Seeds of Compassion: The HIV/AIDS Crisis and Prop 215

Moderator

Stephan Ferris, Board Member, BALIF Writer, educator, speaker, and activist in the LGBTQ and HIV/STI prevention realms

Speakers

William G. Panzer, Criminal Defense Attorney Co-author of California’s Prop 215, The Compassionate Use Act of 1996

Dale Gieringer, Director, California NORML Co-author of California’s Prop 215, The Compassionate Use Act of 1996

John Entwistle, Cannabis Activist Started the first Cannabis Buyers Club to distribute cannabis to AIDS patients

Fred Gardner, Journalist and Activist Managing Editor of Synapse, at UCSF, from 1987 through 1999

Tuesday, June 18, 2019

Location: Café Flore •2298 Market Street• San Francisco, CA

Event Code: G192403

THE COMPASSIONATE USE ACT AND THE HIV/AIDS CRISIS

A Conversation to Mark LGBTQ Pride Month

Speaker Information

Bill Panzer William G. Panzer has been practicing law in the Bay Area for more than thirty years, specializing in cannabis defense. He is a co-author of California's Prop 215, "The Compassionate Use Act of 1996" the nation's first law legalizing the use of cannabis by patients pursuant to a physician's recommendation. In his practice he has represented patients, growers, and medical cannabis dispensaries throughout California in state and federal court, at both the trial and appellate level. He has lectured at numerous NORML legal seminars, Patients Out of Time legal seminars, conferences, and other events on cannabis law and related issues. He is also on the board of Directors and the State Legal Director for California NORML. Bill is a former winner of the NORML "Al Horn Award" and a two time winner of the Sonoma Alliance for Medical Marijuana's "Compassion In Action" Award, as well as a High Times Magazine "Freedom Fighter of the Month". Dale Gieringer Dale Gieringer is the director of California NORML (National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws) and a board member of national NORML. Along with Dennis Peron and others, he was one of the original co-authors of California’s medical marijuana initiative, Proposition 215. He is the author of “Marijuana Medical Handbook” and has published research on marijuana and driving safety, vaporization, potency testing, medical marijuana usage, and the history of marijuana prohibition. He was the proponent of Oakland’s Measure Z “tax and regulate” cannabis initiative in 2005 and a sponsor of California’s first legalization bill, AB 390. John Entwistle John Entwistle, Jr. has been a cannabis activist since 1982. He has organized events and demonstrations in cities across the United States to keep the dream of legalization alive during the dark days of prohibition. In 1987 John moved to San Francisco and began working with Dennis Peron on the front lines of the AIDS epidemic. In the years that followed John and Dennis started the first Cannabis Buyer's Club to distribute cannabis to AIDS patients as well as others in medical need.

John worked by Dennis Peron's side while he drafted, qualified and passed Proposition P (San Francisco - '91), the nation's first medical marijuana initiative. They went on to put two medical marijuana bills on Governor Pete Wilson's Desk both of which were vetoed. John was central to the drafting and subsequent passage of Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. When the Cannabis Buyer's Club was finally closed by Federal Injunction in the very late 1990s John & Dennis started a demonstration farm in Lake County, California to grow cannabis firsthand with patients, all of whom participated directly in the activities of that farm. They retired from farming after several successful years and after fielding two separate raids from the Federal DEA. The high visibility success of that farm changed the way cannabis is grown in Northern California, bringing the crop out into the open following decades of subterfuge. John authored a book recounting the stories behind the original Cannabis Buyer's Club and the role of cannabis in the early days of the epidemic. That book is entitled "Memoirs of Dennis Peron. How a gay hippy outlaw legalized marijuana in response to the AIDS epidemic" and is available through Amazon.com. John also dropped into City College to earn an Associates in the Sciences degree and upon taking an interest in Chinese language and culture John earned a Bachelor's degree (Cum Laude) in Chinese in 2011. Today John is directing the Dennis Peron Legacy Project (DennisPeronLegacyProject.com) to memorialize his spouse Dennis Peron who passed away in January of 2018. Fred Gardner Fred Gardner has been covering and participating in the movement for peace and freedom since the 1960s. He launched the first "GI coffeehouse" near Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and covered the infamous Presidio Mutiny court martials for the underground press. (His book, The Unlawful Concert, published by Viking in 1970, was reissued with an introduction by Alan Dershowitz.) In the 1970s Gardner exposed the DEA's role in spraying the carcinogenic herbicide Paraquat on marijuana being consumed in California, and the hidden ownership of "Erhardt seminar training." From 1987 through 1999 he was managing editor of Synapse, the UCSF weekly, in which he broke the story of CBD's medical potential. From 2000 through 2002 he was public information officer for the District Attorney of San Francisco (Terence Hallinan) and SFDA's liaison to the medical marijuana community. In 2003 he helped Tod Mikuriya, MD, launch O'Shaughnessy's, a journal of sorts distributed by pro-cannabis doctors to their patients. He has written hundreds of topical songs, including "The Ballad of Dennis Peron."

, ~. III

615 Medical Use of Marijuana. Initiative Statute. 2

111111 7

58

Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General

MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA. INITIATIVE STATUTE.

• Exempts patients and defined caregivers who possess or cultivate marijuana for medical treatment recommended by a physician from criminal laws which otherwise prohibit possession or cultivation of marijuana.

• Provides physicians who recommend use of marijuana for medical treatment shall not be punished or denied any right or privilege.

• Declares that measure not be construed to supersede prohibitions of conduct endangering others or to condone diversion of marijuana for non-medical purposes.

• Contains severability clause.

Summary of Legislative Analyst's Estimate of Net State and Local Government Fiscal Impact:

• Adoption of this measure would probably have no significant fiscal impact on state and local governments.

G96

Analysis by the Legislative Analyst

BACKGROUND Under current state law, it is a crime to grow or

.Jossess marijuana, regardless of whether the marijuana is used to ease pain or other symptoms associated with illness. Criminal penalties vary, depending on the amount of marijuana involved. It is also a crime to transport, import into the state, sell, or give away marijuana.

Licensed physicians and certain other health care providers routinely prescribe drugs for medical purposes, including relieving pain and easing symptoms accompanying illness. These drugs are dispensed by pharmacists. Both the physician and pharmacist are required to keep written records of the prescriptions.

PROPOSAL This measure amends state law to allow persons to

grow or possess marijuana for medical use when recommended by a physician. The measure provides for the use of marijuana when a physician has determined that the person's health would benefit from its use in the

treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or "any other illness for which marijuana provides relief." The physician's recommendation may be oral or written. No prescriptions or other record-keeping is required by the measure.

The measure also allows caregivers to grow and possess marijuana for a person for whom the marijuana is recommended.

The measure states that no physician shall be punished for having recommended marijuana for medical purposes. Furthermore, the measure specifies that it is not intended to overrule any law that prohibits the use of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.

FISCAL EFFECT Because the measure specifies that growing and

possessing marijuana is restricted to medical uses when recommended by a physician, and does not change other legal prohibitions on marijuana, this measure would probably have no significant state or local fiscal effect.

For text of Proposition 215 see page 104

G96 59

215 Medical Use of Marijuana. Initiative Statute.

Argument in Favor of Proposition 215 PROPOSITION 215 HELPS TERMINALLY

ILL PATIENTS Proposition 215 will allow seriously and terminally ill patients to

legally use marijuana, if, and only if, they have the approval of a licensed physician.

We are physicians and nurses who have witnessed firsthand the medical benefits of marijuana. Yet today in California, medical use of marijuana is illegal. Doctors cannot prescribe marijuana, and terminally ill patients must break the law to use it.

Marijuana is not a cure, but it can help cancer patients. Most have severe reactions to the disease and chemotherapy--commonly, severe nausea and vomiting. One in three patients discontinues treatment despite a 50% chance of improvement. When standard anti-nausea drugs fail, marijuana often eases patients' nausea and permits continued treatment. It can be either smoked or baked into foods.

MARIJUANA DOESN'T JUST HELP CANCER PATIENTS

University doctors and researchers have found that marijuana is also effective in: lowering internal eye pressure associated with glaucoma, slowing the onset of blindness; reducing the pain of AIDS patients, and stimulating the appetites of those suffering malnutrition because of AIDS 'wasting syndrome'; and alleviating muscle spasticity and chronic pain due to multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, and spinal cord injuries.

When one in five Americans will have cancer, and 20 million may develop glaucoma, shouldn't our government let physicians prescribe any medicine capable of relieving suffering?

The federal government stopped supplying marijuana to patients in 1991. Now it tells patients to take Marinol, a synthetic substitute for marijuana that can cost $30,000 a year and is often less reliable and less effective.

Marijuana is not magic. But often it is the only way to get relief. A Harvard University survey found that almost one-half of cancer doctors surveyed would prescribe marijuana to some of their patients if it were legal.

IF DOCTORS CAN PRESCRIBE MORPHINE, WHY NOT MARIJUANA?

Today, physicians are allowed to prescribe powerful drugs like morphine and codeine. It doesn't make sense that they cannot prescribe marijuana, too.

Proposition 215 allows physicians to recommend marijuana in writing or verbally, but if the recommendation is verbal, the doctor can be required to verify it under oath. Proposition 215 would also protect patients from criminal penalties for marijuana, but ONLY if they have a doctor's recommendation for its use.

MARIJUANA WILL STILL BE ILLEGAL FOR NON-MEDICAL USE

Proposition 215 DOES NOT permit non-medical use of marijuana. Recreational use would still be against the law. Proposition 215 does not permit anyone to drive under the influence of marijuana.

Proposition 215 allows patients to cultivate their own marijuana simply because federal laws prevent the sale of marijuana, and a state initiative cannot overrule those laws.

Proposition 215 is based on legislation passed twice by both houses of the California Legislature with support from Democrats and Republicans. Each time, the legislation was vetoed by Governor Wilson.

Polls show that a majority of Californians support Proposition 215. Please join us to relieve suffering and protect your rights. VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION 215.

RICHARD J. COHEN, M.D. Consulting Medical Oncologist (Cancer Specialist),

California-Pacific Medical Center, San Francisco IVAN SILVERBERG, M.D. Medical Oncologist (Cancer Specialist), San Francisco ANNA T. BOYCE Registered Nurse, Orange County

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 215 AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY SAYS: ". . . Marijuana is not a

substitute for appropriate anti-nausea drugs for cancer chemotherapy and vomiting. [We] see no reason to support the legalization of marijuana for medical use."

Thousands of scientific studies document the harmful physical and psychological effects of smoking marijuana. It is not compassionate to give sick people a drug that will make them sicker.

SMOKING MARIJUANA IS NOT APPROVED BY THE FDA FOR ANY ILLNESS

Morphine and codeine are FDA approved drugs. The FDA has not approved smoking marijuana as a treatment for any illness.

Prescriptions for easily abused drugs such as morphine and codeine must be in writing, and in triplicate, with a copy sent to the Department of Justice so these dangerous drugs can be tracked and kept off the streets. Proposition 215 requires absolutely no written documentation of any kind to grow or smoke marijuana. It will create legal loopholes that would protect drug dealers and growers from prosecution.

PROPOSITION 215 IS MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION-NOT MEDICINE

• Federal laws prohibit the possession and cultivation of marijuana. Proposition 215 would encourage people to break federal law.

• Proposition 215 will make it legal for people to smoke marijuana in the workplace . . . or in public places . . . next to your children.

NOT ONE MAJOR DOCTOR'S ORGANIZATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION OR DRUG EDUCATION GROUP SUPPORTS

PROPOSITION 215-IT'S A SCAM CONCOCTED AND FINANCED BY DRUG LEGALIZATION ADVOCATES!

PLEASE VOTE NO.

SHERIFF BRAD GATES Past President, California

State Sheriffs' Association ERIC A. VOTH, M.D., F.A.C.P. Chairman, The International Drug Strategy Institute GLENN LEVANT Executive Director, DAR.E. America

60 Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency. G96

Medical Use of Marijuana. Initiative Statute. 215 Argument Against Proposition 215

READ PROPOSITION 215 CAREFULLY • IT IS A CRUEL HOAX

The proponents of this deceptive and poorly written initiative want to exploit public compassion for the sick in order to legalize and legitimatize the widespread use of marijuana in California.

Proposition 215 DOES NOT restrict the use of marijuana to AIDS, cancer, glaucoma and other serious illnesses.

READ THE FINE PRINT. Proposition 215 legalizes marijuana use for "any other illness for which marijuana provides relief" This could include stress, headaches, upset stomach, insomnia, a stiff neck . . . or just about anything.

NO WRITTEN PRESCRIPTION REQUIRED • EVEN CHILDREN COULD SMOKE POT LEGALLY!

Proposition 215 does not require a written prescription. Anyone with the "oral recommendation or approval by a physician" can grow, possess or smoke marijuana. No medical examination is required.

THERE IS NO AGE RESTRICTION. Even children can be legally permitted to grow, possess and use marijuana . . . without parental consent.

NO FDA APPROVAL • NO CONSUMER PROTECTION Consumers are protected from unsafe and impure drugs by the Food

and Drug Administration (FDA). This initiative makes marijuana available to the public without FDA approval or regulation. Quality, purity and strength of the drug would be unregulated. There are no rules restricting the amount a person can smoke or how often they can smoke it.

THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, is already available by prescription as the FDA approved drug Marinol.

Responsible medical doctors wishing to treat AIDS patients, cancer patients and other sick people can prescribe Marinol right now. They don't need this initiative.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, MAJOR MEDICAL GROUPS SAY NO TO SMOKING MARIJUANA FOR MEDICINAL PURPOSES

The National Institute of Health conducted an extensive study on the medical use of marijuana in 1992 and concluded that smoking marijuana is not a safe or more effective treatment than Marinol or other FDA approved drugs for people with AIDS, cancer or glaucoma.

The American Medical Association, the American Cancer Society, the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, the American Glaucoma Society and other top medical groups have not accepted smoking marijuana for medical purposes.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DRUG PREVENTION LEADERS SAY NO TO PROPOSITION 215

The California State Sheriffs Association The California District Attorneys Association

The California Police Chiefs Association The California Narcotic Officers Association

The California Peace Officers Association Attorney General Dan Lungren

say that Proposition 215 will provide new legal loopholes for drug dealers to avoid arrest and prosecution . . .

Californians for Drug-Free Youth The California D.A.R.E. Officers Association

Drug Use Is Life Abuse Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America

Drug Watch Int.ernational say that Proposition 215 will damage their efforts to convince young people to remain drug free. It sends our children the false message that marijuana is safe and healthy.

HOME GROWN POT • HAND ROLLED "JOINTS" • DOES THIS SOUND LIKE MEDICINE?

This initiative allows unlimited quantities of marijuana to be grown anywhere . . . in backyards or near schoolyards without any regulation or restrictions. This is not responsible medicine. It is marijuana legalization.

VOTE NO ON PROPOSITION 215

JAMES P. FOX President, California District Attorneys Association MICHAEL J. MEYERS, M.D. Medical Director, Drug and Alcohol Treatment

Program, Brotman Medical Center, CA

SHARON ROSE Red Ribbon Coordinator, Californians for Drug-Free

Youth, Inc.

Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 215 SAN FRANCISCO DISTRICT ATTORNEY

TERENCE HALLINAN SAYS ... Opponents aren't telling you that law enforcement officers are on

both sides of Proposition 215. I support it because I don't want to send cancer patients to jail for using marijuana.

Proposition 215 does not allow "unlimited quantities of marijuana to be grown anywhere." It only allows marijuana to be grown for a patient's personal use. Police officers can still arrest anyone who grows too much, or tries to sell it.

Proposition 215 doesn't give kids the okay to use marijuana, either. Police officers can still arrest anyone for marijuana offenses. Proposition 215 simply gives those arrested a defense in court, if they can prove they used marijuana with a doctor's approval.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN VASCONCELLOS SAYS ... Proposition 215 is based on a bill I sponsored in the California

Legislature. It passed both houses with support from both parties, but was vetoed by Governor Wilson. If it were the kind of irresponsible legislation that opponents claim it was, it would not have received such

widespread support.

CANCER SURVIVOR JAMES CANTER SAYS Doctors and patients should decide what medicines are best. Ten

years ago, I nearly died from testicular cancer that spread into my lungs. Chemotherapy made me sick and nauseous. The standard drugs, like Marinol, didn't help.

Marijuana blocked the nausea. As a result, I was able to continue the chemotherapy treatments. Today I've beaten the cancer, and no longer smoke marijuana. I credit marijuana as part of the treatment that saved my life.

TERENCE HALLINAN San Francisco District Attorney JOHN VASCONCELLOS Assemblyman, 22nd District Author, 1995 Medical Marijuana Bill JAMES CANTER Cancer survivor, Santa Rosa

G96 Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency. 61

asserting as a defense or otherwise relying on any of the antitrust law exemptions contained in Section 16770 of the Business and Professions Code, Section 1342.6 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 10133.6 of the Insurance Code, in any civil or criminal action against it for restraint of trade, unfair trading practices, unfair competition or other violations of Part 2 (commencing with Section 16600) of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.

(d) The remedies contained in this chapter are in addition and cumulative to any other remedies provided by statute or common law.

