Security Sector Transformation in Arab Transitions:

Working for Change

nonaLeL ,torieB

December 17-18, 2012

Iraq Case Study

Omar Al-Shahery

Iraq

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Contents

Table of Figures .............................................................................................................................. 2

Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 3

Pre-Transition and Transition Period .............................................................................................. 4

The Eve of 2003 .......................................................................................................................... 4

Organizational Overview ............................................................................................................ 8

Police and Law Enforcement .................................................................................................... 10

Security.................................................................................................................................... 111

Intelligence .............................................................................................................................. 111

Private Security Firms ............................................................................................................. 122

Gender Issues .......................................................................................................................... 133

Oversight and Accountability ..................................................................................................... 133

Command and Control ................................................................................................................ 155

Service Conditions ...................................................................................................................... 177

Training ....................................................................................................................................... 188

Equipment ................................................................................................................................... 199

Culture........................................................................................................................................... 20

Post-transitional challenges .......................................................................................................... 20

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Table of Figures

Figure 1 MOI structure before 2003 ............................................................................................... 8

Figure 2 Last Configuration of MOI structure ................................................................................ 9

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Summary

The purpose of this short paper is to provide an overview of the security sector in Iraq, including

a basic description of its organizational structure, legal mandate, formal and informal command

flows and modes of operation, and matters pertaining to its professional capabilities and

formation.

The Iraqi police and civilian intelligence apparatus is the focus of this paper. A description of the

Iraqi military and military intelligence is being omitted except for occasional comparative

purposes.

The background paper covers the pre-transition situation, and then summarizes any changes

during the transition, and finishes with a survey of the main challenges facing reform and

restructuring. It also highlights possible solutions and changes that would ensure better future

performance and suitability for the challenges that face the security sector in Iraq.

The paper starts with a description of the pre-war status quo in Iraq and the role, structure and

capabilities of the Iraqi police and intelligence sectors. Later, and throughout, the paper moves

on to describe the early days after the pivotal events of 2003 and how these organizations have

ended up in the present day. The paper underlines the high priority challenges that face the Iraqi

security sector and how these challenges are caused by and could be a solution to the political

situation in the country.

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Pre-Transition and Transition Period

The Eve of 2003

During the preparations for the war in 2003, many of the regular Ministry of Interior (MOI)

command structures were combined and became jointly supervised by the governorate

commands. These commands included all law enforcement agencies within each of the 18

governorates in Iraq. However, in order to fully understand the extent to which such change has

affected the chain of command of the MOI it is important to highlight the standard operating

procedures that preceded this change.

The Ministry of Interior was responsible for the management and operations of several law

enforcement agencies in Iraq. These subsidiary organizations had semi-autonomous command

structures, duties, and set of laws that governed their operations, jurisdictions, and structure

according to the Iraqi law that established each of these organizations.

1. The Iraqi police

2. The Iraqi border guards forces (border police), including customs and port security

3. The Iraqi traffic police

4. The Iraqi nationality and registration agency

5. The Iraqi major crimes directorate

6. The Iraqi police intelligence (National Information and Investigation Agency)

7. The Iraqi river police

8. The Iraqi directorate for counter crime

9. Civil registration offices

10. The Immigration directorate

11. The relief or rapid succor directorate

12. Prisons security

13. Embassies security

14. Iraqi passport general directorate

Some of these organizations and offices report directly to the MOI, and some are grouped under

intermediate administrative units. However, the chain of command is far from a rigid one, and

most the directors of these institutions will have direct reporting and access to the minister,

despite having an intermediate level in the chain of command. This autonomy comes from the

fact that the structure of MOI goes through minor changes from time to time. Usually the

standard configuration of the MOI structure is shown later in figure 1. These agencies varied in

terms of their importance, size, political power, and therefore their leadership’s ranks and

influence within the Iraqi government. The Iraqi police as well as all other national law

enforcement agencies were centralized and managed through the MOI chain of command. The

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nature of the command of each of these organizations varied according the organization’s role.

The police command was ultimately managed by the deputy minister of interior for police, while

the border guards resembled a military command structure that included battalions, brigades and

a central command headquarters. The control over border police (Border Guards) was

occasionally transferred to the MOD and these forces would occasionally assume battle space

within low intensity parts of the front during the 1980-1988 Iraq Iran war. The fact that the

border police had a military command structure allowed smooth transition of command between

the MOI and MOD..

The police command was dispersed according to geographic locale. For a certain governorate

there would be a general commander and then under such commander, sub-commanders for

towns and villages would fall under his direct command. Within the same large central city,

however, there would be several police stations whose commanders would also fall into the same

subordinate position. These police stations constituted the first line of law enforcement, as well

as police- justice fusion cells. In each of these police stations there would be an investigations

judge, detention center, notary public, police investigation unit, and a police intelligence

officer(s). Criminal cases were usually generated at this level and then moved on to the central

criminal courts within a governorate. The investigations judge usually prepared cases for court

proceedings and then carried out court instructions until a verdict could be reached, upon which

an accused would be relocated to a penal center or a central prison.

