Security, privacy and protection in different VANET applications Mario Gerla.

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Security, privacy and protection in different VANET applications Mario Gerla

Transcript of Security, privacy and protection in different VANET applications Mario Gerla.

Page 1: Security, privacy and protection in different VANET applications Mario Gerla.

Security, privacy and protection in different VANET applications

Mario Gerla

Page 2: Security, privacy and protection in different VANET applications Mario Gerla.

Vehicular application and security requirements - Outline

• VANETs Introduction• VANET Applications

– safe navigation (sensor =>actuator) – minimal (other speaker will focus on this)

– content distribution/uploading– collaborative markets, etc– urban sensing (Mobeyes)

• Threat model and different privacy/security/protection requirements

Page 3: Security, privacy and protection in different VANET applications Mario Gerla.

What is a VANET?

Penetration will be progressive (over 2 decades or so)

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Vehicular communications: why?

Most of these problems can be solved by providing appropriate information to the driver or to the vehicle

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Urban “opportunistic” vehicle ad hoc networking

From Wireless toWired networkVia Multihop

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Opportunistic piggy rides in the urban meshPedestrian transmits a large file in blocks to passing cars,

bussesThe carriers deliver the blocks to the hot spot

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Car to Car communications for Safe Driving

Vehicle type: Cadillac XLRCurb weight: 3,547 lbsSpeed: 65 mphAcceleration: - 5m/sec^2Coefficient of friction: .65Driver Attention: YesEtc.

Vehicle type: Cadillac XLRCurb weight: 3,547 lbsSpeed: 45 mphAcceleration: - 20m/sec^2Coefficient of friction: .65Driver Attention: NoEtc.

Vehicle type: Cadillac XLRCurb weight: 3,547 lbsSpeed: 75 mphAcceleration: + 20m/sec^2Coefficient of friction: .65Driver Attention: YesEtc.

Vehicle type: Cadillac XLRCurb weight: 3,547 lbsSpeed: 75 mphAcceleration: + 10m/sec^2Coefficient of friction: .65Driver Attention: YesEtc.

Alert Status: None

Alert Status: Passing Vehicle on left

Alert Status: Inattentive Driver on Right

Alert Status: None

Alert Status: Slowing vehicle aheadAlert Status: Passing vehicle on left

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DSRC*/IEEE 802.11p : Enabler of Novel Applications

• Car-Car communications at 5.9Ghz

• Derived from 802.11a • three types of channels:

Vehicle-Vehicle service, a Vehicle-Gateway service and a control broadcast channel .

• Ad hoc mode; and infrastructure mode

• 802.11p: IEEE Task Group that intends to standardize DSRC for Car-Car communications

* DSRC: Dedicated Short Range Communications

F o r w a r d r a d a r

C o m p u t i n g p l a t f o r m

E v e n t d a t a r e c o r d e r ( E D R )

P o s i t i o n i n g s y s t e m

R e a r r a d a r

C o m m u n i c a t i o n f a c i l i t y

D i s p l a y

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Hot Spot

Hot Spot

Vehicular Grid as Opportunistic Ad Hoc Net

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Hot Spot

Hot Spot

PowerBlackout

ST O P

PowerBlackout

ST O P

Vehicular Grid as Emergency Net

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PowerBlackout

ST O P

PowerBlackout

ST O P

Vehicular Grid as Emergency Net

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CodeTorrent: Content Distribution using

Network Coding in VANETUichin Lee, JoonSang Park,

Joseph Yeh, Giovanni Pau, Mario GerlaComputer Science Dept, UCLA

ACM MobiShare 2006

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Content Distribution in VANET

• Multimedia-based proximity marketing:– Virtual tours of hotel rooms– Movie trailers in nearby theaters

• Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET):– Error-prone channel– Dense, but intermittent connectivity – High, but restricted mobility patterns– No guaranteed cooperativeness (only, users of the same

interests will cooperate)• How do we efficiently distribute content in VANET?

– Traditional approach: BitTorrent-like file swarming

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BitTorrnet-like File Swarming• A file is divided into equal sized blocks• Cooperative (parallel) downloading among peers

From Wikipedia

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Swarming Limitation: Missing Coupon!