Article 14. Severability 1399.960. (a) If any provision, sentence, phrase, word, or group of words in this chapter,

or their application to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions, sentences, phrases, words, groups of words or applications of this chapter. To this end, the provisions, sentences, phrases, words and groups of words in this chapter are severable.

(b) Whenever a provision, sentence, phrase, word, or group of words is held to be in conflict with federal law, that provision, sentence, phrase, word, or group of words shall remain in full force and effect to the maximum extent permitted by federal law.

Article 15. Amendment 1399.965. (a) This chapter may be amended only by the Legislature in ways that further

its purposes. Any other change in the provisions of this chapter shall be approved by vote of the people. In any judicial proceeding concerning a legislative amendment to this chapter, the court shall exercise its independent judgment as to whether or not the amendment satisfies the requirements of this chapter.

(b) No amendment shall be deemed to further the purposes of this chapter unless it furthers the purpose of the specific provision of this chapter that is being amended.

Article 16. Definitions 1399.970. The following definitions shall apply to this chapter: (a) "Affiliated enterprise" means any entity of any form that is wholly owned, controlled,

or managed by a health care business, or in which a health care business holds a beneficial interest of at least twenty-five percent (25%) either through ownership of shares or control of memberships.

(b) "Available for public inspection" means available at the facility or agency during regular business hours to any person for inspection or copying, or both, with any charges for the copying limited to the reasonable cost of reproduction and, when applicable, postage.

(c) "Caregiver" or "licensed or certified caregiver" means health personnel licensed or certified under Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Professions Code, including a person licensed under any initiative act referred to therein, health personnel regulated by the State Department of Health Services, and health personnel regulated by the Emergency Medical Services Authority.

(d) "Health care business" means any health facility, organization, or institution of any kind that provides, or arranges for the provision of, health services, regardless of business form and whether or not organized and operating as a profit or nonprofit, tax-exempt enterprise, including all of the following:

( I) Any health facility defined herein. (2) Any health care service plan as defined in subdivision (j) of Section 1345 of the He

and Safety Code. (3) Any nonprofit hospital service plan as governed by Chapter 11 a (commencing with

Section 1/491) of Part 2 of Division 2 of the Insurance Code. (4) Any disability insurer providing hospital, medical, or surgical coverage as governed

by Section 11012.5 and following of the Insurance Code. (5) Any provider of emergency ambulance services, limited advanced life support, or

advanced life support services. (6) Any preferred provider organization, independent practice association, or other

organized group of health professionals with 50 or more employees in the aggregate contracting for the provision or arrangement of health services.

(e) "Health care consumer" or "patient" means any person who is an actual or potential recipient of health services.

(f) "Health care services" or "health services" means health services of any kind, including, but not limited to, diagnostic tests or procedures, medical treatments, nursing care, mental health, and other health care services as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1345 of the Health and Safety Code.

(g) "Health facility" means any licensed facility of any kind at which health services are provided, including, but not limited to, those facilities defined in Sections 1250,1200,1200.1, and 1204, and home health agencies, as defined in Section 1374.10, regardless of business form, and whether or not organized and operating as a profit or nonprofit, tax -exempt or non-exempt enterprise, and including facilities owned, operated, or controlled, by governmental entities, hospital districts, or other public entities.

(h) "Private health care business" means any health care business as defined herein except governmental entities, including hospital districts and other public entities. "Private health care business" shall include any joint venture, partnership, or any other arrangement or enterprise involving a private entity or person in combination or alliance with a public entitv.

(i) "Health insurer" means any of the following: (1) Any health care service plan as defined in subdivision (j) of Section 1345 of the Health

and Safety Code. (2) Any nonprofit hospital service plan as governed by Chapter lIa (commencing with

Section 1I491) of Part 2 of Division 2 of the Insurance Code. (3) Any disability insurer providing hospital, medical, or surgical coverage as governed

by Section 11012.5 and following of the Insurance Code.

Proposition 215: Text of Proposed Law This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of

Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution. This initiative measure adds a section to the Health and Safety Code; therefore, new

provisions proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW SECTION I. Section 11362.5 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read: Il362.5. (a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the Compassionate Use Act

of 1996. (b)( I) The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the purposes of

the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows: (A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for

medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma. arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief

(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.

(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for . safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.

(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 1I 358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.

(e) For the purposes of this section, "primary caregiver "means the individual designated by the person exempted under this section who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of that person.

SEC. 2. If any provision of this measure or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the measure that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this measure are severable.

Proposition 216: Text of Proposed Law This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of

Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution. This initiative measure adds sections to the Health and Safety Code; therefore, new

provisions proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW Division 2.4 (commencing with Section 1796.01) is added to the Health and Safety Code

to read:

DIVISiON 2.4. THE PATIENT PROTECTION ACI CHAPTER I. PURPOSE AND INTENT

1796.01. This division shall be known as the "Patient Protection Act." The people of California find and declare all of the following:

(a) No health maintenance organization (HMO) or other health care business should be able to prevent doctors, registered nurses, and other health care professionals from informing patients of any information that is relevant to their health care.

(b) Doctors, registered nurses, and other health care professionals should be able to advocate for patients without fear of retaliation from HMOs and other health care businesses.

(c) Health care businesses should not create conflicts of interest that force doctors to choose between increasing their payor giving their patients medically appropriate care.

(d) Patients should not be denied the medical care their doctor recommends just because

104

their HMO or health insurer thinks it will cost too much. (e) HMOs and other health insurers should establish publicly available criteria for

authorizing or denying care that are determined by appropriately qualified health professionals.

(j) No HMO or other health insurer should be able to deny a treatment recommended by a patient's physician unless the decision to deny is made by an appropriately qualified health professional who has physically examined the patient.

(g) All doctors and health care professionals who are responsible for determining in any way the medical care that a health plan provides to patients should be subject to the same professional standards and disciplinary procedures as similarly licensed health professionals who provide direct care for patients.

(h) No hospital, nursing home, or other health facility should be allowed to operate unless it maintains minimum levels of safe staffing by doctors, registered nurses, and other health professionals.

(i) The quality of health care available to California consumers will suffer if health becomes a big business that cares more about making money than it cares about taking g care of patients.

(j) It is not fair to consumers when health care executives are paid millions of dollars in salaries and bonuses while consumers are being forced to accept more and more restrictions on their health care coverage.

(k) The premiums paid to health insurers .fhould be spent on health care services for

G96

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FindLaw Caselaw California CA Supreme Ct. PEOPLE v. In re Patrick K. Kelly on Habeas Corpus.

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PEOPLE v. In re Patrick K. Kelly on Habeas Corpus.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Patrick K. KELLY, Defendant andAppellant. IN RE: Patrick K. Kelly on Habeas Corpus.

No. S164830.

    Decided: January 21, 2010Gloria C. Cohen and Gerald F. Uelman, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant andAppellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. De Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General,Lawrence M. Daniels, Ana R. Duarte, Kristofer Jorstad and Michael R. Johnsen, Deputy Attorneys General, forPlaintiff and Respondent. Robert E. Harris, in pro. per., for Proposition 215 as Amicus Curiae.Health and Safety Code section 11362.77,1 which is part of the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) (§ 11362.7et seq.), prescribes a specific amount of marijuana that a “qualified patient” may possess or cultivate. Wegranted review to determine whether this aspect of section 11362.77 is invalid under California Constitution,article II, section 10, subdivision (c), insofar as it amends, without approval of the electorate, theCompassionate Use Act (CUA) (§ 11362.5), an initiative measure adopted by the voters as Proposition 215 in1996. We conclude, consistently with the decision of the Court of Appeal below (and with the position of bothparties in the present litigation), that insofar as section 11362.77 burdens a defense under the CUA to acriminal charge of possessing or cultivating marijuana, it impermissibly amends the CUA and in that respect isinvalid under article II, section 10, subdivision (c). We also conclude, consistently with the views of bothparties in the present litigation, that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that section 11362.77 must besevered from the MMP and hence voided.

I.

In 1996, the California electorate approved Proposition 215 and adopted the CUA, which provides: “Section11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shallnot apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for thepersonal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.”(§ 11362.5, subd. (d).)2 By this and related provisions, the CUA provides an affirmative defense to prosecutionfor the crimes of possession and cultivation. (See generally People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 474(Mower ); People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 98 (Wright ).) The CUA does not grant immunity from arrestfor those crimes, however. So long as the authorities have probable cause to believe that possession orcultivation has occurred, law enforcement officers may arrest a person for either crime regardless of thearrestee's having a physician's recommendation or approval. (Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th 456, 467-469.)

Nor does the CUA specify an amount of marijuana that a patient may possess or cultivate; it states instead thatthe marijuana possessed or cultivated must be for the patient's “personal medical purposes.” (§ 11362.5, subd.(d), italics added.) An early decision construed this provision of the CUA as establishing “that the quantitypossessed by the patient or the primary caregiver, and the form and manner in which it is possessed, should bereasonably related to the patient's current medical needs.” (People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1549,italics added (Trippet ).)

Despite-or, perhaps, because of-this judicial construction of the CUA, questions persisted for both qualifiedmedical marijuana patients and for law enforcement officers relating to enforcement of and arrest forpossession, cultivation, and other related marijuana offenses. In 2003, the Legislature found that “reportsfrom across the state have revealed problems and uncertainties in the [CUA] that have impeded the ability oflaw enforcement officers to enforce its provisions as the voters intended and, therefore, have preventedqualified patients and designated primary caregivers from obtaining the protections afforded by the act.”(Stats.2003, ch. 875, § 1, subd. (a)(2).) In response, the Legislature enacted the MMP (§ 11362.7 et seq.) to “[c ]larify the scope of the application of the [CUA ] and facilitate the prompt identification of qualified patientsand their designated primary caregivers in order to avoid unnecessary arrest and prosecution of theseindividuals and provide needed guidance to law enforcement officers.” (Stats.2003, ch. 875, § 1, subd. (b)(1),italics added; see also Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th 81, 93; People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 290 [the

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MMP “immunizes from prosecution a range of conduct ancillary to the provision of medical marijuana toqualified patients”].)

Although the MMP did not literally amend the statute that established the CUA (that is, § 11362.5), the MMPdid add 18 new code sections that address the general subject matter covered by the CUA. At the heart of theMMP is a voluntary “identification card” scheme that, unlike the CUA-which, as noted, provides only anaffirmative defense to a charge of possession or cultivation-provides protection against arrest for those andrelated crimes. Under the MMP, a person who suffers from a “serious medical condition,”3 and the designated“primary caregiver”4 of that person, may register and receive an annually renewable identification card that, inturn, can be shown to a law enforcement officer who otherwise might arrest the program participant or his orher primary caregiver. Section 11362.71, subdivision (e) of the MMP provides in full: “No person or designatedprimary caregiver in possession of a valid identification card shall be subject to arrest for possession,transportation, delivery, or cultivation of medical marijuana in an amount established pursuant to this article[that is, the 18 new sections comprising the MMP], unless there is reasonable cause to believe that theinformation contained in the card is false or falsified, the card has been obtained by means of fraud, or theperson is otherwise in violation of the provisions of the article.” (Italics added.)5

The “amount established pursuant to this article” is addressed in section 11362.77, the statute at issue in thiscase. That section does two things: (1) it establishes quantity limitations, and (2) it sets forth a “safe harbor” byauthorizing possession of specific amounts of medical marijuana within those specific limits.6

Subdivision (a) of section 11362.77 provides that a “qualified patient”7 or primary caregiver may “possess nomore than eight ounces of dried marijuana,” and may, “[i]n addition, ․ maintain no more than six mature or 12immature marijuana plants .” (Id., subd. (a), italics added.) The next two subdivisions of the same sectionprovide qualified exceptions for even greater amounts. Subdivision (b) specifies that a patient may “possess anamount of marijuana consistent with the patient's needs,” on condition that the patient “has a doctor'srecommendation” stating that the quantity set out in subdivision (a) is insufficient for the patient's medicalneeds.8 Subdivision (c) specifies that cities or counties may retain or enact guidelines allowing greaterquantities than those set out in subdivision (a). These aspects of section 11362.77 evidently were designed toprovide an objective, bright-line standard in lieu of the subjective, highly individualized reasonable-amountstandard set forth in the CUA as construed by Tripett, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at page 1549, thereby providinglaw enforcement officers with uniform standards, and providing patients who meet those standards (and theirprimary caregivers) with predictability. (See, e.g., Stats.2003, ch. 875, § 1, subd. (b)(1).)

The MMP's safe harbor provision, subdivision (f) of section 11362 .77, authorizes possession of certainamounts of medical marijuana. It provides that a “qualified patient or a person holding a valid identificationcard, or the designated primary caregiver of that qualified patient or person, may possess amounts ofmarijuana consistent with this article [that is, as provided in subds. (a)-(c) of § 11362.77].” By its terms, thissafe harbor provision, which is not directly implicated on the facts of this case, would apply not only to thosewho hold MMP identification cards, but also to qualified patients or their primary caregivers-those personswho are entitled to the protections of the CUA but who do not obtain a program identification card that mayprovide protection against arrest.9

As alluded to above and further explained below, subdivision (a) of section 11362.77, by its terms, does notconfine its specific quantity limitations to those persons who voluntarily register with the program and obtainidentification cards that protect them against arrest. It also restricts individuals who are entitled, under theCUA, to possess or cultivate any quantity of marijuana reasonably necessary for their current medical needs,thereby burdening a defense that might otherwise be advanced by persons protected by the CUA. Moreover,although subdivision (b) of section 11362.77 allows possession of a quantity “consistent with the patient'sneeds” that is greater than the amount set out in subdivision (a), it affords this protection only if a physician sorecommends-a qualification not found in the CUA.

II.

Defendant Patrick Kevin Kelly has long suffered from, among other ailments, hepatitis C, back problems(including ruptured disks), a fused neck, nausea, fatigue, cirrhosis, loss of appetite, and depression. Over thecourse of 10 years, defendant attempted to treat the pain caused by these conditions with multiple epidurals,pain therapy, nerve simulators, and various medications-some of which were very costly, exceeding hismonthly income. Dissatisfied with this treatment plan, defendant decided to seek a recommendation to usemarijuana as permitted by the CUA.

In mid-February 2005, Dr. Eve Elting, a medical doctor employed by Medicann, a physician-owned entity thatevaluates patients who wish to use marijuana for medical purposes, met with defendant. Dr. Elting revieweddefendant's medical records and a 15-page form that defendant had been asked to complete, spoke with him,and then gave him a written recommendation for marijuana use that expired in one year. Dr. Elting did notrecommend a dosage,10 and defendant apparently did not register under the MMP.

Because defendant was unable to afford marijuana from a dispensary, he began to grow it at home for hispersonal use. Defendant consumes approximately one to two ounces of marijuana each week by smoking it,using it in a vaporizer, and consuming it in brownies. He testified that the marijuana lessens his nausea, butthat its effectiveness has decreased over time.

In October 2005, a confidential informant told a law enforcement officer that he or she suspected defendant ofgrowing marijuana. Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Michael Bartman went to the informant's home in theCity of Lakewood, from which the deputy could observe marijuana plants growing in defendant's backyard.Law enforcement officers obtained a warrant, and thereafter Deputy Bartman, along with seven to nine other

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officers, arrested defendant and searched his home. They found seven potted marijuana plants and additionalmarijuana plants growing in the soil outside the garage in the backyard of defendant's home. They alsodiscovered seven plastic bags, most of which were vacuum sealed, each containing one to two ounces of driedmarijuana, along with a small amount of marijuana in a jar. In total, deputies seized slightly more than 12usable ounces of dried marijuana. Deputies also recovered a scale and a loaded firearm from a nightstand inthe master bedroom. No other traditional indicia of sales-such as pagers, cell phones, “pay-owe sheets,” cashmoney in bills, “nickel and dime bags” (bags used to hold small amounts of marijuana, to be sold for $5 or$10), safes, or sophisticated growing systems-were found during the search. Nor was there any record ofcomplaints by neighbors specifically concerning excessive foot traffic at defendant's home.

Dr. Elting's original written recommendation for medical use of marijuana was found in the master bedroom,and a copy was found taped to a wall of the garage. A deputy called the phone number on the recommendationand was told that defendant had a “prescription” to use marijuana. Defendant was arrested and charged withpossessing marijuana for sale (§ 11359) and cultivating marijuana (§ 11358).11

Prior to trial, defendant moved to bar the prosecution from eliciting testimony concerning the quantitylimitations set out in section 11362.77, on the ground that the statute, in that regard, constitutes animpermissible amendment of the CUA. After an extensive hearing the trial court denied the motion. The courtexplained that it would instruct the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 2370, which, as the court observed,“doesn't mention [specific] amounts,” and provides instead that the amount possessed or cultivated must bereasonably related to the patient's current medical needs. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the prosecutorwould be permitted to question witnesses concerning section 11362.77 and also argue to the jury, consistentlywith this statute, that defendant possessed more than eight ounces of dried marijuana and yet lacked aphysician's recommendation for possessing more than that amount. In that regard, the trial court ruled: “Ithink the Legislature has a right to-I don't really [think] it changed the [CUA]. I think it further defined it. So,that's my ruling.”12

At the subsequent jury trial, Deputy Bartman testified that, in his opinion, the marijuana recovered fromdefendant's home was possessed for sale. Bartman explained that he reached this conclusion despite thecircumstance that most of the dried marijuana found at defendant's home was vacuum packed in relativelylarge quantities of approximately one to two ounces, instead of the one-ounce and much smaller nickel anddime bags typically used in sales. The deputy surmised that defendant had packaged the marijuana in largerquantities in order to supply other sellers, who in turn would repackage smaller amounts of the product intosmaller containers. On earlier cross-examination, however, it was revealed that Deputy Bartman had minimalexperience concerning marijuana used for medicinal purposes.