All these police facilities and personnel, excluding the judge, criminal investigator, and the

notary public, would fall under the MOI authority, albeit through more than one chain of

command. The facility itself is an MOI asset but the operations are of a joint nature in which

criminal investigator, the judge, and notary public report to the Ministry of Justice, while police

report to the MOI under minister for police). Intelligence officers, and information station

officers fell under NIIA (National information and investigation agency), which reports to the

under minister of interior for intelligence, while the task force that apprehended the accused

would be under the relief or rapid succor directorate. Despite the fact that MOI was a top down

centralized organization, its operations were far from that of a stove-piped system. The existence

of these multiple stakeholders in each police center ensured communications at all levels of

authority. The system originated back in the mid-1970’s when the government needed to add an

intelligence capacity at that level. The judiciary element of the system was there since the early

1960’s. It is unknown whether this followed the soviet model or not, but the existence of the

intelligence arm at that low level reminds of the role of the political officer in the Soviet system.

Also the government of Iraq tried to maintain separate chains of command to insure limited

corruption. That was evident due to the fact that judges didn’t remain in one location for a long

time.

The operations of the MOI and its subsidiary commands and directorates were established by a

large set of decisions made by the ruling revolutionary council. Most of Iraq’s laws and

regulations carried on from that time with very little changes. The head of the council, which had

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legislative powers, was the president and the members of the council were usually a mix of high

ranking Baath party members, ministers, and other officials, that were mostly handpicked by the

president. These laws governing operations were continuously amended according to the

discretion of the council. However, they were mostly based on the Iraqi constitution that was

drafted during the 1930’s during the monarchy. This constitution and most of the civil laws in

Iraq were loosely based on the British and French system, but more likely on the French system.

The duties and roles of each of these MOI agencies were clear and separate from one another.

Below is a brief description of the duties and authorities of select MOI organizations:

1. The Iraqi police: this was the largest organization within MOI, with a strength of some

60,000, besides administrative personnel work in the nationality offices, border police, or

other services. The police were planned to act as the tool with which the judiciary system

applied laws and that with which the government ensures civil order. They were

responsible for acting on behalf of the legal branch of government, securing populated

areas and combating criminal activity. It was also the main establishment to deal with

investigating criminal activities, enforcing civil laws and regulations.

2. Border guards: responsible for securing the Iraqi national borders and ports, including

border crossings, airports and sea ports. Iraqi customs were a subsidiary (non-military)

office of the border guards. They were organized in a military fashion and followed a

hybrid doctrine that was a mix of military and policing.

3. Iraqi traffic police: responsible for traffic flow, violations, vehicle registrations, driver’s

licenses, and records of vehicles and drivers. They could participate in joint operations

with the police whenever there were criminal activities linked to motor vehicles. It was

the second largest police organization under MOI.

4. Police intelligence (NIIA): this organization was tasked with keeping civilians’ records,

investigating organized (non-political) criminal activities, as well as police oversight.

Therefore the need to have an internal affairs unit was offset by adding these tasks to

NIIA.

5. The Iraqi counter crime unit: This unit or directorate dealt with specific tasks or emerging

crime patterns like narcotics, military desertion, rape gangs, etc. The tasks of this special

unit varied as the need for them arose. This was the only police unit that was authorized

to form SWAT teams and engage criminals by brute force if the situation called for it.

The overlap is evident; however, disputes were solved quickly at higher levels of command to

prevent rivalry. The centralized nature of the MOI allowed it to communicate swiftly across

several layers of command to the top of the MOI and back. Usually, most of these directorates

operated coherently once a lead organization was chosen.

There were several other agencies that operated closely with the MOI forces. These included the

emergency intervention battalions (a rapid deployment riot police type of force usually under the

command of the governor), the national security directorate and the Iraqi national intelligence.

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They had their own training system and central camp, and came for administrative purposes

under the local governorate, which paid their salaries.

Both the national security directorate and the Iraqi national intelligence were directly subordinate

to the president and they could both task any MOI force to perform certain operations on their

behalf. Large police teams could be involved in hunting for dissidents, spies, saboteurs and other

types of security targets. Usually the police and any other MOI organization would follow the

instructions of these organizations whenever the need called for it.

The authority of the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Interior was immense. The Minister of

Interior and his deputies had the authority to appoint anyone below the top commander of each

of the MOI subsidiary organizations. The appointment to key positions such as the general

commander of the police or the head of NIIA was strictly under the authority of the president

only.

Prior to the 2003 war on Iraq the local police commands, traffic police commands, and almost all

agencies of the MOI excluding the border guards and the nationality offices were transferred to

the governor of each governorate. This created a huge conflict within the chain of command of

the MOI. The MOI was still responsible for the payroll, appointments, and all other aspects of

command while operations were strictly the authority of the governor, who was usually by that

time a retired senior officer of the Iraqi army. Two and three star army officers had no idea how

to run a police force. They transferred the police into a fighting force and that drew these forces

away from their close coordinated role with the judiciary system.

The MOI's ability to plan for the operational requirements of its forces was undermined. As the

command of the MOI forces became localized with governors, other centers of power appeared

and started to interfere with the operations of the various police forces. The Baath party

branches, the local national security offices and others started to exert influence within the police

force. The independence of the police from politics and other non-legal pursuits was impaired.

