill

be brought to a standstill. So. by these modes too it is possible, I think, tocombat the precjpita¡cy of the Dogmatisrs in their causal theories.

al,i.

;.. 18. The Skeptic Slogans

r83

in using each of these mod€s aûd those leading to suspension of

1U

o..f.our paÍ¡t¿ 1or example, "Àot mo¡e," "trothing is to be determined," aûdli!ç-it would be rea$onable to take up these next. Let us begin with "not

we uttel certain slogans exp¡essive of the Skeptic tempe¡ of mi¡d

jinothing more"; fo¡ we do not, as some people suppose, employ the "notthisrsometiúes in the form I have just mer¡tioned, but sometimes in the

ir specific investigations and the "rothing mo¡e" in general ones; ¡athe¡,eithe¡ "rot more" or "nothing mo¡e" indife¡ently, and now we shallthem ¿s though they we¡e identical. This slogan, theri, is elliptical. Just

19. The "Not More" Slogan

ta1

124 Sextus Emp icus

similar significaDt features, that the Methodic physician's Way has a kinshipwith Skepticisrn. And indeed, when coûsidered not simply irÌ itself but incomparison with the other medical systems, it has more kitrship than they do.

With this much said about the seeming alterûatives to the Skeptic Way, wehere complete both the general account of Skepticism aûd Book I of theOutlines.

Outlines of PyrrhonismBook 2 of Three

Contents ol Book 2

1. Caú the Skeptic Questio¡1 Whar Is Said by the Dogmatisrs?2. Whe¡e t¡e Cdticism of the Dogmatists Should Begi¡3. The Criterion4. Does The¡e Exist a C¡ite¡ion of T¡uth?

. 5. The "By Whom" Criterion6. The "By Means of Which" C¡iterion7. The "According to Which" C¡iterion8. The True and Trìith9. Is There A¡ythi¡g True by Nârure?

10. Signs11. Is The¡e Such a Thing as a¡ IDdicative Sigtr?12. P¡oof13. A¡e The¡e Proofs?14. Syllogisms15. lnduction16. Defi¡itions17. Division18. Divìsion ofa Te¡m into Its Meani¡gs19. ffi¡ole and Parts20. Ge¡era and Species

21., Common Accidenls22. Sophisms

it;.,1. Can the Skeptic Question What Is Said by the Dogmatists?

ou¡ inquiry is ditected agaiost the Dogûatists, let us go over, briefly andline, each pa¡t ofwhat is called 'þhilosophy',, after û¡st having aûsweredDo€matists who co¡stantly proclaim that the Skeptic is not in a position

iáisequestions about o¡ even comp¡ehetrd in any way the issues conce¡ning.ch they dogmatize. For they declare rhar either úe Skepric apprehendiìt rbe Dogmatists say or he does not; and if he does âpprehend. how canÞq af a loss about what he claims to apprehend? But if he does not

140 SextlLe En?iticus

stars is evefl atrd that it is odd); ând if he says tbat o¡ly some are tlue' by rthat

,trufi *" ¿""1¿" that these non-evidelt matters a¡e true and those are false?

Certainly not by an appearance But if by something nori-evident' th€n' since

*ã-ui"itluotigu't-g *itìch of the ton-eviden! a¡e t¡ue and which are false' this

non-evident point will itself require aûother to decide about it' and that one

ãnãtl"t, unå so on ad infrnitum. Therefore, it is not the case that the

ûot-evident only are t¡ue9l The remainhg altemative is to say that o[ the true, some are appearaûces--

^od .o-" u.".ool"oident, but this possibility, too, is absurd For either all the

upp"-un*a a¡d the non-evident a¡e true, or some of the appea¡ances and

.ãå" tiift" noû-evidenl Now if all, the statement v¡ill once agaitr be ttrr¡ed

aioonã, as it wilt be granted true that trothiûg is tn¡e; ard it will -be=saiq^to

be

p, tru" boih that the number of the stars is even and that it is odd But if only-- .-orn" ãt tn" upp"urances and some of the non-evident a¡e t¡ue' how shall we

à"i"r-io" tmi àf tl" uppea¡a¡ces these arc t¡úe and those are false? If by some

;;;".;", the argument will go on ad infinitum And if by something

rã'.-"tã*i, a¡"t .iãc€ the non-eiident also lequire determining, by means of

*hâr will this nôn-evident Doint be determiÂed? If by some appearânc€, wewhat wll this non-evident Point be determiÂed? If by some appearânc€' we

have the ci¡cularity mode, a;d if by somethjrig noû-eviden! afl itrûnite regress:what wll this non-evident Point be

er iinrilar ttrings must also be said about the ûon-evidett For the pe$on who-- t.iolo **ã

" ¿"termination about them by somethiûg non-evideût falls.irìto

^-. -.G^ r.iê. r^ ¿1ô sô Ììv ân aooea¡ance eithe¡the inûnite regress, while the oûe who tries to do so by an appeaJanc'€ elüe¡

n"i. ioto un ioioi¡" r"gress (iI he again and again employs something âppare¡t)

ãi'ì"iã-""""r*i,v lifL sùtcnesìver to somethiDg non-evident) lt is false'

h"i"ro.o ,o ,uy ilàt of th" true thi¡gs some are appea¡aíces and some a¡e'

DoD-evidenl.9a So if neither the appearances only nor the ¡on-evide¡t only are true' norl

are some of the appearances and some of the noo-evident' thefl oothrng ß tlue;'

;; f;;rlút; is'irue, and the criterion is supposed to be-¡seful f3¡ makilg;

ã"t"..inotiott-. utoot ihe true, the c¡ite¡ion is useless and idle eve¡. if we grant'

i- irr" ."t" of argument that it has soúe sort of existetce' And if one mÙst'

susoend iudgment as to whelher ttt"'" it unytting true' ir follows that those

l¡ã ,ãv it"iA"f"",¡" is tbc science of things false or true or neither are getting

ahead of themselves "llle5 Further, since the criteriod of truth has appeared to be. apo¡etic' it is'¡'ó'--

f.ræ. pãt.í¡f", ü we go by the statemerits of the Dogmatists' to makg 1Î,yi

"oîfi¿"itt "r.".tioo eiiher

'about the thjngs that seem clear or

-about the

rãr-ã"i¿"tta, r"t seeing that the Dogmatisti think that tbey apprehcnd th*fi

latter on the basis of the "clear" thi¡gs. how shall we dare to assert aû)4¡l+g

about the non-evid€nt if we are forced to suspend judgmetrt abou¡ tne's'fÌ

* ,o-"ãir"¿ ;'"r"ut" things? BÌrt for very good measure we shall-raise.some obj!]{j''

ìi.rn. uootnins ueuinsl the ¡on-evideniobjects and states of aflairs in particulaij

,qn¿ .inäihJ." ,."tn l.o be appreheûded a¡d confirmed by means ol stgn aûo

oì"ifl'*" trt"lf p"¡"t .ur briedy that ooe ougbt also to suspendjudgment about

ihose. Let us begin with signs, lor proof seem$ to be a specres ol slgn ;,,

Outl¡nes of Pythonism, Book 2 l4l

10. Signs

Of objects of discourse lta pragmatal, some, acco¡ditrg to the Dogñatists, areprc-evident and some a¡e non-evident; and of the non-evident, some a¡enotr-evident once and fo¡ all, some ate temporadly non-evideÂt, and soûe arenon-evident by-.llilture. And they call "pre-evident" rhose things that come toour aware¡ess direìtly, such as Lhat it is daytime;"ûon-evideril once and fo¡ all"r.a¡e.those which do not natu¡ally fall \¡¡ithin our apprehension, such as that the¡umber.ofthe stars is eveq "temporarily non-evident', are those whicl! though:t¡€y are by nah¡re clear, a¡e temporarily non-evident to us because of external