Defendant testified concerning his medical ailments and treatment efforts. He also explained that he used thescale that was found in his bedroom to ensure that he never took more than one ounce of marijuana with himwhen he traveled, because, although he knew he was permitted to possess medical marijuana, he did not “knowwhat the law is on carrying it,” and he also understood that as a general matter “over an ounce is a felony.”

Christopher Conrad testified as a medical marijuana expert for the defense. Conrad explained that storingmarijuana in vacuum-packed baggies is consistent with medicinal use, and that the total amount found(slightly more than 12 ounces of “dried mature processed flowers”) also was consistent with personal use.Conrad observed that, assuming defendant consumed the marijuana found in his home at a rate of two ouncesa week, the supply would last him slightly more than six weeks.13 Dr. Elting testified concerning herrecommendation that defendant use marijuana to treat his ailments.

On cross-examination of both Conrad and Dr. Elting, the prosecutor, consistently with the trial court's rulings,emphasized that section 11362.77 provides that a person may possess no more than eight ounces of driedmarijuana unless the person has a medical recommendation to exceed that amount, and he elicited theagreement of these witnesses with his reading of the statute. This in turn prompted the trial court to instructthe jury spontaneously, near the conclusion of the cross-examination of Conrad: “[J]ust so the jury knows,because they're the ones that have to decide this case. This statute, basically, says you can have eight ounces ofdried marijuana. But it also says later on that if ․ a city or a county says you could have more, then they couldpass some law that says you can have more. That's basically what it says.” Immediately thereafter, theprosecutor elicited testimony from Conrad establishing that, as far as the witness knew, the County of LosAngeles had not passed any law to “expand the eight ounce limitation.”

Subsequently, the jury was given an instruction modeled on CALCRIM No. 2370, which, consistently with theCUA, explained that defendant was permitted to possess or cultivate an amount of marijuana reasonablyrelated to his current medical needs.14 Notably, the jury was not instructed that, in the absence of a physician'srecommendation that eight dried ounces was insufficient, defendant had a right to possess only that amount.

Thereafter, however-and again, consistently with the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to excludeevidence of statutory quantity limitations, and with the court's spontaneous comment to the jury during thecross-examination of Conrad-the prosecutor in argument to the jury repeatedly stressed that defendant lackeda physician's recommendation to possess more than eight ounces of dried marijuana. The opening threeparagraphs of the prosecutor's summation were as follows:

“This is, ladies and gentlemen, the final leg of the trial. The law is pretty simple in this case. Whether or notyou agree with the law, disagree with the law, it's irrelevant. You have to follow the law. [¶] The facts are thatthe defendant has [a] physician's statement that he can use marijuana for medical purposes. That's not indispute, ladies and gentlemen․ But, what's also clear is that the law says he can only have eight ounces of dried[marijuana]. And testimony by the defense expert Mr. Conrad stated that the amount that was recovered ․ was

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about ․ 12 ounces. [¶] Well, guess what? Twelve ounces is ․ more than eight ounces of marijuana․ So whathappens if the defendant has more than eight ounces of the dried marijuana stuff? Then, there has to be someevidence to show that the doctor recommended more than that. And there is no evidence, ladies andgentlemen. It's not disputed that there is no evidence presented to show that the defendant has any medicalrecommendation that exceeds the eight ounces.” (Italics added.)

After further arguing that, in his view, the evidence demonstrated that defendant was both using marijuanaand selling it, the prosecutor continued: “If, for example, you decide, well you know what? I don't think heintend[ed] to possess for sale. But, you know what? What he can possess is only eight ounces. Remember,ladies and gentlemen. So, the excess that he possess[ed], the other four ounces you can consider that in thepossession charge․”

Thereafter, defense counsel's closing argument urged the jury to determine that defendant neither soldmarijuana nor intended to do so, and that the amount possessed and cultivated by defendant was reasonablefor his personal medical use and hence was protected by the CUA. In response, the prosecutor, in his finalsummation to the jury, argued that defense counsel was “asking you to be legislators” and “interpreters of thelaw,” but “[t]hat's not your job here, ladies and gentlemen. Your job is to follow the law. And the law says,whether we agree with it or not, the law says very clearly in black and white, Health and Safety Code section11362.77[, subdivision] (a), I'm going to read it to you right now. ‘A qualified patient’ [-] we're not disputingthat he's a qualified patient [-] ‘or primary caregiver may possess no more than eight ounces of driedmarijuana per qualified patient. In addition, a qualified patient or primary caregiver may also maintain nomore than six mature or 12 immature plants per qualified patient.” The prosecutor also read to the jury section11362.77, subdivision (b): “ ‘If a qualified patient or primary caregiver has a doctor's recommendation that[t]his quantity does not meet the qualified patient's medical needs, the qualified patient or primary caregivermay possess an amount of marijuana consistent with the patient's needs.’ “

The prosecutor asserted: “What does that mean? He can have eight ounces of the dried stuff. We know he has12 at least, he can have eight ounces of the stuff or [sic: and ] he can have six immature [sic: mature ] plants.Evidence was that they found seven plants in this particular case. But you know what? We're not saying, no,you can't have what you need. That's not what the law says. The law says before you can have more than thatyou need a doctor's recommendation. He doesn't have a doctor's recommendation, ladies and gentleman.”(Italics added.) The prosecutor continued in this vein, and then concluded: “Bottom line․ The law, it is what itis and we all have to follow it. [¶] You're not to guess at why the Legislature [wrote] the law the way it is. It iswhat it is. In this case you can't have more than eight ounces, unless he has [a ] recommendation and hedoesn't have that.” (Italics added.)

The jury deliberated for approximately 90 minutes and found defendant guilty of “possessing more than 28.5grams [one ounce] of marijuana (§ 11357, subd. (c))”-a lesser offense of the charged count of possessingmarijuana for sale (§ 11359). The jury also found defendant guilty as charged of cultivating marijuana (§11358). The trial court placed defendant on three years' probation under various terms and conditions,including that he serve two days in jail, less credit for two days already served.

III.

The Court of Appeal held, first, that section 11362.77 of the MMP, insofar as it limits the amount of medicalmarijuana that a person protected by the CUA may possess, constitutes an amendment of the CUA in violationof California Constitution, article II, section 10, subdivision (c), which precludes legislative amendment of aninitiative measure unless the measure explicitly permits such an amendment.15 Second, the Court of Appealheld that section 11362.77 is “unconstitutional” in its entirety-and “must be severed from the MMP.”

Third and finally, addressing an issue concerning which we did not grant review, the Court of Appealdetermined that although the trial court properly instructed the jury under the CUA that defendant couldpossess an amount of marijuana reasonably related to his current medical needs, the court improperlypermitted the prosecutor to elicit testimony indicating that the quantity limitations set out in section 11362.77applied to defendant and to his defense under the CUA-and to extensively so argue to the jury. In other words,the Court of Appeal concluded that the jury was informed, in essence, that the quantity limitations set out insection 11362.77 overrode the CUA's guarantee (confirmed in Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1549) that aqualified patient is permitted to possess and cultivate any amount reasonably necessary for his or her medicalneeds. This, the Court of Appeal held, constituted prejudicial error: “We cannot conclude that the jury founddefendant guilty because [it] believed the amount of marijuana he possessed and cultivated was not reasonablyrelated to his medical needs, as opposed to believing defendant was guilty because he had more marijuanathan section 11362.77 says he may have. Defendant therefore is entitled to a reversal of the judgment.”16

As explained in part IV. below, we agree with the Court of Appeal's first determination-that section 11362.77 isunconstitutional insofar as it burdens a defense, provided by the CUA, to charges of possessing or cultivatingmarijuana. But, as explained in part V. below, we disagree with the Court of Appeal's second conclusion-thatsection 11362.77 is wholly invalid, and that it “must be severed from the MMP.”

IV.

We first address the Court of Appeal's conclusion that section 11362.77 of the MMP, insofar as that statuteestablishes quantity limitations, constitutes an amendment of the CUA, in violation of California Constitution,article II, section 10, subdivision (c). That provision (quoted in full ante, fn. 15) states in relevant part: “TheLegislature ․ may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only whenapproved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”

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Significantly, as alluded to earlier, section 11362.77 of the MMP does not confine the reach of its quantitylimitations to those persons who voluntarily elect to register with the program and obtain identification cards,but instead extends its reach to “qualified patient[s]” and their “primary caregiver[s].” The term qualifiedpatient is defined by the MMP as “a person who is entitled to the protections of Section 11362.5 [the CUA ], butwho does not have an identification card issued pursuant to this article [that is, the MMP].” (§ 11362.7, subd.(f), italics added.) The term primary caregiver is defined by the MMP as an “individual, designated by aqualified patient or by a person with an identification card, who has consistently assumed responsibility for thehousing, health, or safety of that patient or person.” (§ 11362.7, subd. (d).) In other words, section 11362.77, onits face, sets quantity limitations not only for those persons who voluntarily register under the MMP and hold avalid identification card that provides protection against arrest. The statute also applies to and sets limits forall those “qualified patient [s]” and “primary caregiver[s]” who are entitled under the CUA to possess orcultivate any amount reasonably necessary for the patient's current medical needs. We proceed to considerwhether, in this respect, section 11362.77 constitutes an amendment of the CUA, in violation of CaliforniaConstitution, article II, section 10, subdivision (c).17

A.

We begin with the observation that “[t]he purpose of California's constitutional limitation on the Legislature'spower to amend initiative statutes is to ‘protect the people's initiative powers by precluding the Legislaturefrom undoing what the people have done, without the electorate's consent.’ [Citations.]” (Proposition 103Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1484 (Proposition 103 Enforcement Project).) In this vein, decisions frequently have asserted that courts have a duty to “ ‘ “jealously guard” ‘ “ the people'sinitiative power, and hence to “ ‘ “apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in orderthat the right” ‘ “ to resort to the initiative process “ ‘ “be not improperly annulled” ‘ “ by a legislative body.(DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 776 [construing analogous right to enact initiative countyordinances under Cal. Const., art. II, § 11, as governed by Elec.Code, § 9125]; see also Associated HomeBuilders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591, and cases cited [construing analogous right toenact initiative city ordinances under what is presently Cal. Const., art. II, § 11].)

At the same time, despite the strict bar on the Legislature's authority to amend initiative statutes, judicialdecisions have observed that this body is not thereby precluded from enacting laws addressing the generalsubject matter of an initiative. The Legislature remains free to address a “ ‘related but distinct area’ “ (Countyof San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 830 (San Diego NORML ); see alsoMobilepark West Homeowners Assn. v. Escondido Mobilepark West (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 32, 43 (MobileparkWest Homeowners Assn.) [construing the related initiative power of city voters under Cal. Const., art. II, § 11,and Elec.Code, § 9217] ) or a matter that an initiative measure “does not specifically authorize or prohibit .”(People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 47 (Cooper ); see San Diego NORML, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p.830.)

B.

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case law addressing what constitutes an “amendment” forpurposes of article II, section 10, subdivision (c). Although some decisions contain broad definitions of theamendment process in this context,18 for purposes of resolving the issue in the present case we need notendorse any such expansive definition.19 It is sufficient to observe that for purposes of article II, section 10,subdivision (c), an amendment includes a legislative act that changes an existing initiative statute by takingaway from it. (Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th 38, 44; Knight v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 14, 22(Knight ); Proposition 103 Enforcement Project, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1484-1486; Mobilepark WestHomeowners Assn., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 32, 40 [construing the related initiative power of city voters underCal. Const., art. II, § 11, and Elec.Code, § 9217]; Cory, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776.)

Applying this definition and related formulations (see ante, fn. 18), courts have determined that certainstatutes constitute impermissible amendments of initiative measures. (See Proposition 103 EnforcementProject, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1486-1487 [legislative statute that shifted and reduced insurers' rate-rollback obligations impermissibly amended Prop. 103, an initiative statute]; Huening, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d766, 779 [legislative statute that governed ballot arguments impermissibly amended Political Reform Act, aninitiative measure]; Cory, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776-777 [“control language” inserted by Legislature inbudget bill, in order to restrict manner of audits required by Political Reform Act, impermissibly amended thatact].)

On other facts, courts have found no amendment, and hence no violation of article II, section 10, subdivision(c). (See Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th 38, 44 [legislative limitation on presentence conduct credits did not amend1978 Briggs Initiative]; Knight, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 14, 25 [Legislature's enactment of domestic partnershipstatutes did not conflict with or take away from Prop. 22, an initiative statute providing that “Only marriagebetween a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,” and hence did not constitute amendment ofthat statute]; San Diego NORML, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 831 [Legislature's imposition of “identificationcard” requirements on counties under the MMP did not improperly amend the CUA, an initiative measure].)

C.

The Court of Appeal's analysis began with a review of the voters' intent in enacting the CUA. The courtobserved: “The CUA does not quantify the marijuana a patient may possess. Rather, the only ‘limit’ on howmuch marijuana a person falling under the CUA may possess is” that it must be “ ‘reasonably related to thepatient's current medical needs.’ “ (Quoting Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1549.) The appellate courtcontinued: “Ballot materials make clear that this is the only ‘limitation’ on how much marijuana a person

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under the CUA may possess.[20 ] ․ According to these ballot statements, the CUA does not place a numeric capon how much marijuana is sufficient for a patient's personal medical use. [¶] Section 11362.77, however, doesjust that. It specifies that a qualified patient may possess eight ounces of dried marijuana [and may maintain]six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants. (§ 11362.77, subd. (a).) A qualified patient may possess a greaterquantity if the patient has a doctor's recommendation that the quantity in subdivision (a) does not meet thequalified patient's medical needs. (§ 11362.77, subd. (b).) [[21 ] In other words, section 11362.77 ․ has clarifiedwhat is a reasonable amount for a patient's personal medical use, namely, eight ounces of dried marijuana [or agreater quantity if a physician so recommends, plus cultivation of six mature or 12 immature marijuanaplants]. [¶] But clarifying the limits of ‘reasonableness' is amendatory.”

The Court of Appeal further observed: “The Legislature's imposition of quantity limits in section 11362.77 ․imposes a numeric cap [and the requirement of a physician's recommendation in order to possess more thaneight ounces] where the CUA imposed none. Indeed, the Legislature itself recognized it had overstepped itsbounds in imposing the cap. In 2004, Senator John Vasconcellos, who introduced the MMP, authored andintroduced Senate Bill No. 1494․ [That bill] would have amended section 11362.77 by, among other things,deleting the eight-ounce and plant limits [and substituting a new subd. (a) ] as follows: ‘A qualified patient, aperson with an identification card, or any designated primary caregiver may possess any amount of marijuanaconsistent with the medical needs of that qualified patient or person with an identification card.’ (Italicsadded.) [22 ] [¶] In introducing Senate Bill No. 1494 ․ Senator Vasconcellos acknowledged the MMP'sconstitutional flaw when he said, ‘ “[Senate Bill No. 1494] is a clean-up bill ․ intended to correct a drafting errorin my medical marijuana bill signed into law last year․ [The MMP's] language may be problematic because itstates that all qualified patients (with or without identification cards) are subject to guidelines provided in[the] statute. Despite intent language in our bill stating that the program is intended to be voluntary, manyadvocates argued that it amends the initiative by making the guidelines mandatory-therefore making itunconstitutional. In order to avoid any legal challenges, it is important to make a distinction between ‘qualifiedpatient’ (which applies to all patients) and ‘persons with identification cards.’ “ ‘ (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety[,Analysis of] Sen. Bill No. 1494 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 22, 2004, p. 3; see also Sen. Health &Human Services Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1494 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 22, 2004, p. 3[the change effected by the MMP ‘could be viewed as an unlawful amendment to Proposition 215, an initiativethat did not provide a mechanism for amendments'].)”

Finally, the Court of Appeal below concluded: “Deleting the quantity limits in the manner suggested by SenateBill No. 1494 ․ would have corrected the constitutional problem created when the Legislature enacted the MMPwithout voter approval. Governor Schwarzenegger, however, vetoed the bill, citing a concern that the billremoved ‘[r]easonable and established quantity guidelines.’ (Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's [veto messageconcerning] Sen. Bill No. 1494, July 19, 2004.) That may be a valid concern. Nevertheless, it is a concern thatcannot be addressed by the Legislature acting without the voters' approval. We therefore ․ hold that section11362.77 unconstitutionally amends the CUA․”

D.

In this court, both parties essentially agree with the foregoing conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal. TheAttorney General, who petitioned for this court's review of the appellate decision, states at the outset of hisopening brief: “Respondent does not contest the Court of Appeal's conclusion that section 11362.77 isunconstitutionally amendatory insofar as it limits an in-court CUA defense.” The Attorney Generalsubsequently concludes that “application of section 11362.77's limits to the in-court CUA defense exceeds theboundaries of legislative power under article II, section 10, subdivision (c) ․ by replacing the CUA's‘reasonableness' standard with specified, numeric guidelines.” Defendant, unsurprisingly, agrees with AttorneyGeneral in these respects.