Police commanders in governorates usually had to deal with conflicting orders from MOI and the

governor’s office. Such conflicts ended up in armed confrontations between the police and the

emergency intervention forces on more than once occasion, throwing the security of major cities

into a state of chaos. Also several laws and regulations were bent according the will of powers

that were competing for the control of the police. For exampleIn the late 1990’s the governor of

Basra (Lt. Gen Ahmed Ibrahim Hammash) ordered the police to help the Ministry of Finance to

collect taxes from local Basra businesses, but at the same time, some of the taxes were collected

ad hoc and were earmarked by the governor's office to provide cleaning services and other civil

works for the residents of these commercial areas. The MOI refused to involve the police in

collecting these additional taxes; however, upon the insistence of the governor’s office, some

were collected. Some business owners managed to bribe the police to get out of these taxes and

their acts were covered by the fact that police lacked cleared orders to collect. Corruption was a

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main issue with the local police, especially the traffic police, and this corruption problem was

exacerbated by then newly introduced fissure in command.

Organizational Overview

Figure 1 MOI structure before 2003

The organizational structure of MOI shown in figure 1 represents how the ministry was

structured before and throughout the early days of the invasion in 2003. The Coalition

Provisional Authority opted to base the new Iraqi MOI on the existing one, hardly changing

much of how the MOI was organized except for some minor adjustments. Nonetheless, as soon

as the first Iraqi government was established several of the MOI main offices were eliminated

and new positions were established.

MOI

National Police

River police Local police

Police stations

rapid response police

Prison security Embassy security Counter crime

directorate

Major crimes unit Traffic police Passports

Directorate Border guards

Customs

Port security

Border checkpoints

Nationality Directorate

Civil registration offices

Immigration

NIIA Inspector General

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Figure 2 Last Configuration of MOI structure (as of 2010)

Before 2003 the MOI did have full authority over the troops, stations and operations of the units

under its command. There were special occasions as mentioned above when the government of

Iraq would deploy certain MOI assets to address specific national security threats. However,

even during these occasions the MOI would still have full control over operations involving its

assets and orders were disseminated to its units through its own chain of command.

This control was undermined after the events of 2003. The Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA) faced an increasing problem of armed militia and the growing role that politicians

affiliated with them had in the country. The CPA issued a mandate to demobilize, disarm, and

integrate these militias. The first destination that most of these politically affiliated gunmen had

was the ranks of the police and the MOI. Large numbers of the well-known Badr militia were

hired as policemen, and other militias, mostly affiliated with the Sadr movement in Iraq were

also hired.

The MOI lost most of its command level officers and senior administrators during the early days

of the U.S. invasion due to the infamous de-baathification process. However, the remaining

junior officer corps would have managed to continue to perform adequately, through established

MOI

Iraqi Police

River police Police

Police stations

Major Crimes Unit

Facility protection services

Embassy protection police

rapid response police

Prison security Traffic Police

Inspector General Emergency Riot

Police Border guards

Customs

Port security

Border checkpoints

Nationality Directorate

Civil registration offices

Immigration

Passport Directorate

NIIA National Police

Special forces

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doctrine and guidelines, if the DDR effort (demobilization, disarming and re-integration) was

gradual and limited.

The divided or rather unclear loyalties of these former political militiamen undermined the

discipline and control that MOI had over its police units. Worse cases were registered in what

became known as the federal police, or the special operations police. These new paramilitary

brigades were supposed to be used in specifically authorized counter terrorism and riot control

conditions, however, they grew in size and their operations became increasingly autonomous

from the regular MOI chain of command. The commanders of the special units or brigades

enjoyed unwavering support by the Minister of Interior and the prime minister and were not

accountable to any authority within the Ministry of Interior. Widespread human rights abuses

and other legal violations were rampant and still exist due to this unquestionable authority.

During the years 2006, 2007 and parts of 2008 Iraq suffered from a death squad phenomenon

that caused thousands to die and resulted in the ethnic cleansing of wide areas of the country’s

major cities. Members of these death squads were believed to be on the payroll of the MOI as

soldiers and commander of the special operations brigades.

The MOI continued to provide a wide range of services to the population. Nationality registry,

civil records registry and maintenance, car registry and other services. These services were

mostly provided by NIIA or the Nationality Directorate. MOI, however, lost a significant and

rather critical part of its ability to communicate with the local civilian population due to the

elimination of the neighborhood Mukhtar program. This was designed to provide basic vetting

capacity for the MOI, thanks to the Mukhtar’s knowledge of the neighborhood residents.

However, before 2003, the program was utilized to provide more than a simple security

background check on local residents; it provided information like political affiliation, familial

relations, and other data mostly of political nature in addition to full criminal records. The

controversy of the program and how the Baath party regime abused it caused it to fall out of

favor after 2003; however, the elder provided a reasonable channel of interactions between the

local population and MOI on a semi-official basis.

Police and Law Enforcement

- Police: Local police, river police, traffic police are branches of the Iraqi National

Police. They all follow a chain of command, much like a military chain of command

in which the director general of the governorate police is the actual commander.

However, doctrine, practices, and operations differ significantly from that of the

military. Police officers (excluding those who are members of the special operations

brigades) consider themselves civilians and not members of a military organization.

There was no distinction between police operating in urban and rural areas.