".,:Giicùmstances, as, for example, the city ofAthens is at the moment non-evidetrtíþ:me; and "non-evideût by ûature" are those which are not of such a ratu¡e

las)to .fall witbin our clear view, such as the i¡telligible po¡es, fo¡ these neve¡þpear of themselves but may be thor¡ght to be apprehended, if at all, by ûeansof othe¡ tbings, such as perspiration o¡ somethirig like that. Now the pre- ee

I things, they say, have no need of a sign, fo¡ they are apprehended byofrbemselves. No¡ do the onc€-and-for-all non-evideDr things have ¡eed

sign, since they a¡e neve¡ apprehended _at all. Bu! say the Dogmatists, thear y Don-eyident and the naturally tron-evident are approhended byof sigrs, though not by the same ores, for the tempo¡a.ily ron-evident

iapp¡ehended by means of mnemonic signs, and the natu¡ally noî-evide[tmeans of irdicative sigN.

ii:According to the Dogmatists, the¡, some of the signs a¡e mqemonic anda¡e indicative. And they call a sign "mnemonic" ii havi[g bee¡ observedÌ with the thing signif,ed, it, by its clea¡ne$s at the time 'when it occu¡s(while the thiqg sigoified is rori-evident), leads us to recall what was'ed.together $¡ith it and is ûot occìlffiDg clearly now, as is the case \¡¡itband fiæ. A sign is 'lndicativg" as they say, if it is not clearly observed

ii¡dividual nature atrd constitution; for examplq the motions of the bodyrrwith what is sigûified, but it signifies that of which it is â sigrl by irs

iigns ol the soul. Whe¡ce tbey also defiDe the indicative sign thus: "an

se¡ves to disclose the coDseque¡t." Tbere being two different kiods ofsign,vesign is a proposition that is the t¡ue antec€derit in a t¡Ì¡e conditional

we do not argue agai¡st eve¡y sign but only against the indicativeit seeEs to have been iLented by the Dogmatists. Fot the

sign is relied on in the normal cou¡se of life, since fi¡e is signiñed to.who sees smoke, and if he obse¡ves a sca¡ he says that there has

wound. Hence, úot only do we Dor Aght agaitrst the no¡mal course of

¡!ás, I thinlq appropriate to say th€se things in advance in orde¡ todBposing the peculiar creations of the Dogmatists.

allied with it in that we assenl undogmatically to what it relies

Eatte¡ in,question. It remains fo¡ us to proceed to the refutation,

¡þc..alliqg the apparent equipollence of the arguments that are b¡oughtto show completely the noûexiste[ce of the iodicative sig[,

its. oristence.

142 Sextus Empiiclts

11. Is The¡e Such a Thing as an Indicative Sign?

Now the sign, iI we go by what is said about it by the Dogmatists, is notconceivable. Thus, for example, those who seem to have dealt with it careful-ly - the Stoics - in their atte¡npt to set befo¡e the miqd the notion of sign say

that a sigû is a proposition that is the t¡ue antecedent in a sound conditionaland seÍves to disclose the consequent. And they say that a proposition is a

coÌl],plete lekton that is asserloric by itself, and a sound conditional is one thatdoes not have a true antecedent and a false conseqr¡ent. For the conditiotaleither has a true antecedent and a true coûsequent, (fo¡ example, "If it is day,it is light") or a false artecedent and a false consequent, (for example, "If theearth is flying the ealth has wings') or a true antecederit and a falsecorsequent, (for example, "11 the earth exists, the ea¡th is flyi4g') or a falseantecedent and a true consequer¡t, (fo¡ example, "Ifthe earth is flying, the earthexists"). They say that of these only the one,rrith a true antecedent aûd a falsecoûsequent is unsound, and that the othe¡s are sound. They say also that a"guiding proposirion" is the antecedent of a t¡ue conditio¡al that has a tn¡eantecedenl and a lrue consequenl. And it serves Lo disclose lhe consequent.seeing that "She has milk" seems lo disclose "She has conceived" in thiscoûditional, "lf sbe has milk, she has conceived."

That is what the Stoics say. But we say, frrst of all, that it is non-evidentwhether there is any sùch thing as a l¿ftfor?. Some of the Dogúatists theEpicureans-say that le&fa do Dot exist, while others-the Stoics-say thatthey do exist. lvhen the Stoics say thal lekta exist they employ either me¡eassertion or a p¡oof as well. But if mere asse¡tion, the Epicu¡eans will counterwilh the assertion that iek¡d do not exist; and ¡f the Stoics w¡ll bring in a proof,

106

then sitrce the proof consists of propositions, that is, of l¿Àt¿ì and, itself ,

consisting of lekla, cannot be brought irÌ to promote belief in the existence oflekta (îot how will a pe¡son who does îot grant the existence ol lekta agteéthat there is a system of lekta1)- ú follows ¡hat the person who seeks rtõ':establish the existence of ¡¿ktd by assuming the existence of a system ofis trying to make what is in question believable by means of what isquestion. Hence, if it is impossible to establish the existence o1 lekta eithetsimply or by a proo[ it is non-evideDt that there is ary such thing as a lektòírì

r-- it as one that neithe¡ is no¡ eve¡ was capable of haviûg a true antecedent and1^fal^s¡-consetueot.

According ro him, the conditional ji; ;;;,i;;ilä;',"ue raNe, stbce when lt rs day and I have become silen¡, ir wili have a true

... antecedenr and a fatse consequeût, n"t th" ro o*ing ";;¿i i"iär'riå*. ari",

"jl"î::1"^^.1:l:T,"f things do nor exist. rhen ",.å;;;;;;*;i;;T:"eÀrst. s¡nce rt wl always have Lhe lâlse an¡ecedent. ..Atomic

elem"or, of t-hing,. 1"-l:l "ll.L: and the. true consequ"nr, ..nto'n;"

"1"*"niì .iìïìi"_i'.i üi;lrDc rrìose who mtroduce conDection or coherence say ftaf a co-nairionai ls..,..f9und.whe¡ rhe deniat of its co¡sequent is inc-onsistentíithìh"-åi;ï'"rq:.,.,...3".ording to rhem, the above-mentioned conditionals

";; ;;.*;ã. b*,,;",.l:lt:ytryt:.1:'",.Tf

jr is day. ir is day.,,Ard rh".;;;;;;;;;ä;,,".ä1",._ ll-1t^i,:li{li::"t is.r¡ue if irs co:rsequenr is in efect ir;tu;'ed; i;;;;;ã;,.Áquru¡r8 ro rnem' l suppose. "il ir is day. lhen ir is day" and every repea¡edco¡ditionat wilt be false, for rhere is no way for a ,t¡"g ir*1i," L" ii"i"ä"äì"Íl tsþlt1

proposition ts a lekton. Further, even if it should be gÉnted fo¡ the sakeSimilarly with regard to the question of whethe¡ propositiotrs exist, for

argument lhat l¿kta exist, it will be fouûd that propositioDs do not, for theyðomposed of lekra that do not exisl simultaneously with one another. trn

case of "If it is day, it is light," when I say "It is day" the p¡opositioD ':Itlight" does not yet exist, and when I say "It is light" the "It is day" noe)rists. And since composite things cannot exist if their pa¡ts do trotsimultaneously, ând the things of which propositions are composed do

Ouîlines ol Pyrùonism, Book 2 ß3

exist simultareously, propositions do not exist.But, even leaving these poiûts aside, the sound conditional will be.fo¡i

not to be appreheÂsible. For Philo says that a sound conditional is one thdoes not have a tlue antecedent and a false consequent; for exømple, whei'is day and I am conversing, "Ifit is day,I am co¡rve¡sing"; br.¡t Diodo¡us deiñ

ll, rt rt rs day it is light, and ir is day. then jt is light

,-lT: y-" Tk how we shali_determine whether rbe consequent follows fromantec,eoent. we âre me¡ wirb circula¡irv Fo¡ in o¡der rhár u ¿.t"..¡ai¡n).ut-the-condirionat be proved. the conciusion ot th. p.ooiniui-i;iË;i;;;Rremtses. as we have said abovei and. jn tu¡n. jn orã"r fo, this ¡o bave aouluruLy. ¡r rs fiecessary that a determination have been made about the!]jlïl g¿ *. *t",ion ot foltowing. Which is absurd. The*r".";',;;ornonat ts not appreÀensible.