The interpretation and application of article II, section 10, subdivision (c) adopted by the Court of Appeal andthe parties-namely, that it prohibits an amendment that arguably merely clarifies an initiative statute bysubstituting seemingly reasonable, objective standards and restrictions, in place of a difficult-to-apply“reasonable amount” test-may at first blush seem to be overly strict. Indeed, as discussed below, adetermination that a statute such as section 11362.77 is unconstitutional in this regard almost certainly wouldnot be the conclusion reached by a court faced with similar legislation under the law of any other state. Andyet, as explained below, the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal and the parties is amply supported by,and indeed compelled by, not only the prior California cases that have discussed the initiative power andapplied the foregoing constitutional provision, but also by the history of our state's initiative process.

1

As noted earlier, article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution states in relevant part: “TheLegislature ․ may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only whenapproved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”California's bar on legislative amendment of initiative statutes stands in stark contrast to the analogousconstitutional provisions of other states. (Center for Governmental Studies, Democracy by Initiative: ShapingCalifornia's Fourth Branch of Government (2d ed.2008) p. 114 (hereafter Democracy by Initiative, 2d ed.) [“Noother state in the nation carries the concept of initiatives as ‘written in stone’ to such lengths as to forbid theirlegislatures from updating or amending initiative legislation”]; see generally Miller, Constraining Populism:The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform (2001) 41 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1037, 1046-1047 (hereafter Miller);Manheim & Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in California (1998) 31 Loyola L.A. L.Rev.1165, 1197-1198.)

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Currently, 21 state constitutions allow the electorate to adopt statutes by initiative measure.23 (Dubois &Feeney, Lawmaking by Initiative: Issues, Options and Comparisons (1998) pp. 27-28 (hereafter Dubois andFeeny, Lawmaking by Initiative).) Of those jurisdictions, 12 place no limitation whatsoever24 upon theauthority of the legislature to repeal or amend an initiative statute. In those states, an initiative statute istreated just like any other statute, and may be repealed or amended at any time. (See Comment, Power of theLegislature to Amend or Repeal Direct Legislation (1942) 42 Wash. U. L.Q. 439, 440-442 [decisionsunanimously have held that, absent language in a charter explicitly restricting a legislature's right to amend orrepeal, a state legislature retains that authority even as to initiative statutes].)

Eight of the remaining nine states that allow voters to adopt statutes by initiative measure place variouslimitations upon the authority of the legislature to act in response to an initiative statute. Two of thesejurisdictions allow amendment by the legislature at any time, but impose a moratorium on legislative repealuntil two years after adoption of the initiative statute.25 Three states place a two- to seven-year moratorium onrepeal or amendment; and yet some of these same jurisdictions allow amendment by a two-thirds vote duringthe moratorium period, and by a simple majority thereafter.26 Three other states allow amendment at any timeby a supermajority vote of the legislature, and one of those states-Arizona-additionally requires that theamending legislation “further[s] the purposes” of the original initiative measure.27

In order to illuminate the scope and effect of California's constitutional provision prohibiting the Legislaturefrom amending an initiative adopted by the people, we describe below the history of the provision and of thevarious attempts and proposals to change it.

2

At the close of the 19th century, a small but vocal contingent of reformers, pointing to the record of “directdemocracy” in Switzerland, campaigned for the adoption of the initiative and referendum process in the UnitedStates.28 A concerted effort to include similar provisions in the California Constitution began early in the 20thcentury and consumed a decade.29 During that time 10 states-led by South Dakota, Utah, and Oregon-actedprior to California and granted the powers of initiative and referendum to the electorate.30

Although the provisions of some of those state constitutions withheld authority from the governor to vetoinitiative statutes passed by the electorate,31 all but one imposed no restraint whatsoever upon the statelegislature's power to either repeal or amend an initiative statute.32 Oklahoma's provision, enacted in 1907,most explicitly preserved legislative power to repeal or amend initiative laws: “The reservation of the powers ofthe initiative and referendum in this article shall not deprive the legislature of the right to repeal any law, [or ]propose or pass any measure, which may be consistent with the constitution of the State and the Constitutionof the United States.” (Okla. Const. of 1907, art. V, § 7, italics added, as reprinted in Kettleborough, supra, at p.1098.) The sole exception to this approach in a state charter was reflected in Michigan's provision, effective inearly 1909, which specified the most limited authority for the state legislature to act with respect to a matterthat had been adopted by the voters as an initiative. The Michigan provision, no longer in effect, read: “No act ․adopted by the people at the polls under the initiative provisions of this section shall be amended or repealed,except by a vote of the electors unless otherwise provided in said initiative measure, but the legislature maypropose such amendments, alterations or repeals to the people.” (Mich. Const. of 1909, art. V, § 1, italicsadded, as reprinted in Kettleborough, supra, at p. 689.)33

During the time in which other states were incorporating initiative provisions into their respectiveconstitutions, the California Legislature permitted charter cities to do the same as a local matter. SanFrancisco, in 1898, and Los Angeles, in 1903, each adopted charters permitting local initiatives, and in doingso included provisions similar to that subsequently adopted by Michigan in 1909, under which the legislativebody, although barred from amending an initiative measure on its own, at least was authorized to propose thatthe electorate adopt a specific amendment to an initiative ordinance. (S.F. Charter, art. II, § 20, as adopted bythe S.F. electorate May 26, 1898; L.A. City Charter, art. XIX, § 198a, subd. (b), as amended Jan. 1, 1903.)34 TheCity of Sacramento, by contrast, took a different and stricter approach when it revised its own charter in 1903to permit the enactment of ordinances by initiative. Its charter provided, simply and starkly: “[A]ny ordinanceproposed by petition ․ which shall be adopted by a vote of the people, cannot be repealed or amended, exceptby a vote of the people.” (Sac. City Charter, art. XII, § 231, as amended Nov. 3, 1903, italics added.)35

At each session of the California Legislature convened between 1903 and 1909, proposals were advanced to putbefore the electorate constitutional amendments designed to extend the initiative and referendum statewide.Although most of these bills departed from the prevailing approach of the other states (and followed the strictapproach of the Sacramento charter) by expressly barring any amendment by the Legislature of initiativestatutes,36 legislation proposed in 1907 temporarily changed course and sought to adopt the majority view inthe United States, allowing legislative amendment of statutes adopted by initiative.37 No matter how framed,however, each effort to create a statewide initiative power met the same fate: it failed to secure the necessarysupport of two-thirds of each house of the Legislature, and hence no such proposal was submitted to theelectorate.

Thereafter, in drafting the ultimately successful California measure of 1911, the proponents did not follow themajority model, under which the state legislature was left free to repeal or amend initiative statutes just likeany other statute. Nor did the drafters of the California provision follow even the minority model of SanFrancisco, Los Angeles, and Michigan, under which the legislative body could not directly repeal or amend, butat least could propose to the voters that an initiative measure be repealed or amended.38 Instead, California'slegislative drafters proposed, and the California voters ultimately adopted, a measure that-more strictly thanany other state (then or now), but like the then-extant Sacramento charter-withheld all independent authorityfrom the Legislature to take any action on measures enacted by initiative, unless the initiative measure itself

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specifically authorized such action. In Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 22, the voters endorsed, asProposition 7 on the 1911 ballot, the predecessor to our present article II, section 10, subdivision (c), as follows:“Any act, law or amendment to the constitution submitted to the people by either initiative or referendumpetition and approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, at any election, shall take effect five days afterthe date of the official declaration of the vote by the secretary of state. No act, law or amendment to theconstitution, initiated or adopted by the people, shall be subject to the veto power of the governor, and no act,law or amendment to the constitution, adopted by the people at the polls under the initiative provisions of thissection, shall be amended or repealed except by a vote of the electors, unless otherwise provided in saidinitiative measure; but acts and laws adopted by the people under the referendum provisions of this sectionmay be amended by the legislature at any subsequent session thereof.” (Cal. Const., former art. IV, § 1, addedby Prop. 7, Special Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911), italics added.)

At the next legislative session, two proposed constitutional amendments were introduced, each of whichendeavored to change the new initiative provision by, among other things, giving the Legislature authority toamend initiative statutes upon a supermajority vote of each house.39 Neither effort secured the necessarylegislative support of two-thirds of each house, and hence neither proposal was submitted to the voters.

Similar unsuccessful efforts to amend the initiative process were undertaken in subsequent years. In 1919,Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 16 was introduced in the Legislature, proposing a constitutionalamendment that, if approved by the voters, would have eliminated the initiative power and permitted theLegislature to repeal or amend previously enacted initiative statutes.40 Related, but less drastic, legislativeproposals for constitutional amendments were made in the early- to mid-1920's. One proposal sought to allowlegislative repeal or amendment after a moratorium of four years following adoption of an initiative statute.41

Another proposal, consistent with the National Municipal League's 1924 model state constitution,42 proposedto specify that initiative laws be “subject to amendment by the legislature” so long as the amendment did not“destroy the intent and purpose of the act or ․ cripple or prevent the carrying out of the provisions thereof.”43

In the meantime, statutes enacted by the electorate as initiatives posed problems that demanded attention andamendment. And yet, such statutes were so difficult to amend that they were aptly characterized bycontemporaneous commentators as being, “in effect,” “quasi-constitutional amendments.” (Key & Crouch,supra, at p. 481.) For example, although it became clear that an amendment would benefit the ChiropracticInitiative Act, adopted in 1922, the Legislature apparently believed that it lacked clear authority even to submitto the voters any proposed measure to amend that initiative statute.44 Accordingly, no proposal to change the1922 chiropractic act emanated from the Legislature. Instead, signatures laboriously were gathered to placeonto the ballot proposed amendments in the form of follow-up voter initiative measures. Such ballot measuresconcerning the 1922 chiropractic act were submitted to the voters, and rejected by them, in 1934 and 1939 .45

This and a similar experience with the equally problematic “Torrens Land Title Act” or Land Title Law, adoptedby the voters as an initiative statute in 1914,46 eventually triggered the first of only three substantive changesthat have been made to the Constitution's initiative provision since its adoption in 1911. (See post, fn. 55.)There apparently was no entity willing and able to mount an initiative campaign to amend the Torrens Actinitiative statute, and as observed earlier, the Legislature evidently believed that the strict language of theconstitutional provision (former art. IV, § 1) might be construed to forbid the Legislature even from proposingsuch an amendment to the voters. In response, in 1945 the Legislature adopted, and then proposed to thevoters, Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 22 (Stats.1945, ch. 147, pp. 3163-3164). That provision wasdesigned to amend article IV, section 1, by adding section 1b, to permit “the Legislature to amend or repeal anyact adopted by vote of the people under the initiative, to become effective only when submitted to andapproved by the electors.” (Stats.1945, ch. 147, p. 3164, italics added.)47 The ballot argument in favor of SenateConstitutional Amendment No. 22, submitted to the voters as Proposition 12, explained that “adoption ․ willdo away with our present cumbersome methods and will provide an orderly and responsible way in whichamendments to initiative laws may be proposed, and at the same time preserve to the people their primaryright to approve or reject all such measures.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1946) argument in favor ofProp. 12, pt. I, p. 12, italics added.) The voters adopted Proposition 12 at the 1946 General Election.

In 1948, 1950, and 1952 the Legislature employed its new authority to pass and then propose for voterapproval a series of amendments to the 1922 chiropractic initiative statute.48 Thereafter, to address theproblems related to the 1914 Torrens Act initiative statute, the Legislature in 1954 used its new authority topropose an amendment to that law, giving the Legislature broad power to amend or repeal that particular act.(Stats.1955, 1st Ex.Sess.1954, ch. 58, § 1, pp. 331-332.) The voters ratified the Legislature's proposal at the 1954General Election,49 thereby removing the need for any future approval by the electorate for amendments to theTorrens law, and subsequently the Legislature repealed that law. (Stats.1955, ch. 332, § 1, pp. 789-790.) Nosuch broad authorization had been sought by or given to the Legislature with respect to the 1922 chiropracticinitiative statute, however, and as a result, on seven occasions since 1960, the Legislature has been forced toask the electorate to approve additional amendments to this 1922 initiative statute.50

Although the 1946 amendment to former article IV, section 1, gave the Legislature a method by which it mightpropose a specific amendment to, or repeal of, an initiative-enacted law, that change also carefully preservedarticle IV's original strict safeguards by requiring the electorate's approval of any legislative proposal to amendor repeal (unless the initiative measure itself allowed amendment or repeal without voter approval). Even thisslight modification in the relationship between statutes adopted by initiative and those adopted by theLegislature, however, still left voter-adopted initiative statutes in California far more insulated fromadjustment than in any other jurisdiction.51

In the mid-1960's, California, assisted by the California Constitution Revision Commission, undertook arevision of the Constitution. (See generally Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson (2006) 38 Cal.4th

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735, 752-754.) Although some commentators questioned the then-existing provision of article IV that strictlylimited the legislative amendment of statutes adopted by initiative,52 no specific proposal was made to changethat rule.53 After conducting its own extensive review, the commission recommended no change in thatrespect. (See Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision (1966) p. 47 [proposing revised art. IV, § 24, subd.(c) ] (Proposed Revision).)54 Nor did the Legislature's joint committee question that determination. (SeeAssem. Interim Com. on Const. Amends., Final Reps. (Jan. 2, 1967) 2 Appen. to Assem. J. (1967 Reg. Sess.).)The resulting Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 13 proposed numerous revisions of article IV andvarious other articles, but no change concerning the strict limitation on legislative amendment of initiativestatutes.55 (See Stats.1966, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 139, pp. 960-961, 971-972.)

In the 1966 General Election, the voters adopted Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 13 as Proposition 1-a, which relocated the initiative provisions to article IV, section 22 et seq. Revised article IV, section 24,subdivision (c) rephrased the former provision concerning repeal and amendment, without substantivechange, to read as it does today: “The Legislature may ․ amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statutethat becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment orrepeal without their approval.” Thereafter, following two more failed attempts to change the provision to allowamendment by the Legislature, without voter approval, of statutes adopted by initiative,56 the provision wasrenumbered in 1976, and remains today, as article II, section 10, subdivision (c).

In the ensuing decades, numerous commissions and reports have recommended that California's initiativeprovision be altered to permit legislative amendment of initiative statutes without voter approval,57 and onoccasion bills have been submitted to so amend the Constitution.58 But again, no such proposal has securedthe necessary two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature, and hence no such proposal has been submittedto the electorate.

3

With this background in mind, we return to the Court of Appeal's threshold determination that section11362.77 of the MMP, insofar as it places a specific limitation upon the amount of medical marijuana that aperson protected by the CUA may possess and cultivate, constitutes an amendment of the CUA in violation ofCalifornia Constitution, article II, section 10, subdivision (c). As observed earlier, this constitutional provisionspecifies that the Legislature may amend an initiative measure solely “by another statute that becomeseffective only when approved by the electors”-unless “the initiative statute permits” such amendmentexplicitly.

In the present case, the CUA-unlike many other initiative measures in recent decades-did not grant theLegislature authority to amend.59 Nor did the Legislature merely propose the MMP and submit it to theelectorate for approval. Instead, the Legislature adopted that scheme on its own, without seeking ratificationby the electorate.

In view of the case law recited in part IV.A. and B.-which is, in turn, consistent with the history of article II,section 10, subdivision (c) recited in part IV.D.2-we conclude that section 11362.77, by imposing quantitylimitations upon “qualified patients” and “primary caregivers,” amends the CUA. Under the CUA as adopted byProposition 215, these individuals are not subject to any specific limits and do not require a physician'srecommendation in order to exceed any such limits; instead they may possess an amount of medical marijuanareasonably necessary for their, or their charges', personal medical needs. By extending the reach of section11362.77's quantity limitations beyond those persons who voluntarily register under the MMP and obtain anidentification card that provides protection against arrest-and by additionally restricting the rights of all“qualified patients” and “primary caregivers” who fall under the CUA-the challenged language of section11362.77 effectuates a change in the CUA that takes away from rights granted by the initiative statute. (Cooper,supra, 27 Cal.4th 38, 45 [finding no amendment]; Knight, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 14, 25 [same]; Proposition103 Enforcement Project, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1484-1486 [finding an impermissible amendment].) Inthis sense, section 11362.77's quantity limitations conflict with-and thereby substantially restrict-the CUA'sguarantee that a qualified patient may possess and cultivate any amount of marijuana reasonably necessary forhis or her current medical condition. In that respect, section 11362.77 improperly amends the CUA in violationof the California Constitution.60

As the Governor suggested when he vetoed the 2004 legislation that had been designed to amend section11362.77 of the MMP in order to avoid the constitutional problem identified above, it may well be prudent andadvisable for the Legislature to be able to change the CUA so as to set forth specific guidance as to quantitylimitations, for the mutual benefit of law enforcement officials as well as authorized users of medicalmarijuana. (See Governor's veto message concerning Sen. Bill No. 1494 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) Sen. Daily J.(July 20, 2004) pp. 4676-4677.) In a similar vein, as observed ante, footnote 57, commissions andcommentators have urged that the California Legislature should have the same authority possessed by thelegislatures of all other states to directly amend an initiative statute in order to correct errors, clarifyapplication, or simply make alterations that have been proved by experience to be warranted.61 And yet, asdemonstrated by the history and case law set forth above, the flexibility to make desirable or even necessaryadjustments to initiative statutes long has been, and remains, foreclosed by article II, section 10, subdivision(c), and its predecessor incarnations.