C1 Sends Block 1

C3C2C1

C6C5C4

B1

B1

C3 Sends Block 2

B2

B2

C2 Sends Block 2

B1 B2

B2

B2

C5 Sends Block 2

B2

B2

B2

B1 is STILL missing!!

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Network Coding• Let a file has k blocks: [B1 B2 … Bk] • Encoded block Ei is generated by

– Ei = ai,1*B1 + ai,2*B2 + … + ai,k*Bk

– ai,x : randomly chosen over the finite field• Any “k” linearly independent coded blocks can recover [B1

B2 … Bk] by matrix inversion• Network coding maximizes throughput and minimizes

delaya1,1=1

a1,2=0

Coded Block10E1

Coded Block11E2

Matrix Inversion

B110

B201

B1

B2

a2,1=1

a2,2=1

Network coding over the finite field GF(2)={0,1}

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Network Coding Helps Coupon Collection

C1 Sends Block 1

C3C2C1

C6C5C4

B1

B1

C3 Sends Block 2

B2

B2

C2 Sends a Coded Block: B1+B2

B1 B2B2

B1+B2

B1+B2B1+B2

B1

C5 Sends a Coded Block: B1+B2

B1+B2 B1+B2

B1+B2

B2 B1

C4 and C6 successfully recovered both blocks

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Previous Work: Cooperative Downloading with CarTorrent

Internet

Downloading Blocks from AP

Exchange Blocks via multi-hop pulling

G

RY

Y2

Gossiping Availability of Blocks

YY

Y

RRR

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CodeTorrent: Basic Idea

Internet

Downloading Coded Blocks from AP

Outside Range of AP

Buffer

BufferBuffer

Re-Encoding: Random Linear Comb.of Encoded Blocks in the Buffer

Exchange Re-Encoded Blocks

Meeting Other Vehicles with Coded Blocks

• Single-hop pulling (instead of CarTorrent multihop)

“coded” block

B1

File

: k b

lock

s

B2B3

Bk

+

*a1

*a2*a3

*ak

Random Linear Combination

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Design Rationale• Single-hop better than multihop

– Multi-hop data pulling does not perform well in VANET (routing O/H is high)

– Users in multi-hop may not forward packets not useful to them (lack of incentive)!

• Network coding– Mitigate a rare piece problem– Maximize the benefits of overhearing

• Exploits mobility – Carry-and-forward coded blocks

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FleaNet : A Virtual Market Place on Vehicular Networks

Uichin Lee, Joon-Sang Park Eyal Amir, Mario Gerla

Network Research Lab, Computer Science Dept., UCLA

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Advent of VANETs• Emerging VANET applications

– Safety driving (e.g., TrafficView)– Content distribution (e.g., CarTorrent/AdTorrent)– Vehicular sensors (e.g., MobEyes)

• What about commerce “on wheels”?

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Flea Market on VANETs

• Examples– A mobile user wants to sell “iPod Mini, 4G”– A road side store wants to advertise a special offer

• How to form a “virtual” market place using wireless communications among mobile users as well as pedestrians (including roadside stores)?

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Outline

• FleaNet architecture• FleaNet protocol design• Feasibility analysis• Simulation• Conclusions

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FleaNet Architecture-- System Components

• Vehicle-to-vehicle communications• Vehicle-to-infrastructure (ad-station) communications

Inter-vehic lecommunications

Private Adstation

Vehic le-to-adstationcommunications

* Roadside stores (e.g., a gas station)

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FleaNet Architecture -- Query Formats and Management

• Users express their interests using formatted queries– eBay-like category is provided

• E.g., Consumer Electronics/Mp3 Player/Apple iPod

• Query management– Query storage using a light weight DB (e.g., Berkeley DB)– Spatial/temporal queries– Process an incoming query to find matched queries (i.e.,

exact or approximate match)• E.g. Query(buy an iPod) Query(sell an iPod)

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FleaNet Protocol Design• FleaNet building blocks

– Query dissemination– Distributed query processing – Transaction notification

• Seller and buyer are notified• This requires routing in the VANET

• VANET challenges– Large scale, dense, and highly mobile

• Goal: designing “efficient, scalable, and non-interfering protocols” for VANETs