- Municipal police: there were no branches under this designation.

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- Judicial police: The role of judicial police is taken over by the local police. The local

police station is responsible for the security of personnel, investigations, escort, and

the trial security of detainees. The courts police are part of the facilities protection

services that provide protection to almost all government facilities that are used by

the general public, like hospitals, courts, registry offices, ministries, etc.

- Gendarmerie: Two types of police forces were created after 2003 to take the role of

the gendarmerie. The riot emergency forces which were supposed to be trained to

control riots and can be rapidly deployed to any location within the country. The

other type is the Special operations forces which were mentioned earlier.

- Prison police/staff: There is a small branch of the Iraqi National Police assigned

specifically as a prison police.

Security

- Immigration & borders: The border police provide the border and port security as

well as customs. Immigration is a separate directory within the border control police

(customs).

- Criminal (CID, Special Branch): NIIA is the body within MOI that is tasked with

CID and other police intelligence duties.

- National Security: This was a separate directorate that dealt with political and

economic criminal activities as well organized crime. It was established in 1969 and

reported directly to the president of Iraq, but ceased to exist after 2003.

Intelligence

There were at least four different intelligence services in Iraq before 2003. These were the Iraqi

Intelligence, the Military Intelligence, Interior Intelligence, and the National security directorate.

They all provided internal tactical intelligence as well as strategic intelligence to the Iraqi

government. The duties of these different branches of intelligence routinely overlapped

depending on the nature of the situation. Nonetheless, there was some distinction between the

duties of each of these intelligence branches.

Iraqi Intelligence (Mukhabarat) was the main national intelligence office which was

responsible for collecting and analyzing information both internally and from abroad. It

reported to the president. Mukhabarat was also the office responsible for counter

terrorism, counter intelligence, espionage, and other vital regime security operations.

Whenever there was an overlap in operations with other intelligence agencies, the

Mukhabarat had the upper hand administratively and assumed command.

The national security directorate was mostly responsible for political intelligence

gathering, detention and interrogations. It focused on political, economic and organized

crime more than actual intelligence against foreign players.

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The military intelligence had several branches which included military security, military

counter intelligence, strategic and tactical intelligence, deep penetration and

reconnaissance operations, military attaché offices, etc.

The interior intelligence or the MOI intelligence focused on organized crime, narcotics,

criminal networks, weapons control, civilian information databases and so forth. This was

the only intelligence agency to come under the MOI.

These services were mostly carried by the security apparatuses after 2003 with very little change.

The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) is the direct equivalent of the former Mukhabarat,

and along with the Iraqi Military Intelligence, now known as DGIS (Directorate General of

Intelligence and Security) are the most accomplished. The main reason is the pool from which

they hired their personnel. Most of the officers in these two organizations have been intelligence

officers in the past and were well trained at least at the level of sophistication the Iraq possessed

at the time.

The National Security directorate was seen as a tool to defend the regime prior to 2003, not the

national interest. However, due to the sectarian pattern of appointments and institution-building

intelligence was placed under Sunni leadership after 2003. This prompted an attempt to create a

similar service as a rival under the office of the National Security Advisor, but these attempts fell

through. When the Sunni head of intelligence was replaced by a Shia, the need to establish a

rival intelligence service ceased to exist, and the National Security directorate was dissolved.

The Ministry of Interior Intelligence which became NIIA after 2003, continued to operate like its

predecessor with the addition of counter terrorism to its list of duties.

Private Security Firms

Private security providers or contractors didn’t exist in Iraq before 2003. The law governing

private security firms was ratified by the Iraqi parliament after 2004. Right after that law was

approved a large number of security firms emerged in the country but these firms faced a huge

public backlash due to lack of accountability, proper rules of engagement, and the abuse of

mandate that some of the firms practiced. Iraqi and foreign firms provided security to a large

number of governmental and non-governmental organizations in the country and at one point

security contractors rivaled that of the foreign troops present in the country. The repeated

incidents at which these firms misused force against civilians caused a number of international

incidents including the infamous Blackwater incident. Moreover, the concept of private security

firms is a rather new one.

The 2004 law* that established the guidelines for these private security firms still holds but

licenses are not being issued anymore. Most government agencies have to rely on government

hired personnel to provide personal security and on facilities protection services to provide

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security for buildings and facilities. (* This was a set of regulations endorsed by the Iraqi

governing council, and later confirmed as a law by the new Iraqi parliament.)

The Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Defense agreed on a protocol to create oil security forces

that are trained, equipped and deployed by the MOD but financed by the Ministry of Oil. Even

these forces did not survive this precarious arrangement and were later integrated into the Iraqi

army.

Gender Issues

Historically, the Iraqi security sector was a male dominated domain with very little inclusion of

women. The military opted to include females in medical and administrative branches within its

ranks but even these attempts were abandoned by 1980. Females who acquired military ranks

were transferred to civil service and the program stopped in 1987. The new Iraqi police and

military have a large number of female civilians in administrative posts and the inclusion effort

peaked in 2004 and 2005.