12

144 Sexrus Em?iticus

11? But, leaving these points to oûe side, it is impossible for the sigd to serve

to disclãse thelonseqìent if what is signifred is ¡elative to the sigú-aûd is

thereforc apprehendeá together with it. For ¡elative things are apPreheÂded

together with one another; fol example, just as the right carinot be apprehen-

deã as the right ofthe left before the left is apprehended, nor vice-vers4 soalso

ir the case oT the other ¡elative thiogs; and thus the sign caûnot be apprehen-

ãed as the sigr of the signifrcatur beforc the sig¡ificatum is apprchended.

u¡ And if the sigì is not apprehended before the significatum, it cannot really

serve to disctse something that is apprehended togethel \Yith it and flot

after it.Thus also, if we go by the usùal statements of the Stoics, a concept of sign

cannot be fo¡med. Fór ttey say both that the sign is relative and that it serves

u9 to disclose the significâtuÌn to which they say it is Glative Now, ifit is relative'--- iho.ri, to *y, ."tãtive to the signiûcatr¡m, it certainly ought to be-apprehended

together wiíh tþe significatum, just as the left with the right and the u-p with

thã down and the ¡ist of the relative things But if it also serves to disclose

what is signified, it also certaiûly ought to be apprehendcd in advance in order

tlãt, f"in! p.rkno"o, it may iead us to the rrotiorr of the object o¡ state of

,ro un¡i, tttui t""o^"s known tlrough it. Bqt it is impossible to form a ootion of

an object o¡ state of afrai¡s that cannot be known before thât [object or state

of affársl betore which it has to be apprehended; therefore, it is impossible to

aoo""iu" of to-"tt log that is ¡elative and seryes to disclose that existing thing

i"tal¡" to wtti"tt it i.-thought. But they say both that the sign is relative ând

that it se¡ves to disclose th;sigûifrcatum; it is impossible, thereforc' to coriceive

of the sign. . !

rzl In uãditioo to these points, the following should be said The¡e has been a'--- "ont

lu"try among thosi who have gone b;fore us, with some claiming- tha'ì

in"." l, toÁ a tt"l us an indicative sign and others that there is no $¡ch t¡ing'

Ñoi *ftã"u"t *yJ*tat the¡e is such a thing as an iûdicative sigd.-Yitl s1y th19i

"ittr". .i-ply uod witnout proof, makiúg a bald assertion, -o:ìe

will tilit yilliorool Bui ii he employs mere assefiion he witl not be credible' while if he t¡ies

'r, i;;;;J h";ll ässune what is in quesrioo For sìnce proof is said ro come'-- *å"i rtt" g*", Sign, atd it is dispuËd whether or not there is sucb a thinÉi

i,-u-r¡gn, 1fi"r" tilläso æ a ai,pui" u' to *ttether or not there is such a lbiûg

ui u pioof -¡ut, as wheú, for example, it is questioned whether tbere is,any

such ìhiog as un animal' it is also questioDed whether there is atry such thrng'

u" u fto-ä being; for a human being is an animal But it is absurd.to !!y.toipioo" *ftut it i" ãu".tioo either by means ofwhat is equally in questioû or þilieais of itself; thôrefore, it v'ill not be possible for ânyone by means of a p¡99I1

rr to mairtain ûrmly that tft"r" is .*ft'u-i¡i"g ^ u

'igo úot if one oanr¡'o$

- *n"t¡"ì tt-Ñ o¡ with proof, make and frrm1y maintain a positive asserli'o$

"¡"J in" ¡Ët, t ¡ l-po^ssible for an apprehensive assertion to be ma!9'iÞ0.$

it; alÌd if thi sign is not accurately apprehended, it will ûot be said !q tpl

,ìLrin""r, "ì ".îll¡t'g,

si¡ce it itseii is Isubject oi disagreement' and for '!liï.,$

, Ourlìnes of p¡rrhonßry Book 2 145

¡easo¡ il _will not eveD be a sign. Hence. according to this li¡e of reasonins-

too. the slg¡ is ¡onexisLent and inconceivable.i, .- And there is still more to be said. Eitbe¡ all the signs a¡e appearances, ot 12all are non-evident, or some signs are appea¡ances und ao-" ur"'oon_"uiJårrt.

rjutJl-one ot these alter¡atives is l.¡ue; therefore, there does not exist a sign.rlì Now, that it is not the case that all signs are non_"ui¿"ot i, .toiì

^follows According to the Dogmatists, the ooi_"ni¿"nt ¿o"s oãi "oo"ã,

ãi*"lfbut a[ects us by.meaûs of something else. And so the sign, if it wereDon-e\,1cte¡1, would require another no¡_evjdeÍt sign, since ac¡ording to thehypothesis before us, no sign is an appearance: and lhat one woujd¡equireanoüte!, anct so on ad innni¡um. But il is impossible ro grasp an indniLe

- number oi sig¡$; tberefo¡e. it is impossible fo¡ the sign, if it is noì_evident. to:- be apprchended. And for tbis ¡eason it will also be ¡onexistent, being unább

fi..¡.i e ¡tgnir¡"a1v1tring, that is, to be a sis¡, becaus" it is not appreÁ";;iirï. ^--

i. , _?ut ifallthe:ig¡J are appearances, then, since the sign is relative_thar is, r2s; relaûve to ttre srg¡rficatum _and relative things a¡e app¡eheoded togethe¡. wltb one anothe¡, the things said to be $ig¡ified, being apprehended toietheril-,,Y]ll,Ini,.]. a¡ appearance. will be appearances. Forjust as, when the-right." and t¡e left a¡-e perceived, the right is no mo¡e said to be apparent than ihe

;.. ,left, not the left than the right, so too when the sign and the sþifrcatum a¡e. -raiÞrehen-ded

togethe¡. r¡e sign should no mo¡e bã *f¿ t" t"ãpp"r""iìn"ìir,.ï€ slg¡úcatum. And if tbe sjg¡ificatum is an appeaÉnce, it wilt not be a rzo

::.:sig-mnçatum, s¡nce it will not qeed anything to signify and disclose it. Whence,

Í.].1,"1.11!,t there is ¡o right, neither is there a left, so if there is ¡o significatum

j; $*9 .ul be.no sign; thus, if one says that all signs are appearancei, the sign,gut to be nonexistent.

It remains to suppose lhat some sigos are appeara¡ces and some ¡on_ ¡zrenl; but even so the aporiai remain For tbe tbings said to be signifred byt that^are appearaDces will be appearances, as we said before, and-not beingeed of anything Lo signify tbem. will not be sig¡incata a[ all, whence thãrs.will not be signs, either. as tbey do not sigoify anythiúg, As ro the l¿sevloerìl slgns. whrcb need something to disclose them. if they are said tognified by oon-evidenl thiÍgs. the argument goes on to irlû¡ity and theyound ¡oL to be appreheosible and for that reason noúexistent. as we havebefo¡e. But if rbey are said to be sigrifred Uy upp*ruo"".. if,"y

"ilf ú"

'arances appaehended together q,ith their sigDs and for lhis reaso¡r will also

t24

oexistent. For it is impossjble that there exjst some objecr o¡ srate of..that is both ¡on-evidenl by nature and yet ]s appareni and tbe signshe arguñent is about, having been positLd a" non-"uiaem, ¡uve úã"oto be appearances because the argumenL has been turned around.herefore. i[ is rìeithe¡ tbe case lhat ail the signs are appearances nor that 129

¡{f.qon-evident, nor that some of them a¡e appearances and some a¡elent. and besides these, as lbe Dogmatists rhimselves say, there is ûolemative, the so-called "signs" will be no¡exislent.