As observed earlier, beginning almost immediately after adoption of the initiative provision in 1911, andcontinuing through a number of efforts in recent decades, various proposals have been advanced, andlegislative attempts have been made, to change California's constitutional system in order to bring the state inline with our sister jurisdictions. These efforts have aimed to eliminate the strict limitation on the power of theLegislature (or at least to moderate that power) by, for example, allowing amendments that “further the

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purpose” of the original initiative measure, or allowing amendments after a moratorium of years, or allowingamendments by a supermajority vote of both houses. And yet all such efforts have failed.

Over the course of the decades during which California has had the initiative process, the sole substantivealteration to the governing constitutional provision occurred in 1946, when it was changed to allow theLegislature at least to propose an amendment to an initiative statute, subject to ratification by the statewideelectorate at the ballot. That minor adjustment to the strict rule of nonamendability highlights and reinforcesthe closely circumscribed limits of the Legislature's authority in this regard: the Legislature is powerless to acton its own to amend an initiative statute. Any change in this authority must come in the form of aconstitutional revision or amendment to article II, section 10, subdivision (c). Therefore, we are compelled toconclude that section 11362.77 impermissibly amends the CUA and, as we explain below, is unconstitutional asapplied in this case.

V.

As observed earlier, after the Court of Appeal concluded that section 11362.77 (together with its quantitylimitations) is unconstitutional insofar as this statute burdens a defense otherwise available under the CUA,that court further held that section 11362.77 “must be severed from the MMP” and hence voided in its entirety.The Attorney General asserts that the Court of Appeal erred in imposing this remedy. Instead, the AttorneyGeneral argues, although section 11362.77 can have no effect insofar as it would burden a defense afforded bythe CUA, in a defendant's attempt to establish that a quantity of marijuana possessed was reasonable for aperson's current medical needs, the statute need not and should not be severed from the MMP and voided inits entirety. The Attorney General advocates that section 11362.77 should remain an enforceable part of theMMP, applicable to the extent possible-including to those persons who voluntarily participate in the programby registering and obtaining identification cards that provide protection against arrest. Defendant essentiallyagrees with the Attorney General in this respect.

In this regard, both parties rely upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in San Diego NORML, supra, 165Cal.App.4th 798. In that case, counties challenged the MMP's identification card program-specifically, the dutyimposed upon counties by section 11362.72 of the MMP to “implement a program permitting a limited group ofpersons ․ who qualify for exemption from California's statutes criminalizing certain conduct with respect tomarijuana[,] ․ to apply for and obtain an identification card verifying their exemption.” (165 Cal.App.4th at p.808.) These counties claimed that the MMP's identification card program constitutes an impermissibleamendment of the CUA. The appellate court acknowledged that because the CUA contained no provisionallowing amendment by the Legislature, the MMP's “identification laws ․ are invalid if they amend the CUAwithin the meaning of article II, section 10, subdivision (c).” (San Diego NORML, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p.829.)

Citing and applying Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th 38, 47, and Mobilepark West Homeowners Assn., supra, 35Cal.App.4th 32, 43, the appellate court in San Diego NORML concluded that “the identification card laws [ofthe MMP] do not improperly amend the provisions of the CUA.” (San Diego NORML, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th798, 830.) The court stated:

“The MMP's identification card system, by specifying [that] participation in that system is voluntary and aperson may ‘claim the protections of [the CUA]’ without possessing a card (§ 11362.71, subd. (f)), demonstratesthe MMP's identification card system is a discrete set of laws designed to confer distinct protections underCalifornia law that the CUA does not provide [,] without limiting the protections the CUA does provide. Forexample, unlike the CUA, which did not immunize medical marijuana users from arrest but instead provided alimited ‘immunity’ defense to prosecution under state law for cultivation or possession of marijuana [citation],the MMP's identification card system is designed to protect against unnecessary arrest. (See § 11362.78 [lawenforcement officer must accept the identification card absent reasonable cause to believe card was obtained oris being used fraudulently].)” (San Diego NORML, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 830.)

The court in San Diego NORML concluded: “Here, although the legislation that enacted the MMP addedstatutes regarding California's treatment of those who use medical marijuana or who aid such users, it did notadd statutes or standards to the CUA. Instead, the MMP's identification card is a part of a separate legislativescheme providing separate protections for persons engaged in the medical marijuana programs, and the MMPcarefully declared that the protections provided by the CUA were preserved without the necessity of complyingwith the identification card provisions. (§ 11362.71, subd. (f).) [In this sense] [t]he MMP, in effect, amendedprovisions of the Health and Safety Code regarding regulation of drugs adopted by the Legislature, notprovisions of the CUA. Because the MMP's identification card program has no impact on the protectionsprovided by the CUA, we reject Counties' claim that those provisions are invalidated by article II, section 10,subdivision (c) of the California Constitution.” (San Diego NORML, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 831; accord,People v. Hochanadel (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 997, 1101-1014 [holding that § 11362.775 of the MMP,concerning collectives or cooperatives, does not constitute an unconstitutional amendment of the CUA].)

We agree with the parties that the Court of Appeal below erred in concluding that section 11362.77 must besevered from the MMP and voided in its entirety.

We begin with the fundamental proposition that in resolving a legal claim, a court should speak as narrowly aspossible and resort to invalidation of a statute only if doing so is necessary. (Dittus v. Cranston (1959) 53Cal.2d 284, 286 [“Courts should exercise judicial restraint in passing upon the acts of coordinate branches ofgovernment; the presumption is in favor of constitutionality, and the invalidity of the legislation must be clearbefore it can be declared unconstitutional”]; see also, e.g., In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 710;Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 231, fn. 9.)

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The Court of Appeal provided no reason for its conclusion that section 11362.77 must be severed from theMMP and hence voided in its entirety-and we discern no principled basis for doing so. A determination thatsection 11362.77 is unconstitutional insofar as it might be applied in a manner that burdens a defenseauthorized by the CUA does not, in and of itself, require invalidation of the remaining aspects of this statute;there is no operational or functional reason for such a conclusion. Section 11362.77 continues to have legalsignificance, and can operate as part of the MMP, even if it cannot constitutionally restrict a CUA defense.

As both parties argue, the appropriate remedy in the circumstances presented is to disapprove, or disallow,only the unconstitutional application of section 11362.77, thereby preserving any residuary constitutionalapplication with regard to the other provisions of the MMP. (Cf. Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment &Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 266-267.) It seems clear that the Legislature would have preferred such aresult had it foreseen the invalidity of section 11362.77 insofar as the statute burdens a defense otherwiseavailable under the CUA. Section 11362.82 provides that “any section, subdivision, sentence, clause, phrase, orportion” of the MMP adjudged invalid or unconstitutional “shall not affect the validity of the remainingportion[s]” of the act.62 Although the language of section 11362.82 differs from the severability clause at issuein Walnut Creek, supra, 54 Cal.3d 245, 267, which expressly called for the severance of any invalid applicationof the statute there at issue, the circumstance nonetheless remains that “ ‘[a]lthough not conclusive, aseverability clause normally calls for sustaining the valid part of the enactment․’ “ (Calfarm Ins. Co. v.Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 821.) In this regard, and in view of the history set forth in our opinion in thepresent case, we are confident that the Legislature would have extended the severability provisions of section11362.82 to include invalid applications of the MMP had it foreseen the circumstances here at issue.

Accordingly, although we disallow the invalid application of section 11362.77-that is, insofar as the terms of thestatute purport to burden a defense otherwise available to qualified patients or primary caregivers under theCUA-we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that section 11362.77 must be severed from theMMP and hence voided in its entirety.

VI.

Whether or not a person entitled to register under the MMP elects to do so, that individual, so long as he or shemeets the definition of a patient or primary caregiver under the CUA, retains all the rights afforded by theCUA. Thus, such a person may assert, as a defense in court, that he or she possessed or cultivated an amount ofmarijuana reasonably related to meet his or her current medical needs (see Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th1532, 1549), without reference to the specific quanitative limitations specified by the MMP.

We conclude as follows: To the extent section 11362.77 (together with its quantitative limitations)impermissibly amends the CUA by burdening a defense that would be available pursuant to that initiativestatute, section 11362.77 is invalid under California Constitution article II, section 10, subdivision (c).Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to sever section 11362.77 from the MMP and hence void that provisionin its entirety. To the extent the judgment of the Court of Appeal purports to sever section 11362.77 from theMMP and to void this statute in its entirety, the judgment is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment isaffirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.

2.  The CUA provides in full: “(a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the Compassionate Use Actof 1996.[¶] (b)(1) The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the purposes of theCompassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows: [¶] (A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right toobtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has beenrecommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use ofmarijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, orany other illness for which marijuana provides relief. [¶] (B) To ensure that patients and their primarycaregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician arenot subject to criminal prosecution or sanction. [¶] (C) To encourage the federal and state governments toimplement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medicalneed of marijuana. [¶] (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibitingpersons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone the diversion of marijuana fornonmedical purposes. [¶] (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall bepunished, or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medicalpurposes. [¶] (d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to thecultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses orcultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendationor approval of a physician. [¶] (e) For the purposes of this section, ‘primary caregiver’ means the individualdesignated by the person exempted under this section who has consistently assumed responsibility for thehousing, health, or safety of that person.” (§ 11362.5.)

3.  This term is defined by the MMP as including AIDS, anorexia, arthritis, cachexia, cancer, chronic pain,glaucoma, migraine, persistent muscle spasms (including, but not limited to, spasms associated with multiplesclerosis), seizures (including, but not limited to, seizures associated with epilepsy), severe nausea, and other“chronic or persistent medical symptom[s]” that “[s]ubstantially limit[ ] the ability of the person to conductone or more major life activities as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990” or that, “[i]f notalleviated, may cause serious harm to the patient's safety or physical or mental health.” (§ 11362.7, subd. (h).)

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4.  A “primary caregiver” is defined by the MMP in part as “the individual, designated by a qualified patient orby a person with an identification card, who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, orsafety of that patient or person ․“ (§ 11362.7, subd. (d).)

5.  Numerous other sections of the MMP concern identification cards. Section 11362.735, subdivision (a)(4),requires that each card contain a “24-hour, toll-free telephone number ․ that will enable state and local lawenforcement officers to have immediate access to information necessary to identify the validity of the card .”Various related provisions of the MMP govern matters such as card applications; means of verifying necessarybackground information contained in applications; the processing by county health departments ofapplications; annual renewal of and fees for cards; expiration of cards upon nonrenewal; the obligation of stateor local law enforcement officers and agencies to accept an identification card absent reason to believe that thecard is false or fraudulent, or is being used fraudulently; and penalties for fraudulent representationsconcerning, or use of, an identification card. (See §§ 11362.71-11362.76, 11362.78, 11362.81.)The remainingprovisions of the MMP address significant ancillary matters. Section 11362.7 sets forth definitions. Asexplained in detail post, section 11362.77-the provision at issue in this case-establishes specific quantitylimitations for possession and cultivation, and also establishes a “safe harbor” protecting against prosecutionof those who legitimately possess amounts within those limits. Two sections afford immunity from criminalliability for various crimes-they parallel the immunity afforded by the CUA for possession and cultivation, andextend immunity for other related offenses, such as transportation of marijuana. (§§ 11362.765, 11362.775.)Section 11362.785 provides that no “accommodation” is required for the use of medical marijuana duringemployment or while incarcerated. Section 11362.79 clarifies that nothing in the MMP authorizes smoking ofmedical marijuana where smoking is barred by law or in other circumstances. Section 11362.795 addresses theuse of medical marijuana while on probation, release on bail, or parole. Finally, section 11362.8 protectsdesignated primary caregivers from civil penalties or disciplinary actions by licensing boards.

6.  Section 11362.77 provides in full: “(a) A qualified patient or primary caregiver may possess no more thaneight ounces of dried marijuana per qualified patient. In addition, a qualified patient or primary caregiver mayalso maintain no more than six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants per qualified patient. [¶] (b) If aqualified patient or primary caregiver has a doctor's recommendation that this quantity does not meet thequalified patient's medical needs, the qualified patient or primary caregiver may possess an amount ofmarijuana consistent with the patient's needs. [¶] (c) Counties and cities may retain or enact medicalmarijuana guidelines allowing qualified patients or primary caregivers to exceed the state limits set forth insubdivision (a). [¶] (d) Only the dried mature processed flowers of female cannabis plant or the plantconversion shall be considered when determining allowable quantities of marijuana under this section. [¶] (e)The Attorney General may recommend modifications to the possession or cultivation limits set forth in thissection. These recommendations, if any, shall be made to the Legislature no later than December 1, 2005, andmay be made only after public comment and consultation with interested organizations, including, but notlimited to, patients, health care professionals, researchers, law enforcement, and local governments. Anyrecommended modification shall be consistent with the intent of this article and shall be based on currentlyavailable scientific research. [¶] (f) A qualified patient or a person holding a valid identification card, or thedesignated primary caregiver of that qualified patient or person, may possess amounts of marijuana consistentwith this article.”

7.  A “qualified patient” is defined by the MMP as “a person who is entitled to the protections of Section 11362.5[the CUA], but who does not have an identification card issued pursuant to this article .” (§ 11362.7, subd. (f).)

8.  Under section 11362.77 of the MMP, a physician's “recommendation” (or, perhaps more accurately,statement) pursuant to subdivision (b)-that the eight-ounce quantity set forth in subdivision (a) does not meeta qualified patient's medical needs-is not required to be obtained prior to a defendant's arrest, but instead maybe provided at trial. (See Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th 81, 96-97 [crediting a physician's trial testimony that theamount of marijuana found in the defendant's possession at the time of his arrest-slightly more than onepound-was appropriate in light of the defendant's medical needs and his manner of use (primarily eating itrather than smoking it) ]; People v. Windus (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 634, 643 [although the CUA requires that“a defendant must have obtained a recommendation to use medical marijuana prior to his or her arrest[,] ․ thatrecommendation need not specify an approved dosage or amount of marijuana that may be possessed. Adoctor's opinion [under § 11362.77, subd. (b) of the MMP] that the amount in the defendant's possession meetshis or her personal medical needs may be proffered at trial”].)

9.  In other words, pursuant to the MMP, persons designated by that statutory scheme as “qualified patients”or their “primary caregivers,” but who do not register under the program and obtain valid identification cards,would enjoy two sources of protection. First, under the CUA, as construed in Tripett, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th atpage 1549, such persons may possess and cultivate any amount of marijuana reasonably necessary for theircurrent medical needs, and nothing in the MMP impairs those rights. (See MMP, § 11362.71, subd. (f) [“[i]tshall not be necessary for a person to obtain an identification card in order to claim the protections of Section11362.5 [the CUA]”].) Second, section 11362.77, subdivision (f) of the MMP would allow these same persons to“possess amounts of marijuana consistent with this article” (italics added)-that is, up to eight ounces of driedmarijuana (id., subd. (a)), or even more than that amount if a physician so recommends (id., subd. (b)), or if acity or county allows (id ., subd. (c)). By specifying an allowable quantity, the MMP would enhance theprotections afforded to those who are covered by the CUA. And in other ways as well, the MMP would enhanceprotections afforded to those who are covered by the CUA. As observed ante, footnote 5, the MMP provides, insections 11362.765 and 11362.775, immunity from criminal liability for other crimes, in addition to the offensesof marijuana possession and cultivation. In the present litigation, however, we address only the propriety ofthe MMP insofar as it burdens a defense otherwise afforded by the CUA. We do not consider, or intimate any

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view concerning, provisions of the MMP that would enhance protections afforded to those who are covered bythe CUA.

10.  The California Medical Association (CMA) counsels physicians that because “the federal government hastaken the position that physicians may not lawfully prescribe cannabis for medical use,” physicians shouldavoid offering advice concerning, among other things, “how much medicinal cannabis the patient should taketo obtain therapeutic relief.” (Cal. Medical Assn. Legal Counsel, CMA On-Call Document No. 1315, TheCompassionate Use Act of 1996: The Medical Marijuana Initiative (Jan.2009) p. 15 (hereafter CMA On-Call).)The CMA also advises: “A physician should be free to opine that the allowable amount of cannabis does notappear to meet a particular patient's medical needs, if the physician has a reasonable basis for such an opinion.However, CMA does not advise physicians to specify the amount of cannabis that would be consistent with thepatient's needs.” (Id., at p. 16, italics and boldface omitted; see also id., p. 20 [”A physician should avoid ․[o]ffering a specific patient individualized advice concerning appropriate dosage timing, amount, and route ofadministration (italics and boldface omitted) ].)The CMA's recommendation is itself based upon federal caselaw holding that, because medical marijuana users and cannabis clubs operating under the CUA remainsubject to federal drug prosecution, the federal Controlled Substances Act gives the federal governmentauthority to withhold the ability to prescribe drugs from physicians who act contrary to the “public interest,”including by the unlawful dispensing of controlled substances such as “medical marijuana.” (See 21 U.S.C. §§823(f), 824(a); Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1, 32-33; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'Cooperative (2001) 532 U.S. 483, 494 & fn. 7; see also Conant v. Walters (9th Cir.2002) 309 F.3d 629, 634-639[although physicians have a First Amendment-based right to discuss the pros and cons of medical marijuanause with patients, if physicians advise patients concerning how to obtain the drug, physicians risk triggeringliability under federal law for aiding and abetting the unlawful possession of a controlled substance].)We notethat the United States Department of Justice recently clarified its enforcement priorities with regard to states,such as California, that have enacted laws authorizing the medical use of marijuana. (U.S. Dept. of Justice,Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009) <http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf> [as of _, 2009].) Although this policy changemay give physicians somewhat increased confidence in their ability lawfully to recommend the use ofmarijuana for medical treatment, it is clear that there has been no substantive change in federal law.

