A Security Framework for Executables in a Ubiquitous Computing Environment
Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be...
Transcript of Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be...
![Page 1: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Security, Privacy & Trust in
Ubiquitous Computing
Dr. Jaydip SenInnovation Lab
Tata Consultancy Services, Kolkata
Email: [email protected]
![Page 2: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2
Outline
• The Vision of UbiComp -- According to Mark Weiser
• Trust, Security and Privacy
• Principle of Building Trust and Reputation Systems
• Commercial and Online Systems
• Problems and Proposed Solutions
• Conclusion
![Page 3: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
3
Ubiquitous ComputingMark Weiser, Xerox PARC 1988
“Ubiquitous computing enhances computer use by making many computers available throughout the physical environment, but making them effectively invisible to the user”
![Page 4: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Security and Trust
• Interactions cross multiple organisational boundaries
• Lessons from history: everything worth hacking gets hacked
• Need for secure ‘out of the box’ set up
• Context aware adaptive security
• Identify friend or foe level of trust
• Small communicators, with confidential data, are easily lost or stolen – biometric authentication?
• Trust based on experience + recommendations
• Credential validation with intermittent network connectivity
![Page 5: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
When is Trust Important ?
Trust importance
World type
High
LowEarthHell Paradise
![Page 6: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Two Definitions of Trust
• Reliability trust
– The subjective probability by which an individual, A, expects that another individual, B, performs a given action on which its welfare depends. (Gambetta 1988)
• Decision trust
– The willingness to depend on something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though negative consequences are possible. (McKnight & Chervany 1996)
![Page 7: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Would You Trust This Rope ?
For what?
To climb down from the 3rd floor window of a house
The rope looks very old
Fire drill: No! Yes!Real fire:
![Page 8: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
To Describe Complex Things in a Simple Way
• IT people like anthropomorphic expressions like:
– Firewall, honeypot, virus, Trojan horse, digital signature, …, trusted computing, circle of trust, …
• Anthropomorphic security expressions serve as
– Simple descriptions of complex security concepts
– Marketing slogans
• Trust expressions are often difficult to precisely understand
![Page 9: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Trust Expressions
Trust management
Trusted system
Trusted Computing Base
Trust negotiation Trust systemTrust scope
Trust context
Trust transitivity
Direct trust
Indirect trust
Trusted Third Party
Trusted computing
Trusted code
Circle of trust
Trust providerTrust bar
Trustworthy computing
![Page 10: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Two Sides of Trust Management
Trusting partyWants to assess and make decisions w.r.t. the dependability of the trusted party for a given transaction and context
Trusted partyWants to represent and put in a positive light own competence, honesty, reliability and quality of service.
trust
![Page 11: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Perception and Reality
Perceived security
Real security
High
Low
Insecure Secure
Risky Safe
Trusted and used
Distrusted and not used
![Page 12: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Real Security is Bad for E-Business
• E-business revolution not possible with real security• Thank God the Internet isn’t secure
=
Real security
e-Business
Functionality
e-Business
Real security
Functionality
+
![Page 13: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Perceived Security is Good for E-business
Trust
e-Business
+
Perceived security
Trust =
Perceived security
e-Business
• E-business growth needs perceived security
![Page 14: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
The Security Dilemma
Real security
Functionality
+
Functionality
e-Business
=Real & perceived
security
e-Business
potential
+
Trust
e-Business
Perceived securityTrust
![Page 15: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Jøsang’s Law of Security and E-businessThe potential of e-business is bounded by:
• The lack of functionality caused by real security
• The lack of trust caused by perceived insecurity
Real & perceived security
e-Business
potential
![Page 16: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Trust and PKI
• Cryptography solves security problems, but creates key management complexity
• PKI simplifies the key management, but creates trust management problems
![Page 17: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Public Key Infrastructures
Root CA
CA2 CA3 CA4
A B C D E Users
F
Trust providers • Key distribution mechanism
• User keys are certified by CAs
• Chain of certificates