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Query Dissemination• Query dissemination exploiting vehicle mobility• Query “originator” periodically advertises its query to

1-hop neighbors– Vehicles “carry” received queries w/o further relaying

Q1

Q2

Q1

Q2

Yellow Car w/ Q1

Red Car w/ Q2

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Distributed Query Processing• Received query is processed to find a match of

interests– Eg. Q1 – buy iPod / QM – sell iPod / Q2 – buy Car

QM

QM

Q2

Q2

(1) Find a matching query for Q2

No match found

QM

LocalMatchQMQ1

(2) Send a match notification msg to the originator of query QM

Red car w/ Q2 & carries Q1

Cyan car w/ QM

Q1

(1) Find a matching query for QM

Found query Q1

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Transaction Notification• After seeing a match, use Last Encounter Routing

(LER) to notify seller/buyer– Forward a packet to the node with more “recent”

encounter

QM

LocalMatchQMQ1

Q1

Q1

Q1

Q1 T-1s

T-5s

T-10s

T

Encounter timestamp

Current Time: T

Originator of Q1

Cyan car

Red car

Blue car

Green carYellow carTRXRESP

TRXREQ

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FleaNet Latency

• Restricted mobility patterns are harmful to opportunistic data dissemination

• However, latency can be greatly improved by the popularity of queries

• Popularity distribution of 16,862 posting (make+model) in the vehicle ad section of Craigslist (Mar. 2006)

Freq

uenc

y (l

og)

Items (log)

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FleaNet Scalability• Assume that only the query originator can

“periodically” advertise a query to its neighbors• We are interested in link load• Load depends only on average number of neighbors

and advertisement period (not on network size)• Example:

– Parameter setting : R=250m, 1500B packet size, BW=11Mbps

– N=1,000 nodes in 2,400m x 2,400m (i.e., 90 nodes within one’s communication range)

– Advertisement period: 2 seconds– Worst case link utilization: < 4%

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Simulations• Ns-2 network simulator• 802.11b - 2Mbps, 250M radio

range• Two-ray ground reflection

model• “Track” mobility model

– Vehicles move in the 2400mx2400m Westwood area in the vicinity of the UCLA campus

• Metric– Average latency: time to find a

matched query of interest

Westwood area, 2400mx2400m

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Simulation Results

• Impact of density and speed

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

5 10 15 20 25

Average Speed (m/s)

Late

ncy

(S

eco

nd

s) N=100N=200N=300

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Simulation Results• Impact of query popularity

– Popularity: the fraction of users with the same interest– For a single buyer, increase the number of sellers (e.g., N=200/0.1 =

20 sellers)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25

Popularity

Late

ncy

(S

eco

nds)

N=100/V=5

N=100/V=25

N=300/V=5

N=300/V=25

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Simulation Results• Impact of ad-station location

– Given N=100, fix each node in its initial location, and set it as a “stationary” ad-station (as a buyer)

– measure the average latency to the remaining 99 mobile nodes (run 99 times, by taking turns as a seller: 1 buyer 1 seller)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91

Rank

Late

ncy

(S

eco

nds)

N=100/V=25m/s

avg. stationaryavg. mobile

Latency rank

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Epidemic Diffusion - Idea: Mobility-Assist Data Harvesting

Meta-Data Req

1. Agent (Police) harvestsMeta-Data from its neighbors

2. Nodes return all the meta-datathey have collected so far

Meta-Data Rep

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Threat Model and Security Requirements for VANET

applications

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The Threat Model

An attacker can be:• Insider / Outsider• Malicious / Rational• Active / Passive

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Attack 1 : Bogus traffic information

Attacker: insider, rational,active

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Attack 2 : Disruption of network operations

Attacker: insider, malicious,active

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Attack 3: Cheating with identity, speed, position

Attacker: insider, rational, active

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Attack 4: Jamming

Attacker: insider or outsider, malicious,active

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Attack 5: Tracking

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Security system requirements

Sender authenticationVerification of data consistencyAvailabilityNon-repudiationPrivacyReal-time constraints

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Security Architecture