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Human Nature and the Self

Throughout evolution humans have had to live with

the fact that they are not particularly large, fast,

tough, or well endowed with claws or teeth. Hu-mans are however excellent pattern detectors. We

can instantly sense similarities between past eventsand new situations and produce an "appraisal" thatexperience as positive or negative emotion. We do

this automatically, almost instantly, and with nomore awareness than we have of the processing thattakes place in vision or hearing.

Throughout history we have used our patternmatching ability to anticipate danger and avoidtrouble. For humans, the trouble we handle best is

the trouble that we avoid in the first place. Thisstrategy has allowed us to explore and make a liv-

ing in every part of the world.

Your appraisals (your sense of what is safe or at-tractive and what is not) may be consistent enoughor coherent enough across time and situations to be

noticed by your own pattern detecting system. Thiswould be a very basic form of "self" concept.

Our pattern detecting and matching abilities served

us well when our time frame was more linked toseasons than to minutes and seconds. Today, com-

munication, transportation, and other technologiescreate an environment that is more complex and

and changes more rapidly than anything evolutionprepared us for. Still, we are evolutionarily "wired"to make sense of every novelty and every changewe encounter.

Two Cognitive Systems

According to Cognitive Self Theory, we areequipped with two distinct cognitive systems.

The Experiential (or Intuitive) system is an auto-matic, pattern detecting and matching system. It

contains neural representations of previous experi-ences and their consequences (positive or negative).Processing is carried out almost instantly and en-tirely outside of awareness. The output from Experi-

ential processing is global - a general sense of goodor bad, approach or avoid, safe-dangerous, big -small, etc. The Experiential System does not imme-

diately change its output when given new informa-tion. It continues working from past experience until

it has encountered the new information repeatedly.

The Rational System is an intentional logical rea-soning system. Rational processing is entirely avail-

able to awareness. It is much slower than Experien-tial processing and gives very precise output - alogical conclusion, a numerical value, a specificfact. The Rational System takes new information

into account immediately.

Seymour Epstein

Univ. Massachusetts - Amherst

Cognitive Self Theory:

Class NotesBy E. Waters

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Self Theory postulates are patterns in the Experien-tial System. As a result we do not have directawareness of them. We can however notice patterns

in our own behavior and infer that we must believex, y, or z. Thus we can indirectly become aware ofsome of our self theory postulates.

The Cognitive Self Theorist Seymour Epstein sug-

gests that there are 3 ways to change a belief in theExperiential System. These are (1) real world ex-

perience, (2) experience with the therapist, and (3)experience provided by guided imagery. Manytypes of therapy intentionally or unintentially pro-

vide such experiences. Cognitive Self Theory isunique in expecting that quite a few different typesof therapy could be at least somewhat effective.

This understanding of why therapies work can helpstreamline current therapies and make them moreeffective.

The Self as a Theory

Personality psychologists have invoked the conceptof "self" to describe and explain (1) awareness of

the self, (2) continuity of the sense of self, (3) theimportance of self and tendency to interpret thingsin terms of self relevance, (4) why people prefer

some behaviors to others, and (5) why people doanything at all. Freud used the ego for just these

purposes. Unfortunately this concept of self was"too smart", his theory of motivation was unscien-

tific and at times circular, and his theory addressedonly events in the mind.

According to Seymour Epsteins Cognitive Self

Theory, the "self" is simply a set of beliefs you haveabout yourself and about your relation to the world.

These beliefs are not just a dusty record of what youhave experienced. They are a powerful tool that isused throughout every day to understand your envi-ronment. Constructing and maintaining a self theory

may be a relatively recent human habit but it servesmotives and strategies that are as old as human evo-lution.

According to Epstein, the self theory serves four keyfunctions: (1) making sense of incoming informa-

tion, (2) helping maintain a balance between pleas-ure and pain (or effort and rest); maintaining selfesteem (or defining boundaries of meaningful ef-

fort), and (4) helping maintain relationships.

Only a "good" or valid self theory can effectivelyserve these goals. Self theories are not all equally"good" or valid.

The goodness of a self theory can be evaluated usingthe same criteria you would apply to any theory in

science or social science. A good theory is (1) exten-sive, (2) parsimonious, (3) empirically valid, (4) in-ternally consistent, (5) testable, and (6) useful.

The Structure of Self Theories

A self theory is a hierarchically organized set ofpostulates (beliefs). Higher order postulates are (1)general, (2) normative (common to most people), (3)acquired earlier, (4) resistant to change, and (5) as-sociated with strong positive or negative emotion

when challenged or confirmed by experience. Lowerorder postulates are (1) more specific, (2) not nor-

mative (specific to a person's experiences), (3) ac-quired later, (4) less resistant to change, and (5) as-sociated with mild emotional responses when con-

firmed or challenged.