• Ultimately certified by root CA
• Keys are distributed online
• Root key must go out-of-band (keys are distributed in a different channel)
• Only guarantees authenticity Not reliability
![Page 18: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
PKI Trust Structures
Strict hierarchy General hierarchy
Anarchic structure “The PGP PKI”
Isolated strict hierarchies “The Web PKI”
Cross certified strict hierarchies
![Page 19: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
PKI Trust Issues
• CAs could issue certificates without checking owner identity
• CAs could deliberately issue false certificates
• Private keys could be disclosed by accident or on purpose
• False certificates could be inserted into browsers
• It is not possible to check whether a revocation request is genuine or not (a denial of service attack is possible)
• Checking revoked certificates requires another secure channel
• Liability issues for false or misused keys
![Page 20: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
The Web PKI• Weak out-of-band channel
• No assurance of server security
• No assurance of service provider reliability
• Poor usability
• No real authentication (re: phishing attacks)
a misnomer:
The Web PKI only provides perceived authentication, not real authentication
![Page 21: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Phishing and Spoofing
Illustrates poor Web server authentication
B
Client Attacker Server
Spam email
Access
HTMLB
HTMLB
Login page
A
SSL
Cert A
SSL setup
User
Hijacked login
Bank
![Page 22: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
The Purpose of SSL on the Web
• SSL can theoretically provide authentication and confidentiality
• SSL confidentiality eliminates password sniffing
– SSL in Anonymous Diffie-Hellmann mode (ADH) provides confidentiality
– ADH mode does not require certificates
• SSL actually provides no practical authentication
– Can not prevent phishing attacks
• PKI and certificates currently have no real practical purpose for Web security
![Page 23: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
What Experts Say about Web Certificates
SSL gives no security guarantees that are relevant for e-commerce.Still, users feel more secure.
Dr Richard Walton, former Director of CESG(Communications- Electronics Security Group)
Digital certificates provide no actual security for electronic commerce;it’s a complete sham.
Bruce Schneier: Secrets & Lies
The Web PKI serves to increase perceived security
![Page 24: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Trust and Access Control• Access control paradigm:
– The resource owner grants access authorisation– The system verifies authorisation before access
• Trusted user = authorised user
• Trusted code = code running as system
• Untrusted code = code running in a sandbox
• Semi-trusted code = some more access rights
• Access credentials can be exchanged and evaluated mechanically ⇒ trust negotiation
• Access authorisation can be delegated in a transitive fashion ⇒ transitive trust
![Page 25: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Trust Management Systems
• Idea: “Who can I trust to access my resources?”
• Meaning: Access authorisation and control– Not (necessarily) based on identity– Attribute certificates/credentials– Delegation chains
• Better name: Access credentials management
Trust management is supposed to be an incredibly vague and provocative term invented by Matt Blaze. I don’t know whether he intended it that way, but it comes natural to him
Joan Feigenbaum, AT&T Bell Labs
![Page 26: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Trusted Computing• Idea: It shall be impossible to install and execute software that is not
certified and authorised– Current paradigm: Software-open systems– Trusted computing paradigm: Software closed systems– Controlled by hardware
• 1999: Trusted Computing Group (TCG)– Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specification
• 2001: Production of TPM chip
• 2002: Microsoft announces Palladium TPM chip
• 2005: Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB)
• 2006: Limited trusted computing in Vista– Disk encryption based on TPM (Trusted Platform Module)
• 2009: TPM in almost all PCs, not yet in mobiles
![Page 27: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Trusted Computing Module (TPM)
![Page 28: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
What Trusted Computing Can Do ?
• Can prevent– Installation and execution of unauthorised software– Tampering with installed software– Usage of stolen computers
• Can be used for Digital Rights Management (DRM)– Prevents playing unlicensed digital content
If you want to do DRM on a PC, you need to treat the user as the enemy.
Roger NeedhamFormer director of Microsoft Research Europe
![Page 29: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Problems with Trusted Computing• No protection against
– Malicious authorised software
– Security vulnerabilities due to software bugs
• Bugs in security hardware can be disastrous
• Bureaucracy of software authorisation
– How to authorise software?
– Everything or just selected software?