However, the personal dangers endured by the members of the police and the military deterred

most women from joining these services. Families discourage females from joining the police or

the military out of fear that they would be captured, tortured or violated by insurgent or terrorist

groups. Additionally, the fact that females would have to operate in close quarters and for

prolonged periods (including overnight) with male co-workers is the other reason that these

families, which exist in a mostly conservative Islamic social setting, resist female employment.

Political pressure from the government to shift most of the country’s civil laws, which were

based on the French legal system, to Islamic Shari’a is contributing to an increasingly hostile

work and education environment for women.

Female inclusion is more prevalent in the Kurdish region when compared to the rest of Iraq. This

could be attributed to the fact that the Kurdish region is more stable and security is better

established. Historically, there were always women in the Pesh Marga guerilla forces.

Oversight and Accountability

The Ministry of Interior command structure assured a great deal of civilian control over the

various branches of service that lies under its command. The minister of interior has consistently

been a civilian, including prior to 2003. The ministry’s structure before as well as after the war in

2003 continued to be highly centralized in nature and the chain of command is of a hierarchical

pyramid type in which the minister has almost absolute control over the various services and

branches within the ministry. Appointments to certain command posts as well as the appointment

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of deputy ministers still require ratification by the Iraqi parliament. The Council of ministers

usually intervened in the appointment of brigade commanders and above. However, the minister

still has the authority to appoint and dismiss commanders and police chiefs by recommending

such action to the council of ministers.

This direct control of the civilian leadership of the ministry over its employees was undermined

in 2006. The prime minister established what is now known as the regional commands.

Basically, all military and police forces in the certain key provinces like Basra, Baghdad and

Mosul, now have their own regional command structure that bypasses the Ministry of Interior

and reports directly to the prime minister’s office. The prime minister appointed a regional

commander to whom all military and police services report to. This act rendered the role of the

MOI to merely record keeping, payroll, supply and training. All policy, operations, and planning

is now the duty of the regional command rather than that of the ministry.

The first victim of this new arrangement is oversight and accountability. If the regional

command sanctions a legal violation due to nepotism or mutual interest, the central authority of

the MOI inspector general has no means to interfere. Ideally the inspector general of the Ministry

of Interior is responsible for assuring proper oversight, compliance, and financial accountability.

There is a human rights office (established in 2006) in both MOI and MOD that reports to the

inspector general and both of these offices were incapacitated after the introduction of the

regional command structure.

The MOI has a directorate that is responsible for budgeting and planning. Before 2003, and

mainly due to the economic embargo on Iraq, the fiscal needs and plans of the Ministry of

Interior and the police were usually not met. The standard procedures that ensured smooth and

continuous operations of the MOI were replaced by ad hoc planning and containment strategies

that had to make due with minimum resources.

The planning and budgeting capacity of the MOI was rebuilt after 2003 and there is no lack of

skilled personnel to work these budgets for the ministry. However, some of the plans fall through

mainly due to the high rates of equipment attrition, corruption, and lack of accountability.

Officer training, on the other hand, used to be more than adequate before 2003. The police

academy in Iraq did provide a rigorous training program for four years for police officers,

leading to a BSc degree that included legal training. After 2003, the police academy was re-

established – and later a second academy was also established – but the training program is

abridged and the training still constitutes a fraction of the former pre-2003 program.

The main training deficit is in the attention given to NCO’s and enlisted personnel. Iraq didn’t

have an adequate training system for regular policemen and NCO’s. This problem still mires the

police service and is responsible for underperforming and inadequate operational readiness of the

Iraqi police.

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The MOI didn’t establish the procedures and capacity to perform adequate financial auditing or

oversight. The MOI’s inspector general office was the body responsible for ensuring financial

accountability and it didn’t have the trained and skilled personnel or the authority to undertake

such responsibility. After 2004 the National Integrity Committee was formed as an independent

government oversight institution to provide such capacity. However, the committee’s

performance was mired by politics and was used as a political purging tool rather than a tool to

ensure financial accountability. The political interference in the operations of this committee

exacerbated the corruption problem throughout the country, including the MOI.

The corruption problem is a government policy problem and not a problem of personnel skills or

the lack thereof. The MOI has access to different training programs, nationally and

internationally. The MOI as well as other governmental institutions in Iraq continuously invest in

staff development by either providing mid-career training programs or by providing executive

training. These training courses take place in the MOI, in Iraqi universities, and abroad.

However, the political will to purge corruption doesn’t exist.

NOTE: The above section contains useful information, but a) it seems to include a variety of

issues (training, planning, budgeting) under the heading of oversight and accountability, whereas

maybe they should be put under separate headings; b) the section is somewhat untidy, needs

better sequencing of issues and information; c) you touch on some aspects of oversight and

accountability, but say little or nothing about parliamentary scrutiny – you only refer to

appointments to certain posts being ratified by parliament. But does parliament have the right to

interpellate the minister of interior or his deputy or senior officials/commanders, and if it does

have the formal right does it actually exercise it? Does it scrutinize the budget? Is there a General

Accounting (or Audit) Office that monitors government agencies, including the MOI and/or

individual agencies or intel services? I tried to follow the layout you had in the proposed paper

structure. I know the information is not optimally organized but a re-write could take a long time

at this point. Please let me know what you prefer.