146 Sex.tu: Empíricu,s

These few arguments, out of many, v¡ill sumce fot the present to sùpportthe positio¡r that there is no such thing as an itdicative sign. Next we shall set

forth those suppo¡tifrg the position that signs do exist, in orde¡ that we mayshow the equipollence of th€ opposed arguments. Either, then, the expressionsthat are uttered against sigts signify something or they do ûot. But if they donot, how can they have any bearing on the existenc€ of signs? And if they dosig¡ify something, there is such â thing as a sign. Furthermorc, the a¡guments

against signs are either p¡obative or they a¡e trot. But if they are Dot probative,they do rot prove that the¡e is no such thing as a sign; while if they areprobative, since a proof, as serving to disclose the coriclusion, falls unde¡ thegenus Sign, signs will exist. Whel¡c€ the followirig sort of argument is also

made:

If there is a sig!, there is a sigh; aDd i[ the¡e is no sign, t¡ere is a si8n, fo¡ t¡enonexistence of signs is show¡ by a prool wÞich is a sign. But eithe¡ the¡e isa sign oi tlere ìs not;therelore, there is a sig!.

This argument, howeve¡, is matched by the fol1owitrg:

If the¡e is no sign, therc is no si$L And ilthere is a sign-a sign being whatthe Dogmatists say it is-there is no siÈn. For the sign und€I discussion,which, ìo accord with its concept, is said Lo be both relat¡ve and serving lodisclose the signiÊcatum, turns oÌrt to be nonexlstent, as we have shown. Buteither there is a sign o¡ there is no sig¡; thereforc, tlere is no sign.

130

131

Also, with regard to the phrases uttered about the sig4 let the Dogúatiststhemselves atrswer whethe¡ these signify somethiDg or dol Fo¡ if they do trotsigaify anything, they do not úake cledible the existence of a sigû; while, if they ¡do signify, the signiûcatìrm will follow from them. But this was that there.issì¡ch a thing as a sign; f¡om which, as we showed, by a tumaround of theargument it follows that there is no such thitg as a sigtr.

So, with such plausible a¡guments p¡esented both fo¡ and agaiNt theilexislence of signs. it ûlusr be said that it is 'not mo¡e" the case that sign$ existtha¡ that they do not.

12. P¡oof

r34 From these considerations it is manifest that p¡oof, too, is a mattel uponthere is no ag¡eemetrt; for if we are suspending judgment about signs,

Outlines ol pytthoniw, Book 2 14,1

meân will become more clear from the follow¡ng: An argument is a svstemconsistiog of premises and a conclusio'. Those fropositiãns i;;, ;; ;;;;upoD Io¡ the eslablishmenr of tbe conclusio¡ u..

"uú"a ,fr" f ."ro'lr;;;äii;

proposition which is established tom the p¡emises is called the c"o"j";ì;;. --, For example, in this atgumeût:

-. lf it is day, ir is tight." It is day.

.'i , The¡efore, it is light.

proof is a kind of sign, it is necessa¡y lo suspend judgmeût aboutwell. And we shall frnd that the a¡gumetts propounded concerning

se¡ving to disclose the conclì¡sion, f¡om which has followed all the thitg.s135 have said about signs. But if it is necessary to say something apÞlj

be adapted to fit proofs as well, since the latter seem to be both ¡elative

:¡i!+.iroposition "lris lighf,is the cotrclusion atrd the othe¡s are premises. Somearguments_are valid, and some are not vali{ th"y u." nulid *t;;;;';;;corìdltlonal whose antecedent is rhe conjùrction of the p¡emises and whosecodsequenr js the conclusion, is sou¡d. For jnstance. the previouslV ;;;;;;;argùme¡t ls vatrd, s¡úce ..lt is light..follows from the Dremise coniuncrion ..1¡is day. and if ir is day it is light. in thjs condirio¡al:

specificaly to proofs, I shall briefly consider the a¡gument concemitrgafter frrst trying to give a concise clarificatio¡ of the Dogmatists' defrnilp¡oof

premises and a valid inference, discloses a non-evideût coriclusion. WhatA proof, as they say, is an a¡gument that, by meaûs of agreed

\ï€uments not having this cha¡acteristic arc invalid.¡! And of the valid arguments, some are t¡ue and some a¡e ûot ttue_t¡ue.i.bþneve¡ not only is there a sou¡d conditional consisting oÌ,h;;;i.;önjunctio¡ and the conclusion. as we said befo¡e, but also boih ;. ";J"ì;.i;;.ncl the p¡emise conjunclion. wbjch is the antec€denr of Lhe conditional, arerue...And a conjunction. - for example, ..Ir is day. and if it ir;;;'l;ì;gnt'-ts lrue whe¡ever every co¡junct is true. Argume¡ls nor havine theÞove-descr¡bed characteristic are ¡ot true. Fo¡. supposiDg tbat ¡t is davìime-uch a¡ a¡guñent as lhe followiog is valid enougb.' ' * *''":''

ff (it is day and if it is day it is lighr), then it is lighr.

fì" r If it is night, it is dark.It is night.- Therefore, it is dark.

iiiì)If (it is ûight and if ir is night ir is dark). then ir is dark

following conditionaÌ is sound:

:,lJCiTenl is.:or lru:. For.rhe cotrjunfiive anrecÆdetrr _..Ir is night andnrglìt it js dark"-is false. siDc€ il contajns rhe false conjunct -Tr is'night,..conju¡ction containi¡g a lalse co¡junct is false. Hence lh"y ul;;l;Ã;.a¡guñenr as one rbat leads logically from rrue premisãs to a true

of the true argùInents some are probative aDd some are ¡olthe probalive are those validly cooclùdjng something no¡-evident; lhat are pre-evident. and the non-probati-v" ur" ,¡oõ t¡u, u,"iàibor exañple. such aÍ argume¡t as tbjs:

ill it::is dar it is lieht:It is..day:

138

" ,0, sextus Empíticus

is not probative, fo¡ its conclusion, that it is light, is pre-evident BÙt such an

argument as:

I[ sweat flows through the surface, therc are intelligible pores

Sweat flows through the surface'

Therefore, there are intelligible pores

is Drobative, since its conclusion, "There are intelligible pores" is nori-evident'

rn, --'

And, of th" arguments validly concludiog something noo-evident' some- ^

f"ua ot iniå"gh the iremises to the conclusion simply in.the maÚtrer of guides'

unJ ott "r.

l"ã¿ .r, iot only as gùides but also as bringing sometbing bidden

ø fig¡i. I-"uding us as guiães are those that seem to depend upon trust atrd

memory. for examPle, this one:

lf a god has said to you that this man will be rich' then this

man will be ¡icbThis god (suppose that I am pointitg to Zeus) has said to you

that this ma¡ will be rich'The¡efo¡e' this man wi[ be rich

,

For we assetrt to th€ conclusiol not so\much because of the force of the

", pr"-ir", u, t"*use we trust the asse¡[on ofthe god But some argumetrts lead- -

'us to tle cooolusion not only as guides bÛt also as bringirig something hidden

:lro light, for examPle:

If sweat flows through the surface, there are intelligible pores'

The first.Therefore, the second :

'-\_. Outlitl¿s oî Pyfthonism, Book 2 149

when \¡'e asse¡t the conclusiotr, its premises are no longer in being. Thereforqthê parts of the argument do ûot coexist with one a¡rother, whence it will béappa¡etrt that the a¡gument, too, does rot exist.ìr,. But apart from these considerations, the valid argument is not apprehen-sible. Fo¡ if its validity is dete¡mined on the basis of the soundtress of the

accustomed to clarify the notion of prooi

13. Are There Proofs?

:.rcoüespoûding conditional, and the t¡uth of the conditio¡al is a matte¡ of'. i¡nsgttled dispute and is pe¡haps rlot app¡ehensible, as we have pointed out in

That Þroof is nonexistent can be i¡fe¡¡ed from tbe very things they say' I

artacking each ingredienl of the concept For iûstance' an- argument

"n-oosú of propoìitio¡s, aDd composite thirigs cannot exist udess ttìe ul!