11.  As observed earlier, defendant apparently had not registered under the MMP, and lacked a programidentification card that might have protected him from arrest. In any event, even had defendant possessedsuch a valid card, it would not have prevented his arrest on these facts, because more than eight ounces ofdried marijuana was found in his possession. (§ 11362.71, subd. (e) [protection against arrest applies withregard to marijuana “in an amount established pursuant to this article”]; § 11362.77, subd. (f) [authorizingpossession of “amounts of marijuana consistent with this article”-including subd. (a), which establishes aneight-ounce possession limit].) Nor does the record suggest that either of the two exceptions set out in section11362.77 applied to authorize greater quantities. (See § 11362.77, subd. (b) [physician's statement that theamount set out in subd. (a) is insufficient]; id., subd. (c) [city or county's authorization to exceed the limits setout in subd. (a) ].)

12.  Because of its concerns about the potential vagueness of the “mature” versus “immature” classificationterminology established by section 11362.77, subdivision (a), the trial court tentatively ruled that the provisionwas unconstitutional, and that the prosecution would not be permitted to focus upon that distinction or informthe jury how much defendant's seven plants weighed. Instead, the trial court ruled, the prosecution would beallowed simply to note the circumstance that seven plants were found on his premises. Thereafter, during trial,in response to testimony by defendant's expert witness, the court on its own motion reversed its prior rulingthat the statutory distinction between mature and immature plants was unconstitutional. In addition, the courtdenied the prosecution's further request to include, in the instruction modeled on CALCRIM No. 2370, thespecific quantity limitations set out in section 11362.77. The court stated that the prosecution was “free toargue that to the jury, but I'm not going to put it in the instruction.”

13.  Conrad testified that smoking marijuana produces a faster medicinal effect, but that the effect does not lastas long as when marijuana is eaten. On the other hand, Conrad testified, approximately four times the amountof marijuana must be eaten in order to achieve the equivalent effect of smoking it.

14.  The jury was instructed as follows: “Possession or cultivation of marijuana is not unlawful if authorized bythe Compassionate Use Act. The Compassionate Use Act allows a person to possess or cultivate marijuana forpersonal medical purposes when a physician has recommended or approved such use. The amount ofmarijuana possessed or cultivated must be reasonably related to the patient's current medical needs. ThePeople have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to possessor cultivate marijuana for medical purposes. If the People have not met this burden, you must find thedefendant not guilty of this charge.” (Italics added.)

15.  This constitutional provision reads in full: “The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes. Itmay amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by theelectors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.” (Cal. Const., art. II,§ 10, subd. (c).)

16.  Defendant also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his trial counsel performeddeficiently by failing to move to suppress evidence seized during the search of petitioner's home pursuant to asearch warrant. The petition asserted, in essence, that the officers had a duty to investigate the possibleexistence of a physician's recommendation for the use of marijuana, before a search warrant could be issued.The Court of Appeal consolidated the writ proceeding with the appeal, and denied the writ, explaining that,contrary to petitioner's view, our opinion in Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th 457, 463-464, does not support the

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proposition advanced by petitioner. This issue was not included in our order granting review in this matter,and we do not consider it.

17.  All further undesignated constitutional references are to the California Constitution.

18.  For example, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776-777 (Cory ) states: “An amendmentis ‘․ any change of the scope or effect of an existing statute, whether by addition, omission, or substitution ofprovisions, which does not wholly terminate its existence, whether by an act purporting to amend, repeal,revise, or supplement, or by an act independent and original in form, ․’ (Sutherland, Statutory Construction(4th ed.1972) § 22.01, p. 105.) A statute which adds to or takes away from an existing statute is considered anamendment. (Robbins v. O.R.R. Company (1867) 32 Cal. 472.)[¶] In Assets Reconstruction Corp. v. Munson(1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 363, 368, the court described an amendment as ‘ “a legislative act designed to changesome prior or existing law by adding or taking from it some particular provision.” ‘ And in Balian Ice Cream Co.v. Arden Farms Co. (S.D.Cal.1950) 94 F.Supp. 796, 798-799, the analysis necessary to determine whether aparticular act is or is not an amendment to a prior statute is described as follows: ‘Whether an act isamendatory of existing law is determined not by title alone, or by declarations in the new act that it purports toamend existing law. On the contrary, it is determined by an examination and comparison of its provisions withexisting law. If its aim is to clarify or correct uncertainties which arose from the enforcement of the existinglaw, or to reach situations which were not covered by the original statute, the act is amendatory, even though inits wording it does not purport to amend the language of the prior act.’ “ (Italics omitted.) Although variousaspects of this language quoted from Cory have been repeated with apparent approval by subsequent decisions(see, e.g., Huening v. Eu (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 766, 774-775 (Huening )), we observe that none of the cases orauthorities cited in the quoted passage considered or construed the term “amendment” in the context of aconstitutional provision that restricts legislative amendment of an initiative statute.

19.  We do, however, question some of the broad language in prior decisions such as Cory, supra, 80Cal.App.3d 772, 776-777 (quoted ante, fn. 18), which in some respects conflicts with the language that wequoted above at the conclusion of part IV.A. For example, Cory relies upon an extensive quotation from BalianIce Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra, 94 F.Supp. 796, 798-799, to suggest that a statute is “amendatory”under article II, section 10, subdivision (c), if the statute's “ ‘aim is to ․ correct uncertainties which arose fromthe enforcement of the existing law, or to reach situations which were not covered by the original statute.’ “(Cory, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 777.) As applied to the question of what constitutes an amendment under theconstitutional provision, these statements from Balian Ice Cream Co.-a decision that did not concern or evenaddress this question-appear overbroad and inconsistent with the observations in Cooper and San DiegoNORML that, despite the constitutional provision, the Legislature remains free to enact laws addressing thegeneral subject matter of an initiative, or a “related but distinct area” of law that an initiative measure “doesnot specifically authorize or prohibit.” (Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th 38, 47; see San Diego NORML, supra, 165Cal.App.4th 798, 830.)

20.  At this point the Court of Appeal observed: “An argument against the CUA was [that] it ‘allows unlimitedquantities of marijuana to be grown anywhere ․ in backyards or near schoolyards without any regulation orrestrictions. This is not responsible medicine. It is marijuana legalization.’ (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5,1996), argument against Prop. 215, p. 61.) San Francisco District Attorney Terence Hallinan responded,‘Proposition 215 does not allow “unlimited quantities of marijuana to be grown anywhere.” It only allowsmarijuana to be grown for a patient's personal use. Police officers can still arrest anyone who grows too much,or tries to sell it.’ (Id., rebuttal to argument against Prop. 215, p. 61.)”

21.  As the Court of Appeal was careful to specify, subdivision (b) of section 11362.77 speaks only of the right to“possess” dried marijuana in a quantity consistent with a patient's needs-it does not expressly tracksubdivision (a) by covering both possession of dried marijuana and maintenance (cultivation) of plants.Moreover, insofar as the right to possess marijuana is concerned, subdivision (b) contemplates a standardsimilar to the “reasonable amount” standard afforded under the CUA as construed by Trippet, supra, 56Cal.App.4th 1542, 1549. That subdivision, however, imposes a substantial qualification on that right, notimposed by the CUA, by requiring a physician's recommendation that an eight-ounce allotment does not meetthe person's medical needs.

22.  At this point, the Court of Appeal in a footnote observed that Senate Bill No. 1494 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.)would have amended section 11362.77's remaining subdivisions to read as follows: “(b)(1) A person with anidentification card or a primary caregiver with an identification card shall not be subject to arrest forpossessing eight ounces or less of dried marijuana per person with an identification card, and maintaining sixor fewer mature or 12 or fewer immature marijuana plants per person with an identification card. [¶] (2)Nothing in this section is intended to affect any city or county guidelines to the extent that the amountscontained in those guidelines exceed the quantities set forth in paragraph (1) .[¶] (c) If a physician determinesthat the quantities specified in subdivision (b) do not meet the medical needs of the person with anidentification card, that person or that person's primary caregiver with an identification card may possess anamount of marijuana consistent with those medical needs and shall not be subject to arrest for possessing thatamount. [¶] (d) Only the dried mature processed flowers of female cannabis plant or the plant conversion shallbe considered when determining allowable quantities of marijuana under this section. [¶] (e) The AttorneyGeneral may recommend modifications to the possession or cultivation limits set forth in this section. Theserecommendations, if any, shall be made to the Legislature no later than December 1, 2005, and may be madeonly after public comment and consultation with interested organizations, including, but not limited to,patients, health care professionals, researchers, law enforcement, and local governments. Any recommendedmodification shall be consistent with the intent of this article and shall be based on currently availablescientific research.”

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23.  In addition to California's Constitution (Cal. Const., art. II, §§ 8 & 10), those state constitutions include:Alaska Constitution, article XI; Arizona Constitution, article 4, part 1, section 1(1) and (2); ArkansasConstitution, article 5, section 1; Colorado Constitution, article V, section 1(1); Idaho Constitution, article III,section 1; Maine Constitution, article IV, part 3d, section 18; Massachusetts Constitution, amendment articleXLVIII; Michigan Constitution, article II, section 9; Missouri Constitution, article III, section 49; MontanaConstitution, article III, section 4; Nebraska Constitution, article III, section 2; Nevada Constitution, article 19,section 2; North Dakota Constitution, article III, section 1; Ohio Constitution, article II, sections 2.01, 2.01a,and 2.01b; Oklahoma Constitution, article 5, sections 1 and 2; Oregon Constitution, article IV, section 1(2);South Dakota Constitution, article III, section 1; Utah Constitution, article VI, section 1; WashingtonConstitution, article II, section 1; Wyoming Constitution, article 3, section 52.

24.  These states are: Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma,Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah.

25.  See Alaska Constitution, article XI, section 6; Wyoming Constitution, article 3, section 52(f).

26.  See Nevada Constitution, article 19, section 2, paragraph 3 (moratorium on repeal and amendment forthree years); North Dakota Constitution, article III, section 8 (moratorium on repeal and amendment for sevenyears, but the legislature may amend by two-thirds vote during that period); Washington Constitution, articleII, section 1(c) (moratorium on repeal and amendment for two years, but the legislature may amend by two-thirds vote during that period).

27.  See Arizona Constitution, article 4, part 1, section 1(6)(C) (three-quarters vote required); ArkansasConstitution, article 5, section 1 (two-thirds vote required); Michigan Constitution, article II, section 9 (three-quarters vote required).

28.  See, e.g., Sullivan, Direct Legislation by the Citizenship Through the Initiative and Referendum (1893)pages 5-14; see generally Goebel, A Government by the People: Direct Democracy in America, 1890-1940(2002) pages 31-33, and authorities cited (hereafter Goebel); Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The BallotInitiative Revolution (1989) pages 5-6; Dubois & Feeney, Lawmaking by Initiative, supra, at pages 46-70.

29.  See Key and Crouch, The Initiative and Referendum in California (1939) pages 425-426 (recounting theefforts of Dr. John Randolph Haynes) (hereafter Key and Crouch); Goebel, supra, at pages 85-90 (same).

30.  See South Dakota Constitution, article III, section 1 (as amended Nov. 8, 1898); Utah Constitution, articleVI, section 1, paragraph 2 (as amended Nov. 6, 1900); Oregon Constitution, article IV, section 1 (as amendedJune 2, 1902); Montana Constitution, article V, section 1 (as adopted Dec. 7, 1906); Oklahoma Constitution,article V, section 2 (eff.Nov.16, 1907); Maine Constitution, article IV, part 1st, section 1 (as amended by art.XXXI in 1908); Michigan Constitution, article V, section 1 (as amended, eff. Jan. 1, 1909); MissouriConstitution, article IV, section 57 (as amended Nov. 3, 1908); Colorado Constitution, article V, section 1 (asamended Nov. 8, 1910); Arkansas Constitution, article V, section 1 (as adopted Jan. 12, 1911). (Numeral stylesfor provisions of the early state constitutions cited herein are, for the most part, as set forth in The StateConstitutions and the Federal Constitution (Kettleborough, edit., 1918) (hereafter Kettleborough).)

31.  See, for example, the provisions of the Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, and South DakotaConstitutions, cited ante, footnote 30.

32.  Indeed, most state charters specifically provided that the initiative power “shall not be construed so as todeprive the legislature or any member thereof of the right to propose any measure” (S.D. Const., art. III, § 1, asamended, 1898) or words to that effect. (See the provisions of the Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Montana, andOregon constitutions, cited ante, fn. 30.)

33.  Effective in 1964, Michigan amended its provision to allow legislative repeal or amendment of an initiativestatute, at any time, by a three-quarters vote. (Mich. Const., art. II, § 9, adopted by the electorate Apr. 1, 1963,eff. Jan. 1, 1964.)

34.  The San Francisco provision, which apparently was the first in the state to establish the local initiative, wasapproved by the Legislature in 1899. (Assem. Conc. Res. No. 6, Stats. 1899, res. ch. 2, p. 241 et seq.) It specifiedthat an ordinance adopted by initiative “shall not be repealed by the supervisors. But the supervisors maysubmit a proposition for the repeal of such ordinance, or for amendments thereto, for a vote [by the electorate]at any succeeding election.” (Id., at p. 247, reprinting art. II, § 20 of the S.F. Charter.) The Los Angelesprovision, approved by the Legislature in 1903 (Sen. Conc. Res. No. 4, Stats.1903, res. ch. 4, p. 555 et seq.),read: “[A]ny ordinance proposed by petition, or which shall be adopted by a vote of the people can not berepealed or amended, except by a vote of the people. [¶] ․ [¶] The council may submit a proposition for therepeal of any such ordinance, or for amendments thereto, to be voted upon at any succeeding general cityelection․” (Id., at p. 573, reprinting § 198a, subd. (b) of the L.A. charter; see generally Sitton, John RandolphHaynes: California Progressive (1992) pp. 36-44 [describing history of the L.A. provision and early lobbying fora statewide initiative provision].)

35.  The Sacramento provision, apparently the third in the state to establish the local initiative, was approvedby the Legislature in early February 1905. (Sen. Conc. Res. No. 5, Stats.1905, res. ch. 12, p. 924 et seq.) In theyears between 1905 and 1910, 16 additional California “home rule cities” adopted initiative procedures. (SeeKey & Crouch, supra, at p. 428, fn. 14 [listing the cities].)Presently, Elections Code section 9125, governingcounty initiatives, and section 9217, governing city initiatives, perpetuate the “Sacramento version” of the strictrule, permitting no amendment of a local initiative measure “unless provision is otherwise made in the originalordinance.” Current local charters also follow that approach. (See Sac. City Charter, § 160 [making the

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provisions of the Elec.Code applicable to local initiatives]; S .F. Charter, § 14.101 [“No initiative ․ approved bythe voters shall be subject to veto, or to amendment or repeal except by the voters, unless such initiative ․ shallotherwise provide”]; but see L.A. City Charter, § 464, subd. (a) [“Any ordinance adopted by a vote of theelectors of the City pursuant to an initiative petition cannot be amended or repealed, except by an ordinanceproposed either by petition or by the Council at its own instance and adopted by a vote of the electors, or by anamendment of the Charter superseding the ordinance”].)

36.  In 1903: Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 15 (introduced Jan. 20, 1903, by Mr. Camp, p. 3 [“Nomeasure adopted or approved by vote of the electorate shall be subject to veto, or be amended or repealedexcept by vote of the electorate”] ); Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 9 (introduced Jan. 19, 1903, by Sen.Hubbell, p. 3 [same] ). In 1905: Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 6 (introduced Jan. 16, 1905, by Mr.Prescott, p. 2 [same] ); Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 5 (introduced Jan. 10, 1905, by Sen. Pendleton,p. 2 [same] ). In 1907: Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 6 (introduced Jan. 14, 1907, by Sen. Anthony, p.2 [same] ).In 1909: Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 6 (introduced Jan. 8, 1909, by Sen. Black, p. 3[proposing that “[a] statute adopted by direct vote of the people can be repealed or amended only by directvote of the people”] ); Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 9 (introduced Jan. 8, 1909, by Sen. Anthony, p. 2[proposing that “[n]o measure adopted or approved by vote of the electorate shall be subject to veto, or beamended or repealed [except] by vote of the electorate”] ); Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 11(introduced Jan. 11, 1909, by Mr. Drew, p. 3 [same as Sen. Const. Amend. No. 6, introduced by Sen. Black] );see generally Hichborn, The Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909 (1909) pages 192-201(colorfully describing the drafting and defeat of the 1909 proposals).