Command and Control

The Iraqi security sector remains by far one of the most incoherent and fragmented sectors of any

country around the world. The main reason for this fragmentation and occasional rivalry is the

sectarian building blocks of the government. Prior to 2003, the national security policy was

outlined by the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, in other words, by the president and a

few of his assistants. This stove-piped system was replaced by one which is governed by

conflicting sectarian agendas and by political cronyism. Rank and position didn’t always

determine the person’s influence or role with the MOI or any other security organization, but

rather how close that person is to the political premiership of the country. The same remained

true after 2003.

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This was mostly informal in nature up until 2007 when these strong lines of political allegiances

were manifested in the regional commands structures and in other organizations that were given

priority and authority over others. The prime minister created what is called the special counter

terrorism units, which are Special Forces type of units operating solely under his direct

supervision. Commanders of brigades and divisions were handpicked by the prime minister and

since he’s considered the commander in chief, the Minister of Interior or Defense cannot

overrule his appointments. These appointments were based on personal and political relations

rather than merit. However, both the MOI, and the MOD still have the bureaucracy needed to

reverse the damage if need be. The problem is the misconduct of leadership rather than a faulty

or underperforming institution.

The fusion cells that were put together by the coalition forces between the years 2003 and 2009

began to deteriorate. These cells ensured that MOI, the INIS and MOD would operate in a

cohesive manner at all levels of authority despite the stove-piped system emphasized by their

structures. However, since the policy and strategy of each region of the country became separate

from one another, the entire notion of having these central chains of command to liaise became

self-defeating, mostly because they have little actual influence on operations. The fusion cells

were these were not used by the prime minister in the way he set up regional commands, and

their weakness was evident when they stopped serving as coordination nodes between the army,

police and pesh merga during the crisis between the Kurds and Arabs in 2012.

Nonetheless, having the police and army operate under a unified command structure did yield

some joint operational capacity, despite being severed from the central command structures of

both. INIS and DGIS remained outside this arrangement that included regional police NIIA

offices and army tactical intelligence officers.

In order to overcome the stove-piped system inherited in the organizational structures of MOD

and MOI, the Coalition Forces set up a ministry council in the MOI (and in the MOD) in 2004.

Membership of this council is responsible for approving the plans for manpower, fiscal budgets,

capital investments, training and other operational requirements. These requirements are

determined by the branch commands and intelligence departments depending on the national

security police of the government and the intelligence indicators available. Membership to this

council was usually extended to branch commanders, under ministers, director generals, and

guests that the council is willing to invite due to certain occasions. The council usually holds

meetings once a month and is headed by the minister of interior himself. However, the

effectiveness of this council was severely undermined by the direct micromanagement of the

prime minister and the introduction of the regional commands.

The morale of the leadership of the MOI and MOD is jeopardized by the introduction of regional

field commands and by the micro-management of the prime minister’s officer over troops and

regional police directorates. None of the plans, strategies and operations orders of the central

command in MOI and the MOD have any influence on actual operations in main urban areas. In

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fact, the operations centers of both the MOD and MOI which were established and equipped by

the coalition forces over a period of several years are now put out of business altogether.

According to one brigadier general who managed the operation center of the MOD at a certain

period of time, the staff of the MOD operations center passed time playing dominos and

computer games, and he noticed that his counterparts in MOI were not better off.

The system in which officers are promoted to higher ranks depends on time spent in service

rather than merit and achievement. Moreover, the ascension to positions of command depends on

political affiliation trumping both merit and time of service. Junior officers are ranked up and

given extremely high levels of command merely due to their political affiliation and their

closeness to the political leadership of the country. The top heavy military and police service has

become one that has a huge liability of high ranking officers with no position to fill. In addition

to that, officers who decided to abandon their posts due to political reasons in the past are

compensated by being ranked up to senior levels without the appropriate training or capacity to

assume such ranks.

Service Conditions

A job in the Iraqi MOI is a historically low level paying job, and police pay usually trails that of

the army by a considerable margin. The Iraqi pay grade remained constant despite the

astronomical inflation the country suffered during the 1990’s. The lower ranks suffered

increasingly as commodity prices started to grow way beyond their reach. However, this changed

after 2003. A unified pay system was introduced in 2004 and it not only equated the police with

their army counterparts but also with other civilian employees of the same pay grade. However,

the police and the army were given certain bonuses as danger pay and deployment allowances

that made employment in these services an opportunity for the large segment of unemployed or

underemployed Iraqis. The new pay scale was comprised of 10 different service levels and two

special levels for ministers, general level officers, under ministers, and director generals. At each

of these levels there are ten different pay steps will allow an organization to distinguish length of

service, accomplishment and other issues of merit that need to be reflected by pay. This new

system transformed the police to one of the better paid employment avenues in the Iraqi

economy.

Iraqi retirement law allows retirement after 5 years of service. However, retirement this early

will not earn the retiree a pension. Pensions are given to those who retire after 15 years of

service. The pension would be at 80% of their full employment salary. If a civil servant/officer

would retire after 30 years of service or at a director general level he/she would earn 100 percent

of his/her salary as pension. Iraq started working with this law in 2010 and is still in effect to this

moment.

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These huge payroll budgets have put the budgets of MOI and MOD under a lot of stress. Around

87% of their budget was spent on payroll in the fiscal year 2006. The lack of spending flexibility

caused by this payroll heavy budget meant that capital investment is at an all-time minimum.