;i;iiJ;"t;t"';;;os"d "o"*i.L*irh oo" anotber' as is obvious io rhe ea

of a bed ani similar things. But the parts of an argumenl do Dol coex$t w

o¡e another. For when we slâte the first premise, neitber the other premlse ¡i¡"

""""r"ü"t ", v" "xisLs;

and when we state lhe second one lhe firsl pÍemr

no longer exisrs and tbe conclusioo bas not yet co$e into bemg: ano' nnal

' our discussion ofsigrs, then the valid a¡gumeqt, too, \\,ill not be apprehensible."Now the logiciaÃs say that ari a¡grmetrt becomes invalid €ither by incoherenceiolrrtby deficierrcy or by being put forwa¡d in an unsound schema or byredundancy. For example. ir is jnvalid by i¡coherence wben the premises arenot logically conneoed with one anotber a¡d with tbe conclusion. âs in:

j,,r,,. If it is day, it is light.äi'l, . G¡aii is behg sold in the agora.i,¡1,,,, Therefore, Dion is walking.

ü invalid by redundancy when it contaiûs a premise that is trot needed fo¡ r¿rvalidity of the argument, for example

'j - Ifit is day, it is licht:,". ' lt is day.'r .r. Dion is walking.ìrl The¡efore, it is light.

it is iÀvalid by being in arr uûsoùnd schema wheneve¡ the schema of theis not vali4 for example, while the following as they say, are

If it is day, it is lightIt is day.

',- Theiefole it is light.

:;. .Ifit is day, it is licht.i;ìì:i It is not light.iij:.i,,The¡eforc, it is not day;

'rlÌ itÌs day, it is light.)i'It is liéht.tì liTlìèiéfoie, it is day

is not valid:

'the cotrditional declares that if its antecedent is the case so is theit is ¡easonable, when thc antecede¡t is assumed, to infe¡ also theand v/hen the consequerÌt is denied, to deûy also the atrtecedent,

iairtecedent were the case, the coNequent would âlso be the case. But

148

150 Sexlus EmP i.lts

rvhen the coffequent is assumed, the aûtecedent will nQt in geteral be implied;

for the coûditional did not promise that the antecedeût follows f¡om the

coûsequent, but only that the conseqùent follows f¡om the attecedent

Fó¡ that ¡eason, an atgumeat inferring the conseque[t of a conditionalftom the conditional and its antec€dent is said to be syllogistic, and likewise

one inferring the negâtion of the antecedent from the conditional and the I

negation of ihe consequent. Bul aû argùment, like the otre mentioned above, l

th;t infers the aotecedent ftom the conditiotal and its consequent is i¡valid in .lthat it infers a false coûclusion from tIue premises (when it is utt€red at night.:.1

while there is lamp light). For the conditiona.l "lf it is day, it is light" is true- .l.i

and also the seconã premise, "It is light," but the conclusion, "It is day," is false l'l

An argument is unsound by ãef,ciency if something is lacking that is l:i

needed for inferring the conclusion. Fol example, while the following argument 1

150

is sound, as they suppose:

ïVeallh is good or bâd or indiferentIt is neither bad nor indiferent.The¡efore, it is good,

this argurbent is delecrive by deficiency:

Wealth is good or bad.It is not bad.Therefore, it is good.

l¡t So ifl shall show that, goiûg by what the Dogmatists say, no dife¡ence caí hie

disce¡ned between invalid and valìd argumeûts, I shall have showlÌ that

valid argumeît is not âpprehensible, so that the innume¡able a.rguments {they bring forwald in accord with their logic are useless. And I show it

152

be preceded by making a determination about the truth value of the col

sponding conditional, and since the conditional is not decidable, as I haìgued, it witt be impossible to distiûguish the a¡gumeûts that are invalid

Ls¡ incoherence. For aûyone who says that a giveû argl¡ment is invalid

incoherence will, if he just asserts it, receive in opposition the assgl

contradictory to his own; but if he proves it by an argurnent, he will ùé' i

that this a¡gument must flrst be valid if it is to p¡ove the lack of log

co¡nec[ion betrveen the premises of the argument that is allegedly cha¡aò

lebtablish, that a schema is unsound will not have atr agreed_upon valid',,¿ú.gument by means of which he will be able to infe¡ what hJ claims. Bv theseconsideratio¡s we bave i¡ efect also refuted those who try to show tbat theieare argumenls i¡vâlid by defrciency. For if lhe a¡gument that is comDlete andfinished cannot be disri¡guished frorb olher argum-ents, rhen rbe areú;;l th;;'ts deficieot will be non-evident. And, turtber. wboever wishes tã show- bvrqeans of an argume¡t, lhat soûje argument is deficie¡t will ¡or be able ro makea tested anct co¡-rect statement to tbal effecl because [o¡ the corresÞoDdìnpco¡ditional he does ¡ot have an agreed_upon test by mea¡s of whicú he cai

i Outtioes of pyrrhonism, Book 2 t5I

ized by incohereoce. But we shall ûot know whether it is p¡obative, si

have no agreed-upon test of that conditional by which we are to det

whelher the cotclusion of the argument follows from the conjuDction

:e a dete¡múatiotr about the i¡ference in the a¡gùmeût he is discussing.Fu¡th€rmore, th€ argument said to be uosound by redundancy cannoi benguisbed I¡oûì Lbe proofs. For. as far as redutrdancy is concerned even tbelemonstrated" a¡gument$ so much talked of by túe Stoics wU î" ¡ãrroá

premises. And so, oû this basis, too, we shall not be able to distlÂguis

ihe valid argumenls those aiguments that a¡e invalid by incoherencer' 'rsr We shall say the same things to aûyone who claims that a givet

is invalid by being propounded in an unsound schema Fo¡ he who

ecùve, and il those are tâken away. Stojc logic is overturned. Fo¡ rhese, thexcs say. have no need of demonstration lo establish them. and thev:mselves serye ro demonstrare rhar lhe orher

"rc;;;;;;;;üd.;;, 'rh..

;y are tedundaot wjll be clear whe¡ we have sei fo¡¡h rhe ,_r¡dernonst atäluûents and theD make good what we are saying.::iNow the Stoics fancy that there are many undemonstrated argumeûts, butlihemost part they pu¡ folwa¡d the followiûg five, t" *hi"h ;ía;h;;å;;ieems, can be ¡educed. From a co¡ditionJand it,

""t"""d;r;;-i;" ;.;;ioludes ,the consequent. Fo¡ example:

. .If it is day, rhen it is light.I It is day.Therefore, it is light.

a conditional and the contradjctory of its consequent, the secondles the coDtradictory of tbe antecedenr. For example:

, Ifit is day. then it is lishtIt is úot light.