37.  See Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 17, introduced January 31, 1907, by Mr. Davis, pages 1-2(containing no provision limiting veto by Governor, or limiting legislative amendment of initiative measures);Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 25, introduced January 21, 1907, by Senator Caminetti, page 2 (same;and also providing-as in a number of other state constitutions (ante, fn. 32): “This section shall not beconstrued to deprive any member of the legislature of the right to introduce any measure”).

38.  The drafters of the statewide initiative also departed from the approach that had been employed by theLegislature with respect to the use of the initiative and referendum at the county level. On April 3, 1911, theLegislature had approved former Political Code section 4058, providing for initiative and referendumordinances by counties, and in doing so it had embraced the San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Michigan model,providing that “[t]he board of supervisors may submit to the people, without a petition therefor, a propositionfor the repeal of any adopted ordinance or for amendments thereto ․ to be voted upon at any succeedinggeneral or special election and if such proposition so submitted receive a majority of the votes cast thereon atsuch election, such ordinance shall be repealed or amended accordingly.” (Stats.1911, ch. 342, § 1, p. 579; seealso Stats.1912, 1911 Ex.Sess. ch. 31, § 1, p. 127.) As observed ante, footnote 35, the Legislature subsequentlyreverted to the strict “Sacramento version” of the rule, permitting no amendment of a local (city or county)initiative unless that initiative itself so allows.

39.  See Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 56, introduced February 3, 1913, by Senator Gates, pages 2-3, 7(proposing to increase the number of signatures required for initiative statutes and constitutionalamendments, and proposing to adopt a new subd. (j) to former art. IV, § 1, providing that any initiative law“may be repealed or amended by the legislature by three fourths of the members elected to each house”);Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 59, introduced February 3, 1913, by Mr. Clark (same).

40.  Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 16, introduced January 21, 1919, by Mr. Wickham, would haveeliminated any specific authorization for the people to employ the initiative power, while retaining the powerof referendum. The proposed provision also stated: “Nothing herein shall be construed so as to prevent thelegislature from repealing or amending, any act, or measure heretofore enacted into law by what is known asthe initiative.” (Id., at p. 2.)

41.  See Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 11, introduced January 19, 1923, by Mr. Dozier (proposing toadopt a new § “1 b ” of former art. IV).

42.  Section 40 of the model constitution provided: “The initiative and referendum provisions of thisconstitution shall be self-executing․ Laws may be enacted to facilitate their operation, but no law shall beenacted to hamper, restrict or impair the exercise of the powers herein reserved to the people.” (Nat. MunicipalLeague, A Model State Constitution (rev. ed.1924) § 40, p. 9.)

43.  See Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 22, introduced January 23, 1925, by Mr. Cleveland, page 3(proposing to amend former art. IV, § 1 to read: “[A]ll initiative laws which are now enforced or may hereafterbe adopted by the people are subject to amendment by the legislature; provided, that the legislature shall nothave the power to destroy the intent and purpose of the act or to cripple or prevent the carrying out of theprovisions thereof”).

44.  See Ballot Pamphlet, General Election (Nov. 5, 1946) argument in favor of Proposition 12, part I, page 12(“It is uncertain under the wording of [former art. IV, § 1] whether a proposal to amend an initiative measuremay be submitted by the Legislature to the people for their consideration”).

45.  Proposition 9, in 1934, proposed to amend the 1922 chiropractic initiative statute to, among other things,create a state chiropractors association; define chiropractic and physical therapy, and regulate these practices;regulate chiropractic schools; and provide for chiropractic licenses and fees. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6,1934) text of Prop. 9, pt. II, pp. 13-24 .) The ballot argument in favor of the measure explained that only “[t]hepeople ․ can vote a change in [the 1922 initiative statute].” (Id., pt.I, p. 14.) Likewise, Proposition 2, in 1939,proposed somewhat similar amendments. The argument in favor of Proposition 2 observed: “[T]he changes

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asked for in this amendment ․ can only be done by the people voting ‘YES' on this amendment.” (Ballot Pamp.,Special Elec. (Nov. 7, 1939) pt. I, p. 6.)

46.  That measure as enacted (hereafter Torrens Act initiative statute) was described as “An act to amend anact entitled ‘An act for the certification of land titles and the simplification of the transfer of real estate.’ “(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1914) text of Land Title Law, p. 59.) In many respects the Torrens Actinitiative statute proved unworkable. (See, e.g., 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property,§ 369, p. 434.)

47.  The provision read in full: “Sec. 1b. Laws may be enacted by the Legislature to amend or repeal any actadopted by vote of the people under the initiative, to become effective only when submitted to and approved bythe electors unless the initiative act affected permits the amendment or the repeal without such approval. TheLegislature shall by law prescribe the method and manner of submitting such a proposal to the electors.”(Stats.1945, ch. 147, p. 3164.) In other words, this provision was designed to give to the California Legislaturethe same authority earlier granted to local legislative bodies under the charters of San Francisco and LosAngeles-and granted to the Michigan legislature by the then-extant Michigan Constitution, former article V,section 1-authority which, by virtue of its omission from California Constitution, former article IV, section 1,the Legislature assumed it did not possess.

48.  The voters enacted both Proposition 16 (Gen.Elec., Nov. 2, 1948) and Proposition 7 (Gen.Elec., Nov. 7,1950), but rejected Proposition 17 (Gen.Elec., Nov. 4, 1952).

49.  See Ballot Pamphlet, General Election (Nov. 2, 1954) text of Proposition 7, part II, page 7 (amending the1914 Land Title Law (Torrens Act) to add § 116, providing: “The Legislature may amend or repeal all or anypart of this act at any time”).

50.  Each time, the voters have approved the proposed amendments. (Prop.7, Gen.Elec.(Nov.8, 1960); Prop. 11,Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1970); Prop. 8, Primary Elec. (June 6, 1972); Prop. 15, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 1976); Prop. 4,Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978); Prop. 113, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); and Prop. 44, Primary Elec. (Mar. 5, 2002).)

51.  As observed ante, footnote 33, by 1964 Michigan-which since 1909 had employed a similarly strict rule,and yet at the same time allowed the state legislature to at least propose to the electorate that an initiativestatute be amended-had amended its own constitutional provision to allow legislative repeal or amendment ofan initiative statute at any time, by a supermajority vote.

52.  (See, e.g., Ops. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 7243 (Nov.1964) Comparison of Draft of Proposed Revision ofArticle IV and Existing Article IV of the California Constitution, p. 7, [draft no. 5]; Special Counsel John A.Busterud, Joint Com. On Legis. Organization, letter to Cal. Const. Revision Com., Apr. 7, 1964, p. 2[recommending consideration of a change permitting “amendment or repeal of initiatives by an extraordinaryvote”]; Assem. Interim Com. on Const. Amends., Meeting on the Initiative and Effective Dates of Statutes (Dec.13-14, 1965) pp. 95-96 [committee chair Edward E. Elliott commenting that idea of giving Legislature somepower to amend initiative statutes “does appear to have some merit”]; Assem. Interim Com. on Const.Amends., Background Study on the Initiative (Nov.1965) p. 13 [mentioning proposal to follow approach of Nat.Municipal League's 1963 model constitution and “[a]llow the Legislature the right to ․ amend an adoptedinitiative measure”]; see Nat. Municipal League, Model State Constitution (6th ed.1963) p. 118, appen.)

53.  Nor did the Legislature itself endorse any such proposal for change. Assembly Constitutional AmendmentNo. 3, introduced January 4, 1965, by Assemblyman Winton, would have confined the electorate's initiativepower to statutes only-and not constitutional amendments (id., pp. 1-2)-and would have permitted legislativeamendment of an initiative-enacted statute by a two-thirds vote of each house. (Id., at p. 3.) The proposalfailed to secure the required two-thirds vote of each house, however, and hence no such measure wassubmitted to the voters.

54.  The commission characterized its proposed provision as “restat [ing] without change in meaning theexisting provisions relating to amendment and repeal of initiative and referendum statutes. While theLegislature can amend or repeal a referendum statute, it cannot do so with an initiative statute withoutapproval by the electors.” (Proposed Revision, supra, p. 47.)

55.  With regard to the Constitution's initiative provisions, the California Constitution Revision Commissionrecommended two substantive changes to former article IV that the Legislature endorsed in AssemblyConstitutional Amendment No. 13 (as enrolled July 18, 1966). The first change lowered the number ofsignatures necessary to place a statutory initiative on the ballot, from eight percent of all votes cast forcandidates for governor at the preceding gubernatorial election, to five percent of all such votes cast. (ProposedRevision, supra, pp. 43-44.) The second change removed the optional “indirect initiative” (that is, a petition tothe Legislature, which then had the option to adopt the measure or to submit it, along with a competingmeasure, to the electorate). The purpose of the first change was to encourage sponsors of initiative measures toput forth a statutory initiative rather than a constitutional amendment. (Id., at p. 44.) The optional “indirectinitiative” was removed in light of the signature percentage change, and because “[it] merely adds anadditional step to accomplish the same result that can be accomplished under the initiative generally” and “hasbeen used only four times, and only once successfully.” (Id., at p. 52.)

56.  Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 15, introduced January 24, 1973, would have required a two-thirds vote of the electorate for initiative constitutional amendments, and would have permitted legislativeamendment of an initiative-enacted statute by a two-thirds vote of each house. (Id., at p. 2.) AssemblyConstitutional Amendment No. 66, introduced June 6, 1975, would have permitted the Legislature, after “areasonable time,” to amend or repeal any initiative statute by a majority vote, and would have permitted the

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Legislature to amend or repeal any initiative constitutional amendment by a two-thirds vote, “subject to theapproval of the voters in the next ensuing general election.” (Id., at pp. 5-6 [proposed art. IV, § 22, subd. (h) ].)

57.  See California Commission on Campaign Financing, Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California's FourthBranch of Government (1st ed.1992) page 118 (the Legislature should “be allowed to amend any initiative afterits enactment, so long as the legislation amending an initiative ‘furthers the purposes and intent of the law,’ isin final form for at least 12 days and is approved by a 60% vote of both houses” [or a lesser percentage if theinitiative so specifies] ); Dubois and Feeney, Improving the California Initiative Process: Options for Change(1992) page 70 (“As the circumstances upon which [initiative] statutes are based change, the legislature shouldhave the power to make changes․ [G]iving the legislature this kind of authority would reduce the number ofballot measures by eliminating the need to have trivial changes in old initiatives approved by the people”);Citizens Commission on Ballot Initiatives, Report and Recommendations on the Statewide Initiative Process(Jan.1994) page 4 (“After three years of its enactment, the Legislature should be able to amend any statutoryinitiative (not constitutional amendments) by a two-thirds vote (or less if the initiative itself so specifies),” andany such amendment “must be consistent with the purposes and intent of the initiative”); CaliforniaConstitution Revision Commission, Final Report and Recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature(1996) page 32 (“The Commission recommends that the constitution allow the legislature, with gubernatorialapproval, to amend statutory initiatives after they have been in effect for six years” in order to “allow the stateto change laws and programs in response to changing circumstances” and “correct any unintendedconsequences caused by an initiative”); Dubois and Feeney, Lawmaking by Initiative, supra, at page 224 (“Werecommend that all statutes be treated alike and that initiative statutes be subject to amendment and repeal bythe legislature”); Democracy by Initiative, 2d ed., supra, at page 137 (“The legislature should be allowed toamend any statutory initiative after its enactment, so long as the legislation amending an initiative ‘furthers thepurposes and intent of the law,’ is in final form for at least ten days, and is approved by a two-thirds vote ofboth houses”-or a lesser percentage if the initiative so specifies); see also Miller, supra, 41 Santa Clara L.Rev.1037, 1067-1068 (recommending that the Legislature be afforded power to amend initiative statutes, butrecognizing that such a rule would give initiative proponents “greater incentives to pursue constitutionalinitiatives rather than statutory initiatives for ordinary policies,” and hence recommending reforms to makeconstitutional initiatives more difficult); but see Speaker's Commission on the California Initiative Process,Final Report (Jan.2002) page 23 (listing, as a matter “considered but not adopted,” a proposal to “[a]llow theLegislature and the Governor to amend a statutory initiative after a period of time without a confirming vote ofthe voters”); League of Women Voters of California, Action Policies and Positions (2008) page 2 (continuing torecommend-as originally adopted in 1984 and updated in 1999-that “[a]pproval by the voters should berequired for any changes made by the legislature in a statute adopted by initiative, unless the statute permitsamendment without the approval of voters”).

58.  Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 44, introduced January 5, 1984, would have allowed the Legislatureto amend or repeal an initiative statute (1) by a two-thirds vote, if the initiative statute had been adopted withinthe prior six years; or (2) by a majority vote, if the amendment or repeal was enacted more than six yearsfollowing adoption of the initiative statute. (Id., at p. 3.) Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 49,introduced May 13, 1996, was an omnibus measure that, among other things, would have permitted theLegislature to amend or repeal an initiative statute by a two-thirds vote, but only after a moratorium of sixyears following enactment of the initiative statute. (Id., at p. 20.) Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 39, asamended June 6, 1996, page 20, tracked, in relevant part, Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 49.

59.  See generally Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1251 (“It is common for an initiativemeasure to include a provision authorizing the Legislature to amend the initiative without voter approval onlyif the amendment furthers the purpose of the initiative.”). As observed in Miller, supra, Santa Clara L.Rev.1037, 1067, footnote 92: “In recent years, a majority of initiatives that have qualified for the ballot haveauthorized amendments, but usually only by a supermajority, and only to further the purposes of theinitiative.” As further explained in Democracy by Initiative, 2d ed., supra, at pages 114-115: “Since 1974, agrowing percentage of statutory initiatives have ․ voluntarily permitted the legislature to amend theirprovisions, although none has allowed the legislature to repeal the measure. Of the 107 statutory measuresbetween 1976 and 2006 that qualified for the ballot, 78(73%) had language authorizing amendments. Between2000 and 2006, 15 of the 18 statutory initiatives on the ballot (83%) allowed legislative amendments. [¶]Proponents are increasingly allowing the legislature to amend their initiatives for a number of reasons. First,they are becoming more sophisticated in drafting their measures and are hiring experienced lawyers for thispurpose. These lawyers know that no complex law can be drafted perfectly, and few laws can be left in place foryears without needing fine-tuning or additions. [¶] Second, initiatives are becoming more complex as they seekto adopt detailed solutions to perceived problems. Initiatives are not general policy statements asking thelegislature to solve a problem. They contain specific, legal language that must be kept flexible for continuedviability. [¶] Finally, the legislature, despite a few exceptions, has generally been respectful of initiatives andhas not sought to amend them without at least the tacit approval of the proponents. The legislature hasamended the Political Reform Act over 200 times. In virtually every instance, the Fair Political PracticesCommission, the watchdog agency created by the act and charged with its administration, has not objected.”(Fn.omitted.) Similarly, it has been suggested that although California's strict rule may have been motivated byfear that the Legislature “would hastily tear down what the people have enacted through the initiative process,the general experience in the United States is that legislatures are reluctant to change laws that have beenadopted through the initiative process,” and hence there remains “no valid reason ․ for significantly limitingthe legislature's ability to amend and repeal initiative statutes.” (Dubois & Feeney, Lawmaking by Initiative,supra, at p. 224.)