Self Theory Postulates and Their

Relation to Behavior

Challenges and confirmations of self theory postu-lates lead to negative or positive emotions. This pro-vides a way to identify self theory postulates even if

the person is not aware of them. Just track instancesof strong positive or negative emotions and inter-view the person about their interpretations of the

events that elicited them.

Seymour Epstein Visiting E. Waters Labat Stony Brook (1997)

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Cognitive Self Theory does not make much use ofthe concept "Self Esteem". According to CognitiveSelf Theory "self esteem" refers to the positive

emotions and positive expectations that are com-monly experienced by someone with a coherent andempirically valid self theory. This implies that "self

esteem" arises from competence and success - notthe reverse. That is, raising self esteem is no way to

increase school performance. Instead, better schoolskills will increase self esteem.

Readings on Epsteins Cognitive Self Theory

Catlin, G., & Epstein, S. (1992). Unforgettable ex-

periences: The relation of life-events to basicbeliefs about self and world. Social Cognition,10, 189-209.

Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited or atheory of a theory. American Psychologist, 28,404-416.

Epstein, S. (1983). The unconscious, the precon-scious and the self-concept. In J. Suls & A.Greenwald (Eds.), Psychological perspectives

on the self(Vol. 2, pp. 219- 247). Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.

Epstein, S., & Erskine, N. (1983). The developmentof personal theories of reality. In D. Magnus-son & V. Allen (Eds.), Human development:

An interactional perspective (pp. 133-147).New York: Academic Press.

Epstein, S. (1989). Values from the perspective ofCognitive-experiential Self-theory. In N.Eisenberg, J. Reykowski, & E. Staub (Eds.),

Social and moral values (pp. 3-22). Hillsdale,NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Epstein, S. (1990). Cognitive-experiential Self-the-ory. In L. Pervin (Ed.),Handbook of personal-ity theory and research: Theory and research(pp. 165-192). NY: Guilford Publications, Inc.

Epstein, S. (1991). Cognitive-experiential Self-the-

ory: An integrative theory of personality. In R.Curtis (Ed.), The relational self: Convergencesinpsychoanalysis and social psychology (pp.

111-137). NY: Guilford.

Epstein, S. (1992). The cognitive self, the psycho-

analytic self, and the forgotten selves. Com-ment on Drew Westen, The cognitive self andthe psychoanalytic self: Can we put our selvestogether?Psychological Inquiry, 3, 34-37.

Epstein, S. (1993). Bereavement from the perspec-tive of cognitive-experiential self-theory. In M.S. Stroebe, W. Stroebe, & R. O. Hansson (Eds.),

Handbook of bereavement: Theory, research,and intervention (pp. 112-125). NY: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Epstein, S.(1994). Integration of the cognitive andthe psychodynamic unconscious.American Psy-

chologist, 49, 709- 724.

Epstein, S. (1998). Cognitive-experiential self-the-ory: A dual process personality theory with im-

plications for diagnosis and psychotherapy. InR.F. Bornstein and J. M. Masling (Eds.), Em-

pirical research on the psychoanalytic uncon-

scious (Vol. 7, pp. 99-140). Washington, D.C.:American Psychological Association.

Epstein, S. (1998). Cognitive-experiential self-the-

ory. In D. Barone, M. Hersen, & V. B. VanHas-selt (Eds.),Advanced Personality (pp. 211-238)

NY: Plenum.

Epstein, S. (1998). Personal control from the per-spective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. In

M. Kofta, G. Weary, & G. Sedek (Eds.), Per-sonal control in action: Cognitive and emo-tional mechanisms (pp. 5-26). New York: Ple-

num.

Epstein, S. (1999). The interpretation of dreams

from the perspective of cognitive-experientialself-theory. In Singer & Salovey (Eds.),At playin thefields of consciousness: Essays in honor

of Jerome L. Singer (pp.59-82) Mahway,NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Epstein, S. The rationality debate from the perspec-tive of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Be-havioral and Brain Science, 23, 671-673.

Epstein, S., & Pacini, R. (1999). Some basic issuesregarding dual-process theories from the per-

spective of Cognitive-experiential Self-theory.In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual processtheories in social psychology (pp. 462- 482).

New York: Guilford Publishers.

Epstein, S., & Pacini, R. (in press). A comparison

of the influence of imagined and unimaginedinformation on intuitive and analytical informa-tion processing.Imagination, Cognition, & Per-

sonality: Consciousness in Theory, Research,and Clinical Practice.

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Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., &Heier, H. Individual differences in intui-

tive-experiential and analytical-rationalthinking styles. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 71, 390-405.

Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relationof rational and experiential information

processing styles to personality, basic

beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon.Jounal of Personality and Social Psy-

chology, 76, 972-987.

Teglasi, H., & Epstein, S. (1998). Tempera-ment and personality theory: The per-

spective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. School Psychology Review, 27,534-550.