:rT.hèrefore, it is ûot day.

dènial ofa conjuaction and one ofthe conjuncts, the third concludes

Not both: it is day and ir is nighl.lf is day.

of the othe¡ conjunct. Fo¡ example

disjunction and one of

¡',i:Pither it is day or it is night¡Itiis,day.

of the othe¡ disjunct

it is ûot dght.

the disjuncts, the fou¡th coûcft¡des theFor example:

152 Se't s EmPitictß

From a disjunction and the cont¡adicto¡y of one of the disjuÂcts' the flfth

concludes the other disjunct. For example:

Either it is day or ir is night'It is not ûight.Therefore, it is daY

15e These, then, are the vaunted uÂdemoûstrated ârgumefts' but they all seem to 1

'-' -" ä'i" itiJi¿ uy rerluodancv;To besin with ihe 6¡st' for

"1i.Î"pl?:ilfll Iß agreed or else it is noû-evident rhât lhe oroDosition "It is light' lollows lrom

it.?ntecedent "Il is dav" i¡ the co¡ditionat ';If it is aay' it is light " But if it is

i"r_""iï""q-*, ,t ¡f nåt concede the conditional as agreed upon; while.if it isr ì

nre-evident that if "It is ¿av" is tr¡e äãse üeJ""""ttã¡i ;rt itieht" is also lltiiìH;;"#täËt1ït;ääv'T;;;;t "rt ts right"' so that thiJargument wil;.i

sumce:

It is day.Therefore, it is light

and the conditional "ü j! is day, it is light'' will be superfluous''"" w; ;;;;'; ;;'n ar poini in ¡he- case of the second .u¡demonstrated

^.nr]-"oi. pot either it js possible or it is not possible for the antecedenl to

i:iå'ä'ì; ï" i"'""0ì*,'¿äi'ot But il it is possible' tbe conditio'al"wiLl

"ãt u" i"t"¿; while ú jt is not Possible' then io assertiÂg the negallofi oÌ lne

iãtät""*1,.¡.ir te simultarèously asserting rhe negatioo of th." ""1*:o:1t:

;;;;; ;g"ìt the conditional will be superfluous' since what is bel¡g

propounded amouol.s to: .,

l6l The same reasoning apptes also it the case of the third undemonstr

ääi. ilil'i i piå-evident oi it is noo-evident that it is impossibl

;ii;iä;"il;; oi ìr'å lonjon"¡oo to hold A¡d ir it is nonevideût' we

;:,ï*"ilË;;""ai"toiv of tt'" con¡oo"rioo; while iI it is pte-evidenl'

ilaä""t* ;;;ììh;m we shall be simultaoeouslv denvjng the other'.ân'

ä."it"ài"iãty .l,rt" "oûju¡ctioo

will be superfluous' as we are saymg ln e

It is 4ot lightTherefore, it is not daY

\ Outlikes of ptrrhonish, Book 2 153

when oice is denied it is pre-evident that the other does hold. so that thefollowjng suffice:

: It is day. It is not day.t:r.,...: Therefore, it is not night. Therefore, it is ¡ight.

and the disjunction is superffuous.

. Similar_points c¿n also be made aboul the so-called ..categorical,'syllo_:r,lglsrirs, which are much used by the peripatetics. Thus, in the arfument:

We sav similar things about the founh aûd fifth undemonstrated arg

i"rîri¡ä.'ült pi"-ãui¿"nt o1 it is ûon-evide¡t that' ol the compoDe

disiuncdon, necessarily one rs true and the otber is false And

;i:,itd;;i. ilffi iot concede the disjuocdon: but ir it js pre-evidr

;i";;;;;i;1"; l; assetted it is obvious that tbe other does not h'

It is day.Therefore, it is not ¡ight

The just is fair.The fai¡ is good.The¡efo¡e, the just is good.

"'i it is agreed upon and pre-evident that the fair is good, or it is disputedr¡rotr€vidert. But if it is nor-evident, it will not be conceded whiÈ the

;,:while if it is pre-evident that whateve¡ is fair is without exceptiotr good,,w'hen it is said that something is fair it is simultaneously implied tÀat itô:good, so that the follo\¡ring form of the argument sumces:

is behg put forward, and fo¡ this reasontthe syllogism will not be

T¡e just is fair.Therefo¡e, the just is good.

61hêr premise, in which the fai¡ is said to be good, is superfluous.ir the following argumeût:

Sodates is a hùÎrlan being.| ,Every human being is an animal.¡:lT.he¡efore, Socrates is an animal.'

jqmediately evident in adva¡ce that anything whatever that is a

-ei.ng,is, also ¿¡r ¿¡¡i-ul, the universal premise will Ilot be agreed uponìv.p,corlcede it when the argument is put fo¡ward. But if something,s¡q¡igraf follows from the fact that it is a humar being and for thãtÞ¡q4ise "Eve¡y human being is an animal" is ag.eed to be trug the¡

,that Soc¡ates is a human beiûg it is simultaneously implied thatl. so that tbis fo¡ú of the arg¡¡ûent sumces:

is a human beingSoc¡ates is an animal

r.Every human bei¡g is an animal" is superfluoùs. And, not toor this, it is possible to ùse similar methods in the case ofthecategorical a¡guments.

jlfÍè fact, however, that these atguments on which the logiciansa¡e rcduDdant, all logic is ove¡tu¡ned because of this

154 Sextus Etflpiricüs

¡edurÌdancy, fo¡ we are tot able to distitguish ftom the so-called "valid'L6? syllogisms those a¡gumeûts that are ¡eduridant aûd consequently invalid. And

if some people disapprove single-premised arguments, they a¡e ûo more wolthyof credence than Antipater, who does not reject such alguments.

For these reasons, what the logicians call "valid argùmenf is Ãot deter-

minable. But further, a "true" argument is ûot discove¡able, both for theforegoing reasons and because it must in all cases end in a true proposition.Fo¡ the conclusior that is said to be trìle is eithet a¡ appearance ol it is non-

168 evideÃt, A¡d it is certainly not an appearatce; fo¡ then it would trot ne€d tobe disclosed by means of the p¡emises, being self-evideot and no less anappearance than its premises. But if it is [oû-evident, theû since there is anunresolved dispute concerning non-evideûl things, as we have pointed oùtpreviously, and they are therefore also not apprehensible, the cotclusio[ oftheargumeût said to be true will not be apprehensible, eithe¡. And if this is ûotapprehensible, we shall not know whether dhat is concluded is tn¡e or false.

Thus we shall be ignorant as to whethe¡ the a¡gument is true ot falsg and the

"true" a¡gument will not be discove¡able.t6e But, passiûg over these di-fficulties also, it is impossible to find an a¡gument

that concludes something non-evident by meaDs of things that a¡e pre-evidetrt.

Fo¡ if the conclusion follows f¡om the conjt¡nction of the premises, and if whatfollows and is the coasequerit is relative, that is, relative to the antecedcnt, and

if relatives mùst be app¡ehended togethe¡ with otre another, as we have

established-theq if the conclusion is ûon-evidetrt the premises will b€

rioû-evident, atrd if the premises are pre-evident the conclusion will also bepre-evident, as it is app¡ehended together with them and they are pre-eviden¡'so that no longer is something non-evident beiDg injerred frorn thirÌgs that are

r7o p¡e-evident. For these reasoff neither is the conclusio[ disclosed by the]premises, whether it is no[-evident and thus ûot apprehended, or pre-evidentr

and not iû ûeed of anything to disclose it. lf, the¡efore, a p¡oofis said to be a4

¿rgr¡ment that by iofe¡erce-that is, validly discloses a non-evidetrtclusion by ûeans of some premises agreed to be true, atd we have pointed

t\ Ouîlnes of pttthonßm, Book2 tS5

such thing as\a generic p¡oof. But neither is the¡e a pa¡ticular proof. Fot theywill deûne "proofl' eithe¡ as the sys¡em of premises aIrd conch¡siotr, o¡ as thesystem of premises alone. But neither of these is a proof, as I shall show.

that there e)dsts ro argument that is valid or trùe o¡ that validlysomething non-evident from things thal are pre-evident or that serves

t1t From the following line of attack, too, we shall make plain that.neither exists ûor is eveh conceivable. The persoq who says that there is

disclose its conclusioo, it is plaitr that there is no such thing as a proof. i:'Ì

Tberefore. the¡e is no particular proof. The system of prcmises and conclusionis ¡ot a proof because, nrst of all, it has a non-evident part, namely, the

lìr:òorclusion, and so will be nori-evideût. But this is absurd, lo¡ if the proot isi:t¡on-€vident, then, ¡athet than se¡ving to p¡ove other thiûgs, it will itself be ini,,:.ìùéd of something to prove it [i.e., to p¡ove that it is a prãofl.

a thing as a proof is positing either a generic proof (a "proof in general") orparticulal prool But, as we shall point out, it is flot possible to establish r!

existence either of a generic proof or of a particular proof, and besides thr

no othe¡ caû be thoùght of. The¡efore, nobody can establish the eristenca172 prool For the following reasons the generic proof does not exist. Either i!