Office space, facilities, rations and sleeping quarters are all substandard. On many occasions

several employees would share a single desk and a single chair. In 2009, one of the main

obstructing issues that faced the implementation of NIIA doctrine is the lack of adequate

workspace and equipment. Several police stations, especially the main ones in urban areas

benefited from coalition forces spending, however, newer offices or offices that would provide

services to supplement basic policing have no access to funding for basic equipment, training,

rations, and so on.

The employees can only continue to demand additional funding for equipment from the central

MOI requirements directorate. However, despite these repeated requests and despite the

profound impact the lack of such equipment had on operations, most of these requests go

unanswered.

Police and military personnel are also prohibited from forming unions or political parties. They

have no established complaint mechanisms.

Training

Basic training differed according to the intended rank of the course graduate. Pre-2003 officers

were provided adequate training through the Iraqi police academy. A 4 year Bachelors program

was designed to provide officers with a comprehensive knowledge of basic policing and urban

combat tactics, law, and administration. The NCO’s were subjected to a 9-month program that

was supplemental to the high school education they had already attained. Enlisted policemen

were trained for a minimum of 6 months.

These training times were severely reduced after 2003. Most officers were appointed according

to evaluation of the coalition forces training officer and according to performance in short

training courses. Training courses of the first few batches of policemen took place in Jordan, and

then the program was transferred back to Iraq in around 2006. Training was almost limited to

basic combat tactics and weapons: new recruits learned how to shoot rifles, but not how to police

civilian neighborhoods. The police academy re-opened and new officer graduates started to join

the police force after 2010.

These training programs remain inadequate and lack proper elements that would help the police

to observe the legal aspects of police work. Unfortunately, a very limited number of graduates of

Iraqi law schools opt to join the police and MOI in general.

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Rules of engagement and other aspects of combatting crime are determined at the level of a

police station and according to need. Areas of high rates of violence usually have less restrictive

rules of engagements in comparison to the more stable ones. These discrepancies remain one of

the most problematic issues that the Iraqi police is still addressing.

Equipment

Prior to 2003 the police usually carried a variety of side arms and were rarely issued large caliber

rifles or automatic weapons. The possession of automatic rifles and carbines was limited to

certain police regiments like the Emergency Riot police and the rapid intervention units.

However, most local police usually use 9 mm pistols, while traffic police were equipped with

0.38 special revolvers.

After 2003, the standard issue pistol for the police is a Glock 19, 9mm pistol and AK-47 assault

rifle. Pistols were less common than rifles but the police force was increasingly equipped by

them as they’re made available.

Vehicles, usually pickup trucks and other type of SUV’s, all with police markings are provided,

however, the MOI lacks any maintenance program and attrition rates were extremely high. The

continuous loss of operating vehicles has rendered most police stations crippled or forced to rely

on one or two vehicles in operating condition out of 20.

Body armor and uniforms were available but most of these body armor kits are not rated for

ballistics but rather for secondary fragmentation of explosive devices. The existence of sub-par

equipment, especially in items like body armor had jeopardized and caused the loss of numerous

police officers throughout the last 9 years. It is noteworthy that the Iraqi police didn’t use any

sort of body armor prior to 2003.

Procurement and contracts remain one of the most corruption infested departments in MOI. The

country ranks among the highest in terms of corruption and still lacks adequate standard

operations to combat corruption in public institutions as previously mentioned. The effects of

corruption were evident in the quality of goods supplied to the police and the availability of these

goods as well. Uniforms, as well as ammunition, are now usually provided by the policemen

themselves. A large black market for ammunition that is stolen from warehouses thrives in a

number of Iraqi cities. The inability of the police to provide after action reports and

accountability for excessive use of fire remained the main reason or cover for those who were

able to smuggle and sell these items in the black market.

Some queries:

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How much, if any, of this various equipment (weapons, vehicles, armour, etc) was

donations from external states?

Is there a general procurement law or rules for all government agencies; and for the

MOI?

Culture

Although the Iraqi police regarded itself as a vivilian force, its chain of command, payroll and

ranks were modeled after the Iraqi military until 2003. Ranks and uniforms were almost identical

to that of the Iraqi military before 2003, with the exception of the traffic police. Moreover, the

police have not only resembled the military in terms of uniforms and ranks but also inherited the

same weaknesses and strengths of the Iraqi military. One of the weaknesses that carried on to the

present day is the under emphasis on the NCO corps. Among the strengths that are worth

mentioning were the adequate organization and data management.

The superficial resemblance to the military mostly ended at uniforms and ranks. Rules of

engagement, conduct of operations and doctrine departed significantly from that of the Iraqi

military at the time.

After 2003, the situation was almost the opposite. While uniforms and other obvious similarities

were almost eliminated (with the exception of the special police forces) most operations and

rules of engagement became more in line with that of a military. In fact, the Iraqi government

was able to repeatedly deploy the army and the police interchangeably. This undermined the

police’s ability to forge strong grass roots relations with the community and also undermined its

capacity to carry out the judiciary policies required to establish rule of law.

The trust of the public towards the police forces in Iraq varies from one area to the other.