60.  The case before us is unusual, in that both parties agree with the conclusion that the statutory enactmentconstitutes an unconstitutional amendment. We observe that, although not mentioned in the briefs, the

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opposite conclusion was reached by the Legislative Counsel of California, in an opinion letter dated January 8,2004. (See Cal. Legis. Counsel, letter to Sen. Vasconcellos, Jan. 8, 2004, titled “Medical Marijuana:Proposition 215.”) The Legislative Counsel reasoned that the challenged portions of the MMP did not amendthe CUA, because, in light of section 11362.77, subdivision (b), the “ultimate limit that Section 11352.77 placeson the amount of marijuana that a qualified patient or primary caregiver may possess or cultivate issubstantially the same as the limit provided under [the CUA], as construed by the court in [Trippet, supra, 56Cal.App.4th 1532] at page 1549, which is the amount reasonably related to the patient's current medicalneeds.” (Letter at pp. 9-10, italics added.) In other words, the Legislative Counsel reasoned, because section11362.77, subdivision (b), provides that a qualified patient may possess an amount of marijuana “consistentwith the patient's needs” so long as the patient “has a doctor's recommendation that [the eight-ouncelimitation set forth in subd. (a) ] does not meet the qualified patient's medical needs,” the “ultimate” limits setby the MMP are “essentially the same ” as those set by the CUA. (Letter, at p. 10, italics added.)The problemwith the Legislative Counsel's theory-and perhaps the reason that the Attorney General does not advance it inthis court-is that subdivision (b) of section 11362.77 of the MMP does not truly “substantially” or “essentially”replicate the “reasonable amount” test of the CUA, as construed in Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at page 1549.Instead, as alluded to ante, footnote 21, in two ways, the rights conferred by subdivision (b) of section 11362.77fall significantly short of matching the rights established by the CUA.First, on its face, subdivision (b) speaksonly of the right to “possess” dried marijuana consistent with a patient's needs-it does not expressly tracksubdivision (a) by covering both possession of dried marijuana and maintenance (cultivation) of plants.Presumably, this limitation was intentional. The Legislature may have concluded that physicians would be ableto estimate the amount of dried marijuana that a patient would need to possess for personal medical use, butwould not be qualified to estimate the number of plants that a patient additionally would need to cultivate inorder to maintain a regular supply for such use. In any event, in this respect, subdivision (b) of section11362.77 addresses only part of what is covered by the CUA. Accordingly, even if a physician recommendsunder subdivision (a) of section 11362.77 that eight ounces is insufficient for a patient's needs, subdivision (b)of that section provides no similar “override” for the cultivation limitation (“six mature and 12 immatureplants”), and hence, in this respect at least, the MMP clearly “takes away” from a right created by theCUA.Second, insofar as the right to possess marijuana is concerned, subdivision (b) of the MMP enactmentdoes contemplate a standard similar to the “reasonable amount” standard afforded under the CUA asconstrued by Trippet, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at page 1549. Unlike the CUA, however, this subdivision imposes aburden on that right, by requiring a physician's recommendation that an eight-ounce allotment does not meetthe person's medical needs. As suggested ante, footnote 10, this burden is substantial, because physicians arecounseled by the California Medical Association that in light of federal case law, physicians should avoidoffering advice concerning matters such as “how much medicinal cannabis the patient should take.” (See CMAOn-Call, supra, at p. 15.) Moreover, the CMA cautions, although physicians may “opine that the allowableamount of cannabis does not appear to meet a particular patient's medical needs,” they may do so only if thephysician “has a reasonable basis for such an opinion.” (Id., at p. 16; see also id. at p. 20.) We also observe thatalthough the defendants in Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th 81, and People v. Windus, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 634(both mentioned ante, fn. 8) each secured a recommendation consistent with section 11362.77, subdivision (b),from a physician who testified accordingly at trial, in both cases the physician was the same-William Eidelman,M .D., whose professional license was suspended from May 2002 through February 2004. (Windus, supra, atp. 638; Wright, supra, at p. 86.)In light of the restricted scope of coverage provided by 11362.77, subdivision(b) (that is, its creation of an exception to the quantity limitations set forth in subdivision (a) for possession butnot for cultivation), and in light of the added obligation this subdivision places upon a qualified patient's abilityto argue that he or she possessed an amount of marijuana reasonably related to his or her medical needs (thatis, the requirement of obtaining a physician's recommendation that the amount set forth in subdivision (a) isinsufficient), we conclude that the MMP burdens, and “takes away” from, rights established by the CUA.

61.  Indeed, commentators have suggested that the combination of (1) the restriction imposed by article II,section 10, subdivision (c), together with (2) various initiative measures adopted by California voters duringrecent decades, including those mandating spending for programs without providing funding for thoseprograms, has contributed substantially to the unique budgetary and governance problems faced by this state.(See, e.g., Joseph, The System Is the Problem with California's Budget, Orange County Register (June 5, 2009)[commenting upon both matters]; The Ungovernable State, The Economist (May 16, 2009) pp. 33-36 [same];see also Baldassare and Katz, The Coming Age of Direct Democracy (2008) pp. 15-16 [citing estimates thatapproximately 77 percent, and possibly as high as 90 percent, of the state's general fund is beyond legislativecontrol due to initiative statutes]; see generally Schrag, California: America's High-Stakes Experiment (2006)pp. 95, 143-145; but see Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter Initiatives Paralyzedthe California Budget? (2005) 5 State Pol. & Policy Q. 248, 248, 257-258 [asserting that empirical evidencedoes not support the widely held view that initiatives have “locked in” 70 to 90 percent of the state budget, andfurther opining that measures enacted by initiatives appear not to pose a “significant obstacle” to balancing thestate budget].)

62.  Section 11362.82 provides: “If any section, subdivision, sentence, clause, phrase, or portion of this article isfor any reason held invalid or unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, that portion shall bedeemed a separate, distinct, and independent provision, and that holding shall not affect the validity of theremaining portion thereof.”

GEORGE, C.J.

WE CONCUR: BAXTER, WERDEGAR, CHIN, MORENO, and CORRIGAN, JJ.

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Thank you LaShea for the confirmation of cancellation. R. Raquel Cabading | Bar Association of San Francisco Director, Continuing Legal Education Department 301 Battery Street | Third Floor | San Francisco, CA 94111 Direct: 415.782-8916 | Main: 415.982-1600 | Fax: 415.477-2388 rcabading@sfbar.org | www.sfbar.org

Visit www.SFBar.org for information about upcoming CLE seminars

Check us out on Facebook: www.facebook.com/sfbar

Follow us on Twitter: Twitter.com/sfbarCLE

THIS EMAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) OR ENTITY(IES) TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED. ANY INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE TO OR USE BY ANY PERSON OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S) SHALL NOT BE DEEMED A WAIVER OF ANY EXPECTATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY. IF YOU ARE NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S) OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), PLEASE DELIVER IT TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S). YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO READ, REVIEW, DISSEMINATE, DISTRIBUTE OR COPY THIS COMMUNICATION IF YOU ARE NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), AND ANY SUCH ACTIVITY IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE AT (415) 982-1600 AND DELETE THIS EMAIL AND ANY ATTACHMENTS TO IT FROM THE COMPUTER OR OTHER ELECTRONIC DEVICE ON WHICH YOU RECEIVED IT. THANK YOU.

From: Shay Gilmore [mailto:shay@shaygilmorelaw.com] Sent: Saturday, June 1, 2019 8:58 PM

To: LaShea Sanchez Cc: Raquel Cabading; Stephan Ferris

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Thank you, LaShea.

On Sat, Jun 1, 2019 at 8:55 PM LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org> wrote:

Hi Shay,

I understand and thanks for letting me know. I will take you off the calendar now.

Hopefully we see you soon!

La Shea Sanchez (La-Shay)

Room Rental Coordinator

(pronouns: she, her, hers)

SF LGBT Center

1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102

p. 415.865.5631 e. LasheaS@sfcenter.org

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Sent: Saturday, June 1, 2019 9:51 AM

To: LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org>

Cc: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>; Raquel Cabading <rcabading@sfbar.org>

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Hi LaShea, thank you so much for all your help, but we need to change the venue to

accommodate more attendees. I appreciate your working with us to help us find a space for this

event. We love the Center, and I am sure we will be back soon for another event.

Thank you again.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or

distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 2:43 PM Raquel Cabading <rcabading@sfbar.org> wrote:

Sure LaShea I’m available to talk anytime next week.

What is the max capacity so I can set that up in the registration feed?

R.

Raquel Cabading | Bar Association of San Francisco

Director, Continuing Legal Education Department

301 Battery Street | Third Floor | San Francisco, CA 94111

Direct: 415.782-8916 | Main: 415.982-1600 | Fax: 415.477-2388 rcabading@sfbar.org | www.sfbar.org

Visit www.SFBar.org for information about upcoming CLE seminars

Check us out on Facebook: www.facebook.com/sfbar Follow us on Twitter: Twitter.com/sfbarCLE

THIS EMAIL IS CONFIDENTIAL. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) OR ENTITY(IES) TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED. ANY INADVERTENT

DISCLOSURE TO OR USE BY ANY PERSON OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S) SHALL NOT BE DEEMED A WAIVER OF ANY EXPECTATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY. IF YOU ARE NOT THE

INTENDED RECIPIENT(S) OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), PLEASE DELIVER IT TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S). YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO READ, REVIEW,

DISSEMINATE, DISTRIBUTE OR COPY THIS COMMUNICATION IF YOU ARE NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S), AND ANY SUCH ACTIVITY IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE AT (415) 982-1600 AND DELETE THIS EMAIL AND ANY ATTACHMENTS TO IT FROM THE COMPUTER OR OTHER

ELECTRONIC DEVICE ON WHICH YOU RECEIVED IT. THANK YOU.

From: Shay Gilmore [mailto:shay@shaygilmorelaw.com]

Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2019 12:52 PM

To: LaShea Sanchez

Cc: Stephan Ferris; Raquel Cabading Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Hi LaShea, I still have not received anything from the Finance Department. I am eager to put

down the deposit.

Also, I am concerned about capacity for the event and so I am connecting you here to Raquel

Cabading at BASF who is administering registrations for this June 18 event. Can you please

connect with Raquel on the phone to make sure Raquel understands the room capacity at the

Center and any other details Raquel needs?

Thank you, LaShea. Look forward to hearing from you.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

On Sat, May 25, 2019 at 3:29 PM Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com> wrote:

Thank you so much, La Shea! We really appreciate this message because we still have not heard

from the Finance Department to take my credit card information.

Have a great holiday! Look forward to hearing from you when you get back. Thank you again.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

On Sat, May 25, 2019 at 10:22 AM LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org> wrote:

Good Morning Shay,

I’ve sent all info to the Finance department, so if you haven’t received anything yet, you will by

next week. We will be closed Monday and I will be out Tuesday, I can check in with them again

on Wednesday if nothing still does not come through. If your worried about losing your date, you

won’t. I have it noted that your trying to make your payment.

Best,

La Shea Sanchez (La-Shay)

Room Rental Coordinator

(pronouns: she, her, hers)

SF LGBT Center

1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102

p. 415.865.5631 e. LasheaS@sfcenter.org

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Sent: Friday, May 24, 2019 5:57 PM

To: LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org>

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Hi La Shea, can you give me an update? I did not hear from anyone from the Center today.

Thank you.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 3:15 PM LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org> wrote:

Okay I’ll check in with the finance dep. tomorrow

La Shea Sanchez (La-Shay)

Room Rental Coordinator

(pronouns: she, her, hers)

SF LGBT Center

1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102

p. 415.865.5631 e. LasheaS@sfcenter.org

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2019 3:01 PM

To: LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org>

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Hi La Shea, I just checked my Spam Folder, and there is no e-mail from that address.

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 2:21 PM LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org> wrote:

Hey Shay,

Check your spam too. The email will be from invoice@authorize.net

Best,

La Shea Sanchez (La-Shay)

Room Rental Coordinator

(pronouns: she, her, hers)

SF LGBT Center

1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102

p. 415.865.5631 e. LasheaS@sfcenter.org

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2019 11:02 AM

To: LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org>

Cc: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Hi LaShea,

Regarding Stephan's e-mail, do you have any follow-up questions for us after reviewing our

application? Given the event is set for less than a month from now, may we start promoting the

panel discussion with reception as located at the LGBT Center on June 18? Please let us know.

Thank you so much.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or

distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 4:28 PM Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com> wrote:

Hi LaShea,

Thank you for speaking with Shay and myself this afternoon. Attached is our completed room

rental application. Let us know if we can provide any additional information.

Best,

Stephan Ferris | Intellectual Property and Contracts Attorney

Pronouns: He/Him/His

sferris@boltthreads.com

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:27 PM LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org> wrote:

Hi Shay and Stephan,

It was nice speaking to you both today!

I’ve attached both the Rental application and Policy. Please look over both and send back the

application once you fill it out. Once I receive the application I will then send you the rental

contract. You can also find more info about rentals on our website www.sfcenter.org

If you have any more questions, feel free to contact me.

Best,

La Shea Sanchez (La-Shay)

Room Rental Coordinator

(pronouns: she, her, hers)

SF LGBT Center

1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102

p. 415.865.5631 e. LasheaS@sfcenter.org

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 1:04 PM

To: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>

Cc: LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org>

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Let’s do today @ 3 p.m. Stephan, can you send a meeting invite?

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 12:49 PM Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com> wrote:

I'll be on a plan heading to Chicago tomorrow so my vote would be for today.

Best,

Stephan Ferris | Intellectual Property and Contracts Attorney

Pronouns: He/Him/His

sferris@boltthreads.com

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 12:35 PM Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com> wrote:

Tomorrow (5/22) would be better for me, but copying Stephan here for input. I can make today

work if necessary.

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 12:25 PM LaShea Sanchez <lasheas@sfcenter.org> wrote:

Hi Shay,

I’m available, today 3-4pm or tomorrow 2-4, let me know which day and time will work for you.

Best,

La Shea Sanchez (La-Shay)

Room Rental Coordinator

(pronouns: she, her, hers)

SF LGBT Center

1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102

p. 415.865.5631 e. LasheaS@sfcenter.org

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 6:30 AM

To: Persson, Maceo (ADM) <maceo.persson@sfgov.org>; LaShea Sanchez

<lasheas@sfcenter.org>

Cc: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

Thank you so much, Maceo!

Dear LaShea,

My colleague, Stephan Ferris (copied here), and I would love to set up a time to chat with you

about a space at the Center for our panel and reception event. Are you available today or

tomorrow for a call?

Please let us know, and thank you!

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 3:28 PM Persson, Maceo (ADM) <maceo.persson@sfgov.org> wrote:

La Shae,

I would like to connect you to Shae Gilmore who is an attorney putting together a panel on the

intersection of the HIV/AIDS crisis and the compassionate use act. He’s hoping to host it at the

center so I want to make sure he gets in contact with you about it. I included the application form

that Shay has filled out as well.

Maceo

Maceo Persson, MPA | Pronouns: He, Him, His (What’s this?)

Civic Engagement & Operations Manager

Office of Transgender Initiatives

City & County of San Francisco

1800 Market Street, Ste. 100

San Francisco, CA 94102

ph: 415-671-3073 | e: maceo.persson@sfgov.org

Follow us on Twitter and Facebook @TransCitySF

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Sent: Monday, May 20, 2019 2:20 PM

To: Persson, Maceo (ADM) <maceo.persson@sfgov.org>

Cc: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>

Subject: Fwd: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

So great chatting with you Maceo! I am attaching the application and e-mail I submitted to the

Center but want to point out that we might need to change the event date from June 18 to June

20. Stephan (copied here) and I would love to be connected to whomever you recommend at the

Center to discuss reserving a room for this panel discussion and reception.

Thank you so much, Maceo! Look forward to hearing from you.

This message is from outside the City email system. Do not open links or attachments from untrusted

sources.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:00 AM

Subject: Re: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

To: Ilona M. Turner <ilona@turneradr.com>

Cc: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>

No worries, Ilona! Thank you!

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 9:22 AM Ilona M. Turner <ilona@turneradr.com> wrote:

Hi Shay, I'm very sorry, I don't think I have a current email address for Maceo. I think he is

working at the City's Office of Transgender Initiatives, though, if that helps.

Best,

Ilona

Ilona M. Turner, Esq.

510.295.5288

ilona@TurnerADR.com

www.TurnerADR.com

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 2:59 PM Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com> wrote:

Hi Ilona! Do you know whether I have the correct email address for Maceo? Thank you!

---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Date: Sat, May 18, 2019 at 1:47 PM

Subject: Fwd: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

To: <maceop1@yahoo.com>

CC: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>

Hi Maceo!

How are you doing? I hope you have been well! I am writing to you in my role as the Vice Chair

of the Bar Association of San Francisco (BASF) Cannabis Law Section. My colleague, Stephan

Ferris (copied here), and I are both members of the BASF LGBT Committee, and we are

organizing a panel presentation of lawyers and activists to talk about Prop 215 (a.k.a. The

Compassionate Use Act) and the HIV/AIDS Crisis to mark LGBTQ Pride Month in June. The

panel presentation will be co-sponsored by the BASF LGBT Committee and the Cannabis Law

Section, and we plan to host a reception (sponsored by my law firm) following the panel

presentation.

Stephan and I have put together a powerhouse panel including: Dale Gieringer, John Entwistle,

Bill Panzer and Fred Gardner for a discussion to take place on June 18, but we still have not

secured a venue. We would love to have the event at the Center, and although I have submitted

the room request application, I am concerned that we might be too late. Do you think we are too

late for this? Do you have any advice for us?

Thanks so much, Maceo. Look forward to hearing from you.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: Shay Gilmore <shay@shaygilmorelaw.com>

Date: Sat, May 18, 2019 at 1:45 PM

Subject: June 18 Event: Prop 215 & the HIV/AIDS Crisis

To: <roomrentals@sfcenter.org>

Cc: Stephan Ferris <sferris@boltthreads.com>

Dear LGBT Center,

My colleague, Stephan Ferris (copied here), and I would like to request space at the LGBT

Center for June 18, 2019, starting at 5:30 p.m., to host a panel of lawyers and activists discussing

the intersection of the Compassionate Use Act (Prop 215) and the HIV/AIDS Crisis. This panel

event would mark LGBTQ Pride Month, would be moderated by Stephan, and would be

primarily organized and promoted by the Bar Association of San Francisco.

I have attached the completed application here to this e-mail. Please let me know if you have any

questions or need anything else. Thank you. Look forward to hearing from you.

Best,

Shay

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

--

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential

and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is

prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and

destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

--

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

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destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

--

T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential

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prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and

destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

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T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential

and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is

prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and

destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

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T H E L A W O F F I C E O F

S H A Y A A R O N G I L M O R E

415 846 6397 | www.shaygilmorelaw.com

This e-mail message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential

and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is

prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and

destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.