.ì::::r,, Also, si¡ce they say that proof is relative, that is, relative to what isl,ìnferred aud things that a¡e ¡elative, as they themselves claim, a¡e thor¡ght of'.iin.relation to othe¡ things, what is proved mt¡st be other than the proof; and!.if:ind""d th" couolusion is what is proved, the proof will not be thougbt ofr:lt_olethe¡ with its conclusion. Fùthermore, either the colclusio¡ contributes

some p¡emises and a conclùsiot ol it does not. If it does not, it is not a

If it does have.some plemises and a conclusion, then, sioc€ everythingrrr and proving is particular, it will be a palticular proof. The¡efore, the¡e

evetr be part oI the proof, since we shall say that the latter is defective by

to disclose itselî, ard ifit does rot contribì_¡te but is supe¡fluous, it wllto its owr proof, or it does ûot; but if it does contribute. it,will be

,ï,..But 'neither would the system of the premises alone be a proof, for who rroibùld say that this kitrd of statement:

If it is day, it is lighr.It is day.

r-4lgument o¡ even coúpletely exp¡esses any thought at all? Thus, a systeût'i'emises alone does ¡ot constitute a proof. Therefore, no paíjcular;roofts. eirber. Arrd if ûo particular proof nor generic proofexisrs, and no ãrherrof is conceivable, then tbere is no such thiog as prootOne can show the nonexistence of proof also from úe following consjder-ns. If tbere is a proof. then either. bcing itself an appearance, il serves ro

i

tl

i

i

I

,Ì

ii

ili

ì[

ü

ìili

arr appearaûce, or being itself non-evident. it serves to disclose

làn aþpearance, to disclose something non-evident. But it ca¡not be

non'evideût, or beiûg noû-eyideût, to disclose ¿!n appearance, or

as disclosing any of these; therefore, it can[ot be conceived, Fo¡ 4 Ì?Bìappearance, it serves to disclose an appearance, what is disclosed will

lr.ltaneoùsly an appearaoce and tron-evidetrt-an appeara¡ce, since by.esis it is such. and non-evide¡t, since it is in need of something tòs it and does nol of irself affecr us in a clear way. And if. úingidè-¡it, it serves to disclose something Âoû-evident, it will have ûeed of

iirh the corc€pt of prool A¡d for these rcasons, neithe¡ will a non- 17e

to disclose it and will not serve to disclose othe¡ things, which is at

pioof serve to disclose something pre-evident. No¡ will a pre-evideût

,are apprehended togethe¡ with one a¡other, what is said to be provedto disclose somethiûg non-evident. For since they are ¡elatives, aûd

iiâÞp¡ehended together with the pre-eviderit proof and will be pre-

i 156 Sexrß Empíriars

evideût, so that the argument is turtred back on itself atrd the proof of the

non-evident is found not to be p¡e-evident. If, thercfore, the proof is neithe¡ an

appearance and of an appearancq riol notr-evideût and of somethi¡g noû-

evideot, no¡ non-evident and of something pre-endent, nor pre-evideût add of

something not-evident, and they say that besides these therc is no othe¡

alte¡native, theû it must be stated that the proof is nonexistent.

180 In addition, the following n€eds to be said. There is a contloversy about

proof; for some assert that it does not exist-as, indeed, do those who say that

nothing at all exists-and some, like the majority of the Dogmatists, claim

1Bl that it ¡oes exist; but we say that it "no more" exists that not And besides, a

proof always includes a dogma, and the DogÌnatists have had dispr'rtes about

èvery dogrna, so tecessarily there is conhovelsy about eYe¡y p¡ool For 4 inugr""iog, fo. example, to the proof that the¡e eldsts a vacÙum, one simulta'

neously agrees to the existetce of the vacuum, then it is evideot that those who

disputå the existence of a vacuum will also diqpute the proof of it And the same

reasoning applies to all the other dopas proved by the proofs Therefore,

every proof is disputed aûd is a matter of controve$y. , ' .

ß2 since, then, pìoof is non-evideût because of the coÂtrove$y coûceming it '

(for objects of iontrovers¡ as such, are\ ton-evident), its existencÊ is not"i

Àanifesi of itself but needs to be esíablished for us by a proof. The proofl¡,|

however, by which proof is established will not be agreed upon and manifest!

ifãr *. -"iigftt oo* questioning whether there is any proof at all). and being

a matter ofconlroversy and non-evident, it will require another proot, and that

o¡e another, aod so oo ad i¡6nitum. But it is impossible to prove an infinite

as proof.183 But neither catr it be disclosed by a sign. For since there is a

number of things; therefore, it is impossiblg to show that there is sr¡ch a

whether there is such a thing as a sign, and since sigts require proof of;th

own existence, we have circularity, with the proof ¡equiring a sign and the-si

again requiring a proof, which is absu¡d- A¡d fo¡ these reasons it is not poqsil

tà'r"solue thelontroversy about proof, since the decisio[ requi¡es a c¡ited

and it is questionable whether there is a¡y such thitrg; and in view oJ thjs;jl1

criterion will need a proof showing that therc is such a thing as a oriterig!,

r84 that we have the ciriularity type of apofit once again Hence, if neithprl|

Outlínes of pyúoni$n, Book 2 Isj

Èopound the following atglrnent:

.,.. If thete is a proof, there is a proolIf the¡e is no p¡oof, the¡e is a p¡oof.

.i, .. Eithe¡ there is a proof or there is no proof..r Therefore, there is a proof.

ÍVjth the same fo¡ce they set forth this argumenÍ

means of a proof nor .by means of a sign nor by meaûs of a crilerion

possible to show that the¡e exists a proof, nor is this of itselj p¡e-evident,rr

lave shown, then whether the¡e exists a proof will not be apprehensibþ

this reason, proof will iodeed be rionexistent, fo¡ proof and proviûg aÌel

of together, ;nd so the proof, not beitrg app¡ehensible, will not be able¡

aûythiûg. Hetlce, proof will ûot exist

rs¡ - It wi[ sumce to have said this much, by way of outlhe,

existence of prool The Dogmatists, in support of the opposite point plsay that eithËr the argumenis given against proof are probative, or they 4l

påbative. And if thãy are not probative, they catrnot show that therg

proof; while if they áre probative they theúselves, by a tüna¡ound ì(

rse ärguÁent, establisl the existence of prool Whence the Dogmatists

! ::i . , What follows f¡om cont¡adicto¡y p¡opositions is ¡rot only t¡uebul necessary.

.,.:.,'1, But 'rhere s a proof' and ''There is no proof" are contradic-j:],. to¡ies, f¡om each of which it follows t¡at the¡e is a proof.;,;l:,., th"r"to.",,here is a proof.