However, the ability of the police to use excessive force during its operations and occasional

thefts during house searches caused this relation to deteriorate further over time. The Iraqi law

allows the ministers of security ministries to protect their own employees against civilian law

suits. The law number 37 of the year 1981 allows the minister to dismiss, delay or allow civil law

cases to proceed against members of a security ministry. This allowed MOI to provide some sort

of immunity for its members against prosecution related to unnecessary use of force. Political

affiliation and proximity to the ruling party influence the level of immunity.

Post-transitional challenges

Post-transitional challenges can be summarized as follows:

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a) Ensuring full civilian authority within the MOI and granting MOI the ability to plan,

manage and deploy its assets via a strong and functional chain of command. The micro

management practiced by the prime minister’s office and formation of regional

commands have jeopardized the MOI to establish functional control and oversight over

the police forces.

b) Overall policy and/or operating frameworks and guidelines: The separation of police

operations and distinction of police roles vs. that of the military remains one of the main

challenges that faces the Iraqi security sector. Also the oversized police force that was

intended to combat an all-out insurgency has created increasing burdens on the MOI

budget and fiscal planning. The problem originated when the coalition forces needed a

partner to combat the increasing insurgency. The MOD was still not established and the

only available manpower came from MOI. This caused the increased attention to the

police’s combat capability throughout their training rather than the police’s ability to

conduct law enforcement.

c) Relations with citizens: the lack of communications channels and outreach programs,

and the fact that the police rules of engagements remain loose and close to that of a

military organization continues to alienate the police from the general public. Successful

policing requires the police to possess the capacity to work within communities and be

accountable to them.

d) Practical issues and gaps: training, equipment, and facilities: the ad hoc and hasty pace at

which the police have integrated members of armed militias in 2003-2004 without the

proper training and with limited resources allocated to training means the Iraqi police

will continue to suffer from the inability to maintain security beyond that which is

provided at the tip of the gun. The training programs that exist are mainly focused on

combat tactics in urban warfare environments rather than training programs that are

aimed at establishing the rule of law. The re-establishment of the police academy is a

step in the right direction but the lower ranks of the police still suffer from the absence of

adequate training. Equipment and facilities remain inadequate in most cases and still

present an obstacle that faces the implementation of the certain aspects of various police

branches doctrine.

e) Accountability and transparency: the corruption that riddles the Iraqi institutions have

not spared its police force. The Iraqi police remain one of the most corrupt organizations

in the country, with phantom personnel on the payroll, fraudulent food contracts, taking

of bribes, extortion of detainees, and other negative practices. Proper auditing procedures

and other administrative checks and balances have to be gradually introduced and

accepted as a cultural norm before they become effective. It is necessary to mention that

allowing any single office within MOI or the Iraqi government to practice oversight

might cause this branch or office to become politicized. The Iraqi police and army

suffered from several waves of political purges that were based on inaccurate accusations

of corruption, while in fact the system that is put in place to combat corruption is itself

corrupt.

f) Human rights: although each security ministry has its own human rights office, and

although the Iraqi government has a ministry for human rights, abuses remain widely

spread throughout the Iraqi security apparatuses. Not unlike combatting corruption, the

introduction of human rights culture is a slow process that requires the full attention and

an unadulterated will on behalf of the Iraqi government in order to succeed.

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Final thoughts

The various Iraqi political parties consider the Iraqi security organizations a competition arena.

The threat of a civil war is never far from the minds of Iraqi politicians and the control over the

military and police is a priority aspect in their long and short term planning. The CPA distributed

key positions of power within the security ministries along the lines of these ethnic and sectarian

conflicts, but even this precarious arrangement didn’t survive for long. Continuous and repeated

purging campaigns were carried on by ministers and by the prime minister in order to ensure

unequivocal control over the country’s military and police assets.

Assassinations, dismissal, legal prosecution, and other tools were used to remove commanders,

directors and other key personnel from their positions to ensure that monopoly. These rapid

changes within the MOI and the MOD have caused the chain of commands of these two

organizations to destabilize and weaken over time.

The presence of members of militias among the ranks of the police has caused entire police units

to have split loyalties between their country and their cleric. This compromised loyalty became

evident during the operations to dismantle the strongholds of these militias in eastern Baghdad

and in Basra in 2008. Entire police and army units defected and refused to carry out commands

from the Iraqi government. On several occasions, members of the Iraqi police have been seen

fighting alongside insurgents against their fellow soldiers and policemen.

The solution to these problems is dependent on the training and indoctrination of the police. It

would also depend on the policies and priorities of the government of the country. A political

solution to the ethnic and sectarian rivalries is the key to generating interest in establishing

proper training and police guidelines for the Iraqi police. The notion that a bottom up approach

would work is a flawed assumption, as the problem with Iraqi security forces is the nature of

their leadership and the country’s leadership, as well the fractionalized socio-political

environment that such forces have to exist within.

Another way of establishing higher accountability is a transformation of the police system to one

that is completely decentralized and locally empowered, within established national guidelines.

This is the case in the Kurdish regions of the country and it seems to have worked effectively.

However, the conflicting interests of Iraq’s political entities and their will to control the security

sector out of mutual distrust is likely going to prevent such changes from taking place.