• Control over client machines can be abused under the pretext of DRM
• Introduces liability issues
– The party in control should also be liable
![Page 30: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Trust Pressure on Users
• Users are conditioned to always accept
• Will make wrong decision in case of malware
![Page 31: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Trusted Computing Base: TCB
• A full combination of security mechanisms (hardware and software) within a system
• Security evaluation gives security assurance
– US TCSEC (Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria, aka. Orange Book)
– European ITSEC (Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria)
– ISO Common Criteria
– Represents a public measure of security
– Additional factors can override security assurance at any time, e.g. security flaws
![Page 32: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Trust and Identity Management
• Important issues
– Privacy violation
– Identity theft
– Poor usability leads to policy violation
– Trust relationship requirements
• Establishing trust relationships has a cost
– Simple models have simple trust requirements and vice versa
– Simple models don’t scale well
![Page 33: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Isolated User Identity Model
Examples: It’s everywhere
Legend :
User entity
User identifier
Authentication credential
Service access
Service provision
Identity domain
SP 1 SP 3SP 2
3
3
2
2
1
1
Service provider entity
![Page 34: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Trust Requirements for Isolated Identity Mgmt
T1 Client trusts that service provider protects the client’s privacy;
T2 Client trusts that service provider has satisfactory user registration and authentication mechanisms;
T3 Service provider trusts that client handles their credentials with adequate care.
![Page 35: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Federated User Identity Model
Examples: Liberty Alliance, SAML2.0, WS-Federation, Shibboleth
SP 1 SP 3SP 2
1 2 3
1
1
Legend :
User entity
User identifier
Authentication credential
Service access
Service provision
Identity domain
Service provider entity
Identifier mapping
Circle of trust(Liberty Alliance)
![Page 36: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Trust Requirement for Federated Identity Mgmt
T1 Client trusts that service provider protects the client’s privacy;
T2 Client trusts that service provider has satisfactory user registration and authentication mechanisms;
T3 Service provider trusts that client handles their credentials with adequate care;
T4 Service providers and clients both trust that service access by assertions between service providers will only take place when legitimately requested by the client;
T5 Service providers and clients both trust that the identifier mapping between service providers is correct;
T6 Client trusts that all service providers adhere to the accepted policy for correlating personal data about the same client from other service providers.
![Page 37: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
User Centric Identity Management
B
Client
Bank
Access
SSL
SSL setup Cert B
HTMLB
HTMLB
Login page
UserPAD
ServerLogin
Cert B
![Page 38: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Hard vs. Soft Security
• Traditional security systems: Hard security
– Authentication
– Access control
– Encryption– …
• What about deceit and poor quality services?
– Traditional security provides no protection
– Trust and reputation systems can provide protection
– Soft security
![Page 39: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Reputation and Trust
REPUTATION
• Based on public info
• Common/average opinion
• Not necessarily objective
TRUST
• Based on both private and public info
• Personal
• Private info weighs more than public
“I trust you because of your good reputation” “I trust you despite your bad reputation”
![Page 40: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Trust and Reputation Systems
Trust systems• Private and public ratings as input
• Computes score for target entity only
• Private scores
• Explicit transitivity
Reputation systems• Public ratings/info as input
• Computes scores for all entities
• Public scores
• Implicit transitivity
![Page 41: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
Trust Transitivity
Direct referral trust
Recommendation
Direct functional trust
Indirect functional trust
2
3
4
1
Thanks to Bob’s advice, Alice trusts Eric to be a good mechanic.
Eric has proven to Bob that he is a good mechanic.
Bob has proven to Alice that he is knowledgeable in matters relating to car maintenance.
Eric
Bob
Alice
![Page 42: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
Computational Trust with Subjective Logic
![Page 43: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
Trust in Online Communities
• Privacy and security mechanisms provide trust in the infrastructure
• Trust and reputation systems provide trust in people and service providers
– Enhances the quality of online markets and communities
– P2P networks, eBay, Slashdot, Amazon, Epinion
• Hard and soft security are complementary
![Page 44: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
Conclusion
• There is no shortcut to trust
– Provide real security, and it will be trusted
– Perceived security is no long term solution
• Challenge the security-functionality trade-off
– Stronger focus needed on usability of security
• Online trust requires more than just security
– Trust and reputation systems promising technology to make the Internet a safer place to be
![Page 45: Security, Privacy & Trust in Ubiquitous Computing · – Provide real security, and it will be trusted – Perceived security is no long term solution • Challenge the security -functionality](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022071012/5fca4f16dfec50127078e325/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
45
Thank You!