Now i¡ opposition to tbese po¡Ãts it is possible to state. lor example. lhat.since we do úot lhink that any argument is probative. we do not say absolutely

argume¡lts against proof a¡e probative, but orly that they seemto us; and plausible arguments are qot ¡ecessarily p¡obative. yet iI

are probative (which we do l1ot maintain), they certainly are also t¡ue.true a¡guments a¡e those that from true premises validly infer somethingtherefo¡e thei¡ conclusion is true. But that conclusion was .,Thereforq

is no such thing as a p¡oof"; co¡sequerÌtly, tùrning the argument around,è is no such thing as a proof is true- And just as cathartic drugs flushelves out along v¿ith the vadous materials in the body, so these argu-apply.to themselves along with the othet arguments that arc said to b€

iÀ{.ole. ove¡, th€ followirg argument,each of the othe¡ statements but negates itseLf as well.

Nor is this nonsense, fo¡ even the slogar "Nothing i$ t¡ue,' rot ody

-:If there is a proof, there is a proof.I lf there is no proof, the¡e is a proof.

'iEithe¡ there is a p¡oof ot there is no proof.'iherefore, there is a prool

suffice. Ifthe conditional "If there is a p¡oof, there is a proof is sound,tùèrcontradictory of its consequent, namely, "The¡e is no proof' must b€

invalid in a number of ryays, but for the present let the following

tènt with "There is a proof," for the latte¡ is the artec€dent of theNow, according to the Dogmatists it is impossible fo¡ a oondi-[p ôf i¡consistent propositions to be sornd. Fo¡ a coDditioaal says

its a¡tecedent is the case, so is its consequent, whereas inconsistent

rcfo¡q if the conditioûal "If the¡e is a proo{, there is a prool' isognilitioral "If the¡e is no proof, there i$ a p¡oofl'carinot be sound.

or the othe¡ ha¡d, say that if either is the case, the other cannot

gÍF.e.ilJ,,,úw9 agree by hypothesis that the cotrditional "If there is Do proof,iþ proof is sor¡nd, then the proposition '"Ihere is a proof'can holdqìi¡eôùsly with '"The¡e is no proof." And ifit ca¡ hold simultaneously with

188 i

IjiII

il

I

iii

il

ti

tii

iti

il

189

158 Sextus Empíricus

it, it is ûot incorisistent with it. The¡efore, in the conditioÂal, "If the¡e is a proof,

there is a proof," the contradicto¡y of its coûsequeût is not i¡consisteÂt withits antec€dent, so that, convenely, this co[ditional will not be sound, sinçe the

other one was poshúated as sound by hypothesis. And since the p¡opositioo

"There is no proof is not inconsistent with "There is a proof', the disjunction

"Either there is a proof o¡ the¡e is no proof' will not be souûd, for the sounddisjunctio[ says that one of its disjuncts is soutd and the other o¡ others are

false, with iûconsistency. Or, conversely, if the disjunctioû is soutr4 the

co¡ditional "If the¡e is rio p¡oof, there is a p¡oof," as composed of ìconsistent

parts, l'¿ill be found unsound. Consequently, the ptemises of the aforemeû-

tioned a¡gument a¡e inconsistent, that is, they ûegate one aoother, and thus the

argument is trot sourid. But the Dognatists caûnot even show that anythiagfollows logically f¡oú th€ cottradictoly propositiols, sitce, âs üe have argued,

they have no critedon for logical cotrsequenceBut we are going on beyorid necessity' For 4 oû the oûe hand, the

arguments on behalf of proof are plausiblo (ând let them be so), while, oû the.

other hand, the attacks made against p¡oof are also plausible, it is necessa¡:i

to suspend judgment about proof, saying lhat it "no more" exists than not 'l\ .i':

I .:

.i14. Syllogisms ' i

I sì¡ppose that it is also superfluous to discuss in detail the much vauntedii

syllogisms since, fo¡ one thing, they are iocluded in the refutatìo¡ of the

existence of proof (for it is eviden! lhat wheú proof does no¡ exist there is no

place for probative a.rgument eithe¡), and for another, we have in effect ¡efuteili

them by the objections previously mâde. when in discussing redundancy we-

meDtioned a metbod by means ol wbich il is possible to show that all the

probative arguments of the Stoics atrd Peripatetics are invalid Yet perhaps-i1

will not be aûúss to coûsider them separately, for good measure, sinc€

thhkers are much take¡ with them. Now there is a great deal that otre

say by way of showing theil ûoûexistence, but ifl an outlitre it sumces to a

with them by the followiûg method. And for the p¡esent I shall discuôs '

Outl¡ es of pyrùonßm, Book 2 159

true. Thus, wheo they say:

, . Every humaa being is an animal.

., The¡efo¡e, Soc¡ates is an aûimal.

undemonst¡ated syllogisms, for if these are nullifred all the remaining

meûts a¡e overthrown, since the proof of their validity is based oD these.

So, then, the proposition "Every humaû beiûg is an aîimal" is est¡

by induction f¡om the pa¡ticulaß; fo¡ f¡om the fact that Soc¡ates is

humao being and an a¡imal, and Plato, Diotr, and each of the pal

.tlt:qq:g_ to i¡Jer from the universal proposition ..Every humaû being is ananimaj" the parricular proposition .-Therefore,

Soc¡ates is an animal,,. iwhich,:;tìâs we pointed out, is involved itr establisbing by induction the uo¡".rall, ttã

fall into a circular. arguñenr. establishing rhJ uniu"orf p.oporitl* tnåiÉiiilìyby means of each of the particula¡s. and then syllogisúcally irferring the

¡jìrparticular from the universâI. Simitarly, in the case of tñis *d";ì; -' "-^

like\'¿ise, it seems possible to maintain that eae¡y human being is an

mal-¡ecogniziÂg that if even oûe of the particulars should appear to þopposite case with the othe¡s, the universal proposition is not soutrd;

example, although most animals move their lower jaw and only the

moves the upper, the proposition "Ev€ry animal moves the lower jaw'¡

Soqates is a human being.No huúan being is foùr footed.Therefore, Socrates is not fou¡ footed,

p¡oposing to establish inductively the ,,No humatr being is fou¡ footed,,positio_n while wishing to infer each o[ the palticular caseJfrom it. they areght iD the ci¡cuìaúty dpo¡ia.A simila¡ treatrne¡r should be giveo to the remai¡jng arguments calleddemorìslrated" by rbe Pe¡ipatetics. and also to such propoiitions as .,lf itay, it is light." For the proposition .,If it is day, it is

-lighì" is, as they say,

ved in proving the p¡oposition .Tt is light,; and the proposition -..It

isa'together witb-'tt is day', serves ro esrablish tbe propoiiLión ..If it is day,light'; for tbe aforemetrtioned co¡dilio¡aj would ¡àr úave been considereãid if the coostaûtly conjoined truth of .1t is tighf' a"d ït is d;/;;ã noir observed beforehand. But iL in order to estabiish the conditional .,If it isit is lighr,' it js nece$sary to apprehend iú advance that wheDever it is dayalso always light. while from this condirional it is inlerred that wheowe'day it.is lighr-so that rhe coexistence of ils bei¡g day and irs be¡¡g lightrplied by the conditional 'Ifi[ is day. it is light , insofaias tbìs just de-pei'ds.he uodemonstrared argument before us. and thar co¡ditio¡ãl jn rum js

196

ied by the coholdi¡g of the aforementioned p¡opositions_then he¡ecircularity mode of apoli,a destroys the basis of tLe argument.

So likewise tr the case of the atgument:

ff it is day, it is light.It is not light.Therefore, it is not day.

,basis of day's not being obseryed without light, the conditioûal ,,If it islight" would be thoùght sound, assuming that if indeed by hypothesisld ever appear without light, the conditional would be saià tá ie false.r as the matterjust depe¡ds on the aforementioned undemonst¡atedÌthe p¡oposition "The¡e is no day wheû there is no light" is infer¡ed